Code: void sctp_association_free(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
	struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
	struct sctp_transport *transport;
	struct list_head *pos, *temp;
	int i;

 	/* Only real associations count against the endpoint, so
 	 * don't bother for if this is a temporary association.
 	 */
	if (!asoc->temp) {
 		list_del(&asoc->asocs);
 
 		/* Decrement the backlog value for a TCP-style listening
		 * socket.
		 */
		if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))
			sk->sk_ack_backlog--;
	}

	/* Mark as dead, so other users can know this structure is
	 * going away.
	 */
	asoc->base.dead = true;

	/* Dispose of any data lying around in the outqueue. */
	sctp_outq_free(&asoc->outqueue);

	/* Dispose of any pending messages for the upper layer. */
	sctp_ulpq_free(&asoc->ulpq);

	/* Dispose of any pending chunks on the inqueue. */
	sctp_inq_free(&asoc->base.inqueue);

	sctp_tsnmap_free(&asoc->peer.tsn_map);

	/* Free ssnmap storage. */
	sctp_ssnmap_free(asoc->ssnmap);

	/* Clean up the bound address list. */
	sctp_bind_addr_free(&asoc->base.bind_addr);

	/* Do we need to go through all of our timers and
	 * delete them?   To be safe we will try to delete all, but we
	 * should be able to go through and make a guess based
	 * on our state.
	 */
	for (i = SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_NONE; i < SCTP_NUM_TIMEOUT_TYPES; ++i) {
		if (del_timer(&asoc->timers[i]))
			sctp_association_put(asoc);
	}

	/* Free peer's cached cookie. */
	kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
	kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);

	/* Release the transport structures. */
	list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
		transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
		list_del_rcu(pos);
		sctp_transport_free(transport);
	}

	asoc->peer.transport_count = 0;

	sctp_asconf_queue_teardown(asoc);

	/* Free pending address space being deleted */
	if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending != NULL)
		kfree(asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending);

	/* AUTH - Free the endpoint shared keys */
	sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&asoc->endpoint_shared_keys);

	/* AUTH - Free the association shared key */
	sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);

	sctp_association_put(asoc);
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS 
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sctp_association_free function in net/sctp/associola.c in the Linux kernel before 3.15.2 does not properly manage a certain backlog value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (socket outage) via a crafted SCTP packet.
Commit Message: sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem

Consider the scenario:
For a TCP-style socket, while processing the COOKIE_ECHO chunk in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(), after it has passed a series of sanity check,
a new association would be created in sctp_unpack_cookie(), but afterwards,
some processing maybe failed, and sctp_association_free() will be called to
free the previously allocated association, in sctp_association_free(),
sk_ack_backlog value is decremented for this socket, since the initial
value for sk_ack_backlog is 0, after the decrement, it will be 65535,
a wrap-around problem happens, and if we want to establish new associations
afterward in the same socket, ABORT would be triggered since sctp deem the
accept queue as full.
Fix this issue by only decrementing sk_ack_backlog for associations in
the endpoint's list.

Fix-suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>