Code: static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
		unsigned long address, pte_t *page_table, pmd_t *pmd,
		unsigned int flags)
{
	struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
	struct page *page;
	spinlock_t *ptl;
	pte_t entry;
 
 	pte_unmap(page_table);
 
 	/* Check if we need to add a guard page to the stack */
 	if (check_stack_guard_page(vma, address) < 0)
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;

	/* Use the zero-page for reads */
	if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !mm_forbids_zeropage(mm)) {
		entry = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(my_zero_pfn(address),
						vma->vm_page_prot));
		page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
		if (!pte_none(*page_table))
			goto unlock;
		goto setpte;
	}

	/* Allocate our own private page. */
	if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
		goto oom;
	page = alloc_zeroed_user_highpage_movable(vma, address);
	if (!page)
		goto oom;

	if (mem_cgroup_try_charge(page, mm, GFP_KERNEL, &memcg))
		goto oom_free_page;

	/*
	 * The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
	 * preceeding stores to the page contents become visible before
	 * the set_pte_at() write.
	 */
	__SetPageUptodate(page);

	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));

	page_table = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
	if (!pte_none(*page_table))
		goto release;

	inc_mm_counter_fast(mm, MM_ANONPAGES);
	page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
	mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false);
	lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
setpte:
	set_pte_at(mm, address, page_table, entry);

	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
	update_mmu_cache(vma, address, page_table);
unlock:
	pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
	return 0;
release:
	mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(page, memcg);
	page_cache_release(page);
	goto unlock;
oom_free_page:
	page_cache_release(page);
oom:
	return VM_FAULT_OOM;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv 
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm/memory.c in the Linux kernel before 4.1.4 mishandles anonymous pages, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (page tainting) via a crafted application that triggers writing to page zero.
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping

Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().

Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.

For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>