Code: int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig,      unsigned long siglen,
                       const unsigned char *hash,     unsigned long hashlen,
                             int            padding,
                             int            hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
                             int           *stat,     rsa_key      *key)
{
  unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
  int           err;
  unsigned char *tmpbuf;

  LTC_ARGCHK(hash  != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(sig   != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(stat  != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(key   != NULL);

  /* default to invalid */
  *stat = 0;

  /* valid padding? */

  if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
      (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) {
    return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
  }

  if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
    /* valid hash ? */
    if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       return err;
    }
  }

  /* get modulus len in bits */
  modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));

  /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
  modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
  if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
     return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
  }

  /* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
  tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
  if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
     return CRYPT_MEM;
  }

  /* RSA decode it  */
  x = siglen;
  if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     XFREE(tmpbuf);
     return err;
  }

  /* make sure the output is the right size */
  if (x != siglen) {
     XFREE(tmpbuf);
     return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
  }

  if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
    /* PSS decode and verify it */

    if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
      err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
    }
    else{
      err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
    }

   } else {
     /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
     unsigned char *out;
    unsigned long outlen, loid[16];
     int           decoded;
     ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
 
    /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
    if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
       err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
       goto bail_2;
    }

    /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
    outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
    out    = XMALLOC(outlen);
    if (out == NULL) {
      err = CRYPT_MEM;
      goto bail_2;
    }

    if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      XFREE(out);
      goto bail_2;
    }

    /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
    /* construct the SEQUENCE
      SEQUENCE {
         SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
                   blah    NULL
         }
         hash    OCTET STRING
      }
   */
    LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
    LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL,              NULL,                          0);
    LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,          digestinfo,                    2);
    LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      tmpbuf,                        siglen);

    if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       XFREE(out);
        goto bail_2;
     }
 
     /* test OID */
    if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
         (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
         (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
         (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
       *stat = 1;
    }

#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
    zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
    XFREE(out);
  }

bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
  zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
  XFREE(tmpbuf);
  return err;
}

Vulnerability Type: 
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rsa_verify_hash_ex function in rsa_verify_hash.c in LibTomCrypt, as used in OP-TEE before 2.2.0, does not validate that the message length is equal to the ASN.1 encoded data length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to forge RSA signatures or public certificates by leveraging a Bleichenbacher signature forgery attack.
Commit Message: rsa_verify_hash: fix possible bleichenbacher signature attack