Code: struct sk_buff *sock_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk, unsigned long header_len,
				     unsigned long data_len, int noblock,
				     int *errcode)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	gfp_t gfp_mask;
 	long timeo;
 	int err;
 
 	gfp_mask = sk->sk_allocation;
 	if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
		gfp_mask |= __GFP_REPEAT;

	timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
	while (1) {
		err = sock_error(sk);
		if (err != 0)
			goto failure;

		err = -EPIPE;
		if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
			goto failure;

 		if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) < sk->sk_sndbuf) {
 			skb = alloc_skb(header_len, gfp_mask);
 			if (skb) {
				int npages;
 				int i;
 
 				/* No pages, we're done... */
 				if (!data_len)
 					break;
 
				npages = (data_len + (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 				skb->truesize += data_len;
 				skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = npages;
 				for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
					struct page *page;

					page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
					if (!page) {
						err = -ENOBUFS;
						skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = i;
						kfree_skb(skb);
						goto failure;
					}

					__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i,
							page, 0,
							(data_len >= PAGE_SIZE ?
							 PAGE_SIZE :
							 data_len));
					data_len -= PAGE_SIZE;
				}

				/* Full success... */
				break;
			}
			err = -ENOBUFS;
			goto failure;
		}
		set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
		set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
		err = -EAGAIN;
		if (!timeo)
			goto failure;
		if (signal_pending(current))
			goto interrupted;
		timeo = sock_wait_for_wmem(sk, timeo);
	}

	skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
	return skb;

interrupted:
	err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
failure:
	*errcode = err;
	return NULL;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv 
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The sock_alloc_send_pskb function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 does not properly validate a certain length value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging access to a TUN/TAP device.
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()

We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.

Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>