Code: int ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init(
	struct ieee80211_radiotap_iterator *iterator,
 	struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *radiotap_header,
 	int max_length, const struct ieee80211_radiotap_vendor_namespaces *vns)
 {
 	/* Linux only supports version 0 radiotap format */
 	if (radiotap_header->it_version)
 		return -EINVAL;

	/* sanity check for allowed length and radiotap length field */
	if (max_length < get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len))
		return -EINVAL;

	iterator->_rtheader = radiotap_header;
	iterator->_max_length = get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len);
	iterator->_arg_index = 0;
	iterator->_bitmap_shifter = get_unaligned_le32(&radiotap_header->it_present);
	iterator->_arg = (uint8_t *)radiotap_header + sizeof(*radiotap_header);
	iterator->_reset_on_ext = 0;
	iterator->_next_bitmap = &radiotap_header->it_present;
	iterator->_next_bitmap++;
	iterator->_vns = vns;
	iterator->current_namespace = &radiotap_ns;
	iterator->is_radiotap_ns = 1;

	/* find payload start allowing for extended bitmap(s) */

	if (iterator->_bitmap_shifter & (1<<IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
		while (get_unaligned_le32(iterator->_arg) &
					(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
			iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);

			/*
			 * check for insanity where the present bitmaps
			 * keep claiming to extend up to or even beyond the
			 * stated radiotap header length
 			 */
 
 			if ((unsigned long)iterator->_arg -
			    (unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader >
 			    (unsigned long)iterator->_max_length)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}

		iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);

		/*
		 * no need to check again for blowing past stated radiotap
		 * header length, because ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_next
		 * checks it before it is dereferenced
		 */
	}

	iterator->this_arg = iterator->_arg;

	/* we are all initialized happily */

	return 0;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init function in net/wireless/radiotap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.7 does not check whether a frame contains any data outside of the header, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via a crafted header.
Commit Message: wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun

When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
 1) the minimum radiotap header size
 2) the space for extended bitmaps

The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.

Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>