Code: static int hci_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
			    int *addr_len, int peer)
{
	struct sockaddr_hci *haddr = (struct sockaddr_hci *) addr;
	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
	struct hci_dev *hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;

	BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);

	if (!hdev)
		return -EBADFD;

	lock_sock(sk);

 	*addr_len = sizeof(*haddr);
 	haddr->hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
 	haddr->hci_dev    = hdev->id;
 
 	release_sock(sk);
 	return 0;
}

Vulnerability Type: +Info 
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The Bluetooth protocol stack in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application that targets the (1) L2CAP or (2) HCI implementation.
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak via getsockname()

The HCI code fails to initialize the hci_channel member of struct
sockaddr_hci and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the
getsockname() syscall. Initialize hci_channel with 0 to avoid the
info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>