Code: static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy, nodemask_t *nmask,
			     unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags)
{
	int err;
	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
	struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
	struct mempolicy *pol = current->mempolicy;

	if (flags &
		~(unsigned long)(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR|MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (flags & MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED) {
		if (flags & (MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR))
			return -EINVAL;
		*policy = 0;	/* just so it's initialized */
		task_lock(current);
		*nmask  = cpuset_current_mems_allowed;
		task_unlock(current);
		return 0;
	}

	if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
		/*
		 * Do NOT fall back to task policy if the
		 * vma/shared policy at addr is NULL.  We
		 * want to return MPOL_DEFAULT in this case.
		 */
		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
		vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, addr, addr+1);
		if (!vma) {
			up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
			return -EFAULT;
		}
		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy)
			pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
		else
			pol = vma->vm_policy;
	} else if (addr)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!pol)
		pol = &default_policy;	/* indicates default behavior */

	if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
		if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
			err = lookup_node(addr);
			if (err < 0)
				goto out;
			*policy = err;
		} else if (pol == current->mempolicy &&
				pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
			*policy = next_node_in(current->il_prev, pol->v.nodes);
		} else {
			err = -EINVAL;
			goto out;
		}
	} else {
		*policy = pol == &default_policy ? MPOL_DEFAULT :
						pol->mode;
		/*
		 * Internal mempolicy flags must be masked off before exposing
		 * the policy to userspace.
		 */
 		*policy |= (pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS);
 	}
 
	if (vma) {
		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
		vma = NULL;
	}
 	err = 0;
 	if (nmask) {
 		if (mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)) {
			*nmask = pol->w.user_nodemask;
		} else {
			task_lock(current);
			get_policy_nodemask(pol, nmask);
			task_unlock(current);
		}
	}

 out:
	mpol_cond_put(pol);
	if (vma)
		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
	return err;
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS 
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The do_get_mempolicy function in mm/mempolicy.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy

I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled.  The related call trace is as follows.

  BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
  Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798

  INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
     __slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
     kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
     mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
     mpol_new+0x66/0x80
     SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
     system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
     __slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
     kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
     __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
     SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
     system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
  INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600

  Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  ........ZZZZZZZZ
  Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
  Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5                          kkkkkkk.
  Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
  Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a                          ZZZZZZZZ
  Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  >ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc

!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem.  do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.

Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer.").  but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model.  The issue was introduced
accordingly.

Fix the issue by removing the premature release.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>