Code:  monitor_init(void)
 {
	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;			/* XXX */
 	struct monitor *mon;
 
 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
 
	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
	if (options.compression) {
		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
	}
 	return mon;
 }

Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.

Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.

Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@

NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
 monitor_init(void)
 {
 	struct monitor *mon;
 
 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
 
 	return mon;
 }
