Code: static void kiocb_batch_free(struct kiocb_batch *batch)
 {
 	struct kiocb *req, *n;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(req, n, &batch->head, ki_batch) {
 		list_del(&req->ki_batch);
 		kmem_cache_free(kiocb_cachep, req);
 	}
 }

Vulnerability Type: DoS 
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The kiocb_batch_free function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via vectors that trigger incorrect iocb management.
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.

commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.

Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs.  All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.

If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active.  This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero.  Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.

Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().

Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>