Daily Papers

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications has driven the need for structured and reliable responses. A key challenge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems is ensuring that outputs align with expected formats while minimizing hallucinations. This study examines the role of guided decoding in RAG systems, comparing three methods, Outlines, XGrammar, and LM Format Enforcer, across different multi-turn prompting setups (0-turn, 1-turn, and 2-turn). By evaluating success rates, hallucination rates, and output quality, we provide insights into their performance and applicability. Our findings reveal how multi-turn interactions influence guided decoding, uncovering unexpected performance variations that can inform method selection for specific use cases. This work advances the understanding of structured output generation in RAG systems, offering both theoretical insights and practical guidance for LLM deployment.

Controlling the format of outputs generated by large language models (LLMs) is a critical functionality in various applications. Current methods typically employ constrained decoding with rule-based automata or fine-tuning with manually crafted format instructions, both of which struggle with open-domain format requirements. To address this limitation, we introduce a novel framework for controlled generation in LLMs, leveraging user-provided, one-shot QA pairs. This study investigates LLMs' capabilities to follow open-domain, one-shot constraints and replicate the format of the example answers. We observe that this is a non-trivial problem for current LLMs. We also develop a dataset collection methodology for supervised fine-tuning that enhances the open-domain format control of LLMs without degrading output quality, as well as a benchmark on which we evaluate both the helpfulness and format correctness of LLM outputs. The resulting datasets, named OIFC-SFT, along with the related code, will be made publicly available at https://github.com/cofe-ai/OIFC.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adept at following instructions containing task descriptions to solve complex problems, such as mathematical reasoning and automatic evaluation (LLM-as-a-Judge). However, as prompts grow more complex, models often struggle to adhere to all instructions. This difficulty is especially common when instructive prompts intertwine reasoning directives -- specifying what the model should solve -- with rigid formatting requirements that dictate how the solution must be presented. The entanglement creates competing goals for the model, suggesting that more explicit separation of these two aspects could lead to improved performance. To this front, we introduce Deco-G, a decoding framework that explicitly decouples format adherence from task solving. Deco-G handles format compliance with a separate tractable probabilistic model (TPM), while prompts LLMs with only task instructions. At each decoding step, Deco-G combines next token probabilities from the LLM with the TPM calculated format compliance likelihood to form the output probability. To make this approach both practical and scalable for modern instruction-tuned LLMs, we introduce three key innovations: instruction-aware distillation, a flexible trie-building algorithm, and HMM state pruning for computational efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Deco-G across a wide range of tasks with diverse format requirements, including mathematical reasoning, LLM-as-a-judge, and event argument extraction. Overall, our approach yields 1.0% to 6.0% relative gain over regular prompting practice with guaranteed format compliance.

Though safety alignment has been applied to most large language models (LLMs), LLM service providers generally deploy a subsequent moderation as the external safety guardrail in real-world products. Existing moderators mainly practice a conventional full detection, which determines the harmfulness based on the complete LLM output, causing high service latency. Recent works pay more attention to partial detection where moderators oversee the generation midway and early stop the output if harmfulness is detected, but they directly apply moderators trained with the full detection paradigm to incomplete outputs, introducing a training-inference gap that lowers the performance. In this paper, we explore how to form a data-and-model solution that natively supports partial detection. For the data, we construct FineHarm, a dataset consisting of 29K prompt-response pairs with fine-grained annotations to provide reasonable supervision for token-level training. Then, we propose the streaming content monitor, which is trained with dual supervision of response- and token-level labels and can follow the output stream of LLM to make a timely judgment of harmfulness. Experiments show that SCM gains 0.95+ in macro F1 score that is comparable to full detection, by only seeing the first 18% of tokens in responses on average. Moreover, the SCM can serve as a pseudo-harmfulness annotator for improving safety alignment and lead to a higher harmlessness score than DPO.

Large language models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. However, these models are still susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which are becoming increasingly dangerous as models become increasingly powerful. In this work, we introduce a dataset of jailbreaks where each example can be input in both a single or a multi-turn format. We show that while equivalent in content, they are not equivalent in jailbreak success: defending against one structure does not guarantee defense against the other. Similarly, LLM-based filter guardrails also perform differently depending on not just the input content but the input structure. Thus, vulnerabilities of frontier models should be studied in both single and multi-turn settings; this dataset provides a tool to do so.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with deployment-specific requirements is critical but inherently imperfect. Despite extensive training, models remain susceptible to misalignment and adversarial inputs such as jailbreaks. Content moderation filters are commonly used as external safeguards, though they typically focus narrowly on safety. We introduce SGM (Specification-Guided Moderation), a flexible framework for training moderation filters grounded in user-defined specifications that go beyond standard safety concerns. SGM automates training data generation without relying on human-written examples, enabling scalable support for diverse, application-specific alignment goals. SGM-trained filters perform on par with state-of-the-art safety filters built on curated datasets, while supporting fine-grained and user-defined alignment control.

Large language models can produce creative and diverse responses. However, to integrate them into current developer workflows, it is essential to constrain their outputs to follow specific formats or standards. In this work, we surveyed 51 experienced industry professionals to understand the range of scenarios and motivations driving the need for output constraints from a user-centered perspective. We identified 134 concrete use cases for constraints at two levels: low-level, which ensures the output adhere to a structured format and an appropriate length, and high-level, which requires the output to follow semantic and stylistic guidelines without hallucination. Critically, applying output constraints could not only streamline the currently repetitive process of developing, testing, and integrating LLM prompts for developers, but also enhance the user experience of LLM-powered features and applications. We conclude with a discussion on user preferences and needs towards articulating intended constraints for LLMs, alongside an initial design for a constraint prototyping tool.

Efforts to align Large Language Models (LLMs) are mainly conducted via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) methods. However, RLHF encounters major challenges including training reward models, actor-critic engineering, and importantly, it requires access to LLM parameters. Here we introduce Aligner, a new efficient alignment paradigm that bypasses the whole RLHF process by learning the correctional residuals between the aligned and the unaligned answers. Our Aligner offers several key advantages. Firstly, it is an autoregressive seq2seq model that is trained on the query-answer-correction dataset via supervised learning; this offers a parameter-efficient alignment solution with minimal resources. Secondly, the Aligner facilitates weak-to-strong generalization; finetuning large pretrained models by Aligner's supervisory signals demonstrates strong performance boost. Thirdly, Aligner functions as a model-agnostic plug-and-play module, allowing for its direct application on different open-source and API-based models. Remarkably, Aligner-7B improves 11 different LLMs by 21.9% in helpfulness and 23.8% in harmlessness on average (GPT-4 by 17.5% and 26.9%). When finetuning (strong) Llama2-70B with (weak) Aligner-13B's supervision, we can improve Llama2 by 8.2% in helpfulness and 61.6% in harmlessness. See our dataset and code at https://aligner2024.github.io

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as promising assistants for scientific writing. However, there have been concerns regarding the quality and reliability of the generated text, one of which is the citation accuracy and faithfulness. While most recent work relies on methods such as LLM-as-a-Judge, the reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge alone is also in doubt. In this work, we reframe citation evaluation as a problem of citation attribution alignment, which is assessing whether LLM-generated citations match those a human author would include for the same text. We propose CiteGuard, a retrieval-aware agent framework designed to provide more faithful grounding for citation validation. CiteGuard improves the prior baseline by 12.3%, and achieves up to 65.4% accuracy on the CiteME benchmark, on par with human-level performance (69.7%). It also enables the identification of alternative but valid citations.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but also present risks such as biased content generation and privacy issues. One of the current alignment techniques includes principle-driven integration, but it faces challenges arising from the imprecision of manually crafted rules and inadequate risk perception in models without safety training. To address these, we introduce Guide-Align, a two-stage approach. Initially, a safety-trained model identifies potential risks and formulates specific guidelines for various inputs, establishing a comprehensive library of guidelines and a model for input-guidelines retrieval. Subsequently, the retrieval model correlates new inputs with relevant guidelines, which guide LLMs in response generation to ensure safe and high-quality outputs, thereby aligning with human values. An additional optional stage involves fine-tuning a model with well-aligned datasets generated through the process implemented in the second stage. Our method customizes guidelines to accommodate diverse inputs, thereby enhancing the fine-grainedness and comprehensiveness of the guideline library. Furthermore, it incorporates safety expertise from a safety-trained LLM through a lightweight retrieval model. We evaluate our approach on three benchmarks, demonstrating significant improvements in LLM security and quality. Notably, our fine-tuned model, Labrador, even at 13 billion parameters, outperforms GPT-3.5-turbo and surpasses GPT-4 in alignment capabilities.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

Alignment in large language models (LLMs) is used to enforce guidelines such as safety. Yet, alignment fails in the face of jailbreak attacks that modify inputs to induce unsafe outputs. In this paper, we present and evaluate a method to assess the robustness of LLM alignment. We observe that alignment embeds a safety classifier in the target model that is responsible for deciding between refusal and compliance. We seek to extract an approximation of this classifier, called a surrogate classifier, from the LLM. We develop an algorithm for identifying candidate classifiers from subsets of the LLM model. We evaluate the degree to which the candidate classifiers approximate the model's embedded classifier in benign (F1 score) and adversarial (using surrogates in a white-box attack) settings. Our evaluation shows that the best candidates achieve accurate agreement (an F1 score above 80%) using as little as 20% of the model architecture. Further, we find attacks mounted on the surrogate models can be transferred with high accuracy. For example, a surrogate using only 50% of the Llama 2 model achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 70%, a substantial improvement over attacking the LLM directly, where we only observed a 22% ASR. These results show that extracting surrogate classifiers is a viable (and highly effective) means for modeling (and therein addressing) the vulnerability of aligned models to jailbreaking attacks.

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), they are not only used as general-purpose AI assistants but are also customized through further fine-tuning to meet the requirements of different applications. A pivotal factor in the success of current LLMs is the alignment process. Current alignment methods, such as supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), focus on training-time alignment and are often complex and cumbersome to implement. Therefore, we develop InferAligner, a novel inference-time alignment method that utilizes cross-model guidance for harmlessness alignment. InferAligner utilizes safety steering vectors extracted from safety-aligned model to modify the activations of the target model when responding to harmful inputs, thereby guiding the target model to provide harmless responses. Experimental results show that our method can be very effectively applied to domain-specific models in finance, medicine, and mathematics, as well as to multimodal large language models (MLLMs) such as LLaVA. It significantly diminishes the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of both harmful instructions and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining almost unchanged performance in downstream tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent in a wide variety of applications, concerns about the safety of their outputs have become more significant. Most efforts at safety-tuning or moderation today take on a predominantly Western-centric view of safety, especially for toxic, hateful, or violent speech. In this paper, we describe LionGuard, a Singapore-contextualized moderation classifier that can serve as guardrails against unsafe LLM outputs. When assessed on Singlish data, LionGuard outperforms existing widely-used moderation APIs, which are not finetuned for the Singapore context, by 14% (binary) and up to 51% (multi-label). Our work highlights the benefits of localization for moderation classifiers and presents a practical and scalable approach for low-resource languages.

User alignment is crucial for adapting general-purpose language models (LMs) to downstream tasks, but human annotations are often not available for all types of instructions, especially those with customized constraints. We observe that user instructions typically contain constraints. While assessing response quality in terms of the whole instruction is often costly, efficiently evaluating the satisfaction rate of constraints is feasible. We investigate common constraints in NLP tasks, categorize them into three classes based on the types of their arguments, and propose a unified framework, ACT (Aligning to ConsTraints), to automatically produce supervision signals for user alignment with constraints. Specifically, ACT uses constraint verifiers, which are typically easy to implement in practice, to compute constraint satisfaction rate (CSR) of each response. It samples multiple responses for each prompt and collect preference labels based on their CSR automatically. Subsequently, ACT adapts the LM to the target task through a ranking-based learning process. Experiments on fine-grained entity typing, abstractive summarization, and temporal question answering show that ACT is able to enhance LMs' capability to adhere to different classes of constraints, thereby improving task performance. Further experiments show that the constraint-following capabilities are transferable.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

To combat the misuse of Large Language Models (LLMs), many recent studies have presented LLM-generated-text detectors with promising performance. When users instruct LLMs to generate texts, the instruction can include different constraints depending on the user's need. However, most recent studies do not cover such diverse instruction patterns when creating datasets for LLM detection. In this paper, we reveal that even task-oriented constraints -- constraints that would naturally be included in an instruction and are not related to detection-evasion -- cause existing powerful detectors to have a large variance in detection performance. We focus on student essay writing as a realistic domain and manually create task-oriented constraints based on several factors for essay quality. Our experiments show that the standard deviation (SD) of current detector performance on texts generated by an instruction with such a constraint is significantly larger (up to an SD of 14.4 F1-score) than that by generating texts multiple times or paraphrasing the instruction. We also observe an overall trend where the constraints can make LLM detection more challenging than without them. Finally, our analysis indicates that the high instruction-following ability of LLMs fosters the large impact of such constraints on detection performance.

Large language models (LLMs) can be prompted with specific styles (e.g., formatting responses as lists), including in jailbreak queries. Although these style patterns are semantically unrelated to the malicious intents behind jailbreak queries, their safety impact remains unclear. In this work, we seek to understand whether style patterns compromise LLM safety, how superficial style alignment increases model vulnerability, and how best to mitigate these risks during alignment. We evaluate 32 LLMs across seven jailbreak benchmarks, and find that malicious queries with style patterns inflate the attack success rate (ASR) for nearly all models. Notably, ASR inflation correlates with both the length of style patterns and the relative attention an LLM exhibits on them. We then investigate superficial style alignment, and find that fine-tuning with specific styles makes LLMs more vulnerable to jailbreaks of those same styles. Finally, we propose SafeStyle, a defense strategy that incorporates a small amount of safety training data augmented to match the distribution of style patterns in the fine-tuning data. Across three LLMs and five fine-tuning style settings, SafeStyle consistently outperforms baselines in maintaining LLM safety.

As large language models (LLMs) are adopted as a fundamental component of language technologies, it is crucial to accurately characterize their performance. Because choices in prompt design can strongly influence model behavior, this design process is critical in effectively using any modern pre-trained generative language model. In this work, we focus on LLM sensitivity to a quintessential class of meaning-preserving design choices: prompt formatting. We find that several widely used open-source LLMs are extremely sensitive to subtle changes in prompt formatting in few-shot settings, with performance differences of up to 76 accuracy points when evaluated using LLaMA-2-13B. Sensitivity remains even when increasing model size, the number of few-shot examples, or performing instruction tuning. Our analysis suggests that work evaluating LLMs with prompting-based methods would benefit from reporting a range of performance across plausible prompt formats, instead of the currently-standard practice of reporting performance on a single format. We also show that format performance only weakly correlates between models, which puts into question the methodological validity of comparing models with an arbitrarily chosen, fixed prompt format. To facilitate systematic analysis we propose FormatSpread, an algorithm that rapidly evaluates a sampled set of plausible prompt formats for a given task, and reports the interval of expected performance without accessing model weights. Furthermore, we present a suite of analyses that characterize the nature of this sensitivity, including exploring the influence of particular atomic perturbations and the internal representation of particular formats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained with safety alignment to prevent generating malicious content. Although some attacks have highlighted vulnerabilities in these safety-aligned LLMs, they typically have limitations, such as necessitating access to the model weights or the generation process. Since proprietary models through API-calling do not grant users such permissions, these attacks find it challenging to compromise them. In this paper, we propose Jailbreaking Using LLM Introspection (JULI), which jailbreaks LLMs by manipulating the token log probabilities, using a tiny plug-in block, BiasNet. JULI relies solely on the knowledge of the target LLM's predicted token log probabilities. It can effectively jailbreak API-calling LLMs under a black-box setting and knowing only top-5 token log probabilities. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness, outperforming existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches across multiple metrics.

Common Large Language model (LLM) evaluations rely on demonstration examples to steer models' responses to the desired style. While the number of examples used has been studied and standardized, the choice of how to format examples is less investigated. In evaluation protocols and real world usage, users face the choice how to separate in-context examples: use a comma? new line? semi-colon? hashtag? etc.? Surprisingly, we find this seemingly minor choice can dramatically alter model response quality. Across leading model families (Llama, Qwen, Gemma), performance on MMLU for example can vary by pm 23% depending on the choice of delimiter. In fact, one can manipulate model rankings to put any model in the lead by only modifying the single character separating examples. We find LLMs' brittleness pervades topics, model families, and doesn't improve with scale. By probing attention head scores, we find that good-performing delimiters steer attention towards key tokens in the input. Finally, we explore methods to improve LLMs' robustness to the choice of delimiter. We find specifying the selected delimiter in the prompt boosts robustness and offer practical recommendations for the best-performing delimiters to select.

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

Data is a crucial element in large language model (LLM) alignment. Recent studies have explored using LLMs for efficient data collection. However, LLM-generated data often suffers from quality issues, with underrepresented or absent aspects and low-quality datapoints. To address these problems, we propose Data Advisor, an enhanced LLM-based method for generating data that takes into account the characteristics of the desired dataset. Starting from a set of pre-defined principles in hand, Data Advisor monitors the status of the generated data, identifies weaknesses in the current dataset, and advises the next iteration of data generation accordingly. Data Advisor can be easily integrated into existing data generation methods to enhance data quality and coverage. Experiments on safety alignment of three representative LLMs (i.e., Mistral, Llama2, and Falcon) demonstrate the effectiveness of Data Advisor in enhancing model safety against various fine-grained safety issues without sacrificing model utility.

Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) exhibit limitations such as generating unsafe responses, unreliable reasoning, etc. Existing inference intervention approaches attempt to mitigate these issues by finetuning additional models to produce calibration signals (such as rewards) that guide the LLM's decoding process. However, this solution introduces substantial time and space overhead due to the separate models required. This work proposes Non-disruptive parameters insertion (Otter), inserting extra parameters into the transformer architecture to predict calibration signals along with the original LLM output. Otter offers state-of-the-art performance on multiple demanding tasks while saving up to 86.5\% extra space and 98.5\% extra time. Furthermore, Otter seamlessly integrates with existing inference engines, requiring only a one-line code change, and the original model response remains accessible after the parameter insertion. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/chenhan97/Otter

Instruction-following made modern large language models (LLMs) helpful assistants. However, the key to taming LLMs on complex instructions remains mysterious, for that there are huge gaps between models trained by open-source community and those trained by leading companies. To bridge the gap, we propose a simple and scalable approach UltraIF for building LLMs that can follow complex instructions with open-source data. UltraIF first decomposes real-world user prompts into simpler queries, constraints, and corresponding evaluation questions for the constraints. Then, we train an UltraComposer to compose constraint-associated prompts with evaluation questions. This prompt composer allows us to synthesize complicated instructions as well as filter responses with evaluation questions. In our experiment, for the first time, we successfully align LLaMA-3.1-8B-Base to catch up with its instruct version on 5 instruction-following benchmarks without any benchmark information, using only 8B model as response generator and evaluator. The aligned model also achieved competitive scores on other benchmarks. Moreover, we also show that UltraIF could further improve LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct through self-alignment, motivating broader use cases for the method. Our code will be available at https://github.com/kkk-an/UltraIF.

Large Language Models (LLMs) guardrail systems are designed to protect against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. However, they remain vulnerable to evasion techniques. We demonstrate two approaches for bypassing LLM prompt injection and jailbreak detection systems via traditional character injection methods and algorithmic Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) evasion techniques. Through testing against six prominent protection systems, including Microsoft's Azure Prompt Shield and Meta's Prompt Guard, we show that both methods can be used to evade detection while maintaining adversarial utility achieving in some instances up to 100% evasion success. Furthermore, we demonstrate that adversaries can enhance Attack Success Rates (ASR) against black-box targets by leveraging word importance ranking computed by offline white-box models. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities within current LLM protection mechanisms and highlight the need for more robust guardrail systems.

LLM-based agents have recently emerged as promising tools for solving challenging problems without the need for task-specific finetuned models that can be expensive to procure. Currently, the design and implementation of such agents is ad hoc, as the wide variety of tasks that LLM-based agents may be applied to naturally means there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to agent design. In this work we aim to alleviate the difficulty of designing and implementing new agents by proposing a minimalistic, high-level generation framework that simplifies the process of building agents. The framework we introduce allows the user to specify desired agent behaviors in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). The declarative LTL specification is then used to construct a constrained decoder that guarantees the LLM will produce an output exhibiting the desired behavior. By designing our framework in this way, we obtain several benefits, including the ability to enforce complex agent behavior, the ability to formally validate prompt examples, and the ability to seamlessly incorporate content-focused logical constraints into generation. In particular, our declarative approach, in which the desired behavior is simply described without concern for how it should be implemented or enforced, enables rapid design, implementation and experimentation with different LLM-based agents. We demonstrate how the proposed framework can be used to implement recent LLM-based agents, and show how the guardrails our approach provides can lead to improvements in agent performance. In addition, we release our code for general use.

We introduce Aligner, a novel Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) method for aligning multi-billion-parameter-sized Large Language Models (LLMs). Aligner employs a unique design that constructs a globally shared set of tunable tokens that modify the attention of every layer. Remarkably with this method, even when using one token accounting for a mere 5,000 parameters, Aligner can still perform comparably well to state-of-the-art LLM adaptation methods like LoRA that require millions of parameters. This capacity is substantiated in both instruction following and value alignment tasks. Besides the multiple order-of-magnitude improvement in parameter efficiency, the insight Aligner provides into the internal mechanisms of LLMs is also valuable. The architectural features and efficacy of our method, in addition to our experiments demonstrate that an LLM separates its internal handling of "form" and "knowledge" in a somewhat orthogonal manner. This finding promises to motivate new research into LLM mechanism understanding and value alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, has resulted in the widespread presence of LLM-generated content on social media platforms, raising concerns about misinformation, data biases, and privacy violations, which can undermine trust in online discourse. While detecting LLM-generated content is crucial for mitigating these risks, current methods often focus on binary classification, failing to address the complexities of real-world scenarios like human-LLM collaboration. To move beyond binary classification and address these challenges, we propose a new paradigm for detecting LLM-generated content. This approach introduces two novel tasks: LLM Role Recognition (LLM-RR), a multi-class classification task that identifies specific roles of LLM in content generation, and LLM Influence Measurement (LLM-IM), a regression task that quantifies the extent of LLM involvement in content creation. To support these tasks, we propose LLMDetect, a benchmark designed to evaluate detectors' performance on these new tasks. LLMDetect includes the Hybrid News Detection Corpus (HNDC) for training detectors, as well as DetectEval, a comprehensive evaluation suite that considers five distinct cross-context variations and two multi-intensity variations within the same LLM role. This allows for a thorough assessment of detectors' generalization and robustness across diverse contexts. Our empirical validation of 10 baseline detection methods demonstrates that fine-tuned PLM-based models consistently outperform others on both tasks, while advanced LLMs face challenges in accurately detecting their own generated content. Our experimental results and analysis offer insights for developing more effective detection models for LLM-generated content. This research enhances the understanding of LLM-generated content and establishes a foundation for more nuanced detection methodologies.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

The most effective techniques to detect LLM-generated text rely on inserting a detectable signature -- or watermark -- during the model's decoding process. Most existing watermarking methods require access to the underlying LLM's logits, which LLM API providers are loath to share due to fears of model distillation. As such, these watermarks must be implemented independently by each LLM provider. In this paper, we develop PostMark, a modular post-hoc watermarking procedure in which an input-dependent set of words (determined via a semantic embedding) is inserted into the text after the decoding process has completed. Critically, PostMark does not require logit access, which means it can be implemented by a third party. We also show that PostMark is more robust to paraphrasing attacks than existing watermarking methods: our experiments cover eight baseline algorithms, five base LLMs, and three datasets. Finally, we evaluate the impact of PostMark on text quality using both automated and human assessments, highlighting the trade-off between quality and robustness to paraphrasing. We release our code, outputs, and annotations at https://github.com/lilakk/PostMark.

Despite extensive pre-training and fine-tuning in moral alignment to prevent generating harmful information at user request, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose AutoDefense, a response-filtering based multi-agent defense framework that filters harmful responses from LLMs. This framework assigns different roles to LLM agents and employs them to complete the defense task collaboratively. The division in tasks enhances the overall instruction-following of LLMs and enables the integration of other defense components as tools. AutoDefense can adapt to various sizes and kinds of open-source LLMs that serve as agents. Through conducting extensive experiments on a large scale of harmful and safe prompts, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed AutoDefense in improving the robustness against jailbreak attacks, while maintaining the performance at normal user request. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/XHMY/AutoDefense.

Structured generation, the process of producing content in standardized formats like JSON and XML, is widely utilized in real-world applications to extract key output information from large language models (LLMs). This study investigates whether such constraints on generation space impact LLMs' abilities, including reasoning and domain knowledge comprehension. Specifically, we evaluate LLMs' performance when restricted to adhere to structured formats versus generating free-form responses across various common tasks. Surprisingly, we observe a significant decline in LLMs' reasoning abilities under format restrictions. Furthermore, we find that stricter format constraints generally lead to greater performance degradation in reasoning tasks.

Chaining language model (LM) calls as composable modules is fueling a new powerful way of programming. However, ensuring that LMs adhere to important constraints remains a key challenge, one often addressed with heuristic "prompt engineering". We introduce LM Assertions, a new programming construct for expressing computational constraints that LMs should satisfy. We integrate our constructs into the recent DSPy programming model for LMs, and present new strategies that allow DSPy to compile programs with arbitrary LM Assertions into systems that are more reliable and more accurate. In DSPy, LM Assertions can be integrated at compile time, via automatic prompt optimization, and/or at inference time, via automatic selfrefinement and backtracking. We report on two early case studies for complex question answering (QA), in which the LM program must iteratively retrieve information in multiple hops and synthesize a long-form answer with citations. We find that LM Assertions improve not only compliance with imposed rules and guidelines but also enhance downstream task performance, delivering intrinsic and extrinsic gains up to 35.7% and 13.3%, respectively. Our reference implementation of LM Assertions is integrated into DSPy at https://github.com/stanfordnlp/dspy

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Modern moderation systems increasingly support multiple languages, but often fail to address localisation and low-resource variants - creating safety gaps in real-world deployments. Small models offer a potential alternative to large LLMs, yet still demand considerable data and compute. We present LionGuard 2, a lightweight, multilingual moderation classifier tailored to the Singapore context, supporting English, Chinese, Malay, and partial Tamil. Built on pre-trained OpenAI embeddings and a multi-head ordinal classifier, LionGuard 2 outperforms several commercial and open-source systems across 17 benchmarks, including both Singapore-specific and public English datasets. The system is actively deployed within the Singapore Government, demonstrating practical efficacy at scale. Our findings show that high-quality local data and robust multilingual embeddings can achieve strong moderation performance, without fine-tuning large models. We release our model weights and part of our training data to support future work on LLM safety.

The continuous advancement of large language models (LLMs) has brought increasing attention to the critical issue of developing fair and reliable methods for evaluating their performance. Particularly, the emergence of subjective or non-subjective cheating phenomena, such as test set leakage and prompt format overfitting, poses significant challenges to the reliable evaluation of LLMs. Since evaluation frameworks often utilize Regular Expression (RegEx) for answer extraction, some models may adjust their responses to comply with specific formats that are easily extractable by RegEx. Nevertheless, the key answer extraction module based on RegEx frequently suffers from extraction errors. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the entire LLM evaluation chain, demonstrating that optimizing the key answer extraction module can improve extraction accuracy, reduce LLMs' reliance on specific answer formats, and enhance the reliability of LLM evaluation. To address these issues, we propose xFinder, a model specifically designed for key answer extraction. As part of this process, we create a specialized dataset, the Key Answer Finder (KAF) dataset, to ensure effective model training and evaluation. Through generalization testing and evaluation in real-world scenarios, the results demonstrate that the smallest xFinder model with only 500 million parameters achieves an average answer extraction accuracy of 93.42%. In contrast, RegEx accuracy in the best evaluation framework is 74.38%. xFinder exhibits stronger robustness and higher accuracy compared to existing evaluation frameworks. All resources for xFinder are available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/xFinder.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

We introduce WildGuard -- an open, light-weight moderation tool for LLM safety that achieves three goals: (1) identifying malicious intent in user prompts, (2) detecting safety risks of model responses, and (3) determining model refusal rate. Together, WildGuard serves the increasing needs for automatic safety moderation and evaluation of LLM interactions, providing a one-stop tool with enhanced accuracy and broad coverage across 13 risk categories. While existing open moderation tools such as Llama-Guard2 score reasonably well in classifying straightforward model interactions, they lag far behind a prompted GPT-4, especially in identifying adversarial jailbreaks and in evaluating models' refusals, a key measure for evaluating safety behaviors in model responses. To address these challenges, we construct WildGuardMix, a large-scale and carefully balanced multi-task safety moderation dataset with 92K labeled examples that cover vanilla (direct) prompts and adversarial jailbreaks, paired with various refusal and compliance responses. WildGuardMix is a combination of WildGuardTrain, the training data of WildGuard, and WildGuardTest, a high-quality human-annotated moderation test set with 5K labeled items covering broad risk scenarios. Through extensive evaluations on WildGuardTest and ten existing public benchmarks, we show that WildGuard establishes state-of-the-art performance in open-source safety moderation across all the three tasks compared to ten strong existing open-source moderation models (e.g., up to 26.4% improvement on refusal detection). Importantly, WildGuard matches and sometimes exceeds GPT-4 performance (e.g., up to 3.9% improvement on prompt harmfulness identification). WildGuard serves as a highly effective safety moderator in an LLM interface, reducing the success rate of jailbreak attacks from 79.8% to 2.4%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive few-shot learning capabilities, but they often underperform compared to fine-tuned models on challenging tasks. Furthermore, their large size and restricted access only through APIs make task-specific fine-tuning impractical. Moreover, LLMs are sensitive to different aspects of prompts (e.g., the selection and order of demonstrations) and can thus require time-consuming prompt engineering. In this light, we propose a method to correct LLM outputs without relying on their weights. First, we generate a pool of candidates by few-shot prompting an LLM. Second, we refine the LLM-generated outputs using a smaller model, the LM-corrector (LMCor), which is trained to rank, combine and rewrite the candidates to produce the final target output. Our experiments demonstrate that even a small LMCor model (250M) substantially improves the few-shot performance of LLMs (62B) across diverse tasks. Moreover, we illustrate that the LMCor exhibits robustness against different prompts, thereby minimizing the need for extensive prompt engineering. Finally, we showcase that the LMCor can be seamlessly integrated with different LLMs at inference time, serving as a plug-and-play module to improve their performance.

Jailbreak attacks against multimodal large language Models (MLLMs) are a significant research focus. Current research predominantly focuses on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), often overlooking whether the generated responses actually fulfill the attacker's malicious intent. This oversight frequently leads to low-quality outputs that bypass safety filters but lack substantial harmful content. To address this gap, we propose JPS, Jailbreak MLLMs with collaborative visual Perturbation and textual Steering, which achieves jailbreaks via corporation of visual image and textually steering prompt. Specifically, JPS utilizes target-guided adversarial image perturbations for effective safety bypass, complemented by "steering prompt" optimized via a multi-agent system to specifically guide LLM responses fulfilling the attackers' intent. These visual and textual components undergo iterative co-optimization for enhanced performance. To evaluate the quality of attack outcomes, we propose the Malicious Intent Fulfillment Rate (MIFR) metric, assessed using a Reasoning-LLM-based evaluator. Our experiments show JPS sets a new state-of-the-art in both ASR and MIFR across various MLLMs and benchmarks, with analyses confirming its efficacy. Codes are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS{https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS}. warningcolor{Warning: This paper contains potentially sensitive contents.}

Even highly capable large language models (LLMs) can produce biased or unsafe responses, and alignment techniques, such as RLHF, aimed at mitigating this issue, are expensive and prone to overfitting as they retrain the LLM. This paper introduces a novel inference-time alignment approach that ensures LLMs generate safe responses almost surely, i.e., with a probability approaching one. We achieve this by framing the safe generation of inference-time responses as a constrained Markov decision process within the LLM's latent space. Crucially, we augment a safety state that tracks the evolution of safety constraints and enables us to demonstrate formal safety guarantees upon solving the MDP in the latent space. Building on this foundation, we propose InferenceGuard, a practical implementation that safely aligns LLMs without modifying the model weights. Empirically, we demonstrate InferenceGuard effectively balances safety and task performance, outperforming existing inference-time alignment methods in generating safe and aligned responses.

Ultra-long generation by large language models (LLMs) is a widely demanded scenario, yet it remains a significant challenge due to their maximum generation length limit and overall quality degradation as sequence length increases. Previous approaches, exemplified by LongWriter, typically rely on ''teaching'', which involves supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on synthetic long-form outputs. However, this strategy heavily depends on synthetic SFT data, which is difficult and costly to construct, often lacks coherence and consistency, and tends to be overly artificial and structurally monotonous. In this work, we propose an incentivization-based approach that, starting entirely from scratch and without relying on any annotated or synthetic data, leverages reinforcement learning (RL) to foster the emergence of ultra-long, high-quality text generation capabilities in LLMs. We perform RL training starting from a base model, similar to R1-Zero, guiding it to engage in reasoning that facilitates planning and refinement during the writing process. To support this, we employ specialized reward models that steer the LLM towards improved length control, writing quality, and structural formatting. Experimental evaluations show that our LongWriter-Zero model, trained from Qwen2.5-32B, consistently outperforms traditional SFT methods on long-form writing tasks, achieving state-of-the-art results across all metrics on WritingBench and Arena-Write, and even surpassing 100B+ models such as DeepSeek R1 and Qwen3-235B. We open-source our data and model checkpoints under https://huggingface.co/THU-KEG/LongWriter-Zero-32B

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

We study how to watermark LLM outputs, i.e. embedding algorithmically detectable signals into LLM-generated text to track misuse. Unlike the current mainstream methods that work with a fixed LLM, we expand the watermark design space by including the LLM tuning stage in the watermark pipeline. While prior works focus on token-level watermark that embeds signals into the output, we design a model-level watermark that embeds signals into the LLM weights, and such signals can be detected by a paired detector. We propose a co-training framework based on reinforcement learning that iteratively (1) trains a detector to detect the generated watermarked text and (2) tunes the LLM to generate text easily detectable by the detector while keeping its normal utility. We empirically show that our watermarks are more accurate, robust, and adaptable (to new attacks). It also allows watermarked model open-sourcing. In addition, if used together with alignment, the extra overhead introduced is low - only training an extra reward model (i.e. our detector). We hope our work can bring more effort into studying a broader watermark design that is not limited to working with a fixed LLM. We open-source the code: https://github.com/xiaojunxu/learning-to-watermark-llm .

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in recent days. Extensive efforts have been made before the public release of LLMs to align their behaviors with human values. The primary goal of alignment is to ensure their helpfulness, honesty and harmlessness. However, even meticulously aligned LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious manipulations such as jailbreaking, leading to unintended behaviors. The jailbreak is to intentionally develop a malicious prompt that escapes from the LLM security restrictions to produce uncensored detrimental contents. Previous works explore different jailbreak methods for red teaming LLMs, yet they encounter challenges regarding to effectiveness and scalability. In this work, we propose Tastle, a novel black-box jailbreak framework for automated red teaming of LLMs. We designed malicious content concealing and memory reframing with an iterative optimization algorithm to jailbreak LLMs, motivated by the research about the distractibility and over-confidence phenomenon of LLMs. Extensive experiments of jailbreaking both open-source and proprietary LLMs demonstrate the superiority of our framework in terms of effectiveness, scalability and transferability. We also evaluate the effectiveness of existing jailbreak defense methods against our attack and highlight the crucial need to develop more effective and practical defense strategies.

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of writing grammatical text that follows instructions, answers questions, and solves problems. As they have advanced, it has become difficult to distinguish their output from human-written text. While past research has found some differences in surface features such as word choice and punctuation, and developed classifiers to detect LLM output, none has studied the rhetorical styles of LLMs. Using several variants of Llama 3 and GPT-4o, we construct two parallel corpora of human- and LLM-written texts from common prompts. Using Douglas Biber's set of lexical, grammatical, and rhetorical features, we identify systematic differences between LLMs and humans and between different LLMs. These differences persist when moving from smaller models to larger ones, and are larger for instruction-tuned models than base models. This demonstrates that despite their advanced abilities, LLMs struggle to match human styles, and hence more advanced linguistic features can detect patterns in their behavior not previously recognized.

Recent research shows the potential of enhancing the problem-solving ability of large language models (LLMs) through the use of external tools. However, prior work along this line depends on the availability of existing tools. In this work, we take an initial step towards removing this dependency by proposing a closed-loop framework, referred to as LLMs As Tool Makers (LATM), where LLMs create their own reusable tools for problem-solving. Our approach consists of two key phases: 1) tool making: an LLM acts as the tool maker that crafts tools for given tasks, where a tool is implemented as a Python utility function. 2) tool using: an LLM acts as the tool user, which applies the tool built by the tool maker for problem-solving. The tool user can be either the same or a different LLM from the tool maker. Tool-making enables an LLM to continually generate tools that can be applied to different requests so that future requests can call the corresponding APIs when beneficial for solving the tasks. Furthermore, the division of labor among LLMs for tool-making and tool-using phases introduces the opportunity to achieve cost effectiveness without degrading the quality of generated tools and problem solutions. For example, recognizing that tool-making demands more sophisticated capabilities than tool-using, we can apply a powerful yet resource-intensive model as the tool maker, and a lightweight while cost-effective model as the tool user. We validate the effectiveness of our approach across a variety of complex reasoning tasks, including Big-Bench tasks. With GPT-4 as the tool maker and GPT-3.5 as the tool user, LATM can achieve performance that is on par with using GPT-4 for both tool making and tool using, while the inference cost is significantly reduced.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across various natural language processing tasks. Due to their training on internet-sourced datasets, LLMs can sometimes generate objectionable content, necessitating extensive alignment with human feedback to avoid such outputs. Despite massive alignment efforts, LLMs remain susceptible to adversarial jailbreak attacks, which usually are manipulated prompts designed to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Here, we introduce a novel approach, Directed Rrepresentation Optimization Jailbreak (DROJ), which optimizes jailbreak prompts at the embedding level to shift the hidden representations of harmful queries towards directions that are more likely to elicit affirmative responses from the model. Our evaluations on LLaMA-2-7b-chat model show that DROJ achieves a 100\% keyword-based Attack Success Rate (ASR), effectively preventing direct refusals. However, the model occasionally produces repetitive and non-informative responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a helpfulness system prompt that enhances the utility of the model's responses. Our code is available at https://github.com/Leon-Leyang/LLM-Safeguard.

Large Language Models have achieved remarkable success in natural language processing tasks, with Reinforcement Learning playing a key role in adapting them to specific applications. However, obtaining ground truth answers for training LLMs in mathematical problem-solving is often challenging, costly, and sometimes unfeasible. This research delves into the utilization of format and length as surrogate signals to train LLMs for mathematical problem-solving, bypassing the need for traditional ground truth answers.Our study shows that a reward function centered on format correctness alone can yield performance improvements comparable to the standard GRPO algorithm in early phases. Recognizing the limitations of format-only rewards in the later phases, we incorporate length-based rewards. The resulting GRPO approach, leveraging format-length surrogate signals, not only matches but surpasses the performance of the standard GRPO algorithm relying on ground truth answers in certain scenarios, achieving 40.0\% accuracy on AIME2024 with a 7B base model. Through systematic exploration and experimentation, this research not only offers a practical solution for training LLMs to solve mathematical problems and reducing the dependence on extensive ground truth data collection, but also reveals the essence of why our label-free approach succeeds: base model is like an excellent student who has already mastered mathematical and logical reasoning skills, but performs poorly on the test paper, it simply needs to develop good answering habits to achieve outstanding results in exams , in other words, to unlock the capabilities it already possesses.

Recent advances in Language Model (LM) agents and tool use, exemplified by applications like ChatGPT Plugins, enable a rich set of capabilities but also amplify potential risks - such as leaking private data or causing financial losses. Identifying these risks is labor-intensive, necessitating implementing the tools, manually setting up the environment for each test scenario, and finding risky cases. As tools and agents become more complex, the high cost of testing these agents will make it increasingly difficult to find high-stakes, long-tailed risks. To address these challenges, we introduce ToolEmu: a framework that uses an LM to emulate tool execution and enables the testing of LM agents against a diverse range of tools and scenarios, without manual instantiation. Alongside the emulator, we develop an LM-based automatic safety evaluator that examines agent failures and quantifies associated risks. We test both the tool emulator and evaluator through human evaluation and find that 68.8% of failures identified with ToolEmu would be valid real-world agent failures. Using our curated initial benchmark consisting of 36 high-stakes tools and 144 test cases, we provide a quantitative risk analysis of current LM agents and identify numerous failures with potentially severe outcomes. Notably, even the safest LM agent exhibits such failures 23.9% of the time according to our evaluator, underscoring the need to develop safer LM agents for real-world deployment.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

Like a criminal under investigation, Large Language Models (LLMs) might pretend to be aligned while evaluated and misbehave when they have a good opportunity. Can current interpretability methods catch these 'alignment fakers?' To answer this question, we introduce a benchmark that consists of 324 pairs of LLMs fine-tuned to select actions in role-play scenarios. One model in each pair is consistently benign (aligned). The other model misbehaves in scenarios where it is unlikely to be caught (alignment faking). The task is to identify the alignment faking model using only inputs where the two models behave identically. We test five detection strategies, one of which identifies 98% of alignment-fakers.

Financial reports offer critical insights into a company's operations, yet their extensive length typically spanning 30 40 pages poses challenges for swift decision making in dynamic markets. To address this, we leveraged finetuned Large Language Models (LLMs) to distill key indicators and operational metrics from these reports basis questions from the user. We devised a method to locate critical data, and leverage the FinQA dataset to fine-tune both Llama-2 7B and T5 models for customized question answering. We achieved results comparable to baseline on the final numerical answer, a competitive accuracy in numerical reasoning and calculation.

Despite the power of Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, they still struggle with tasks that require generating complex, structured outputs. In this study, we assess the capability of Current LLMs in generating complex structured data and propose a structure-aware fine-tuning approach as a solution to improve this ability. To perform a comprehensive evaluation, we propose Struc-Bench, include five representative LLMs (i.e., GPT-NeoX 20B, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Vicuna) and evaluate them on our carefully constructed datasets spanning raw text, HTML, and LaTeX tables. Based on our analysis of current model performance, we identify specific common formatting errors and areas of potential improvement. To address complex formatting requirements, we utilize FormatCoT (Chain-of-Thought) to generate format instructions from target outputs. Our experiments show that our structure-aware fine-tuning method, when applied to LLaMA-7B, significantly improves adherence to natural language constraints, outperforming other evaluated LLMs. Based on these results, we present an ability map of model capabilities from six dimensions (i.e., coverage, formatting, reasoning, comprehension, pragmatics, and hallucination). This map highlights the weaknesses of LLMs in handling complex structured outputs and suggests promising directions for future work. Our code and models can be found at https://github.com/gersteinlab/Struc-Bench.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents significantly extend the capabilities of standalone LLMs, empowering them to interact with external tools (e.g., APIs, functions) and complete complex tasks in a self-directed fashion. The challenge of tool use demands that LLMs not only understand user queries and generate answers but also excel in task planning, memory management, tool invocation, and result summarization. While traditional approaches focus on training a single LLM with all these capabilities, performance limitations become apparent, particularly with smaller models. Moreover, the entire LLM may require retraining when tools are updated. To overcome these challenges, we propose a novel strategy that decomposes the aforementioned capabilities into a planner, caller, and summarizer. Each component is implemented by a single LLM that focuses on a specific capability and collaborates with other components to accomplish the task. This modular framework facilitates individual updates and the potential use of smaller LLMs for building each capability. To effectively train this framework, we introduce a two-stage training paradigm. First, we fine-tune a backbone LLM on the entire dataset without discriminating sub-tasks, providing the model with a comprehensive understanding of the task. Second, the fine-tuned LLM is used to instantiate the planner, caller, and summarizer respectively, which are continually fine-tuned on respective sub-tasks. Evaluation across various tool-use benchmarks illustrates that our proposed multi-LLM framework surpasses the traditional single-LLM approach, highlighting its efficacy and advantages in tool learning.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Large language models have demonstrated outstanding performance on a wide range of tasks such as question answering and code generation. On a high level, given an input, a language model can be used to automatically complete the sequence in a statistically-likely way. Based on this, users prompt these models with language instructions or examples, to implement a variety of downstream tasks. Advanced prompting methods can even imply interaction between the language model, a user, and external tools such as calculators. However, to obtain state-of-the-art performance or adapt language models for specific tasks, complex task- and model-specific programs have to be implemented, which may still require ad-hoc interaction. Based on this, we present the novel idea of Language Model Programming (LMP). LMP generalizes language model prompting from pure text prompts to an intuitive combination of text prompting and scripting. Additionally, LMP allows constraints to be specified over the language model output. This enables easy adaption to many tasks while abstracting language model internals and providing high-level semantics. To enable LMP, we implement LMQL(short for Language Model Query Language), which leverages the constraints and control flow from an LMP prompt to generate an efficient inference procedure that minimizes the number of expensive calls to the underlying language model. We show that LMQL can capture a wide range of state-of-the-art prompting methods in an intuitive way, especially facilitating interactive flows that are challenging to implement with existing high-level APIs. Our evaluation shows that we retain or increase the accuracy on several downstream tasks, while also significantly reducing the required amount of computation or cost in the case of pay-to-use APIs (26-85% cost savings).

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with precise length control, particularly in zero-shot settings. We conduct a comprehensive study evaluating LLMs' length control capabilities across multiple measures and propose practical methods to improve controllability. Our experiments with LLaMA 3 reveal stark differences in length adherence across measures and highlight inherent biases of the model. To address these challenges, we introduce a set of methods: length approximation, target adjustment, sample filtering, and automated revisions. By combining these methods, we demonstrate substantial improvements in length compliance while maintaining or enhancing summary quality, providing highly effective zero-shot strategies for precise length control without the need for model fine-tuning or architectural changes. With our work, we not only advance our understanding of LLM behavior in controlled text generation but also pave the way for more reliable and adaptable summarization systems in real-world applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in various natural language processing tasks but remain vulnerable to generating harmful content or being exploited for malicious purposes. Although safety alignment datasets have been introduced to mitigate such risks through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), these datasets often lack comprehensive risk coverage. Most existing datasets focus primarily on lexical diversity while neglecting other critical dimensions. To address this limitation, we propose a novel analysis framework to systematically measure the risk coverage of alignment datasets across three essential dimensions: Lexical Diversity, Malicious Intent, and Jailbreak Tactics. We further introduce TRIDENT, an automated pipeline that leverages persona-based, zero-shot LLM generation to produce diverse and comprehensive instructions spanning these dimensions. Each harmful instruction is paired with an ethically aligned response, resulting in two datasets: TRIDENT-Core, comprising 26,311 examples, and TRIDENT-Edge, with 18,773 examples. Fine-tuning Llama 3.1-8B on TRIDENT-Edge demonstrates substantial improvements, achieving an average 14.29% reduction in Harm Score, and a 20% decrease in Attack Success Rate compared to the best-performing baseline model fine-tuned on the WildBreak dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as automated evaluators to assess the safety of generated content, yet their reliability in this role remains uncertain. This study evaluates a diverse set of 11 LLM judge models across critical safety domains, examining three key aspects: self-consistency in repeated judging tasks, alignment with human judgments, and susceptibility to input artifacts such as apologetic or verbose phrasing. Our findings reveal that biases in LLM judges can significantly distort the final verdict on which content source is safer, undermining the validity of comparative evaluations. Notably, apologetic language artifacts alone can skew evaluator preferences by up to 98\%. Contrary to expectations, larger models do not consistently exhibit greater robustness, while smaller models sometimes show higher resistance to specific artifacts. To mitigate LLM evaluator robustness issues, we investigate jury-based evaluations aggregating decisions from multiple models. Although this approach both improves robustness and enhances alignment to human judgements, artifact sensitivity persists even with the best jury configurations. These results highlight the urgent need for diversified, artifact-resistant methodologies to ensure reliable safety assessments.

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose LLM Self Defense, a simple approach to defend against these attacks by having an LLM screen the induced responses. Our method does not require any fine-tuning, input preprocessing, or iterative output generation. Instead, we incorporate the generated content into a pre-defined prompt and employ another instance of an LLM to analyze the text and predict whether it is harmful. We test LLM Self Defense on GPT 3.5 and Llama 2, two of the current most prominent LLMs against various types of attacks, such as forcefully inducing affirmative responses to prompts and prompt engineering attacks. Notably, LLM Self Defense succeeds in reducing the attack success rate to virtually 0 using both GPT 3.5 and Llama 2. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/llm-self-defense

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly relied upon to evaluate text outputs of other LLMs, thereby influencing leaderboards and development decisions. However, concerns persist over the accuracy of these assessments and the potential for misleading conclusions. In this work, we investigate the effectiveness of LLMs as evaluators for text generation tasks. We propose FBI, a novel framework designed to examine the proficiency of Evaluator LLMs in assessing four critical abilities in other LLMs: factual accuracy, instruction following, coherence in long-form writing, and reasoning proficiency. By introducing targeted perturbations in answers generated by LLMs, that clearly impact one of these key capabilities, we test whether an Evaluator LLM can detect these quality drops. By creating a total of 2400 perturbed answers covering 22 perturbation categories, we conduct a comprehensive study using different evaluation strategies on five prominent LLMs commonly used as evaluators in the literature. Our findings reveal significant shortcomings in current Evaluator LLMs, which failed to identify quality drops in over 50\% of cases on average. Single-answer and pairwise evaluations demonstrated notable limitations, whereas reference-based evaluations showed comparatively better performance. These results underscore the unreliable nature of current Evaluator LLMs and advocate for cautious implementation in practical applications. Code and data are available at https://github.com/AI4Bharat/FBI.

We propose LLM-Interleaved (LLM-I), a flexible and dynamic framework that reframes interleaved image-text generation as a tool-use problem. LLM-I is designed to overcome the "one-tool" bottleneck of current unified models, which are limited to synthetic imagery and struggle with tasks requiring factual grounding or programmatic precision. Our framework empowers a central LLM or MLLM agent to intelligently orchestrate a diverse toolkit of specialized visual tools, including online image search, diffusion-based generation, code execution, and image editing. The agent is trained to select and apply these tools proficiently via a Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework that features a hybrid reward system combining rule-based logic with judgments from LLM and MLLM evaluators. Trained on a diverse new dataset using four different model backbones, LLM-I demonstrates state-of-the-art performance, outperforming existing methods by a large margin across four benchmarks. We also introduce a novel test-time scaling strategy that provides further performance gains. Project Page: https://github.com/ByteDance-BandAI/LLM-I.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

As large language models (LLMs) become integrated into everyday applications, ensuring their robustness and security is increasingly critical. In particular, LLMs can be manipulated into unsafe behaviour by prompts known as jailbreaks. The variety of jailbreak styles is growing, necessitating the use of external defences known as guardrails. While many jailbreak defences have been proposed, not all defences are able to handle new out-of-distribution attacks due to the narrow segment of jailbreaks used to align them. Moreover, the lack of systematisation around defences has created significant gaps in their practical application. In this work, we perform systematic benchmarking across 15 different defences, considering a broad swathe of malicious and benign datasets. We find that there is significant performance variation depending on the style of jailbreak a defence is subject to. Additionally, we show that based on current datasets available for evaluation, simple baselines can display competitive out-of-distribution performance compared to many state-of-the-art defences. Code is available at https://github.com/IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often asked to generate structured outputs that obey precise syntactic rules, such as code snippets or formatted data. Grammar-constrained decoding (GCD) can guarantee that LLM outputs matches such rules by masking out tokens that will provably lead to outputs that do not belong to a specified context-free grammar (CFG). To guarantee soundness, GCD algorithms have to compute how a given LLM subword tokenizer can align with the tokens used by a given context-free grammar and compute token masks based on this information. Doing so efficiently is challenging and existing GCD algorithms require tens of minutes to preprocess common grammars. We present a new GCD algorithm together with an implementation that offers 17.71x faster offline preprocessing than existing approaches while preserving state-of-the-art efficiency in online mask computation.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

We introduce Llama Guard, an LLM-based input-output safeguard model geared towards Human-AI conversation use cases. Our model incorporates a safety risk taxonomy, a valuable tool for categorizing a specific set of safety risks found in LLM prompts (i.e., prompt classification). This taxonomy is also instrumental in classifying the responses generated by LLMs to these prompts, a process we refer to as response classification. For the purpose of both prompt and response classification, we have meticulously gathered a dataset of high quality. Llama Guard, a Llama2-7b model that is instruction-tuned on our collected dataset, albeit low in volume, demonstrates strong performance on existing benchmarks such as the OpenAI Moderation Evaluation dataset and ToxicChat, where its performance matches or exceeds that of currently available content moderation tools. Llama Guard functions as a language model, carrying out multi-class classification and generating binary decision scores. Furthermore, the instruction fine-tuning of Llama Guard allows for the customization of tasks and the adaptation of output formats. This feature enhances the model's capabilities, such as enabling the adjustment of taxonomy categories to align with specific use cases, and facilitating zero-shot or few-shot prompting with diverse taxonomies at the input. We are making Llama Guard model weights available and we encourage researchers to further develop and adapt them to meet the evolving needs of the community for AI safety.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Large language models (LLMs) are a promising avenue for machine translation (MT). However, current LLM-based MT systems are brittle: their effectiveness highly depends on the choice of few-shot examples and they often require extra post-processing due to overgeneration. Alternatives such as finetuning on translation instructions are computationally expensive and may weaken in-context learning capabilities, due to overspecialization. In this paper, we provide a closer look at this problem. We start by showing that adapter-based finetuning with LoRA matches the performance of traditional finetuning while reducing the number of training parameters by a factor of 50. This method also outperforms few-shot prompting and eliminates the need for post-processing or in-context examples. However, we show that finetuning generally degrades few-shot performance, hindering adaptation capabilities. Finally, to obtain the best of both worlds, we propose a simple approach that incorporates few-shot examples during finetuning. Experiments on 10 language pairs show that our proposed approach recovers the original few-shot capabilities while keeping the added benefits of finetuning.

The powerful ability to understand, follow, and generate complex language emerging from large language models (LLMs) makes LLM-generated text flood many areas of our daily lives at an incredible speed and is widely accepted by humans. As LLMs continue to expand, there is an imperative need to develop detectors that can detect LLM-generated text. This is crucial to mitigate potential misuse of LLMs and safeguard realms like artistic expression and social networks from harmful influence of LLM-generated content. The LLM-generated text detection aims to discern if a piece of text was produced by an LLM, which is essentially a binary classification task. The detector techniques have witnessed notable advancements recently, propelled by innovations in watermarking techniques, zero-shot methods, fine-turning LMs methods, adversarial learning methods, LLMs as detectors, and human-assisted methods. In this survey, we collate recent research breakthroughs in this area and underscore the pressing need to bolster detector research. We also delve into prevalent datasets, elucidating their limitations and developmental requirements. Furthermore, we analyze various LLM-generated text detection paradigms, shedding light on challenges like out-of-distribution problems, potential attacks, and data ambiguity. Conclusively, we highlight interesting directions for future research in LLM-generated text detection to advance the implementation of responsible artificial intelligence (AI). Our aim with this survey is to provide a clear and comprehensive introduction for newcomers while also offering seasoned researchers a valuable update in the field of LLM-generated text detection. The useful resources are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/LLM-generated-Text-Detection.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Large Language Model (LLM) pre-training exhausts an ever growing compute budget, yet recent research has demonstrated that careful document selection enables comparable model quality with only a fraction of the FLOPs. Inspired by efforts suggesting that domain-specific training document selection is in fact an interpretable process [Gunasekar et al., 2023], as well as research showing that instruction-finetuned LLMs are adept zero-shot data labelers [Gilardi et al.,2023], we explore a promising direction for scalable general-domain document selection; employing a prompted LLM as a document grader, we distill quality labels into a classifier model, which is applied at scale to a large, and already heavily-filtered, web-crawl-derived corpus autonomously. Following the guidance of this classifier, we drop 75% of the corpus and train LLMs on the remaining data. Results across multiple benchmarks show that: 1. Filtering allows us to quality-match a model trained on the full corpus across diverse benchmarks with at most 70% of the FLOPs, 2. More capable LLM labelers and classifier models lead to better results that are less sensitive to the labeler's prompt, 3. In-context learning helps to boost the performance of less-capable labeling models. In all cases we use open-source datasets, models, recipes, and evaluation frameworks, so that results can be reproduced by the community.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Instruction-tuned large language models (IT-LLMs) exhibit strong zero-shot reasoning, yet their ability to execute simple, self-contained instructions remains underexplored, despite this being foundational to complex instruction-following. We evaluate 20 IT-LLMs on modified MMLU and MMLU-Pro benchmarks, by systematically varying the format of option labels (alphabetic, numeric, Roman) while keeping their meaning identical under four paradigms, namely: (1) With explicit instructions, label changes cause large performance shifts (e.g., -30.45\% for Roman vs. numeric), revealing instruction-format bias. (2) Without instructions, performance drops further (up to -10.84\%) and label sensitivity intensifies, underscoring the role of explicit guidance. (3) When option contents are removed, models fail random-choice baselines except with numeric labels, suggesting weak adherence to atomic directives. (4) Three-shot exemplars yield no significant gains in robustness or fidelity, and generation analyses show persistent label errors, especially for non-numeric formats. Across model sizes, larger LLMs achieve higher accuracy but remain inconsistent in instruction adherence. These results expose the insufficiencies of current instruction-tuning paradigms and highlight the need for evaluation methods and training strategies that explicitly target atomic instruction-following.

Large Language Models (LLMs) currently struggle with tool invocation and chaining, as they often hallucinate or miss essential steps in a sequence. We propose RE-GAINS and EnChAnT, two novel frameworks that empower LLMs to tackle complex user queries by making API calls to external tools based on tool descriptions and argument lists. Tools are chained based on the expected output, without receiving the actual results from each individual call. EnChAnT, an open-source solution, leverages an LLM format enforcer, OpenChat 3.5 (an LLM), and ToolBench's API Retriever. RE-GAINS utilizes OpenAI models and embeddings with a specialized prompt based on the Reasoning via Planning (RAP) framework. Both frameworks are low cost (0.01\$ per query). Our key contribution is enabling LLMs for tool invocation and chaining using modifiable, externally described tools.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.

We propose a constraint learning schema for fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) with attribute control. Given a training corpus and control criteria formulated as a sequence-level constraint on model outputs, our method fine-tunes the LLM on the training corpus while enhancing constraint satisfaction with minimal impact on its utility and generation quality. Specifically, our approach regularizes the LLM training by penalizing the KL divergence between the desired output distribution, which satisfies the constraints, and the LLM's posterior. This regularization term can be approximated by an auxiliary model trained to decompose the sequence-level constraints into token-level guidance, allowing the term to be measured by a closed-form formulation. To further improve efficiency, we design a parallel scheme for concurrently updating both the LLM and the auxiliary model. We evaluate the empirical performance of our approach by controlling the toxicity when training an LLM. We show that our approach leads to an LLM that produces fewer inappropriate responses while achieving competitive performance on benchmarks and a toxicity detection task.

This study demonstrates a novel approach to testing the security boundaries of Vision-Large Language Model (VLM/ LLM) using the EICAR test file embedded within JPEG images. We successfully executed four distinct protocols across multiple LLM platforms, including OpenAI GPT-4o, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Anthropic Claude 3.5 Sonnet. The experiments validated that a modified JPEG containing the EICAR signature could be uploaded, manipulated, and potentially executed within LLM virtual workspaces. Key findings include: 1) consistent ability to mask the EICAR string in image metadata without detection, 2) successful extraction of the test file using Python-based manipulation within LLM environments, and 3) demonstration of multiple obfuscation techniques including base64 encoding and string reversal. This research extends Microsoft Research's "Penetration Testing Rules of Engagement" framework to evaluate cloud-based generative AI and LLM security boundaries, particularly focusing on file handling and execution capabilities within containerized environments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into services such as ChatGPT to provide responses to user queries. To mitigate potential harm and prevent misuse, there have been concerted efforts to align the LLMs with human values and legal compliance by incorporating various techniques, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), into the training of the LLMs. However, recent research has exposed that even aligned LLMs are susceptible to adversarial manipulations known as Jailbreak Attacks. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a method called Token Highlighter to inspect and mitigate the potential jailbreak threats in the user query. Token Highlighter introduced a concept called Affirmation Loss to measure the LLM's willingness to answer the user query. It then uses the gradient of Affirmation Loss for each token in the user query to locate the jailbreak-critical tokens. Further, Token Highlighter exploits our proposed Soft Removal technique to mitigate the jailbreak effects of critical tokens via shrinking their token embeddings. Experimental results on two aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2 and Vicuna-V1.5) demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively defend against a variety of Jailbreak Attacks while maintaining competent performance on benign questions of the AlpacaEval benchmark. In addition, Token Highlighter is a cost-effective and interpretable defense because it only needs to query the protected LLM once to compute the Affirmation Loss and can highlight the critical tokens upon refusal.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in specialized production data processing pipelines across diverse domains -- such as finance, marketing, and e-commerce. However, when running them in production across many inputs, they often fail to follow instructions or meet developer expectations. To improve reliability in these applications, creating assertions or guardrails for LLM outputs to run alongside the pipelines is essential. Yet, determining the right set of assertions that capture developer requirements for a task is challenging. In this paper, we introduce PROMPTEVALS, a dataset of 2087 LLM pipeline prompts with 12623 corresponding assertion criteria, sourced from developers using our open-source LLM pipeline tools. This dataset is 5x larger than previous collections. Using a hold-out test split of PROMPTEVALS as a benchmark, we evaluated closed- and open-source models in generating relevant assertions. Notably, our fine-tuned Mistral and Llama 3 models outperform GPT-4o by 20.93% on average, offering both reduced latency and improved performance. We believe our dataset can spur further research in LLM reliability, alignment, and prompt engineering.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated advanced capabilities in real-world agentic applications. Growing research efforts aim to develop LLM-based agents to address practical demands, introducing a new challenge: agentic scenarios often involve lengthy instructions with complex constraints, such as extended system prompts and detailed tool specifications. While adherence to such instructions is crucial for agentic applications, whether LLMs can reliably follow them remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce AgentIF, the first benchmark for systematically evaluating LLM instruction following ability in agentic scenarios. AgentIF features three key characteristics: (1) Realistic, constructed from 50 real-world agentic applications. (2) Long, averaging 1,723 words with a maximum of 15,630 words. (3) Complex, averaging 11.9 constraints per instruction, covering diverse constraint types, such as tool specifications and condition constraints. To construct AgentIF, we collect 707 human-annotated instructions across 50 agentic tasks from industrial application agents and open-source agentic systems. For each instruction, we annotate the associated constraints and corresponding evaluation metrics, including code-based evaluation, LLM-based evaluation, and hybrid code-LLM evaluation. We use AgentIF to systematically evaluate existing advanced LLMs. We observe that current models generally perform poorly, especially in handling complex constraint structures and tool specifications. We further conduct error analysis and analytical experiments on instruction length and meta constraints, providing some findings about the failure modes of existing LLMs. We have released the code and data to facilitate future research.

Background: Large language models (LLMs) are trained to follow directions, but this introduces a vulnerability to blindly comply with user requests even if they generate wrong information. In medicine, this could accelerate the generation of misinformation that impacts human well-being. Objectives/Methods: We analyzed compliance to requests to generate misleading content about medications in settings where models know the request is illogical. We investigated whether in-context directions and instruction-tuning of LLMs to prioritize logical reasoning over compliance reduced misinformation risk. Results: While all frontier LLMs complied with misinformation requests, both prompt-based and parameter-based approaches can improve the detection of logic flaws in requests and prevent the dissemination of medical misinformation. Conclusion: Shifting LLMs to prioritize logic over compliance could reduce risks of exploitation for medical misinformation.

Pre-trained large language models (LLMs) capture procedural knowledge about the world. Recent work has leveraged LLM's ability to generate abstract plans to simplify challenging control tasks, either by action scoring, or action modeling (fine-tuning). However, the transformer architecture inherits several constraints that make it difficult for the LLM to directly serve as the agent: e.g. limited input lengths, fine-tuning inefficiency, bias from pre-training, and incompatibility with non-text environments. To maintain compatibility with a low-level trainable actor, we propose to instead use the knowledge in LLMs to simplify the control problem, rather than solving it. We propose the Plan, Eliminate, and Track (PET) framework. The Plan module translates a task description into a list of high-level sub-tasks. The Eliminate module masks out irrelevant objects and receptacles from the observation for the current sub-task. Finally, the Track module determines whether the agent has accomplished each sub-task. On the AlfWorld instruction following benchmark, the PET framework leads to a significant 15% improvement over SOTA for generalization to human goal specifications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to be aligned with human expectations to ensure their safety and utility in most applications. Alignment is challenging, costly, and needs to be repeated for every LLM and alignment criterion. We propose to decouple LLMs and alignment by training aligner models that can be used to align any LLM for a given criteria on an as-needed basis, thus also reducing the potential negative impacts of alignment on performance. Our recipe for training the aligner models solely relies on synthetic data generated with a (prompted) LLM and can be easily adjusted for a variety of alignment criteria. We illustrate our method by training an "ethical" aligner and verify its efficacy empirically.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various tasks in different domains. However, the emergence of biases and the potential for generating harmful content in LLMs, particularly under malicious inputs, pose significant challenges. Current mitigation strategies, while effective, are not resilient under adversarial attacks. This paper introduces Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models (RigorLLM), a novel framework designed to efficiently and effectively moderate harmful and unsafe inputs and outputs for LLMs. By employing a multi-faceted approach that includes energy-based training data augmentation through Langevin dynamics, optimizing a safe suffix for inputs via minimax optimization, and integrating a fusion-based model combining robust KNN with LLMs based on our data augmentation, RigorLLM offers a robust solution to harmful content moderation. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that RigorLLM not only outperforms existing baselines like OpenAI API and Perspective API in detecting harmful content but also exhibits unparalleled resilience to jailbreaking attacks. The innovative use of constrained optimization and a fusion-based guardrail approach represents a significant step forward in developing more secure and reliable LLMs, setting a new standard for content moderation frameworks in the face of evolving digital threats.

Detecting text generated by large language models (LLMs) is of great recent interest. With zero-shot methods like DetectGPT, detection capabilities have reached impressive levels. However, the reliability of existing detectors in real-world applications remains underexplored. In this study, we present a new benchmark, DetectRL, highlighting that even state-of-the-art (SOTA) detection techniques still underperformed in this task. We collected human-written datasets from domains where LLMs are particularly prone to misuse. Using popular LLMs, we generated data that better aligns with real-world applications. Unlike previous studies, we employed heuristic rules to create adversarial LLM-generated text, simulating advanced prompt usages, human revisions like word substitutions, and writing errors. Our development of DetectRL reveals the strengths and limitations of current SOTA detectors. More importantly, we analyzed the potential impact of writing styles, model types, attack methods, the text lengths, and real-world human writing factors on different types of detectors. We believe DetectRL could serve as an effective benchmark for assessing detectors in real-world scenarios, evolving with advanced attack methods, thus providing more stressful evaluation to drive the development of more efficient detectors. Data and code are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/DetectRL.

The widespread dissemination of hate speech, harassment, harmful and sexual content, and violence across websites and media platforms presents substantial challenges and provokes widespread concern among different sectors of society. Governments, educators, and parents are often at odds with media platforms about how to regulate, control, and limit the spread of such content. Technologies for detecting and censoring the media contents are a key solution to addressing these challenges. Techniques from natural language processing and computer vision have been used widely to automatically identify and filter out sensitive content such as offensive languages, violence, nudity, and addiction in both text, images, and videos, enabling platforms to enforce content policies at scale. However, existing methods still have limitations in achieving high detection accuracy with fewer false positives and false negatives. Therefore, more sophisticated algorithms for understanding the context of both text and image may open rooms for improvement in content censorship to build a more efficient censorship system. In this paper, we evaluate existing LLM-based content moderation solutions such as OpenAI moderation model and Llama-Guard3 and study their capabilities to detect sensitive contents. Additionally, we explore recent LLMs such as GPT, Gemini, and Llama in identifying inappropriate contents across media outlets. Various textual and visual datasets like X tweets, Amazon reviews, news articles, human photos, cartoons, sketches, and violence videos have been utilized for evaluation and comparison. The results demonstrate that LLMs outperform traditional techniques by achieving higher accuracy and lower false positive and false negative rates. This highlights the potential to integrate LLMs into websites, social media platforms, and video-sharing services for regulatory and content moderation purposes.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Training automatic summary fact verifiers often faces the challenge of a lack of human-labeled data. In this paper, we explore alternative way of leveraging Large Language Model (LLM) generated feedback to address the inherent limitation of using human-labeled data. We introduce FineSumFact, a large-scale dataset containing fine-grained factual feedback on summaries. We employ 10 distinct LLMs for diverse summary generation and Llama-3-70B-Instruct for feedback. We utilize this dataset to fine-tune the lightweight open-source model Llama-3-8B-Instruct, optimizing resource efficiency while maintaining high performance. Our experimental results reveal that the model trained on extensive LLM-generated datasets surpasses that trained on smaller human-annotated datasets when evaluated using human-generated test sets. Fine-tuning fact verification models with LLM feedback can be more effective and cost-efficient than using human feedback. The dataset is available at https://github.com/DISL-Lab/FineSumFact.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become powerful tools for complex problem solving, but their structured reasoning pathways can lead to unsafe outputs when exposed to harmful prompts. Existing safety alignment methods reduce harmful outputs but can degrade reasoning depth, leading to significant trade-offs in complex, multi-step tasks, and remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks. To address this, we introduce SAFEPATH, a lightweight alignment method that fine-tunes LRMs to emit a short, 8-token Safety Primer at the start of their reasoning, in response to harmful prompts, while leaving the rest of the reasoning process unsupervised. Empirical results across multiple benchmarks indicate that SAFEPATH effectively reduces harmful outputs while maintaining reasoning performance. Specifically, SAFEPATH reduces harmful responses by up to 90.0% and blocks 83.3% of jailbreak attempts in the DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B model, while requiring 295.9x less compute than Direct Refusal and 314.1x less than SafeChain. We further introduce a zero-shot variant that requires no fine-tuning. In addition, we provide a comprehensive analysis of how existing methods in LLMs generalize, or fail, when applied to reasoning-centric models, revealing critical gaps and new directions for safer AI.

LLMs are an integral part of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems. While many studies focus on evaluating the quality of end-to-end RAG systems, there is a lack of research on understanding the appropriateness of an LLM for the RAG task. Thus, we introduce a new metric, Trust-Score, that provides a holistic evaluation of the trustworthiness of LLMs in an RAG framework. We show that various prompting methods, such as in-context learning, fail to adapt LLMs effectively to the RAG task. Thus, we propose Trust-Align, a framework to align LLMs for higher Trust-Score. LLaMA-3-8b, aligned with our method, significantly outperforms open-source LLMs of comparable sizes on ASQA (up 10.7), QAMPARI (up 29.2) and ELI5 (up 14.9). We release our code at: https://github.com/declare-lab/trust-align.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant capability across various tasks, with their real-world effectiveness often driven by prompt design. While recent research has focused on optimizing prompt content, the role of prompt formatting, a critical but often overlooked dimension, has received limited systematic investigation. In this paper, we introduce Content-Format Integrated Prompt Optimization (CFPO), an innovative methodology that jointly optimizes both prompt content and formatting through an iterative refinement process. CFPO leverages natural language mutations to explore content variations and employs a dynamic format exploration strategy that systematically evaluates diverse format options. Our extensive evaluations across multiple tasks and open-source LLMs demonstrate that CFPO demonstrates measurable performance improvements compared to content-only optimization methods. This highlights the importance of integrated content-format optimization and offers a practical, model-agnostic approach to enhancing LLM performance. Code will be available at https://github.com/HenryLau7/CFPO.

Instruction following is one of the fundamental capabilities of large language models (LLMs). As the ability of LLMs is constantly improving, they have been increasingly applied to deal with complex human instructions in real-world scenarios. Therefore, how to evaluate the ability of complex instruction-following of LLMs has become a critical research problem. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on modeling different types of constraints in human instructions while neglecting the composition of different constraints, which is an indispensable constituent in complex instructions. To this end, we propose ComplexBench, a benchmark for comprehensively evaluating the ability of LLMs to follow complex instructions composed of multiple constraints. We propose a hierarchical taxonomy for complex instructions, including 4 constraint types, 19 constraint dimensions, and 4 composition types, and manually collect a high-quality dataset accordingly. To make the evaluation reliable, we augment LLM-based evaluators with rules to effectively verify whether generated texts can satisfy each constraint and composition. Furthermore, we obtain the final evaluation score based on the dependency structure determined by different composition types. ComplexBench identifies significant deficiencies in existing LLMs when dealing with complex instructions with multiple constraints composition.

One of the most widely used tasks to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) is Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA). While open-ended question answering tasks are more challenging to evaluate, MCQA tasks are, in principle, easier to assess, as the model's answer is thought to be simple to extract and is directly compared to a set of predefined choices. However, recent studies have started to question the reliability of MCQA evaluation, showing that multiple factors can significantly impact the reported performance of LLMs, especially when the model generates free-form text before selecting one of the answer choices. In this work, we shed light on the inconsistencies of MCQA evaluation strategies, which can lead to inaccurate and misleading model comparisons. We systematically analyze whether existing answer extraction methods are aligned with human judgment, and how they are influenced by answer constraints in the prompt across different domains. Our experiments demonstrate that traditional evaluation strategies often underestimate LLM capabilities, while LLM-based answer extractors are prone to systematic errors. Moreover, we reveal a fundamental trade-off between including format constraints in the prompt to simplify answer extraction and allowing models to generate free-form text to improve reasoning. Our findings call for standardized evaluation methodologies and highlight the need for more reliable and consistent MCQA evaluation practices.

Language models (LMs) exhibit remarkable abilities to solve new tasks from just a few examples or textual instructions, especially at scale. They also, paradoxically, struggle with basic functionality, such as arithmetic or factual lookup, where much simpler and smaller models excel. In this paper, we show that LMs can teach themselves to use external tools via simple APIs and achieve the best of both worlds. We introduce Toolformer, a model trained to decide which APIs to call, when to call them, what arguments to pass, and how to best incorporate the results into future token prediction. This is done in a self-supervised way, requiring nothing more than a handful of demonstrations for each API. We incorporate a range of tools, including a calculator, a Q\&A system, two different search engines, a translation system, and a calendar. Toolformer achieves substantially improved zero-shot performance across a variety of downstream tasks, often competitive with much larger models, without sacrificing its core language modeling abilities.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

Despite efforts to align large language models (LLMs) with human values, widely-used LLMs such as GPT, Llama, Claude, and PaLM are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks, wherein an adversary fools a targeted LLM into generating objectionable content. To address this vulnerability, we propose SmoothLLM, the first algorithm designed to mitigate jailbreaking attacks on LLMs. Based on our finding that adversarially-generated prompts are brittle to character-level changes, our defense first randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs. SmoothLLM reduces the attack success rate on numerous popular LLMs to below one percentage point, avoids unnecessary conservatism, and admits provable guarantees on attack mitigation. Moreover, our defense uses exponentially fewer queries than existing attacks and is compatible with any LLM. Our code is publicly available at the following link: https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm.

Verifiers play a crucial role in large language model (LLM) reasoning, needed by post-training techniques such as reinforcement learning. However, reliable verifiers are hard to get for difficult coding problems, because a well-disguised wrong solution may only be detected by carefully human-written edge cases that are difficult to synthesize. To address this issue, we propose HARDTESTGEN, a pipeline for high-quality test synthesis using LLMs. With this pipeline, we curate a comprehensive competitive programming dataset HARDTESTS with 47k problems and synthetic high-quality tests. Compared with existing tests, HARDTESTGEN tests demonstrate precision that is 11.3 percentage points higher and recall that is 17.5 percentage points higher when evaluating LLM-generated code. For harder problems, the improvement in precision can be as large as 40 points. HARDTESTS also proves to be more effective for model training, measured by downstream code generation performance. We will open-source our dataset and synthesis pipeline at https://leililab.github.io/HardTests/.

LLMs(Large Language Models) nowadays have widespread adoption as a tool for solving issues across various domain/tasks. These models since are susceptible to produce harmful or toxic results, inference-time adversarial attacks, therefore they do undergo safety alignment training and Red teaming for putting in safety guardrails. For using these models, usually fine-tuning is done for model alignment on the desired tasks, which can make model more aligned but also make it more susceptible to produce unsafe responses, if fine-tuned with harmful data.In this paper, we study how much of impact introduction of harmful data in fine-tuning can make, and if it can override the safety protection of those models. Conversely,it was also explored that if model is fine-tuned on safety data can make the model produce more safer responses. Further we explore if fine-tuning the model on harmful data makes it less helpful or less trustworthy because of increase in model uncertainty leading to knowledge drift. Our extensive experimental results shown that Safety protection in an open-source can be overridden, when fine-tuned with harmful data as observed by ASR increasing by 35% when compared to basemodel's ASR. Also, as observed, fine-tuning a model with harmful data made the harmful fine-tuned model highly uncertain with huge knowledge drift and less truthfulness in its responses. Furthermore, for the safe fine-tuned model, ASR decreases by 51.68% as compared to the basemodel, and Safe model also shown in minor drop in uncertainty and truthfulness as compared to basemodel. This paper's code is available at: https://github.com/techsachinkr/Overriding_Model_Safety_Protections

Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of transforming natural language domain descriptions into plausibly looking PDDL markup. However, ensuring that actions are consistent within domains still remains a challenging task. In this paper we present a novel concept to significantly improve the quality of LLM-generated PDDL models by performing automated consistency checking during the generation process. Although the proposed consistency checking strategies still can't guarantee absolute correctness of generated models, they can serve as valuable source of feedback reducing the amount of correction efforts expected from a human in the loop. We demonstrate the capabilities of our error detection approach on a number of classical and custom planning domains (logistics, gripper, tyreworld, household, pizza).

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate structured outputs, such as JSON, is crucial for their use in Compound AI Systems. However, evaluating and improving this capability remains challenging. In this work, we introduce StructuredRAG, a benchmark of six tasks designed to assess LLMs' proficiency in following response format instructions. We evaluate two state-of-the-art LLMs, Gemini 1.5 Pro and Llama 3 8B-instruct with 4-bit quantization using two distinct prompting strategies. We introduce these prompting strategies as f-String and Follow the Format (FF) prompting. Across 24 experiments, we find an average success rate of 82.55%. We further find a high variance in performance across tasks, models, and prompting strategies with success rates ranging from 0 to 100%. We find that Llama 3 8B-instruct often performs competitively with Gemini 1.5 Pro. We observe that task complexity significantly influences performance, with tasks involving lists or composite object outputs proving more challenging. Our findings highlight the need for further research into improving the reliability and consistency of structured output generation in LLMs. We have open-sourced our experimental code and results at github.com/weaviate/structured-rag.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Legal Prompt Engineering (LPE) or Legal Prompting is a process to guide and assist a large language model (LLM) with performing a natural legal language processing (NLLP) skill. Our goal is to use LPE with LLMs over long legal documents for the Legal Judgement Prediction (LJP) task. We investigate the performance of zero-shot LPE for given facts in case-texts from the European Court of Human Rights (in English) and the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (in German, French and Italian). Our results show that zero-shot LPE is better compared to the baselines, but it still falls short compared to current state of the art supervised approaches. Nevertheless, the results are important, since there was 1) no explicit domain-specific data used - so we show that the transfer to the legal domain is possible for general-purpose LLMs, and 2) the LLMs where directly applied without any further training or fine-tuning - which in turn saves immensely in terms of additional computational costs.

Offering a promising solution to the scalability challenges associated with human evaluation, the LLM-as-a-judge paradigm is rapidly gaining traction as an approach to evaluating large language models (LLMs). However, there are still many open questions about the strengths and weaknesses of this paradigm, and what potential biases it may hold. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of the performance of various LLMs acting as judges. We leverage TriviaQA as a benchmark for assessing objective knowledge reasoning of LLMs and evaluate them alongside human annotations which we found to have a high inter-annotator agreement. Our study includes 9 judge models and 9 exam taker models -- both base and instruction-tuned. We assess the judge model's alignment across different model sizes, families, and judge prompts. Among other results, our research rediscovers the importance of using Cohen's kappa as a metric of alignment as opposed to simple percent agreement, showing that judges with high percent agreement can still assign vastly different scores. We find that both Llama-3 70B and GPT-4 Turbo have an excellent alignment with humans, but in terms of ranking exam taker models, they are outperformed by both JudgeLM-7B and the lexical judge Contains, which have up to 34 points lower human alignment. Through error analysis and various other studies, including the effects of instruction length and leniency bias, we hope to provide valuable lessons for using LLMs as judges in the future.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

The growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has influenced the development of their lighter counterparts-Small Language Models (SLMs)-to enable on-device deployment across smartphones and edge devices. These SLMs offer enhanced privacy, reduced latency, server-free functionality, and improved user experience. However, due to resource constraints of on-device environment, SLMs undergo size optimization through compression techniques like quantization, which can inadvertently introduce fairness, ethical and privacy risks. Critically, quantized SLMs may respond to harmful queries directly, without requiring adversarial manipulation, raising significant safety and trust concerns. To address this, we propose LiteLMGuard (LLMG), an on-device prompt guard that provides real-time, prompt-level defense for quantized SLMs. Additionally, our prompt guard is designed to be model-agnostic such that it can be seamlessly integrated with any SLM, operating independently of underlying architectures. Our LLMG formalizes prompt filtering as a deep learning (DL)-based prompt answerability classification task, leveraging semantic understanding to determine whether a query should be answered by any SLM. Using our curated dataset, Answerable-or-Not, we trained and fine-tuned several DL models and selected ELECTRA as the candidate, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy. Our safety effectiveness evaluations demonstrate that LLMG defends against over 87% of harmful prompts, including both direct instruction and jailbreak attack strategies. We further showcase its ability to mitigate the Open Knowledge Attacks, where compromised SLMs provide unsafe responses without adversarial prompting. In terms of prompt filtering effectiveness, LLMG achieves near state-of-the-art filtering accuracy of 94%, with an average latency of 135 ms, incurring negligible overhead for users.

Large Language Models (LLMs) changed the way we design and interact with software systems. Their ability to process and extract information from text has drastically improved productivity in a number of routine tasks. Developers that want to include these models in their software stack, however, face a dreadful challenge: debugging LLMs' inconsistent behavior across minor variations of the prompt. We therefore introduce two metrics for classification tasks, namely sensitivity and consistency, which are complementary to task performance. First, sensitivity measures changes of predictions across rephrasings of the prompt, and does not require access to ground truth labels. Instead, consistency measures how predictions vary across rephrasings for elements of the same class. We perform an empirical comparison of these metrics on text classification tasks, using them as guideline for understanding failure modes of the LLM. Our hope is that sensitivity and consistency will be helpful to guide prompt engineering and obtain LLMs that balance robustness with performance.

Diffusion-based large language models (dLLMs) have recently emerged as a powerful alternative to autoregressive LLMs, offering faster inference and greater interactivity via parallel decoding and bidirectional modeling. However, despite strong performance in code generation and text infilling, we identify a fundamental safety concern: existing alignment mechanisms fail to safeguard dLLMs against context-aware, masked-input adversarial prompts, exposing novel vulnerabilities. To this end, we present DIJA, the first systematic study and jailbreak attack framework that exploits unique safety weaknesses of dLLMs. Specifically, our proposed DIJA constructs adversarial interleaved mask-text prompts that exploit the text generation mechanisms of dLLMs, i.e., bidirectional modeling and parallel decoding. Bidirectional modeling drives the model to produce contextually consistent outputs for masked spans, even when harmful, while parallel decoding limits model dynamic filtering and rejection sampling of unsafe content. This causes standard alignment mechanisms to fail, enabling harmful completions in alignment-tuned dLLMs, even when harmful behaviors or unsafe instructions are directly exposed in the prompt. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that DIJA significantly outperforms existing jailbreak methods, exposing a previously overlooked threat surface in dLLM architectures. Notably, our method achieves up to 100% keyword-based ASR on Dream-Instruct, surpassing the strongest prior baseline, ReNeLLM, by up to 78.5% in evaluator-based ASR on JailbreakBench and by 37.7 points in StrongREJECT score, while requiring no rewriting or hiding of harmful content in the jailbreak prompt. Our findings underscore the urgent need for rethinking safety alignment in this emerging class of language models. Code is available at https://github.com/ZichenWen1/DIJA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable fluency and competence across various natural language tasks. However, recent research has highlighted their sensitivity to variations in input prompts. To deploy LLMs in a safe and reliable manner, it is crucial for their outputs to be consistent when prompted with expressions that carry the same meaning or intent. While some existing work has explored how state-of-the-art LLMs address this issue, their evaluations have been confined to assessing lexical equality of single- or multi-word answers, overlooking the consistency of generative text sequences. For a more comprehensive understanding of the consistency of LLMs in open-ended text generation scenarios, we introduce a general measure of semantic consistency, and formulate multiple versions of this metric to evaluate the performance of various LLMs. Our proposal demonstrates significantly higher consistency and stronger correlation with human evaluations of output consistency than traditional metrics based on lexical consistency. Finally, we propose a novel prompting strategy, called Ask-to-Choose (A2C), to enhance semantic consistency. When evaluated for closed-book question answering based on answer variations from the TruthfulQA benchmark, A2C increases accuracy metrics for pretrained and finetuned LLMs by up to 47%, and semantic consistency metrics for instruction-tuned models by up to 7-fold.

LaTeX's precision and flexibility in typesetting have made it the gold standard for the preparation of scientific documentation. Large Language Models (LLMs) present a promising opportunity for researchers to produce publication-ready material using LaTeX with natural language instructions, yet current benchmarks completely lack evaluation of this ability. By introducing TeXpert, our benchmark dataset with natural language prompts for generating LaTeX code focused on components of scientific documents across multiple difficulty levels, we conduct an in-depth analysis of LLM performance in this regard and identify frequent error types. Our evaluation across open and closed-source LLMs highlights multiple key findings: LLMs excelling on standard benchmarks perform poorly in LaTeX generation with a significant accuracy drop-off as the complexity of tasks increases; open-source models like DeepSeek v3 and DeepSeek Coder strongly rival closed-source counterparts in LaTeX tasks; and formatting and package errors are unexpectedly prevalent, suggesting a lack of diverse LaTeX examples in the training datasets of most LLMs. Our dataset, code, and model evaluations are available at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/TeXpert.

Ensuring alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions [1,2], has become a critical task before deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications. For instance, OpenAI devoted six months to iteratively aligning GPT-4 before its release [3]. However, a major challenge faced by practitioners is the lack of clear guidance on evaluating whether LLM outputs align with social norms, values, and regulations. This obstacle hinders systematic iteration and deployment of LLMs. To address this issue, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of key dimensions that are crucial to consider when assessing LLM trustworthiness. The survey covers seven major categories of LLM trustworthiness: reliability, safety, fairness, resistance to misuse, explainability and reasoning, adherence to social norms, and robustness. Each major category is further divided into several sub-categories, resulting in a total of 29 sub-categories. Additionally, a subset of 8 sub-categories is selected for further investigation, where corresponding measurement studies are designed and conducted on several widely-used LLMs. The measurement results indicate that, in general, more aligned models tend to perform better in terms of overall trustworthiness. However, the effectiveness of alignment varies across the different trustworthiness categories considered. This highlights the importance of conducting more fine-grained analyses, testing, and making continuous improvements on LLM alignment. By shedding light on these key dimensions of LLM trustworthiness, this paper aims to provide valuable insights and guidance to practitioners in the field. Understanding and addressing these concerns will be crucial in achieving reliable and ethically sound deployment of LLMs in various applications.

The widespread accessibility of large language models (LLMs) to the general public has significantly amplified the dissemination of machine-generated texts (MGTs). Advancements in prompt manipulation have exacerbated the difficulty in discerning the origin of a text (human-authored vs machinegenerated). This raises concerns regarding the potential misuse of MGTs, particularly within educational and academic domains. In this paper, we present LLM-DetectAIve -- a system designed for fine-grained MGT detection. It is able to classify texts into four categories: human-written, machine-generated, machine-written machine-humanized, and human-written machine-polished. Contrary to previous MGT detectors that perform binary classification, introducing two additional categories in LLM-DetectiAIve offers insights into the varying degrees of LLM intervention during the text creation. This might be useful in some domains like education, where any LLM intervention is usually prohibited. Experiments show that LLM-DetectAIve can effectively identify the authorship of textual content, proving its usefulness in enhancing integrity in education, academia, and other domains. LLM-DetectAIve is publicly accessible at https://huggingface.co/spaces/raj-tomar001/MGT-New. The video describing our system is available at https://youtu.be/E8eT_bE7k8c.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has garnered significant attention in both academia and industry. Prior research on LLMs has primarily focused on enhancing or leveraging their generalization capabilities in zero- and few-shot settings. However, there has been limited investigation into effectively fine-tuning LLMs for a specific natural language understanding task in supervised settings. In this study, we conduct an experimental analysis by fine-tuning LLMs for the task of Chinese short text matching. We explore various factors that influence performance when fine-tuning LLMs, including task modeling methods, prompt formats, and output formats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) play powerful, black-box readers in the retrieve-then-read pipeline, making remarkable progress in knowledge-intensive tasks. This work introduces a new framework, Rewrite-Retrieve-Read instead of the previous retrieve-then-read for the retrieval-augmented LLMs from the perspective of the query rewriting. Unlike prior studies focusing on adapting either the retriever or the reader, our approach pays attention to the adaptation of the search query itself, for there is inevitably a gap between the input text and the needed knowledge in retrieval. We first prompt an LLM to generate the query, then use a web search engine to retrieve contexts. Furthermore, to better align the query to the frozen modules, we propose a trainable scheme for our pipeline. A small language model is adopted as a trainable rewriter to cater to the black-box LLM reader. The rewriter is trained using the feedback of the LLM reader by reinforcement learning. Evaluation is conducted on downstream tasks, open-domain QA and multiple-choice QA. Experiments results show consistent performance improvement, indicating that our framework is proven effective and scalable, and brings a new framework for retrieval-augmented LLM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with safe-alignment training are powerful instruments with robust language comprehension capabilities. These models typically undergo meticulous alignment procedures involving human feedback to ensure the acceptance of safe inputs while rejecting harmful or unsafe ones. However, despite their massive scale and alignment efforts, LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where malicious users manipulate the model to produce harmful outputs that it was explicitly trained to avoid. In this study, we find that the safety mechanisms in LLMs are predominantly embedded in the middle-to-late layers. Building on this insight, we introduce a novel white-box jailbreak method, SABER (Safety Alignment Bypass via Extra Residuals), which connects two intermediate layers s and e such that s < e, through a residual connection. Our approach achieves a 51% improvement over the best-performing baseline on the HarmBench test set. Furthermore, SABER induces only a marginal shift in perplexity when evaluated on the HarmBench validation set. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/PalGitts/SABER.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Language model (LM) agents have gained significant attention for their ability to autonomously complete tasks through interactions with environments, tools, and APIs. LM agents are primarily built with prompt engineering or supervised finetuning. At the same time, reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored to enhance LM's capabilities, such as reasoning and factuality. However, the combination of the LM agents and reinforcement learning (Agent-RL) remains underexplored and lacks systematic study. To this end, we built AgentFly, a scalable and extensible Agent-RL framework designed to empower LM agents with a variety of RL algorithms. Our framework supports multi-turn interactions by adapting traditional RL methods with token-level masking. It features a decorator-based interface for defining tools and reward functions, enabling seamless extension and ease of use. To support high-throughput training, we implement asynchronous execution of tool calls and reward computations, and design a centralized resource management system for scalable environment coordination. We also provide a suite of prebuilt tools and environments, demonstrating the framework's effectiveness through successful agent training across multiple tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently emerged as a focal point of research and application, driven by their unprecedented ability to understand and generate text with human-like quality. Even more recently, LLMs have been extended into multi-modal large language models (MM-LLMs) which extends their capabilities to deal with image, video and audio information, in addition to text. This opens up applications like text-to-video generation, image captioning, text-to-speech, and more and is achieved either by retro-fitting an LLM with multi-modal capabilities, or building a MM-LLM from scratch. This paper provides an extensive review of the current state of those LLMs with multi-modal capabilities as well as the very recent MM-LLMs. It covers the historical development of LLMs especially the advances enabled by transformer-based architectures like OpenAI's GPT series and Google's BERT, as well as the role of attention mechanisms in enhancing model performance. The paper includes coverage of the major and most important of the LLMs and MM-LLMs and also covers the techniques of model tuning, including fine-tuning and prompt engineering, which tailor pre-trained models to specific tasks or domains. Ethical considerations and challenges, such as data bias and model misuse, are also analysed to underscore the importance of responsible AI development and deployment. Finally, we discuss the implications of open-source versus proprietary models in AI research. Through this review, we provide insights into the transformative potential of MM-LLMs in various applications.

Instruction following is a key capability for LLMs. However, recent studies have shown that LLMs often struggle with instructions containing multiple constraints (e.g. a request to create a social media post "in a funny tone" with "no hashtag"). Despite this, most evaluations focus solely on synthetic data. To address this, we introduce RealInstruct, the first benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to follow real-world multi-constrained instructions by leveraging queries real users asked AI assistants. We also investigate model-based evaluation as a cost-effective alternative to human annotation for this task. Our findings reveal that even the proprietary GPT-4 model fails to meet at least one constraint on over 21% of instructions, highlighting the limitations of state-of-the-art models. To address the performance gap between open-source and proprietary models, we propose the Decompose, Critique and Refine (DeCRIM) self-correction pipeline, which enhances LLMs' ability to follow constraints. DeCRIM works by decomposing the original instruction into a list of constraints and using a Critic model to decide when and where the LLM's response needs refinement. Our results show that DeCRIM improves Mistral's performance by 7.3% on RealInstruct and 8.0% on IFEval even with weak feedback. Moreover, we demonstrate that with strong feedback, open-source LLMs with DeCRIM can outperform GPT-4 on both benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown human-like reasoning abilities but still struggle with complex logical problems. This paper introduces a novel framework, Logic-LM, which integrates LLMs with symbolic solvers to improve logical problem-solving. Our method first utilizes LLMs to translate a natural language problem into a symbolic formulation. Afterward, a deterministic symbolic solver performs inference on the formulated problem. We also introduce a self-refinement module, which utilizes the symbolic solver's error messages to revise symbolic formalizations. We demonstrate Logic-LM's effectiveness on five logical reasoning datasets: ProofWriter, PrOntoQA, FOLIO, LogicalDeduction, and AR-LSAT. On average, Logic-LM achieves a significant performance boost of 39.2% over using LLM alone with standard prompting and 18.4% over LLM with chain-of-thought prompting. Our findings suggest that Logic-LM, by combining LLMs with symbolic logic, offers a promising avenue for faithful logical reasoning. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/teacherpeterpan/Logic-LLM.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into operational workflows (LLM-Ops), there is a pressing need for effective guardrails to ensure safe and aligned interactions, including the ability to detect potentially unsafe or inappropriate content across languages. However, existing safe-for-work classifiers are primarily focused on English text. To address this gap for the Malaysian language, we present a novel safe-for-work text classifier tailored specifically for Malaysian language content. By curating and annotating a first-of-its-kind dataset of Malaysian text spanning multiple content categories, we trained a classification model capable of identifying potentially unsafe material using state-of-the-art natural language processing techniques. This work represents an important step in enabling safer interactions and content filtering to mitigate potential risks and ensure responsible deployment of LLMs. To maximize accessibility and promote further research towards enhancing alignment in LLM-Ops for the Malaysian context, the model is publicly released at https://huggingface.co/malaysia-ai/malaysian-sfw-classifier.

With the rise of generative large language models (LLMs) like LLaMA and ChatGPT, these models have significantly transformed daily life and work by providing advanced insights. However, as jailbreak attacks continue to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms, exploiting carefully crafted scenarios or tokens, the safety risks of LLMs have come into focus. While numerous defense strategies--such as prompt detection, modification, and model fine-tuning--have been proposed to counter these attacks, a critical question arises: do these defenses compromise the utility and usability of LLMs for legitimate users? Existing research predominantly focuses on the effectiveness of defense strategies without thoroughly examining their impact on performance, leaving a gap in understanding the trade-offs between LLM safety and performance. Our research addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive study on the utility degradation, safety elevation, and exaggerated-safety escalation of LLMs with jailbreak defense strategies. We propose USEBench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate these aspects, along with USEIndex, a comprehensive metric for assessing overall model performance. Through experiments on seven state-of-the-art LLMs, we found that mainstream jailbreak defenses fail to ensure both safety and performance simultaneously. Although model-finetuning performs the best overall, their effectiveness varies across LLMs. Furthermore, vertical comparisons reveal that developers commonly prioritize performance over safety when iterating or fine-tuning their LLMs.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

We present ShieldGemma, a comprehensive suite of LLM-based safety content moderation models built upon Gemma2. These models provide robust, state-of-the-art predictions of safety risks across key harm types (sexually explicit, dangerous content, harassment, hate speech) in both user input and LLM-generated output. By evaluating on both public and internal benchmarks, we demonstrate superior performance compared to existing models, such as Llama Guard (+10.8\% AU-PRC on public benchmarks) and WildCard (+4.3\%). Additionally, we present a novel LLM-based data curation pipeline, adaptable to a variety of safety-related tasks and beyond. We have shown strong generalization performance for model trained mainly on synthetic data. By releasing ShieldGemma, we provide a valuable resource to the research community, advancing LLM safety and enabling the creation of more effective content moderation solutions for developers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) face threats from jailbreak prompts. Existing methods for detecting jailbreak prompts are primarily online moderation APIs or finetuned LLMs. These strategies, however, often require extensive and resource-intensive data collection and training processes. In this study, we propose GradSafe, which effectively detects jailbreak prompts by scrutinizing the gradients of safety-critical parameters in LLMs. Our method is grounded in a pivotal observation: the gradients of an LLM's loss for jailbreak prompts paired with compliance response exhibit similar patterns on certain safety-critical parameters. In contrast, safe prompts lead to different gradient patterns. Building on this observation, GradSafe analyzes the gradients from prompts (paired with compliance responses) to accurately detect jailbreak prompts. We show that GradSafe, applied to Llama-2 without further training, outperforms Llama Guard, despite its extensive finetuning with a large dataset, in detecting jailbreak prompts. This superior performance is consistent across both zero-shot and adaptation scenarios, as evidenced by our evaluations on ToxicChat and XSTest. The source code is available at https://github.com/xyq7/GradSafe.

Improving the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) is a crucial aspect of realizing trustworthy AI systems. Although alignment methods aim to suppress harmful content generation, LLMs are often still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that employ adversarial inputs that subvert alignment and induce harmful outputs. We propose the Randomized Embedding Smoothing and Token Aggregation (RESTA) defense, which adds random noise to the embedding vectors and performs aggregation during the generation of each output token, with the aim of better preserving semantic information. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves superior robustness versus utility tradeoffs compared to the baseline defenses.

This paper presents FoFo, a pioneering benchmark for evaluating large language models' (LLMs) ability to follow complex, domain-specific formats, a crucial yet underexamined capability for their application as AI agents. Despite LLMs' advancements, existing benchmarks fail to assess their format-following proficiency adequately. FoFo fills this gap with a diverse range of real-world formats and instructions, developed through an AI-Human collaborative method. Our evaluation across both open-source (e.g., Llama 2, WizardLM) and closed-source (e.g., GPT-4, PALM2, Gemini) LLMs highlights three key findings: open-source models significantly lag behind closed-source ones in format adherence; LLMs' format-following performance is independent of their content generation quality; and LLMs' format proficiency varies across different domains. These insights suggest the need for specialized tuning for format-following skills and highlight FoFo's role in guiding the selection of domain-specific AI agents. FoFo is released here at https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/FoFo.

The model is usually kept integral in the mainstream large language model (LLM) fine-tuning protocols. No works have questioned whether maintaining the integrity of the model is indispensable for performance. In this work, we introduce Mask Fine-Tuning (MFT), a brand-new LLM fine-tuning paradigm to show that properly breaking the integrity of the model can surprisingly lead to improved performance. Specifically, MFT learns a set of binary masks supervised by the typical LLM fine-tuning objective. Extensive experiments show that MFT gains a consistent performance boost across various domains and backbones (e.g., 1.95%/1.88% average gain in coding with LLaMA2-7B/3.1-8B). Detailed procedures are provided to study the proposed MFT from different hyperparameter perspectives for better insight. In particular, MFT naturally updates the current LLM training protocol by deploying it on a complete well-trained model. This study extends the functionality of mask learning from its conventional network pruning context for model compression to a more general scope.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents equipped with external tools have become increasingly powerful for complex tasks such as web shopping, automated email replies, and financial trading. However, these advancements amplify the risks of adversarial attacks, especially when agents can access sensitive external functionalities. Nevertheless, manipulating LLM agents into performing targeted malicious actions or invoking specific tools remains challenging, as these agents extensively reason or plan before executing final actions. In this work, we present UDora, a unified red teaming framework designed for LLM agents that dynamically hijacks the agent's reasoning processes to compel malicious behavior. Specifically, UDora first generates the model's reasoning trace for the given task, then automatically identifies optimal points within this trace to insert targeted perturbations. The resulting perturbed reasoning is then used as a surrogate response for optimization. By iteratively applying this process, the LLM agent will then be induced to undertake designated malicious actions or to invoke specific malicious tools. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to existing methods across three LLM agent datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/UDora.

Conditional graphic layout generation, which automatically maps user constraints to high-quality layouts, has attracted widespread attention today. Although recent works have achieved promising performance, the lack of versatility and data efficiency hinders their practical applications. In this work, we propose LayoutPrompter, which leverages large language models (LLMs) to address the above problems through in-context learning. LayoutPrompter is made up of three key components, namely input-output serialization, dynamic exemplar selection and layout ranking. Specifically, the input-output serialization component meticulously designs the input and output formats for each layout generation task. Dynamic exemplar selection is responsible for selecting the most helpful prompting exemplars for a given input. And a layout ranker is used to pick the highest quality layout from multiple outputs of LLMs. We conduct experiments on all existing layout generation tasks using four public datasets. Despite the simplicity of our approach, experimental results show that LayoutPrompter can compete with or even outperform state-of-the-art approaches on these tasks without any model training or fine-tuning. This demonstrates the effectiveness of this versatile and training-free approach. In addition, the ablation studies show that LayoutPrompter is significantly superior to the training-based baseline in a low-data regime, further indicating the data efficiency of LayoutPrompter. Our project is available at https://github.com/microsoft/LayoutGeneration/tree/main/LayoutPrompter.

Previous works on Large Language Models (LLMs) have mainly focused on evaluating their helpfulness or harmlessness. However, honesty, another crucial alignment criterion, has received relatively less attention. Dishonest behaviors in LLMs, such as spreading misinformation and defrauding users, eroding user trust, and causing real-world harm, present severe risks that intensify as these models approach superintelligence levels. Enhancing honesty in LLMs addresses critical deficiencies and helps uncover latent capabilities that are not readily expressed. This underscores the urgent need for reliable methods and benchmarks to effectively ensure and evaluate the honesty of LLMs. In this paper, we introduce BeHonest, a pioneering benchmark specifically designed to assess honesty in LLMs comprehensively. BeHonest evaluates three essential aspects of honesty: awareness of knowledge boundaries, avoidance of deceit, and consistency in responses. Building on this foundation, we designed 10 scenarios to evaluate and analyze 9 popular LLMs on the market, including both closed-source and open-source models from different model families with varied model sizes. Our findings indicate that there is still significant room for improvement in the honesty of LLMs. We also encourage the AI community to prioritize honesty alignment in LLMs. Our benchmark and code can be found at: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/BeHonest.

The alignment of large language models (LLMs) aims to ensure their outputs adhere to human values, ethical standards, and legal norms. Traditional alignment methods often rely on resource-intensive fine-tuning (FT), which may suffer from knowledge degradation and face challenges in scenarios where the model accessibility or computational resources are constrained. In contrast, training-free (TF) alignment techniques--leveraging in-context learning, decoding-time adjustments, and post-generation corrections--offer a promising alternative by enabling alignment without heavily retraining LLMs, making them adaptable to both open-source and closed-source environments. This paper presents the first systematic review of TF alignment methods, categorizing them by stages of pre-decoding, in-decoding, and post-decoding. For each stage, we provide a detailed examination from the viewpoint of LLMs and multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), highlighting their mechanisms and limitations. Furthermore, we identify key challenges and future directions, paving the way for more inclusive and effective TF alignment techniques. By synthesizing and organizing the rapidly growing body of research, this survey offers a guidance for practitioners and advances the development of safer and more reliable LLMs.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

In this paper, we introduce SaulLM-7B, a large language model (LLM) tailored for the legal domain. With 7 billion parameters, SaulLM-7B is the first LLM designed explicitly for legal text comprehension and generation. Leveraging the Mistral 7B architecture as its foundation, SaulLM-7B is trained on an English legal corpus of over 30 billion tokens. SaulLM-7B exhibits state-of-the-art proficiency in understanding and processing legal documents. Additionally, we present a novel instructional fine-tuning method that leverages legal datasets to further enhance SaulLM-7B's performance in legal tasks. SaulLM-7B is released under the CC-BY-SA-4.0 License.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Pretrained large language models (LLMs) are currently state-of-the-art for solving the vast majority of natural language processing tasks. While many real-world applications still require fine-tuning to reach satisfactory levels of performance, many of them are in the low-data regime, making fine-tuning challenging. To address this, we propose LLM2LLM, a targeted and iterative data augmentation strategy that uses a teacher LLM to enhance a small seed dataset by augmenting additional data that can be used for fine-tuning on a specific task. LLM2LLM (1) fine-tunes a baseline student LLM on the initial seed data, (2) evaluates and extracts data points that the model gets wrong, and (3) uses a teacher LLM to generate synthetic data based on these incorrect data points, which are then added back into the training data. This approach amplifies the signal from incorrectly predicted data points by the LLM during training and reintegrates them into the dataset to focus on more challenging examples for the LLM. Our results show that LLM2LLM significantly enhances the performance of LLMs in the low-data regime, outperforming both traditional fine-tuning and other data augmentation baselines. LLM2LLM reduces the dependence on labor-intensive data curation and paves the way for more scalable and performant LLM solutions, allowing us to tackle data-constrained domains and tasks. We achieve improvements up to 24.2% on the GSM8K dataset, 32.6% on CaseHOLD, 32.0% on SNIPS, 52.6% on TREC and 39.8% on SST-2 over regular fine-tuning in the low-data regime using a LLaMA2-7B student model.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in handling multilingual machine translation (MMT). In this paper, we systematically investigate the advantages and challenges of LLMs for MMT by answering two questions: 1) How well do LLMs perform in translating a massive number of languages? 2) Which factors affect LLMs' performance in translation? We evaluate popular LLMs, including XGLM, OPT, BLOOMZ, and ChatGPT, on 102 languages. Our empirical results show that even the best model ChatGPT still lags behind the supervised baseline NLLB in 83.33% of translation directions. Through further analysis, we discover that LLMs exhibit new working patterns when used for MMT. First, prompt semantics can surprisingly be ignored when given in-context exemplars, where LLMs still show strong performance even with unreasonable prompts. Second, cross-lingual exemplars can provide better task instruction for low-resource translation than exemplars in the same language pairs. Third, we observe the overestimated performance of BLOOMZ on dataset Flores-101, indicating the potential risk when using public datasets for evaluation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning for complex tasks inherently involves a trade-off between solution accuracy and computational efficiency. The subsequent step of verification, while intended to improve performance, further complicates this landscape by introducing its own challenging trade-off: sophisticated Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) can be computationally prohibitive if naively integrated with LLMs at test-time, while simpler, faster methods may lack reliability. To overcome these challenges, we introduce FlexiVe, a novel generative verifier that flexibly balances computational resources between rapid, reliable fast thinking and meticulous slow thinking using a Flexible Allocation of Verification Budget strategy. We further propose the Solve-Detect-Verify pipeline, an efficient inference-time scaling framework that intelligently integrates FlexiVe, proactively identifying solution completion points to trigger targeted verification and provide focused solver feedback. Experiments show FlexiVe achieves superior accuracy in pinpointing errors within reasoning traces on ProcessBench. Furthermore, on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks (AIME 2024, AIME 2025, and CNMO), our full approach outperforms baselines like self-consistency in reasoning accuracy and inference efficiency. Our system offers a scalable and effective solution to enhance LLM reasoning at test time.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has resulted in the production of LLM-generated texts that is highly sophisticated and almost indistinguishable from texts written by humans. However, this has also sparked concerns about the potential misuse of such texts, such as spreading misinformation and causing disruptions in the education system. Although many detection approaches have been proposed, a comprehensive understanding of the achievements and challenges is still lacking. This survey aims to provide an overview of existing LLM-generated text detection techniques and enhance the control and regulation of language generation models. Furthermore, we emphasize crucial considerations for future research, including the development of comprehensive evaluation metrics and the threat posed by open-source LLMs, to drive progress in the area of LLM-generated text detection.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled powerful autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and multi-modal tool use. Despite their growing capabilities, today's agent frameworks remain fragile, lacking principled mechanisms for secure information flow, reliability, and multi-agent coordination. In this work, we introduce SAFEFLOW, a new protocol-level framework for building trustworthy LLM/VLM-based agents. SAFEFLOW enforces fine-grained information flow control (IFC), precisely tracking provenance, integrity, and confidentiality of all the data exchanged between agents, tools, users, and environments. By constraining LLM reasoning to respect these security labels, SAFEFLOW prevents untrusted or adversarial inputs from contaminating high-integrity decisions. To ensure robustness in concurrent multi-agent settings, SAFEFLOW introduces transactional execution, conflict resolution, and secure scheduling over shared state, preserving global consistency across agents. We further introduce mechanisms, including write-ahead logging, rollback, and secure caches, that further enhance resilience against runtime errors and policy violations. To validate the performances, we built SAFEFLOWBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate agent reliability under adversarial, noisy, and concurrent operational conditions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that agents built with SAFEFLOW maintain impressive task performance and security guarantees even in hostile environments, substantially outperforming state-of-the-art. Together, SAFEFLOW and SAFEFLOWBENCH lay the groundwork for principled, robust, and secure agent ecosystems, advancing the frontier of reliable autonomy.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Guardrails have emerged as an alternative to safety alignment for content moderation of large language models (LLMs). Existing model-based guardrails have not been designed for resource-constrained computational portable devices, such as mobile phones, more and more of which are running LLM-based applications locally. We introduce LoRA-Guard, a parameter-efficient guardrail adaptation method that relies on knowledge sharing between LLMs and guardrail models. LoRA-Guard extracts language features from the LLMs and adapts them for the content moderation task using low-rank adapters, while a dual-path design prevents any performance degradation on the generative task. We show that LoRA-Guard outperforms existing approaches with 100-1000x lower parameter overhead while maintaining accuracy, enabling on-device content moderation.

The instruction-following ability of large language models enables humans to interact with AI agents in a natural way. However, when required to generate responses of a specific length, large language models often struggle to meet users' needs due to their inherent difficulty in accurately perceiving numerical constraints. To explore the ability of large language models to control the length of generated responses, we propose the Target Length Generation Task (TLG) and design two metrics, Precise Match (PM) and Flexible Match (FM) to evaluate the model's performance in adhering to specified response lengths. Furthermore, we introduce a novel, model-agnostic approach called Ruler, which employs Meta Length Tokens (MLTs) to enhance the instruction-following ability of large language models under length-constrained instructions. Specifically, Ruler equips LLMs with the ability to generate responses of a specified length based on length constraints within the instructions. Moreover, Ruler can automatically generate appropriate MLT when length constraints are not explicitly provided, demonstrating excellent versatility and generalization. Comprehensive experiments show the effectiveness of Ruler across different LLMs on Target Length Generation Task, e.g., at All Level 27.97 average gain on PM, 29.57 average gain on FM. In addition, we conduct extensive ablation experiments to further substantiate the efficacy and generalization of Ruler. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/Geaming2002/Ruler.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated effectiveness in solving a wide range of tasks by integrating LLMs with key modules such as planning, memory, and tool usage. Increasingly, customers are adopting LLM agents across a variety of commercial applications critical to reliability, including support for mental well-being, chemical synthesis, and software development. Nevertheless, our observations and daily use of LLM agents indicate that they are prone to making erroneous plans, especially when the tasks are complex and require long-term planning. In this paper, we propose PDoctor, a novel and automated approach to testing LLM agents and understanding their erroneous planning. As the first work in this direction, we formulate the detection of erroneous planning as a constraint satisfiability problem: an LLM agent's plan is considered erroneous if its execution violates the constraints derived from the user inputs. To this end, PDoctor first defines a domain-specific language (DSL) for user queries and synthesizes varying inputs with the assistance of the Z3 constraint solver. These synthesized inputs are natural language paragraphs that specify the requirements for completing a series of tasks. Then, PDoctor derives constraints from these requirements to form a testing oracle. We evaluate PDoctor with three mainstream agent frameworks and two powerful LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4). The results show that PDoctor can effectively detect diverse errors in agent planning and provide insights and error characteristics that are valuable to both agent developers and users. We conclude by discussing potential alternative designs and directions to extend PDoctor.

The training paradigm for machine translation has gradually shifted, from learning neural machine translation (NMT) models with extensive parallel corpora to instruction finetuning on pretrained multilingual large language models (LLMs) with high-quality translation pairs. In this paper, we focus on boosting the many-to-many multilingual translation performance of LLMs with an emphasis on zero-shot translation directions. We demonstrate that prompt strategies adopted during instruction finetuning are crucial to zero-shot translation performance and introduce a cross-lingual consistency regularization, XConST, to bridge the representation gap among different languages and improve zero-shot translation performance. XConST is not a new method, but a version of CrossConST (Gao et al., 2023a) adapted for multilingual finetuning on LLMs with translation instructions. Experimental results on ALMA (Xu et al., 2023) and LLaMA-2 (Touvron et al., 2023) show that our approach consistently improves translation performance. Our implementations are available at https://github.com/gpengzhi/CrossConST-LLM.

The rise of LLMs (Large Language Models) has contributed to the improved performance and development of cutting-edge NLP applications. However, these can also pose risks when used maliciously, such as spreading fake news, harmful content, impersonating individuals, or facilitating school plagiarism, among others. This is because LLMs can generate high-quality texts, which are challenging to differentiate from those written by humans. GLTR, which stands for Giant Language Model Test Room and was developed jointly by the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab and HarvardNLP, is a visual tool designed to help detect machine-generated texts based on GPT-2, that highlights the words in text depending on the probability that they were machine-generated. One limitation of GLTR is that the results it returns can sometimes be ambiguous and lead to confusion. This study aims to explore various ways to improve GLTR's effectiveness for detecting AI-generated texts within the context of the IberLef-AuTexTification 2023 shared task, in both English and Spanish languages. Experiment results show that our GLTR-based GPT-2 model overcomes the state-of-the-art models on the English dataset with a macro F1-score of 80.19%, except for the first ranking model (80.91%). However, for the Spanish dataset, we obtained a macro F1-score of 66.20%, which differs by 4.57% compared to the top-performing model.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Autoformalization is the process of automatically translating from natural language mathematics to formal specifications and proofs. A successful autoformalization system could advance the fields of formal verification, program synthesis, and artificial intelligence. While the long-term goal of autoformalization seemed elusive for a long time, we show large language models provide new prospects towards this goal. We make the surprising observation that LLMs can correctly translate a significant portion (25.3%) of mathematical competition problems perfectly to formal specifications in Isabelle/HOL. We demonstrate the usefulness of this process by improving a previously introduced neural theorem prover via training on these autoformalized theorems. Our methodology results in a new state-of-the-art result on the MiniF2F theorem proving benchmark, improving the proof rate from 29.6% to 35.2%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to produce safe, helpful, and honest content during interaction with human users, but they frequently fail to align with such values when given flawed instructions, e.g., missing context, ambiguous directives, or inappropriate tone, leaving substantial room for improvement along multiple dimensions. A cost-effective yet high-impact way is to pre-align instructions before the model begins decoding. Existing approaches either rely on prohibitive test-time search costs or end-to-end model rewrite, which is powered by a customized training corpus with unclear objectives. In this work, we demonstrate that the goal of efficient and effective preference alignment can be achieved by P-Aligner, a lightweight module generating instructions that preserve the original intents while being expressed in a more human-preferred form. P-Aligner is trained on UltraPrompt, a new dataset synthesized via a proposed principle-guided pipeline using Monte-Carlo Tree Search, which systematically explores the space of candidate instructions that are closely tied to human preference. Experiments across different methods show that P-Aligner generally outperforms strong baselines across various models and benchmarks, including average win-rate gains of 28.35% and 8.69% on GPT-4-turbo and Gemma-2-SimPO, respectively. Further analyses validate its effectiveness and efficiency through multiple perspectives, including data quality, search strategies, iterative deployment, and time overhead.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way we access information. These models are often tuned to refuse to comply with requests that are considered harmful and to produce responses that better align with the preferences of those who control the models. To understand how this "censorship" works. We use representation engineering techniques to study open-weights safety-tuned models. We present a method for finding a refusal--compliance vector that detects and controls the level of censorship in model outputs. We also analyze recent reasoning LLMs, distilled from DeepSeek-R1, and uncover an additional dimension of censorship through "thought suppression". We show a similar approach can be used to find a vector that suppresses the model's reasoning process, allowing us to remove censorship by applying the negative multiples of this vector

Although the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) ideally scale up with increasing data and compute, they are inevitably constrained by limited resources in reality. Suppose we have a moderately trained LLM (e.g., trained to align with human preference) in hand, can we further exploit its potential and cheaply acquire a stronger model? In this paper, we propose a simple method called ExPO to boost LLMs' alignment with human preference. ExPO assumes that a medium-aligned model can be interpolated between a less-aligned (weaker) model, e.g., the initial SFT model, and a better-aligned (stronger) one, thereby directly obtaining this stronger model by extrapolating from the weights of the former two relatively weaker models. On the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark, we show that ExPO pushes models trained with less preference data (e.g., 10% or 20%) to reach and even surpass the fully-trained one, without any additional training. Furthermore, ExPO also significantly improves off-the-shelf DPO/RLHF models and exhibits decent scalability across model sizes from 7B to 70B. Our work demonstrates the efficacy of model extrapolation in exploiting LLMs' capabilities, suggesting a promising direction that deserves future exploration.

Recent large language model (LLM) defenses have greatly improved models' ability to refuse harmful queries, even when adversarially attacked. However, LLM defenses are primarily evaluated against automated adversarial attacks in a single turn of conversation, an insufficient threat model for real-world malicious use. We demonstrate that multi-turn human jailbreaks uncover significant vulnerabilities, exceeding 70% attack success rate (ASR) on HarmBench against defenses that report single-digit ASRs with automated single-turn attacks. Human jailbreaks also reveal vulnerabilities in machine unlearning defenses, successfully recovering dual-use biosecurity knowledge from unlearned models. We compile these results into Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks (MHJ), a dataset of 2,912 prompts across 537 multi-turn jailbreaks. We publicly release MHJ alongside a compendium of jailbreak tactics developed across dozens of commercial red teaming engagements, supporting research towards stronger LLM defenses.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential as generalist assistants, showcasing powerful task understanding and problem-solving capabilities. To deploy LLMs as AI assistants, it is crucial that these models exhibit desirable behavioral traits, such as non-toxicity and resilience against jailbreak attempts. Current methods for detoxification or preventing jailbreaking usually involve Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which requires finetuning billions of parameters through gradient descent with substantial computation cost. Furthermore, models modified through SFT and RLHF may deviate from the pretrained models, potentially leading to a degradation in foundational LLM capabilities. In this paper, we observe that surprisingly, directly editing a small subset of parameters can effectively modulate specific behaviors of LLMs, such as detoxification and resistance to jailbreaking. Specifically, for a behavior that we aim to avoid, we employ a linear classifier, which we term the behavior probe, to classify binary behavior labels within the hidden state space of the LLM. Using this probe, we introduce an algorithm to identify a critical subset of LLM parameters that significantly influence this targeted behavior. Then we directly edit these selected parameters by shifting them towards the behavior probe. Such a direct parameter editing method necessitates only inference-level computational resources. Experiments demonstrate that in the representative detoxification task, our approach achieves reductions of up to 90.0\% in toxicity on the RealToxicityPrompts dataset and 49.2\% on ToxiGen, while maintaining the LLM's general capabilities in areas such as common sense, question answering, and mathematics. Our code is available at https://github.com/lucywang720/model-surgery.

Scientific figure captioning is a complex task that requires generating contextually appropriate descriptions of visual content. However, existing methods often fall short by utilizing incomplete information, treating the task solely as either an image-to-text or text summarization problem. This limitation hinders the generation of high-quality captions that fully capture the necessary details. Moreover, existing data sourced from arXiv papers contain low-quality captions, posing significant challenges for training large language models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce a framework called Multi-LLM Collaborative Figure Caption Generation (MLBCAP) to address these challenges by leveraging specialized LLMs for distinct sub-tasks. Our approach unfolds in three key modules: (Quality Assessment) We utilize multimodal LLMs to assess the quality of training data, enabling the filtration of low-quality captions. (Diverse Caption Generation) We then employ a strategy of fine-tuning/prompting multiple LLMs on the captioning task to generate candidate captions. (Judgment) Lastly, we prompt a prominent LLM to select the highest quality caption from the candidates, followed by refining any remaining inaccuracies. Human evaluations demonstrate that informative captions produced by our approach rank better than human-written captions, highlighting its effectiveness. Our code is available at https://github.com/teamreboott/MLBCAP

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred transformative applications in various domains, ranging from open-source to proprietary LLMs. However, jailbreak attacks, which aim to break safety alignment and user compliance by tricking the target LLMs into answering harmful and risky responses, are becoming an urgent concern. The practice of red-teaming for LLMs is to proactively explore potential risks and error-prone instances before the release of frontier AI technology. This paper proposes an agentic workflow to automate and scale the red-teaming process of LLMs through the Composition-of-Principles (CoP) framework, where human users provide a set of red-teaming principles as instructions to an AI agent to automatically orchestrate effective red-teaming strategies and generate jailbreak prompts. Distinct from existing red-teaming methods, our CoP framework provides a unified and extensible framework to encompass and orchestrate human-provided red-teaming principles to enable the automated discovery of new red-teaming strategies. When tested against leading LLMs, CoP reveals unprecedented safety risks by finding novel jailbreak prompts and improving the best-known single-turn attack success rate by up to 19.0 times.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

Enterprise customers are increasingly adopting Large Language Models (LLMs) for critical communication tasks, such as drafting emails, crafting sales pitches, and composing casual messages. Deploying such models across different regions requires them to understand diverse cultural and linguistic contexts and generate safe and respectful responses. For enterprise applications, it is crucial to mitigate reputational risks, maintain trust, and ensure compliance by effectively identifying and handling unsafe or offensive language. To address this, we introduce SweEval, a benchmark simulating real-world scenarios with variations in tone (positive or negative) and context (formal or informal). The prompts explicitly instruct the model to include specific swear words while completing the task. This benchmark evaluates whether LLMs comply with or resist such inappropriate instructions and assesses their alignment with ethical frameworks, cultural nuances, and language comprehension capabilities. In order to advance research in building ethically aligned AI systems for enterprise use and beyond, we release the dataset and code: https://github.com/amitbcp/multilingual_profanity.

Enabling Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate citations in Question-Answering (QA) tasks is an emerging paradigm aimed at enhancing the verifiability of their responses when LLMs are utilizing external references to generate an answer. However, there is currently no unified framework to standardize and fairly compare different citation generation methods, leading to difficulties in reproducing different methods and a comprehensive assessment. To cope with the problems above, we introduce \name, an open-source and modular toolkit designed to facilitate the implementation and evaluation of existing citation generation methods, while also fostering the development of new approaches to improve citation quality in LLM outputs. This tool is highly extensible, allowing users to utilize 4 main modules and 14 components to construct a pipeline, evaluating an existing method or innovative designs. Our experiments with two state-of-the-art LLMs and 11 citation generation baselines demonstrate varying strengths of different modules in answer accuracy and citation quality improvement, as well as the challenge of enhancing granularity. Based on our analysis of the effectiveness of components, we propose a new method, self-RAG \snippet, obtaining a balanced answer accuracy and citation quality. Citekit is released at https://github.com/SjJ1017/Citekit.

In recent years, there have been remarkable advancements in the performance of Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) across various domains. As these LLMs are deployed for increasingly complex tasks, they often face the needs to conduct longer reasoning processes or understanding larger contexts. In these situations, the length generalization failure of LLMs on long sequences become more prominent. Most pre-training schemes truncate training sequences to a fixed length (such as 2048 for LLaMa). LLMs often struggle to generate fluent texts, let alone carry out downstream tasks, after longer contexts, even with relative positional encoding which is designed to cope with this problem. Common solutions such as finetuning on longer corpora often involves daunting hardware and time costs and requires careful training process design. To more efficiently leverage the generation capacity of existing LLMs, we theoretically and empirically investigate the main out-of-distribution (OOD) factors contributing to this problem. Inspired by this diagnosis, we propose a simple yet effective solution for on-the-fly length generalization, LM-Infinite, which involves only a Lambda-shaped attention mask and a distance limit while requiring no parameter updates or learning. We find it applicable to a variety of LLMs using relative-position encoding methods. LM-Infinite is computational efficient with O(n) time and space, and demonstrates consistent fluency and generation quality to as long as 32k tokens on ArXiv and OpenWebText2 datasets, with 2.72x decoding speedup. On downstream task such as passkey retrieval, it continues to work on inputs much longer than training lengths where vanilla models fail immediately.

The aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful language understanding and decision-making tools that are created through extensive alignment with human feedback. However, these large models remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks, where adversaries manipulate prompts to elicit malicious outputs that should not be given by aligned LLMs. Investigating jailbreak prompts can lead us to delve into the limitations of LLMs and further guide us to secure them. Unfortunately, existing jailbreak techniques suffer from either (1) scalability issues, where attacks heavily rely on manual crafting of prompts, or (2) stealthiness problems, as attacks depend on token-based algorithms to generate prompts that are often semantically meaningless, making them susceptible to detection through basic perplexity testing. In light of these challenges, we intend to answer this question: Can we develop an approach that can automatically generate stealthy jailbreak prompts? In this paper, we introduce AutoDAN, a novel jailbreak attack against aligned LLMs. AutoDAN can automatically generate stealthy jailbreak prompts by the carefully designed hierarchical genetic algorithm. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that AutoDAN not only automates the process while preserving semantic meaningfulness, but also demonstrates superior attack strength in cross-model transferability, and cross-sample universality compared with the baseline. Moreover, we also compare AutoDAN with perplexity-based defense methods and show that AutoDAN can bypass them effectively.

Large language models (LLMs) often demonstrate inconsistencies with human preferences. Previous research gathered human preference data and then aligned the pre-trained models using reinforcement learning or instruction tuning, the so-called finetuning step. In contrast, aligning frozen LLMs without any extra data is more appealing. This work explores the potential of the latter setting. We discover that by integrating self-evaluation and rewind mechanisms, unaligned LLMs can directly produce responses consistent with human preferences via self-boosting. We introduce a novel inference method, Rewindable Auto-regressive INference (RAIN), that allows pre-trained LLMs to evaluate their own generation and use the evaluation results to guide backward rewind and forward generation for AI safety. Notably, RAIN operates without the need of extra data for model alignment and abstains from any training, gradient computation, or parameter updates; during the self-evaluation phase, the model receives guidance on which human preference to align with through a fixed-template prompt, eliminating the need to modify the initial prompt. Experimental results evaluated by GPT-4 and humans demonstrate the effectiveness of RAIN: on the HH dataset, RAIN improves the harmlessness rate of LLaMA 30B over vanilla inference from 82% to 97%, while maintaining the helpfulness rate. Under the leading adversarial attack llm-attacks on Vicuna 33B, RAIN establishes a new defense baseline by reducing the attack success rate from 94% to 19%.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Recent work in interpretability shows that large language models (LLMs) can be adapted for new tasks in a learning-free way: it is possible to intervene on LLM representations to elicit desired behaviors for alignment. For instance, adding certain bias vectors to the outputs of certain attention heads is reported to boost the truthfulness of models. In this work, we show that localized fine-tuning serves as an effective alternative to such representation intervention methods. We introduce a framework called Localized Fine-Tuning on LLM Representations (LoFiT), which identifies a subset of attention heads that are most important for learning a specific task, then trains offset vectors to add to the model's hidden representations at those selected heads. LoFiT localizes to a sparse set of heads (3%) and learns the offset vectors from limited training data, comparable to the settings used for representation intervention. For truthfulness and reasoning tasks, we find that LoFiT's intervention vectors are more effective for LLM adaptation than vectors from representation intervention methods such as Inference-time Intervention. We also find that the localization step is important: selecting a task-specific set of attention heads can lead to higher performance than intervening on heads selected for a different task. Finally, for the tasks we study, LoFiT achieves comparable performance to other parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods such as LoRA, despite modifying 20x-200x fewer parameters than these methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) involves analyzing digital evidence to support legal investigations. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer new opportunities in DFIR tasks such as log analysis and memory forensics, but their susceptibility to errors and hallucinations raises concerns in high-stakes contexts. Despite growing interest, there is no comprehensive benchmark to evaluate LLMs across both theoretical and practical DFIR domains. To address this gap, we present DFIR-Metric, a benchmark with three components: (1) Knowledge Assessment: a set of 700 expert-reviewed multiple-choice questions sourced from industry-standard certifications and official documentation; (2) Realistic Forensic Challenges: 150 CTF-style tasks testing multi-step reasoning and evidence correlation; and (3) Practical Analysis: 500 disk and memory forensics cases from the NIST Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program (CFTT). We evaluated 14 LLMs using DFIR-Metric, analyzing both their accuracy and consistency across trials. We also introduce a new metric, the Task Understanding Score (TUS), designed to more effectively evaluate models in scenarios where they achieve near-zero accuracy. This benchmark offers a rigorous, reproducible foundation for advancing AI in digital forensics. All scripts, artifacts, and results are available on the project website at https://github.com/DFIR-Metric.

Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs) can significantly impact output quality, yet their effects on truthfulness, safety, and helpfulness remain critically underexamined. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how two popular watermarking approaches-Gumbel and KGW-affect these core alignment properties across four aligned LLMs. Our experiments reveal two distinct degradation patterns: guard attenuation, where enhanced helpfulness undermines model safety, and guard amplification, where excessive caution reduces model helpfulness. These patterns emerge from watermark-induced shifts in token distribution, surfacing the fundamental tension that exists between alignment objectives. To mitigate these degradations, we propose Alignment Resampling (AR), an inference-time sampling method that uses an external reward model to restore alignment. We establish a theoretical lower bound on the improvement in expected reward score as the sample size is increased and empirically demonstrate that sampling just 2-4 watermarked generations effectively recovers or surpasses baseline (unwatermarked) alignment scores. To overcome the limited response diversity of standard Gumbel watermarking, our modified implementation sacrifices strict distortion-freeness while maintaining robust detectability, ensuring compatibility with AR. Experimental results confirm that AR successfully recovers baseline alignment in both watermarking approaches, while maintaining strong watermark detectability. This work reveals the critical balance between watermark strength and model alignment, providing a simple inference-time solution to responsibly deploy watermarked LLMs in practice.

LLMs are not generally able to adjust the length of their outputs based on strict length requirements, a capability that would improve their usefulness in applications that require adherence to diverse user and system requirements. We present an approach to train LLMs to acquire this capability by augmenting existing data and applying existing fine-tuning techniques, which we compare based on the trained models' adherence to the length requirement and overall response quality relative to the baseline model. Our results demonstrate that these techniques can be successfully applied to train LLMs to adhere to length requirements, with the trained models generating texts which better align to the length requirements. Our results indicate that our method may change the response quality when using training data that was not generated by the baseline model. This allows simultaneous alignment to another training objective in certain scenarios, but is undesirable otherwise. Training on a dataset containing the model's own responses eliminates this issue.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming a prominent generative AI tool, where the user enters a query and the LLM generates an answer. To reduce harm and misuse, efforts have been made to align these LLMs to human values using advanced training techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of LLMs to adversarial jailbreak attempts aiming at subverting the embedded safety guardrails. To address this challenge, this paper defines and investigates the Refusal Loss of LLMs and then proposes a method called Gradient Cuff to detect jailbreak attempts. Gradient Cuff exploits the unique properties observed in the refusal loss landscape, including functional values and its smoothness, to design an effective two-step detection strategy. Experimental results on two aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) and six types of jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) show that Gradient Cuff can significantly improve the LLM's rejection capability for malicious jailbreak queries, while maintaining the model's performance for benign user queries by adjusting the detection threshold.

The robustness of LLMs to jailbreak attacks, where users design prompts to circumvent safety measures and misuse model capabilities, has been studied primarily for LLMs acting as simple chatbots. Meanwhile, LLM agents -- which use external tools and can execute multi-stage tasks -- may pose a greater risk if misused, but their robustness remains underexplored. To facilitate research on LLM agent misuse, we propose a new benchmark called AgentHarm. The benchmark includes a diverse set of 110 explicitly malicious agent tasks (440 with augmentations), covering 11 harm categories including fraud, cybercrime, and harassment. In addition to measuring whether models refuse harmful agentic requests, scoring well on AgentHarm requires jailbroken agents to maintain their capabilities following an attack to complete a multi-step task. We evaluate a range of leading LLMs, and find (1) leading LLMs are surprisingly compliant with malicious agent requests without jailbreaking, (2) simple universal jailbreak templates can be adapted to effectively jailbreak agents, and (3) these jailbreaks enable coherent and malicious multi-step agent behavior and retain model capabilities. We publicly release AgentHarm to enable simple and reliable evaluation of attacks and defenses for LLM-based agents. We publicly release the benchmark at https://huggingface.co/ai-safety-institute/AgentHarm.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have shown great potential for solving real-world problems and promise to be a solution for tasks automation in industry. However, more benchmarks are needed to systematically evaluate automation agents from an industrial perspective, for example, in Civil Engineering. Therefore, we propose DrafterBench for the comprehensive evaluation of LLM agents in the context of technical drawing revision, a representation task in civil engineering. DrafterBench contains twelve types of tasks summarized from real-world drawing files, with 46 customized functions/tools and 1920 tasks in total. DrafterBench is an open-source benchmark to rigorously test AI agents' proficiency in interpreting intricate and long-context instructions, leveraging prior knowledge, and adapting to dynamic instruction quality via implicit policy awareness. The toolkit comprehensively assesses distinct capabilities in structured data comprehension, function execution, instruction following, and critical reasoning. DrafterBench offers detailed analysis of task accuracy and error statistics, aiming to provide deeper insight into agent capabilities and identify improvement targets for integrating LLMs in engineering applications. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/Eason-Li-AIS/DrafterBench, with the test set hosted at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Eason666/DrafterBench.

Hate speech is a harmful form of online expression, often manifesting as derogatory posts. It is a significant risk in digital environments. With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is concern about their potential to replicate hate speech patterns, given their training on vast amounts of unmoderated internet data. Understanding how LLMs respond to hate speech is crucial for their responsible deployment. However, the behaviour of LLMs towards hate speech has been limited compared. This paper investigates the reactions of seven state-of-the-art LLMs (LLaMA 2, Vicuna, LLaMA 3, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) to hate speech. Through qualitative analysis, we aim to reveal the spectrum of responses these models produce, highlighting their capacity to handle hate speech inputs. We also discuss strategies to mitigate hate speech generation by LLMs, particularly through fine-tuning and guideline guardrailing. Finally, we explore the models' responses to hate speech framed in politically correct language.

Authorship obfuscation, rewriting a text to intentionally obscure the identity of the author, is an important but challenging task. Current methods using large language models (LLMs) lack interpretability and controllability, often ignoring author-specific stylistic features, resulting in less robust performance overall. To address this, we develop StyleRemix, an adaptive and interpretable obfuscation method that perturbs specific, fine-grained style elements of the original input text. StyleRemix uses pre-trained Low Rank Adaptation (LoRA) modules to rewrite an input specifically along various stylistic axes (e.g., formality and length) while maintaining low computational cost. StyleRemix outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and much larger LLMs in a variety of domains as assessed by both automatic and human evaluation. Additionally, we release AuthorMix, a large set of 30K high-quality, long-form texts from a diverse set of 14 authors and 4 domains, and DiSC, a parallel corpus of 1,500 texts spanning seven style axes in 16 unique directions

A standard way to evaluate the abilities of LLM involves presenting a multiple-choice question and selecting the option with the highest logit as the model's predicted answer. However, such a format for evaluating LLMs has limitations, since even if the model knows the correct answer, it may struggle to select the corresponding letter simply due to difficulties in following this rigid format. To address this, we introduce new scores that better capture and reveal model's underlying knowledge: the Query-Key Score (QK-score), derived from the interaction between query and key representations in attention heads, and the Attention Score, based on attention weights. These scores are extracted from specific select-and-copy heads, which show consistent performance across popular Multi-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) datasets. Based on these scores, our method improves knowledge extraction, yielding up to 16\% gain for LLaMA2-7B and up to 10\% for larger models on popular MCQA benchmarks. At the same time, the accuracy on a simple synthetic dataset, where the model explicitly knows the right answer, increases by almost 60\%, achieving nearly perfect accuracy, therefore demonstrating the method's efficiency in mitigating MCQA format limitations. To support our claims, we conduct experiments on models ranging from 7 billion to 70 billion parameters in both zero- and few-shot setups.

As research in large language models (LLMs) continues to accelerate, LLM-based evaluation has emerged as a scalable and cost-effective alternative to human evaluations for comparing the ever increasing list of models. This paper investigates the efficacy of these "LLM evaluators", particularly in using them to assess instruction following, a metric that gauges how closely generated text adheres to the given instruction. We introduce a challenging meta-evaluation benchmark, LLMBar, designed to test the ability of an LLM evaluator in discerning instruction-following outputs. The authors manually curated 419 pairs of outputs, one adhering to instructions while the other diverging, yet may possess deceptive qualities that mislead an LLM evaluator, e.g., a more engaging tone. Contrary to existing meta-evaluation, we discover that different evaluators (i.e., combinations of LLMs and prompts) exhibit distinct performance on LLMBar and even the highest-scoring ones have substantial room for improvement. We also present a novel suite of prompting strategies that further close the gap between LLM and human evaluators. With LLMBar, we hope to offer more insight into LLM evaluators and foster future research in developing better instruction-following models.

Large language model (LLM) prompting is a promising new approach for users to create and customize their own chatbots. However, current methods for steering a chatbot's outputs, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, do not support users in converting their natural feedback on the model's outputs to changes in the prompt or model. In this work, we explore how to enable users to interactively refine model outputs through their feedback, by helping them convert their feedback into a set of principles (i.e. a constitution) that dictate the model's behavior. From a formative study, we (1) found that users needed support converting their feedback into principles for the chatbot and (2) classified the different principle types desired by users. Inspired by these findings, we developed ConstitutionMaker, an interactive tool for converting user feedback into principles, to steer LLM-based chatbots. With ConstitutionMaker, users can provide either positive or negative feedback in natural language, select auto-generated feedback, or rewrite the chatbot's response; each mode of feedback automatically generates a principle that is inserted into the chatbot's prompt. In a user study with 14 participants, we compare ConstitutionMaker to an ablated version, where users write their own principles. With ConstitutionMaker, participants felt that their principles could better guide the chatbot, that they could more easily convert their feedback into principles, and that they could write principles more efficiently, with less mental demand. ConstitutionMaker helped users identify ways to improve the chatbot, formulate their intuitive responses to the model into feedback, and convert this feedback into specific and clear principles. Together, these findings inform future tools that support the interactive critiquing of LLM outputs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable progress in reasoning, often through supervised fine-tuning (SFT). However, SFT is resource-intensive, relying on large curated datasets, rejection-sampled demonstrations, and uniform optimization across all tokens, even though only a fraction carry meaningful learning value. In this work, we explore a counterintuitive idea: can smaller language models (SLMs) teach larger language models (LLMs) by revealing high-value reasoning moments that reflect the latter's unique strength? We propose LightReasoner, a novel framework that leverages the behavioral divergence between a stronger expert model (LLM) and a weaker amateur model (SLM). LightReasoner operates in two stages: (1) a sampling stage that pinpoints critical reasoning moments and constructs supervision examples capturing the expert's advantage through expert-amateur contrast, and (2) a fine-tuning stage that aligns the expert model with these distilled examples, amplifying its reasoning strengths. Across seven mathematical benchmarks, LightReasoner improves accuracy by up to 28.1%, while reducing time consumption by 90%, sampled problems by 80%, and tuned token usage by 99%, all without relying on ground-truth labels. By turning weaker SLMs into effective teaching signals, LightReasoner offers a scalable and resource-efficient approach for advancing LLM reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/HKUDS/LightReasoner

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Given the impressive capabilities of recent Large Language Models (LLMs), we investigate and benchmark the most popular proprietary and different sized open source models on the task of explicit instruction following in conflicting situations, e.g. overrides. These include the ability of the model to override the knowledge within the weights of the model, the ability to override (or moderate) extracted knowledge in the prompt, and lastly the ability to perform a full jailbreak. Experimentation performed suggest several key findings to improve instruction following - larger models perform the best in following instructions that override internal and contextual instructions, and are obedient, even to a fault. When scaling to longer contexts via rope scaling, a significant buffer needs to be maintained from the edge of the perplexity cliff in order to maintain instruction following capabilities. Finally, we observe improving instruction following, and subsequently instruction overrides/jailbreaks, is fundamentally at odds with the ability of a language model to follow given safety filters or guidelines. Thus, we postulate the most effective approach for safe, trustworthy AI should be dealt external to the LLM itself.