Code: static int picolcd_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
		struct hid_report *report, u8 *raw_data, int size)
{
	struct picolcd_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
	unsigned long flags;
	int ret = 0;

 	if (!data)
 		return 1;
 
 	if (report->id == REPORT_KEY_STATE) {
 		if (data->input_keys)
 			ret = picolcd_raw_keypad(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
	} else if (report->id == REPORT_IR_DATA) {
		ret = picolcd_raw_cir(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
	} else {
		spin_lock_irqsave(&data->lock, flags);
		/*
		 * We let the caller of picolcd_send_and_wait() check if the
		 * report we got is one of the expected ones or not.
		 */
		if (data->pending) {
			memcpy(data->pending->raw_data, raw_data+1, size-1);
			data->pending->raw_size  = size-1;
			data->pending->in_report = report;
			complete(&data->pending->ready);
		}
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data->lock, flags);
	}

	picolcd_debug_raw_event(data, hdev, report, raw_data, size);
	return 1;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the picolcd_raw_event function in devices/hid/hid-picolcd_core.c in the PicoLCD HID device driver in the Linux kernel through 3.16.3, as used in Android on Nexus 7 devices, allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted device that sends a large report.
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback

The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>