Code: ieee802_11_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
                 const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int orig_caplen, int pad,
                 u_int fcslen)
{
	uint16_t fc;
	u_int caplen, hdrlen, meshdrlen;
	struct lladdr_info src, dst;
	int llc_hdrlen;

	caplen = orig_caplen;
	/* Remove FCS, if present */
	if (length < fcslen) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
		return caplen;
	}
	length -= fcslen;
	if (caplen > length) {
		/* Amount of FCS in actual packet data, if any */
		fcslen = caplen - length;
		caplen -= fcslen;
		ndo->ndo_snapend -= fcslen;
	}

	if (caplen < IEEE802_11_FC_LEN) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
		return orig_caplen;
	}

	fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
	hdrlen = extract_header_length(ndo, fc);
	if (hdrlen == 0) {
		/* Unknown frame type or control frame subtype; quit. */
		return (0);
	}
	if (pad)
 		hdrlen = roundup2(hdrlen, 4);
 	if (ndo->ndo_Hflag && FC_TYPE(fc) == T_DATA &&
 	    DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(FC_SUBTYPE(fc))) {
 		meshdrlen = extract_mesh_header_length(p+hdrlen);
 		hdrlen += meshdrlen;
 	} else
		meshdrlen = 0;

	if (caplen < hdrlen) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
		return hdrlen;
	}

	if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
		ieee_802_11_hdr_print(ndo, fc, p, hdrlen, meshdrlen);

	/*
	 * Go past the 802.11 header.
	 */
	length -= hdrlen;
	caplen -= hdrlen;
	p += hdrlen;

	src.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
	dst.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
	switch (FC_TYPE(fc)) {
	case T_MGMT:
		get_mgmt_src_dst_mac(p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
		if (!mgmt_body_print(ndo, fc, src.addr, p, length)) {
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
			return hdrlen;
		}
		break;
	case T_CTRL:
		if (!ctrl_body_print(ndo, fc, p - hdrlen)) {
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
			return hdrlen;
		}
		break;
	case T_DATA:
		if (DATA_FRAME_IS_NULL(FC_SUBTYPE(fc)))
			return hdrlen;	/* no-data frame */
		/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
		if (FC_PROTECTED(fc)) {
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data"));
			if (!wep_print(ndo, p)) {
				ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
				return hdrlen;
			}
		} else {
			get_data_src_dst_mac(fc, p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
			llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, &src, &dst);
			if (llc_hdrlen < 0) {
				/*
				 * Some kinds of LLC packet we cannot
				 * handle intelligently
				 */
				if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
					ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
				llc_hdrlen = -llc_hdrlen;
			}
			hdrlen += llc_hdrlen;
		}
		break;
	default:
		/* We shouldn't get here - we should already have quit */
		break;
	}

	return hdrlen;
}

Vulnerability Type: 
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c for the Mesh Flags subfield.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check

ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.

This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.

Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).