Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
{
 	struct snd_seq_port_info *info = arg;
 	struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
 	struct snd_seq_port_callback *callback;
 
 	/* it is not allowed to create the port for an another client */
 	if (info->addr.client != client->number)
		return -EPERM;

	port = snd_seq_create_port(client, (info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_FLG_GIVEN_PORT) ? info->addr.port : -1);
	if (port == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && info->kernel) {
		snd_seq_delete_port(client, port->addr.port);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (client->type == KERNEL_CLIENT) {
		if ((callback = info->kernel) != NULL) {
			if (callback->owner)
				port->owner = callback->owner;
			port->private_data = callback->private_data;
			port->private_free = callback->private_free;
			port->event_input = callback->event_input;
			port->c_src.open = callback->subscribe;
			port->c_src.close = callback->unsubscribe;
			port->c_dest.open = callback->use;
			port->c_dest.close = callback->unuse;
		}
	}

	info->addr = port->addr;
 
 	snd_seq_set_port_info(port, info);
 	snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start(port->addr.client, port->addr.port);
 
 	return 0;
 }

Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port

There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing.  snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
 =============================================================================
 BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G    B          ): kasan: bad access detected
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
 	___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
 	__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
  	kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
	snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
	snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
 	do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
 	SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
 INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
 	__slab_free+0x204/0x310
 	kfree+0x15f/0x180
 	port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
 	snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
 	do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
 	SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
  [<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
  [<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
  [<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
  [<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
  [<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
  [<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
  [<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
  .....

We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use.  Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.

This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
static int snd_seq_ioctl_create_port(struct snd_seq_client *client, void *arg)
{
 	struct snd_seq_port_info *info = arg;
 	struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
 	struct snd_seq_port_callback *callback;
	int port_idx;
 
 	/* it is not allowed to create the port for an another client */
 	if (info->addr.client != client->number)
		return -EPERM;

	port = snd_seq_create_port(client, (info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_FLG_GIVEN_PORT) ? info->addr.port : -1);
	if (port == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && info->kernel) {
		port_idx = port->addr.port;
		snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
		snd_seq_delete_port(client, port_idx);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (client->type == KERNEL_CLIENT) {
		if ((callback = info->kernel) != NULL) {
			if (callback->owner)
				port->owner = callback->owner;
			port->private_data = callback->private_data;
			port->private_free = callback->private_free;
			port->event_input = callback->event_input;
			port->c_src.open = callback->subscribe;
			port->c_src.close = callback->unsubscribe;
			port->c_dest.open = callback->use;
			port->c_dest.close = callback->unuse;
		}
	}

	info->addr = port->addr;
 
 	snd_seq_set_port_info(port, info);
 	snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start(port->addr.client, port->addr.port);
	snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
 
 	return 0;
 }
