Code: static int kill_something_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
	int ret;

	if (pid > 0) {
		rcu_read_lock();
		ret = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return ret;
 	}
 
 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 	if (pid != -1) {
 		ret = __kill_pgrp_info(sig, info,
				pid ? find_vpid(-pid) : task_pgrp(current));
	} else {
		int retval = 0, count = 0;
		struct task_struct * p;

		for_each_process(p) {
			if (task_pid_vnr(p) > 1 &&
					!same_thread_group(p, current)) {
				int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
				++count;
				if (err != -EPERM)
					retval = err;
			}
		}
		ret = count ? retval : -ESRCH;
	}
	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);

	return ret;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The kill_something_info function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13, when an unspecified architecture and compiler is used, might allow local users to cause a denial of service via an INT_MIN argument.
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info

When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
  negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
  CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G    B          ---- -------   3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
  Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
    ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
    __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
    SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
    SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>