Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    OM_uint32 minor, major;
    gss_ctx_id_t context;
    gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
    krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
    krb5_key k1, k2;
    krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
    gss_buffer_desc in, out;
    unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
    size_t i;

    /*
     * Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
     * work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys.  If we implement
     * gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
     * interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
     * implementation.
     */
    context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
     uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
     uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
     kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
     kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
     kb1.contents = k1buf;
     kb2.contents = k2buf;
    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
        /* Set up the keys for this test. */
        kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
        kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
        check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
        kgctx.subkey = k1;
        kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
        kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
        check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
        kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;

        /* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
         * it to the first expected output. */
        in.length = 0;
        in.value = NULL;
        major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
                                  44, &out);
        check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
        (void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
        assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
        (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);

        /* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
         * string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
        in.length = strlen(inputstr);
        in.value = (char *)inputstr;
        major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
                                  &out);
        check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
        (void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
        assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
        (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);

        /* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
        major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
                                  &out);
        check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
        assert(out.length == 0);
        (void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);

        krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
        krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
    }
    return 0;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code 
CWE ID: 
Summary: The krb5_gss_process_context_token function in lib/gssapi/krb5/process_context_token.c in the libgssapi_krb5 library in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.11.5, 1.12.x through 1.12.2, and 1.13.x before 1.13.1 does not properly maintain security-context handles, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and double free, and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted GSSAPI traffic, as demonstrated by traffic to kadmind.
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]

[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid.  Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts.  Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.

ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup