Code: static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
	struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];
	struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
	unsigned uninitialized_var(in), log;
	struct vhost_log *vq_log;
	struct msghdr msg = {
		.msg_name = NULL,
		.msg_namelen = 0,
		.msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
		.msg_controllen = 0,
		.msg_iov = vq->iov,
		.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
	};
	struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = {
		.hdr.flags = 0,
		.hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
	};
	size_t total_len = 0;
	int err, mergeable;
	s16 headcount;
	size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen;
	size_t vhost_len, sock_len;
	struct socket *sock;

	mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
	sock = vq->private_data;
	if (!sock)
		goto out;
	vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);

	vhost_hlen = nvq->vhost_hlen;
	sock_hlen = nvq->sock_hlen;

	vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ?
		vq->log : NULL;
	mergeable = vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF);

	while ((sock_len = peek_head_len(sock->sk))) {
		sock_len += sock_hlen;
		vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
		headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads, vhost_len,
					&in, vq_log, &log,
					likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);
 		/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
 		if (unlikely(headcount < 0))
 			break;
 		/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
 		if (!headcount) {
 			if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
				/* They have slipped one in as we were
				 * doing that: check again. */
				vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
				continue;
			}
			/* Nothing new?  Wait for eventfd to tell us
			 * they refilled. */
			break;
		}
		/* We don't need to be notified again. */
		if (unlikely((vhost_hlen)))
			/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
			move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, vhost_hlen, in);
		else
			/* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF:
			 * needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */
			copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in);
		msg.msg_iovlen = in;
		err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
					 sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
		/* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile:
		 * it's not supposed to do this usually, but might be hard
		 * to prevent. Discard data we got (if any) and keep going. */
		if (unlikely(err != sock_len)) {
			pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: "
				 " len %d, expected %zd\n", err, sock_len);
			vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
			continue;
		}
		if (unlikely(vhost_hlen) &&
		    memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, 0,
				      vhost_hlen)) {
			vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p\n",
			       vq->iov->iov_base);
			break;
		}
		/* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */
		if (likely(mergeable) &&
		    memcpy_toiovecend(nvq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&headcount,
				      offsetof(typeof(hdr), num_buffers),
				      sizeof hdr.num_buffers)) {
			vq_err(vq, "Failed num_buffers write");
			vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
			break;
		}
		vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
					    headcount);
		if (unlikely(vq_log))
			vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len);
		total_len += vhost_len;
		if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
			vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
			break;
		}
	}
out:
	mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr. 
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.10, when mergeable buffers are disabled, does not properly validate packet lengths, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and host OS crash) or possibly gain privileges on the host OS via crafted packets, related to the handle_rx and get_rx_bufs functions.
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short

When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.

This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.

Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.

Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.

CVE-2014-0077

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>