Monday, December 1, 2008

Week 10: Social cognition (Part 1)

Jackendoff, R. (2003). An agenda for a theory of social cognition. In R. Jackendoff (Author), Language, consciousness, culture: Essays on mental structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Beer, J.S., Shimamura, A. P., & Knight, R. T. (2004). Frontal lobe contributions to executive control of cognitive and social behavior. In Gazzaniga, M.S. (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences III (pp. 1091-1104). Cambridge, MA : MIT Press.

Ochsner, K. N. (2007). Social Cognitive Neuroscience: Historical Development, Core Principles, and Future Promise. In Kruglanksi, A., & Higgins, E. T. (Eds.). Social Psychology: A Handbook of Basic Principles (pp. 39-66). 2nd Ed. New York: Guilford Press.

The articles for this week’s topic, were only somewhat illuminating on the actual topic of social cognition, as they covered the topic in much broader strokes than would have been helpful as an introduction to the topic. Nevertheless, some interesting information was gleaned.

Beer et al. (2004) review several studies that describe the differential role of lateral versus medial/orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal cortex. Specifically, lateral prefrontal cortex is repeatedly implicated in what are traditionally conceived of as cognitive processes, and the article focuses primarily upon the role of the LPFC in attention. Evidence from several lesion and animal studies implicate the LPFC in allocating attention, inhibiting or exciting neuronal activity in sensory regions (visual or auditory). Lesion studies demonstrate how damage to this region impairs the individual’s ability to filter out irrelevant information. In sum, the LPFC plays an important role in controlled information processing. By contrast, the medial and orbitofrontal regions of the PFC appear to be implicated in self-regulation and the processing of social information, serving to integrate emotional and cognitive information.

This idea is not new to us here, as in prior weeks we have seen this region implicated in the integration of cognition and emotion in decision making, reasoning, and behavioral inhibition (á la dear Phinneas Gage). It makes sense, then, that processing social information would implicate this region as well. One could hypothesize that acting in socially appropriate ways would require a similar process as decision making, wherein one decides whether to follow an emotional impulse or inhibit that impulse based upon contextual and historical information. Beer et al. also review studies implicating the medial PFC in encoding information relevant to the self and making inferences about other’s behaviors (theory of mind). This would also make sense, as this region appears to be important for integrating information about the emotional salience of stimuli with reward-based information about potential responses to this information. One could argue social information is inherently emotional, as it involves processing information that is ultimately pertinent to the maintenance and attainment of survival goals. We learn to navigate the social world in ways that maximize our own survival by maintaining proximity to important others that aid in our survival and maintaining distance from those that threaten it. At the risk of being reductionist, it seems to circle back to that old familiar theme of cognitive/affective integration.

Jackendoff’s article picks up this point, by discussing the myriad of social interactions that one must learn to navigate. Taking a much different approach, he argues for the analogy between social cognition and language development. Both language and social competency are attained through the interplay between “hardwired,” computational capacity and culturally driven, externally derived information. We are born with the capacity to learn language, but the nuances of what we learn and how our language is ultimately used is shaped by our language interactions with those around us. Similarly with social behavior – we have an innate ability for social processes such as empathy, “cheater detection” or the ability to detect the intentions of others, theory of mind, emotional contagion or the ability to mirror the emotions expressed by others, and self-monitoring/self-regulation in the service of socially appropriate behavior. How these capacities are expressed is a function of the immediate world we live in, and as such are culturally and group specified. The more I read, the more beautifully orchestrated human nature seems – information gathered through the internal lens, the external synthesized with the internal, and the combination offered back out again to the world.

The third article in this series, by Kevin Ochsner, is less a treatise on social cognition than a manifesto for the new discipline of social cognitive neuroscience. The article lays out an agenda for this new line of research, encouraging a multi-layered analysis of social psychology, examining the behavioral, computational/representational, and neuronal levels. The chapter suggests ways in which previously distinct disciplines of social psychology, social cognition, and cognitive neuroscience can work together to answer questions in a more constrained and meaningful way. While the chapter was a very interesting read, it did not provide much by way of examining specific research in social cognition, so was less useful to our immediate purposes here. Perhaps the Thagard chapter will provide more fine-grained insight…

Sunday, November 23, 2008

Week 8& 9: Reasoning and Problem Solving

Saturday, November 22, 2008

Week 7: Consciousness (Part 2)

Saturday, November 15, 2008

Week 7: Consciousness (Part 1)

synonyms see aware

Saturday, October 25, 2008

Week 6: Computational models of cognition and affect (Part 2)

Thagard, P. (2008). How molecules matter to mental computation. In P. Thagard (Ed.) Hot Thought: Mechanisms and applications of emotional cognition pp 115-131. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

In this chapter, Thagard argues that computational models of cognition need to consider the influence of neuromodulators at the molecular level. He argues for understanding processes in the brain as the result of both chemical and electrical activity. He goes on to point out that many of the chemical influences on synaptic activation occur as the result of activity of cells far removed from the local neural network, such as when the release of hormones influence distant synaptic firing. Much of the chapter goes into technical details of how chemicals such as hormones influence the action of neurotransmitters and synaptic activity, but the overall thesis is that if cognitive scientist are to construct accurate computational models, they must take into consideration the effects of chemical processes on the activation of these models, rather than approach them as if they were electrical computers. The effects of chemical processes, he argues, are even more important to consider in computational models of cognition as the evidence for the role of emotion in cognition mounts. Evidence already exists for the effects of hormones or other neuromodulators on emotion; therefore, these same chemical reactions ultimately affect cognition. He points out that while it may not be necessary to only consider systems at the molecular level, knowledge about molecular processes should be considered one type of map that is useful for certain levels of analyses – he presents the example that while a large map of Europe is useful for locating Switzerland as north of Italy, another type of map, more fine grained, is useful for navigating the terrain of the Swiss Alps. I would tend to agree that if a truly holistic account of cognition is to be developed, consideration of the molecular processes contributing to patterns of neural activation would only serve to enrich this development. While it might not serve cognitive science for researchers to try to attempt the formidable task of becoming expert in all levels of analysis, integrating findings from molecular and network levels of analyses would likely strengthen the understanding of cognition at both of these levels and strengthen a more holistic understanding.

Week 6: Computational models of cognition and affect (Part 1)

Wagar, B. M., & Thagard, P. (2004). Spiking Phineas Gage: A neurocomputational theory of cognitive-affective integration in decision making. Psychological Review, 111, 67-79.

In this article, Wagar & Thagard present a new computational model of cognitive-affective processing, called GAGE after the famous case of Phinneas Gage (whose personality changed dramatically after a tamping iron destroyed the left side of his brain, transforming him from a reliable, dependable and level-headed figure to an impulsive and profane individual). GAGE focus on the contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in gauging future consequences and behaving accordingly. Specifically, the VMPFC has been implicated in the ability to refrain from behavior leading to an immediate reward if that behavior has future negative consequences, or delaying immediate reward for a future, larger reward. In the GAGE model, Wagar and Thagard examine how the VMPFC and amygdala interact with the hippocampus to coordinate potential responses with bodily states associated with the current situation and contextual information about the situation. They were particularly interested in the mechanism by which context has a moderating effect on emotional reactions to stimuli.
Their model is an extension of A. Dimasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, whereby feelings or emotional states become associated with long-term outcomes of certain responses to a given situation. The VMPFC is thought to play an important role in generating somatic markers. In this hypothesis, sensory representations of a response to a current situation activate knowledge about previous emotional experiences in similar situations. These markers act as biases influencing higher cognitive processes that coordinate responses. Wagar & Thagard extend on this by suggesting four key brain structures involved in this process. First, the VMPFC responds in concert with the amygdala. However, Wagar & Thagard suggest the mechanism by which the amygdala response (or immediate emotional response) versus the VMPFC response (based on potential outcomes of responses) wins access to higher cognitive processing is through gating by the nucleus accumbens, which in turn gates information based upon contextual information received from the hippocampus. The process is hypothesized to unfold as such: 1) the VMPFC receives input from sensory cortices, representing behavioral options; 2) the VMPFC also receives input from limbic regions, providing information about internal bodily states, most notably from the amygdala; 3) the VMPFC records signals defining a given response by encoding representations of the stimuli and comparing it to the behavioral significance of somatic states that have been previously associated with the response; 4) the VMPFC generates a “memory trace” representing the action and expected consequences of that action; 5) through reciprocal connections to the amygdala, the VMPFC elicits a reenactment of bodily states associated with the specific action; 6) this covert emotional reaction is passed on to overt-decision making processes – however, the transmission of this information is gated by the NAcc, as controlled by the hippocampus, as 7) the hippocampus controls VMPFC and amygdala throughput by depolarizing the NAcc based upon context – the NAcc allows only activation signals from the VMPFC and amygdala through that are consistent with the current context allowing spike activity in the NAcc. As staed in the article, “The hippocampus influences the selection of a given response by facilitating within the NAcc only those responses that are congruent with the current context (p.70).”
This is where the article loses me a bit, because I am not entirely certain by what process the hippocampus is purported to match current contextual information with memory traces about past contexts, as generated by the VMPFC, in order to chose which potential response information to allow through. For example, given the tendency for individuals with anxiety and mood disorders, and particularly trauma, to misread the current contextual information, this would be an important part of this process to understand. Individuals who have experienced trauma, for example, show a tendency to disproportionally map past representations onto current contexts. If Wagar & Thagard are suggesting the hippocampus is matching current context to past memory traces, this would imply individuals with trauma have deficits in the ability of their hippocampus’s to accurately gauge the current context. (However, perhaps it is the result of affective influences on sensory processing, such that information about the current context is distorted, and thereby may match memory traces more closely.) In addition, while I can understand the mechanics of this proposed process, it leaves me with open questions about the hippocampus’s “motivation.”
Nevertheless, Wagar & Thagard go on to present evidence from two studies of the GAGE model. The goal of the first study was to see if GAGE could simulate the experimental results of the Iowa gambling task in Bechara et al., 1994. In this task, participants are given a choice of four decks and are asked to make series of card selections from each of the four decks. They are given $2,000 as a loan to start, and play the decks to try to capitalize on this loan. “Bad” decks give immediate rewards, but long-term net losses, whereas “good” decks give larger delayed rewards and overall net gain. The results from the initial experiment showed normal participants quickly adopted a strategy of pulling cards from the good decks, thereby demonstrating the ability to delay reward for greater ultimate gains. By contrast, participants with VMPFC lesions never learned this strategy, and continued to act upon immediate rewards without regard to future consequences. In the current study, Wagar & Thagard trained GAGE on this same task. When the VMPFC was taken out of the model, GAGE acted only upon immediate reward, whereas leaving the VMPFC in the model resulted in more selections from “good” decks and greater overall gains. In essence, without the influence of the VMPFC, the computer was acting upon emotional reactions elicited by the amygdala and reflecting the immediate situation. When the VMPFC was included, decisions were based upon potential outcomes, not immediate affective appraisals. VMPFC and amygdala responses were modulated by gating of the NAcc, which in turn was modulated by the hippocampus, in line with the proposed model above.
In a second study, the goal was to simulate the role of context in the integration of physiological affective arousal and cognition; specifically, the mechanism by which context moderates emotional reactions to stimuli. They had the machine gauge emotional reactions as positive or negative while in a positive versus a negative context. The results of this study showed that when the NAcc was presented with two possible VMPFC representations, the hippocampal-derived context drove GAGE’s behavior, such that positive contexts elicited positive responses and vice versa. The researchers go on to suggest that the NAcc stores associations between VMPFC and hippocampus to elicit representations based on the current context.
The two studies are summarized as such: Study 1 demonstrates that “the VMPFC and the amygdala interact to produce emotional signals indicating expected outcomes and that these expected outcomes compete with immediate outcomes for amygdala output…temporal coordination between the VMPFC and amygdala is a key component to eliciting emotional reactions to stimuli (p. 76).” Study 2 demonstrates that context exerts an effect on cognitive-affective integration, such that “For the signals from the VMPFC and the amygdala to access brain areas responsible for higher order reasoning, context information from the hippocampus must unlock the NAcc gate, allowing this information to pass through (p.76).” These conclusions lead to a few questions. First, does this suggest that the hippocampus overrides potential outcome decisions presented by the VMPFC? In other words, if the VMPFC is creating memory traces based on past experiences in similar situations, is it the case that the VMPFC is assuming one context that the hippocampus either rejects or confirms? Do the context appraisals formed by the hippocampus represent contextual memories or the actual current context? And how does the hippocampus form judgments about the current context, unless it is comparing it to prior encounters with the context? Isn’t contextual memory formation a key function of the hippocampus? There seems to be almost a memory loop going on here – the VMPFC is taking in sensory information and judging appropriate behavioral responses based upon the behavioral outcome of past encounters with the stimuli – which would imply some form of contextual representation. This information then is gated by the way in which the hippocampus judges the current context, and whether the information presented by the VMPFC is matching this judgment. The hippocampus encodes contextual memories about past encounters with the current context, which you would think influences the VMPFC’s initial representations. Is this process more dynamic than the GAGE model is implying?

Friday, October 24, 2008

Week 5: Language Acquisition and Processing (Part 2)

Jia, G., Aaronson, D., Wu, Y. (2002). Long-term language attainment of bilingual immigrants: Predictive variables and language group differences. Applied Psycholinguistics, 23, 599-621.

This article presents a study in which the long-term attainment of a second language, specifically factors relating to long-term L2 decline, was explored. The study sought to answer four main questions: 1) Given long-term L2 attainment decline versus long-term L1 increase, which aspects of language proficiency and to which bilingual groups can the findings be generalized; 2) what are the mechanisms leading to the switching or maintenance of dominant language between young and older arrivals; 3) what environmental or affective variables might be involved; 4) are their differences apparent in other groups previously studied, namely Chinese-English and Spanish-English, and are there additional social or cultural variables influencing differences in attainment between bilingual groups above and beyond language distance. To answer these questions, the study 1) investigated grammatical proficiency of 44 Mandarin-English speakers to investigate the relationship between long-term L1 and L2 attainment; 2) using a language background questionnaire, explored additional social, environmental, and affective variables; 3) collected normative data on L1 proficiency for Mandarin monolinguals between the ages of 9-16 to compare relative L1 proficiency between bilinguals and their monolingual counterparts; and finally, 4) gathered data on long-term L2 attainment of other groups to examine generalizability of results to other bilingual groups (specifically, Korean- Mandarin- Cantonese-English and European English bilinguals).
In the initial study, participants were presented with a listening and a reading task designed to assess judgments about grammaticality of sentences. Each task was presented in both English and Mandarin. Judgments in English included morphology (past tense, plurals, third person, present/past progressive, etc.) and syntax (articles, predicate structures, particle movement, pronominalization, etc.). Judgments in Mandarin included word order, inappropriate insertion of words, and inappropriate omission of words. Both grammatically correct and incorrect sentences were presented. Results showed younger AoA was associated with higher accuracy on the English listening and reading task and lower accuracy on the Mandarin listening task. There was also a negative correlation, such that better performance on L2 was associated with poorer performance on L1. Higher performance was also associated with self-report ratings of proficiency in both L1 and L2. This study also assessed environmental and cultural variables. Higher performance on the English listening and reading tasks was associated with younger AoA and more years of education in the U.S., but not length of time in the U.S. Better performance on the English listening task was associated with with more frequent usage at home, as well as more people speaking English at home. Better performance on the Mandarin task was associated with less frequent usage of English, and less people speaking English, at home. The variance between L1 and L2 proficiency was also associated with the level of the speaker’s mother’s proficiency in English, such that the more proficient the mother is in speaking English, the more proficient the children are. Looking at the normative data for comparable level of proficiency in Mandarin between bilinguals and Mandarin monolinguals, the bilinguals tended to arrive with less than adult proficiency in Mandarin. The authors suggest future studies should examine whether level of L1 proficiency in early learners has an effect on L2 acquisition.
Examining the generalizability of these results with other bilinguals, Asian language speakers evidenced stronger AoA effects and significantly lower accuracy on the listening and reading tasks than European language bilinguals. This finding is in line with the proposals of Hernandez and Li, wherein the lexical difference between L1 and L2 influences levels of lexical attainment, as is evident in greater AoA effects in Chinese-English bilinguals than in Spanish-English bilinguals.
In general, the results of this study show individuals who immigrate at a young age tend to switch dominant languages from L1 (Mandarin) to L2 (English), whereas older immigrants tend to maintain their dominant language. However, the maintenance of L1 as the dominant language was influenced by the extent to which English was spoken at home. This suggests it is not merely AoA effects on the ability to acquire the lexical aspects of L2 that prevents greater L2 attainment, but perhaps a combination of factors, including the extent to which the “language of life” is expressed in L2 rather than L1. Thinking back to Harris, Gleason, and Aycicegi (2006), it would be interested to see the extent to which a late learner who is immersed in the L2 language and culture, such as being married to a native speaker, would have less difficulty detecting grammatical errors than a late learner who remained in a household where L2 and accompanying cultural practices were intact. However, this again makes me think of my own step-mother, who would very likely have great difficulty detecting all the grammatical errors in a listening task. If she performed poorly on the tasks in this study, one could assume AoA effects in her ability to acquire English are present to a large extent. She is an individual who speaks L2 to her husband, her children, her step-children, her coworkers, and her friends on a daily basis – in other words, her language of life has been English for the last 25 years of her life. The only remaining contact she has with L1 is in conversations with her sisters. Despite the length of time she has been in the U.S. and living in an English speaking household, she is less than proficient in her ability to speak English, particularly in her pronunciation of English words which, according to this study, would have resulted in lower attainment by her eldest daughter, which did not prove to be the case. However, her eldest daughter was only six when she arrived, and was less than proficient in Vietnamese. Her daughter’s superior attainment of English (such that she sounds no different than a native speaker) fits with the conclusions of this study that younger immigrants tend acquire L2 to a higher proficiency and even switch dominant languages from L1 to L2, and perhaps her younger age of arrival cancels out the effects of her mother’s lower language proficiency.
In sum, this study, by focusing on differences in grammatical ability, lends support to the proposal by Hernandez and Li (2007) that perhaps AoA effects are the result of a critical period for sensorimotor processing, which in turn affects the ability to discern lexical differences between L1 and L2, and therefore affects grammatical accuracy and attainment in L2. It would be interesting to see further studies of late learners, in which differences in environmental and social factors and their relationship to overall L2 attainment are explored.

Week 5: Language Acquisition and Processing (Part 1)

Hernandez, A.E., & Li, P. (2007). Age of acquisition: It’s neural and computational mechanisms. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 638-650.

This article explores possible neural and computational underpinnings of AoA effects, and presents an argument for specific aspects of language acquisition that are more susceptible to AoA effects. Hernandez and Li first present a few of the existing theoretical accounts of AoA. Brown and Watson (1987) propose AoA effects in word learning are the result of “phonological completeness,” whereby early-learned words are stored holistically (thus more easily retrieved), while late-learned words are fragmented and need to be reconstructed. However, this theory has been disputed based on the fact that in a segmentation task reaction times were found to be faster for early-learned words than late-learned words, which the authors suggest is counter to what should be the case if the late-learned words were already fragmented. (This argument was a little difficult to follow simply because the article does not explain what a “segmentation task” actually is.) Another theory of AoA effects is the “cumulative frequency” hypothesis. This theory proposes early-learned words are more easily accessed because of the additive effects of their frequent usage over time. Late-learned words, according to this theory, would have been encountered less frequently and therefore would be less easily accessed. However, research in older adults did not find AoA effects of specific words to increase with age.
Another theory is the “semantic locus hypothesis,” which posits that early-learned words have semantic advantage over late-learned words because they are represented in the semantic network first, and affect the way later learned words are semantically processed. This would suggest a semantic “map” that is formed to early words and affects later words. Hernandez and Li point out that, if this was the case, bilingual speakers would match semantic concepts to two separate forms, that AoA would transfer from one language to the next, and that L2 lexical items should inherit L1’s lexical AoA. This does not turn out to be the case, however, as L2 lexical speed is associated with the age at which the word was learned in L2 and not the corresponding age it was learned in L1. For the semantic locus hypothesis to work, therefore, there would have to be separate semantic stores for each language. Hernandez and Li therefore suggest AoA exerts effects at the lexical level, not the semantic level. Further, evidence from computational modeling reviewed in the article suggests increased rigidity in word learning with age, which would be more suggestive of AoA effects at the lexical level, since one could assume semantic processing would be more enriched with age given the increased capacity to manipulate concepts and infer semantic meaning as one gets older.
The article goes on to present some intriguing evidence from neuroimaging studies of increased activation of Heschl’s gyrus, implicated in auditory processing, when making lexical decisions to early learned words, whereas increased inferior prefrontal cortex activation, implicated in effortful activation of semantic meaning, is evidenced for late learned words. The authors suggest this may represent a reliance on auditory processing for early learned words and a reliance on semantic processing for late learned words. If the lexical/semantic distinction in AoA is correct, this would make sense, in that early encoding of lexical information would involve increased reliance upon auditory processing to detect subtleties between phonemes and morphemes in phrase construction in order to learn lexical rules. In line with this, another study cited in the article found that participants coactivated auditory representations when making lexical decisions pertaining to early learned words, even though these words were presented visually. Hernandez and Li conclude that the neural substrates of early learned lexical information appears to represent more automatic processing, whereas late learned words require additional processing, mapping lexical information onto semantic information.
This has interesting implications for the learning of a second language. Hernandez and Li review studies that have investigated semantic and lexical processing between L1 and L2. In neuroimaging studies, tasks involving syntactic processing evidenced greater AoA effects than tasks involving semantic processing. In a study of Chinese-English bilinguals, in which individuals read sentences containing syntactic violations, differences between bilinguals and native speakers arose for both syntactic and semantic violations, but were apparent at different ages. Differences between L2 learners and native speakers in the detection of syntactical violations appeared in participants who had learned English as early as 2 years of age, whereas detection of semantic violations appeared only after age 11. In addition, late learners rated themselves as less proficient in L2. Another study found increased activation relative to early learners in areas implicated in motor planning and articulatory effort when late learners of L2 processed grammatical violations, suggesting early learners were able to process words more automatically whereas late learners required additional, more effortful processing. These differences were not found in semantic processing, and instead differences in semantic processing were only found when comparing late learners with high proficiency to late learners with low proficiency. The authors suggest, therefore, that AoA effects exist for grammatical violations, whereas proficiency is associated with semantic violations. Further, the article goes on to discuss how the magnitude of AoA effects in L2 acquisition are greatest when the differences between L1 and L2 are large. For example, AoA effects in judging grammatical errors in Spanish-English learners are smaller than AoA effects in judging grammatical errors in Chinese-English learners.
The authors suggest this difference in the magnitude AoA effects is the result of the ability to detect subtle differences in syntax between the two languages, or what would constitute a syntactic violation in L2, which require phonological and articulatory demands, which in turn require a certain level of auditory and motor processing. They argue that it is here where AoA exerts its effects – that perhaps the “window” for learning lexical aspects of a second language has more to do with sensorimotor processing. They relate this to the critical period evidenced in the development of sensorimotor processing in visual domains, and in the behavioral and neural domains of learning music (perfect pitch; synchronization of motor movements to visual presented stimuli). They posit that language, in essence, reflects a sensorimotor ability. Because areas involved in sensorimotor processing undergo rapid organization and reorganization early in life, and evidence a loss of plasticity, perhaps the difficulty a late learner of L2 has in mastering the subtleties of L2 (such as noun-verb agreement in Chinese-English speakers, or verb irregularities in Spanish-English speakers), is the result of reduced plasticity in processing and articulating these subtle differences. The study by Jia, Aronson, & Wu reviewed in the next posting lends further support to this hypothesis.
I immediately think of my own step-mother, who came to America in 1975 from her native Vietnam. After 33 years speaking English and 25 years living with an English-speaking husband in an English-speaking household, she has an excellent grasp of the semantics of English, and has even written books and poetry about her experiences using English. However, she still struggles with the grammatical subtleties of English, such as dropping the last sound of words, using correct noun-verb agreements, or using the wrong verb form in sentences. By contrast, her oldest daughter, who was 6 years old when they arrived in America, has no trace of a Vietnamese accent, and sounds no different than a native speaker of English. This account may also lend support the emotional context of learning hypothesis of Harris, Gleason, and Aycicegi (2006) reviewed in the last posting: One could argue that regardless of the ability to master the grammatical or lexical aspects of language, the ability to master the semantic aspects of a second language continues throughout life, and grasping the semantic meaning would also imply a relating of that meaning to the self through emotional processes. Therefore, one could develop a richer emotional connection to certain words from L2 learned late, and a critical window for pairing emotion and words may not necessarily exist. Instead, as Harris, Gleason & Aycicegi (2006) suggest, it may be the case that the greater emotional salience of early learned words accounts for differences found between the emotional intensity of reprimands in L1 versus L2, rather than AoA effects being at play.

Wednesday, October 22, 2008

Week 4: Special Topic: Affect and language

Harris, C.L., Gleason, J.B.,& Aycicegi, A. (2006). When is a first language more emotional? Psychophysiological evidence from bilingual speakers. In A. Pavlenko (Ed.), Bilingual minds: Emotional experience, expression, and representation. Clevedon, United Kingdom: Mulilingual Matters.

In this article, Harris and Gleason move away from computational accounts of language acquisition in bilingual speakers and consider the role of emotion. They note that, traditionally, investigations into the emotional and subjective experiential accounts of language has been shunned due to the idiosyncratic nature of emotion, which runs counter to a research agenda that seeks to identify the universality in linguistic processes. However, Harris and Gleason point out that there is significant overlap in subjective accounts of language, and that the subjective quality of specific experiences can be very similar across individuals. They point to consistent results found in recent research conducted by Dewaele (2004), in which greater emotional intensity was endorsed when speakers used taboo in their native language than in a second language. Harris and Gleason also point out that when emotion has been considered in psycholinguistics, it has been thus far limited to investigations of monolingual speakers. The article goes on to review recent studies conducted by the authors further investigating the role of emotion in bilingualism – specifically, are utterances in L1 more emotionally arousing than utterances in L2?
In a series of studies, the authors use psychophysiological measurement (SCR) in conjunction with self-report to investigate emotional responses to specific phrases. SCR was chosen as these responses are generated not only to threat but also indicate the degree of relevance a specific stimulus holds for the individual. In the first study, participants included native Turkish speakers residing in the U.S. Participants were presented with a series of phrases in both L1 (Turkish) and L2 (English) that included taboo words, reprimands, aversive words, positive words, and neutral words. Whereas emotional reaction to taboo words was high in both Turkish and English, the greatest difference in responding was found for reprimands. The authors suggest the greater emotional responsivity to reprimands in L1 may be the result of the emotional environment in which these phrases were initially learned. Research suggests conversational aspects of autobiographical memory may be encoded in a specific language, and memories of being reprimanded may therefore be encoded pairing specific words with their emotional contexts. The authors also point out that language acquisition occurs in the same years as the development of emotion regulation. Reprimands by parents may elicit highly emotionally-charged responses from the child, as maintaining attachment relationships with the parent (i.e. not jeopardizing this relationship through wrongdoing) is a paramount motivational goal. Memories of reprimands, therefore, are encoded as highly emotionally salient events. Following research on emotion and memory, it is likely that specific words are paired as emotionally relevant auditory stimuli that become associated and encoded as emotionally salient. In support of this, greater responses in this study were elicited when participants were presented with reprimands in L1 (Turkish) as auditory stimuli than as visual stimuli. As these reprimands are generally heard first before being read, and reading reprimands may not occur within as emotionally-charged a situation as hearing them, the visual stimuli of written reprimands may not have been encoded in memory with the same degree of emotionally salience.
In a second study, Spanish-English bilinguals were included and categorized according to age of acquisition: early learners (born to immigrant parents and learned English around age 5); balanced bilinguals (arrived in America around age 6 or 7); and late learners (learned English around age 12). The early learners endorsed English as their most proficient language, balanced bilinguals endorsed both, and late learners endorsed Spanish. Similar to the first study, the greatest difference in L1 relative to L2 responses was found to reprimands, but only for the late learners. Further, the emotional arousal of L2 was weaker than L1 only for those who acquired L2 past the age of 7. This suggest a decline in the emotional significance of L2 as a function of both age of acquisition and degree of proficiency in L2.
To investigate whether one language in these studies was inherently more emotional than the other, a third study investigated ratings of emotional intensity of phrases in Spanish versus English through a questionnaire study involving both American and Colombian students. This study found items rated similarly. However, another study conducted by the authors found native Turkish speakers rated Turkish phrases higher than English speakers rated the English counterparts. The authors suggest cultural differences may exist in the approach to these ratings, wherein baseline ratings are higher or lower dependent upon culture. This is an important observation, however the article does not tie this finding back to earlier investigations of American and Colombian students, so it is unclear if similar effects exist between Spanish and English speakers in these cultures.
The article goes on to explore possible reasons why a first language might be more emotionally forceful than a second language. A few psycholinguistic theories are reviewed, such as Johnson and Newport’s theory of a maturational mechanism in which genes for acquiring language are expressed more strongly in early childhood. This would suggest the affective primacy of L1 is related to a general language acquisition mechanism that is present in early in life. Birdsong came to different conclusions, pointing to motivational factors. It is interesting to note, however, that both of these lines of research are investigating grammatical knowledge, and are investigating very different L1 languages. Johnson and Newport investigated Korean- and Chinese-English speakers, whereas Birdsong investigated Spanish-English speakers. As will be explored in a review of Hernandez and Li (2007; see separate post), the differences found in between these investigations may have more to do with the lexical difference between L1 and L2 than differences in affective or semantic significance. In other words, if two languages are more grammatically similar, differences in grammatical knowledge as a function of age of acquisition might be less distinct as differences accounted for by levels of motivation or length of time speaking. In contrast, languages that are grammatically very different might evidence greater AoA effects if, as Hernandez and Li suggest, an AoA effect exists for acquisition of syntax in L2 (such that acquiring L2 syntax is easier as a function of age). This point will be explored further in a separate post.
Returning to the present article, another suggestion as to why L1 may be more emotionally salient is the fact that because early language development occurs in tandem with the development of emotion regulation, and therefore early words and phrases may have more connections with the amygdala, whereas later learned words may have more connections with cortical areas. However, recall the results of the studies above found greatest differences in emotional salience for reprimands. Perhaps the greater emotional intensity of early learned phrases have more to do with the more highly charged emotional context, whereas the same phrases learned later are less emotionally charged??
In line with this, Harris and Gleason propose a “context of learning theory” in which language has a distinctive emotional feel because it is learned and/or habitually used in a distinctive emotional context. Words and phrases become stored in memory in a context-dependent manner. They go on to present anecdotal evidence that L1 is not always the most emotional language. They point to stories of colleagues who have come to the U.S. to study and subsequently have remained in the U.S., getting married and starting families. These individuals report their second language (English) as feeling more emotional. The authors suggest that experiencing highly emotional events, such as having children in the context of L2 may result in L2 becoming more emotional. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis – using the same method in the studies above, it would be interesting to see if the presentation of specific words or phrases related to caring for children (such as “crib” “bottle” or “the baby is crying”) would be more emotional for these individuals in L1 or L2. In other words, would specific words or phrases accompanying these highly emotionally-charged experiences be encoded with more emotional significance much in the same way reprimands in childhood were found to be?
Harris and Gleason’s context of learning theory fits nicely with the Hernandez and Li article concerning age of acquisition. Harris and Gleason pose the question as to whether a maturational mechanism may be at play in the results reported above, such that first-acquired languages are always more emotional. However, they point out that the early contexts in which language is first acquired are also generally more emotional (for example, naturalistic settings tend to be more emotionally charged than classroom settings), which may play more of a causal role. In addition, if differences in the emotional force between languages are a function of maturational mechanisms, how would this account for the anecdotal evidence presented above, in which individuals who acquired a second language later in life nevertheless report L2 as feeling more emotional? An important consideration, however, is what specific factors of language are affected by age of acquisition (AoA), a point explored by Hernandez and Li (2007). AoA effects may be present only for syntax, and not for semantics, such that a “critical period” for processing syntactical information may occur early in life, whereas the processing of semantic information can occur throughout the lifespan. If this were to be the case, this would lend further support to Harris and Gleason’s argument that the greater emotional force of a first language has more to do with the emotional context in which the language was acquired and less to do with maturational mechanisms, because the syntax in the phrases presented in the studies above does not vary, only the semantic content. This would also lend support for why L2 might still be more emotional when learned late, if L2 is frequently used in highly emotional contexts. It seems more plausible that specific words and phrases become highly associated with specific emotional contexts and are encoded in memory as such. Again, to test this theory, it would be interesting to replicate the studies above using words or phrases congruent with highly charged emotional contexts experienced later in life, to see whether similar effects arise.

(n.b. - Further discussion of the Hernandez and Li article appears as a separate post.)

Sunday, September 28, 2008

Week 3: Culture, Language, Cognition and Affect

This week’s readings take an interesting look at cultural differences in the experience and expression of emotion, as well as the role of emotion in social relationships.

Potter, S. (1988). The cultural construction of emotion in rural Chinese social life. Ethos, 16, 181–208.

Potter’s article spotlights a fundamental difference between Americans and Chinese in the way that individual emotional experiences are both valued and used to guide action. Specifically, Potter focuses on the impact of experienced and expressed emotions on social structure. The article begins by pointing out that in the context of American culture, the “form and meaning” of social relationships are directly determined by the emotional experience of the individual, such that the experience of emotions both validate and maintain social structure and guides social action. For example, a “loveless” marriage is a legitimate reason for divorce, or anger at an institution is a valid reason to organize and press for change. Potter also points out that the important role emotions play in these social relationships puts an emphasis on continual emotional validation, such that the individual must reaffirm their emotional position through repeated emotional expression (i.e. parents hugging their children; spouses saying “I love you”), and without these repeated emotional displays the relationship may come into question or be considered devoid of meaning.
By contrast, Potter suggests individual emotional experience in rural Chinese life is viewed as irrelevant to the maintenance of social order or social action, maybe even to some extent threatening. In rural Chinese life, the social order exists and remains intact regardless of the inner experience of the individual. This is a major distinction between the ways in which emotions guide experience in American versus Chinese culture. As Potter states, “To root all meaningful social experience in the self is, from one point of view, an affirmation of the self and the importance of the individual. From another point of view, it puts an intolerable burden on individual experience.” In China, social structure is viewed as continuous, carried down across generations, such that the transgressions of an ancestor can have implications on the status of an individual generations later, without reference to that individual’s current experience. Further, because individual emotional experience is irrelevant to the social order, an emotion is never viewed as a legitimate rationale for social action – emotional expression has no formal consequences. Therefore, emotions are expressed more freely, without regards to how the expressed emotion might affect social standing. Potter gives the example of a villager ranting in rage at an officer, without concern of retribution by the officer for this display. This is very different from our own cultural context, where shouting at an officer can land you in jail. The fundamental difference is that in one context the display of anger is not viewed as potentially changing the situation, and therefore is not viewed by the authority figure as threatening, whereas in the other context it is intended to produce some wanted result, which may be in conflict with the officer’s goal and requires the officer’s response.
Potter describes an interesting developmental implication of this alternate view of the role of individual emotional experience in social structure. In America, emotional displays of children are responded to immediately and therefore produce results for the child, whether they be positive or negative. Further, the response to children’s emotional displays are judgment-laden, such that expressions of frustration or temper elicit negative reactions from caregivers, and pleasant expressions elicit positive reactions. The child therefore learns two important lessons – first, that expressed emotions can guide actions of others and produce wanted or unwanted consequences; and second, that some emotions are inherently “bad” while others are inherently “good.” By contrast, because individual emotions are viewed as irrelevant to social structures in rural Chinese life, emotional displays by children are largely ignored, and are neither encouraged nor suppressed. Thus, the Chinese child learns a) emotional displays do not produce results from others, and b) emotions are neither good nor bad. It is this developmental perspective, I think, that the difference between our own view of individual emotion and the views of rural Chinese can be best understood.
In reading this article, I found it very difficult to disentangle individual emotional experience from interactions with the outside world, and found myself often questioning, “yes, but is it true that the internal emotions of the Chinese individual do not guide interactions at all??” Looking at it from this developmental perspective, however, Potter’s argument is easier to understand. It is likely the case that internal emotional experiences do indeed color individual experience in similar ways across cultures, but seeing the different results that emotional expressions produce between the two cultures offers a greater understanding of the different ways emotions might be used to interact with the social world and motivate behavior. If we view emotional experience as existing as a sort of feedback loop, then it is easy to see how different the perspective on emotion between the two cultures might be. This is interesting clinically as well. One of the more recent trends in the treatment of emotional disorders borrows directly from eastern (particularly Buddhist) tradition that encourages taking a non-judgmental stance towards emotional experiences. Potter’s article I think in some ways highlights one mechanism by which taking this non-judgmental, accepting stance might be particularly difficult for Westerners to adopt. An accepting stance towards emotional experiences requires to some extent loosing the connection between internal emotional experiences and their potential consequences, something that, following Potter’s arguments, might be particularly challenging for American’s to accomplish, and is something to bear in mind clinically.

Tsai, JL, Knutson, B., & Fung, HH (2006). Cultural variation in affect valuation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 288-307.

Tsai et al. present an interesting new theory of emotion that attempts to close the gap between what ethnographers and scientists have found in studying differences in emotion experience across cultures. The article begins by pointing out that while ethnographers by-and-large have reported wide variation in emotions across cultures, scientists have reported many similarities. They propose a new theory to account for this discrepancy – “affect valuation theory.” This theory posits that two forms of affect exist, “ideal affect,” or the affect individuals would like to experience or value highly, and “actual affect,” the affect people actually experience. They further suggest that ideal affect is more related to cultural factors, while actual affect is related to temperamental factors. They set out to study these hypotheses in two separate studies, and chose to explore these differences between two cultures who differ along the lines of individualism versus collectivism.
Study 1 was conducted in an undergraduate sample of European Americans (EA) and Asian Americans (AA). They posited that the EA group would value high arousal positive states (HAP), as these states are congruent with individualists need to act upon the environment to achieve individual goals. By contrast, they posited the AA group would value low-arousal positive states (LAP), congruent to a collectivist viewpoint with the goal of adjusting to the environment. Study 1 set out to demonstrate that 1) ideal affect differs from actual affect, and 2) culture influences pure ideal affect more than pure actual affect. Results a two-factor model of ideal and actual affect provided a better fit than a one factor model. Further, EA participants valued HAP more than AA participants. However, this study was unable to conclusively demonstrate the hypothesis that the difference between ideal and actual affect was mediated by individualism-collectivism and not by temperamental factors. Therefore, a second study was conducted to directly address this hypothesis. The sample in Study 2 included EA, Chinese-Americans (CA), and Chinese from Hong Kong. Results from this study lent further support to the two-factor model of affect. Results also showed that the EA group valued HAP more than both the CA and CH group, and that the CA and CH group valued LAP more. One further analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between discrepancies in actual and ideal affect and depression. The discrepancy between actual and ideal HAP was significantly associated with depression in both EA and CA groups, but not CH groups. By contrast, the discrepancy between actual and ideal LAP was significantly associated with depression in the CA and CH groups, but not the EA groups. Finally, affective traits were found to be more strongly associated with actual affect than ideal affect. These findings lend support to the suggestion that discrepancies exist between how people feel and how they want to feel, and how they want to feel is influenced by cultural factors.
These studies, while focusing on cultural differences, also seem to have some clinical significance. For example, people with anxiety and mood disorders may report valuing positive emotions highly, in line with the American view that positive emotions are good and negative emotions are bad. However, clinical experience indicates that for many suffering mood and anxiety disorders, the actual experience of positive affect is experienced as aversive, often provoking further anxiety. Viewing this through an “ideal” versus “actual” affect distinction might be helpful in understanding this clinical discrepancy, and helps to highlight one potential reason for the low mood resulting from this discrepancy.

Wilkins, R., & Gareirs, E. (2006). Emotion expression and the locution “I love you”: A cross cultural study. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30, 51-75.

In this study, the locution “I love you” was investigated along the following domains: a) when does it occur, b) with whom, c) in what language (native or non-native), d) about which topics, e)as part of what interactional sequences, and f) with what consequences. The study was conducted using an online survey enrolling undergraduates from a communications course. Results showed the locution was used most with lovers, followed by parents and grandparents and respective children and grandchildren. The expression was used rarely with siblings or cousins, and most often never with neighbors and coworkers. Males used it less frequently than females. Domestic students used it more frequently overall than international students, and were more likely to use it with parents and children. Non-verbal usage was more common with spouses. Non-native English speakers used the locution more often in English than in their native language. Further exploration was conducted using a qualitative questionnaire. Through this questionnaire, cultural differences emerged, that were by and large similar to the differences highlighted in the Potter article. Specifically, differences appeared to emerge based upon the consequences or the relationship between using the locution and maintaining social order, such that in cultures in which the expression of individual emotion has a direct bearing on relationships the expression was used more frequently than in cultures where expression has little or no bearing on the relationship. Cultures also differed on the weight of the phrase itself, with some cultures reserving it to only the most paramount circumstances, thereby preserving its special meaning, and others using it across multiple contexts of varying importance.
Because of the small sample size, it is hard to draw any specific conclusions about this study. Nevertheless, it lends further support to the idea that variations in emotion expression may be intricately woven within the specific social implications of that expression within the specific cultural context. At a much broader level, it speaks to the important interaction between affect, the cognitive interpretation of affect, and the consequences of that interpretation on behavior.

Saturday, September 20, 2008

This week’s readings were extremely thought provoking (no pun intended), and in many ways a must read for clinical psychologists. In essence, each article argues for the elimination of the cognition/emotion distinction, providing evidence for the interaction and integration of emotion and cognition, and against the notion of cognition and emotion as separable constructs. The articles immediately brought to mind the current arguments put forth by some in the field against the utility of cognitive therapy – some have proposed deemphasizing cognitive reappraisal in treatments and a move towards more purely behavioral or experiential therapies. When considering the way information about the world and internal states is processed, however, it becomes clear that behavior, cognition, and emotion are so intricately intertwined that a lack of consideration for any one of these domains in therapy in effect results in only a partial picture of the patient’s experience. Each of these articles is summarized below.

1) Duncan, S., & Barrett, L.F. (2007). Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 1184-1211.

Duncan and Barret (2007) propose that, while there may be an argument for a phenomenological or functional distinction between cognition and emotion, this distinction should not be confused as an ontological. They begin by a discussion of core affect, which they describe as valence and arousal, and which acts as a “neurophysiologic barometer that sums up the individual’s relationship to the environment” (p. 1186), with self-reported feelings functioning as “barometer readings.” They argue that core affect is in effect core knowledge, and forms the core of conscious experience, serving the primary function of evaluating the potential somatovisceral impact of external stimuli and organizing behavior accordingly. They go on to demonstrate that in addition to subcortical structures traditionally implicated in affective processing (amygdala, ventral striatum, insula), structures traditionally viewed as cognitive (orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex) are integral in the computation of the value of stimuli and in coordinating visceral and motor responses. For example, while regions of the amygdala function to evaluate the predictive value of stimuli, the OFC functions to generate an appropriate response based upon that prediction. The article goes on to discuss how sensory processing is widely distributed throughout the brain via interconnected structures, using the example of the amygdala’s role in visual processing. The amygdala can influence visual processing indirectly through top-down control of attention via the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The amygdala can also directly enhance visual processing through reciprocal projections to the ventral visual stream, by modulating the intensity of neuronal firing. Finally, the amygdala can influence visual processing directly through connections with regions of the brainstem, in modulating the release of neurotransmitters that in turn enhance sensory processing. Further, Duncan & Barrett point out that core affective circuitry such as the amygdala, OFC, and VMPFC offer the only route by which sensory information reaches the brainstem and basal forebrain. A key way in which the amygdala modulates the processing of visual information is through heightened awareness of stimuli. In essence, the amygdala monitors the affective significance of stimuli, influencing both cortical control of attention and response generation and sensory processing. The authors point out that heightened activation of the amygdala seen anxiety and mood disorders appears to affect sensory processing leading to heightened sensitivity to affective information seen in these disorders. As such, disruptions in core affective circuitry have direct consequences for sensory processing. Sensory information that is deemed to have greater significance to the somatovisceral homeostasis of the individual is preferentially processed, in line with studies reported in Treat & Dirks (2007). Duncan and Barrett go on to demonstrate how core affect influences memory, consciousness, and language, all domains considered to be the domain of cognition. In sum, the article provides an argument for the inseparability of cognition and emotion, showing that all aspects of cognitive processing are integrated with the processing of affective information.

2) Pessoa, L. (2008). On the relationship between emotion and cognition.

Pessoa continues along a similar argument, using evidence from structural connectivity models to demonstrate the interrelationship between “cognitive” and “affective” regions. He argues that while distinctions between anatomical structures considered cognitive versus affective can be made, these structures are highly interconnected, evidencing a greater integration of cognitive and emotional processing than the reliance upon purely anatomical divisions can provide. In fact, following an analysis by Young and colleagues (2000), he suggests the amygdala acts as a central hub in a vast distributed network reaching nearly every region of the brain. He proposes a cognitive-affective control circuit for the processing of information reaching from cortical areas to the brainstem, comprised of the lateral PFC, the OFC, the anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens, and the ventral tagmental area. He further proposes that behavior is the result of both affective and cognitive computations. He concludes by proposing we must go beyond looking at interactions between cognition and emotion, and instead consider how cognition and emotion are integrated (how each in effect constrains the other). In essence, Pessoa suggests we consider how both affective information (such as reward properties of stimuli) and cognitive information (such as perceptual processing, attention, and memory) are orchestrated to motivate behavior.

3) Thagard, P. (2008). How cognition meets emotion: Beliefs, desires, and feelings as neural activity. In G. Brun, U. Doguoglu & D. Kuenzle (Eds.), Epistemology and emotions. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Thagard takes a decidedly philosophical point of view, through which he argues for the inseparability of cognition and emotion in epistemology. He points out that traditionally epistemology has ignored emotion, and offers the counter viewpoint that the acquisition and expression of knowledge is inherently affective and therefore inherently emotional (to the extent that one knows something through evaluating the significance of that knowledge to themselves as an individual, or acquires knowledge based upon the motivation or desire to know something). He also argues against conventional views that mental states are propositional attitudes (relations between the self and a proposition), instead suggesting beliefs, desires, and emotions are the result of patterns of neural activity. While much of this article argues an alternative view of epistemology, one major point Thagard makes was well taken. Since knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge are inherently affective, the quest for knowledge and the way that knowledge is processed (perceived or understood) is influenced by the desires and goals of the seeker. This is an important consideration for anyone pursuing scientific knowledge. Given the evidence presented in the previous two papers about the affective influence on information processing, it is important to recognize that the pursuit of knowledge and the interpretation of that knowledge is always intertwined with our own individual beliefs and desires (ie affective motivation). Therefore, we are always operating within our own individual biases. Thus the importance of sharing and collaboration with peers in the quest for scientific knowledge!

Sunday, September 14, 2008

Week 1: Contemporary cognitive science: New directions


LCWR: Trump's executive order 'is unconscionable' during the 'global refugee crisis'

People in Hamtramck, Mich., participate in a Jan. 29 protest against President Donald Trump's travel ban. (CNS/Jim West)

The Leadership Conference of Women Religious issued a statement Monday about the executive orders that President Donald Trump issued Jan. 27, saying they show "misplaced priorities," denigrate American values and endanger all citizens.

"We are appalled by President Trump's order which bans residents of seven Muslim majority countries from entering the U.S. for 90 days, suspends refugee resettlement entirely for four months, and bars resettlement of Syrian refugees indefinitely," officials wrote in the statement. "This is unconscionable in the face of the unprecedented global refugee crisis."

LCWR is made up of the leaders of communities of women religious and represents about 80 percent of the nearly 50,000 women religious in the United States. It rarely issues statements on politics or current events because its membership is diverse and the group generally does not seek to speak for everyone. When LCWR does take stances, it is usually in support of issues its members favor.

However, the Trump administration appears to have spurred the group to greater outspokenness. On Jan. 18, it issued a joint letter with the Conference of Major Superiors of Men urging the president to work for unity after a divisive election campaign.

The statement on the Jan. 27 executive order took the new president to task, saying he has forced everyone into an untenable position.

"More than 61 million people have been displaced from their homes, more than at any time since World War II. Some 21 million are refugees; most are children who have been forced from their homes by unthinkable violence," the group said. "The Trump administration has forced all of us to turn our backs on families who are literally running for their lives."

On Jan. 31, two of the largest communities of women religious in the United States also issued statements against the order.

The Sisters of Mercy denounced Trump's orders as immoral, saying they go against the nation's founding principles.

"Given the unprecedented scale of the global refugee crisis, these measures will deepen the tremendous suffering of those fleeing unimaginable conditions of violence, poverty and war, and further tear families apart," the statement said. "We fear that these orders will only exacerbate the scapegoating and attacks already directed against vulnerable communities, including immigrants, Muslims and people of color."

The Adrian Dominicans called the order "both heartbreaking and chilling."

"These orders are inimical to our Catholic belief in the inherent dignity of every person; our Judeo-Christian tradition of caring for the stranger; our American values of welcoming people who yearn to 'breathe free;' and our nation's protection of religious freedom," the statement said.

The LCWR statement said the orders hurt those who are helpless.

"Halting or undermining the U.S. refugee resettlement program leaves vulnerable refugees, including women and children fleeing violence, in extreme danger and diminishes us all," the statement says. "We strongly object to President Trump's attempts to limit our ability to heed God's call to welcome the stranger (Mt. 25:35) and to care for those most in need (Mt 25:40) and we are particularly concerned about rules and regulations that deny access to refugees because of their religion, race, or nationality. It is a violation of our faith and every norm of humanity."

LCWR officials also denounced the Trump's plans to build a border wall, increase deportations and punish sanctuary cities.

"Spending billions of dollars on an unnecessary and ineffective wall and further militarizing the border will divert funding from health, education, and social programs and will not make America safe again," the statement said. "President Trump's orders, if enacted, will tear families apart, challenge our already stressed immigration courts, and deny those fleeing persecution and violence their right to asylum; all at enormous cost to our treasure and our souls."

LCWR was also a signatory to a letter sent Jan. 27 by eight religious groups saying they looked forward to working with the president on pro-life issues but noting that they hold a "comprehensive pro-life" view that includes dealing with global conflict and violence, immigration, climate change, health care and social services, the refugee crisis and criminal justice.


Hilfe + Info

help + information

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Sustainability Guide for Work-Related Flights

Is it justified to fly to meetings, conferences or other work-related trips? This guide helps you to decide. By asking a series of questions relating to the purpose, conditions and alternatives to the trip, you can see whether the benefits of flying outweigh the climate and local environmental impacts of the flight(s).

When is air travel justified?

In general, air travel for work-related purposes is justified when the sustainability benefit outweighs the sustainability cost of the trip. Obviously, this is difficult to evaluate, for example how do you trade off ecological damage and social benefit? And where should be the bench mark if you know that only 5% of the global population participate in air travel?This tool helps the user to evaluate all aspects of the proposed business trip, and thus to plan air travel in a responsible manner. It supports informed decision making and helps to think about aspects of the trip that may help to balance benefits and costs of the trip.

How to use the Sustainability Guide for Work-Related Flights?

The evaluation starts with key parameters: the overall objective of the trip, the duration of the trip and the travel distance. In addition the trip is evaluated by asking a series of seven questions covering different aspects of sustainability. For each aspect up to 4 points can be obtained. Supportive questions to each aspect give guidance what could be worth a point. The resulting overall rating gives an indication of whether the trip is planned in a responsible manner or whether the trip should be modified from a sustainability point of view.

The tool has been developed for work-related flights. Flights for private reasons may need other key parameters, weightening and supportive questions. However, even for non-work flights, this Guide will provide food for thought.

Key Parameters of the Air Travel

Trips without clearly defined objectives can only by accident serve the business and sustainability.
Trips without overnight stays provide limited opportunities for intercultural exchange and fostering of good relationships. Longer trips create more opportunities for positive sustainability engagement in the trip schedule as an "off-set" for the negative environmental aspects of the air travel. Round trips combining more projects share the ecological burden.
This differentiation has ecological reasons: Short distance flights up to 800km have the worst climate effect, as start and landing are very fuel intensive and cannot be levelled out by the short cruise mode of the trip. If available - alternatives should be considered. Middle distance flights up to 3800 km have a much better result per flight kilometre due to the longer cruise mode. Long distance flights over 3800 km show again worse results as larger amounts of fuel have to be carried with.

Scoring of Sustainability Aspects

1) Environmental aspects

1.1 Climate protection: Have measures been taken to minimise CO2-emissions from the trip?

Give yourself a score of between 0 and 4, based on questions such as

- does the meeting location allow shortest possible travel distance for all participants?

- is there no reasonable alternative to air travel?

- have CO2 emission been minimized (most direct flight, most ecological airline)?

- have CO2 emission been compensated by a trusted carbon offsetting scheme?

1.2 Resource conservation: Are food, accommodation and transport at the destination appropriate when compared to local conditions?

Give yourself a score of between 0 and 4 based on questions such as

- is food and accommodation in line with living standards of the local middle class?

- are means of transportation in line with living standards of the local middle class?

- do restaurants/hotels respect environmental standards / local ecological capacity (eco-labels)?

- is the catering regional, seasonal, bio-fair and at least partially vegetarian?

2) Social aspects

2.1 Does the travel schedule foster reliable, long-term personal relationships?

- is the trip part of a long-term collaboration / larger joint undertaking?

- is time included for informal gatherings and socialising?

- does the trip help to develop key relationships where talking face to face will make a big difference?

- is there a joint task / working experience planned as part of the trip?

2.2 Does the travel schedule foster intercultural exchange at eye-level and an in-depth experience of the local culture?

- are visits to local cultural events or (historic) places or time for cultural exchange planned?

- will catering include local ingredients (where possible, fair trade) and recipes?

- will the program include an introduction to local customs and intercultural awareness?

- does the schedule foresee joint/social experiences with local / program partners?

3) Economical aspects

3.1 Are fair working conditions guaranteed for people employed in transport, hotels and restaurants?

Score between 0 and 4 points, based on questions such as

- high standards of occupational health and safety at the working places

- adequate pay and working hours (ILO-convention, minimal wages / living wages)

- right for labourers to organize themselves (ILO-convention)

- does the trip foster sustainable business practices of local partners and service-providers?

3.2 Apart from the cost of the flights, will the host country gain most benefit from the trip (financial benefit, taxes, ...)?

Score between 0 and 4 points, based on questions such as

- is most of the travel budget spent for services by local companies?

- do the service providers (food, accommodation, transport, ...) pay their tax in the host country?

- do the service providers engage in training of their workforce and offer permanent jobs?

- does the objective of the trip foster the development of a healthy, independent local economy?

4) Sustainability overall

4.1 Does the trip trigger subsequent activities in the home and the host country, which foster a more sustainable world?

Score between 0 and 4 points, based on questions such as

- will the trip lead to changed practices in sustainability in the home and the host country?

- does the trip contribute to environmental protection (climate, resources, overall awareness)?

- does the trip contribute to international understanding (respect, meeting face-to-face)?

- "Bonus point" - optional extra point for another tangible sustainability measure not reflected above.

Total of 28 possible points 0

Overall Sustainability Score of the Trip

Total score out of 36.4 possible points:

Not all Fields have been set.

more than 24 points - good travel plan, way to go! Keep it up!

12-24 points - acceptable travel plan with improvement potential!

less than 12 points - sustainability criteria not met


DAILY MAIL Will Stewart

She said Londoners seemed reassured by the level of security and imagined that if some calamity occurred they would be rescued by the emergency services.

‘They explain the CCTV cameras on every corner by fighting terrorism and crime – but sadly it doesn’t solve the problems,’ she told the Moscow newspaper Komsololskaya Pravda in an interview.

‘Watching the rubbish bins, they waste more money than on the actual fight with the problems.’

On a different note, Mrs Zeinalova added: ‘And as for smokers – they are treated like lepers here.’

She said the English believed they were ‘masters of the world’.

‘The Englishmen’s position is: let all the rest of the nations argue about who is the master of the world, we won’t take part in it. We know who is the master.’

The British were also proud of their reputation for being stand- offish. ‘The British are a very special separate-nation,’ she said. ‘I have been here for two years and I communicate closely with quite a lot of people. But no matter how closely we chat, they never let me in.’

Mrs Zeinalova said the British worship TV and football.

Being a ‘safe society’ exciting things don’t happen very often, so the British become obsessed with TV.

‘Recently, one of the TV show participants – a small and not very famous one – decided to leave,’ she said.

‘The papers were going on about it for a week. We would never have it like this in Russia. It is a completely different perception of life.’

As for football, ‘it’s a mix of unbelievably high ambitions, money, advertising and popularity in England’.

But she admitted: ‘I have fallen in love with football, I am a fan of Manchester United now.’


Round Earth Media

Why do they do it?

May 7, 2016

Why do they do it?

I get this question a lot, once again last week after my speech on the challenges facing international journalists.

What compels a journalist to risk his or her life simply to file a story?

Some answers to those questions can be found in an unflinching podcast produced by the BBC. In Islamic State’s Most Wanted, reporter Chloe Hadjimatheou tells the astonishing story of a group of young men from Raqqa, Syria who became citizen journalists, using the internet to show the reality of life under the so-called “Islamic State.” They have risked everything to oppose ISIS; several have been killed, or had family members murdered. Yet, they continue.

Click on the photo above for the story of these young journalists (warning — this broadcast contains disturbing information).

And in the radio documentary, Diary of a Bad Year, Kelly McEvers, a former NPR Middle East correspondent and now a host of All Things Considered, considers what she calls “a war correspondent’s dilemma.”
Kelly’s collaborator, Jay Allison, explained: Colleagues and friends were being kidnapped. Some were getting killed. But still, she went toward the story. Kelly began to wonder, “Why do otherwise intelligent people risk their lives when they don’t have to?a1ef329c-5bfe-4b2a-88fb-6539cdb722af

Click on the photo above for Kelly’s riveting — and honest — examination of that question.

Warmest regards,

Mary Stucky
Round Earth Media

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"Lord, if it is you," Peter replied, "tell me to come to you on the water." "Come," the Lord said. Then Peter walked on the water and came toward Jesus. -Matt. 14:28-29

Of all the disciples in the boat that night, Peter was the only one to step out in faith and walk on water. It is the only documented case in history where a person walked on water, other than Jesus. Only after Peter responded to Jesus' Word, "COME" was he able to step out with complete trust and answer the Lord's call. Has God called you to "come" out of the boat? Is there a dream He has placed in your heart, a dream to touch lives and help others, a desire to fulfill your life's calling?

Sadly, most people never realize their biggest dreams because they never step out of the boat in faith. Their biggest fear is that they will sink once they step out. Peter stepped out in faith and walked on water until he took his eyes off Jesus and sank amidst the surrounding storm. He took his focus off His Source and got distracted by the storm around him.

Are you facing a storm that is preventing you from getting out of the boat? Any worthwhile pursuit takes a step of faith. And yes, there will be storms all around you and most likely you will sink at some point. But fear not, because, as in Peter's case, your Heavenly Father will always be there to pick you up when you trust in Him.

Wellness Application: Step out of the boat in faith and keep your focus on the Truth and Word, which is Jesus Christ. Your faith and focus will enable you to walk on water and fulfill your grandest dreams.


Scholarly Communication as a Historical Process

Scholarly communication is a relatively recent field of study that Christine Borgman  has suggested goes back to the 1960s and 70s, but really only became prominent with the advent of new information technology in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Borgman defines scholarly communication as “the study of how scholars in any field (e.g. physical, biological, social, and behavioural sciences, humanities, technology) use and disseminate information through formal and informal channels” (p. 414). and goes on to say that “essential elements such as the scholarly journal article are remarkably stable and print publication continues unabated, despite the proliferation of digital media” (p. 413). Furthermore, Borgman identifies two research areas within scholarly communication.  First, there is the study of the structures of scholarly communication that can be revealed by scientometric and bibliometric analyses.  Second is the process of scholarly communication which encompasses how and why scholars publish.  Much of the literature on scholarly communication has focused on what Borgman defines as structure.

Such scholarship has suggested that “individual imperatives for career self-interest, advancing the field, and receiving credit are often more powerful motivators in publishing decisions than the technological affordances of new media.”  These conclusions rest on a particular line of thinking advocated by researchers such as Eugene Garfield, the founder of the Institute for Scientific Information citation index who has stated that “Those of us who have worked in the field of scientometrics and its antecedent bibliometrics almost universally recognize the debt we owe to Robert K. Merton” (p. 54).  Merton focused on the importance of status as a motivator for scholarly communication.   Garfield measured such status with a very particular method: citations within journal literature.  Other scholars, namely Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, when discussing the approach of Merton and others to measurement of status argue that “we find it difficult to believe that the quest for prestige and status is the sole motive shaping intellectual innovation” (p. 211).  In other words, there may be another way of investigating the ways in which what Borgman defines as the “process” by which scholarly communication forms and sustains itself.

My work, I think, focuses on the “process” of scholarly communication, or, how it developed in the ways that it did and why it did so.  In my view, history is the best way to answer such a question.  In the United States, the earliest journals were founded in the mid to late nineteenth century. Therefore, there are many sources that can help to understand the ways in which scholars institutionalized the communication of their research.  By looking at the careers and debates of scholars from the the mid to late nineteenth century, it may possible to determine the contours of their discussion about scholarly publishing before it developed into the modern system described by Borgman and Harley.  Moreover, these nineteenth century debates may help to think about how modern discussions regarding scholarly communication.  In fact, I think that this debate still continues today.  Steve Miller has stated that “we are entering a new age for public understanding of science,  it is important that citizens get used to scientists arguing out controversial facts, theories, and issues” (p. 119).  The question is, how can these historical debates help us to answer these modern questions.  I hope that by understanding the historical process of scholarly communication, I may be able to answer that question.

Open Access Alchemy

(image from the Chemical Heritage Foundation, Distillations magazine,

A Tale of Two Chemists

Purpose of (19th Century) Academic Publishing

I was looking a bit more on some of my work on Theophilus Wylie, and thought about a question related to scholarly communication.  Wylie lived in a time when (more or less) the only scholarly journal in the United States was the American Journal of Science better known at the time as “Silliman’s Journal” (Benjamin Silliman, Jr. being the editor at the time).  In the modern scholarly communication system, publishing in such a journal would be essential for continuing an appointment as a professor.  In Wylie’s day, however, that was not true.  What were Wylie’s practices for disseminating his scholarship?  They were obviously very different from today.  Also, in my view, knowing about previous methods of sharing scholarship may help modern scholars think in new ways about how scholarship should be shared.  Should modern scholars return to the earlier system used by Wylie?  Probably not, but in some ways Wylie represents a tradition where sharing of scholarship happened primarily through teaching to non-specialist audiences.  Such a practice might also benefit modern scholarship.

The first way of addressing the question of how Wylie disseminated his scholarship would be to look at his publications.  That is how a professor now would be judged, and by modern standards no doubt Wylie would never advance in his career.  He published just one book (a history of Indiana University) which was not until after his retirement from the university in 1891.  In 1860 he wrote a biography of his cousin Andrew Wylie, first president of Indiana University in the Indiana School Journal. In terms of scientific research in his field, Theophilus Wylie published one article in Silliman’s journal, on mastadon bones (which is really more of a report of what he saw rather than a scholarly article, even by 19th century standards).  If one wishes to count it as a publication, Wylie is mentioned by Prof. John Frazer in the Journal of the Franklin Institute, about the discovery of gold in Indiana (similar to his article in Silliman’s journal, this too  is more of a report than a scientific article).  In 1859, Theophilus Wylie published two items.  He wrote an article for a local newspaper, the Indianapolis Journal that, like his articles in Silliman’s Journal and the Journal of the Franklin Institute, was more of a report (this time on mining conditions in Indiana) and his baccalaureate addresses.  That brings Wylie a grand total of 6 publications, only one of which appeared in an academic journal, over a career of 49 years (1836-1885).

Such a list gives to simplistic a picture of Wylie’s activities at Indiana University, however.  Over the same period of time, Wylie gave a large number of public addresses and sermons (many of which survive in note form at the Indiana University Archives).  I have not counted them all, but needless to say they far outnumber Wylie’s print publications.  What conclusions might one draw from this disparity between public addresses and printed publications?  First, I think it is fair to say that Wylie put more emphasis on his preaching and teaching than on his publishing.  I think there is one key aspect to Wylie’s practices, though which goes beyond mere numbers of his printed publications and lectures.

If one looks at all of Wylie’s outputs (lectures and publications alike), I think there is one common denominator:  the audience for which they were intended.  Only two articles (Journal of the Franklin Institute and Silliman’s Journal) were intended for fellow scientists.  The rest were intended for various members of the general public.  Therefore, it seems to me at least that Wylie saw his purpose in sharing knowledge as a public duty, a not one that was meant to be shared only among fellow academics.  In this time where there is increasing debate about whether academic professionals should be engaged in the public sphere, perhaps it is worth thinking about the ways in which professors communicated their scholarship to the public prior to the creation of academic journals.  Might the career of people like Theophilus Wylie be an interesting window into that debate?  I think it certainly could.

Authority in Scholarly Communication

There are three words that are rarely used in the same sentence, but I think may need to be brought more closely together in future discussions about scholarly discourse: Diplomatics, scholarly communication, and digital curation.  Diplomatics was originally a method within archival science designed to establish authenticity in medieval legal documents (now of course expanded to electronic and other media).  Scholarly communication is of course about the ways in which academics disseminate their scholarship.  Digital curation as a field seeks to preserve and add value to content, particularly electronic resources, for future generations.  All of these fields share one characteristic – an interest in authority – that I think needs to be thought about in more depth.

Though authority is not always something discussed that overtly in much scholarly communication literature, is is an issue underlying many of those debates.  Who determines what articles are “valid” through the peer review system?  Who determines the peer reviewers?  How are those peer reviewers selected?  Are certain citations more valuable than others?  Why are certain journals more authoritative than others?  There is of course much scholarship devoted to some of these questions, but I think it is important to see how those questions are similar in many ways to similar questions posited within the field of digital curation.

Digital curation also seeks to understand better how to create “trustworthy” or to put that another way, authoritative digital repositories.  A digital curator might ask questions similar to those above about scholarly communication.  How can we determine what materials are more trustworthy than others?  Who determines and selects such materials for such a repository?  How is the authority of such selectors determined? Are certain repositories more authoritative than others?  Are certain methods of collecting more authoritative than others?

I discussed the concept of “organic information” previously, a concept that comes from the field of diplomatics.  I think this may be a useful framework to think about the concept of authority, particularly in the intersections of both scholarly communication and digital curation.  The theory of “organic information” that recognizes documents as an ever-changing material object that is dependent both on a physical (or in the case of electronic documents a virtual) form, but also is part of a dynamic social system that places different values on that object at different periods in history.  Additionally, the field of diplomatics has several criteria for evaluating authenticity within these contexts that can help to frame discussions of trust for any type of information that might be found within a digital repository.

Some scholars  define the fundamentals of diplomatics as a method of knowledge organization.  In the nineteenth century diplomatics established the principle of respect de fonds defined by Michel Duchein as “to group, without mixing them [documents] with others, the archives (documents of every kind) created by or coming from an administration, establishment, person, or corporate body.”  From this principle, other scholars have identified a differentiation between organic and non-organic information.  The former is defined as information gathered by an individual in the course of some practical activity; the latter refers to something that is contained in a bibliographic reference.  Respect de fonds, therefore, is about honoring the groups and individuals who have gathered certain documents together.  To put this another way, this principle is a method for studying how individuals create authority for certain documents and place those texts together in a kind of archive with other materials that might explain the collection of records as a whole.  In order to systematize this study, there are several methods diplomatistes (practitioners of diplomatics) utilize.

With the arrival of new kinds of documents and the recent explosion of information, scholars have been calling for an expansion of the field into these new areas. Francis Blouin tries to create a framework in which such developments could happen.  He identifies two sub-fields within diplomatics.  The first of these focuses on documents themselves.  This is the field practitioners most commonly associate with the word diplomatics, the study of an individual document (often a historical one like a medieval manuscript), and whether or not it is an original or a forgery.  Tied to that kind of study is a second, less well known, but equally important sub-field however that Blouin describes as “organizational context” or the connections between a particular document and the institution in which it was created and the people who created a document for a particular purpose.  He stresses that these two approaches are complementary and cannot be separated from one another.

Bruno Delmas identifies the purpose of diplomatics as a discipline that establishes authority within a particular document.  To do this, he identifies four characteristics: memory, evidence, understanding, and communication as essential elements of any document whether physical or electronic.  Delmas also distinguishes the methods of practice in which all diplomatists must engage.  These include the study of form (or what a document looks like and what its original purpose was), genesis (or the original context of a document), edition (whether a document was added to at a later time), and selection (how a document was chosen to represent a certain type of characteristic such as memory or evidence).  Olivier Guyotjeannin identifies the same basic methods as Delmas, though he describes them slightly differently.  He identifies form, tradition (similar to edition but including a concept of an author’s heritage and whether an author fits within a particular literary tradition), genesis, critique of false (the historical method of determining authenticity from previous scholarship and opinions), and chronology (study of dating of materials and how earlier dates translate into modern ones).  Guyotejeannin further argues (in ways similar to Blouin) that these methods ought to be applied to modern print and electronic materials.

How might diplomatics shape further discussions about authority in scholarly communication?  Fundamentally, all electronic documents, whether they are published through a scholarly journal or deposited in an online repository (and many documents go through both processes), are subject to these questions about authority.  Diplomatics, particularly the concept of “organic information,” I think provides an interesting framework to investigate these questions further.  Documents are a product of various social processes that shape them.  Using a historical and social analysis to determine authority might help reframe some of the ways we talk about establishing authority within the scholarly communication system.