Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
		const void __user * __user *, pages,
 		const int __user *, nodes,
 		int __user *, status, int, flags)
 {
	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 	int err;
	nodemask_t task_nodes;

	/* Check flags */
	if (flags & ~(MPOL_MF_MOVE|MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL))
		return -EINVAL;

	if ((flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
		return -EPERM;

	/* Find the mm_struct */
	rcu_read_lock();
	task = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
	if (!task) {
		rcu_read_unlock();
		return -ESRCH;
	}
	get_task_struct(task);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
	 * process. The right exists if the process has administrative
	 * capabilities, superuser privileges or the same
	 * userid as the target process.
 	 */
	tcred = __task_cred(task);
	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
	    !uid_eq(cred->uid,  tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid,  tcred->uid) &&
	    !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		err = -EPERM;
 		goto out;
	}
	rcu_read_unlock();

 	err = security_task_movememory(task);
 	if (err)
		goto out;

	task_nodes = cpuset_mems_allowed(task);
	mm = get_task_mm(task);
	put_task_struct(task);

	if (!mm)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (nodes)
		err = do_pages_move(mm, task_nodes, nr_pages, pages,
				    nodes, status, flags);
	else
		err = do_pages_stat(mm, nr_pages, pages, status);

	mmput(mm);
	return err;

out:
	put_task_struct(task);
	return err;
}

Vulnerability Type: +Info 
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The move_pages system call in mm/migrate.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.9 doesn't check the effective uid of the target process, enabling a local attacker to learn the memory layout of a setuid executable despite ASLR.
Commit Message: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks

The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).

That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.

So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.

This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.

Famous last words.

Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>