Code: static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
			    struct flowi *fl, struct sock *sk)
{
	struct sctp_association *asoc = t->asoc;
 	struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
 	struct flowi6 *fl6 = &fl->u.ip6;
 	struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
 	struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *laddr;
 	union sctp_addr *baddr = NULL;
 	union sctp_addr *daddr = &t->ipaddr;
 	union sctp_addr dst_saddr;
 	__u8 matchlen = 0;
 	__u8 bmatchlen;
 	sctp_scope_t scope;

	memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(struct flowi6));
	fl6->daddr = daddr->v6.sin6_addr;
	fl6->fl6_dport = daddr->v6.sin6_port;
	fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_SCTP;
	if (ipv6_addr_type(&daddr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
		fl6->flowi6_oif = daddr->v6.sin6_scope_id;

	pr_debug("%s: dst=%pI6 ", __func__, &fl6->daddr);

	if (asoc)
		fl6->fl6_sport = htons(asoc->base.bind_addr.port);

	if (saddr) {
		fl6->saddr = saddr->v6.sin6_addr;
		fl6->fl6_sport = saddr->v6.sin6_port;

 		pr_debug("src=%pI6 - ", &fl6->saddr);
 	}
 
	dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, NULL, false);
 	if (!asoc || saddr)
 		goto out;
 
	bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
	scope = sctp_scope(daddr);
	/* ip6_dst_lookup has filled in the fl6->saddr for us.  Check
	 * to see if we can use it.
	 */
	if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
		/* Walk through the bind address list and look for a bind
		 * address that matches the source address of the returned dst.
		 */
		sctp_v6_to_addr(&dst_saddr, &fl6->saddr, htons(bp->port));
		rcu_read_lock();
		list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
			if (!laddr->valid || (laddr->state != SCTP_ADDR_SRC))
				continue;

			/* Do not compare against v4 addrs */
			if ((laddr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
			    (sctp_v6_cmp_addr(&dst_saddr, &laddr->a))) {
				rcu_read_unlock();
				goto out;
			}
		}
		rcu_read_unlock();
		/* None of the bound addresses match the source address of the
		 * dst. So release it.
		 */
		dst_release(dst);
		dst = NULL;
	}

	/* Walk through the bind address list and try to get the
	 * best source address for a given destination.
	 */
	rcu_read_lock();
	list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
		if (!laddr->valid)
			continue;
		if ((laddr->state == SCTP_ADDR_SRC) &&
		    (laddr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
		    (scope <= sctp_scope(&laddr->a))) {
			bmatchlen = sctp_v6_addr_match_len(daddr, &laddr->a);
			if (!baddr || (matchlen < bmatchlen)) {
				baddr = &laddr->a;
				matchlen = bmatchlen;
			}
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (baddr) {
 		fl6->saddr = baddr->v6.sin6_addr;
 		fl6->fl6_sport = baddr->v6.sin6_port;
		dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, NULL, false);
 	}
 
 out:
	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dst)) {
		struct rt6_info *rt;

		rt = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
		t->dst = dst;
		t->dst_cookie = rt->rt6i_node ? rt->rt6i_node->fn_sernum : 0;
		pr_debug("rt6_dst:%pI6 rt6_src:%pI6\n", &rt->rt6i_dst.addr,
			 &fl6->saddr);
	} else {
		t->dst = NULL;

		pr_debug("no route\n");
	}
}

Vulnerability Type: +Info 
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: The IPv6 SCTP implementation in net/sctp/ipv6.c in the Linux kernel through 3.11.1 uses data structures and function calls that do not trigger an intended configuration of IPsec encryption, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit

Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:

SCTP + IPv4:

  22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
    192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
  22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
    192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):

SCTP + IPv6:

  22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
    fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
    1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]

Moreover, Alan says:

  This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
  this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
  protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
  follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
  Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
  this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
  is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.

In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):

  ...
  0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
  0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...

Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.

SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.

SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.

Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:

SCTP + IPv6:

  08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
    AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
  08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
    AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296

This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.

 [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf

Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>