Code: int mp_unpack_full(lua_State *L, int limit, int offset) {
    size_t len;
    const char *s;
    mp_cur c;
    int cnt; /* Number of objects unpacked */
    int decode_all = (!limit && !offset);

    s = luaL_checklstring(L,1,&len); /* if no match, exits */

    if (offset < 0 || limit < 0) /* requesting negative off or lim is invalid */
        return luaL_error(L,
            "Invalid request to unpack with offset of %d and limit of %d.",
            offset, len);
    else if (offset > len)
        return luaL_error(L,
            "Start offset %d greater than input length %d.", offset, len);

    if (decode_all) limit = INT_MAX;

    mp_cur_init(&c,(const unsigned char *)s+offset,len-offset);

    /* We loop over the decode because this could be a stream
     * of multiple top-level values serialized together */
    for(cnt = 0; c.left > 0 && cnt < limit; cnt++) {
        mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,&c);

        if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_EOF) {
            return luaL_error(L,"Missing bytes in input.");
        } else if (c.err == MP_CUR_ERROR_BADFMT) {
            return luaL_error(L,"Bad data format in input.");
        }
    }

    if (!decode_all) {
        /* c->left is the remaining size of the input buffer.
          * subtract the entire buffer size from the unprocessed size
          * to get our next start offset */
         int offset = len - c.left;
         /* Return offset -1 when we have have processed the entire buffer. */
         lua_pushinteger(L, c.left == 0 ? -1 : offset);
         /* Results are returned with the arg elements still
         * in place. Lua takes care of only returning
         * elements above the args for us.
         * In this case, we have one arg on the stack
         * for this function, so we insert our first return
         * value at position 2. */
        lua_insert(L, 2);
        cnt += 1; /* increase return count by one to make room for offset */
    }

    return cnt;
}

Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr. 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10, and 5.x before 5.0 RC2 because of stack-based buffer overflows.
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.

@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.