Code: void PromoResourceService::ScheduleNotification(double promo_start,
                                                double promo_end) {
  if (promo_start > 0 && promo_end > 0) {
    const int64 ms_until_start =
        static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
            promo_start) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
    const int64 ms_until_end =
        static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
            promo_end) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
    if (ms_until_start > 0) {
       PostNotification(ms_until_start);
     } else if (ms_until_end > 0) {
       if (ms_until_start <= 0) {
         PostNotification(0);
       }
       PostNotification(ms_until_end);
     }
   }
 }

Vulnerability Type: 
CWE ID: 
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched

The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).

BUG=
TEST=


Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98