Daily Papers

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become essential for improving language model capabilities, but traditional approaches rely on the assumption that human preferences follow a transitive Bradley-Terry model. This assumption fails to capture the non-transitive nature of populational human preferences. Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF), targeting non-transitive preferences, is a problem of computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the two-player constant-sum game defined by the human preference. We introduce Extragradient preference optimization (EGPO), a novel algorithm for NLHF achieving last-iterate linear convergence to the NE of KL-regularized games and polynomial convergence to the NE of original games, while being robust to noise. Unlike previous approaches that rely on nested optimization, we derive an equivalent implementation using gradients of an online variant of the identity preference optimization (IPO) loss, enabling more faithful implementation for neural networks. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate EGPO's superior performance over baseline methods when training for the same number of epochs, as measured by pairwise win-rates using the ground truth preference. These results validate both the theoretical strengths and practical advantages of EGPO for language model alignment with non-transitive human preferences.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but require careful alignment with human preferences. Traditional training-time methods finetune LLMs using human preference datasets but incur significant training costs and require repeated training to handle diverse user preferences. Test-time alignment methods address this by using reward models (RMs) to guide frozen LLMs without retraining. However, existing test-time approaches rely on trajectory-level RMs which are designed to evaluate complete responses, making them unsuitable for autoregressive text generation that requires computing next-token rewards from partial responses. To address this, we introduce GenARM, a test-time alignment approach that leverages the Autoregressive Reward Model--a novel reward parametrization designed to predict next-token rewards for efficient and effective autoregressive generation. Theoretically, we demonstrate that this parametrization can provably guide frozen LLMs toward any distribution achievable by traditional RMs within the KL-regularized reinforcement learning framework. Experimental results show that GenARM significantly outperforms prior test-time alignment baselines and matches the performance of training-time methods. Additionally, GenARM enables efficient weak-to-strong guidance, aligning larger LLMs with smaller RMs without the high costs of training larger models. Furthermore, GenARM supports multi-objective alignment, allowing real-time trade-offs between preference dimensions and catering to diverse user preferences without retraining.

Recent Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms making use of Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization as a core component have shown outstanding performance. Yet, only little is understood theoretically about why KL regularization helps, so far. We study KL regularization within an approximate value iteration scheme and show that it implicitly averages q-values. Leveraging this insight, we provide a very strong performance bound, the very first to combine two desirable aspects: a linear dependency to the horizon (instead of quadratic) and an error propagation term involving an averaging effect of the estimation errors (instead of an accumulation effect). We also study the more general case of an additional entropy regularizer. The resulting abstract scheme encompasses many existing RL algorithms. Some of our assumptions do not hold with neural networks, so we complement this theoretical analysis with an extensive empirical study.

Self-play alignment algorithms have been developed as effective methods for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs), formulating preference optimization as a two-player game. However, the regularization with respect to the reference policy, which is crucial for mitigating over-optimization, has been insufficiently investigated in self-play alignment. In this paper, we show that our regularization method can improve the unregularized self-play significantly. To study the impact of different regularizations in self-play alignment, we propose Regularized Self-Play Policy Optimization (RSPO). This generalized framework regularizes the self-play by simply adding a chosen regularization term into the loss while maintaining provable last-iterate convergence to the Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding regularized game. Surprisingly, empirical evaluations using the Mistral-7B-Instruct base model reveal that forward KL divergence regularization reduces response length in RSPO, whereas reverse KL divergence markedly improves raw win rates. RSPO with a linear combination of forward and reverse KL divergence regularization substantially increases the length-controlled win rate in AlpacaEval-2, elevating the unregularized self-play alignment method (SPPO) from 28.53% to 35.44%. Finally, we show that RSPO also improves the response diversity.

Many policy optimization approaches in reinforcement learning incorporate a Kullback-Leilbler (KL) divergence to the previous policy, to prevent the policy from changing too quickly. This idea was initially proposed in a seminal paper on Conservative Policy Iteration, with approximations given by algorithms like TRPO and Munchausen Value Iteration (MVI). We continue this line of work by investigating a generalized KL divergence -- called the Tsallis KL divergence -- which use the q-logarithm in the definition. The approach is a strict generalization, as q = 1 corresponds to the standard KL divergence; q > 1 provides a range of new options. We characterize the types of policies learned under the Tsallis KL, and motivate when q >1 could be beneficial. To obtain a practical algorithm that incorporates Tsallis KL regularization, we extend MVI, which is one of the simplest approaches to incorporate KL regularization. We show that this generalized MVI(q) obtains significant improvements over the standard MVI(q = 1) across 35 Atari games.

Policy gradient algorithms have been successfully applied to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Despite the widespread use of Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization in policy gradient algorithms to stabilize training, the systematic exploration of how different KL divergence formulations can be estimated and integrated into surrogate loss functions for online reinforcement learning (RL) presents a nuanced and systematically explorable design space. In this paper, we propose regularized policy gradient (RPG), a systematic framework for deriving and analyzing KL-regularized policy gradient methods in the online RL setting. We derive policy gradients and corresponding surrogate loss functions for objectives regularized by both forward and reverse KL divergences, considering both normalized and unnormalized policy distributions. Furthermore, we present derivations for fully differentiable loss functions as well as REINFORCE-style gradient estimators, accommodating diverse algorithmic needs. We conduct extensive experiments on RL for LLM reasoning using these methods, showing improved or competitive results in terms of training stability and performance compared to strong baselines such as GRPO, REINFORCE++, and DAPO. The code is available at https://github.com/complex-reasoning/RPG.

Incorporating expert demonstrations has empirically helped to improve the sample efficiency of reinforcement learning (RL). This paper quantifies theoretically to what extent this extra information reduces RL's sample complexity. In particular, we study the demonstration-regularized reinforcement learning that leverages the expert demonstrations by KL-regularization for a policy learned by behavior cloning. Our findings reveal that using N^{E} expert demonstrations enables the identification of an optimal policy at a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(Poly(S,A,H)/(varepsilon^2 N^{E})) in finite and mathcal{O}(Poly(d,H)/(varepsilon^2 N^{E})) in linear Markov decision processes, where varepsilon is the target precision, H the horizon, A the number of action, S the number of states in the finite case and d the dimension of the feature space in the linear case. As a by-product, we provide tight convergence guarantees for the behaviour cloning procedure under general assumptions on the policy classes. Additionally, we establish that demonstration-regularized methods are provably efficient for reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). In this respect, we provide theoretical evidence showing the benefits of KL-regularization for RLHF in tabular and linear MDPs. Interestingly, we avoid pessimism injection by employing computationally feasible regularization to handle reward estimation uncertainty, thus setting our approach apart from the prior works.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Reinforcement learning (RL) post-training is crucial for LLM alignment and reasoning, but existing policy-based methods, such as PPO and DPO, can fall short of fixing shortcuts inherited from pre-training. In this work, we introduce Qsharp, a value-based algorithm for KL-regularized RL that guides the reference policy using the optimal regularized Q function. We propose to learn the optimal Q function using distributional RL on an aggregated online dataset. Unlike prior value-based baselines that guide the model using unregularized Q-values, our method is theoretically principled and provably learns the optimal policy for the KL-regularized RL problem. Empirically, Qsharp outperforms prior baselines in math reasoning benchmarks while maintaining a smaller KL divergence to the reference policy. Theoretically, we establish a reduction from KL-regularized RL to no-regret online learning, providing the first bounds for deterministic MDPs under only realizability. Thanks to distributional RL, our bounds are also variance-dependent and converge faster when the reference policy has small variance. In sum, our results highlight Qsharp as an effective approach for post-training LLMs, offering both improved performance and theoretical guarantees. The code can be found at https://github.com/jinpz/q_sharp.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful tool for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to improve complex reasoning abilities. However, state-of-the-art policy optimization methods often suffer from high computational overhead and memory consumption, primarily due to the need for multiple generations per prompt and the reliance on critic networks or advantage estimates of the current policy. In this paper, we propose A*-PO, a novel two-stage policy optimization framework that directly approximates the optimal advantage function and enables efficient training of LLMs for reasoning tasks. In the first stage, we leverage offline sampling from a reference policy to estimate the optimal value function V*, eliminating the need for costly online value estimation. In the second stage, we perform on-policy updates using a simple least-squares regression loss with only a single generation per prompt. Theoretically, we establish performance guarantees and prove that the KL-regularized RL objective can be optimized without requiring complex exploration strategies. Empirically, A*-PO achieves competitive performance across a wide range of mathematical reasoning benchmarks, while reducing training time by up to 2times and peak memory usage by over 30% compared to PPO, GRPO, and REBEL. Implementation of A*-PO can be found at https://github.com/ZhaolinGao/A-PO.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), regularization has emerged as a popular tool both in theory and practice, typically based either on an entropy bonus or a Kullback-Leibler divergence that constrains successive policies. In practice, these approaches have been shown to improve exploration, robustness and stability, giving rise to popular Deep RL algorithms such as SAC and TRPO. Policy Mirror Descent (PMD) is a theoretical framework that solves this general regularized policy optimization problem, however the closed-form solution involves the sum of all past Q-functions, which is intractable in practice. We propose and analyze PMD-like algorithms that only keep the last M Q-functions in memory, and show that for finite and large enough M, a convergent algorithm can be derived, introducing no error in the policy update, unlike prior deep RL PMD implementations. StaQ, the resulting algorithm, enjoys strong theoretical guarantees and is competitive with deep RL baselines, while exhibiting less performance oscillation, paving the way for fully stable deep RL algorithms and providing a testbed for experimentation with Policy Mirror Descent.

This paper studies the theoretical framework of the alignment process of generative models with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). We consider a standard mathematical formulation, the reverse-KL regularized contextual bandit for RLHF. Despite its widespread practical application, a rigorous theoretical analysis of this formulation remains open. We investigate its behavior in three distinct settings -- offline, online, and hybrid -- and propose efficient algorithms with finite-sample theoretical guarantees. Moving towards practical applications, our framework, with a robust approximation of the information-theoretical policy improvement oracle, naturally gives rise to several novel RLHF algorithms. This includes an iterative version of the Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) algorithm for online settings, and a multi-step rejection sampling strategy for offline scenarios. Our empirical evaluations on real-world alignment experiment of large language model demonstrate that these proposed methods significantly surpass existing strong baselines, such as DPO and Rejection Sampling Optimization (RSO), showcasing the connections between solid theoretical foundations and their powerful practical implementations.

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1{T}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T) bound.

We consider learning in an adversarial Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the loss functions can change arbitrarily over K episodes and the state space can be arbitrarily large. We assume that the Q-function of any policy is linear in some known features, that is, a linear function approximation exists. The best existing regret upper bound for this setting (Luo et al., 2021) is of order mathcal O(K^{2/3}) (omitting all other dependencies), given access to a simulator. This paper provides two algorithms that improve the regret to mathcal O(sqrt K) in the same setting. Our first algorithm makes use of a refined analysis of the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm with the log-barrier regularizer. This analysis allows the loss estimators to be arbitrarily negative and might be of independent interest. Our second algorithm develops a magnitude-reduced loss estimator, further removing the polynomial dependency on the number of actions in the first algorithm and leading to the optimal regret bound (up to logarithmic terms and dependency on the horizon). Moreover, we also extend the first algorithm to simulator-free linear MDPs, which achieves mathcal O(K^{8/9}) regret and greatly improves over the best existing bound mathcal O(K^{14/15}). This algorithm relies on a better alternative to the Matrix Geometric Resampling procedure by Neu & Olkhovskaya (2020), which could again be of independent interest.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.

For RL algorithms, appropriate entropy control is crucial to their effectiveness. To control the policy entropy, a commonly used method is entropy regularization, which is adopted in various popular RL algorithms including PPO, SAC and A3C. Although entropy regularization proves effective in robotic and games RL conventionally, studies found that it gives weak to no gains in LLM-RL training. In this work, we study the issues of entropy bonus in LLM-RL setting. Specifically, we first argue that the conventional entropy regularization suffers from the LLM's extremely large response space and the sparsity of the optimal outputs. As a remedy, we propose AEnt, an entropy control method that utilizes a new clamped entropy bonus with an automatically adjusted coefficient. The clamped entropy is evaluated with the re-normalized policy defined on certain smaller token space, which encourages exploration within a more compact response set. In addition, the algorithm automatically adjusts entropy coefficient according to the clamped entropy value, effectively controlling the entropy-induced bias while leveraging the entropy's benefits. AEnt is tested in math-reasoning tasks under different base models and datasets, and it is observed that AEnt outperforms the baselines consistently across multiple benchmarks.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is frequently employed in fine-tuning large language models (LMs), such as GPT-3, to penalize them for undesirable features of generated sequences, such as offensiveness, social bias, harmfulness or falsehood. The RL formulation involves treating the LM as a policy and updating it to maximise the expected value of a reward function which captures human preferences, such as non-offensiveness. In this paper, we analyze challenges associated with treating a language model as an RL policy and show how avoiding those challenges requires moving beyond the RL paradigm. We start by observing that the standard RL approach is flawed as an objective for fine-tuning LMs because it leads to distribution collapse: turning the LM into a degenerate distribution. Then, we analyze KL-regularised RL, a widely used recipe for fine-tuning LMs, which additionally constrains the fine-tuned LM to stay close to its original distribution in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We show that KL-regularised RL is equivalent to variational inference: approximating a Bayesian posterior which specifies how to update a prior LM to conform with evidence provided by the reward function. We argue that this Bayesian inference view of KL-regularised RL is more insightful than the typically employed RL perspective. The Bayesian inference view explains how KL-regularised RL avoids the distribution collapse problem and offers a first-principles derivation for its objective. While this objective happens to be equivalent to RL (with a particular choice of parametric reward), there exist other objectives for fine-tuning LMs which are no longer equivalent to RL. That observation leads to a more general point: RL is not an adequate formal framework for problems such as fine-tuning language models. These problems are best viewed as Bayesian inference: approximating a pre-defined target distribution.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We address the challenge of exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) when the agent operates in an unknown environment with sparse or no rewards. In this work, we study the maximum entropy exploration problem of two different types. The first type is visitation entropy maximization previously considered by Hazan et al.(2019) in the discounted setting. For this type of exploration, we propose a game-theoretic algorithm that has mathcal{O}(H^3S^2A/varepsilon^2) sample complexity thus improving the varepsilon-dependence upon existing results, where S is a number of states, A is a number of actions, H is an episode length, and varepsilon is a desired accuracy. The second type of entropy we study is the trajectory entropy. This objective function is closely related to the entropy-regularized MDPs, and we propose a simple algorithm that has a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(poly(S,A,H)/varepsilon). Interestingly, it is the first theoretical result in RL literature that establishes the potential statistical advantage of regularized MDPs for exploration. Finally, we apply developed regularization techniques to reduce sample complexity of visitation entropy maximization to mathcal{O}(H^2SA/varepsilon^2), yielding a statistical separation between maximum entropy exploration and reward-free exploration.

We propose a game-based formulation for learning dimensionality-reducing representations of feature vectors, when only a prior knowledge on future prediction tasks is available. In this game, the first player chooses a representation, and then the second player adversarially chooses a prediction task from a given class, representing the prior knowledge. The first player aims is to minimize, and the second player to maximize, the regret: The minimal prediction loss using the representation, compared to the same loss using the original features. For the canonical setting in which the representation, the response to predict and the predictors are all linear functions, and under the mean squared error loss function, we derive the theoretically optimal representation in pure strategies, which shows the effectiveness of the prior knowledge, and the optimal regret in mixed strategies, which shows the usefulness of randomizing the representation. For general representations and loss functions, we propose an efficient algorithm to optimize a randomized representation. The algorithm only requires the gradients of the loss function, and is based on incrementally adding a representation rule to a mixture of such rules.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We propose a new class of online learning algorithms, generalized implicit Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL), that expands the scope of FTRL framework. Generalized implicit FTRL can recover known algorithms, as FTRL with linearized losses and implicit FTRL, and it allows the design of new update rules, as extensions of aProx and Mirror-Prox to FTRL. Our theory is constructive in the sense that it provides a simple unifying framework to design updates that directly improve the worst-case upper bound on the regret. The key idea is substituting the linearization of the losses with a Fenchel-Young inequality. We show the flexibility of the framework by proving that some known algorithms, like the Mirror-Prox updates, are instantiations of the generalized implicit FTRL. Finally, the new framework allows us to recover the temporal variation bound of implicit OMD, with the same computational complexity.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Policy optimization methods are popular reinforcement learning algorithms in practice. Recent works have built theoretical foundation for them by proving T regret bounds even when the losses are adversarial. Such bounds are tight in the worst case but often overly pessimistic. In this work, we show that in tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs), by properly designing the regularizer, the exploration bonus and the learning rates, one can achieve a more favorable polylog(T) regret when the losses are stochastic, without sacrificing the worst-case guarantee in the adversarial regime. To our knowledge, this is also the first time a gap-dependent polylog(T) regret bound is shown for policy optimization. Specifically, we achieve this by leveraging a Tsallis entropy or a Shannon entropy regularizer in the policy update. Then we show that under known transitions, we can further obtain a first-order regret bound in the adversarial regime by leveraging the log-barrier regularizer.

Because it is difficult to precisely specify complex objectives, reinforcement learning policies are often optimized using proxy reward functions that only approximate the true goal. However, optimizing proxy rewards frequently leads to reward hacking: the optimized reward function ceases to be a good proxy and the resulting policy performs poorly with respect to the unspecified true reward. Principled solutions to reward hacking have been impeded by the lack of a good definition for the problem. To address this gap, we introduce a definition of reward hacking based on the correlation between proxy and true rewards for states and actions seen by a "base policy" that breaks down under optimization. We show that this definition captures reward hacking behavior across several realistic settings, including in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Using our formulation, we show theoretically that regularization to the base policy can effectively prevent reward hacking. While the current practice in RLHF applies a KL penalty between action distributions for this purpose, our theory suggests regularizing the chi^2 divergence between the policies' occupancy measures can be more effective. We intuitively show the benefits of this type of regularization and demonstrate that it better mitigates reward hacking in practice across four realistic settings, including RLHF. Our code is available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/orpo.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

On-policy reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular framework for solving sequential decision problems due to its computational efficiency and theoretical simplicity. Some on-policy methods guarantee every policy update is constrained to a trust region relative to the prior policy to ensure training stability. These methods often require computationally intensive non-linear optimization or require a particular form of action distribution. In this work, we show that applying KL penalization alone is nearly sufficient to enforce such trust regions. Then, we show that introducing a "fixup" phase is sufficient to guarantee a trust region is enforced on every policy update while adding fewer than 5% additional gradient steps in practice. The resulting algorithm, which we call FixPO, is able to train a variety of policy architectures and action spaces, is easy to implement, and produces results competitive with other trust region methods.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Exploration is essential in modern learning, from reinforcement learning environments with small neural policies to large language models (LLMs). Existing work, such as DPO, leverages full sequence log-likelihoods to capture an entire trajectory of the model's decisions, while methods like GRPO aggregate per-token ratios into a trajectory-level update. However, both often limit exploration on long-horizon tasks. We introduce History-Aggregated Exploratory Policy Optimization (HAEPO), a history-aware exploratory loss to combat these shortcomings. HAEPO compresses each trajectory into the sum of its logarithmic probabilities (a cumulative logarithmic likelihood), and applies a Plackett-Luce softmax across trajectories to obtain normalized weights proportional to their returns, thus encouraging broader exploration. We add entropy regularization to stabilize the aggressive updates to prevent premature collapse and a soft KL penalty relative to a frozen copy of the previous (reference) policy. Empirically, HAEPO converges fast, explores thoroughly, aligns closely with true rewards, and demonstrates robust learning behavior better or at par with PPO, GRPO, and DPO across diverse tasks. Thus, HAEPO provides a stable and interpretable framework by explicitly leveraging full-trajectory history while balancing exploration and stability.

Mixture of experts (MoE) has a well-principled finite mixture model construction for prediction, allowing the gating network (mixture weights) to learn from the predictors (explanatory variables) together with the experts' network (mixture component densities). We investigate the estimation properties of MoEs in a high-dimensional setting, where the number of predictors is much larger than the sample size, for which the literature lacks computational and especially theoretical results. We consider the class of finite MoE models with softmax gating functions and Gaussian regression experts, and focus on the theoretical properties of their l_1-regularized estimation via the Lasso. We provide a lower bound on the regularization parameter of the Lasso penalty that ensures an l_1-oracle inequality is satisfied by the Lasso estimator according to the Kullback--Leibler loss. We further state an l_1-ball oracle inequality for the l_1-penalized maximum likelihood estimator from the model selection.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has propelled Large Language Models in complex reasoning, yet its scalability is often hindered by a training bottleneck where performance plateaus as policy entropy collapses, signaling a loss of exploration. Previous methods typically address this by maintaining high policy entropy, yet the precise mechanisms that govern meaningful exploration have remained underexplored. Our analysis suggests that an unselective focus on entropy risks amplifying irrelevant tokens and destabilizing training. This paper investigates the exploration dynamics within RLVR and identifies a key issue: the gradual elimination of valuable low-probability exploratory tokens, which we term \textit{reasoning sparks}. We find that while abundant in pre-trained models, these sparks are systematically extinguished during RLVR due to over-penalization, leading to a degeneracy in exploration. To address this, we introduce Low-probability Regularization (Lp-Reg). Its core mechanism regularizes the policy towards a heuristic proxy distribution. This proxy is constructed by filtering out presumed noise tokens and re-normalizing the distribution over the remaining candidates. The result is a less-noisy proxy where the probability of reasoning sparks is amplified, which then serves as a soft regularization target to shield these valuable tokens from elimination via KL divergence. Experiments show that Lp-Reg enables stable on-policy training for around 1,000 steps, a regime where baseline entropy-control methods collapse. This sustained exploration leads to state-of-the-art performance, achieving a 60.17% average accuracy on five math benchmarks, an improvement of 2.66% over prior methods. Code is available at https://github.com/CarlanLark/Lp-Reg.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of regret. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel unsupervised training loss of regret-loss, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Modern neural models trained on textual data rely on pre-trained representations that emerge without direct supervision. As these representations are increasingly being used in real-world applications, the inability to control their content becomes an increasingly important problem. We formulate the problem of identifying and erasing a linear subspace that corresponds to a given concept, in order to prevent linear predictors from recovering the concept. We model this problem as a constrained, linear maximin game, and show that existing solutions are generally not optimal for this task. We derive a closed-form solution for certain objectives, and propose a convex relaxation, \method, that works well for others. When evaluated in the context of binary gender removal, the method recovers a low-dimensional subspace whose removal mitigates bias by intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation. We show that the method is highly expressive, effectively mitigating bias in deep nonlinear classifiers while maintaining tractability and interpretability.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Recent advances in large language model (LLM) post-training have leveraged two distinct paradigms to enhance reasoning capabilities: reinforcement learning (RL) and knowledge distillation (KD). While RL enables the emergence of complex reasoning behaviors, it often suffers from low sample efficiency when the initial policy struggles to explore high-reward trajectories. Conversely, KD improves learning efficiency via mimicking the teacher model but tends to generalize poorly to out-of-domain scenarios. In this work, we present KDRL, a unified post-training framework that jointly optimizes a reasoning model through teacher supervision (KD) and self-exploration (RL). Specifically, KDRL leverages policy gradient optimization to simultaneously minimize the reverse Kullback-Leibler divergence (RKL) between the student and teacher distributions while maximizing the expected rule-based rewards. We first formulate a unified objective that integrates GRPO and KD, and systematically explore how different KL approximations, KL coefficients, and reward-guided KD strategies affect the overall post-training dynamics and performance. Empirical results on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that KDRL outperforms GRPO and various KD baselines while achieving a favorable balance between performance and reasoning token efficiency. These findings indicate that integrating KD and RL serves as an effective and efficient strategy to train reasoning LLMs.

The controllable generation of diffusion models aims to steer the model to generate samples that optimize some given objective functions. It is desirable for a variety of applications including image generation, molecule generation, and DNA/sequence generation. Reinforcement Learning (RL) based fine-tuning of the base model is a popular approach but it can overfit the reward function while requiring significant resources. We frame controllable generation as a problem of finding a distribution that optimizes a KL-regularized objective function. We present SLCD -- Supervised Learning based Controllable Diffusion, which iteratively generates online data and trains a small classifier to guide the generation of the diffusion model. Similar to the standard classifier-guided diffusion, SLCD's key computation primitive is classification and does not involve any complex concepts from RL or control. Via a reduction to no-regret online learning analysis, we show that under KL divergence, the output from SLCD provably converges to the optimal solution of the KL-regularized objective. Further, we empirically demonstrate that SLCD can generate high quality samples with nearly the same inference time as the base model in both image generation with continuous diffusion and biological sequence generation with discrete diffusion. Our code is available at https://github.com/Owen-Oertell/slcd

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has delivered impressive gains in mathematical and multimodal reasoning and has become a standard post-training paradigm for contemporary language and vision-language models. However, the RLVR recipe introduces a significant risk of capability regression, where models forget foundational skills after prolonged training without employing regularization strategies. We empirically confirm this concern, observing that open-source reasoning models suffer performance degradation on core capabilities such as perception and faithfulness. While imposing regularization terms like KL divergence can help prevent deviation from the base model, these terms are calculated on the current task, thus they do not guarantee broader knowledge. Meanwhile, commonly used experience replay across heterogeneous domains makes it nontrivial to decide how much training focus each objective should receive. To address this, we propose RECAP-a replay strategy with dynamic objective reweighting for general knowledge preservation. Our reweighting mechanism adapts in an online manner using short-horizon signals of convergence and instability, shifting the post-training focus away from saturated objectives and toward underperforming or volatile ones. Our method is end-to-end and readily applicable to existing RLVR pipelines without training additional models or heavy tuning. Extensive experiments on benchmarks based on Qwen2.5-VL-3B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, which not only preserves general capabilities but also improves reasoning by enabling more flexible trade-offs among in-task rewards.

Learning from human preference data has emerged as the dominant paradigm for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). The two most common families of techniques -- online reinforcement learning (RL) such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and offline contrastive methods such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- were positioned as equivalent in prior work due to the fact that both have to start from the same offline preference dataset. To further expand our theoretical understanding of the similarities and differences between online and offline techniques for preference fine-tuning, we conduct a rigorous analysis through the lens of dataset coverage, a concept that captures how the training data covers the test distribution and is widely used in RL. We prove that a global coverage condition is both necessary and sufficient for offline contrastive methods to converge to the optimal policy, but a weaker partial coverage condition suffices for online RL methods. This separation provides one explanation of why online RL methods can perform better than offline methods, especially when the offline preference data is not diverse enough. Finally, motivated by our preceding theoretical observations, we derive a hybrid preference optimization (HyPO) algorithm that uses offline data for contrastive-based preference optimization and online data for KL regularization. Theoretically and empirically, we demonstrate that HyPO is more performant than its pure offline counterpart DPO, while still preserving its computation and memory efficiency.

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and alternating updates. Our method gives real-valued parameter updates, making it a drop-in replacement for standard optimizers. We empirically demonstrate that complex-valued momentum can improve convergence in realistic adversarial games - like generative adversarial networks - by showing we can find better solutions with an almost identical computational cost. We also show a practical generalization to a complex-valued Adam variant, which we use to train BigGAN to better inception scores on CIFAR-10.

Let p denote a generative language model. Let r denote a reward model that returns a scalar that captures the degree at which a draw from p is preferred. The goal of language model alignment is to alter p to a new distribution phi that results in a higher expected reward while keeping phi close to p. A popular alignment method is the KL-constrained reinforcement learning (RL), which chooses a distribution phi_Delta that maximizes E_{phi_{Delta}} r(y) subject to a relative entropy constraint KL(phi_Delta || p) leq Delta. Another simple alignment method is best-of-N, where N samples are drawn from p and one with highest reward is selected. In this paper, we offer a closed-form characterization of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution. We demonstrate that any alignment method that achieves a comparable trade-off between KL divergence and reward must approximate the optimal KL-constrained RL solution in terms of relative entropy. To further analyze the properties of alignment methods, we introduce two simplifying assumptions: we let the language model be memoryless, and the reward model be linear. Although these assumptions may not reflect complex real-world scenarios, they enable a precise characterization of the asymptotic behavior of both the best-of-N alignment, and the KL-constrained RL method, in terms of information-theoretic quantities. We prove that the reward of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution satisfies a large deviation principle, and we fully characterize its rate function. We also show that the rate of growth of the scaled cumulants of the reward is characterized by a proper Renyi cross entropy. Finally, we show that best-of-N is asymptotically equivalent to KL-constrained RL solution by proving that their expected rewards are asymptotically equal, and concluding that the two distributions must be close in KL divergence.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in performing complex multi-step reasoning, yet they continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, often making systematic errors. A promising solution is reinforcement learning (RL) guided by reward models, particularly those focusing on process rewards, which score each intermediate step rather than solely evaluating the final outcome. This approach is more effective at guiding policy models towards correct reasoning trajectories. In this work, we propose an entropy-regularized process reward model (ER-PRM) that integrates KL-regularized Markov Decision Processes (MDP) to balance policy optimization with the need to prevent the policy from shifting too far from its initial distribution. We derive a novel reward construction method based on the theoretical results. Our theoretical analysis shows that we could derive the optimal reward model from the initial policy sampling. Our empirical experiments on the MATH and GSM8K benchmarks demonstrate that ER-PRM consistently outperforms existing process reward models, achieving 1% improvement on GSM8K and 2-3% improvement on MATH under best-of-N evaluation, and more than 1% improvement under RLHF. These results highlight the efficacy of entropy-regularization in enhancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities.

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.

We show that Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods for solving Text-Based Games (TBGs) often fail to generalize on unseen games, especially in small data regimes. To address this issue, we propose Context Relevant Episodic State Truncation (CREST) for irrelevant token removal in observation text for improved generalization. Our method first trains a base model using Q-learning, which typically overfits the training games. The base model's action token distribution is used to perform observation pruning that removes irrelevant tokens. A second bootstrapped model is then retrained on the pruned observation text. Our bootstrapped agent shows improved generalization in solving unseen TextWorld games, using 10x-20x fewer training games compared to previous state-of-the-art methods despite requiring less number of training episodes.

In the misspecified kernel ridge regression problem, researchers usually assume the underground true function f_{rho}^{*} in [H]^{s}, a less-smooth interpolation space of a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) H for some sin (0,1). The existing minimax optimal results require |f_{rho}^{*}|_{L^{infty}}<infty which implicitly requires s > alpha_{0} where alpha_{0}in (0,1) is the embedding index, a constant depending on H. Whether the KRR is optimal for all sin (0,1) is an outstanding problem lasting for years. In this paper, we show that KRR is minimax optimal for any sin (0,1) when the H is a Sobolev RKHS.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

Real-world reinforcement learning (RL) is often severely limited since typical RL algorithms heavily rely on the reset mechanism to sample proper initial states. In practice, the reset mechanism is expensive to implement due to the need for human intervention or heavily engineered environments. To make learning more practical, we propose a generic no-regret reduction to systematically design reset-free RL algorithms. Our reduction turns reset-free RL into a two-player game. We show that achieving sublinear regret in this two-player game would imply learning a policy that has both sublinear performance regret and sublinear total number of resets in the original RL problem. This means that the agent eventually learns to perform optimally and avoid resets. By this reduction, we design an instantiation for linear Markov decision processes, which is the first provably correct reset-free RL algorithm to our knowledge.

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Existing imitation learning methods mainly focus on making an agent effectively mimic a demonstrated behavior, but do not address the potential contradiction between the behavior style and the objective of a task. There is a general lack of efficient methods that allow an agent to partially imitate a demonstrated behavior to varying degrees, while completing the main objective of a task. In this paper we propose a method called Regularized Soft Actor-Critic which formulates the main task and the imitation task under the Constrained Markov Decision Process framework (CMDP). The main task is defined as the maximum entropy objective used in Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) and the imitation task is defined as a constraint. We evaluate our method on continuous control tasks relevant to video games applications.

Policy-based methods currently dominate reinforcement learning (RL) pipelines for large language model (LLM) reasoning, leaving value-based approaches largely unexplored. We revisit the classical paradigm of Bellman Residual Minimization and introduce Trajectory Bellman Residual Minimization (TBRM), an algorithm that naturally adapts this idea to LLMs, yielding a simple yet effective off-policy algorithm that optimizes a single trajectory-level Bellman objective using the model's own logits as Q-values. TBRM removes the need for critics, importance-sampling ratios, or clipping, and operates with only one rollout per prompt. We prove convergence to the near-optimal KL-regularized policy from arbitrary off-policy data via an improved change-of-trajectory-measure analysis. Experiments on standard mathematical-reasoning benchmarks show that TBRM consistently outperforms policy-based baselines, like PPO and GRPO, with comparable or lower computational and memory overhead. Our results indicate that value-based RL might be a principled and efficient alternative for enhancing reasoning capabilities in LLMs.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

A simple and effective method for the alignment of generative models is the best-of-n policy, where n samples are drawn from a base policy, and ranked based on a reward function, and the highest ranking one is selected. A commonly used analytical expression in the literature claims that the KL divergence between the best-of-n policy and the base policy is equal to log (n) - (n-1)/n. We disprove the validity of this claim, and show that it is an upper bound on the actual KL divergence. We also explore the tightness of this upper bound in different regimes. Finally, we propose a new estimator for the KL divergence and empirically show that it provides a tight approximation through a few examples.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

We consider the problem of conformal prediction under covariate shift. Given labeled data from a source domain and unlabeled data from a covariate shifted target domain, we seek to construct prediction sets with valid marginal coverage in the target domain. Most existing methods require estimating the unknown likelihood ratio function, which can be prohibitive for high-dimensional data such as images. To address this challenge, we introduce the likelihood ratio regularized quantile regression (LR-QR) algorithm, which combines the pinball loss with a novel choice of regularization in order to construct a threshold function without directly estimating the unknown likelihood ratio. We show that the LR-QR method has coverage at the desired level in the target domain, up to a small error term that we can control. Our proofs draw on a novel analysis of coverage via stability bounds from learning theory. Our experiments demonstrate that the LR-QR algorithm outperforms existing methods on high-dimensional prediction tasks, including a regression task for the Communities and Crime dataset, an image classification task from the WILDS repository, and an LLM question-answering task on the MMLU benchmark.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

We provide a theoretical framework for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Our analysis shows that when the true reward function is linear, the widely used maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) converges under both the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model and the Plackett-Luce (PL) model. However, we show that when training a policy based on the learned reward model, MLE fails while a pessimistic MLE provides policies with improved performance under certain coverage assumptions. Additionally, we demonstrate that under the PL model, the true MLE and an alternative MLE that splits the K-wise comparison into pairwise comparisons both converge. Moreover, the true MLE is asymptotically more efficient. Our results validate the empirical success of existing RLHF algorithms in InstructGPT and provide new insights for algorithm design. Furthermore, our results unify the problem of RLHF and max-entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), and provide the first sample complexity bound for max-entropy IRL.

In the post-training of large language models (LLMs), Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is an effective approach to achieve generation aligned with human preferences. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) allows for policy training with a simple binary cross-entropy loss without a reward model. The objective of DPO is regularized by reverse KL divergence that encourages mode-seeking fitting to the reference policy. Nonetheless, we indicate that minimizing reverse KL divergence could fail to capture a mode of the reference distribution, which may hurt the policy's performance. Based on this observation, we propose a simple modification to DPO, H-DPO, which allows for control over the entropy of the resulting policy, enhancing the distribution's sharpness and thereby enabling mode-seeking fitting more effectively. In our experiments, we show that H-DPO outperformed DPO across various tasks, demonstrating superior results in pass@k evaluations for mathematical tasks. Moreover, H-DPO is simple to implement, requiring only minor modifications to the loss calculation of DPO, which makes it highly practical and promising for wide-ranging applications in the training of LLMs.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Despite the great empirical success of deep reinforcement learning, its theoretical foundation is less well understood. In this work, we make the first attempt to theoretically understand the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) from both algorithmic and statistical perspectives. In specific, we focus on a slight simplification of DQN that fully captures its key features. Under mild assumptions, we establish the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence for the action-value functions of the iterative policy sequence obtained by DQN. In particular, the statistical error characterizes the bias and variance that arise from approximating the action-value function using deep neural network, while the algorithmic error converges to zero at a geometric rate. As a byproduct, our analysis provides justifications for the techniques of experience replay and target network, which are crucial to the empirical success of DQN. Furthermore, as a simple extension of DQN, we propose the Minimax-DQN algorithm for zero-sum Markov game with two players. Borrowing the analysis of DQN, we also quantify the difference between the policies obtained by Minimax-DQN and the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game in terms of both the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence.

Recently, the study of linear misspecified bandits has generated intriguing implications of the hardness of learning in bandits and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, Du et al. (2020) show that even if a learner is given linear features in R^d that approximate the rewards in a bandit or RL with a uniform error of varepsilon, searching for an O(varepsilon)-optimal action requires pulling at least Omega(exp(d)) queries. Furthermore, Lattimore et al. (2020) show that a degraded O(varepsilond)-optimal solution can be learned within poly(d/varepsilon) queries. Yet it is unknown whether a structural assumption on the ground-truth parameter, such as sparsity, could break the varepsilond barrier. In this paper, we address this question by showing that algorithms can obtain O(varepsilon)-optimal actions by querying O(varepsilon^{-s}d^s) actions, where s is the sparsity parameter, removing the exp(d)-dependence. We then establish information-theoretical lower bounds, i.e., Omega(exp(s)), to show that our upper bound on sample complexity is nearly tight if one demands an error O(s^{delta}varepsilon) for 0<delta<1. For deltageq 1, we further show that poly(s/varepsilon) queries are possible when the linear features are "good" and even in general settings. These results provide a nearly complete picture of how sparsity can help in misspecified bandit learning and provide a deeper understanding of when linear features are "useful" for bandit and reinforcement learning with misspecification.

Despite the widespread empirical success of ResNet, the generalization properties of deep ResNet are rarely explored beyond the lazy training regime. In this work, we investigate scaled ResNet in the limit of infinitely deep and wide neural networks, of which the gradient flow is described by a partial differential equation in the large-neural network limit, i.e., the mean-field regime. To derive the generalization bounds under this setting, our analysis necessitates a shift from the conventional time-invariant Gram matrix employed in the lazy training regime to a time-variant, distribution-dependent version. To this end, we provide a global lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of the Gram matrix under the mean-field regime. Besides, for the traceability of the dynamic of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, we establish the linear convergence of the empirical error and estimate the upper bound of the KL divergence over parameters distribution. Finally, we build the uniform convergence for generalization bound via Rademacher complexity. Our results offer new insights into the generalization ability of deep ResNet beyond the lazy training regime and contribute to advancing the understanding of the fundamental properties of deep neural networks.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has shown great promise in enhancing the reasoning abilities of large reasoning models (LRMs). However, it suffers from a critical issue: entropy collapse and premature convergence. Naive entropy regularization, a common approach for encouraging exploration in the traditional RL literature, fails to address this problem in the context of LRM. Our analysis reveals that this failure stems from the vast action space and long trajectories in LRMs, which easily trigger a global entropy explosion as the model indiscriminately explores all possible actions and states. To address this, we propose SIREN (SelectIve entRopy rEgularizatioN), a method that confines exploration to a meaningful subset of actions and states. SIREN achieves this through a two-step entropy masking mechanism, consisting of a top-p mask and a peak-entropy mask. In addition, regularization is transformed into a self-anchored form to stabilize training. Across five mathematical benchmarks, SIREN attains superior average performance over previous entropy-related RLVR approaches, exemplified by a +6.6 maj@k improvement on AIME24/25 with Qwen2.5-Math-7B. Further analysis confirms that SIREN promotes greater response diversity and maintains entropy at an appropriate level, which helps to preserve the validation pass@k throughout training. This effectively mitigates the premature convergence problem common in RLVR for LRM.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

The dominant line of work in domain adaptation has focused on learning invariant representations using domain-adversarial training. In this paper, we interpret this approach from a game theoretical perspective. Defining optimal solutions in domain-adversarial training as a local Nash equilibrium, we show that gradient descent in domain-adversarial training can violate the asymptotic convergence guarantees of the optimizer, oftentimes hindering the transfer performance. Our analysis leads us to replace gradient descent with high-order ODE solvers (i.e., Runge-Kutta), for which we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees. This family of optimizers is significantly more stable and allows more aggressive learning rates, leading to high performance gains when used as a drop-in replacement over standard optimizers. Our experiments show that in conjunction with state-of-the-art domain-adversarial methods, we achieve up to 3.5% improvement with less than of half training iterations. Our optimizers are easy to implement, free of additional parameters, and can be plugged into any domain-adversarial framework.

This paper explores the effects of various forms of regularization in the context of language model alignment via self-play. While both reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO) require to collect costly human-annotated pairwise preferences, the self-play fine-tuning (SPIN) approach replaces the rejected answers by data generated from the previous iterate. However, the SPIN method presents a performance instability issue in the learning phase, which can be mitigated by playing against a mixture of the two previous iterates. In the same vein, we propose in this work to address this issue from two perspectives: first, by incorporating an additional Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization to stay at the proximity of the reference policy; second, by using the idea of fictitious play which smoothens the opponent policy across all previous iterations. In particular, we show that the KL-based regularizer boils down to replacing the previous policy by its geometric mixture with the base policy inside of the SPIN loss function. We finally discuss empirical results on MT-Bench as well as on the Hugging Face Open LLM Leaderboard.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

The vast majority of Reinforcement Learning methods is largely impacted by the computation effort and data requirements needed to obtain effective estimates of action-value functions, which in turn determine the quality of the overall performance and the sample-efficiency of the learning procedure. Typically, action-value functions are estimated through an iterative scheme that alternates the application of an empirical approximation of the Bellman operator and a subsequent projection step onto a considered function space. It has been observed that this scheme can be potentially generalized to carry out multiple iterations of the Bellman operator at once, benefiting the underlying learning algorithm. However, till now, it has been challenging to effectively implement this idea, especially in high-dimensional problems. In this paper, we introduce iterated Q-Network (i-QN), a novel principled approach that enables multiple consecutive Bellman updates by learning a tailored sequence of action-value functions where each serves as the target for the next. We show that i-QN is theoretically grounded and that it can be seamlessly used in value-based and actor-critic methods. We empirically demonstrate the advantages of i-QN in Atari 2600 games and MuJoCo continuous control problems.

Kullback-Leiber divergence has been widely used in Knowledge Distillation (KD) to compress Large Language Models (LLMs). Contrary to prior assertions that reverse Kullback-Leibler (RKL) divergence is mode-seeking and thus preferable over the mean-seeking forward Kullback-Leibler (FKL) divergence, this study empirically and theoretically demonstrates that neither mode-seeking nor mean-seeking properties manifest in KD for LLMs. Instead, RKL and FKL are found to share the same optimization objective and both converge after a sufficient number of epochs. However, due to practical constraints, LLMs are seldom trained for such an extensive number of epochs. Meanwhile, we further find that RKL focuses on the tail part of the distributions, while FKL focuses on the head part at the beginning epochs. Consequently, we propose a simple yet effective Adaptive Kullback-Leiber (AKL) divergence method, which adaptively allocates weights to combine FKL and RKL. Metric-based and GPT-4-based evaluations demonstrate that the proposed AKL outperforms the baselines across various tasks and improves the diversity and quality of generated responses.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Mirror descent value iteration (MDVI), an abstraction of Kullback-Leibler (KL) and entropy-regularized reinforcement learning (RL), has served as the basis for recent high-performing practical RL algorithms. However, despite the use of function approximation in practice, the theoretical understanding of MDVI has been limited to tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs). We study MDVI with linear function approximation through its sample complexity required to identify an varepsilon-optimal policy with probability 1-delta under the settings of an infinite-horizon linear MDP, generative model, and G-optimal design. We demonstrate that least-squares regression weighted by the variance of an estimated optimal value function of the next state is crucial to achieving minimax optimality. Based on this observation, we present Variance-Weighted Least-Squares MDVI (VWLS-MDVI), the first theoretical algorithm that achieves nearly minimax optimal sample complexity for infinite-horizon linear MDPs. Furthermore, we propose a practical VWLS algorithm for value-based deep RL, Deep Variance Weighting (DVW). Our experiments demonstrate that DVW improves the performance of popular value-based deep RL algorithms on a set of MinAtar benchmarks.

Recent works have shown a reduction from contextual bandits to online regression under a realizability assumption [Foster and Rakhlin, 2020, Foster and Krishnamurthy, 2021]. In this work, we investigate the use of neural networks for such online regression and associated Neural Contextual Bandits (NeuCBs). Using existing results for wide networks, one can readily show a {O}(T) regret for online regression with square loss, which via the reduction implies a {O}(K T^{3/4}) regret for NeuCBs. Departing from this standard approach, we first show a O(log T) regret for online regression with almost convex losses that satisfy QG (Quadratic Growth) condition, a generalization of the PL (Polyak-\L ojasiewicz) condition, and that have a unique minima. Although not directly applicable to wide networks since they do not have unique minima, we show that adding a suitable small random perturbation to the network predictions surprisingly makes the loss satisfy QG with unique minima. Based on such a perturbed prediction, we show a {O}(log T) regret for online regression with both squared loss and KL loss, and subsequently convert these respectively to mathcal{O}(KT) and mathcal{O}(KL^* + K) regret for NeuCB, where L^* is the loss of the best policy. Separately, we also show that existing regret bounds for NeuCBs are Omega(T) or assume i.i.d. contexts, unlike this work. Finally, our experimental results on various datasets demonstrate that our algorithms, especially the one based on KL loss, persistently outperform existing algorithms.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

Robust Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and risk-sensitive MDPs are both powerful tools for making decisions in the presence of uncertainties. Previous efforts have aimed to establish their connections, revealing equivalences in specific formulations. This paper introduces a new formulation for risk-sensitive MDPs, which assesses risk in a slightly different manner compared to the classical Markov risk measure (Ruszczy\'nski 2010), and establishes its equivalence with a class of regularized robust MDP (RMDP) problems, including the standard RMDP as a special case. Leveraging this equivalence, we further derive the policy gradient theorem for both problems, proving gradient domination and global convergence of the exact policy gradient method under the tabular setting with direct parameterization. This forms a sharp contrast to the Markov risk measure, known to be potentially non-gradient-dominant (Huang et al. 2021). We also propose a sample-based offline learning algorithm, namely the robust fitted-Z iteration (RFZI), for a specific regularized RMDP problem with a KL-divergence regularization term (or equivalently the risk-sensitive MDP with an entropy risk measure). We showcase its streamlined design and less stringent assumptions due to the equivalence and analyze its sample complexity.

In this paper, we present improved learning-augmented algorithms for the multi-option ski rental problem. Learning-augmented algorithms take ML predictions as an added part of the input and incorporates these predictions in solving the given problem. Due to their unique strength that combines the power of ML predictions with rigorous performance guarantees, they have been extensively studied in the context of online optimization problems. Even though ski rental problems are one of the canonical problems in the field of online optimization, only deterministic algorithms were previously known for multi-option ski rental, with or without learning augmentation. We present the first randomized learning-augmented algorithm for this problem, surpassing previous performance guarantees given by deterministic algorithms. Our learning-augmented algorithm is based on a new, provably best-possible randomized competitive algorithm for the problem. Our results are further complemented by lower bounds for deterministic and randomized algorithms, and computational experiments evaluating our algorithms' performance improvements.

We introduce the framework of performative reinforcement learning where the policy chosen by the learner affects the underlying reward and transition dynamics of the environment. Following the recent literature on performative prediction~Perdomo et. al., 2020, we introduce the concept of performatively stable policy. We then consider a regularized version of the reinforcement learning problem and show that repeatedly optimizing this objective converges to a performatively stable policy under reasonable assumptions on the transition dynamics. Our proof utilizes the dual perspective of the reinforcement learning problem and may be of independent interest in analyzing the convergence of other algorithms with decision-dependent environments. We then extend our results for the setting where the learner just performs gradient ascent steps instead of fully optimizing the objective, and for the setting where the learner has access to a finite number of trajectories from the changed environment. For both settings, we leverage the dual formulation of performative reinforcement learning and establish convergence to a stable solution. Finally, through extensive experiments on a grid-world environment, we demonstrate the dependence of convergence on various parameters e.g. regularization, smoothness, and the number of samples.

Stochastically Extended Adversarial (SEA) model is introduced by Sachs et al. [2022] as an interpolation between stochastic and adversarial online convex optimization. Under the smoothness condition, they demonstrate that the expected regret of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) depends on the cumulative stochastic variance sigma_{1:T}^2 and the cumulative adversarial variation Sigma_{1:T}^2 for convex functions. They also provide a slightly weaker bound based on the maximal stochastic variance sigma_{max}^2 and the maximal adversarial variation Sigma_{max}^2 for strongly convex functions. Inspired by their work, we investigate the theoretical guarantees of optimistic online mirror descent (OMD) for the SEA model. For convex and smooth functions, we obtain the same O(sigma_{1:T^2}+Sigma_{1:T^2}) regret bound, without the convexity requirement of individual functions. For strongly convex and smooth functions, we establish an O(min{log (sigma_{1:T}^2+Sigma_{1:T}^2), (sigma_{max}^2 + Sigma_{max}^2) log T}) bound, better than their O((sigma_{max}^2 + Sigma_{max}^2) log T) bound. For exp-concave and smooth functions, we achieve a new O(dlog(sigma_{1:T}^2+Sigma_{1:T}^2)) bound. Owing to the OMD framework, we can further extend our result to obtain dynamic regret guarantees, which are more favorable in non-stationary online scenarios. The attained results allow us to recover excess risk bounds of the stochastic setting and regret bounds of the adversarial setting, and derive new guarantees for many intermediate scenarios.

In this work, we build on recent advances in distributional reinforcement learning to give a generally applicable, flexible, and state-of-the-art distributional variant of DQN. We achieve this by using quantile regression to approximate the full quantile function for the state-action return distribution. By reparameterizing a distribution over the sample space, this yields an implicitly defined return distribution and gives rise to a large class of risk-sensitive policies. We demonstrate improved performance on the 57 Atari 2600 games in the ALE, and use our algorithm's implicitly defined distributions to study the effects of risk-sensitive policies in Atari games.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Poker, also known as Texas Hold'em, has always been a typical research target within imperfect information games (IIGs). IIGs have long served as a measure of artificial intelligence (AI) development. Representative prior works, such as DeepStack and Libratus heavily rely on counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) to tackle heads-up no-limit Poker. However, it is challenging for subsequent researchers to learn CFR from previous models and apply it to other real-world applications due to the expensive computational cost of CFR iterations. Additionally, CFR is difficult to apply to multi-player games due to the exponential growth of the game tree size. In this work, we introduce PokerGPT, an end-to-end solver for playing Texas Hold'em with arbitrary number of players and gaining high win rates, established on a lightweight large language model (LLM). PokerGPT only requires simple textual information of Poker games for generating decision-making advice, thus guaranteeing the convenient interaction between AI and humans. We mainly transform a set of textual records acquired from real games into prompts, and use them to fine-tune a lightweight pre-trained LLM using reinforcement learning human feedback technique. To improve fine-tuning performance, we conduct prompt engineering on raw data, including filtering useful information, selecting behaviors of players with high win rates, and further processing them into textual instruction using multiple prompt engineering techniques. Through the experiments, we demonstrate that PokerGPT outperforms previous approaches in terms of win rate, model size, training time, and response speed, indicating the great potential of LLMs in solving IIGs.

Top-k decoding is a widely used method for sampling from LLMs: at each token, only the largest k next-token-probabilities are kept, and the next token is sampled after re-normalizing them to sum to unity. Top-k and other sampling methods are motivated by the intuition that true next-token distributions are sparse, and the noisy LLM probabilities need to be truncated. However, to our knowledge, a precise theoretical motivation for the use of top-k decoding is missing. In this work, we develop a theoretical framework that both explains and generalizes top-k decoding. We view decoding at a fixed token as the recovery of a sparse probability distribution. We consider Bregman decoders obtained by minimizing a separable Bregman divergence (for both the primal and dual cases) with a sparsity-inducing ell_0 regularization. Despite the combinatorial nature of the objective, we show how to optimize it efficiently for a large class of divergences. We show that the optimal decoding strategies are greedy, and further that the loss function is discretely convex in k, so that binary search provably and efficiently finds the optimal k. We show that top-k decoding arises as a special case for the KL divergence, and identify new decoding strategies that have distinct behaviors (e.g., non-linearly up-weighting larger probabilities after re-normalization).

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Off-policy learning (OPL) aims at finding improved policies from logged bandit data, often by minimizing the inverse propensity scoring (IPS) estimator of the risk. In this work, we investigate a smooth regularization for IPS, for which we derive a two-sided PAC-Bayes generalization bound. The bound is tractable, scalable, interpretable and provides learning certificates. In particular, it is also valid for standard IPS without making the assumption that the importance weights are bounded. We demonstrate the relevance of our approach and its favorable performance through a set of learning tasks. Since our bound holds for standard IPS, we are able to provide insight into when regularizing IPS is useful. Namely, we identify cases where regularization might not be needed. This goes against the belief that, in practice, clipped IPS often enjoys favorable performance than standard IPS in OPL.

Black box optimisation of an unknown function from expensive and noisy evaluations is a ubiquitous problem in machine learning, academic research and industrial production. An abstraction of the problem can be formulated as a kernel based bandit problem (also known as Bayesian optimisation), where a learner aims at optimising a kernelized function through sequential noisy observations. The existing work predominantly assumes feedback is immediately available; an assumption which fails in many real world situations, including recommendation systems, clinical trials and hyperparameter tuning. We consider a kernel bandit problem under stochastically delayed feedback, and propose an algorithm with mathcal{O}(Gamma_k(T)T+E[tau]) regret, where T is the number of time steps, Gamma_k(T) is the maximum information gain of the kernel with T observations, and tau is the delay random variable. This represents a significant improvement over the state of the art regret bound of mathcal{O}(Gamma_k(T)T+E[tau]Gamma_k(T)) reported in Verma et al. (2022). In particular, for very non-smooth kernels, the information gain grows almost linearly in time, trivializing the existing results. We also validate our theoretical results with simulations.

In this paper, we propose a weak regularity principle which is similar to both weak K\"onig's lemma and Ramsey's theorem. We begin by studying the computational strength of this principle in the context of reverse mathematics. We then analyze different ways of generalizing this principle.

The Distributionally Robust Markov Decision Process (DRMDP) is a popular framework for addressing dynamics shift in reinforcement learning by learning policies robust to the worst-case transition dynamics within a constrained set. However, solving its dual optimization oracle poses significant challenges, limiting theoretical analysis and computational efficiency. The recently proposed Robust Regularized Markov Decision Process (RRMDP) replaces the uncertainty set constraint with a regularization term on the value function, offering improved scalability and theoretical insights. Yet, existing RRMDP methods rely on unstructured regularization, often leading to overly conservative policies by considering transitions that are unrealistic. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework, the d-rectangular linear robust regularized Markov decision process (d-RRMDP), which introduces a linear latent structure into both transition kernels and regularization. For the offline RL setting, where an agent learns robust policies from a pre-collected dataset in the nominal environment, we develop a family of algorithms, Robust Regularized Pessimistic Value Iteration (R2PVI), employing linear function approximation and f-divergence based regularization terms on transition kernels. We provide instance-dependent upper bounds on the suboptimality gap of R2PVI policies, showing these bounds depend on how well the dataset covers state-action spaces visited by the optimal robust policy under robustly admissible transitions. This term is further shown to be fundamental to d-RRMDPs via information-theoretic lower bounds. Finally, numerical experiments validate that R2PVI learns robust policies and is computationally more efficient than methods for constrained DRMDPs.

We study regret minimization for reinforcement learning (RL) in Latent Markov Decision Processes (LMDPs) with context in hindsight. We design a novel model-based algorithmic framework which can be instantiated with both a model-optimistic and a value-optimistic solver. We prove an O(mathsf{Var^star M Gamma S A K}) regret bound where O hides logarithm factors, M is the number of contexts, S is the number of states, A is the number of actions, K is the number of episodes, Gamma le S is the maximum transition degree of any state-action pair, and Var^star is a variance quantity describing the determinism of the LMDP. The regret bound only scales logarithmically with the planning horizon, thus yielding the first (nearly) horizon-free regret bound for LMDP. This is also the first problem-dependent regret bound for LMDP. Key in our proof is an analysis of the total variance of alpha vectors (a generalization of value functions), which is handled with a truncation method. We complement our positive result with a novel Omega(mathsf{Var^star M S A K}) regret lower bound with Gamma = 2, which shows our upper bound minimax optimal when Gamma is a constant for the class of variance-bounded LMDPs. Our lower bound relies on new constructions of hard instances and an argument inspired by the symmetrization technique from theoretical computer science, both of which are technically different from existing lower bound proof for MDPs, and thus can be of independent interest.

Closed drafting or "pick and pass" is a popular game mechanic where each round players select a card or other playable element from their hand and pass the rest to the next player. Games employing closed drafting make for great studies on memory and turn order due to their explicitly calculable memory of other players' hands. In this paper, we establish first-principle benchmarks for studying model-free reinforcement learning algorithms and their comparative ability to learn memory in a popular family of closed drafting games called "Sushi Go Party!", producing state-of-the-art results on this environment along the way. Furthermore, as Sushi Go Party! can be expressed as a set of closely-related games based on the set of cards in play, we quantify the generalizability of reinforcement learning algorithms trained on various sets of cards, establishing key trends between generalized performance and the set distance between the train and evaluation game configurations. Finally, we fit decision rules to interpret the strategy of the learned models and compare them to the ranking preferences of human players, finding intuitive common rules and intriguing new moves.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

We analyze continual learning on a sequence of separable linear classification tasks with binary labels. We show theoretically that learning with weak regularization reduces to solving a sequential max-margin problem, corresponding to a special case of the Projection Onto Convex Sets (POCS) framework. We then develop upper bounds on the forgetting and other quantities of interest under various settings with recurring tasks, including cyclic and random orderings of tasks. We discuss several practical implications to popular training practices like regularization scheduling and weighting. We point out several theoretical differences between our continual classification setting and a recently studied continual regression setting.

Representation rank is an important concept for understanding the role of Neural Networks (NNs) in Deep Reinforcement learning (DRL), which measures the expressive capacity of value networks. Existing studies focus on unboundedly maximizing this rank; nevertheless, that approach would introduce overly complex models in the learning, thus undermining performance. Hence, fine-tuning representation rank presents a challenging and crucial optimization problem. To address this issue, we find a guiding principle for adaptive control of the representation rank. We employ the Bellman equation as a theoretical foundation and derive an upper bound on the cosine similarity of consecutive state-action pairs representations of value networks. We then leverage this upper bound to propose a novel regularizer, namely BEllman Equation-based automatic rank Regularizer (BEER). This regularizer adaptively regularizes the representation rank, thus improving the DRL agent's performance. We first validate the effectiveness of automatic control of rank on illustrative experiments. Then, we scale up BEER to complex continuous control tasks by combining it with the deterministic policy gradient method. Among 12 challenging DeepMind control tasks, BEER outperforms the baselines by a large margin. Besides, BEER demonstrates significant advantages in Q-value approximation. Our code is available at https://github.com/sweetice/BEER-ICLR2024.

We study reinforcement learning with linear function approximation and adversarially changing cost functions, a setup that has mostly been considered under simplifying assumptions such as full information feedback or exploratory conditions.We present a computationally efficient policy optimization algorithm for the challenging general setting of unknown dynamics and bandit feedback, featuring a combination of mirror-descent and least squares policy evaluation in an auxiliary MDP used to compute exploration bonuses.Our algorithm obtains an widetilde O(K^{6/7}) regret bound, improving significantly over previous state-of-the-art of widetilde O (K^{14/15}) in this setting. In addition, we present a version of the same algorithm under the assumption a simulator of the environment is available to the learner (but otherwise no exploratory assumptions are made), and prove it obtains state-of-the-art regret of widetilde O (K^{2/3}).

Reinforcement learning (RL) yields substantial improvements in large language models (LLMs) downstream task performance and alignment with human values. Surprisingly, such large gains result from updating only a small subnetwork comprising just 5 percent to 30 percent of the parameters, with the rest effectively unchanged. We refer to this phenomenon as parameter update sparsity induced by RL. It is observed across all 7 widely used RL algorithms (e.g., PPO, GRPO, DPO) and all 10 LLMs from different families in our experiments. This sparsity is intrinsic and occurs without any explicit sparsity promoting regularizations or architectural constraints. Finetuning the subnetwork alone recovers the test accuracy, and, remarkably, produces a model nearly identical to the one obtained via full finetuning. The subnetworks from different random seeds, training data, and even RL algorithms show substantially greater overlap than expected by chance. Our analysis suggests that this sparsity is not due to updating only a subset of layers, instead, nearly all parameter matrices receive similarly sparse updates. Moreover, the updates to almost all parameter matrices are nearly full-rank, suggesting RL updates a small subset of parameters that nevertheless span almost the full subspaces that the parameter matrices can represent. We conjecture that the this update sparsity can be primarily attributed to training on data that is near the policy distribution, techniques that encourage the policy to remain close to the pretrained model, such as the KL regularization and gradient clipping, have limited impact.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

Regularized optimal transport (OT) is now increasingly used as a loss or as a matching layer in neural networks. Entropy-regularized OT can be computed using the Sinkhorn algorithm but it leads to fully-dense transportation plans, meaning that all sources are (fractionally) matched with all targets. To address this issue, several works have investigated quadratic regularization instead. This regularization preserves sparsity and leads to unconstrained and smooth (semi) dual objectives, that can be solved with off-the-shelf gradient methods. Unfortunately, quadratic regularization does not give direct control over the cardinality (number of nonzeros) of the transportation plan. We propose in this paper a new approach for OT with explicit cardinality constraints on the transportation plan. Our work is motivated by an application to sparse mixture of experts, where OT can be used to match input tokens such as image patches with expert models such as neural networks. Cardinality constraints ensure that at most k tokens are matched with an expert, which is crucial for computational performance reasons. Despite the nonconvexity of cardinality constraints, we show that the corresponding (semi) dual problems are tractable and can be solved with first-order gradient methods. Our method can be thought as a middle ground between unregularized OT (recovered in the limit case k=1) and quadratically-regularized OT (recovered when k is large enough). The smoothness of the objectives increases as k increases, giving rise to a trade-off between convergence speed and sparsity of the optimal plan.

Reasoning abilities, especially those for solving complex math problems, are crucial components of general intelligence. Recent advances by proprietary companies, such as o-series models of OpenAI, have made remarkable progress on reasoning tasks. However, the complete technical details remain unrevealed, and the techniques that are believed certainly to be adopted are only reinforcement learning (RL) and the long chain of thoughts. This paper proposes a new RL framework, termed OREAL, to pursue the performance limit that can be achieved through Outcome REwArd-based reinforcement Learning for mathematical reasoning tasks, where only binary outcome rewards are easily accessible. We theoretically prove that behavior cloning on positive trajectories from best-of-N (BoN) sampling is sufficient to learn the KL-regularized optimal policy in binary feedback environments. This formulation further implies that the rewards of negative samples should be reshaped to ensure the gradient consistency between positive and negative samples. To alleviate the long-existing difficulties brought by sparse rewards in RL, which are even exacerbated by the partial correctness of the long chain of thought for reasoning tasks, we further apply a token-level reward model to sample important tokens in reasoning trajectories for learning. With OREAL, for the first time, a 7B model can obtain 94.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500 through RL, being on par with 32B models. OREAL-32B also surpasses previous 32B models trained by distillation with 95.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500. Our investigation also indicates the importance of initial policy models and training queries for RL. Code, models, and data will be released to benefit future researchhttps://github.com/InternLM/OREAL.

RLCard is an open-source toolkit for reinforcement learning research in card games. It supports various card environments with easy-to-use interfaces, including Blackjack, Leduc Hold'em, Texas Hold'em, UNO, Dou Dizhu and Mahjong. The goal of RLCard is to bridge reinforcement learning and imperfect information games, and push forward the research of reinforcement learning in domains with multiple agents, large state and action space, and sparse reward. In this paper, we provide an overview of the key components in RLCard, a discussion of the design principles, a brief introduction of the interfaces, and comprehensive evaluations of the environments. The codes and documents are available at https://github.com/datamllab/rlcard

Policy constraint methods to offline reinforcement learning (RL) typically utilize parameterization or regularization that constrains the policy to perform actions within the support set of the behavior policy. The elaborative designs of parameterization methods usually intrude into the policy networks, which may bring extra inference cost and cannot take full advantage of well-established online methods. Regularization methods reduce the divergence between the learned policy and the behavior policy, which may mismatch the inherent density-based definition of support set thereby failing to avoid the out-of-distribution actions effectively. This paper presents Supported Policy OpTimization (SPOT), which is directly derived from the theoretical formalization of the density-based support constraint. SPOT adopts a VAE-based density estimator to explicitly model the support set of behavior policy and presents a simple but effective density-based regularization term, which can be plugged non-intrusively into off-the-shelf off-policy RL algorithms. SPOT achieves the state-of-the-art performance on standard benchmarks for offline RL. Benefiting from the pluggable design, offline pretrained models from SPOT can also be applied to perform online fine-tuning seamlessly.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

We study the task of agnostically learning halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution. Specifically, given labeled examples (x,y) from an unknown distribution on R^n times { pm 1}, whose marginal distribution on x is the standard Gaussian and the labels y can be arbitrary, the goal is to output a hypothesis with 0-1 loss OPT+epsilon, where OPT is the 0-1 loss of the best-fitting halfspace. We prove a near-optimal computational hardness result for this task, under the widely believed sub-exponential time hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. Prior hardness results are either qualitatively suboptimal or apply to restricted families of algorithms. Our techniques extend to yield near-optimal lower bounds for related problems, including ReLU regression.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

We consider online learning problems in the realizable setting, where there is a zero-loss solution, and propose new Differentially Private (DP) algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret bounds. For the problem of online prediction from experts, we design new algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret {O} big( varepsilon^{-1} log^{1.5}{d} big) where d is the number of experts. This significantly improves over the best existing regret bounds for the DP non-realizable setting which are {O} big( varepsilon^{-1} minbig{d, T^{1/3}log dbig} big). We also develop an adaptive algorithm for the small-loss setting with regret O(L^starlog d + varepsilon^{-1} log^{1.5}{d}) where L^star is the total loss of the best expert. Additionally, we consider DP online convex optimization in the realizable setting and propose an algorithm with near-optimal regret O big(varepsilon^{-1} d^{1.5} big), as well as an algorithm for the smooth case with regret O big( varepsilon^{-2/3} (dT)^{1/3} big), both significantly improving over existing bounds in the non-realizable regime.

Existing theoretical studies on offline reinforcement learning (RL) mostly consider a dataset sampled directly from the target task. In practice, however, data often come from several heterogeneous but related sources. Motivated by this gap, this work aims at rigorously understanding offline RL with multiple datasets that are collected from randomly perturbed versions of the target task instead of from itself. An information-theoretic lower bound is derived, which reveals a necessary requirement on the number of involved sources in addition to that on the number of data samples. Then, a novel HetPEVI algorithm is proposed, which simultaneously considers the sample uncertainties from a finite number of data samples per data source and the source uncertainties due to a finite number of available data sources. Theoretical analyses demonstrate that HetPEVI can solve the target task as long as the data sources collectively provide a good data coverage. Moreover, HetPEVI is demonstrated to be optimal up to a polynomial factor of the horizon length. Finally, the study is extended to offline Markov games and offline robust RL, which demonstrates the generality of the proposed designs and theoretical analyses.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We consider the problem of learning the best possible policy from a fixed dataset, known as offline Reinforcement Learning (RL). A common taxonomy of existing offline RL works is policy regularization, which typically constrains the learned policy by distribution or support of the behavior policy. However, distribution and support constraints are overly conservative since they both force the policy to choose similar actions as the behavior policy when considering particular states. It will limit the learned policy's performance, especially when the behavior policy is sub-optimal. In this paper, we find that regularizing the policy towards the nearest state-action pair can be more effective and thus propose Policy Regularization with Dataset Constraint (PRDC). When updating the policy in a given state, PRDC searches the entire dataset for the nearest state-action sample and then restricts the policy with the action of this sample. Unlike previous works, PRDC can guide the policy with proper behaviors from the dataset, allowing it to choose actions that do not appear in the dataset along with the given state. It is a softer constraint but still keeps enough conservatism from out-of-distribution actions. Empirical evidence and theoretical analysis show that PRDC can alleviate offline RL's fundamentally challenging value overestimation issue with a bounded performance gap. Moreover, on a set of locomotion and navigation tasks, PRDC achieves state-of-the-art performance compared with existing methods. Code is available at https://github.com/LAMDA-RL/PRDC

With the widespread adoption of machine learning systems, the need to curtail their behavior has become increasingly apparent. This is evidenced by recent advancements towards developing models that satisfy robustness, safety, and fairness requirements. These requirements can be imposed (with generalization guarantees) by formulating constrained learning problems that can then be tackled by dual ascent algorithms. Yet, though these algorithms converge in objective value, even in non-convex settings, they cannot guarantee that their outcome is feasible. Doing so requires randomizing over all iterates, which is impractical in virtually any modern applications. Still, final iterates have been observed to perform well in practice. In this work, we address this gap between theory and practice by characterizing the constraint violation of Lagrangian minimizers associated with optimal dual variables, despite lack of convexity. To do this, we leverage the fact that non-convex, finite-dimensional constrained learning problems can be seen as parametrizations of convex, functional problems. Our results show that rich parametrizations effectively mitigate the issue of feasibility in dual methods, shedding light on prior empirical successes of dual learning. We illustrate our findings in fair learning tasks.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Reinforcement learning (RL) theory has largely focused on proving minimax sample complexity bounds. These require strategic exploration algorithms that use relatively limited function classes for representing the policy or value function. Our goal is to explain why deep RL algorithms often perform well in practice, despite using random exploration and much more expressive function classes like neural networks. Our work arrives at an explanation by showing that many stochastic MDPs can be solved by performing only a few steps of value iteration on the random policy's Q function and then acting greedily. When this is true, we find that it is possible to separate the exploration and learning components of RL, making it much easier to analyze. We introduce a new RL algorithm, SQIRL, that iteratively learns a near-optimal policy by exploring randomly to collect rollouts and then performing a limited number of steps of fitted-Q iteration over those rollouts. Any regression algorithm that satisfies basic in-distribution generalization properties can be used in SQIRL to efficiently solve common MDPs. This can explain why deep RL works, since it is empirically established that neural networks generalize well in-distribution. Furthermore, SQIRL explains why random exploration works well in practice. We leverage SQIRL to derive instance-dependent sample complexity bounds for RL that are exponential only in an "effective horizon" of lookahead and on the complexity of the class used for function approximation. Empirically, we also find that SQIRL performance strongly correlates with PPO and DQN performance in a variety of stochastic environments, supporting that our theoretical analysis is predictive of practical performance. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/effective-horizon.

In reinforcement learning and imitation learning, an object of central importance is the state distribution induced by the policy. It plays a crucial role in the policy gradient theorem, and references to it--along with the related state-action distribution--can be found all across the literature. Despite its importance, the state distribution is mostly discussed indirectly and theoretically, rather than being modeled explicitly. The reason being an absence of appropriate density estimation tools. In this work, we investigate applications of a normalizing flow-based model for the aforementioned distributions. In particular, we use a pair of flows coupled through the optimality point of the Donsker-Varadhan representation of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, for distribution matching based imitation learning. Our algorithm, Coupled Flow Imitation Learning (CFIL), achieves state-of-the-art performance on benchmark tasks with a single expert trajectory and extends naturally to a variety of other settings, including the subsampled and state-only regimes.

We present the OMG-CMDP! algorithm for regret minimization in adversarial Contextual MDPs. The algorithm operates under the minimal assumptions of realizable function class and access to online least squares and log loss regression oracles. Our algorithm is efficient (assuming efficient online regression oracles), simple and robust to approximation errors. It enjoys an O(H^{2.5} T|S||A| ( mathcal{R(O) + H log(delta^{-1}) )}) regret guarantee, with T being the number of episodes, S the state space, A the action space, H the horizon and R(O) = R(O_{sq}^F) + R(O_{log}^P) is the sum of the regression oracles' regret, used to approximate the context-dependent rewards and dynamics, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first efficient rate optimal regret minimization algorithm for adversarial CMDPs that operates under the minimal standard assumption of online function approximation.

We study the problem of optimally projecting the transition matrix of a finite ergodic multivariate Markov chain onto a lower-dimensional state space. Specifically, we seek to construct a projected Markov chain that optimizes various information-theoretic criteria under cardinality constraints. These criteria include entropy rate, information-theoretic distance to factorizability, independence, and stationarity. We formulate these tasks as best subset selection problems over multivariate Markov chains and leverage the submodular (or supermodular) structure of the objective functions to develop efficient greedy-based algorithms with theoretical guarantees. We extend our analysis to k-submodular settings and introduce a generalized version of the distorted greedy algorithm, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we illustrate the theory and algorithms through extensive numerical experiments with publicly available code on multivariate Markov chains associated with the Bernoulli-Laplace and Curie-Weiss model.

In this work, we present a variety of novel information-theoretic generalization bounds for learning algorithms, from the supersample setting of Steinke & Zakynthinou (2020)-the setting of the "conditional mutual information" framework. Our development exploits projecting the loss pair (obtained from a training instance and a testing instance) down to a single number and correlating loss values with a Rademacher sequence (and its shifted variants). The presented bounds include square-root bounds, fast-rate bounds, including those based on variance and sharpness, and bounds for interpolating algorithms etc. We show theoretically or empirically that these bounds are tighter than all information-theoretic bounds known to date on the same supersample setting.

We study linear contextual bandits in the misspecified setting, where the expected reward function can be approximated by a linear function class up to a bounded misspecification level zeta>0. We propose an algorithm based on a novel data selection scheme, which only selects the contextual vectors with large uncertainty for online regression. We show that, when the misspecification level zeta is dominated by tilde O (Delta / d) with Delta being the minimal sub-optimality gap and d being the dimension of the contextual vectors, our algorithm enjoys the same gap-dependent regret bound tilde O (d^2/Delta) as in the well-specified setting up to logarithmic factors. In addition, we show that an existing algorithm SupLinUCB (Chu et al., 2011) can also achieve a gap-dependent constant regret bound without the knowledge of sub-optimality gap Delta. Together with a lower bound adapted from Lattimore et al. (2020), our result suggests an interplay between misspecification level and the sub-optimality gap: (1) the linear contextual bandit model is efficiently learnable when zeta leq tilde O(Delta / d); and (2) it is not efficiently learnable when zeta geq tilde Omega({Delta} / {d}). Experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets corroborate our theoretical results.

The generalization capability of deep neural networks has been substantially improved by applying a wide spectrum of regularization methods, e.g., restricting function space, injecting randomness during training, augmenting data, etc. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective regularization method named progressive self-knowledge distillation (PS-KD), which progressively distills a model's own knowledge to soften hard targets (i.e., one-hot vectors) during training. Hence, it can be interpreted within a framework of knowledge distillation as a student becomes a teacher itself. Specifically, targets are adjusted adaptively by combining the ground-truth and past predictions from the model itself. We show that PS-KD provides an effect of hard example mining by rescaling gradients according to difficulty in classifying examples. The proposed method is applicable to any supervised learning tasks with hard targets and can be easily combined with existing regularization methods to further enhance the generalization performance. Furthermore, it is confirmed that PS-KD achieves not only better accuracy, but also provides high quality of confidence estimates in terms of calibration as well as ordinal ranking. Extensive experimental results on three different tasks, image classification, object detection, and machine translation, demonstrate that our method consistently improves the performance of the state-of-the-art baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/lgcnsai/PS-KD-Pytorch.

Generalization in Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to learn an agent during training that generalizes to the target environment. This paper studies RL generalization from a theoretical aspect: how much can we expect pre-training over training environments to be helpful? When the interaction with the target environment is not allowed, we certify that the best we can obtain is a near-optimal policy in an average sense, and we design an algorithm that achieves this goal. Furthermore, when the agent is allowed to interact with the target environment, we give a surprising result showing that asymptotically, the improvement from pre-training is at most a constant factor. On the other hand, in the non-asymptotic regime, we design an efficient algorithm and prove a distribution-based regret bound in the target environment that is independent of the state-action space.

This paper presents a new approach that integrates deep learning with computational chess, using both the Mixture of Experts (MoE) method and Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Our methodology employs a suite of specialized models, each designed to respond to specific changes in the game's input data. This results in a framework with sparsely activated models, which provides significant computational benefits. Our framework combines the MoE method with MCTS, in order to align it with the strategic phases of chess, thus departing from the conventional ``one-for-all'' model. Instead, we utilize distinct game phase definitions to effectively distribute computational tasks across multiple expert neural networks. Our empirical research shows a substantial improvement in playing strength, surpassing the traditional single-model framework. This validates the efficacy of our integrated approach and highlights the potential of incorporating expert knowledge and strategic principles into neural network design. The fusion of MoE and MCTS offers a promising avenue for advancing machine learning architectures.

We propose a new method for optimistic planning in infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes based on the idea of adding regularization to the updates of an otherwise standard approximate value iteration procedure. This technique allows us to avoid contraction and monotonicity arguments typically required by existing analyses of approximate dynamic programming methods, and in particular to use approximate transition functions estimated via least-squares procedures in MDPs with linear function approximation. We use our method to recover known guarantees in tabular MDPs and to provide a computationally efficient algorithm for learning near-optimal policies in discounted linear mixture MDPs from a single stream of experience, and show it achieves near-optimal statistical guarantees.

Compositional reinforcement learning is a promising approach for training policies to perform complex long-horizon tasks. Typically, a high-level task is decomposed into a sequence of subtasks and a separate policy is trained to perform each subtask. In this paper, we focus on the problem of training subtask policies in a way that they can be used to perform any task; here, a task is given by a sequence of subtasks. We aim to maximize the worst-case performance over all tasks as opposed to the average-case performance. We formulate the problem as a two agent zero-sum game in which the adversary picks the sequence of subtasks. We propose two RL algorithms to solve this game: one is an adaptation of existing multi-agent RL algorithms to our setting and the other is an asynchronous version which enables parallel training of subtask policies. We evaluate our approach on two multi-task environments with continuous states and actions and demonstrate that our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art baselines.

Recent studies have shown that episodic reinforcement learning (RL) is no harder than bandits when the total reward is bounded by 1, and proved regret bounds that have a polylogarithmic dependence on the planning horizon H. However, it remains an open question that if such results can be carried over to adversarial RL, where the reward is adversarially chosen at each episode. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by proposing the first horizon-free policy search algorithm. To tackle the challenges caused by exploration and adversarially chosen reward, our algorithm employs (1) a variance-uncertainty-aware weighted least square estimator for the transition kernel; and (2) an occupancy measure-based technique for the online search of a stochastic policy. We show that our algorithm achieves an Obig((d+log (|S|^2 |A|))Kbig) regret with full-information feedback, where d is the dimension of a known feature mapping linearly parametrizing the unknown transition kernel of the MDP, K is the number of episodes, |S| and |A| are the cardinalities of the state and action spaces. We also provide hardness results and regret lower bounds to justify the near optimality of our algorithm and the unavoidability of log|S| and log|A| in the regret bound.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

The ability to achieve long-term goals is a key challenge in the current development of large language models (LLMs). To address this, pre-trained LLMs can be fine-tuned with reinforcement learning (RL) to explore solutions that optimize a given goal. However, exploration with LLMs is difficult, as a balance has to be struck between discovering new solutions and staying close enough to the pre-trained model, so as not to degrade basic capabilities. This is typically controlled with a Kullback-Leibler (KL) penalty. In this paper, we investigate the exploration dynamics of a small language model on a simple arithmetic task. We show how varying degrees of pre-training influence exploration and demonstrate the importance of "critical tokens" which have a dramatic impact on the final outcome. Consequently, we introduce a simple modification to the KL penalty that favors exploration on critical tokens, increasing the efficiency of the RL fine-tuning stage.

The lottery ticket hypothesis posits the existence of ``winning tickets'' within a randomly initialized neural network. Do winning tickets exist for LLMs in fine-tuning scenarios? How can we find such winning tickets? In this paper, we propose KS-Lottery, a method to identify a small subset of LLM parameters highly effective in multilingual fine-tuning. Our key idea is to use Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to analyze the distribution shift of parameters before and after fine-tuning. We further theoretically prove that KS-Lottery can find the certified winning tickets in the embedding layer, fine-tuning on the found parameters is guaranteed to perform as well as full fine-tuning. Comparing KS-Lottery with other parameter-efficient tuning algorithms on translation tasks, the experimental results show that KS-Lottery finds a much smaller set of parameters for fine-tuning while achieving the comparable performance as full fine-tuning LLM. Surprisingly, we find that fine-tuning 18 tokens' embedding of LLaMA suffices to reach the fine-tuning translation performance. Code and model will be released to the public.

In online reinforcement learning (online RL), balancing exploration and exploitation is crucial for finding an optimal policy in a sample-efficient way. To achieve this, existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms typically consist of three components: estimation, planning, and exploration. However, in order to cope with general function approximators, most of them involve impractical algorithmic components to incentivize exploration, such as optimization within data-dependent level-sets or complicated sampling procedures. To address this challenge, we propose an easy-to-implement RL framework called Maximize to Explore (MEX), which only needs to optimize unconstrainedly a single objective that integrates the estimation and planning components while balancing exploration and exploitation automatically. Theoretically, we prove that MEX achieves a sublinear regret with general function approximations for Markov decision processes (MDP) and is further extendable to two-player zero-sum Markov games (MG). Meanwhile, we adapt deep RL baselines to design practical versions of MEX, in both model-free and model-based manners, which can outperform baselines by a stable margin in various MuJoCo environments with sparse rewards. Compared with existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms with general function approximations, MEX achieves similar sample efficiency while enjoying a lower computational cost and is more compatible with modern deep RL methods.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) denotes a powerful family of algorithms for recovering a reward function justifying the behavior demonstrated by an expert agent. A well-known limitation of IRL is the ambiguity in the choice of the reward function, due to the existence of multiple rewards that explain the observed behavior. This limitation has been recently circumvented by formulating IRL as the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, i.e., the region of the rewards compatible with the expert's behavior. In this paper, we make a step towards closing the theory gap of IRL in the case of finite-horizon problems with a generative model. We start by formally introducing the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, the corresponding PAC requirement, and discussing the properties of particular classes of rewards. Then, we provide the first minimax lower bound on the sample complexity for the problem of estimating the feasible reward set of order {Omega}Bigl( H^3SA{epsilon^2} bigl( log bigl(1{delta}bigl) + S bigl)Bigl), being S and A the number of states and actions respectively, H the horizon, epsilon the desired accuracy, and delta the confidence. We analyze the sample complexity of a uniform sampling strategy (US-IRL), proving a matching upper bound up to logarithmic factors. Finally, we outline several open questions in IRL and propose future research directions.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

The fine-tuning of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) using reinforcement learning (RL) is generally formulated as direct policy optimization. This approach was naturally favored as it efficiently improves a pretrained LLM, seen as an initial policy. Another RL paradigm, Q-learning methods, has received far less attention in the LLM community while demonstrating major success in various non-LLM RL tasks. In particular, Q-learning effectiveness comes from its sample efficiency and ability to learn offline, which is particularly valuable given the high computational cost of sampling with LLMs. However, naively applying a Q-learning-style update to the model's logits is ineffective due to the specificity of LLMs. Our core contribution is to derive theoretically grounded loss functions from Bellman equations to adapt Q-learning methods to LLMs. To do so, we carefully adapt insights from the RL literature to account for LLM-specific characteristics, ensuring that the logits become reliable Q-value estimates. We then use this loss to build a practical algorithm, ShiQ for Shifted-Q, that supports off-policy, token-wise learning while remaining simple to implement. Finally, we evaluate ShiQ on both synthetic data and real-world benchmarks, e.g., UltraFeedback and BFCL-V3, demonstrating its effectiveness in both single-turn and multi-turn LLM settings

We consider the problem of contextual kernel bandits with stochastic contexts, where the underlying reward function belongs to a known Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS). We study this problem under the additional constraint of joint differential privacy, where the agents needs to ensure that the sequence of query points is differentially private with respect to both the sequence of contexts and rewards. We propose a novel algorithm that improves upon the state of the art and achieves an error rate of Oleft(frac{gamma_T{T}} + gamma_T{T varepsilon}right) after T queries for a large class of kernel families, where gamma_T represents the effective dimensionality of the kernel and varepsilon > 0 is the privacy parameter. Our results are based on a novel estimator for the reward function that simultaneously enjoys high utility along with a low-sensitivity to observed rewards and contexts, which is crucial to obtain an order optimal learning performance with improved dependence on the privacy parameter.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.