Code: print_bacp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
                          const u_char *p, int length)
{
	int len, opt;

	if (length < 2)
		return 0;
	ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
	len = p[1];
	opt = p[0];
	if (length < len)
		return 0;
	if (len < 2) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t  %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
		          tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
		          opt,
		          len));
		return 0;
	}

	ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t  %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
	          tok2str(bacconfopts_values, "Unknown", opt),
	          opt,
	          len));

	switch (opt) {
	case BACPOPT_FPEER:
		if (len != 6) {
 			ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
 			return len;
 		}
		ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 4);
 		ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Magic-Num 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(p + 2)));
 		break;
 	default:
		/*
		 * Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
		 * not going to do so below.
		 */
		if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
			print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t    ", len - 2);
		break;
	}
	if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
		print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t    ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */

	return len;

trunc:
	ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|bacp]"));
	return 0;
}

Vulnerability Type: 
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PPP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ppp.c:print_ccp_config_options().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.

For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.

This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.

Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.