Code: int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
 	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
	const char *cipher_str;
	int keysize;
 	u8 *raw_key = NULL;
 	int res;
 
 	res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
 	if (res)
 		return res;
 
 	if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
retry:
	crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
	if (crypt_info) {
		if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
				key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
			return 0;
		fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
		goto retry;
	}
 
 	res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
 	if (res < 0) {
		if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
		    inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode))
			return res;
		/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
		memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
		ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
		ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
		ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
		memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
	} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
		return -EINVAL;

	crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
	if (!crypt_info)
		return -ENOMEM;

	crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
 	crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
 	crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
 	crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
	crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
 	memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
 				sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
 
	res = determine_cipher_type(crypt_info, inode, &cipher_str, &keysize);
	if (res)
		goto out;

	/*
	 * This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
	 * crypto API as part of key derivation.
	 */
	res = -ENOMEM;
	raw_key = kmalloc(FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
	if (!raw_key)
		goto out;

	res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX);
	if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
		int res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
					     inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix);
		if (res2) {
			if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
				res = -ENOKEY;
			goto out;
		}
	} else if (res) {
		goto out;
	}
	ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
	if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
		res = ctfm ? PTR_ERR(ctfm) : -ENOMEM;
		printk(KERN_DEBUG
		       "%s: error %d (inode %u) allocating crypto tfm\n",
		       __func__, res, (unsigned) inode->i_ino);
		goto out;
	}
	crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctfm, ~0);
	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
	res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, keysize);
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
 
	kzfree(raw_key);
	raw_key = NULL;
	if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
		put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
		goto retry;
	}
	return 0;
 out:
 	if (res == -ENOKEY)
 		res = 0;
 	put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
 	kzfree(raw_key);
 	return res;
 }

Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode)
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
 	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
	const char *cipher_str;
	int keysize;
 	u8 *raw_key = NULL;
 	int res;
 
	if (inode->i_crypt_info)
		return 0;

 	res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
 	if (res)
 		return res;
 
 	if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
 	if (res < 0) {
		if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
		    inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode))
			return res;
		/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
		memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
		ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
		ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
		ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
		memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
	} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
		return -EINVAL;

	crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
	if (!crypt_info)
		return -ENOMEM;

	crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
 	crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
 	crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
 	crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
 	memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
 				sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
 
	res = determine_cipher_type(crypt_info, inode, &cipher_str, &keysize);
	if (res)
		goto out;

	/*
	 * This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
	 * crypto API as part of key derivation.
	 */
	res = -ENOMEM;
	raw_key = kmalloc(FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
	if (!raw_key)
		goto out;

	res = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key, FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX);
	if (res && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
		int res2 = validate_user_key(crypt_info, &ctx, raw_key,
					     inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix);
		if (res2) {
			if (res2 == -ENOKEY)
				res = -ENOKEY;
			goto out;
		}
	} else if (res) {
		goto out;
	}
	ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(cipher_str, 0, 0);
	if (!ctfm || IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
		res = ctfm ? PTR_ERR(ctfm) : -ENOMEM;
		printk(KERN_DEBUG
		       "%s: error %d (inode %u) allocating crypto tfm\n",
		       __func__, res, (unsigned) inode->i_ino);
		goto out;
	}
	crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctfm, ~0);
	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
	res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, keysize);
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
 
	if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
		crypt_info = NULL;
 out:
 	if (res == -ENOKEY)
 		res = 0;
 	put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
 	kzfree(raw_key);
 	return res;
 }
