Code: static void perf_event_init_cpu(int cpu)
{
 	struct swevent_htable *swhash = &per_cpu(swevent_htable, cpu);
 
 	mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
	swhash->online = true;
 	if (swhash->hlist_refcount > 0) {
 		struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
 
		hlist = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*hlist), GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
		WARN_ON(!hlist);
		rcu_assign_pointer(swhash->swevent_hlist, hlist);
	}
	mutex_unlock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv 
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Race condition in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging incorrect handling of an swevent data structure during a CPU unplug operation.
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash

There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.

Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.

When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>