Code: static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr,
	unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_len, unsigned long *p)
{
	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);

	if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr)
		goto Efault;

	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
		goto Einval;

	/* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
 	if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
 		goto Efault;
 
	if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_PFNMAP)) {
		if (new_len > old_len)
 			goto Efault;
 	}
 
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
		unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
		locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
		lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
		locked += new_len - old_len;
		if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
			goto Eagain;
	}

	if (!may_expand_vm(mm, (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
		goto Enomem;

	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
		unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
		if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
			goto Efault;
		*p = charged;
	}

	return vma;

Efault:	/* very odd choice for most of the cases, but... */
	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
Einval:
	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Enomem:
	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
Eagain:
	return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}

Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow 
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the vma_to_resize function in mm/mremap.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) via a crafted mremap system call that expands a memory mapping.
Commit Message: mm: avoid wrapping vm_pgoff in mremap()

The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow.  However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.

Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code.  A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.

Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>