Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
		      void *data)
{
	int err;
	struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
	struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);

	if (!check_mnt(mnt))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* Don't allow changing of locked mnt flags.
	 *
	 * No locks need to be held here while testing the various
	 * MNT_LOCK flags because those flags can never be cleared
	 * once they are set.
	 */
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
 	err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
 	if (err)
 		return err;

	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
	if (flags & MS_BIND)
		err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
	else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		err = -EPERM;
	else
		err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
	if (!err) {
		lock_mount_hash();
		mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
		mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
		touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
		unlock_mount_hash();
	}
	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
	return err;
}

Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount

While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.

The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.

The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.

The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.

Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
		      void *data)
{
	int err;
	struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
	struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);

	if (!check_mnt(mnt))
		return -EINVAL;

	if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* Don't allow changing of locked mnt flags.
	 *
	 * No locks need to be held here while testing the various
	 * MNT_LOCK flags because those flags can never be cleared
	 * once they are set.
	 */
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
 	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
	    ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK))) {
		return -EPERM;
	}

 	err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
 	if (err)
 		return err;

	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
	if (flags & MS_BIND)
		err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
	else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		err = -EPERM;
	else
		err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
	if (!err) {
		lock_mount_hash();
		mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
		mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
		touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
		unlock_mount_hash();
	}
	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
	return err;
}
