Early one morning in June 2013, the electricity went out for more than 450 people in a residential neighborhood in Rancho Bernardo. As soon as the outage occurred, smart meters sent remote alerts back to San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), informing electric grid operators about the outage and allowing them to immediately dispatch crews to the scene. By the time the first customer call came in, crews had already been on-site for nearly an hour working to repair the damaged underground cable. As electricity was restored to all customers at 6 a.m., some never even knew the power had been out in the first place.

SDG&E detected this event using the new Outage Management System (OMS) that employs smart grid technology to speed up the detection of power outages and help restore electricity to customers faster than ever before. The new system leverages real-time data from 1.4 million smart meters, which send remote alerts back to the control room when an outage occurs in the surrounding neighborhood. Previously, grid operators often had to rely on customers to report outages over the phone, even when the outage occurred late at night or in a remote location. Since the system was installed in 2012, crews have arrived on the scene of literally dozens of outages before customers were even aware of the problem. SDG&E now knows immediately when an outage happens anywhere on the system and can dispatch crews to make necessary and prompt repairs.

As the Rancho Bernardo example demonstrates, reducing outage times is important to all residents, who count on reliable energy in their homes, businesses, streets and neighborhoods. Reliable energy keeps schools running smoothly as they educate local children and maintains operations in essential hospitals as they care for the sick. Energy also sustains the economy of the entire region, literally powering the workplace and providing a foundation for San Diego to produce $177 billion in economic output each year, which equates to $500 million every day.

“Energy is a key to the economic prosperity of San Diego,” said Jerry Sanders, president and CEO of the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce. “We need a reliable supply of power to keep our industries moving and our citizens employed. Because of our reliable grid, San Diego’s growing, technology-based economy is able to produce new jobs and compete in the global economy.”

Along with the Outage Management System, SDG&E is implementing other innovative software systems that can actually help the grid “heal” itself automatically during outages. The Distribution Management System (DMS) is basically new computer software that collects detailed real-time information about the condition of the grid from more than 1,000 remotely controlled switches that SDG&E has installed on power lines, as well as other sensors in the field. During an outage, DMS will detect the problem immediately and determine the best way to reroute power to the area. DMS will then communicate automatically with remote switches in the field to bring power to the affected area, thus restoring electricity to many customers within minutes through its self-healing capabilities. Both OMS and DMS are already producing benefits. In some instances, OMS has helped SDG&E identify outages an average of 25 minutes more quickly than before, thus reducing outage response and restoration times. Another innovative project is the installation of conditioned-based maintenance sensors, which have been placed on 75 percent of substation transformers to alert crews remotely if maintenance is needed, thus extending the life of valuable equipment and saving millions of dollars, while keeping power flowing smoothly and reliably.

SDG&E also is using technology to bring in greater quantities of renewable energy in a reliable manner. The challenge here is that these new cleaner forms of renewable energy – wind and solar – tend to be intermittent by nature. If a cloud goes over the sun, or the wind stops blowing, the power output of these sources can become suddenly unavailable. SDG&E is using new technology to integrate these resources onto the grid without sacrificing reliability during these unpredictable fluctuations. For example, SDG&E has installed several energy storage devices (large batteries), designed to supply the grid when renewable sources fluctuate. These batteries also store clean power for later use.

In addition to new technology, SDG&E is strengthening the physical infrastructure of the grid. The utility has proactively replaced nearly 1,000 miles of underground cable, and approximately 3,000 wooden transmission and distribution poles have been replaced with resilient steel poles in areas where wildfire risk is highest. SDG&E is also undertaking one of the largest safety inspections of natural gas pipelines ever, with the goal of further enhancing the safety of the system.

All these efforts are aimed a transforming older infrastructure into a new, more versatile and resilient energy grid that is able to sense and respond to real-time information faster in order to “heal” itself. As a result, the grid is becoming even more reliable and sustainable for customers, as the utility works to incorporate unprecedented levels of clean, renewable energy for the benefit of all residents. The utility’s focus on this area is producing stellar results, as evidenced by SDG&E being named the most reliable utility in the western United States for seven years in a row. SDG&E will continue to modernize the electric grid with innovative technology and enhanced equipment, providing reliable and safe power for customers and empowering a prosperous future for the entire region.


Crashing the Neolithic Revolution

This week, in Global I, we are starting to examine the Neolithic Revolution and its effects on the development of early complex societies. The development of farming techniques and the domestication of animals changed humans’ relationship with sources of food. The following video, provided by Crash Course, provides an in-depth analysis of this period in time. Question for us today: What were the benefits and potential drawbacks of the Neolithic Revolution? Post your responses to the video in the text box below.

Globalization as it relates to world history…

Last week, we began our semester really examining a new concept in world history: the concept of Globalization. As we examine the DBQ closely, we can see that there is a development of increasing economic interaction across the globe over time. The article below is from a 2013 issue of the Economist, a fantastic journal to make the connections between economic, social, and political events worldwide. Perhaps another question for us could be: Is our modern-day concept of globalization (certainly the above cartoon presents a viewpoint on Globalization) consistent with the globalization that occurred in Columbus’ and da Gama’s time (as the article points out), or even prior to those explorers’ voyages? If you think that our concepts of globalization in the 21st century are different than those existing in the 16th century, what do you think accounts for those differences? If you think they are similar, what causes the similarities in the ideas of globalization between the 16th century and the 21st century?

When did Globalization start?

by C.R. | LONDON

“GLOBALISATION” has become the buzzword of the last two decades. The sudden increase in the exchange of knowledge, trade and capital around the world, driven by technological innovation, from the internet to shipping containers, thrust the term into the limelight.

Some see globalisation as a good thing. According to Amartya Sen, a Nobel-Prize winning economist, globalisation “has enriched the world scientifically and culturally, and benefited many people economically as well”. The United Nations has even predicted that the forces of globalisation may have the power to eradicate poverty in the 21st century.

Others disagree. Globalisation has been attacked by critics of free market economics, like the economists Joseph Stiglitz and Ha-Joon Chang, for perpetuating inequality in the world rather than reducing it. Some agree that they may have a point. The International Monetary Fund admitted in 2007 that inequality levels may have been increased by the introduction of new technology and the investment of foreign capital in developing countries. Others, in developed nations, distrust globalisation as well. They fear that it often allows employers to move jobs away to cheaper places. In France, “globalisation” and “délocalisation” have become derogatory terms for free market policies. An April 2012 survey by IFOP, a pollster, found that only 22% of French people thought globalisation a “good thing” for their country.

However, economic historians reckon the question of whether the benefits of globalisation outweigh the downsides is more complicated than this. For them, the answer depends on when you say the process of globalisation started. But why does it matter whether globalisation started 20, 200, or even 2,000 years ago? Their answer is that it is impossible to say how much of a “good thing” a process is in history without first defining for how long it has been going on.

Early economists would certainly have been familiar with the general concept that markets and people around the world were becoming more integrated over time. Although Adam Smith himself never used the word, globalisation is a key theme in the Wealth of Nations. His description of economic development has as its underlying principle the integration of markets over time. As the division of labour enables output to expand, the search for specialisation expands trade, and gradually, brings communities from disparate parts of the world together. The trend is nearly as old as civilisation. Primitive divisions of labour, between “hunters” and “shepherds”, grew as villages and trading networks expanded to include wider specialisations. Eventually armourers to craft bows and arrows, carpenters to build houses, and seamstress to make clothing all appeared as specialist artisans, trading their wares for food produced by the hunters and shepherds. As villages, towns, countries and continents started trading goods that they were efficient at making for ones they were not, markets became more integrated, as specialisation and trade increased. This process that Smith describes starts to sound rather like “globalisation”, even if it was more limited in geographical area than what most people think of the term today.

Smith had a particular example in mind when he talked about market integration between continents: Europe and America. The discovery of Native Americans by European traders enabled a new division of labour between the two continents. He mentions as an example, that the native Americans, who specialised in hunting, traded animal skins for “blankets, fire-arms, and brandy” made thousands of miles away in the old world.

Some modern economic historians dispute Smith’s argument that the discovery of the Americas, by Christopher Columbus in 1492, accelerated the process of globalisation. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson argued in a 2002 paper that globalisation only really began in the nineteenth century when a sudden drop in transport costs allowed the prices of commodities in Europe and Asia to converge. Columbus’ discovery of America and Vasco Da Gama’s discovery of the route to Asia around the Cape of Good Hope had very little impact on commodity prices, they argue.

But there is one important market that Mssrs O’Rourke and Williamson ignore in their analysis: that for silver. As European currencies were generally based on the value of silver, any change in its value would have had big effects on the European price level. Smith himself argued this was one of the greatest economic changes that resulted from the discovery of the Americas:

The influx of about 150,000 tonnes of silver from Mexico and Bolivia by the Spanish and Portuguese Empires after 1500 reversed the downwards price trends of the medieval period. Instead, prices rose dramatically in Europe by a factor of six or seven times over the next 150 years as more silver chased the same amount of goods in Europe (see chart).

How Christopher Columbus caused inflation

The impact of what historians have called the resulting “price revolution” dramatically changed the face of Europe. Historians attribute everything from the dominance of the Spanish Empire in Europe to the sudden increase in witch hunts around the sixteenth century to the destabilising effects of inflation on European society. And if it were not for the sudden increase of silver imports from Europe to China and India during this period, European inflation would have been much worse than it was. Price rises only stopped in about 1650 when the price of silver coinage in Europe fell to such a low level that it was no longer profitable to import it from the Americas.

The rapid convergence of the silver market in early modern period is only one example of “globalisation”, some historians argue. The German historical economist, Andre Gunder Frank, has argued that the start of globalisation can be traced back to the growth of trade and market integration between the Sumer and Indus civilisations of the third millennium BC. Trade links between China and Europe first grew during the Hellenistic Age, with further increases in global market convergence occuring when transport costs dropped in the sixteenth century and more rapidly in the modern era of globalisation, which Mssrs O’Rourke and Williamson describe as after 1750. Global historians such as Tony Hopkins and Christopher Bayly have also stressed the importance of the exchange of not only trade but also ideas and knowledge during periods of pre-modern globalisation.

Globalisation has not always been a one-way process. There is evidence that there was also market disintegration (or deglobalisation) in periods as varied as the Dark Ages, the seventeenth century, and the interwar period in the twentieth. And there is some evidence that globalisation has retreated in the current crisis since 2007. But it is clear that globalisation is not simply a process that started in the last two decades or even the last two centuries. It has a history that stretches thousands of years, starting with Smith’s primitive hunter-gatherers trading with the next village, and eventually developing into the globally interconnected societies of today. Whether you think globalisation is a “good thing” or not, it appears to be an essential element of the economic history of mankind.

Masterchef Crusaders

OK, today we’ ve looked at the Crusades and its effects on Europe and the Middle East. One of the areas that we noticed was the introduction of spices to European foods on a wider scale than found since the fall of Rome. To fully understand this, we should also examine the diet of those who did go on the Crusades. Question for this blog: How do you think the diet of the Crusaders had an impact on them if and when they returned home after the Crusades? I’m guessing Gordon Ramsay would have nothing to do with any of this…in the meantime, expand to full screen when viewing this.

China and Japan over World War II – 60 years later…

Tokyo War Crimes trial

During this week in our Global History IV course, we’ve examined human rights violations that prior to this week we probably unthinkable beforehand, with the 1937 Japanese invasion of China. I’ve also asked my intrepid students to consider the idea of whether justice is feasible here (should those responsible should still be prosecuted for their crimes). The students have been quite passionate in their arguments on both sides of the issue (these were criminal acts committed over 50 years ago v. the victims of these activities, regardless of time passed, deserve justice). As we have examined the events through the documentary Nanking,the question keeps coming up: is a truly fair sense of justice possible with crimes of this magnitude? Why or why not?

“China and Japan Spar Over War Trials, More Than Six Decades On”, Didi Kristen Tarlow, New York Times, March 20, 2013

BEIJING – What would international reaction be if Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, were to publicly cast doubt on the fairness of the Nuremberg Trials, which condemned top Nazis at the end of World War II?

Something quite similar may have happened recently in Japan, where, according to media reports, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe cast doubt on the Tokyo Trials there (these found about two dozen prominent Japanese guilty of war crimes; seven were sentenced to death).

Here’s a headline from the Japan Daily Press: “PM Abe says WWII war crime trials were just ‘victors’ justice.’ ”

“In a meeting of the House of Representatives Budget Committee last Tuesday, Abe said that what the world now thinks of the outcome of World War II was dictated by the victorious Allied Forces and it is only under their judgement that the Japanese were condemned,” the Japan Daily Press article said, citing an article in The Telegraph.

World War II is still a sensitive topic not just in China but further afield in Asia, where memories of brutality by the invading Japanese Imperial Army linger and many believe that Japan, unlike Germany, has never entirely faced up to what it did. Memories may be bitterest in China, where millions died and where the government uses anti-Japanese sentiment to bolster nationalism.

This week there was a response in China to Abe’s comments, and it took an unusually scholarly form: The National Library of China announced it would for the first time publish what it said was its original historical documents and records of the trials, in which Chinese judges and prosecutors took part, to be called “Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” (as the court was formally known). The collection will be published starting in June and will be in two parts; 80 volumes of trial records, to be followed by 50 additional volumes of archival materials and references, reported the China Culture News, a newspaper owned by the Ministry of Culture.

The report promised that the documents, which will be available to researchers and ordinary readers, would push back against “rightists” in Japan who deny the justice of the trials or other aspects of World War II history, long a complaint of China’s.

“On Mar. 3, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at a parliamentary budget meeting, openly called into question the Tokyo Trials,” the China Culture News wrote, citing Gao Hong, a researcher at the library and head of document preservation from the Republican era (1911-1949). The new collection “will become a powerful tool for refuting the opinions of Japanese rightists and conservatives who distort or deny the historical truth about the invasion of China.”

Last year the library, together with Jiao Tong University in Shanghai, set up an institute to study the trials, called the Tokyo Trials Research Center, it said.

Yet if China accuses rightists in Japan of distorting the debate over the war, historians have said that China has done so too.

After the war, the Chinese Communist Party glossed over wartime atrocities, to “avoid engendering national hatred towards Japan that would have confused it with China’s true archenemies, the KMT,” or Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalists, “and the United States,” wrote He Yinan in an essay in a book, “Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power.”

“One thing it did was to suppress domestic truth-telling about Japanese war crimes and Chinese suffering,” Ms. He wrote.

The article in the China Culture News may have acknowledged that problem, if obliquely. “For a long time, because of various historical reasons, there has been a great deal of urgent work that has needed to be done to extend the accumulation, thorough research and international scholarly exchanges on the first-hand materials of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,” it said.

The Comfort Women issue…from a local perspective…

A memorial in Palisades Park, N.J., is dedicated to women, many Korean, who were sexually enslaved by Japanese soldiers during World War II.

So it is now near the end of the year, and we’re looking on issues we have seen in Global I, II, III, and IV. Here’s one we discussed to some point in class – it’s moments like this that we bring issues in other regions close up to our own neighborhoods. If one were to go over the GW Bridge, near Ft. Lee, is the neighborhood, Palisades Park. This neighborhood has also become a firestorm over an issue in Japanese-Korean relations, and yup you guessed it, there’s a history link here. I won’t take the wind out of the sails now – but how do you think the town board should handle this issue?

May 18, 2012

Two delegations of Japanese officials visited Palisades Park, N.J., this month with a request that took local administrators by surprise: The Japanese wanted a small monument removed from a public park.

The monument, a brass plaque on a block of stone, was dedicated in 2010 to the memory of so-called comfort women, tens of thousands of women and girls, many Korean, who were forced into sexual slavery by Japanese soldiers during World War II.

But the Japanese lobbying to remove the monument seems to have backfired — and deepened animosity between Japan and South Korea over the issue of comfort women, a longstanding irritant in their relations.

The authorities in Palisades Park, a borough across the Hudson River from Manhattan, rejected the demand, and now the Japanese effort is prompting Korean groups in the New York region and across the country to plan more such monuments.

“They’re helping us, actually,” said Chejin Park, a lawyer at the Korean American Voters’ Council, a civic group that championed the memorial in Palisades Park, where more than half of the population of about 20,000 is of Korean descent, according to the Census Bureau. “We can increase the awareness of this issue.”

Korean groups have been further motivated by a letter-writing campaign in Japan in opposition to a proposal by Peter Koo, a New York councilman and Chinese immigrant, to rename a street in Flushing, Queens, in honor of comfort women.

Mr. Park said that in the past week or so, his organization had received calls from at least five Korean community organizers around the country — in Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey and Texas — expressing interest in building their own memorials. These would be in addition to at least four memorials in the works in California and Georgia, he added.

The monument in Palisades Park is the only one in the United States dedicated to comfort women, borough officials said.

“Starting from Flushing, N.Y., we will continue the construction in the areas of major Korean-American communities,” said Paul Park, executive director of the Korean-American Association of Greater New York, one of the oldest Korean community organizations in the region. “We Korean-Americans observe the issue on the level of a global violation of human rights.”

Tensions between Japan and South Korea over the legacy of comfort women were reignited in December when a bronze statue in honor of victims was installed across the street from the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, the South Korean capital. Japanese officials have asked the Korean authorities to remove that statue.

Japanese leaders have said that their formal apologies, expressions of remorse and admissions of responsibility regarding the treatment of comfort women are sufficient, including an offer to set up a $1 billion fund for victims. But many Koreans contend that those actions are inadequate. Surviving victims have rejected the fund because it would be financed by private money. The victims are seeking government reparations.

Mayor James Rotundo of Palisades Park said the lobbying began obliquely late last month. Officials at the Japanese consulate in New York sent e-mails requesting a meeting with borough administrators.

“I called the secretary and said, ‘What is this about?’ ” the mayor recalled in an interview, “and she said, ‘It’s about Japanese-U.S. relations,’ and I said: ‘Oh. Well, O.K.’ ”

Borough officials rejected the request, and the delegation left.

The Japanese consulate in New York has been reluctant to discuss its lobbying.

In interviews this week, Fumio Iwai, the deputy consul general, would not say whether the consul general had requested that the monument be removed. But he denied that the consul general had offered to help the borough in return for the monument’s removal. Mr. Hiroki “did not offer any such condition,” he said.

Mr. Iwai said the issue of comfort women, if not Palisades Park specifically, was the subject of continuing discussions “at a very high level” between the governments of South Korea and Japan.

“So,” he said, pausing as if to choose his words carefully, “things are quite complicated.”

A New Look at Nuremberg…new criminals, new way of finding justice?

So, now in our Global IV classroom, we are witnessing a novel turning point, that of a concept that individuals are accountable for their actions during wartime. Of course, I am writing of the Nuremberg Trials. It’s amazing that at the end of the day, the multitude of horrors that Hitler and the Nazi Party committed upon Europe were examined inside a courtroom and that a group of leaders were able to be seen not as political leaders following some pernicious ideology of a megalomaniac, but rather as criminals conspiring to commit the gravest of crimes.  As we will see soon, many of those sitting in the dockets made their way to the gallows, some lived the remainders of their lives in a prison cell, and those who did leave both behind still had to accept that they were no longer relevant in the world…or so we may think.

As we move into this part of the year, we need to add a new phrase into our vocabulary: Transitional Justice (TJ). This relates to how justice is carried out after a particular period of conflict.Since Nuremberg, we’ve seen a number of different versions of Transitional Justice occur. From western-style courtroom proceedings in the International Criminal Court to Truth Commissons with amnesty being offered in exchange for full testimony, TJ is a hot topic now. Perhaps this month is going to be even more dynamic in the concept of TJ, if only for an issue of one individual, a man named Joseph Kony. Kony is allegedly an African warlord, in the central-east country of Uganda, a beautiful country which unfortunately has been associated with dictatorships, civil war, and some of the most heinous of atrocities to have occurred in the post-World War II period. We have seen how Nuremberg played itself out for post-Hitler Europe. Question for this blog: What could one expect of a Nuremberg-style trial for Joseph Kony? Should it be held in Kampala, Uganda’s capital? Who should oversee the trial? How can Kony be guaranteed a fair trial? There are probably more questions for us in the immediate future, I hope we answer most of them before April 20th.

Now this Youtube video has gone quite viral, and although I do have issues with it (which I will address in our Post-Colonial movements in Africa and Asia), I have to admit I am impressed with much of the message that was put forth here.  On that one, you know my questions now. Catch the video and put in your two cents…

Japanese militarism in the 21st century…

An armband worn by a member of the Japanese group Zaitokukai. The red characters say “The Volunteer Corps Against Lawless Koreans”; the black characters say “Expel barbarians.

So this week, we’ve discussed the rise of militarism in Japan and its impact on 1930s East Asia. In fact, we used this discussion to lead into the event known as ‘The Rape of Nanking’, the term used for the Japanese invasion of Nanking in 1937. The question for this blog’s discussion is as follows: How are these issues similar to the rise of 1930s militarism? How different are their views toward violence? The reason why these questions are important are clear: study the effects of Japanese militarism on East Asia in the 30s, the invasion of Manchuria in ’31, the invasion of China in 1937, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. As we progress through World War II, these militarist forces would bring Japan to its darkest days in the modern period, and with some of these crimes, the modern Japanese government has been quick to deny culpability.

New Dissent in Japan Is Loudly Anti-Foreign
By Martin Fackler

Published: August 28, 2010

Comparisons between the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution

In our Global IV class, we have begun discussions of what was the start of the 1917 Russian Revolution. We’ve analyzed the causes of the Revolution, the violent crackdowns as exemplified in the 1905 ‘Bloody Sunday’ event, and the uncertainty of the direction of the Revolution after the end of the Czar.
I think we are witnessing a return to that same sense of uncertainty in Egypt. As most of you are probably quite aware, there is an overall revolution against the existing orders that be in the Middle East. In 2011, we witnessed several political revolutions, in Tunisia, Egypt, and in Libya. Egypt is an interesting point for us to start, as those early leaders are just starting to figure out what future they anticipate for an Egypt after the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
The following link is an video documentary from the young revolutionaries on the situations in Egypt one year later.

Questions for us today are: How do we see similarities between what we’ve learned so far about the Russian Revolution and the situation in Egypt one year later? How are those similarities found in the Revolutions’ leaders in both cases? Do you think the revolutionaries faced a sense of disillusionment in both cases?

Welcome to North Korea

So here we are on Christmas eve, and what am I posting up? a docuemntary on North Korea. Yesterday, we had some spirited discussion on NK, and yet we saw very little of what we discussed. Sure, we get that there is a nationalist sentiment in NK, ‘Juche’, which helps to explain why the country is so secretive. Yes, we get the idea that the leadership in the country is certifiable, but that doesn’t mean they’re stupid. In the end, though, what kind of hope is possible for North Korea’s future? Any thoughts on this one???

Guns, Germs, and Steel – holiday video project

Back in September, at the beginning of the 2011-12 school year, I posed a question to my Global III classes – why has the world turned out the way that it has done so far, with so few people having so much, and so many people having so little. It came from ‘Yali’s question’ in Guns, Germs, and Steel, an incredible piece from Jared Diamond. Throughout the semester, I have heard various students getting close to the answers to that one large question. I wanted to assign GGS for a book project, but I also realized that without visualizing what Diamond wrote, it might shortchange what students are able to analyze in terms of the role that guns, germs, and steel have had on human history…and also provide us with a means to change that question to a more positive conclusion for ourselves.

That said, here is the project guidelines. There are a total of 20 questions. Your task is this: to answer any 10 questions with an original idea, based on evidence shown in the video clips (include the clip # in your blog post), and to respond to an additional 10 posts by your colleagues either by agreeing or disagreeing with their posts. This does not mean one will get credit for simply saying ” I agree with so and so’s post”. I expect that someone will write, for example “Jeremy’s take on question XX is interesting and relevant, for the potential following reasons…” or “On Kathleen’s idea for xx question, I have an issue…”. The rubric will be available this week, and will be available by the Tuesday we return to class from the winter holidays.

Guns Germs and Steel I

Guns Germs and Steel II

Guns Germs and Steel III

Guns Germs and Steel IV
How accurate is Jared Diamond when he says of a civilizations ability to gain power, wealth, and strength, “…what’s far more important is the hand that people have been dealt, the raw materials they’ve had at their disposal.”(In other words, do you agree with Prof. Diamond) Why or why not?

Guns Germs and Steel V

Guns Germs and Steel VI

Guns Germs and Steel VII

Guns Germs and Steel VIII

Guns Germs and Steel IX
At the time that the Spanish conquistador’s invaded the Inca Empire, they were armed with state of the art weaponry. Describe this weaponry.

Guns Germs and Steel X
What is Jared Diamond’s explanation for why the Spanish had advanced to steel swords while Inca’s were still making tools and weapons from bronze?

Guns Germs and Steel XI
How did the battle tactics used by the Spanish conquistadors help the small army defeat the Inca army that outnumbered it by the thousands?

Guns Germs and Steel XII
According to Jared Diamond, what made the Europeans “accidental conquerors”?

Guns Germs and Steel XIII
According to Jared Diamond, what is the one factor that allowed Europeans to develop the forces necessary to conquer vast portions of the world?

Guns Germs and Steel XIV
Why were the Europeans who settled the South African cape so successful? Describe two reasons.
How did disease allow the Europeans to conquer the native populations in the Americas and in the African cape?

Guns Germs and Steel XV
While the Europeans who were attempting to overtake/settle the tropical areas of the African continent were responsible for introducing killer germs to the native populations, they also suffered from the effects of the germs native to this part of the world. Describe how these germs worked against the European settlers.

Guns Germs and Steel XVI
How did the native Africans protected themselves from the germs that caused diseases such as Smallpox and Malaria? Give specific examples cited in the film.

Guns Germs and Steel XVII
What is the number one public health problem in Zambia, and who are the people primarily affected by this?
How has disease contributed to the poverty in many African countries such as Zambia?

Guns Germs and Steel XVIII
According to statistics from the film, how has Malaria effected the net growth in Africa over the last 50 years?
Describe how other tropical countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have developed rich economies despite having many of the same geographical and health problems faced by African nations.


Archive of posts for category
Law of the Sea

So How Is China Taking Its Loss at the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal? Not Well.

by Julian Ku

I have been curious to see how China would respond to yesterday’s UNCLOS Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling finding it has jurisdiction to hear the Philippines South China Sea related claims.  Well, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ready with this blistering response:

Q: The Arbitral Tribunal established at the request of the Republic of the Philippines rendered the award on jurisdiction and admissibility of the South China Sea arbitration. What is China’s comment on that?

A: The Chinese government will not accept nor participate in the South China Sea arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has immediately released a statement to elaborate on China’s solemn position. The award is null and void, and has no binding effect on China. I would like to highlight three points.

First, China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters. As a sovereign state and a State Party to the UNCLOS, China is entitled to choose the means and procedures of dispute settlement of its own will. China has all along been committed to resolving disputes with its neighbors over territory and maritime jurisdiction through negotiations and consultations. China and the Philippines have repeatedly reaffirmed in bilateral documents since the 1990s and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 that they shall resolve relevant disputes through negotiations and consultations.

Second, disregarding that the essence of this arbitration case is territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and related matters, maliciously evading the declaration on optional exceptions made by China in 2006 under Article 298 of the UNCLOS, and negating the consensus between China and the Philippines on resolving relevant disputes through negotiations and consultations, the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures, misrepresented the law and obstinately forced ahead with the arbitration, and as a result, have severely violated the legitimate rights that China enjoys as a State Party to the UNCLOS, completely deviated from the purposes and objectives of the UNCLOS, and eroded the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS.

Third, as a State Party to the UNCLOS, China firmly opposes the acts of abusing the compulsory procedures for dispute settlement under the UNCLOS, and calls upon all parties concerned to work together to safeguard the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS. China urges the Philippines to honor its own commitments, respect China’s rights under international law, change its course and return to the right track of resolving relevant disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations and consultations. That is the correct path with bright prospects.

The full MFA statement is here, and includes a swipe at the Philippines for using the “cloak of law as a political provocation.”  It is worth noting that China is still aiming most of its rhetorical fire at the Philippines, but it has also now directly criticized the Arbitral Tribunal for “abus[ing] relevant procedures [and] misrepresent[ing] the law….”  I also detect a slightly larger emphasis in China’s complaint about the “unilateral” nature of this arbitration.

I am also impressed by China’s willingness to just ignore the clear provisions of Article 288(4) of UNCLOS, and simply declare that the Tribunal’s ruling is “null and void” and has “no binding legal effect.”  At some point, someone in China is going to have to gin up a legal argument to get past UNCLOS’ clear language giving the Tribunal the power to determine questions of jurisdiction.  But for now, it looks like China is going to stick to its guns.

Breaking: UNCLOS Tribunal Rules Against China, Unanimously Finds It Has Jurisdiction Over Philippines South China Sea Claims

by Julian Ku

It’s been a rough week for China’s South China Seas policy. In addition to facing a US Freedom of Navigation operation near one of its artificial islands, the arbitration tribunal formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has decided that it has jurisdiction to proceed to the merits on the Philippines’ legal challenge to certain Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

I will blog more about this later, but for now it is worth noting that the tribunal unanimously ruled that it can proceed to the merits on seven out of 15 of the Philippines’ claims, and that it reserves the question of jurisdiction on seven other claims as being so interwoven with the merits that it cannot be resolved without first considering the merits.

I will note that the tribunal reserved the question of jurisdiction over the Philippines’ biggest and most flashy claim: the argument that China’s Nine Dash Line “historic rights” claim is inconsistent with UNCLOS. It held that:

The Philippines’ Submission No. 1 does, however, require the Tribunal to consider the effect of any historic rights claimed by China to maritime entitlements in the South China Sea and the interaction of such rights with the provisions of the Convention. This is a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider this question, however, would be dependent on the nature of any such historic rights and whether they are covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction over “historic bays or titles” in Article 298. The nature and validity of any historic rights claimed by China is a merits determination. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission No. 1 therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines’ Submission No. 1 for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines’ claims.

On the other hand, the Tribunal did find that the question of whether the Scarborough Shoal is a “rock” or an “island” is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, irrespective of the merits. It did so because it held that there are no overlapping sovereignty or sea boundary claims that might impact the determination.

Overall, it should never be surprising when an arbitral tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction to hear a case. The Tribunal did throw China a bone by noting that it is still possible that seven of the Philippines’ claims (including the Nine Dash Line challenge) could be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at the merits stage.

But by reserving the question of jurisdiction, and guaranteeing it will rule on the merits for several other claims, the Tribunal shoves the ball back onto China’s court.  Will China continue to claim it is not bound by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction, when the Tribunal has now found it has jurisdiction?  China would more clearly be in violation of UNCLOS now than it was before, because UNCLOS Article 288(4) makes it clear that “[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.”  My guess is China will pretend that Article 288 doesn’t exist and continue to refuse to participate.  The interesting question is whether China will pay any serious price (in reputational terms) if it does so.

China’s Weak Legal Basis for Criticizing the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea

by Julian Ku

The US Navy executed a much anticipated “freedom of navigation operation” (FONOP) today within 12 nautical miles of Subi reef, the site of one of China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.   Predictably, China has reacted sharply to this operation by sending two Chinese destroyers to shadow the U.S. ship and planes, summoning the U.S. ambassador, and issuing angry public statements (see below).  Although it is not the main focus of their complaints, the Chinese have repeatedly described the U.S. operation as “illegal” thus highlighting the legal conflict underlying this naval showdown.

The most detailed official reaction was presented by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu Kang.

It is unclear exactly how the U.S. ship put personnel on the islands and reefs at risk, but in any event, the spokesperson went on to assure the world that China has, and always will, respect the freedom of navigation consistent with international law.

China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui echoed these remarks, although this statement focused more on China’s “indisputable sovereignty” than on the legality of the U.S. actions.  China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi simply warned the U.S. against “stirring up trouble.” Perhaps more seriously, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson called the U.S. action an “abuse” of the principle of “freedom of navigation under international law” that would cause “harm” to bilateral trust and relations.

As I suggested in a previous post, the US and China might have chosen to downplay this incident by treating the U.S. naval visit as an “innocent passage” through China’s territorial seas.  But China believes even innocent passage requires its permission, and the U.S. Navy made sure that its destroyer was accompanied by naval surveillance aircraft. The inclusion of the aircraft makes it clear that the U.S. is not trying to claim an “innocent passage.” Rather, the U.S. is stating (through its actions) that it does not believe Subi reef (where the Chinese have added an artificial island) is a rock or island generating a territorial sea.  Therefore, US naval vessels should be free to conduct any activity they wish in this area.

It is interesting that at least one Chinese media outlet is claiming that there is no real conflict over international law between the two sides.  In this portrayal, China’s actions in building artificial islands is “completely legal” and the U.S. is just trying to flaunt its power by “harassing” China.  China’s legal position appears to be that it is building artificial islands on reefs that are entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea.  Or, as another commentator sympathetic to China’s position has argued, because China claims every land feature in the South China Sea, even if the relevant reef is not entitled to a territorial sea, other nearby land features (also claimed by China) probably generate such rights.

In my view, the U.S. has a much stronger legal position.  Indeed, China is barely offering any serious legal defense other than repeating the words “indisputable sovereignty” repeatedly.  China is not doing itself any favors by calling US actions illegal, but failing to offer any specific criticism or explanation of its own legal position.

On the other hand, perhaps it is China’s interest to downplay the legal aspects of this dispute, and to feed the narrative that the U.S. is “provoking” a confrontation.  To some degree,this is working, as the global and Chinese media are feeding the narrative about a US-China naval showdown and ignoring the niceties of the U.S. legal position.  Indeed, if China raises the stakes by threatening some military response (as it is getting close to doing), it will be hard to convince the world (or the U.S. public) that such a conflict is worthwhile in order to vindicate an abstract legal principle like “freedom of navigation.”

Why “Following International Law” Won’t Necessary Solve the South China Sea Conflict Over Freedom of Navigation

by Julian Ku

As Chris notes below, it seems like there will be a showdown soon between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea over the right of freedom of navigation set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law. It is tempting to see this as a problem of one side ignoring international law, and the other trying to uphold it.  But the U.S. and China have a fundamentally different understanding of what international law requires and allows under the principle of “freedom of navigation”. So getting all sides  to “follow” international law is not necessarily going to solve the dispute here.

The U.S. definition of freedom of navigation means all ships (including warships) are allowed to traverse both the 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and the 12 nm territorial seas without obtaining the permission of the coastal state.  In the 200 nm EEZ, the U.S. believes that military ships may conduct any activity, including surveillance of the coastal state (e.g. “spying”).  Within 12 nm, the U.S. believes military ships must abide by the rules of “innocent passage” which precludes any overt military-related activity.

The Chinese definition of freedom of navigation is quite different.  Essentially, the Chinese argue that military ships should have to follow rules of innocent passage even in the 200 nm EEZ, and that military ships must get permission to enter the 12 nm territorial sea, even if those ships are planning to make an innocent passage.

Why does this difference in the definition of freedom of navigation matter?  Because it allows both sides to say that they are abiding by the rules for freedom of navigation set forth in UNCLOS, while disagreeing dramatically on what each side is allowed to do.  From the U.S. perspective, its navy should be allowed to enter the 12 nm territorial seas around China’s “islands” as long as they abide by the rules of innocent passage.  But the Chinese will say that freedom of navigation doesn’t permit this activity.

Most states agree with the U.S. definition of freedom of navigation.  But some states (including neighboring South China Sea coastal states) do agree with the Chinese view on the EEZ (like Malaysia) and others follow the Chinese view on the 12 nm territorial sea (like Vietnam). So although I think the U.S. reading of UNCLOS is the correct one, the Chinese are not alone in their interpretation.  And as this editorial from China’s leading state-run English language paper indicates, the Chinese are going to emphasize this difference in legal interpretations in their response.

Of all foreign military activities in the special economic zones (especially those of China and the U.S.), the innocent passage of warships through territorial seas, have fueled the majority of clashes and disagreements, as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea fails to provide explicit regulations on such activities.

To be sure, the Chinese may be shifting their own views since the Chinese Navy recently entered U.S. territorial seas on an “innocent passage”. But the official Chinese position still would require the U.S. to get permission before entering its 12 nm territorial seas.

One more note:  because several of China’s “artificial islands” are not islands but underwater features like shoals or reefs, the U.S. position ought to be that there is no “innocent passage” requirement for its naval ships even after entering within 12 nm miles.  Because China’s artificial island do not generate a 12 nm territorial sea, the U.S. should make clear it is NOT following the rules of innocent passage.

In any event, although international law is important, it cannot by itself resolve this festering US-China dispute until both sides agree on what international law actually requires.

Freedom of Navigation Operations and the South China Sea

by Chris Borgen

The BBC charts the latest back-and-forth between China, the U.S. over the Spratly Islands and, especially, navigation in the South China Sea. Much of the discussion of this issue has focused on the increased pace of China construction and land reclamation on series of islands and reefs, changing the “facts on the ground” to bolster its territorial and maritime claims. Other countries have also built on various islands and reefs, positioning for their own claims. But the scope of China’s activities had brought the issue back to the forefront.

The current flurry has been about the U.S.’s reaction and, in particular, whether the U.S. will use of “freedom of navigation” (FON) operations (previously discussed by Julian, here) in the midst of all this activity in the Spratlys.

According to the BBC, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry stated:

On Tuesday, US Defence Secretary Ash Carter expressed “strong concerns” over island-building, and defended Washington’s plans.

“Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea will not be an exception,” he said at a news conference with the Australian foreign and defence ministers.

“We will do that in the time and places of our choosing,” he added, according to Reuters news agency.

According to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. has undertaken such freedom of navigation (FON) operations since 1983 to “exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention.” This is a topic where one can see the U.S. refer explicitly and repeatedly to international law:

The FON Program since 1979 has highlighted the navigation provisions of the LOS Convention to further the recognition of the vital national need to protect maritime rights throughout the world. The FON Program operates on a triple track, involving not only diplomatic representations and operational assertions by U.S. military units, but also bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments in an effort to promote maritime stability and consistency with international law, stressing the need for and obligation of all States to adhere to the customary international law rules and practices reflected in the LOS Convention.

Emphases added.

A year-by-year summary of Freedom of Navigation operations by the U.S. can be found on the U.S. Department of Defense website, here.

However, the BBC notes that:

The US might have mounted sea patrols in this area, but not for several years, our analyst says – and not since China began its massive building programme in the South China Sea.

A US military plane that flew near one of the islands in May was warned off – eight times.

The US now has to decide whether to send in its ships and risk confrontation, or back down and look weak, our analyst says.

How the situation evolves from here will depend in part on the reactions of other states that border the South China Sea or use its sea lanes.  Stay tuned…

Touchy, Touchy. What China’s Sensitivity About the Philippines Arbitration Reveals About the Strength of Its Legal Position

by Julian Ku

While I was on (my completely undeserved) vacation in California recently, I noticed more evidence that China’s government is becoming hyper-sensitive about criticism of its non-participation in the Philippines-China arbitration at the Hague.

First, a top U.S. government official stated at a conference on July 21 that, among other things, “…[W]hen they became parties to the Convention, both the Philippines and China agreed to its compulsory dispute settlement regime. Under this regime, the decision of the arbitral tribunal is legally binding on the parties to the dispute. It’s a treaty. In keeping with the rule of law, both the Philippines and China are obligated to abide by whatever decision may be rendered in the case, whether they like it or not. ”

On July 17, the New York Times published a rather bland staff editorial on the China-Philippines arbitration gently chiding China for failing to participate in that arbitral process.  Noting that China was likely to ignore the arbitration’s outcome, the NYT opined: “[China] should participate in the tribunal process if China wants to be recognized as a leader in a world that values the resolution of disputes within a legal framework.”

Both statements are pretty gentle, in my view, and Russel’s point about China’s obligation to abide by the arbitral tribunal’s rulings on jurisdiction is quite correct as a matter of law.  But it is China’s rather vociferous response that is more striking.

First, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sharply rejected Russel’s remarks.  Most curiously, it charged that the U.S. was, by “[a]ttempting to push forward the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, [acting] like an ‘arbitrator outside the tribunal’, designating the direction for the arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines.”  The spokesperson went on to say “This is inconsistent with the position the US side claims to uphold on issues concerning the South China Sea disputes.”

Second, the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. wrote a letter to the editor of the NYT, calling its editorial “unfair.”  It also concluded that  “we do not believe that the arbitration court has jurisdiction, and as a member of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China is entitled to exclude any third-party compulsory settlement.”

I am sympathetic to China’s position that compulsory arbitration is not the way to go here, but as a legal matter, their views are hard to understand.  The UNCLOS does NOT give China the right to exclude any “third-party compulsory settlement.”  It does the opposite, and allows very limited exceptions to compulsory dispute resolution which may or may not apply here.  Furthermore, as numerous commentators have explained but which China continues to ignore, Article 288 of UNCLOS plainly gives the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal the final say on jurisdiction.  Russel was only repeating what is in the plain text of the treaty (UNCLOS) that China signed and ratified.

China’s sharply worded but legally incoherent responses are a sign that it is more nervous about the Philippines arbitration than it has let on in the past. China should just stop complaining about the arbitration and move on. It should have enough diplomatic, military, and political leverage to get past this.  It will get nowhere with its legal arguments.

The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Dangerous Comoros Review Decision

by Kevin Jon Heller

In late 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor rejected a request by Comoros to open a formal investigation into Israel’s attack on the Mavi Marmara. To my great surprise, the Pre-Trial Chamber (Judge Kovacs dissenting) has now ordered the OTP to reconsider its decision. The order does not require the OTP to open a formal investigation, because the declination was based on gravity, not on the interests of justice — a critical distinction under Art. 53 of the Rome Statute, as I explain here. But the PTC’s decision leaves little doubt that it expects the OTP to open one. Moreover, the PTC’s decision appears designed to push the OTP to decline to formally investigate a second time (assuming it doesn’t change its mind about the Comoros situation) on the basis of the interests of justice, which would then give the PTC the right to demand the OTP investigate.

To put it simply, this is a deeply problematic and extremely dangerous decision — nothing less than a frontal assault on the OTP’s prosecutorial discretion, despite the PTC’s claims to the contrary. I will explain why in this (very long) post.

At the outset, it is important to emphasise that we are dealing here with situational gravity, not case gravity. In other words, the question is not whether the OTP should have opened a case against specific members of the IDF who were responsible for crimes on the Mavi Marmara, but whether the OTP should have opened a situation into the Comoros situation as a whole. The Rome Statute is notoriously vague about the difference between situational gravity and case gravity, even though it formally adopts the distinction in Art. 53. But it is a critical distinction, because the OTP obviously cannot assess the gravity of an entire situation in the same way that it assesses the gravity of a specific crime within a situation.

The PTC disagrees with nearly every aspect of the OTP’s gravity analysis. It begins by rejecting the OTP’s insistence (in ¶ 62 of its response to Comoro’s request for review) that the gravity of the Comoros situation is limited by the fact that there is no “reasonable basis to believe that ‘senior IDF commanders and Israeli leaders’ were responsible as perpetrators or planners of the apparent war crimes’.” Here is how the PTC responds to that claim:

23. The Chamber is of the view that the Prosecutor erred in the Decision Not to Investigate by failing to consider whether the persons likely to be the object of the investigation into the situation would include those who bear the greatest responsibility for the identified crimes. Contrary to the Prosecutor’s argument at paragraph 62 of her Response, the conclusion in the Decision Not to Investigate that there was not a reasonable basis to believe that “senior IDF commanders and Israeli leaders” were responsible as perpetrators or planners of the identified crimes does not answer the question at issue, which relates to the Prosecutor’s ability to investigate and prosecute those being the most responsible for the crimes under consideration and not as such to the seniority or hierarchical position of those who may be responsible for such crimes.

These are fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of “potential perpetrator” gravity. The OTP is taking the traditional ICTY/ICTR approach, asking whether the Israeli perpetrators of the crimes on the Mavi Marmara are militarily or politically important enough to justify the time and expense of a formal investigation. The PTC, by contrast, does not care about the relative importance of the perpetrators; it simply wants to know whether the OTP can prosecute the individuals who are most responsible for committing the crimes in question.

To see the difference between the two approaches — and to see why the OTP’s approach is far better — consider a hypothetical situation involving only one crime: a group of the lowest-ranking soldiers from State X executes, against the stated wishes of their commanders, 10 civilians from State Y. The OTP would conclude that the “potential perpetrator” gravity factor militates against opening a formal investigation in State Y, because the crime in question, though terrible, did not involve militarily important perpetrators. The PTC, by contrast, would reach precisely the opposite conclusion concerning gravity, deeming the soldiers “most responsible” for the crime by virtue of the fact that they acted against orders. After all, no one else was responsible for the decision to execute the civilians.

The PTC’s approach to “potential perpetrator” gravity is simply bizarre….

Dear World Media: The U.S. is NOT Challenging China’s Territorial Claims in the South China Sea (Yet)

by Julian Ku

I have been following closely the U.S. Navy’s plans to use military ships and aircraft to challenge China’s aggressive land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and China’s not very positive reaction to these plans.  But although there is a real dispute brewing here that could escalate into a sovereignty fight, I think media reports are making this dispute more serious than it actually is.

Contrary to some media reports, the U.S. Navy plans do NOT intend to challenge China’s “sovereignty” claims in the South China Sea. Instead, the U.S. Navy is asserting its rights to freedom of navigation under international law. If we understand the U.S. Navy plans in this context, it may help us defuse (at least somewhat) the growing tensions between the U.S. and China in this region, if only the media would help us out with better reporting.

From CNN, here is an example of how media reporting is making this dispute seem worse than it is.

(Emphasis added). This report feeds into the (accurate) narrative about growing tensions between the US and Chinese navies.  In this story, the US Navy is flying “over” the Chinese islands in order to challenge or reject China’s territorial claims.  But later in that same report, CNN says that U.S. Navy is considering “flying such surveillance missions even closer over the islands, as well as sailing U.S. warships within miles of them, as part of the new, more robust U.S. military posture in the area.” (emphasis added).

Here’s the problem.  If the U.S. Navy aircraft featured in the CNN video (a military surveillance plane and “sub hunter”) actually flew “over” the Chinese artificial islands, then why would they consider flying even closer “over” the islands and what would be the significance of sending naval ships?

In fact, the US Navy has tried to make it clear to reporters that they are merely conducting freedom of navigation operations and “that U.S. military aircraft do not fly directly over areas claimed by China in the Spratly Islands.” (in the washington post).  It’s my guess that the Navy hasn’t even flown within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands.

Why? Because as far as I can tell, this is a standard US Navy “freedom of navigation” operation that it uses to assert international law rights of navigation against numerous countries around the world.  It is NOT, as the CNN and other reports suggest, a challenge to China’s territorial claims.

Freedom of Navigation” operations involve sending US Navy warships into both the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone and the 12 nautical mile territorial seas recognized under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  In the view of  the U.S., military warships and aircraft are free to conduct surveillance operations (e.g. spying) in any country’s 200 nm EEZ and surface warships (but not military aircraft or submarines) have the right to “innocent passage” through a country’s 12 nautical mile territorial waters.

The U.S. Navy has been conducting  “freedom of navigation” operations for decades to enforce these views of international law, and it even has a “Freedom of Navigation” website making public where it has been operating. The point of these operations it to publicly challenge a country which is making (in the U.S. view) unjustified legal rights under UNCLOS.  China has a longstanding disagreement with this U.S. interpretation of UNCLOS. So they always make protests, and China has sometimes sent its fighter jets out to harass or challenge US spy aircraft.

But the bottom line: pace CNN, freedom of navigation operations are not challenges to “territorial claims” or “sovereignty.” The US Navy operations assume that the other nation has “sovereignty” over the relevant coastline or island.  So the US Navy operations near China’s artificial islands can assume that China has sovereignty but still demand China allow US military aircraft and ships  transit rights etc. under UNCLOS.

It is worth noting that the U.S. could escalate the dispute with China.  The U.S. might take the view that China is building artificial islands on top  of reefs or submerged features which do not entitle China to any legal rights at all (See UNCLOS, Art.60(8): “Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”).  If so, then the US would fly within 12 nm miles or even directly “over” the artificial islands. Such operations would effectively be a direct challenge  to a China’s territorial claims, because the U.S. would be taking the view that China has no territorial basis at all for claims in the South China Sea.

“Challenging legal rights under UNCLOS” doesn’t make for very sexy headlines or get many clicks as compared to “challenging China’s territorial claims”. But it is worth parsing media reports about US Navy activities in the South China Sea very carefully, and it would be nice of those well-sourced reporters would clarify just how close the US Navy is going to fly/sail to China’s reclaimed islands.

Maybe the U.S. government should directly challenge China’s territorial claims and sovereignty claims.  I am not sure in my own mind whether the U.S. should take that next step.   But for now, the U.S. hasn’t challenged China’s territorial claims yet, and I wish reporters would stop making it seem like it is doing so.

Whale Wars Seeks a New Forum: The U.S. Supreme Court

by Julian Ku

Sea Shepherd, the activist group that has been aggressively protesting Japanese whaling practices, has filed a very interesting petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  Readers may recall that Sea Shepherd was sued by a group representing Japanese whalers under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Sea Shepherd’s actions of boarding the Japanese whalers and obstructing them could fall within the definition of “piracy” for the purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS.

The best argument for Sea Shepherd is that the definition of piracy adopted by the Ninth Circuit cannot meet the Supreme Court’s “Sosa” standard for requiring ATS claims to be “universal” and “specific” under international law.  I think there is some force to this argument, although I find their disparagement of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea’s definition of piracy a little odd.  In any event, the question may turn on the definition of “private ends” that UNCLOS requires as an element of piracy.  I don’t have a strong view on this, but I refer our readers to Kevin’s critique of the Ninth Circuit conclusion that private ends can include political activism, and Eugene Kontorovich’s contrary view in support of the Ninth Circuit. The petition for certiorari smartly frames this as a “Sosa” issue, which would ordinarily mean that the uncertainty as to the applicability of “private ends” here should defeat ATS jurisdiction.  I am not sure the petitioners will get much traction, given the unusual and narrow facts of this case, but no doubt this case is worth watching.

Guest Post: The Mediterranean Migrants Crisis and the Use of Force–Is There a Case for Destroying Smugglers’ Boats?

by Sondre Torp Helmersen and Niccolo Ridi

[Sondre Torp Helmersen is a PhD Candidate at the University of Oslo and Niccolò Ridi is a PhD Candidate at King’s College London and SNSF Research Assistant, The Graduate Institute, Geneva.]

1. Introduction

The recent disasters off the coasts of Italy have been the deadliest documented incidents in the troubled history of migration in the Mediterranean sea. The unprecedented number of lives lost at sea has prompted outrage in a number of countries and brought the Mediterranean migrants Crisis at the top of the European political agenda. After more than 1000 people drowned in ten days, a summit was finally called by the President of the European Council Donald Tusk.

The outcome of the meeting has been met with disappointment: outside of southern European Countries, plans for a more equitable distribution of migrants within the European Union states do not seem a priority, and the measures agreed upon focus merely on preventing departure. States have agreed on a number of measures comprising the tripling of the funding allocated to Europe’s Operation Triton (which had previously been called ‘woefully inadequate’ by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres), improved cooperation against smugglers networks, a generic pledge to do more for refugee protection and resettlement on a voluntary basis and, more controversially, actions directed to identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers before they can be used.

The idea of targeting smugglers’ vessels was originally included in a 10-point action plan relying on the precedent of Operation Atalanta, which focuses on protecting on preventing piracy acts off the coast of Somalia. The adoption of such a strategy as a means of dealing with a migrants crisis, however, calls for careful consideration.

European leaders have asked EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini “to propose actions in order to capture and destroy the smugglers’ vessels before they can be used”. However, aside from rumours on the possible use of Apache helicopters targeting vessels from a range of 2 km, proposals on the use of force have so far been quite vague, and their wording careful enough to suggest that any action would have to be consistent with international law. Angela Merkel is reported to have suggested that either a Security Council resolution or the cooperation of a Libyan unity government would be prerequisite for these operations. French President François Hollande has said that France and the United Kingdom will push for a Security Council resolution. But how do these proposed operations fit in the traditional paradigms on the use of force?

2. The Legality of Using Force

The force envisaged by European leaders would apparently be used to destroy boats docked in African harbours or internal or territorial waters. This would violate the prohibition of using force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, unless one of its exceptions apply. Attacking the boats may alternatively be classified as ‘law enforcement’ rather than ‘use of force’ (e.g. Guyana v Suriname para 445), but such enforcement would be equally illegal in another State’s territory or internal or territorial waters in the absence of the same exceptions.

The exception for self-defence is not applicable, since there has been no “armed attack” against European countries from African States or people smugglers (the latter would be relevant if one recognises a right to self-defence against non-State actors). There may also be a right for States to use force to protect their nationals abroad, but European nationals are generally neither threatened by nor involved in the smuggling. The more or less debunked doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would also not be applicable, since, even if one could argue that parts of Africa and/or the Middle East are suffering humanitarian crises, destroying people smugglers’ ships would not help alleviate those crises.

The simplest approach would be to have the consent of the relevant African States. In most cases this would mean Libya. A complicating factor is the current split between the two governments that claim to represent the State of Libya. One is based in Tripoli, the other in Tobruk. This raises the question of which of these, if any, that may give valid consent to the use of force in Libyan harbours and waters. The Tobruk government controls the majority of Libya’s territory, and is recognised by most other States as Libya’s government. However the Tripoli government controls the country’s traditional capital as well a substantial part of its territory. Some territory is also controlled by other groups, including the (so-called) Islamic State. In short, the situation is murky. After having repeatedly offered its cooperation to help fight the smuggling operations, the Tripoli government has said it will not give consent to using force against people smugglers. The Tobruk government has apparently not yet taken an official position.

The second option is to get authorisation from the UN Security Council, under the UN Charter Chapter VII. Such authorisation was given for the EU’s anti-piracy ‘Operation Atalanta’ off the coast of Somalia. However in that case the authorisation was made conditional on the consent of the Somali government. A similar condition could be set now. Authorisation would also require the consent of the UNSC’s five permanent members. Relations are currently frosty between Russia and the West, and one reason is how the Western powers used and possibly abused the 2011 authorisation to use force in Libya. Indeed, President Hollande has conceded that some convincing might be necessary to overcome Russian reluctance. Another basic condition for the UNSC to authorise the use of force is that the force is necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42), in the presence of either a “threat to” or “breach of” international peace or an “act of aggression” (Article 39). The most plausible route would be to argue that the situation in the Mediterranean constitutes a “threat to the peace”. This is not obvious from the text of Article 39, but the UNSC has interpreted the provision highly flexibly in the past, and may well do so again. For example, in Resolution 668 (on Iraq’s treatment of its Kurdish population), the UNSC held that “a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers … threaten[s] international peace and security”.

Other legal issues may also arise. African countries’ failure to clamp down on people smugglers’ activities may constitute a violation of the ‘duty of vigilance’ (Armed Activities para 246-250), but such a violation does not in itself authorise other States to respond with armed force. Further, if we concede that international humanitarian law applies, smugglers’ boats would be entitled to protection as civilian objects. The smugglers’ activities should not qualify as ‘piracy’ under the UNCLOS Article 101. That would in any case only make them liable to seizure by force by any State on the high seas (Article 105). To argue that the provision allows to destroy their ships when docked in a harbour seems too much of a stretch.

3. Conclusion: Another Problem that Cannot be Solved by Force

While there are legal avenues open for using force against African people smugglers, a wholly different question is whether this would actually contribute to solving the problem. The former head of operations of Atalanta has recently stated that to destroy smugglers’ boats would not be effective, as the boats used tend to be cheap and easy to replace. In a broader perspective, it would help solve neither the underlying causes of migration, which include conflict and misrule in Africa, nor the causes of the EU’s attempts to restrict migration, which include its social and economic costs.

The EU does seem to envisage the destruction of boats as one element in a broader set of tools. What is lacking, though, is an attempt to improve the current European asylum framework and a more equitable distribution of migrants among the members of the Union. This remains one of the most controversial and polarising issues in the EU. It therefore comes as no surprise that states less concerned by the refugee flows, such as the UK, would lend their support to operations at sea but avoid committing to any plans for a new resettlement system.

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the construction of a narrative that places emphasis on the criminal nature of smuggling activities is conspicuous. There is clearly no question that smugglers are criminals. The idea of a “war on smugglers” seems to fit the policy goal of avoiding to give the Triton operation a clear search and rescue mandate – indeed, one of the most significant concerns voiced by human rights groups. As Kenneth Roth has suggested, to reduce the problem to the “false pretext of criminality” is to ignore the gravity of the situations from which many migrants are fleeing, and the resulting readiness to go to any lengths to seek better opportunities on European soil.

Guest Post: Law of the Sea Tribunal Adopts ‘Due Diligence’ Standard for Flag State Responsibility for IUU Fishing

by Craig H. Allen

[Craig H. Allen is the Judson Falknor Professor of Law/Professor of Marine and Environmental Affairs at the University of Washington.]

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal) continued to develop the law of flag State responsibility in a 68-page advisory opinion issued on April 2, 2015 (Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), ITLOS Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of April 2, 2015). Five ITLOS judges wrote separate declarations or opinions.

A “Living” Law of the Sea Convention?

The April 2, 2015 advisory opinion was the first one issued by the full Tribunal. Four years earlier, the Tribunal’s Seabed Disputes Chamber had issued an advisory opinion, as it was expressly authorized to do under Article 191 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area [Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber], ITLOS Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011). In response to the SRFC request concerning IUU fishing, however, several States, including Australia, China, Ireland, Spain and the UK, objected that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions except in disputes involving the international seabed. Writing separately, Judge Lucky characterized the States’ jurisdictional objections as “cogent, clear and articulate, as well as considerably persuasive,” but he ultimately rejected them (Separate Opinion of Lucky, J.). In doing so, Judge Lucky opined that UNCLOS “is akin to (comparable with) a national constitution” and that, just as the “living constitution” doctrine advocates argue, UNCLOS “must ‘grow’ in accordance with the times.” (Id. ¶ 9). Oddly, in interpreting the Convention, Judge Lucky did not cite the relevant articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties until much later in his opinion.

The Opinion

Jurisdictional issues aside, this latest advisory opinion brings needed definition to the law of State Responsibility with respect to UNCLOS. The opinion was issued in response to a 2013 request by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) established by seven West African States). The SRFC submitted four questions, principally regarding the obligations and liability of flag States for IUU fishing by their vessels in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of another State. In all, 20 judges participated in the decision. They unanimously held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to issue the advisory opinion, citing Article 138 of the Court’s own rules. At the same time, the Tribunal noted that since the Tribunal was established in 1996 this was the first time an advisory opinion had been issued by the full Tribunal.

In answering the questions presented, the Tribunal distinguished the flag State’s responsibility under UNCLOS from its liability. With respect to the latter question, the Tribunal declared that the liability of the flag State does not arise from a failure of vessels flying its flag to comply with the applicable laws and regulations, because “the violation of such laws and regulations by vessels is not per se attributable to the flag State” (¶ 146). Instead, the liability of the flag State arises from its failure to comply with its own “due diligence” obligations. Thus, the flag State will not be liable if it has taken “all necessary and appropriate measures to meet its ‘due diligence’ obligations” to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of the coastal States (¶ 148).

The due diligence standard adopted by the Tribunal can be traced to the arbitration panel’s decision in the CSS Alabama case, which involved Great Britain’s responsibility for damages done by the CSS Alabama, a Confederate States warship built in Great Britain, in violation of that State’s neutrality in the Civil War (Alabama claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, Award of Sept. 14, 1872, XXIX Reports of International Arbitration Awards 122, 129.) The standard was also adopted in the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber’s 2011 advisory opinion (¶¶ 110-117), in which it cited the ICJ’s 2010 decision in the Pulp Mills on the Uruguay River case (2010 ICJ Rep. 14, 79, ¶ 197).

Importantly, in its opinion the Tribunal cited flag State responsibilities under Articles 58.3 (rights and duties of other states in the EEZ), 62.4 (utilization of living resources of the EEZ), 94 (duties of the flag State) and 192 (general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment). In a separate opinion, Judge Paik elaborated on the flag States’ obligations under Article 94. Thus, the opinion’s examination of flag State responsibility and the due diligence standard is likely to find application beyond the context of IUU fishing in the EEZ.

Cote D’Ivoire Seeks Provisional Measures Order from ITLOS To Stop Oil Exploration in Disputed Waters

by Julian Ku

Last September, Ghana commenced an arbitration under Annex VII of the UN Convention for the Law of Sea seeking judicial confirmation of its rights to explore for oil and other resources in maritime areas disputed by its neighbor Cote D’Ivoire.  This past January, the two countries agreed to submit a dispute over maritime boundaries to a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  And last week, Cote D’Ivoire filed a request for Provisional Measures with the special chamber asking it to require Ghana to suspend any oil exploration activities while the matter is before the ITLOS special chamber.

Under UNCLOS Article 290, a court or tribunal with jurisdiction is empowered to issue provisional measures “which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.”  I haven’t been privy to the papers filed in this case, but it does seem like Cote D’Ivoire should have a pretty reasonable provisional measures claim.  Indeed, the UK oil company currently exploring the disputed waters pursuant to a contract with Ghana is already planning to suspend its operations pending the outcome of the provisional measures hearing.

The Ghana-Cote D’Ivoire dispute bears watching. If these two countries are able to settle their maritime boundary dispute where lots of oil is at stake, then this would be a pretty significant accomplishment for the UNCLOS dispute settlement system. Hello, China? Anyone there?   History suggests this is going to be pretty hard, but you never know.


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by William J. Cooper

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From a highly regarded historian, a new perspective on the period between Lincoln's election in November 1860 and the firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861 when all efforts to avoid or impede secession and prevent war failed.

In rapid succession a series of events led to the great cataclysm in American history, the Civil War. Lincoln won the presidential

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In rapid succession a series of events led to the great cataclysm in American history, the Civil War. Lincoln won the presidential election; southern states initiated the process of secession; Congress proved unable to devise a compromise acceptable to the Republicans and the Lower South; the Lower South seceded and formed the Confederate States of America; Lincoln took the oath of office; shots rang out at Fort Sumter; Lincoln moved to suppress the rebellion; the Upper South seceded; war ensued. William J. Cooper captures the sense of contingency, showing Americans in these months as not knowing where decisions would lead, how events would unfold. He helps us understand what the major actors said and did. And he highlights Lincoln's unbending posture on slavery and attributes it to a basic ignorance of the South, resulting in a tone deafness to how Southerners would react as events unfolded.

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Editorial Reviews

Publishers Weekly
In this dry yet informative volume, noted Southern historian Cooper (Jefferson Davis, American) focuses on a crucial five months of political wrangling and behind-the-scenes negotiations leading up to the Civil War. With then President Buchanan and President-elect Lincoln caught in the middle, and the Southern Democrats squaring off against the Northern Republicans, it became obvious that there was a fundamental disconnect among the states and that war was increasingly unavoidable. Cooper leaves no stone unturned as he explores the hard decisions and compromises leading up to the war, beginning with the way Lincoln’s election changed the face of American politics: representing a new party, he was also the first president with no Southern constituency, and, Cooper says, he had little understanding of the South. With the radical faction known as fire-eaters working to encourage secession, and Buchanan forced to make ever more desperate choices, it becomes clear through Cooper’s narrative that the outbreak of the Civil War was not sudden, but the result of thousands of tiny moments. Cooper’s research is thorough and unbiased, assigning credit and blame on all sides. Cooper’s scholarly tone may not appeal to casual readers, but Civil War buffs will appreciate the expert examination of the period. Illus., maps. (Sept.)
Library Journal
Cooper (history, Louisiana State Univ.; Jefferson Davis, American) posits that the Civil War came about because Lincoln and Republican radicals refused to engage in serious compromise efforts with Southern moderates and "fire-eaters," referring primarily to the Southern demand for the territorial expansion of slavery. In fact, Lincoln and the Republicans consistently stated that they were willing to compromise over every other divisive issue except slavery in the territories. Cooper contends that the territorial expansion of slavery wasn't practically important because slavery would not exist in Western climates and, therefore, Republicans should not have been so intransigent. This only leads to the question, why did the South demand it if it was unimportant? Further, Cooper argues that Lincoln should not have used force to coerce Southern states back into the Union and should instead have sought reconciliation by giving in to all Southern demands. It's difficult to see how Lincoln could have survived politically if he had completely abandoned the platform on which he was elected. Nor does Cooper explain how reunion could have taken place since secessionists made clear that the break was permanent. VERDICT Most pro-Confederate books downplay the role of slavery in the conflict. Cooper calls slavery a moral wrong, while making it the central issue. Objective historians may want to read this book, but they are likely to find that Cooper's argument uses flawed logic.—MF
Kirkus Reviews
Cooper (History/Louisiana State Univ.; Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era, 2008, etc.) shares his encyclopedic knowledge of the American South and the Civil War as he exposes the players who drew the country into war. President James Buchanan's attempts to diffuse the tensions only postponed a crisis. After South Carolina's secession, he concluded a gentlemen's agreement with Gov. Francis Pickens not to reinforce Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor as long as there was no interference. Though historians often claim that slavery was not the true cause of the war, the Southern states demanded their right to reclaim escaped slaves and the rights of the new territories to establish themselves as slave or free. Abraham Lincoln was adamantly against extending the right of slavery in the territories, a true deal breaker for the South. The Republican Party, rejoicing upon gaining the White House in November 1860, was determined to control the South, and they were unwilling to compromise, thwarting every attempt in Congress and using debate and delay methods that are all too familiar today. The Democratic Congress stalwartly attempted to find resolution, with committees in both houses, but again the Republicans used all the instruments of democracy to frustrate success. There were countless attempts to save the Union, including the Crittenden Compromise, the tireless work of William Seward, and the proposal of an amendment to guarantee slavery as it existed. Each had a possibility of success but suffered reverses, delays and impenetrable opposition. Drawing on his wide knowledge of the time period, Cooper clearly enumerates the many ways the Civil War could have been avoided and how many people were clueless as to the real threat, especially Lincoln. Illuminating Civil War history from an expert in the field.
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Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group
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6.70(w) x 9.34(h) x 1.25(d)

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The cataclysm of the Civil War is the defining moment in the history of the United States. At the cost of more than 750,000 dead and that many more wounded, it guaranteed the preservation of the Union and abolished the in- stitution of racial slavery. Even with that frightful human toll, the outcome made it a good war for the United States. These generalizations are well known and shared by most Americans of our time.

But not all Americans wanted another compromise. In the South, radi- cal secessionists saw this moment, the election of a northern president head- ing a northern party by northern voters, as their opportunity to disrupt the Union. The North had its own segment that spurned any compromise with the South. These vigorous partisans of the triumphant Republican party were determined to celebrate their victory without any deal with an alarmed, uneasy South.

“Is This Not a Remarkable Spectacle?”

In the early evening of Sunday, March 3, 1861, the white-headed gentleman stood once more among his fellow senators. Of medium height, spare and erect, with a face deeply lined, almost craggy, John J. Crittenden commanded attention. With a long commitment to his coun- try and an unsurpassed reputation for integrity, he was foremost a man of character. But Crittenden’s audience consisted of more than his Senate col- leagues. Spectators jammed the galleries long before he spoke at 7:00 p.m. In this assembly sat Abraham Lincoln, to be inaugurated president the next day.

That judicial conclusion directly contradicted the main tenet of one of the two major parties—the Republican party, which had grown in the North from the rubble of the old Whig party and from Democrats disaf- fected by what they perceived as an increasingly pro-southern bias in their former political home. With its single-minded commitment to the North, the Republican party had barely a footprint in the South, and that only in the Border slave states. From the very inception of their party, Republicans had preached no slavery in the territories as their gospel. Even in the face of Dred Scott they refused to back away. In 1860, the Republican candidate for president, Abraham Lincoln, running on a platform that trumpeted territo- rial prohibition, was elected president of the United States without a single electoral vote from a slave state.

Senator Crittenden came forward with proposals, chiefly to settle the territorial question by extending the old Missouri Compromise line west- ward to California and embedding the division in the Constitution. Be- tween December and March he pushed, at times altering the specifics of his plan to attract support. Other senators and congressmen floated additional suggestions; none went anywhere. The judgment of a close observer in mid-January described the plight of the would-be compromisers: “Things look dark here today. The utter inactivity of Congress stupefies those who would otherwise have some hope.” Most Republicans were funda- mentally obdurate in opposing any compromise touching the territories, even in permitting either House or Senate to vote on any such measure. Their strength increased in both houses as congressmen and senators from seceded states left the capital. Despite his arduous efforts, Crittenden never even succeeded in getting the Senate to say aye or nay to his plan.

Now, with the session coming to a close and no congressional action on his or any other proposal, the venerable lawmaker gave his final assessment. It was also his valedictory, for his term expired with the 36th Congress. Crit- tenden spoke the language of failure, but even more of incomprehension. Addressing his fellow senators, Crittenden asked, “Is this not a remark- able spectacle?” He wanted to know why “when the country trusted to our hands is going to ruin,” the Senate has been unable “to devise any measure of public safety.” “We see the danger,” he announced; “we acknowledge our duty.” Yet, he sorrowfully noted, “we are acknowledging before the world we can do nothing; acknowledging before the world, or appear- ing to all the world as men who do nothing.” “The saddest spectacle,” he deplored.

Thus, in his view the South did have constitutional rights in the com- mon national territory. And these rights, in his mind, included taking slave property into that territory. He even admitted that the South had “some plausible reason to be discontented” because Republicans repeatedly main- tained that they would bar southerners from the territories, taking all for the North. For Crittenden solving this problem was simple—a compro-mise, extending the Missouri line westward to California. This was more than an equitable division, he informed Republicans, for it gave the North fully two-thirds of the national domain. Furthermore, because of the inhos- pitable climate and terrain below that line, he foresaw little chance of slavery taking hold there. As a result, he defined Republican insistence on the total prohibition of slavery as “a mere question of abstract right.”

Although he tried hard to dam the torrent of disunion, Crittenden left no doubt about his personal position. “I am not for secession. No, sir,” he announced. Whatever came he would stand by the Union, and he urged his state, Kentucky, to do likewise. Nothing that secession could prom- ise, he declared, could match the glory of the Union. Only “an imperious necessity” that he could not envision would legitimize Kentucky’s seced- ing. Kentucky, the Constitution, the Union—together they comprised the rock of Crittenden’s conviction and patriotism.

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We Have the War Upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860-April 1861 5 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
Anonymous More than 1 year ago


Natural Gas (NG) is also responsible for marketing gas originating from the SDFI. NG also manages Statoil's asset ownership in gas infrastructure, such as the processing and transportation system for Norwegian gas (Gassled).

NG's business is conducted from Norway (Stavanger) and from offices in Belgium, the UK, Germany, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the USA (Houston and Stamford).

In 2011, we sold 36.1 bcm (1.3 tcf) of natural gas from the NCS on our own behalf, in addition to approximately 33.5 bcm (1.2 tcf) of NCS gas on behalf of the Norwegian state. Statoil's total European gas sales, including third-party gas, amounted to 79.8 bcm (2.9 tcf) in 2011 of which 39.5 bcm (1.4 tcf) was gas sold on behalf of the Norwegian state.

In addition, we sold 5.5 bcm (0.2 tcf) of gas originating from our international positions, mainly in Azerbaijan and the USA, of which 2.7 bcm (0.1 tcf) was entitlement gas.

We are a significant shipper in the NCS pipeline system owned by Gassled*, which is the world's largest offshore gas pipeline transportation system, totalling approximately 8,100 kilometres. This network links gas fields on the NCS with processing plants on the Norwegian mainland and with terminals at six landing points located in France, Germany, Belgium and the UK. It thereby gives us access to customers throughout Europe.

*Statoil had a 5% ownership interest in the system at the end of 2011.


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