Tewatt Air Compressor Applications

Succeed to American TEWATT hundred years’ of screw air compressor manufacturing technology, insist on the philosophy of serious, pragmatic and humanity, TEWATT devotes itself to provide worldwide users with excellent service and solutions. To provide durable driving force to the projects of mining, water well drilling,hydroelectric power, railway, highway, shipbuilding, oil and gas field, hole drilling,  municipal construction, military industry etc.

water well drilling

Water Well Drilling

♦  Well, geothermal industry generally use diesel portable air compressor, which demands large displacement, high pressure, moving frequently.
♦  Working conditions: most working locations are in the cold weather, higher altitude, and bad environment place.
♦  Air compressor displacement is generally from 21m3/min to 35m3/min, displacement from 18kg/cm2 to 35kg/cm2, drilling hole diameter between 100mm and 400mm.

mining industry

Mining Industry

♦ There are usually quarries, iron ore, copper, coal fields etc. in mine industry, mainly diesel portable air compressor are used for drilling and blasting.
♦ Working conditions: generally remote mountainous areas with high dusty and poor fuel quality. Cold weather in the north is longer, some of high altitude, common diesel engines are difficult to adapt.
♦ Air compressor used for smaller holes directional blasting usually with the discharge pressure of 10kg/cm2-14kg/cm2, displacement 21m3/min, this model is one machine with multi-drills, aperture diameter between 50-80mm. For large holes of mountain explosion, then the air compressor used will be of 24kg/cm2, 30m3/min, driving two sets of hydraulic drills of 115 -120mm, which can work with 1,000 meters of shale and 300 meters of limestone.

oil&gas field drilling

Oil and Gas Industry

♦ Subways, tunnels, bridges, utilities and other infrastructure construction industry demand air compressor with large displacement but not high pressure.

♦Some use the electric stationary model, electric portable model, and diesel portable air compressor, the exhaust pressure is between 8kg/cm2-18kg/cm2, displacement from 10m3/min-180m3/min.

♦ Heavy dust at the construction site, long continuous operation time, parallel operation needed frequently, as well as economy operation be required.

ship repair

Ship Repair

♦  Air compressor is mainly used for sand-blasting and pipe pressure test in Ship repair industry.
♦  Working conditions: general operations at the seaside, high humidity, strong corrosive, heavy dust, and demand of flexible mobility.
♦  Diesel portable air compressor is generally used with pressure from 8kg/cm2-12kg/cm2, displacement between 21m3/min-30m3/min.
♦ With fuel price rising all the time, many shipyard use electric air compressor instead, but they need to well plan the arrangement of the power cables.
♦ With extremely low temperatures in Winter in shipyard from North China, cold start of diesel engine is required, With high temperatures in Summer from Southern shipyard, high thermal performance is requirements to the air compressors.
♦ Shipyard has high requirements on the air compressor’s safety and environmental performance, too.


June 26, 2014

Dear Friends,

Teaching young people about investing tends to not have much lasting impact. I’ve been giving a lot of thought to this sad fact and how we might change it. Obviously, the first step is to offer classes, and the next is to make the information relevant, provoking conversation among students that they consider important.

The day this newsletter is sent to you, I will be speaking at the Master Financial Educator’s Conference at Olympic College, addressing 50 or more Washington State high school teachers who teach financial literacy as part of their curriculum.

The title of my keynote is “10 Life-changing investment lessons for high school students.” My focus is encouraging teachers to concentrate on 10 decisions students will make that will change their life, and find ways to excite them about the importance to their lives.

These lessons go far beyond financial education to life skills and learning how to make smart choices, as the life we create is based on the decisions we make at each fork in the road. Every decision is made with choices. As adults, we tend to make them intuitively, based on biases acquired over years; and they are often wrong. Young people, on the other hand, can have the advantage of being open and starting fresh to make good choices from the beginning.

For example, the first of the 10 lessons regarding finances is whether to spend or save. The students will make this decision millions of times in their life. Whether they choose to save or spend will change their future. We know this to be true, but what is the motivation to save when you’re 15 or 18 years old? How do you get young people to be excited about the difference between having accumulated $100,000 or $2 million when, from their teenage perspective, both are huge sums?

When working directly with students, I ask them to make list of the people who want them to save for the future. Why do they want you to save? The list inevitably includes those nearest and dearest (normally mom, dad, grandma and grandpa), and the answer, “because they love me and want me to have the best life possible.” Then I ask them to list the people who want them to spend. Why do they want you to spend? The answers are obvious, and have nothing to do with love or concern for you.

We say we want our children to save, but are we setting that role model? My sense is that if they can see how this works for those who love them, if they can be motivated by love, and if they can understand why saving is important to their future, such lessons in investing will have a long and lasting impact.

If you have a young person in your life – or are getting started on investing no matter what age! – I invite you to visit  my website and get your free copy of “First-Time Investor: Grow and Protect Your Money.

To your success,

The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
During a bit of downtime on a cruise in Italy this spring, I had a chance to revisit one of my favorite topics: The astounding long-term benefits of small-cap value investing.

How to Invest Like a Rich Guy
From time to time over the years I’ve been invited to talk to high-school students about financial matters. I always enjoy this opportunity to learn from them and – I hope – teach them some important things.


Quantum Questions

Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists

Publisher: Shambhala
Here is a collection of writings that bridges the gap between science and religion. Quantum Questions collects the mystical writings of each of the major physicists involved in the discovery of quantum physics and relativity, including Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Max Planck. The selections are written in nontechnical language and will be of interest to scientists and nonscientists alike.


Call today: (941) 586-0929

Alcohol Abuse – Special Issues for Adolescent Girls

While it’s true that men are more likely to drink alcohol and more likely to drink greater amounts, women have a higher risk of developing problems from alcohol consumption. When a woman drinks, the alcohol in her bloodstream typically reaches a higher level than a man’s even if both are drinking the same amount. This is because women’s bodies generally have less water than men’s bodies. Because alcohol mixes with body water, a given amount of alcohol is less diluted in a woman’s body than in a man’s. Women become more impaired by alcohol’s effects and are more susceptible to alcohol–related organ damage. That is, women develop damage at lower levels of consumption over a shorter period of time.

Considering that about one–third of American women report regular alcohol consumption and 2.3 percent, or 2.5 million women, meet the criteria for alcohol dependence, it is clear that research to better understand the effects of alcohol in women is critical. This issue of Alcohol Alert summarizes some of the most practical implications for women across the lifespan to come from that research.

Results from national surveys show that alcohol use is prevalent among both adolescents and young adults. And while heavy drinking remains more common among young men, the rate of alcohol abuse in adolescent girls is alarmingly high.

Adolescence is a critical stage of development. Rapidly changing body systems may be especially vulnerable to alcohol’s effects. Drinking during this time of accelerated brain and hormonal maturation may have long–term consequences.

During adolescence, striking physical changes occur in the brain. The prefrontal cortex, the brain region thought to be involved in various goal–directed behaviors, undergoes substantial changes. The amygdala, the brain structure believed to be involved in a person’s emotional reactions and coordinating the body’s response to stress, also undergoes developmental changes. Changes in these systems have a powerful effect on adolescent psychological functioning and behavior. As a result, some adolescents may be more likely to engage in risk–taking behaviors, such as experimenting with alcohol and other drugs.

In adolescents with significant alcohol use problems, the volume of the hippocampus, a brain region important for learning and memory, has been found to be significantly smaller than in control subjects. Limited research suggests that women may be more susceptible than men to shrinkage of brain regions. Whether this is true in adolescent girls is not yet known.

Adolescence is a time of dramatic changes in hormone levels and patterns. Gender differences in the body’s hormonal response to stress also begin to emerge. Some girls may be at particular risk for emotional difficulties, depression, and problems with self–image as well as an increase in risk–taking behaviors. In addition, during early adolescence, girls may be especially vulnerable to stress. Levels of perceived stress have been found to be the most powerful predictor of alcohol and other drug use, after peer substance use.

Finally, evidence from animal studies suggests that alcohol may affect adolescents differently than adults. Adolescents do not become as uncoordinated or sleepy when drinking alcohol as adults do. Adolescents do, however, appear to be more sensitive to alcohol–induced disruptions in certain types of memory. Clearly, more research is needed to explain how gender differences may influence the way alcohol affects the developing adolescent brain and other body systems. What is known, however, is that the younger a person begins drinking, the more likely he or she is to develop a problem with alcohol later in life.

This information is from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism website.


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Dy ( Dysprosium )

 Dysprosium is relatively stable in air at room temperature, and is readily attacked by acids. It is soft enough to be cut with a knife.

Nama lain (trademark, branding etc.)

 Dysprosium, Dysprosium, Disprozij, Dysprosium -s, Disprosio, Диспроэий,

Spesifikasi Produk

Overview of Dysprosium Atomic Number 66 Period 6 Series Lanthanides Relative Atomic Mass (12C=12.000)  162.5 Boiling Point:  2835K 2562°C 4644°F Melting Point:  1685K 1412°C 2574°F Density/kg m-3  8550 (293K) Ground State Electron Configuration  [Xe]4f106s2 Electron Affinity(M-M-)/kJ mol-1  not available Discoverer P.-E. Lecoq de Boisbaudran  Discovery Location Paris, France. Discovery Year 1886 Name Origin Greek: dysprositos (hard to get at).

Dysprosium has not yet found many applications. However, it has a high thermal neutron absorption cross-section and a high melting point, and so it may be useful in nuclear control alloys. A dysprosium oxide-nickel cement is used in nuclear reactor control rods, and has the property of absorbing neutrons readily without swelling or contracting under prolonged neutron bombardment.

Bahan Baku

Dysprosium is a chemical element with the symbol Dy and atomic number 66. It is a rare earth element with a metallic silver luster. Dysprosium is never found in nature as a free element, though it is found in various minerals, such as xenotime.

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Produk terkait

    Dysprosium metal is typically prepared by calciothermic reduction of the trihalide, typically DyF3. Although its melting point is similar to Y, Gd, Tb, and Lu, its vapor pressure at the melting point is much higher. This makes purification of Dy, and similar elements Sc, Ho, and Er with high vapor pressures, comparatively easy. Common interstitial impurities which form stable compounds with nitrogen, carbon, and oxygen remain in the residue when the metal is sublimed at 1175 °C at a slow rate.1 Dysprosium metal is formed when the fluoride preferentially separates from dysprosium fluoride at high-temperature and combines with calcium metal forming calcium fluoride and deposits a high-purity dysprosium metal.
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Literary Birthday - 28 May - Ian Fleming

Happy Birthday, Ian Fleming, born 28 May 1908, died 12 August 1964

FIve Quotes

  2. A woman can put up with almost anything; anything but indifference.
  4. I always make it a rule never to look back. Otherwise, I’d ask myself how I could write such piffle and live with myself, day after day.
  5. You only live twice: Once when you’re born. And once when you look death in the face.

Fleming was an English author, journalist and naval intelligence officer. Although he was best known for his James Bond series of spy novels, he also wrote the children’s story Chitty-Chitty-Bang-Bang. In 2008, The Times ranked Fleming 14th on its list of ‘The 50 greatest British writers since 1945’.

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Writers Write - Write to communicate


How Neurofeedback works | What Exactly is EEG Biofeedback ?

How Does Neurofeedback Work ?

Brain activity - tiny electrical signals Neurofeedback works by ‘holding a mirror up to the the brain’ to give it feedback on how well it is working. In this way the brain can literally be ‘trained’ to work better. The idea that the brain can change comes from Neuroplasticity; it is now accepted by science that not only can the brain change over time, but that this is an essential part of the process of human evolution and this is how some mental health disorders are acquired. The learning method comes from the concept of ‘classical conditioning’, discovered many years ago, that unconscious behaviour can be learned by rewarding it. The feedback is delivered to the brain via the eyes and ears through video. When the brain is working well our technology causes the video to go faster, louder or bigger. As the client relaxes, the brain ‘tunes in’ to this feedback and adjusts in response. It is this positive reinforcement in the form of sensory feedback that trains the brain to correct any irregular behaviour it may have been exhibiting. Our technology measures brain activity by observing tiny electrical signals (known as brain waves) to assess how well the brain is performing. Slide1 The technical name for this is electroencephalography, or EEG, but can be thought of simply as a kind of ‘stethoscope’ to see or listen to the brainwaves. Sophisticated computer technology assesses these raw brainwaves and that data is used to provide direct feedback to the brain on how well it is functioning, using video software. The feedback can be provided by video games, or documentaries or music videos. For younger clients a cuddly bear that vibrates can be used to give extra sensory feedback. The good news is the client does not have to think, this all happens subconsciously – so the treatment works for very young children as well as adults. The client just needs to relax and let the brain use its own ability to self-regulate. The feedback itself is very simple and always has been: originally it was a red or green light; these days the feedback is still very simple but is presented in more sophisticated and engaging ways – for example the speed of the rocket, the speed of the car, or the size of the picture. Obtaining information directly from the brain and providing feedback straight back via the senses, in real time, is what makes Neurofeedback unique and so successful. Additionally, Neurofeedback is completely safe; there is no surgery, no medication and no side effects whatsoever. In the video below, Charlotte Keizer explains how Neurofeedback works:

To find out more please call BrainTrainUK today on 0207 118 0887.

Does Neurofeedback have a history of success or is this a new treatment?

To read more about this, please read the next page on The BrainTrainUK Programme.

Google+ BrainTrainUK


Failure = The Imaginary Monster Under Your Bed

You can’t fail.

I’m serious.

But it’s true.

Plenty of self-help authors and their acolytes say otherwise.  They acknowledge failure as an essential part of the success process.  They pay it lip service and prop it up with sayings like “failure’s the mother of success.”

There’s another way to look at it.  A better perspective.  Once I adopted it, it’s allowed me to work past resistance and plenty of misgivings about not wanting to “fail.”

And that way is this:

Failure is a concept created in our minds.  It’s an intangible thing, though we give it respect like it was an external law of nature.

Humans are the only silly species that worry about or even comprehend the notion of “failure.” (credit to Eben Pagan for articulating this concept so concisely).

If a lion goes hunting and the gazelle she chases escapes, does she hang her head because she “failed?”  Does this “failure” prevent her from chasing down another gazelle at the next possible opportunity?  Does it make her overanalyze or become timid?

You can't fail...

Do you think she’s worried about “failing?”

The entire idea is ridiculous.

The lion accepts that the first hunt didn’t go the way she wanted.  Then she goes out and does what she needs to do (making adjustments if needed) to accomplish her objective.

There are simply hits and misses.  Things that worked and didn’t work.  “Failure” isn’t part of the equation.

When you realize how silly the concept of failure is, it loses its mysterious hold over you.  There’s less room for analysis paralysis and worrying about being perfect.

You act, see if what you did accomplished your goal, adjust when you need to, and keep acting until it works.

The stuff that doesn’t work along the way is also the stuff that teaches you what it takes to be the best in business.  You’re more receptive to those lessons when you aren’t beating yourself up about “failing.”

So, there you have it.  Action, and one of two results: hits, or essential lessons.

Take “failure” out of your mind, and you literally can’t lose.

P.S. If you’ve got a new ad or marketing campaign in the pipe and you want to win big, get in touch and let’s talk about how we can make it happen.


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Mathematical Physics (math-ph) updates on the e-print archive

Published: 2017-09-21T20:30:00-05:00

Organizing symmetry-protected topological phases by layering and symmetry forgetting: a minimalist perspective. (arXiv:1709.06998v1 [cond-mat.str-el])

It is demonstrated that fermionic/bosonic symmetry-protected topological (SPT) phases across different dimensions and symmetry classes can be organized using geometric constructions that increase dimensions and symmetry-forgetting maps that change symmetry groups. Specifically, it is shown that the interacting classifications of SPT phases with and without glide symmetry fit into a short exact sequence, so that the classification with glide is constrained to be a direct sum of cyclic groups of order 2 or 4. Applied to fermionic SPT phases in the Wigner-Dyson class AII, this implies that the complete interacting classification in the presence of glide is ${\mathbb Z}_4{\oplus}{\mathbb Z}_2{\oplus}{\mathbb Z}_2$ in 3 dimensions. In particular, the hourglass-fermion phase recently realized in the band insulator KHgSb must be robust to interactions. Generalizations to spatiotemporal glide symmetries are discussed.

First and second-order relativistic corrections to the two and higher-dimensional isotropic harmonic oscillator obeying the spinless Salpeter equation. (arXiv:1709.07059v1 [quant-ph])

We study the relativistic version of the $d$-dimensional isotropic quantum harmonic oscillator based on the spinless Salpeter equation. This has no exact analytical solutions. We use perturbation theory to obtain compact formulas for the first and second-order relativistic corrections; they are expressed in terms of two quantum numbers and the spatial dimension $d$. The formula for the first-order correction is obtained using two different methods and we illustrate how this correction splits the original energy into a number of distinct levels each with their own degeneracy. Previous authors obtained results in one and three dimensions and our general formulas reduce to them when $d=1$ and $d=3$ respectively. Our two-dimensional results are novel and we provide an example that illustrates why two dimensions is of physical interest. We also obtain results for the two-dimensional case using a completely independent method that employs ladder operators in polar coordinates. In total, three methods are used in this work and the results all agree.

Entanglement and quantum state geometry of spin system with long-range Ising-type interaction. (arXiv:1709.07067v1 [quant-ph])

The evolution of $N$ spin-$1/2$ system with long-range Ising-type interaction is considered. For this system we study the entanglement of one spin with the rest spins. It is shown that the entanglement depends on the amount of spins and the initial state. Also the geometry of manifold which contains entangled states is obtained. Finally we find the dependence of entanglement on the scalar curvature of manifold and examine it for different number of spins in the system.

A Mathematical Aspect of Hohenberg-Kohn Theorem. (arXiv:1709.07118v1 [physics.chem-ph])

The Hohenberg-Kohn theorem plays a fundamental role in density functional theory, which has become a basic tool for the study of electronic structure of matter. In this article, we study the Hohenberg-Kohn theorem for a class of external potentials based on a unique continuation principle.

The k-tacnode process. (arXiv:1709.07141v1 [math.PR])

The tacnode process is a universal behavior arising in nonintersecting particle systems and tiling problems. For Dyson Brownian bridges, the tacnode process describes the grazing collision of two packets of walkers. We consider such a Dyson sea on the unit circle with drift. For any integer k, we show that an appropriate double scaling of the drift and return time leads to a generalization of the tacnode process in which k particles are expected to wrap around the circle. We derive winding number probabilities and an expression for the correlation kernel in terms of functions related to the generalized Hastings-McLeod solutions to the inhomogeneous Painleve-II equation. The method of proof is asymptotic analysis of discrete orthogonal polynomials with a complex weight.

Lens elliptic gamma function solution of the Yang-Baxter equation at roots of unity. (arXiv:1709.07148v1 [math-ph])

We study the root of unity limit of the lens elliptic gamma function solution of the star-triangle relation, for an integrable model with continuous and discrete spin variables. This limit involves taking an elliptic nome to a primitive $rN$-th root of unity, where $r$ is an existing integer parameter of the lens elliptic gamma function, and $N$ is an additional integer parameter. This is a singular limit of the star-triangle relation, and at subleading order of an asymptotic expansion, another star-triangle relation is obtained for a model with discrete spin variables in $\mathbb{Z}_{rN}$. Some special choices of solutions of equation of motion are shown to result in well-known discrete spin solutions of the star-triangle relation. The saddle point equations themselves are identified with three-leg forms of "3D-consistent" classical discrete integrable equations, known as $Q4$ and $Q3_{(\delta=0)}$. We also comment on the implications for supersymmetric gauge theories, and in particular comment on a close parallel with the works of Nekrasov and Shatashvili.

On Composite Quantum Hypothesis Testing. (arXiv:1709.07268v1 [quant-ph])

We extend quantum Stein's lemma in asymmetric quantum hypothesis testing to composite null and alternative hypotheses. As our main result, we show that the asymptotic error exponent for testing convex combinations of quantum states $\rho^{\otimes n}$ against convex combinations of quantum states $\sigma^{\otimes n}$ is given by a regularized quantum relative entropy distance formula. We prove that in general such a regularization is needed but also discuss various settings where our formula as well as extensions thereof become single-letter. This includes a novel operational interpretation of the relative entropy of coherence in terms of hypothesis testing. For our proof, we start from the composite Stein's lemma for classical probability distributions and lift the result to the non-commutative setting by only using elementary properties of quantum entropy. Finally, our findings also imply an improved Markov type lower bound on the quantum conditional mutual information in terms of the regularized quantum relative entropy - featuring an explicit and universal recovery map.

Drinfeld-Sokolov hierarchies, tau functions, and generalized Schur polynomials. (arXiv:1709.07309v1 [math-ph])

For a simple Lie algebra $\mathfrak{g}$ and an irreducible faithful representation $\pi$ of $\mathfrak{g}$, we introduce the Schur polynomials of $(\mathfrak{g},\pi)$-type. We then derive the Sato-Zhou type formula for tau functions of the Drinfeld-Sokolov (DS) hierarchy of $\mathfrak{g}$-type. Namely, we show that the tau functions are linear combinations of the Schur polynomials of $(\mathfrak{g},\pi)$-type with the coefficients being the Pl\"ucker coordinates. As an application, we provide a way of computing polynomial tau functions for the DS hierarchy. For $\mathfrak{g}$ of low rank, we give several examples of polynomial tau functions, and use them to detect bilinear equations for the DS hierarchy.

The generating function for the Bessel point process and a system of coupled Painlev\'{e} V equations. (arXiv:1709.07365v1 [math-ph])

We study the joint probability generating function for $k$ occupancy numbers on disjoint intervals in the Bessel point process. This generating function can be expressed as a Fredholm determinant. We obtain an expression for it in terms of a system of coupled Painlev\'{e} V equations, which are derived from a Lax pair of a Riemann-Hilbert problem. This generalizes a result of Tracy and Widom [23], which corresponds to the case $k = 1$. We also provide some examples and applications. In particular, several relevant quantities can be expressed in terms of the generating function, like the gap probability on a union of disjoint bounded intervals, the gap between the two smallest particles, and large $n$ asymptotics for $n\times n$ Hankel determinants with a Laguerre weight possessing several jumps discontinuities near the hard edge.

A New Large N Expansion for General Matrix-Tensor Models. (arXiv:1709.07366v1 [hep-th])

We define a new large $N$ limit for general $\text{O}(N)^{R}$ or $\text{U}(N)^{R}$ invariant tensor models, based on an enhanced large $N$ scaling of the coupling constants. The resulting large $N$ expansion is organized in terms of a half-integer associated with Feynman graphs that we call the index. This index has a natural interpretation in terms of the many matrix models embedded in the tensor model. Our new scaling can be shown to be optimal for a wide class of non-melonic interactions, which includes all the maximally single-trace terms. Our construction allows to define a new large $D$ expansion of the sum over diagrams of fixed genus in matrix models with an additional $\text{O}(D)^{r}$ global symmetry. When the interaction is the complete vertex of order $R+1$, we identify in detail the leading order graphs for $R$ a prime number. This slightly surprising condition is equivalent to the complete interaction being maximally single-trace.

Completeness of the Six Vertex Model with Reflecting Boundary Conditions. (arXiv:1709.07416v1 [nlin.SI])

In this note, we prove the completeness of Bethe vectors for the six vertex model with diagonal reflecting boundary conditions. We show that as inhomogeneity parameters get sent to infinity in a successive order the Bethe vectors give a complete basis of the space of states.

Relating relative entropy, optimal transport and Fisher information: a quantum HWI inequality. (arXiv:1709.07437v1 [quant-ph])

Quantum Markov semigroups characterize the time evolution of an important class of open quantum systems. Studying convergence properties of such a semigroup, and determining concentration properties of its invariant state, have been the focus of much research. Quantum versions of functional inequalities (like the modified logarithmic Sobolev and Poincar\'{e} inequalities) and the so-called transportation cost inequalities, have proved to be essential for this purpose. Classical functional and transportation cost inequalities are seen to arise from a single geometric inequality, called the Ricci lower bound, via an inequality which interpolates between them. The latter is called the HWI-inequality, where the letters I, W and H are, respectively, acronyms for the Fisher information (arising in the modified logarithmic Sobolev inequality), the so-called Wasserstein distance (arising in the transportation cost inequality) and the relative entropy (or Boltzmann H function) arising in both. Hence, classically, all the above inequalities and the implications between them form a remarkable picture which relates elements from diverse mathematical fields, such as Riemannian geometry, information theory, optimal transport theory, Markov processes, concentration of measure, and convexity theory. Here we consider a quantum version of the Ricci lower bound introduced by Carlen and Maas, and prove that it implies a quantum HWI inequality from which the quantum functional and transportation cost inequalities follow. Our results hence establish that the unifying picture of the classical setting carries over to the quantum one.

Would Two Dimensions be World Enough for Spacetime?. (arXiv:1709.07438v1 [physics.hist-ph])

We consider various curious features of general relativity, and relativistic field theory, in two spacetime dimensions. In particular, we discuss: the vanishing of the Einstein tensor; the failure of an initial-value formulation for vacuum spacetimes; the status of singularity theorems; the non-existence of a Newtonian limit; the status of the cosmological constant; and the character of matter fields, including perfect fluids and electromagnetic fields. We conclude with a discussion of what constrains our understanding of physics in different dimensions.

Inverse problems for Lorentzian manifolds and non-linear hyperbolic equations. (arXiv:1405.3386v4 [math.DG] UPDATED)

We study two inverse problems on a globally hyperbolic Lorentzian manifold $(M,g)$. The problems are:

1. Passive observations in spacetime: Consider observations in a neighborhood $V\subset M$ of a time-like geodesic $\mu$. Under natural causality conditions, we reconstruct the conformal type of the unknown open, relatively compact set $W\subset M$, when we are given $V$, the conformal class of $g|_V$, and the light observations sets $P_V(q)$ corresponding to all source points $q$ in $W$. The light observation set $P_V(q)$ is the intersection of $V$ and the light-cone emanating from the point $q$, i.e., the points in the set $V$ where light from a point source at $q$ is observed.

2. Active measurements in spacetime: We develop a new method for inverse problems for non-linear hyperbolic equations that utilizes the non-linearity as a tool. This enables us to solve inverse problems for non-linear equations for which the corresponding problems for linear equations are still unsolved. To illustrate this method, we solve an inverse problem for semilinear wave equations with quadratic non-linearities. We assume that we are given the neighborhood $V$ of the time-like geodesic $\mu$ and the source-to-solution operator that maps the source supported on $V$ to the restriction of the solution of the wave equation in $V$. When $M$ is 4-dimensional, we show that these data determine the topological, differentiable, and conformal structures of the spacetime in the maximal set where waves can propagate from $\mu$ and return back to $\mu$.

Massey products in differential cohomology via stacks. (arXiv:1510.06366v3 [math.AT] UPDATED)

We extend Massey products from cohomology to differential cohomology via stacks, organizing and generalizing existing constructions in Deligne cohomology. We study the properties and show how they are related to more classical Massey products in de Rham, singular, and Deligne cohomology. The setting and the algebraic machinery via stacks allow for computations and make the construction well-suited for applications. We illustrate with several examples from differential geometry and mathematical physics.

Primary operations in differential cohomology. (arXiv:1604.05988v3 [math.AT] UPDATED)

We characterize primary operations in differential cohomology via stacks, and illustrate by differentially refining Steenrod squares and Steenrod powers explicitly. This requires a delicate interplay between integral, rational, and mod p cohomology, as well as cohomology with U(1) coefficients and differential forms. Along the way we develop computational techniques in differential cohomology, including a K\"unneth decomposition, that should also be useful in their own right, and point to applications to higher geometry and mathematical physics.

Gross-Pitaevskii Dynamics for Bose-Einstein Condensates. (arXiv:1702.05625v3 [math-ph] UPDATED)

We study the time-evolution of initially trapped Bose-Einstein condensates in the Gross-Pitaevskii regime. Under a physically motivated assumption on the energy of the initial data, we show that condensation is preserved by the many-body evolution and that the dynamics of the condensate wave function can be described by the time-dependent Gross-Pitaevskii equation. With respect to previous works, we provide optimal bounds on the rate of condensation (i.e. on the number of excitations of the Bose-Einstein condensate). To reach this goal, we combine the method of \cite{LNS}, where fluctuations around the Hartree dynamics for $N$-particle initial data in the mean-field regime have been analyzed, with ideas from \cite{BDS}, where the evolution of Fock-space initial data in the Gross-Pitaevskii regime has been considered.

On Blow-up Profile of Ground States of Boson Stars with External Potential. (arXiv:1703.10324v3 [math-ph] UPDATED)

We study minimizers of the pseudo-relativistic Hartree functional $$\mathcal{E}_{a}(u):=\|(-\Delta+m^{2})^{1/4}u\|_{L^{2}}^{2}-\frac{a}{2}\int_{\mathbb{R}^{3}}(\left|\cdot\right|^{-1}\star |u|^{2})(x)|u(x)|^{2}{\rm d}x+\int_{\mathbb{R}^{3}}V(x)|u(x)|^{2}{\rm d}x$$ under the mass constraint $\int_{\mathbb{R}^3}|u(x)|^2{\rm d}x=1$. Here $m>0$ is the mass of particles and $V\geq 0$ is an external potential. We prove that minimizers exist if and only if $a$ satisfies $0\leq a

V(x)=||x|-1|^p$ for some $p>0$.

Maximum and minimum entropy states yielding local continuity bounds. (arXiv:1706.02212v2 [quant-ph] UPDATED)

Given an arbitrary quantum state ($\sigma$), we obtain an explicit construction of a state $\rho^*_\varepsilon(\sigma)$ (resp. $\rho_{*,\varepsilon}(\sigma)$) which has the maximum (resp. minimum) entropy among all states which lie in a specified neighbourhood ($\varepsilon$-ball) of $\sigma$. Computing the entropy of these states leads to a local strengthening of the continuity bound of the von Neumann entropy, i.e., the Audenaert-Fannes inequality. Our bound is local in the sense that it depends on the spectrum of $\sigma$. The states $\rho^*_\varepsilon(\sigma)$ and $\rho_{*,\varepsilon}(\sigma)$ depend only on the geometry of the $\varepsilon$-ball and are in fact optimizers for a larger class of entropies. These include the R\'enyi entropy and the min- and max- entropies. This allows us to obtain local continuity bounds for these quantities as well. In obtaining this bound, we first derive a more general result which may be of independent interest, namely a necessary and sufficient condition under which a state maximizes a concave and G\^ateaux-differentiable function in an $\varepsilon$-ball around a given state $\sigma$. Examples of such a function include the von Neumann entropy, and the conditional entropy of bipartite states. Our proofs employ tools from the theory of convex optimization under non-differentiable constraints, in particular Fermat's Rule, and majorization theory.

Asymptotics of free fermions in a quadratic well at finite temperature and the Moshe-Neuberger-Shapiro random matrix model. (arXiv:1706.06653v2 [math-ph] UPDATED)

We derive the local statistics of the canonical ensemble of free fermions in a quadratic potential well at finite temperature, as the particle number approaches infinity. This free fermion model is equivalent to a random matrix model proposed by Moshe, Neuberger and Shapiro. Limiting behaviors obtained before for the grand canonical ensemble are observed in the canonical ensemble: We have at the edge the phase transition from the Tracy--Widom distribution to the Gumbel distribution via the Kardar-Parisi-Zhang (KPZ) crossover distribution, and in the bulk the phase transition from the sine point process to the Poisson point process. A similarity between this model and a class of models in the KPZ universality class is explained. We also derive the multi-time correlation functions and the multi-time gap probability formulas for the free fermions along the imaginary time.

Beltrami vector fields with an icosahedral symmetry. (arXiv:1706.09295v4 [math.DG] UPDATED)

A vector field is called a Beltrami vector field, if $B\times(\nabla\times B)=0$. In this paper we construct two unique Beltrami vector fields $\mathfrak{I}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}$, such that $\nabla\times\mathfrak{I}=\mathfrak{I}$, $\nabla\times\mathfrak{Y}=\mathfrak{Y}$, and such that both have an orientation-preserving icosahedral symmetry. Both of them have an additional symmetry with respect to a non-trivial automorphism of the number field $\mathbb{Q}(\,\sqrt{5}\,)$.

Ground-states for the liquid drop and TFDW models with long-range attraction. (arXiv:1707.06674v2 [math.AP] UPDATED)

We prove that both the liquid drop model in $\mathbb{R}^3$ with an attractive background nucleus and the Thomas-Fermi-Dirac-von Weizs\"{a}cker (TFDW) model attain their ground-states \emph{for all} masses as long as the external potential $V(x)$ in these models is of long range, that is, it decays slower than Newtonian (e.g., $V(x)\gg |x|^{-1}$ for large $|x|$.) For the TFDW model we adapt classical concentration-compactness arguments by Lions, whereas for the liquid drop model with background attraction we utilize a recent compactness result for sets of finite perimeter by Frank and Lieb.

On the supersymmetric $N=1$ and $N=(1,1)$ spectral data : A multiplicativity property. (arXiv:1708.03104v2 [math.OA] UPDATED)

We show that there are six different choice of tensor product of supersymmetric N=(1,1) spectral data in the context of supersymmetric quantum theory and noncommutative geometry. We also show that the procedure of extending a supersymmetric N=1 spectral data to N=(1,1) spectral data respects only one tensor product among these. We refer this as the multiplicativity property of the extension procedure. Therefore, if we demand that the extension procedure is multiplicative then there is a unique choice of tensor product of N=(1,1) spectral data.

Light Deflection and Gauss-Bonnet Theorem: Definition of Total Deflection Angle and its Applications. (arXiv:1708.04011v2 [gr-qc] UPDATED)

In this paper, we re-examine the light deflection in the Schwarzschild and the Schwarzschild-de Sitter spacetime. First, supposing a static and spherically symmetric spacetime, we propose the definition of the total deflection angle $\alpha$ of the light ray by constructing a quadrilateral $\Sigma^4$ on the optical reference geometry ${\cal M}^{\rm opt}$ determined by the optical metric $\bar{g}_{ij}$. On the basis of the definition of the total deflection angle $\alpha$ and the Gauss-Bonnet theorem, we derive two formulas to calculate the total deflection angle $\alpha$; (1) the angular formula that uses four angles determined on the optical reference geometry ${\cal M}^{\rm opt}$ or the curved $(r, \phi)$ subspace ${\cal M}^{\rm sub}$ being a slice of constant time $t$ and (2) the integral formula on the optical reference geometry ${\cal M}^{\rm opt}$ which is the areal integral of the Gaussian curvature $K$ in the area of a quadrilateral $\Sigma^4$ and the line integral of the geodesic curvature $\kappa_g$ along the curve $C_{\Gamma}$. The curve $C_{\Gamma}$ is the unperturbed reference line that is the null geodesic $\Gamma$ on the background spacetime such as the Minkowski or the de Sitter spacetime. We demonstrate that the two formulas give the same total deflection angle $\alpha$ for the Schwarzschild and the Schwarzschild-de Sitter spacetime. In particular, in the Schwarzschild case, the result coincides with Epstein-Shapiro's formula when the source $S$ and the receiver $R$ of the light ray are located at infinity. In addition, in the Schwarzschild-de Sitter case, there appear order ${\cal O}(\Lambda m)$ terms in addition to the Schwarzschild-like part, while order ${\cal O}(\Lambda)$ terms disappear.


Tag: Security

How does linking your Aadhaar to your bank account destroy the banking system?

benami money laundering aadhaar bank account

Linking Aadhaar to bank accounts is a recipe for creating benami[2] bank accounts and scaling benami bank transactions. It threatens to destroy your bank accounts and destroy the country’s banking system. It’s devastating that the integrity of banking processes is being destroyed by dividing, outsourcing and privatising processes integral to core banking so that they become the responsibility of no one.

A Digital India with no interest in fixing serious security flaws profile at HackerOne

The government of India doesn’t seem to be interested in getting security vulnerabilities fixed. A CS engineer, Bhavyanshu Parasher, has been spending his time understanding the current security standards deployed by the government of India in most of its data-critical apps and websites. Last year, in September, he disclosed a security flaw in Prime Minster …


Social and Philosophical pillars

Together we have it all

As it was already mentioned main idea of my game is that it is going to be crowdsourcing. So it is all about participation and contribution. This has a lot to do with social and philosophical pillars of sustainability.

Social and philosophical sustainability are less defined and less discussed then environmental and economical ones. Though, as for my mind, they are not least important. We can define social sustainability as the ability of a community to develop processes and structures which not only meet the needs of its current members but also support the ability of future generations to maintain a healthy community.

Nobel Laureat Amartya Sen gives the following dimensions for social sustainability:

  • Equity – the community provides equitable opportunities and outcomes for all its members, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable members of the community
  • Diversity – the community promotes and encourages diversity
  • Interconnected/Social cohesions – the community provides processes, systems and structures that promote connectedness within and outside the community at the formal, informal and institutional level
  • Democracy and governance – the community provides democratic processes and open and accountable governance structures.

Let’s see how this corresponds with crowdsourcing games. From the definition it follows that a lot of people are involved in this process, and they all are from different layers of society. And doesn’t make any difference on how rich the person is, his or her abilities to participate  in this project are always equal. The more diverse participators would be, the better is the result. To build AI later on in is needed to have as much different results as possible. Only this may help to make the AI more human – alike.

It is really important, that once launched, this system can live on its own.

To achieve social and philosophical aspects of sustainability it is needed to understand needs of everybody, who is involved in a project. This can be done through analyzing motivation factors.

trait perspective: individual stable motives (achievement motive, need for power, need for affiliation). So, in the project achievements and success would be emphasized, by usage of leaderboards and badges. This project will be a competition, with several winners. So, it would engage players with strong achievement motive mostly. It is important to make a belief around this ‘game.

behaviorist learning perspective: results from past positive and negative reinforcements, which influence the probability of future behavior. ‘Players’ would be motivated by fast feedback – evaluation of their results by other users.

perspective of self – determination: focuses on social – contextual conditions. Players would experience both autonomy and social relatedness.

perspective of interest: individual preferences and content aspects.

And as these processes have to be mutual, every person involved in a project should take care about 2 things:

  • First, do no harm—In what ways are we undermining these needs for our stakeholders?
  • Second, make a positive difference—How can we contribute to meeting these needs in a sustainable way?

Also, speaking about these aspects of sustainability we shouldn’t forget about cons of using gamification and crowdsourcing science.

First of all, motivation factors, described above, should be achieved successfully. Otherwise, there is a risk that somebody wouldn’t be fair enough or wouldn’t take the participation in the project seriously enough. And so, his / her results wouldn’t be correct and can be really harmful for the statistics and the project.

And is it all good about gamification? Some scientists think that it blurs boundaries between virtuality and reality. So, for example, when used a lot in studying, students may not realize danger of chemicals or electrostatics because their only experience in using them has been in simulations online. And similar examples may be found in different spheres of life.

But what is even more dangerous, is that it leads to overstimulation or game play addiction. And as a result, people do not have enough stimulus to do something, what is not gamified and can manage their time poorly, based mostly on the will to achieve new level, and not to complete the task which was gamified.


todo o material postado no blog pode ser encontrado na internet

Dining Etiquette Subtleties In Different Countries

There’s no question that there are some major cultural differences between countries and regions, and dining etiquette is no exception. However, it can get pretty complicated and confusing if you’re all set to travel from one side of the world to the other. Here are a few infographics created by with essential dining etiquette tips that you should bear in mind in different countries.

From giving tips to bill splitting and from eating manners to the sounds you make (or don’t make) while you eat, almost every country has something that can surprise or bewilder tourists. However, many of these dos and don’ts originate from old traditions, and the modern etiquette rules in these countries may be less rigid. Feel free to leave comments with your insights on whether, considering your own experience, you feel that these infographics are correct.

Source: | (via:

MikeLiveira's Space on Tumblr


This documentation is archived and is not being maintained.

Microsoft Specific

Selects two specific double-precision, floating-point values from a and b, based on the mask i.

__m128d _mm_shuffle_pd (__m128d a, __m128d b, int i);

The mask must be an immediate. See Macro Function for Shuffle Using Streaming SIMD Extensions 2 Instructions section for a description of the shuffle semantics.

Header: emmintrin.h

END Microsoft Specific


Tag Archives: geopolitics

On Zbigniew Brzezinski: Geopolitical Mastermind, Realist Practitioner

3 Jun

Personal Prelude

Brzezinski versus Kissinger

Post-Cold War Geopolitics: A Eurasian Scenario

Late Brzezinski Foreign Policy Positions

Alternate Worldviews: Davutoğlu, Kissinger, Xi Jinping

25 May

[Prefatory Note: This post is a much modified version of a shorter
opinion piece published by the global-e online publication on May 18, 2017. It is a response to and commentary upon an essay of Ahmet
ğlu, former foreign minister and prime minister of Turkey, published under the title ‘Response to Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “The Future of National and Global (Dis)order: Exclusive Populism versus Inclusive Global Governance.”’It contrasts the global outlook of Davutoğlu with that of Henry Kissinger, yet does not discuss the specific policies pursued by either of these public figures while they acted on behalf of their respective governments, and ends with an allusion to Xi Jinping’s speech at the World Economic Forum a few months ago.]

In his global-e essay of March 30, 2017, Ahmet Davutoğlu provides a provocative and comprehensive assessment of current global trends, and their impact on the future of world order. What sets Davutoğlu’s diagnosis of the global setting apart is his insistence that the current crisis of governance, including the ominous dangers that he identifies, can only be overcome in an enduring manner if it is fully appreciated that present maladies on the surface of world politics are symptoms of deeper structural disorders. He gives particular attention in this regard to the failure of the United States to support a reformist agenda that could help establish global governance on foundations that were effective, legitimate, and humane after the end of the Cold War. Implicit here is the contrast between the benevolent global role played by the U.S. after World War II and its harmful dedication to neoliberal globalization after the end of the Cold War without attending to the historic opportunities and challenges of the 1990s.

At first glance, Davutoğlu seems to be echoing the lament of Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of Nixon’s foreign policy during the 1970s. Kissinger plaintively asks, “Are we facing a period in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the future?” This is coupled with Kissinger’s underlying worry: “Our age is insistently, at times almost desperately, in pursuit of a concept of world order.” [World Order, Penguin Press, 2014, 2] Not surprisingly for those familiar with Kissinger’s approach, he expresses a nostalgic fondness and airbrushed account of the liberal world order that the U.S. took the lead in establishing after World War II, as well as his signature nostalgia associated with the construction of the European state-centric system of world order in the aftermath of devastating religious wars in the seventeenth century. His idealizing of this post-Westphalian framework is expressed in a language no one in the global south could read without a good belly laugh as it totally ignores the predatory geopolitics by which the West subjugated and exploited much of the non-Western world. According to Kissinger the new golden age of Westphalia after 1945 was reflective of “an American consensus—an inexorably expanding cooperative order of states observing common rules and norms, embracing liberal economic systems, foreswearing territorial conquest, respecting national sovereignty, and adopting participatory and democratic systems of governance.” [p.1]

The best Kissinger can offer to repair what he now finds so deeply disturbing is “a modernization of the Westphalian system informed by contemporary realities.” By the latter, he primarily means accommodating the rise of China, and the consequent dewesternization of the global relation of forces. Such an adjustment would require some restructuring, taking steps to integrate non-Western values into the procedures, norms, and institutions of governance facilitating geopolitical cooperation between dominant states. The content of these cooperative relations would emphasize the establishment of mutually beneficial trade and security governing relations among states. For this to happen the liberal West would have to accept the participation of states that based national governance on authoritarian patterns of national governance without passing adverse judgment. Kissinger, never an advocate of ‘democratic peace’ as theory or policy, is consistent in his promotion of a world order that does not pass judgment on the internal public order systems of sovereign states, leaving human rights to one side, and not making the adoption of democracy an ingredient of political legitimacy. In this regard, Kissinger’s version of geopolitics revives the ethos of a pre-World War II realpolitik prior to the sorts of ideas of ‘democracy promotion’ associated with the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

What makes the comparison of Kissinger and Davutoğlu of interest is less their overlapping concerns with the current deficiencies of global governance than their differing articulation of alternative explanations and recommendations. Kissinger writing in a post-colonial period where hard and soft power have become more globally dispersed, especially moving toward Asia, considers the challenge mainly to be one of reforming state-centric world order by a process of inter-civilizational accommodation and mutual respect with a particular eye focused on how to properly address the rise of China alongside the partial eclipse of Europe.

In contrast, Davutoğlu sees the immediate crisis to be the result of inadequate global responses to a series of four ‘earthquakes’ that have rocked the system in ways that greatly diminished its legitimacy and functionality (that is, the capacity to offer adequate solutions for the major challenges of the historical moment). This sequence of earthquakes (end of Cold War, 9/11 attacks, financial breakdown starting in 2008, and Arab uprisings of 2011) occasioned responses by global leaders that Davutoğlu derides as “short-termism and conjectural politics,” that is, ‘quick fixes,’ which failed to appreciate either underlying causes or structural factors. This meant that the policy remedies adopted did not address the problems presented in ways that would avoid recurrent crises in the future. It is this failure of global leadership to address causes and structures that is partly blamed for the present malaise. Davutoğlu characterizes the present period as marked by “a rising tide of extremism,” constituted by a political spectrum with non-state groups like DAESH (also known as ISIS) at one end and the populist surge producing such dysfunctional statist outcomes as Brexit and Trumpism at the other. Davutoğlu does not treat the ascent of China as a fifth earthquake, exhibiting a conceptual understanding of the complexities and originality of the present global setting, while according less attention to the shift in the geopolitical hierarchy associated primarily with China’s rise.

Davutoğlu identifies three sets of disappointing tendencies that clarifies his critique: (1) the American abandonment of the liberal international order that it earlier established and successfully managed; (2) the disappointing reactions by the West to anti-authoritarian national upheavals, illustrated by the tepid reactions of the United States and Europe to the Arab Spring, withholding encouragement and support, despite its declared commitment to democratization and human rights; (3) and the structural numbness illustrated by failing to reform and update existing international institutions in the economic and political spheres, particularly the UN, which has been unable to act effectively because so little has been done to take account of drastic changes in the global landscape over the course of the last 70 years.

The comparison here between Davutoğlu and Kissinger reveals fundamental differences of analysis and prescription. Kissinger sees the main challenge as one of geopolitical chaos that needs to be overcome by forging realistic, yet cooperative, relations between the U.S. and China. Although he is not explicit, Kissinger seems to be preoccupied with what Graham Allison influentially labels as ‘the Thucydides trap.’ In such circumstances a reigning dominant state feels its status threatened by an emerging challenger, and the rivalry eventuates in war. In the nuclear age even political realists search for alternatives to such a dire prospect. Additionally, Kissinger clearly believes that unless the U.S. and China can agree on world order there will be chaos even if it not outright war. Underlying this imperative is the idea that dominant states are alone capable of creating order on a global scale, making the UN irrelevant, a distraction, and considering international law as a proposed regulative enterprise to be a house of cards.

Kissinger favors a live and let live geopolitical equilibrium presiding over a state-centric world order that works best if the power of the dominant states is balanced and their core interests served on the basis of a shared understanding of how best to govern the world. In a fundamental sense, by proposing the incorporation of China at the apex of global governance Kissinger is advocating the global expansion of the Westphalian approach that was historically developed to minimize war and maximize stability in Europe. As might be expected, Kissinger utters not a word about justice, human rights, the UN, climate change, and the abolition of nuclear weapons. In effect, Kissinger traverses the future as if embarking on a perilous journey across a normative desert. It is hardly an occasion for surprise that Donald Trump should summon Kissinger to the White House amid the Comey crisis or that Kissinger would make himself available for an Oval Office photo op to shore up the challenged legitimacy of an imploding presidency. Trump knows less about foreign policy than my ten-year old granddaughter so that when he described Kissinger’s visit as ‘an honor’ it is left as a complete mystery why this was so. It is amusing that Trump also described his audience with Pope Francis at The Vatican as an honor. The irony of the pairing should not escape even the most casual scrutiny.

Davutoğlu’s offers a far more sophisticated and nuanced response to his equally pessimistic diagnosis of the current global situation. His fears and hopes center on an approach that might be described as ‘normative realism’ or ‘ethical pragmatism.’ In this fundamental respect Davutoğlu analyzes the challenges confronting humanity in light of the international structures that exist. He advocates the adaptation of these structures to current realities, but with a strong normative pull toward the fulfillment of their humane and inclusive democratizing potential. He optimistically hopes that the United States will again play up to its weight on the global stage, especially as a normative leader and problem-solver. For this reason he strongly disapproves of the shrill Trump call of ‘America first’ as well as worries about the varieties of right-wing populism that have led to the rise of ultra-nationalist autocrats throughout the planet.

Davutoğlu, a leading political figure in Turkey over the course of the last fifteen years, is both a Turkish nationalist and an internationalist. He urges greater representation for emerging economies and states in international institutions and procedures, and the necessary reforms of procedures and practices to bring this about. No personal achievement during his years as Foreign Minister brought Davutoğlu greater satisfaction than Turkey’s election to term membership in the UN Security Council. For Davutoğlu such a supreme soft power recognition of status on the world stage epitomized a new kind of cosmopolitan nationalism. As Kissinger is (hard)power-oriented, Davutoğlu is people-oriented when it comes to global politics. In this regard, Davutoğlu’s worldview moves in the direction of normative pluralism, incorporating diverse civilizational constructs to the extent possible, globalized by crucial universalist dimensions, particularly with respect to human dignity, human rights, and a diplomacy focused on conflict resolution. Davutoğlu gives scant attention to working out a Kissingerian modus vivendi between dominant state actors, but is receptive to practical solutions and political compromises for the sake of peace, justice, and stability.

Although I share Davutoğlu’s diagnosis and overall prescriptions I would take note of several differences that might turn out to be only matters of emphasis if our respective positions were more fully elaborated. I think the most distinctive feature of the current world order crisis is its insufficient capacity to address challenges of global scope, most notably climate change, but also the persistence and slow spread of nuclear weapons as well as the pestilence of chronic poverty. The Westphalian approach to world order was premised on the interplay of geopolitical actors and state-centric territorial sovereignty, and was never until recent decades confronted by threats that imperiled the wellbeing, and possibly, the survival of the whole (species or world) as distinct from the part (state, empire, region, civilization). With nuclear weapons, rather than seeking their abolition, the United States exerts as much control as possible over a geopolitical regime seeking to prevent their proliferation, especially using coercive diplomacy to threaten governments viewed as hostile. Claiming to act on this basis, the United States, in coalition with the United Kingdom, launched a devastating attack in 2003 on Iraq followed by a decade of chaotic occupation. This anti-proliferation outlook presupposes that the principal danger to world peace and stability arises from countries that do not possess the weaponry rather from those that have used, developed, and deployed nuclear weapons. Considered objectively, Iran and North Korea are two countries under threat in ways that make their acquisition of nuclear weapons rationally responsive to upholding their security by deterring attacks. It is time to realize that nonproliferation ethos is precarious, misleading, and self-serving, and contributes to a cleavage that splits human community at its core. This split occurs at the very time when greater confidence in human unity is urgently needed so that shared challenges of global scope can be effectively and fairly addressed.

In effect, I am contending that Davutoğlu’s prescriptive vision does not directly address a principal underlying cause of the current crisis—namely, the absence of institutional mechanisms and accompanying political will to promote human and global interests, as well as national and local interests. Under present arrangements and attitudes, global challenges are not being adequately met by geopolitical leadership or by multilateral mechanisms that seek to aggregate national interests. The Paris Climate Change Agreement of 2015 represented a heroic effort to test the outer limits of multilateralism, but it still falls menacingly short of what the scientific consensus informs us as necessary to avoid exceedingly harmful levels of global warming. Given the current geopolitical mood, it seems unlikely that even the inadequate Paris approach will be properly implemented.

Similarly, the sputtering response to the situation created by the North Korean crisis should be treated as a wakeup call as to the dangerous dysfunctionality of a militarist approach to nuclear weapons policy, relying on threat diplomacy and punitive sanctions. The only approach that seems likely to be effective and deemed reasonable over time is one based on mutual security considerations, a serious embrace of a denuclearization agenda, and what might be called restorative diplomacy.

In the end, I share Davutoğlu’s call for the replacement of ‘international order’ (the Kissinger model) by ‘global governance’ (specified by Davutoğlu as “rule- and value-based, multilateral, consensual, fair, and inclusive form [of] global governance.” Such a shift to a governance focus is sensitive to the role of non-state actors and movements, as well as to the relevance of national ideology and governing style. It rejects a top down geopolitical approach.

It could be a hopeful sign that such a way of thinking is gaining ground that a recent speech in the West by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, moved in Davutoğlu’s, rather than Kissinger’s direction. When Xi addressed the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos he endorsed a worldview that rejected geopolitics, encouraged an inclusive multipolarity, and advocated nuclear disarmament. As Washington continues to conceive of the Chinese challenge as materialist and military, the real challenge being posed by China seems to be on the level of ideas, values, and survival instincts.

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Asking Foolish Questions About Serious Issues

7 Mar

Erasing the UN

3 Mar

18 Dec

Five Years after the Arab Spring: A Critical Evaluation

7 Dec

[Prefatory Note: The post below is an introduction to a series of articles on the theme of assessing the Arab Spring jointly written with the prominent Turkish scholar, Bülent Aras, whose bio-sketch appears below. It was published in the Third World Quarterly, 37 (No. 12): 2258-2334 (2016).]

Five Years after the Arab Spring: A Critical Evaluation

Bülent Aras  and Richard Falk

a Professor of International Relations, Sabancı University, Turkey bRichard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University, United States.

[Abstract: A new political geography has emerged in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the Arab Spring. The transformative impact of the popular upheavals appeared to put an end to long-term authoritarian regimes. Today, the region is far from stable since authoritarian resilience violently pushed back popular demands for good governance and is pushing to restore former state structures. However, the collective consciousness of the popular revolts endures, and a transformative prospect may emerge on the horizon. The chaotic situation is the result of an ongoing struggle between those who seek change and transformation and others in favor of the status quo ante. A critical evaluation of the Arab Spring after five years indicates a continuous process of recalculation and recalibration of policies and strategies. There are alternative routes for an eventual settlement in the MENA region, which are in competition against both regional and transregional quests for a favorable order.]

The transformative impact of the Arab Spring on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) symbolizes a turning point in the recent history of the region. The change is obviously visible, although five years is not long enough to see the full effects of a popular movement with the transformative goals of the Arab Spring. The protests and the immediate aftershocks remain confined within regional boundaries, which affect only Arab countries, although the anti-authority discourse has reached a wider resonance. In this sense, one obvious dimension of this novel political development has been the “Arabness” of its core mobilization.

In more specific terms, the MENA region faces transformations on a range of fronts, from state-society relations to resilience of authoritarian regimes, from state failures to shifting alliances in the region. This complex picture is the result of interaction and socialization of new and old actors in the domestic to regional and regional to global flows. The domestic environments in the regional contagion range from failed transitions to civil wars, while regional order as a whole is almost a perfect example of “the anarchical society” without the existence of any overarching authority and institution capable of enforcing rules and establishing order.

On the domestic fronts, the Arab Spring brought the analyses of democratization and robustness of authoritarianism to the fore with a rich variety of cases for discussion. We put forward the idea that the Arab Spring represents a search of the masses under authoritarian regimes for honor, dignity, liberty, good governance, and accountability of rulers. These uprisings created a new collective consciousness or subjectivity strongly influenced by the transnational diffusion of international norms of governance, freedom, and equality. The uprisings in various authoritarian states thus made sense beyond the geography of immediate impact and created a strong transnational impetus for change in a series of countries outside the Arab World. The demands for change, search for representation, and struggle for honor created a new collective consciousness that provides motivation, solidarity, belief, and strategy in various national contexts to engage in similar struggles against rulers. Societal groups enjoy the empowerment of sub-state actors and benefit from state vulnerabilities in undertaking political initiatives within authoritarian settings. The opposition to authoritarian rule also finds its expression in a relatively democratized context, giving rise to further political demands, especially for stronger societal participation. Throughout the different phases of the Arab Spring, the masses have faced several challenges and difficulties associated with imposing their new collective consciousness on rule and transforming authoritarian regimes in desired directions.

The first challenge was the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East and the differential ability of rulers to learn and recalibrate policies to preserve their hold on power. Second has been the lack of support from the international community in the struggle for freedom and liberties despite the fact that these ideas have been promoted with “universal” validity. The third challenge has been the fragility and fracturing of the societal consensus that has unleashed the uprisings, which underscores the vitality of sustainable coalitions that could have functioned as a social glue for realizing the transformative goals in its aftermath. The original consensus that gave rise to the new collective consciousness was severely challenged and even broken in some cases when it came to reforming the governing process along more democratic lines. When the popular expectations accompanying the uprising were dashed, active social forces backing the revolution became divided and certain elements indeed turned against the revolution to settle for what has been a reversal of the uprisings in the form of a counterrevolutionary backlash. This was actually what happened in Egypt after the election and overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The reactions of the ruling regimes vary according to their receptivity and resistance to the transformative claims set forth by the new collective consciousness. The Arab Spring has also been a learning process for all sides in terms of new calculations, recalibration of policies, and the development of effective strategies to cope with the new political atmosphere. The rulers and establishment elites as well as the popular movements also face fundamental challenges. Above all is the challenge of meeting societal demands for change in the domestic political order and the governing process. A second challenge concerns the transnational nature of the Arab Spring. This makes countries vulnerable to the potentially subversive transnational diffusion of the new collective consciousness. Inside/outside differences in policy-making have been more fluid than ever during this period. A third challenge has arisen when Arab rulers have found themselves with a capacity and incentive to exert an influence for or against the transformation of other states while at the same time facing a similar situation at home. Attitudes toward transformation of neighbors usually conform to the positions adopted at home. Rulers tend to support resistance to change outside if they adopt status quo policies at home: Most leaders seek outcomes that resemble as much as possible their domestic policies and are in conformity with their interests.

The fourth set of challenges may be the most confusing. The new transnational web of regional and international relations occurs within an atmosphere of flexible alliances and shifting alignments and priorities. Yesterday’s enemy may selectively become today’s friend. The contradictions and multiple dimensions of conflict that have risen to the surface in Syria during the last five years highlight this concern. A number of countries in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, have reacted to the situation elsewhere in the region to raise firewalls to protect their hold on power at home. A fifth set of challenges follows from the involvement of global political actors, mainly Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States. The aspirations of these actors are not always clear, and may alter under pressure and in response to national shifts in the balance of forces. This further complicates an assessment of internal strife, exhibiting both mixed signals coming from some of these actors and rigid attitudes from others. The relations of Middle Eastern countries with these external actors have often become strained by the shifts and turns in response to the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring is now at a critical phase as both popular forces and the ruling elites are recalculating their policies and reshaping attitudes toward change and the option of resistance. This is a distinctive moment in history that is showing the limits of creativity to meet the challenges of the Arab Spring, which ranges from the particularistic such as determining the future of Bashar al-Assad in Syria to broader issues of the role of Islamism such as the legitimacy and role of the pro-democracy Ennahda movement in Tunisia. The mobilization of new political movements in Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria, or the Saudi attempts to empower the administration in Bahrain and shape an anti-Houthi outcome in Yemen also undermine the political order of the region in different ways. It is possible to analyze the Arab Spring within four subsystems, categorizing their adaptability and resistance to the diffusion of transnational values. The four categories that we set forth are the Arab I and Arab II, Turkish-Iranian complex, and Kurdish de facto autonomy systems.

The Arab System I refers to those Arab states that share the commonalities of high population and low natural resources. These countries have been vulnerable to popular revolts and possess a limited ability to address societal challenges through peaceful means. The Arab System II consists of Arab states having a small population and a strong resource base. They exert more control over societal demands and also enjoy surplus financial capacity to influence political outcomes in other countries. The societal demands are more basic in terms of democratization and appropriation of civil rights and liberties. The state-society tension, in general, has risen to unstable levels and in some cases has led to the outbreak of civil war. One could depict several sub-regions within these subsystems. Furthermore, these two Arab configurations of states are not mutually exclusive. There occur complex and multiple interactions with each other that are further complicated by extra-regional involvements. The “Syriraq” crisis, the rise of Daesh, and the Saudi-led coalition’s air war against Yemen, among others, are issues concentrated in the Arab System I, although these events are also of clear relevance to the Gulf Kingdoms of the Arab System II that are preoccupied with maximizing authoritarian survival beyond their own borders, and devote resources to ensuring the persistence of an authoritarian neighborhood.

The Turkish-Iranian system is different than the Arab systems in reference to political institutions and societal demands. The 1979 revolution put an end to the authoritarian monarchy in power, replacing it with Islamic rule. Iran has regular elections, a diverse civil society, and a functioning parliament. Despite these moderating features of the governing process, the Iranian opposition seeks greater democratization, protection of human rights and basic freedoms. Thus the fundamental questions in Iranian politics are how to secure free and fair elections, political liberalization, the empowerment of civil society and politicians, and normalization of relations with the West against the stronghold of the establishment. In 2009, people protested against the presidential elections with the slogan “Where is my vote?”, yet were suppressed in the name of raison d’etat. The Iran nuclear deal seems to be a game changer since it carries the potential to put an end to Iran’s international isolation and turn Iran into a legitimate actor in regional politics. Iran’s new status helped it to have a psychological upper hand in the course of the scaling down of the U.S. presence in the Middle East, which lessens the likelihood of any new hegemonic order in the region for the foreseeable future. The region will now become even more prone to rivalries, conflicts, and protracting crises as regional actors pursue contradictory goals. This is what has happened during the five years after the Arab Spring. The geopolitics of the Middle East is now being manipulated predominantly within a framework of sectarian conflict and the overall rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional influence.

The Turkish situation is more about the enhancement of democracy, fine-tuning, and active participation in decision-making processes and a fundamental emphasis on economic development.. The societal demands are centered on the call for transparency, accountability, freedom of expression, and further civil rights. There is also an issue of cultural and language rights sought by Kurdish political forces. The Gezi Park protests in 2013 are exemplary in this sense of Turkish unrest. Young people resisted the building of a shopping mall in one of the few green parks in the urban center of Istanbul. The Turkish subsystem, compared to the others, despite its shortcomings, comes closest in the region to institute a democratic order. Turkey has taken strides in good governance and economic development, but has ever since been haunted by the quest for sustaining a democratic transition. In that sense, societal demands for better representation, checks on the political leadership, and the desire to control and limit political excesses fits into the general spirit of the new collective consciousness that has already been in motion within the dynamics of the Turkish system. The challenging issues for Turkey are responding demands for wider representation, addressing growing societal polarization and consolidating democratic institutions against a counterproductive trend in favor of reaching political goals through violence in the Kurdish problem and an undefined social call for security in the face of terrorist attacks launched by the extremists including Daesh.

The failed attempted coup of July 15, 2016 in Turkey can be connected to the Arab Spring experience, including the aftermath, in several significant ways. The most obvious reverberation of 2011 was the degree to which the leader was able to summon the people of Turkey to exhibit historical agency by displaying their support for the existing government and sacrificing their bodies to uphold the elected political leaders of the country. At first glance, the contrasts with Egypt are most striking. In 2011, the Egyptian masses in their revolt against Mubarak’s rule proved themselves and to the world their historical agency by opposing an unelected authoritarian government, and following the overthrow of the regime in Tunisia, catalyzed uprisings throughout the region. Then in 2013, disappointed by the failures of the elected leadership to perform, the Egyptian people were again mobilized effectively, this time to support a military coup against the elected leadership. In these fundamental respects, what happened in Turkey on July 15th is the exact opposite of the second Egyptian uprising that brought General Sisi to power, an outcome later ratified by elections conducted unreliably in a post-coup atmosphere of repression focused on crushing the Muslim Brotherhood that had won the prior nationwide elections held in 2012.

The situation in Turkey remains uncertain as the aftermath of failed coup has created contradictory signals about what to expect from the perspective of stability, human rights and democracy. In the early post-coup atmosphere in Turkey was dominated by a problem unique to the region, the deep penetration of all governmental institutions by the Gulenists, the followers of Fethullah Gülen who resides in the U.S. This left the Turkish government led by its president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with the formidable task of rebuilding the Turkish state without destroying Turkish democracy. On the one side, there are encouraging signals suggesting a new and welcome willingness of the main political parties to work together to preserve constitutional democracy in the country while restoring confidence in the security apparatus of the state. On the other side, there is challenging task of dealing with the detentions of Gülenist suspects from the various branches of government including the armed forces along with mass dismissals from educational institutions and an array of interferences with journalists and writers in a situation of state of emergency.

How these dramatic developments will play out in the region remains to be seen. Even before the coup, Turkey was engaged in a foreign policy reset, featuring successful efforts to renew normal diplomatic relations with Russia and Israel, which had become antagonistic in the prior five years. The Turkish relationship with the United States is also under unprecedented pressure due to the coup as its accused leader, Fethullah Gülen, resides in the United States. The Turkish government has formally requested extradition in accordance with a bilateral treaty, and whether it is granted or denied could affect the future of U.S./Turkish relations, as well as the coherence of NATO.

The Kurdish system is the most problematic challenge confronting Turkey. Although the Kurds do not have a state of their own, they have been empowered in their respective geographies during the Arab Spring, which has raised their expectations. Kurds are a minority group in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. There are three Kurdish sub-systems emerging within the atmosphere of change and transformation in the Middle East. First is the Syrian-Iranian sub-system, which seems best characterized by war and survival. Second is the Iraqi subsystem, which is a quasi-state structure that faces the challenges of securing the autonomy and consolidation of political and economic order, which may require an opening up of its political structure to satisfy societal demands. Third is the Turkish subsystem, which oscillates between war against the PKK and a peace process with Kurdish political representatives in an environment of a relatively advanced political structure. In the last year or so there has been a definite move away from peace and diplomacy and a firm embrace of armed struggle tactics.by both sides

Against this backdrop, Emirhan Yorulmazlar and Bülent Aras deal with the geopolitics of the Arab Spring and develop a framework to combine the factors that brought the previous regional order to an end. The domestic to regional and regional to global flows are examined in detail as the authors analyze and assess the regional disorder that emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Ever since the regional political landscape appears to have been completely altered. The article identifies the emerging subregional systems in the Middle East, which could pinpoint the basis for further changes and evolve to constitute the prospective regional order.

Fuat Keyman deals with the regional crisis and explains how this contributes to global turmoil. In this regional to global flow, regional problems are elevated to matters of international security. Keyman analyzes Turkey’s dilemma specifically, facing both the rise of Daesh and the refugee problem. He rejects the idea that Turkey is a buffer zone and encourages a more constructive and integrative dialogue between both Turkey and EU and Turkey and the U.S. with the objective of addressing these issues.

Pınar Akpınar focuses on the limits of mediation with respect to conflict resolution in the five years of Arab Spring. Akpınar’s focus on the effects of the multi-actor environment, the results of various trials of mediation, and a particular consideration of the mediation attempts in Syria underlines the necessity to rethink the means, nature, and capability of mediators as an alternative to chaos and armed struggle.

Halil Ibrahim Yenigün explores the repercussions of the purported failure of Islamist experimentations with democracy during the Arab Spring in terms of the inclusion-moderation hypotheses with a specific focus on the Egyptian case. He puts forward that moderation can only go so far because of the relevance and limits of Islamists’ political theology and further democratization may be dependent on a more viable Islamist political theology that accords better with rights and freedoms than a simplistic understanding of majority principle.

Richard Falk evaluates the aftermath of the Arab Spring through the dual optic of a regional phenomenon and a series of country narratives. These narratives are categorized by reference first to the secular states that found a path to stability after experiencing strong uprisings that drove rulers from power , second to the states in which the uprisings generated prolonged resistance and continuing acute instability, and third to the monarchies that neutralized the uprisings at their inception and restored stability. When other dimensions of conflict are taken into account it seems likely that the Middle East will continue to experience chaos, intervention, and counterrevolution for years to come, and possibly even a second cycle of uprisings directed at the evolving order.

Notes on Contributors

Bülent Aras is Senior Scholar and Coordinator of the Conflict Resolution and Mediation stream at Istanbul Policy Center, Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University and Global Fellow at Wilson Center. He is Academic Coordinator of POMEAS (Project on the Middle East and Arab Spring). His current research interests include geopolitics of Arab Spring, non-state actors in peacebuilding and bridging the gap between theory and practice in foreign policy. Recent work has been published in Middle East Policy, International Peacekeeping, Political Science Quarterly, International Journal, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Journal of Third World Studies, Third World Quarterly.

Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law Emeritus at Princeton University where he was a member of the faculty for forty years (1961-2001). He is Chair of International Board of Advisers of POMEAS. Between 2002 and 2013 he has been associated with Global & International Studies at the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, and is continuing to direct a research project on ‘Climate Change, Human Security, and Democracy’ in his role as Fellow of the Orfalea Center. Professor Falk has been the Special Rapporteur on Occupied Palestine for the United Nations Human Rights Council between 2008 and 2014. He served as Chair of the Board, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2004-2012, and is now its Senior Vice President. In 2008-2009 he was appointed expert advisor to the President of the UN General Assembly. Over the years, Falk has published more than 50 books. The most recent one is Power Shift: On the New Global Order (2016).

* Corresponding author. Email: bulent@sabanciuniv.edu

An Unlikely AMEXIT: Pivoting Away from the Middle East

14 Jul

[Prefatory Note: The post that follows is a modified version of an opinion piece that was published by Al Jazeera English on July 10, 2016; it examines the argument for disengagement from the Middle East by analogizing a plausible AMEXIT to BREXIT.]

The Case for Disengagement

A few years ago Barack Obama made much of an American pivot to East Asia, a recognition of China’s emergence and regional assertiveness, and the related claim that the American role in Asia-Pacific should be treated as a prime strategic interest that China needed to be made to respect. The shift also involved the recognition by Obama that the United States had become overly and unsuccessfully engaged in Middle Eastern politics creating incentives to adjust foreign policy priorities. The 2012 pivot was an overdue correction of the neocon approach to the region during the presidency of George W. Bush that reached its climax with the disastrous 2003 intervention in Iraq, which continues to cause negative reverberations throughout the region. It was then that the idiocy of ‘democracy promotion’ gave an idealistic edge to America’s military intervention and the delusion prospect of the occupiers receiving a warm welcome from the Iraqi people hit a stone wall of unanticipated resistance.

In retrospect, it seems evident that despite the much publicized ‘pivot’ the United States has not disengaged from the Middle East. Its policies are tied as ever to Israel, and its fully engaged in the military campaigns taking place in Syria and against DAESH. In a recent article in The National Interest, Mohammed Ayoob, proposes a gradual American disengagement from the region. He makes a highly intelligent and informed strategic interest argument based on Israel’s military superiority, the reduced Western dependence on Gulf oil, and the nuclear agreement with Iran. In effect, Ayoob convincingly contends that circumstances no longer justify a major American engagement in the region, and that to maintain the commitment at present levels adds to Middle East turmoil, and its extra-regional terrorist spillover, in ways that harms American interests.

Why Disengagement Won’t Happen

Ayoob’s reasoning is flawless, but disengagement won’t happen, and not because Americans are not smart enough to recognize changed circumstances. The pivot to East Asia was a recent instance of such an adjustment based on an assessment of changed geopolitical circumstances. Actually, the high degree of American involvement in the Middle East was itself the result of an adjustment to changed circumstances. After the Soviet collapse, the earlyier geopolitical preoccupation with Europe seemed superfluous and outmoded, and the Middle East with its oil, Israel, expanding Islamic influence, risky nuclear proliferation potential seemed then like a region where a strong American commitment would solidify its role as global leader. This perception was reinforced after the Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, which gave neocon hawks a pretext for a regime-changing attack on Iraq, which the neocons hoped was but a prelude to a more elaborate political reconfiguring of the region by way of regime-changing interventions. [See ‘Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’ (1996) for a fuller understanding of the Israeli oriented neocon mindset] The Iraqi undertaking failed miserably during the state-rebuilding occupation that followed upon the attack and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. The master plan involved reconstructing the government and economy of Iraq to serve Western interests while at the same time supposedly democratizing the country. It totally backfired. This American pivot to the Middle East after the Cold War was based on the geopolitical opportunism of Washington in a context of a persisting failure to understand the changing circumstances of the post-colonial world, and especially the altered balance between the military superiority associated with foreign intervention and the resourcefulness of territorial resistance.

So why the inflexibility with respect to the Middle East when disengagement brings immediate major practical advantages? Part of the explanation is surely governmental inertia, reinforced by the belief that the changes in conditions are not as clear and favorable as Ayoob contends, making disengagement seem geopolitically vulnerable to future charges that the Obama presidency was responsible for ‘losing the Middle East,’ as if it was ever America’s to lose!

More to the point is a range of other reasons militating against disengagement. Perhaps, most significant, is the militarist bias of American foreign policy that is even unable to acknowledge that the attacks on Iraq or Libya were failures. This refusal to think outside the military box prevails in American policy circles, making the debate on what to do about Syria or DAESH center on the single question of how much American military power should be deployed to resolve these conflicts. What Eisenhower called the military industrial complex has come to dominate the machinery of government in Washington, further abetted by the accretion of a huge homeland security bureaucracy since 9/11. Real threats to American interests exist in the Middle East, and given this unwillingness to rely on political or diplomatic solutions for the resolution of most disputes, virtually requires the United States to retain its military presence to ensure the availability of options to intervene militarily whenever the occasion arises.

Then there is the anti-international mood that has taken over American domestic politics. It is hostile to every kind of international commitment other than military action against real and imagined Islamic enemies. Additionally, the US Congress has been completely captured by the Israeli Lobby, which puts a high premium on maintaining the American geopolitical engagement so as to share with Israel the burdens and risks associated with the management of regional turbulence. As neither the Arab uprisings of 2011 nor the robust counterrevolutionary aftermath were anticipated, it is argued that there is too uncertainty to risk any further disengagement. This is coupled with the claim that the rapid drawdown of American combat forces in Iraq was actually premature, and led to a resurgence of civil strife that has persuaded the Obama administration to redeploy American troops both to aid in the fight to regain territory occupied by ISIS and to help the government to establish some degree of stability.

Why Disengagement Should Happen

Neither realist arguments about interests nor ethical considerations of principle will lead to an overdue American disengagement. Washington refuses to understand why intervention by Western military forces in the post-colonial Middle East generates dangerous extremist forms of resistance (e.g. DAESH) magnifying the problems that prompted intervention in the first place. In essence, the intervention option is a lose/lose proposition, but without it American engagement makes no sense.

Unfortunately, for America and the peoples throughout the Middle East the US seems incapable of extricating itself from yet another geopolitical quagmire that is partly responsible for generating extra-regional terrorism of the sort that has afflicted Europe in the last two years. And so although disengagement is a sensible course of action, it won’t happen for a long, long time, if at all. Unlike BREXIT, for AMEXIT, and geopolitics generally, there are no referenda offered the citizenry.


I’m sorry

A week from tomorrow my materials are due for my tenure evaluation. What this means is that after next week the college I work for is going to decide: either I get a promotion, or I get fired. There is no in-between.  I’ve been working to obtain the desired position for most of 2-3 decades, and preparing for this evaluation practically non-stop for the last year. If I don’t get it and instead lose my job, my husband and I will have to move to who knows where to do who knows what, and I don’t even want to contemplate what this means for my treatment or my mental health.

I have plenty more unsaid stuff to say but I have been finding it hard to really invest in writing about it, because I keep thinking about the upcoming deadline and evaluation. I hope you understand and I’m sorry.