Code: static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
					      struct sk_buff *skb,
					      struct request_sock *req,
					      struct dst_entry *dst,
					      struct request_sock *req_unhash,
					      bool *own_req)
{
 	struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
 	struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
 	const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
 	struct inet_sock *newinet;
 	struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
 	struct sock *newsk;

	if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
		/*
		 *	v6 mapped
		 */
		newsk = dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
						  req_unhash, own_req);
		if (newsk == NULL)
			return NULL;

		newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
		newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
		newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
		newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);

		memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));

		newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;

		inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
		newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
		newnp->pktoptions  = NULL;
		newnp->opt	   = NULL;
		newnp->mcast_oif   = inet6_iif(skb);
		newnp->mcast_hops  = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;

		/*
		 * No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
		 * here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
		 * that function for the gory details. -acme
		 */

		/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
		   worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
		   Sync it now.
		 */
		dccp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);

		return newsk;
	}


	if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
		goto out_overflow;

	if (!dst) {
		struct flowi6 fl6;

		dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_DCCP);
		if (!dst)
			goto out;
	}

	newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
	if (newsk == NULL)
		goto out_nonewsk;

	/*
	 * No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
	 * count here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
	 * comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
	 */

	__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
	newsk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features & ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
						      NETIF_F_TSO);
	newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
	newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
	newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
	newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);

	memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));

	newsk->sk_v6_daddr	= ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
	newnp->saddr		= ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
	newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr	= ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
	newsk->sk_bound_dev_if	= ireq->ir_iif;

	/* Now IPv6 options...

	   First: no IPv4 options.
	 */
	newinet->inet_opt = NULL;

	/* Clone RX bits */
	newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;

	newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
	newnp->opt	  = NULL;
	newnp->mcast_oif  = inet6_iif(skb);
	newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;

	/*
	 * Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
	 *
 	 * Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
 	 * one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
 	 */
	if (np->opt != NULL)
		newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt);
 	inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
	if (newnp->opt != NULL)
		inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
						     newnp->opt->opt_flen);
 
 	dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
 
	newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
	newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;

	if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
		inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
		dccp_done(newsk);
		goto out;
	}
	*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
	/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
	if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) {
		newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
		consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
		ireq->pktopts = NULL;
		if (newnp->pktoptions)
			skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
	}

	return newsk;

out_overflow:
	NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
	dst_release(dst);
out:
	NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
	return NULL;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv 
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel before 4.3.3 mishandles options data, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) via a crafted sendmsg system call.
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt

This patch addresses multiple problems :

UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.

Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())

This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>