Code: static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
	int i;

	if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
		return 0;

	for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
 		struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
 		struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
 
 		memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
 		up->family = kp->encap_family;
 		memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
		up->reqid = kp->reqid;
		up->mode = kp->mode;
		up->share = kp->share;
		up->optional = kp->optional;
		up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
		up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
		up->calgos = kp->calgos;
	}

	return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
		       sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr, vec);
}

Vulnerability Type: +Info 
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()

The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>