Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
        OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> &params,
        OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
 Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
 if (allottedSize > params->size()) {

         return BAD_VALUE;
     }
 
    BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, true);
 
     OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
 
    OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
            mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
 if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
        CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
                SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
 delete buffer_meta;
        buffer_meta = NULL;

 *buffer = 0;

 return StatusFromOMXError(err);
 }

    CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);

 *buffer = makeBufferID(header);

    addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);

    sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
 if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
        bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
 }

    CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
            params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));

 return OK;
}

Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv 
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: omx/OMXNodeInstance.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 does not validate the buffer port, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 28816827.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using

Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
