Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
			int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
			int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
			void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
			int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
			struct rt6_info *rt)

{
	struct sk_buff *skb;
	int err;

	/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
	 * device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
 	 * udp datagram
 	 */
 	if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
 		skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
 			hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
 			(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
		if (skb == NULL)
			return err;

		/* reserve space for Hardware header */
		skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);

		/* create space for UDP/IP header */
		skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);

		/* initialize network header pointer */
		skb_reset_network_header(skb);

		/* initialize protocol header pointer */
		skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;

 		skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
 		skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
 		skb->csum = 0;
	}
	err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
				      (length - transhdrlen));
	if (!err) {
		struct frag_hdr fhdr;
 
 		/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
 		 * It has to be a multiple of 8.
		 */
		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
					     sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
 		ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
 		skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
 		__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
		return 0;
 	}
	/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
	 * so follow normal path
	 */
	kfree_skb(skb);
 
	return err;
 }

Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr. 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the Linux kernel through 3.11.4 does not properly determine the need for UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) processing of small packets after the UFO queueing of a large packet, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via network traffic that triggers a large response packet.
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO

In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.

In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.

This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).

Found with trinity.

Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>