Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

Critique ability, a meta-cognitive capability of humans, presents significant challenges for LLMs to improve. Recent works primarily rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using critiques generated by a single LLM like GPT-4. However, these model-generated critiques often exhibit flaws due to the inherent complexity of the critique. Consequently, fine-tuning LLMs on such flawed critiques typically limits the model's performance and propagates these flaws into the learned model. To overcome these challenges, this paper proposes a novel data generation pipeline, named MultiCritique, that improves the critique ability of LLMs by utilizing multi-agent feedback in both the SFT and reinforcement learning (RL) stages. First, our data generation pipeline aggregates high-quality critiques from multiple agents instead of a single model, with crucial information as input for simplifying the critique. Furthermore, our pipeline improves the preference accuracy of critique quality through multi-agent feedback, facilitating the effectiveness of RL in improving the critique ability of LLMs. Based on our proposed MultiCritique data generation pipeline, we construct the MultiCritiqueDataset for the SFT and RL fine-tuning stages. Extensive experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate: 1) the superior quality of our constructed SFT dataset compared to existing critique datasets; 2) additional improvements to the critique ability of LLMs brought by the RL stage. Notably, our fine-tuned 7B model significantly surpasses other advanced 7B-13B open-source models, approaching the performance of advanced 70B LLMs and GPT-4. Codes, datasets and model weights will be publicly available.

Critique, as a natural language description for assessing the quality of model-generated content, has been proven to play an essential role in the training, evaluation, and refinement of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, there is a lack of principled understanding in evaluating the quality of the critique itself. In this paper, we pioneer the critique of critique, termed MetaCritique, which is a framework to evaluate the critique from two aspects, i.e., factuality as precision score and comprehensiveness as recall score. We calculate the harmonic mean of precision and recall as the overall rating called F1 score. To obtain a reliable evaluation outcome, we propose Atomic Information Units (AIUs), which describe the critique in a more fine-grained manner. MetaCritique takes each AIU into account and aggregates each AIU's judgment for the overall score. Moreover, given the evaluation process involves intricate reasoning, our MetaCritique provides a natural language rationale to support each judgment. We construct a meta-evaluation dataset containing 300 critiques (2653 AIUs) across four tasks (question answering, reasoning, entailment, and summarization), and we conduct a comparative study to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness. Experiments also show superior critique judged by MetaCritique leads to better refinement, indicating generative artificial intelligence indeed has the potential to be significantly advanced with our MetaCritique. We will release relevant code and meta-evaluation datasets at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/MetaCritique.

Critiques are important for enhancing the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs), enabling both self-improvement and constructive feedback for others by identifying flaws and suggesting improvements. However, evaluating the critique capabilities of LLMs presents a significant challenge due to the open-ended nature of the task. In this work, we introduce a new benchmark designed to assess the critique capabilities of LLMs. Unlike existing benchmarks, which typically function in an open-loop fashion, our approach employs a closed-loop methodology that evaluates the quality of corrections generated from critiques. Moreover, the benchmark incorporates features such as self-critique, cross-critique, and iterative critique, which are crucial for distinguishing the abilities of advanced reasoning models from more classical ones. We implement this benchmark using eight challenging reasoning tasks. We have several interesting findings. First, despite demonstrating comparable performance in direct chain-of-thought generation, classical LLMs significantly lag behind the advanced reasoning-based model o1-mini across all critique scenarios. Second, in self-critique and iterative critique settings, classical LLMs may even underperform relative to their baseline capabilities. We hope that this benchmark will serve as a valuable resource to guide future advancements. The code and data are available at https://github.com/tangzhy/RealCritic.

Critique ability are crucial in the scalable oversight and self-improvement of Large Language Models (LLMs). While many recent studies explore the critique ability of LLMs to judge and refine flaws in generations, how to comprehensively and reliably measure the critique abilities of LLMs is under-explored. This paper introduces \shortname, a novel benchmark designed to comprehensively and reliably evaluate four key critique ability dimensions of LLMs: feedback, comparison, refinement and meta-feedback. \shortname~encompasses nine diverse tasks, each assessing the LLMs' ability to critique responses at varying levels of quality granularity. Our extensive evaluations of open-source and closed-source LLMs reveal intriguing relationships between the critique ability and tasks, response qualities, and model scales. Datasets, resources and evaluation toolkit for \shortname~will be publicly released at https://github.com/gmftbyGMFTBY/CriticBench.

Training large language models (LLMs) to spend more time thinking and reflection before responding is crucial for effectively solving complex reasoning tasks in fields such as science, coding, and mathematics. However, the effectiveness of mechanisms like self-reflection and self-correction depends on the model's capacity to accurately assess its own performance, which can be limited by factors such as initial accuracy, question difficulty, and the lack of external feedback. In this paper, we delve into a two-player paradigm that separates the roles of reasoning and critique models, where the critique model provides step-level feedback to supervise the reasoning (actor) model during both test-time and train-time. We first propose AutoMathCritique, an automated and scalable framework for collecting critique data, resulting in a dataset of 76,321 responses paired with step-level feedback. Fine-tuning language models with this dataset enables them to generate natural language feedback for mathematical reasoning. We demonstrate that the critique models consistently improve the actor's performance on difficult queries at test-time, especially when scaling up inference-time computation. Motivated by these findings, we introduce the critique-based supervision to the actor's self-training process, and propose a critique-in-the-loop self-improvement method. Experiments show that the method improves the actor's exploration efficiency and solution diversity, especially on challenging queries, leading to a stronger reasoning model. Lastly, we take the preliminary step to explore training self-talk reasoning models via critique supervision and showcase its potential. Our code and datasets are at https://mathcritique.github.io/{https://mathcritique.github.io/}.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a popular training paradigm, particularly when paired with reasoning models. While effective, it primarily focuses on generating responses and lacks mechanisms to explicitly foster critique or reflection. Several recent studies, like Critique-Fine-Tuning (CFT) and Critique-Guided-Distillation (CGD) have shown the benefits of explicitly teaching LLMs how to critique. Motivated by them, we propose Critique Reinforcement Learning (CRL), where the model is tasked with generating a critique for a given (question, solution) pair. The reward is determined solely by whether the final judgment label c in {True, False} of the generated critique aligns with the ground-truth judgment c^*. Building on this point, we introduce Critique-Coder, which is trained on a hybrid of RL and CRL by substituting 20\% of the standard RL data with CRL data. We fine-tune multiple models (Critique-Coder) and evaluate them on different benchmarks to show their advantages over RL-only models. We show that Critique-Coder consistently outperforms RL-only baselines on all the evaluated benchmarks. Notably, our Critique-Coder-8B can reach over 60\% on LiveCodeBench (v5), outperforming other reasoning models like DeepCoder-14B and GPT-o1. Beyond code generation, Critique-Coder also demonstrates enhanced general reasoning abilities, as evidenced by its better performance on logic reasoning tasks from the BBEH dataset. This indicates that the application of CRL on coding datasets enhances general reasoning and critique abilities, which are transferable across a broad range of tasks. Hence, we believe that CRL works as a great complement to standard RL for LLM reasoning.

Accurate confidence calibration in Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for safe use in high-stakes domains, where clear verbalized confidence enhances user trust. Traditional methods that mimic reference confidence expressions often fail to capture the reasoning needed for accurate confidence assessment. We propose natural language critiques as a solution, ideally suited for confidence calibration, as precise gold confidence labels are hard to obtain and often require multiple generations. This paper studies how natural language critiques can enhance verbalized confidence, addressing: (1) What to critique: uncertainty (question-focused) or confidence (answer-specific)? Analysis shows confidence suits multiple-choice tasks, while uncertainty excels in open-ended scenarios. (2) How to critique: self-critique or critique calibration training? We propose Self-Critique, enabling LLMs to critique and optimize their confidence beyond mere accuracy, and CritiCal, a novel Critique Calibration training method that leverages natural language critiques to improve confidence calibration, moving beyond direct numerical optimization. Experiments show that CritiCal significantly outperforms Self-Critique and other competitive baselines, even surpassing its teacher model, GPT-4o, in complex reasoning tasks. CritiCal also shows robust generalization in out-of-distribution settings, advancing LLM's reliability.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

The critique capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for reasoning abilities, which can provide necessary suggestions (e.g., detailed analysis and constructive feedback). Therefore, how to evaluate the critique capacity of LLMs has drawn great attention and several critique benchmarks have been proposed. However, existing critique benchmarks usually have the following limitations: (1). Focusing on diverse reasoning tasks in general domains and insufficient evaluation on code tasks (e.g., only covering code generation task), where the difficulty of queries is relatively easy (e.g., the code queries of CriticBench are from Humaneval and MBPP). (2). Lacking comprehensive evaluation from different dimensions. To address these limitations, we introduce a holistic code critique benchmark for LLMs called CodeCriticBench. Specifically, our CodeCriticBench includes two mainstream code tasks (i.e., code generation and code QA) with different difficulties. Besides, the evaluation protocols include basic critique evaluation and advanced critique evaluation for different characteristics, where fine-grained evaluation checklists are well-designed for advanced settings. Finally, we conduct extensive experimental results of existing LLMs, which show the effectiveness of CodeCriticBench.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to critique and refine their reasoning is crucial for their application in evaluation, feedback provision, and self-improvement. This paper introduces CriticBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess LLMs' abilities to critique and rectify their reasoning across a variety of tasks. CriticBench encompasses five reasoning domains: mathematical, commonsense, symbolic, coding, and algorithmic. It compiles 15 datasets and incorporates responses from three LLM families. Utilizing CriticBench, we evaluate and dissect the performance of 17 LLMs in generation, critique, and correction reasoning, i.e., GQC reasoning. Our findings reveal: (1) a linear relationship in GQC capabilities, with critique-focused training markedly enhancing performance; (2) a task-dependent variation in correction effectiveness, with logic-oriented tasks being more amenable to correction; (3) GQC knowledge inconsistencies that decrease as model size increases; and (4) an intriguing inter-model critiquing dynamic, where stronger models are better at critiquing weaker ones, while weaker models can surprisingly surpass stronger ones in their self-critique. We hope these insights into the nuanced critique-correct reasoning of LLMs will foster further research in LLM critique and self-improvement.

The ability of critique is vital for models to self-improve and serve as reliable AI assistants. While extensively studied in language-only settings, multimodal critique of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) remains underexplored despite their growing capabilities in tasks like captioning and visual reasoning. In this work, we introduce MM-CRITIC, a holistic benchmark for evaluating the critique ability of LMMs across multiple dimensions: basic, correction, and comparison. Covering 8 main task types and over 500 tasks, MM-CRITIC collects responses from various LMMs with different model sizes and is composed of 4471 samples. To enhance the evaluation reliability, we integrate expert-informed ground answers into scoring rubrics that guide GPT-4o in annotating responses and generating reference critiques, which serve as anchors for trustworthy judgments. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of MM-CRITIC and provide a comprehensive assessment of leading LMMs' critique capabilities under multiple dimensions. Further analysis reveals some key insights, including the correlation between response quality and critique, and varying critique difficulty across evaluation dimensions. Our code is available at https://github.com/MichealZeng0420/MM-Critic.

Since the natural language processing (NLP) community started to make large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, act as a critic to evaluate the quality of generated texts, most of them only train a critique generation model of a specific scale on specific datasets. We argue that a comprehensive investigation on the key factor of LLM-based evaluation models, such as scaling properties, is lacking, so that it is still inconclusive whether these models have potential to replace GPT-4's evaluation in practical scenarios. In this paper, we propose a new critique generation model called CritiqueLLM, which includes a dialogue-based prompting method for high-quality referenced / reference-free evaluation data. Experimental results show that our model can achieve comparable evaluation performance to GPT-4 especially in system-level correlations, and even outperform GPT-4 in 3 out of 8 tasks in a challenging reference-free setting. We conduct detailed analysis to show promising scaling properties of our model in the quality of generated critiques. We also demonstrate that our generated critiques can act as scalable feedback to directly improve the generation quality of LLMs.

Training critiquing language models to assess and provide feedback on model outputs is a promising way to improve LLMs for complex reasoning tasks. However, existing approaches typically rely on stronger supervisors for annotating critique data. To address this, we propose Critique-RL, an online RL approach for developing critiquing language models without stronger supervision. Our approach operates on a two-player paradigm: the actor generates a response, the critic provides feedback, and the actor refines the response accordingly. We first reveal that relying solely on indirect reward signals from the actor's outputs for RL optimization often leads to unsatisfactory critics: while their helpfulness (i.e., providing constructive feedback) improves, the discriminability (i.e., determining whether a response is high-quality or not) remains poor, resulting in marginal performance gains. To overcome this, Critique-RL adopts a two-stage optimization strategy. In stage I, it reinforces the discriminability of the critic with direct rule-based reward signals; in stage II, it introduces indirect rewards based on actor refinement to improve the critic's helpfulness, while maintaining its discriminability via appropriate regularization. Extensive experiments across various tasks and models show that Critique-RL delivers substantial performance improvements. For example, it achieves a 9.02% gain on in-domain tasks and a 5.70% gain on out-of-domain tasks for Qwen2.5-7B, highlighting its potential.

The ability of large vision-language models (LVLMs) to critique and correct their reasoning is an essential building block towards their self-improvement. However, a systematic analysis of such capabilities in LVLMs is still lacking. We propose VISCO, the first benchmark to extensively analyze the fine-grained critique and correction capabilities of LVLMs. Compared to existing work that uses a single scalar value to critique the entire reasoning [4], VISCO features dense and fine-grained critique, requiring LVLMs to evaluate the correctness of each step in the chain-of-thought and provide natural language explanations to support their judgments. Extensive evaluation of 24 LVLMs demonstrates that human-written critiques significantly enhance the performance after correction, showcasing the potential of the self-improvement strategy. However, the model-generated critiques are less helpful and sometimes detrimental to the performance, suggesting that critique is the crucial bottleneck. We identified three common patterns in critique failures: failure to critique visual perception, reluctance to "say no", and exaggerated assumption of error propagation. To address these issues, we propose an effective LookBack strategy that revisits the image to verify each piece of information in the initial reasoning. LookBack significantly improves critique and correction performance by up to 13.5%.

Large language models (LLMs) have improved significantly in their reasoning through extensive training on massive datasets. However, relying solely on additional data for improvement is becoming increasingly impractical, highlighting the need for models to autonomously enhance their reasoning without external supervision. In this paper, we propose Debate, Train, Evolve (DTE), a novel ground truth-free training framework that uses multi-agent debate traces to evolve a single language model. We also introduce a new prompting strategy Reflect-Critique-Refine, to improve debate quality by explicitly instructing agents to critique and refine their reasoning. Extensive evaluations on five reasoning benchmarks with six open-weight models show that our DTE framework achieve substantial improvements, with an average accuracy gain of 8.92% on the challenging GSM-PLUS dataset. Furthermore, we observe strong cross-domain generalization, with an average accuracy gain of 5.8% on all other benchmarks, suggesting that our method captures general reasoning capabilities.

Self-critic has become an important mechanism for enhancing the reasoning performance of LLMs. However, current approaches mainly involve basic prompts without further training, which tend to be over-simplified, leading to limited accuracy.Moreover, there is a lack of in-depth investigation of the relationship between LLM's ability to criticism and its task-solving performance.To address these issues, we propose Critic-CoT, a novel framework that pushes LLMs toward System-2-like critic capability, via step-wise CoT reasoning format and distant-supervision data construction, without the need for human annotation. Experiments on GSM8K and MATH show that via filtering out invalid solutions or iterative refinement, our enhanced model boosts task-solving performance, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our method. Further, we find that training on critique and refinement alone improves the generation. We hope our work could shed light on future research on improving the reasoning and critic ability of LLMs.

Peer review serves as a backbone of academic research, but in most AI conferences, the review quality is degrading as the number of submissions explodes. To reliably detect low-quality reviews, we define misinformed review points as either "weaknesses" in a review that contain incorrect premises, or "questions" in a review that can be already answered by the paper. We verify that 15.2% of weaknesses and 26.4% of questions are misinformed and introduce ReviewScore indicating if a review point is misinformed. To evaluate the factuality of each premise of weaknesses, we propose an automated engine that reconstructs every explicit and implicit premise from a weakness. We build a human expert-annotated ReviewScore dataset to check the ability of LLMs to automate ReviewScore evaluation. Then, we measure human-model agreements on ReviewScore using eight current state-of-the-art LLMs and verify moderate agreements. We also prove that evaluating premise-level factuality shows significantly higher agreements than evaluating weakness-level factuality. A thorough disagreement analysis further supports a potential of fully automated ReviewScore evaluation.

Reward modeling is crucial for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences, especially in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, current reward models mainly produce scalar scores and struggle to incorporate critiques in a natural language format. We hypothesize that predicting both critiques and the scalar reward would improve reward modeling ability. Motivated by this, we propose Critic-RM, a framework that improves reward models using self-generated critiques without extra supervision. Critic-RM employs a two-stage process: generating and filtering high-quality critiques, followed by joint fine-tuning on reward prediction and critique generation. Experiments across benchmarks show that Critic-RM improves reward modeling accuracy by 3.7%-7.3% compared to standard reward models and LLM judges, demonstrating strong performance and data efficiency. Additional studies further validate the effectiveness of generated critiques in rectifying flawed reasoning steps with 2.5%-3.2% gains in improving reasoning accuracy.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

This paper takes a first step towards a critical thinking curriculum for neural auto-regressive language models. We introduce a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments, and generate artificial argumentative texts to train and evaluate GPT-2. Significant transfer learning effects can be observed: Training a model on three simple core schemes allows it to accurately complete conclusions of different, and more complex types of arguments, too. The language models generalize the core argument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, we obtain consistent and promising results for NLU benchmarks. In particular, pre-training on the argument schemes raises zero-shot accuracy on the GLUE diagnostics by up to 15 percentage points. The findings suggest that intermediary pre-training on texts that exemplify basic reasoning abilities (such as typically covered in critical thinking textbooks) might help language models to acquire a broad range of reasoning skills. The synthetic argumentative texts presented in this paper are a promising starting point for building such a "critical thinking curriculum for language models."

We present PREMISE (PREdict with Matching ScorEs), a new architecture for the matching-based learning in the multimodal fields for the multimodal review helpfulness (MRHP) task. Distinct to previous fusion-based methods which obtains multimodal representations via cross-modal attention for downstream tasks, PREMISE computes the multi-scale and multi-field representations, filters duplicated semantics, and then obtained a set of matching scores as feature vectors for the downstream recommendation task. This new architecture significantly boosts the performance for such multimodal tasks whose context matching content are highly correlated to the targets of that task, compared to the state-of-the-art fusion-based methods. Experimental results on two publicly available datasets show that PREMISE achieves promising performance with less computational cost.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

We test the robustness of debate as a method of scalable oversight by training models to debate with data generated via self-play. In a long-context reading comprehension task, we find that language model based evaluators answer questions more accurately when judging models optimized to win debates. By contrast, we find no such relationship for consultancy models trained to persuade a judge without an opposing debater present. In quantitative and qualitative comparisons between our debate models and novel consultancy baselines, we find evidence that debate training encourages stronger and more informative arguments, showing promise that it can help provide high-quality supervision for tasks that are difficult to directly evaluate.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is commonly used to train language models to imitate annotated responses for given instructions. In this paper, we challenge this paradigm and propose Critique Fine-Tuning (CFT), a strategy where models learn to critique noisy responses rather than simply imitate correct ones. Inspired by human learning processes that emphasize critical thinking, CFT encourages deeper analysis and nuanced understanding-traits often overlooked by standard SFT. To validate the effectiveness of CFT, we construct a 50K-sample dataset from WebInstruct, using GPT-4o as the teacher to generate critiques in the form of (input=[query; noisy response], output=critique). CFT on this dataset yields a consistent 4-10% improvement over SFT on six math benchmarks with different base models like Qwen2.5, Qwen2.5-Math and DeepSeek-Math. We further expand to MetaMath and NuminaMath datasets and observe similar gains over SFT. Notably, our Qwen2.5-Math-CFT model-trained on just 50K samples-matches or outperforms competitive models such as AceMath and Qwen2.5-Math-Instruct on most benchmarks, both of which use over 2M samples. Ablation studies show that CFT is robust to the source of noisy response and teacher critique model. Through these findings, we argue that critique-based training offers a more effective alternative to advance the reasoning of language models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving, providing accurate feedback and scalable oversight on their outputs becomes an urgent and critical problem. Leveraging LLMs as critique models to achieve automated supervision is a promising solution. In this work, we focus on studying and enhancing the math critique ability of LLMs. Current LLM critics provide critiques that are too shallow and superficial on each step, leading to low judgment accuracy and struggling to offer sufficient feedback for the LLM generator to correct mistakes. To tackle this issue, we propose a novel and effective two-stage framework to develop LLM critics that are capable of deliberately critiquing on each reasoning step of math solutions. In the first stage, we utilize Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct to generate 4.5K long-form critiques as seed data for supervised fine-tuning. Each seed critique consists of deliberate step-wise critiques that includes multi-perspective verifications as well as in-depth critiques of initial critiques for each reasoning step. Then, we perform reinforcement learning on the fine-tuned model with either existing human-labeled data from PRM800K or our automatically annotated data obtained via Monte Carlo sampling-based correctness estimation, to further incentivize its critique ability. Our developed critique model built on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct not only significantly outperforms existing LLM critics (including the same-sized DeepSeek-R1-distill models and GPT-4o) on various error identification benchmarks, but also more effectively helps the LLM generator refine erroneous steps through more detailed feedback.

In vision-language modeling, critic models are typically trained to evaluate outputs -- assigning scalar scores or pairwise preferences -- rather than to generate responses. This separation from policy models, which produce the responses, is so entrenched that critics are rarely considered for direct policy use. In this work, we challenge this convention. We propose to reorganize preference-labeled critic datasets into verifiable training signals and perform reinforcement learning directly on a base generative model, producing LLaVA-Critic-R1, a multimodal critic trained to optimize preference judgments while retaining full generation ability. Surprisingly, LLaVA-Critic-R1 emerges not only as a top-performing critic but also as a competitive policy model -- matching or surpassing specialized reasoning VLMs trained with in-domain data across 26 visual reasoning and understanding benchmarks, with an average gain of +5.7% over its base model (Qwen-2.5-VL-7B). Extending this approach to existing strong reasoning VLMs yields LLaVA-Critic-R1+, which further advances policy performance without sacrificing critic quality, achieving a SoTA performance of 71.9 on MMMU at the 7B scale. Finally, we show that the enhanced critic ability benefits inference: applying self-critique at test time yields an average +13.8% improvement on five representative reasoning tasks without additional training. Our results reveal that RL training on critic data can produce a unified model excelling at both evaluation and generation, offering a simple path toward scalable, self-improving multimodal systems.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples, a wide spread belief in their iterative self-critique capabilities persists. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting of LLMs in the context of Graph Coloring, a canonical NP-complete reasoning problem that is related to propositional satisfiability as well as practical problems like scheduling and allocation. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT4 in solving graph coloring instances or verifying the correctness of candidate colorings. In iterative modes, we experiment with the model critiquing its own answers and an external correct reasoner verifying proposed solutions. In both cases, we analyze whether the content of the criticisms actually affects bottom line performance. The study seems to indicate that (i) LLMs are bad at solving graph coloring instances (ii) they are no better at verifying a solution--and thus are not effective in iterative modes with LLMs critiquing LLM-generated solutions (iii) the correctness and content of the criticisms--whether by LLMs or external solvers--seems largely irrelevant to the performance of iterative prompting. We show that the observed increase in effectiveness is largely due to the correct solution being fortuitously present in the top-k completions of the prompt (and being recognized as such by an external verifier). Our results thus call into question claims about the self-critiquing capabilities of state of the art LLMs.

Current open-source Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) excel at tasks such as open-vocabulary language grounding and segmentation but can suffer under false premises when queries imply the existence of something that is not actually present in the image. We observe that existing methods that fine-tune an LMM to segment images significantly degrade their ability to reliably determine ("see") if an object is present and to interact naturally with humans ("say"), a form of catastrophic forgetting. In this work, we propose a cascading and joint training approach for LMMs to solve this task, avoiding catastrophic forgetting of previous skills. Our resulting model can "see" by detecting whether objects are present in an image, "say" by telling the user if they are not, proposing alternative queries or correcting semantic errors in the query, and finally "segment" by outputting the mask of the desired objects if they exist. Additionally, we introduce a novel False Premise Correction benchmark dataset, an extension of existing RefCOCO(+/g) referring segmentation datasets (which we call FP-RefCOCO(+/g)). The results show that our method not only detects false premises up to 55% better than existing approaches, but under false premise conditions produces relative cIOU improvements of more than 31% over baselines, and produces natural language feedback judged helpful up to 67% of the time.

Despite their remarkable performance, the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) faces a critical challenge in scalable oversight: providing effective feedback for tasks where human evaluation is difficult or where LLMs outperform humans. While there is growing interest in using LLMs for critique, current approaches still rely on human annotations or more powerful models, leaving the issue of enhancing critique capabilities without external supervision unresolved. We introduce SCRIT (Self-evolving CRITic), a framework that enables genuine self-evolution of critique abilities. Technically, SCRIT self-improves by training on synthetic data, generated by a contrastive-based self-critic that uses reference solutions for step-by-step critique, and a self-validation mechanism that ensures critique quality through correction outcomes. Implemented with Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct, one of the most powerful LLMs, SCRIT achieves up to a 10.3\% improvement on critique-correction and error identification benchmarks. Our analysis reveals that SCRIT's performance scales positively with data and model size, outperforms alternative approaches, and benefits critically from its self-validation component.

Optimizing the phrasing of argumentative text is crucial in higher education and professional development. However, assessing whether and how the different claims in a text should be revised is a hard task, especially for novice writers. In this work, we explore the main challenges to identifying argumentative claims in need of specific revisions. By learning from collaborative editing behaviors in online debates, we seek to capture implicit revision patterns in order to develop approaches aimed at guiding writers in how to further improve their arguments. We systematically compare the ability of common word embedding models to capture the differences between different versions of the same text, and we analyze their impact on various types of writing issues. To deal with the noisy nature of revision-based corpora, we propose a new sampling strategy based on revision distance. Opposed to approaches from prior work, such sampling can be done without employing additional annotations and judgments. Moreover, we provide evidence that using contextual information and domain knowledge can further improve prediction results. How useful a certain type of context is, depends on the issue the claim is suffering from, though.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

We introduce Debate Speech Evaluation as a novel and challenging benchmark for assessing LLM judges. Evaluating debate speeches requires a deep understanding of the speech at multiple levels, including argument strength and relevance, the coherence and organization of the speech, the appropriateness of its style and tone, and so on. This task involves a unique set of cognitive abilities that have previously received limited attention in systematic LLM benchmarking. To explore such skills, we leverage a dataset of over 600 meticulously annotated debate speeches and present the first in-depth analysis of how state-of-the-art LLMs compare to human judges on this task. Our findings reveal a nuanced picture: while larger models can approximate individual human judgments in some respects, they differ substantially in their overall judgment behavior. We also investigate the ability of frontier LLMs to generate persuasive, opinionated speeches, showing that models may perform at a human level on this task.

Large language models frequently encounter conflicts between their parametric knowledge and contextual input, often resulting in factual inconsistencies or hallucinations. We propose Self-Reflective Debate for Contextual Reliability (SR-DCR), a lightweight framework that integrates token-level self-confidence with an asymmetric multi-agent debate to adjudicate such conflicts. A critic, deprived of context, challenges a defender who argues from the given passage; a judge model evaluates the debate and determines the context's reliability. The final answer is selected by combining the verdict with model confidence. Experiments on the ClashEval benchmark demonstrate that SR-DCR consistently enhances robustness to misleading context while maintaining accuracy on trustworthy inputs, outperforming both classical debate and confidence-only baselines with minimal computational overhead. The code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/Self-Reflective-Debates.

We propose a novel dynamic safety framework that optimizes language model (LM) safety reasoning at inference time without modifying model weights. Building on recent advances in self-critique methods, our approach leverages a meta-critique mechanism that iteratively updates safety prompts-termed specifications-to drive the critique and revision process adaptively. This test-time optimization not only improves performance against adversarial jailbreak requests but also in diverse general safety-related tasks, such as avoiding moral harm or pursuing honest responses. Our empirical evaluations across several language models demonstrate that dynamically optimized safety prompts yield significantly higher safety scores compared to fixed system prompts and static self-critique defenses. Code to be released at https://github.com/vicgalle/meta-self-critique.git .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in general natural language processing tasks but often fall short in complex reasoning tasks. Recent studies have explored human-like problem-solving strategies, such as self-correct, to push further the boundary of single-model reasoning ability. In this work, we let a single model "step outside the box" by engaging multiple models to correct each other. We introduce a multi-agent collaboration strategy that emulates the academic peer review process. Each agent independently constructs its own solution, provides reviews on the solutions of others, and assigns confidence levels to its reviews. Upon receiving peer reviews, agents revise their initial solutions. Extensive experiments on three different types of reasoning tasks show that our collaboration approach delivers superior accuracy across all ten datasets compared to existing methods. Further study underscores the effectiveness of integrating confidence in reviews, demonstrates the superiority of feedback exchange over mere solution sharing, and highlights the role of capability and diversity in fostering successful collaboration.

As frontier language models increasingly saturate standard QA benchmarks, concerns about data contamination, memorization, and escalating dataset creation costs persist. We propose a debate-driven evaluation paradigm that transforms any existing QA dataset into structured adversarial debates--where one model is given the official answer to defend, and another constructs and defends an alternative answer--adjudicated by a judge model blind to the correct solution. By forcing multi-round argumentation, this approach substantially increases difficulty while penalizing shallow memorization, yet reuses QA items to reduce curation overhead. We make two main contributions: (1) an evaluation pipeline to systematically convert QA tasks into debate-based assessments, and (2) a public benchmark that demonstrates our paradigm's effectiveness on a subset of MMLU-Pro questions, complete with standardized protocols and reference models. Empirical results validate the robustness of the method and its effectiveness against data contamination--a Llama 3.1 model fine-tuned on test questions showed dramatic accuracy improvements (50% -> 82%) but performed worse in debates. Results also show that even weaker judges can reliably differentiate stronger debaters, highlighting how debate-based evaluation can scale to future, more capable systems while maintaining a fraction of the cost of creating new benchmarks. Overall, our framework underscores that "pretraining on the test set is no longer all you need," offering a sustainable path for measuring the genuine reasoning ability of advanced language models.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is fundamentally limited by the capacity of humans to correctly evaluate model output. To improve human evaluation ability and overcome that limitation this work trains "critic" models that help humans to more accurately evaluate model-written code. These critics are themselves LLMs trained with RLHF to write natural language feedback highlighting problems in code from real-world assistant tasks. On code containing naturally occurring LLM errors model-written critiques are preferred over human critiques in 63% of cases, and human evaluation finds that models catch more bugs than human contractors paid for code review. We further confirm that our fine-tuned LLM critics can successfully identify hundreds of errors in ChatGPT training data rated as "flawless", even though the majority of those tasks are non-code tasks and thus out-of-distribution for the critic model. Critics can have limitations of their own, including hallucinated bugs that could mislead humans into making mistakes they might have otherwise avoided, but human-machine teams of critics and contractors catch similar numbers of bugs to LLM critics while hallucinating less than LLMs alone.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have witnessed remarkable growth, showcasing formidable capabilities in handling intricate multimodal tasks with exceptional performance. Recent research has underscored the inclination of large language models to passively accept defective inputs, often resulting in futile reasoning on invalid prompts. However, the same critical question of whether LMMs can actively detect and scrutinize erroneous inputs still remains unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the Input Scrutiny Ability Evaluation Framework (ISEval), which encompasses seven categories of flawed premises and three evaluation metrics. Our extensive evaluation of ten advanced LMMs has identified key findings. Most models struggle to actively detect flawed textual premises without guidance, which reflects a strong reliance on explicit prompts for premise error identification. Error type affects performance: models excel at identifying logical fallacies but struggle with surface-level linguistic errors and certain conditional flaws. Modality trust varies-Gemini 2.5 pro and Claude Sonnet 4 balance visual and textual info, while aya-vision-8b over-rely on text in conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LMMs' proactive verification of input validity and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/LMM_ISEval.

Despite their unprecedented success, even the largest language models make mistakes. Similar to how humans learn and improve using feedback, previous work proposed providing language models with natural language feedback to guide them in repairing their outputs. Because human-generated critiques are expensive to obtain, researchers have devised learned critique generators in lieu of human critics while assuming one can train downstream models to utilize generated feedback. However, this approach does not apply to black-box or limited access models such as ChatGPT, as they cannot be fine-tuned. Moreover, in the era of large general-purpose language agents, fine-tuning is neither computationally nor spatially efficient as it results in multiple copies of the network. In this work, we introduce RL4F (Reinforcement Learning for Feedback), a multi-agent collaborative framework where the critique generator is trained to maximize end-task performance of GPT-3, a fixed model more than 200 times its size. RL4F produces critiques that help GPT-3 revise its outputs. We study three datasets for action planning, summarization and alphabetization and show improvements (~5% on average) in multiple text similarity metrics over strong baselines across all three tasks.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) with numerical feedback, such as scalar rewards, have significantly enhanced the complex reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Despite this success, we identify three key challenges encountered by RL with solely numerical feedback: performance plateaus, limited effectiveness of self-reflection, and persistent failures. We then demonstrate that RL-finetuned models, even after exhibiting performance plateaus, can generate correct refinements on persistently failed problems by leveraging natural language feedback in the form of critiques. Building on this insight, we propose Critique-GRPO, an online RL framework that integrates both natural language and numerical feedback for effective policy optimization. Critique-GRPO enables LLMs to learn from initial responses and critique-guided refinements simultaneously while maintaining exploration. Extensive experiments using Qwen2.5-7B-Base and Qwen3-8B-Base show that Critique-GRPO consistently outperforms supervised learning-based and RL-based fine-tuning approaches across eight challenging mathematical, STEM, and general reasoning tasks, improving average pass@1 scores by approximately 4.5% and 5%, respectively. Notably, Critique-GRPO surpasses a strong baseline that incorporates expert demonstrations within online RL. Further analysis reveals two critical insights about policy exploration: (1) higher entropy does not always guarantee efficient learning from exploration, and (2) longer responses do not necessarily lead to more effective exploration.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

While slow-thinking large language models (LLMs) exhibit reflection-like reasoning, commonly referred to as the "aha moment:, their ability to generate informative critiques and refine prior solutions remains limited. In this paper, we introduce Double-Checker, a principled framework designed to enhance the reasoning capabilities of slow-thinking LLMs by fostering explicit self-critique and iterative refinement of their previous solutions. By fine-tuning on our curated 1,730 self-critical instances, Double-Checker empowers long-CoT LLMs to iteratively critique and refine their outputs during inference until they evaluate their solutions as correct under self-generated critiques. We validate the efficacy of Double-Checker across a comprehensive suite of reasoning benchmarks, demonstrating that iterative self-critique significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of long-CoT LLMs. Notably, our Double-Checker increases the pass@1 performance on challenging AIME benchmarks from 4.4% to 18.2% compared to the original long-CoT LLMs. These results highlight a promising direction for developing more trustworthy and effective LLMs capable of structured self-critique. Our codes and data are available at https://github.com/XinXU-USTC/DoubleChecker

Prompt sensitivity, referring to the phenomenon where paraphrasing (i.e., repeating something written or spoken using different words) leads to significant changes in large language model (LLM) performance, has been widely accepted as a core limitation of LLMs. In this work, we revisit this issue and ask: Is the widely reported high prompt sensitivity truly an inherent weakness of LLMs, or is it largely an artifact of evaluation processes? To answer this question, we systematically evaluate 7 LLMs (e.g., GPT and Gemini family) across 6 benchmarks, including both multiple-choice and open-ended tasks on 12 diverse prompt templates. We find that much of the prompt sensitivity stems from heuristic evaluation methods, including log-likelihood scoring and rigid answer matching, which often overlook semantically correct responses expressed through alternative phrasings, such as synonyms or paraphrases. When we adopt LLM-as-a-Judge evaluations, we observe a substantial reduction in performance variance and a consistently higher correlation in model rankings across prompts. Our findings suggest that modern LLMs are more robust to prompt templates than previously believed, and that prompt sensitivity may be more an artifact of evaluation than a flaw in the models.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

In this thesis, I evaluate the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), specifically the Logic Games section of the test. I focus on this section because it presents a complex logical reasoning task and thus is a valuable source of data for evaluating how modern, increasingly capable LLMs can handle hard logical reasoning tasks. I construct a dataset of LSAT logic games and their associated metadata, and extensively evaluate LLMs' performance in a Chain-of-Thought prompting setting. Given the weak performance in this setting, I explore other prompting frameworks on a smaller subset of the dataset, adapting ideas from Reflexion to this task. This results in a substantially improved accuracy of 70 percent for GPT-4 and 46 percent for GPT-3.5 on this data subset, highlighting the capacity of LLMs to revise their logical errors, despite initially weak performance. Finally, I analyze the types of logic games that models perform better or worse on, as well as the types of logical errors I observe from human annotation, providing detailed insights on the logical reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

There have been widespread claims about Large Language Models (LLMs) being able to successfully verify or self-critique their candidate solutions in reasoning problems in an iterative mode. Intrigued by those claims, in this paper we set out to investigate the verification/self-critiquing abilities of large language models in the context of planning. We evaluate a planning system that employs LLMs for both plan generation and verification. We assess the verifier LLM's performance against ground-truth verification, the impact of self-critiquing on plan generation, and the influence of varying feedback levels on system performance. Using GPT-4, a state-of-the-art LLM, for both generation and verification, our findings reveal that self-critiquing appears to diminish plan generation performance, especially when compared to systems with external, sound verifiers and the LLM verifiers in that system produce a notable number of false positives, compromising the system's reliability. Additionally, the nature of feedback, whether binary or detailed, showed minimal impact on plan generation. Collectively, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of LLMs in a self-critiquing, iterative framework for planning tasks.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Despite the remarkable capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in various reasoning tasks, they still struggle with table reasoning tasks, particularly in maintaining consistency throughout multi-step reasoning processes. While existing approaches have explored various decomposition strategies, they often lack effective mechanisms to identify and correct errors in intermediate reasoning steps, leading to cascading error propagation. To address these issues, we propose Table-Critic, a novel multi-agent framework that facilitates collaborative criticism and iterative refinement of the reasoning process until convergence to correct solutions. Our framework consists of four specialized agents: a Judge for error identification, a Critic for comprehensive critiques, a Refiner for process improvement, and a Curator for pattern distillation. To effectively deal with diverse and unpredictable error types, we introduce a self-evolving template tree that systematically accumulates critique knowledge through experience-driven learning and guides future reflections. Extensive experiments have demonstrated that Table-Critic achieves substantial improvements over existing methods, achieving superior accuracy and error correction rates while maintaining computational efficiency and lower solution degradation rate.

As large language models take on growing roles as automated evaluators in practical settings, a critical question arises: Can individuals persuade an LLM judge to assign unfairly high scores? This study is the first to reveal that strategically embedded persuasive language can bias LLM judges when scoring mathematical reasoning tasks, where correctness should be independent of stylistic variation. Grounded in Aristotle's rhetorical principles, we formalize seven persuasion techniques (Majority, Consistency, Flattery, Reciprocity, Pity, Authority, Identity) and embed them into otherwise identical responses. Across six math benchmarks, we find that persuasive language leads LLM judges to assign inflated scores to incorrect solutions, by up to 8% on average, with Consistency causing the most severe distortion. Notably, increasing model size does not substantially mitigate this vulnerability. Further analysis demonstrates that combining multiple persuasion techniques amplifies the bias, and pairwise evaluation is likewise susceptible. Moreover, the persuasive effect persists under counter prompting strategies, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines and underscoring the need for robust defenses against persuasion-based attacks.

The reflection capacity of Large Language Model (LLM) has garnered extensive attention. A post-hoc prompting strategy, e.g., reflexion and self-refine, refines LLM's response based on self-evaluated or external feedback. However, recent research indicates without external feedback, LLM's intrinsic reflection is unstable. Our investigation unveils that the key bottleneck is the quality of the self-evaluated feedback. We find LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or high randomness when self-evaluate, offering stubborn or inconsistent feedback, which causes poor reflection. To remedy this, we advocate Self-Contrast: It adaptively explores diverse solving perspectives tailored to the request, contrasts the differences, and summarizes these discrepancies into a checklist which could be used to re-examine and eliminate discrepancies. Our method endows LLM with diverse perspectives to alleviate stubborn biases. Moreover, their discrepancies indicate potential errors or inherent uncertainties that LLM often overlooks. Reflecting upon these can catalyze more accurate and stable reflection. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning and translation tasks with different LLMs serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our strategy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can correct their self-generated responses, but a decline in accuracy after self-correction is also witnessed. To have a deeper understanding of self-correction, we endeavor to decompose, evaluate, and analyze the self-correction behaviors of LLMs. By enumerating and analyzing answer correctness before and after self-correction, we decompose the self-correction capability into confidence (being confident to correct answers) and critique (turning wrong answers to correct) capabilities, and propose two metrics from a probabilistic perspective to measure these 2 capabilities, along with another metric for overall self-correction capability evaluation. Based on our decomposition and evaluation metrics, we conduct extensive experiments and draw some empirical conclusions. For example, we find different models can exhibit distinct behaviors: some models are confident while others are more critical. We also find the trade-off between the two capabilities (i.e. improving one can lead to a decline in the other) when manipulating model self-correction behavior by prompts or in-context learning. Further, we find a simple yet efficient strategy to improve self-correction capability by transforming Supervision Fine-Tuning (SFT) data format, and our strategy outperforms vanilla SFT in both capabilities and achieves much higher accuracy after self-correction. Our code will be publicly available on GitHub.

This study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview model in higher-order cognitive domains, including critical thinking, systematic thinking, computational thinking, data literacy, creative thinking, logical reasoning, and scientific reasoning. Using established benchmarks, we compared the o1-preview models's performance to human participants from diverse educational levels. o1-preview achieved a mean score of 24.33 on the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (EWCTET), surpassing undergraduate (13.8) and postgraduate (18.39) participants (z = 1.60 and 0.90, respectively). In systematic thinking, it scored 46.1, SD = 4.12 on the Lake Urmia Vignette, significantly outperforming the human mean (20.08, SD = 8.13, z = 3.20). For data literacy, o1-preview scored 8.60, SD = 0.70 on Merk et al.'s "Use Data" dimension, compared to the human post-test mean of 4.17, SD = 2.02 (z = 2.19). On creative thinking tasks, the model achieved originality scores of 2.98, SD = 0.73, higher than the human mean of 1.74 (z = 0.71). In logical reasoning (LogiQA), it outperformed humans with average 90%, SD = 10% accuracy versus 86%, SD = 6.5% (z = 0.62). For scientific reasoning, it achieved near-perfect performance (mean = 0.99, SD = 0.12) on the TOSLS,, exceeding the highest human scores of 0.85, SD = 0.13 (z = 1.78). While o1-preview excelled in structured tasks, it showed limitations in problem-solving and adaptive reasoning. These results demonstrate the potential of AI to complement education in structured assessments but highlight the need for ethical oversight and refinement for broader applications.

Debate is the process of exchanging viewpoints or convincing others on a particular issue. Recent research has provided empirical evidence that the persuasiveness of an argument is determined not only by language usage but also by communicator characteristics. Researchers have paid much attention to aspects of languages, such as linguistic features and discourse structures, but combining argument persuasiveness and impact with the social personae of the audience has not been explored due to the difficulty and complexity. We have observed the impressive simulation and personification capability of ChatGPT, indicating a giant pre-trained language model may function as an individual to provide personae and exert unique influences based on diverse background knowledge. Therefore, we propose a persona knowledge-aligned framework for argument quality assessment tasks from the audience side. This is the first work that leverages the emergence of ChatGPT and injects such audience personae knowledge into smaller language models via prompt tuning. The performance of our pipeline demonstrates significant and consistent improvement compared to competitive architectures.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Visual language models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across diverse multimodal reasoning tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations, resulting in incorrect reasoning outcomes. Inspired by recent research on external feedback mechanisms in large language models (LLMs), we propose a multimodal actor-critic framework to enhance VLM reasoning capabilities. Specifically, the actor model generates step-by-step reasoning paths based on image and text inputs, while the critic model evaluates these reasoning paths and provides corrective feedback. The actor model iteratively refines its reasoning based on the feedback until the reasoning outcome is deemed satisfactory by the critic model. To reduce reliance on costly manual annotations, we introduce an automated method for constructing multimodal critique datasets. By leveraging Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), we systematically guide the actor model to explore diverse reasoning paths. To obtain critique data for correcting erroneous reasoning steps, we prompt an annotator model to compare pairs of reasoning paths diverging from a shared ancestor node - one leading to a correct conclusion and the other to an incorrect one. This approach enables us to construct the MMC (MCTS-based Multimodal Critique) dataset, upon which we further develop a comprehensive training and inference pipeline. Extensive experiments conducted on several public benchmark datasets and mainstream VLMs demonstrate that our approach significantly improves the performance of VLM on complex multimodal reasoning tasks, underscoring its effectiveness and wide applicability.

Self-correction has emerged as a promising solution to boost the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs), where LLMs refine their solutions using self-generated critiques that pinpoint the errors. This work explores whether smaller-size (<= 13B) language models (LMs) have the ability of self-correction on reasoning tasks with minimal inputs from stronger LMs. We propose a novel pipeline that prompts smaller LMs to collect self-correction data that supports the training of self-refinement abilities. First, we leverage correct solutions to guide the model in critiquing their incorrect responses. Second, the generated critiques, after filtering, are used for supervised fine-tuning of the self-correcting reasoner through solution refinement. Our experimental results show improved self-correction abilities of two models on five datasets spanning math and commonsense reasoning, with notable performance gains when paired with a strong GPT-4-based verifier, though limitations are identified when using a weak self-verifier for determining when to correct.

Recent developments in large language models (LLMs) have been impressive. However, these models sometimes show inconsistencies and problematic behavior, such as hallucinating facts, generating flawed code, or creating offensive and toxic content. Unlike these models, humans typically utilize external tools to cross-check and refine their initial content, like using a search engine for fact-checking, or a code interpreter for debugging. Inspired by this observation, we introduce a framework called CRITIC that allows LLMs, which are essentially "black boxes" to validate and progressively amend their own outputs in a manner similar to human interaction with tools. More specifically, starting with an initial output, CRITIC interacts with appropriate tools to evaluate certain aspects of the text, and then revises the output based on the feedback obtained during this validation process. Comprehensive evaluations involving free-form question answering, mathematical program synthesis, and toxicity reduction demonstrate that CRITIC consistently enhances the performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, our research highlights the crucial importance of external feedback in promoting the ongoing self-improvement of LLMs.

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Large Language Models, such as Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (aka. GPT-3), have been developed to understand language through the analysis of extensive text data, allowing them to identify patterns and connections between words. While LLMs have demonstrated impressive performance across various text-related tasks, they encounter challenges in tasks associated with reasoning. To address this challenge, Chain of Thought(CoT) prompting method has been proposed as a means to enhance LLMs' proficiency in complex reasoning tasks like solving math word problems and answering questions based on logical argumentative reasoning. The primary aim of this research is to assess how well four language models can grade reflective essays of third-year medical students. The assessment will specifically target the evaluation of critical thinking skills using CoT prompting. The research will provide the following contributions; to introduce and educate on the process of instructing models to evaluate reflective essays from a dataset they have not been previously trained on; to illustrate the use of CoT prompting as an instructional approach for training large models to carry out particular tasks. Our results suggest that among all the models, Llama-7b performs the least effectively, displaying the highest mean squared error. Conversely, ChatGPT emerges as the superior model, boasting a higher Cohen kappa score value of 0.53. Lastly, it's important to note that the selected models do prioritise user privacy by allowing users to delete their own conducted conversations.

We have witnessed that strong LLMs like Qwen-Math, MiMo, and Phi-4 possess immense reasoning potential inherited from the pre-training stage. With reinforcement learning (RL), these models can improve dramatically on reasoning tasks. Recent studies have shown that even RL on a single problem can unleash these models' reasoning capabilities. However, RL is not only expensive but also unstable. Even one-shot RL requires hundreds of GPU hours. This raises a critical question: Is there a more efficient way to unleash the reasoning potential of these powerful base LLMs? In this work, we demonstrate that Critique Fine-Tuning (CFT) on only one problem can effectively unleash the reasoning potential of LLMs. Our method constructs critique data by collecting diverse model-generated solutions to a single problem and using teacher LLMs to provide detailed critiques. We fine-tune Qwen and Llama family models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, on the CFT data and observe significant performance gains across diverse reasoning tasks. For example, with just 5 GPU hours of training, Qwen-Math-7B-CFT show an average improvement of 15% on six math benchmarks and 16% on three logic reasoning benchmarks. These results are comparable to or even surpass the results from RL with 20x less compute. Ablation studies reveal the robustness of one-shot CFT across different prompt problems. These results highlight one-shot CFT as a simple, general, and compute-efficient approach to unleashing the reasoning capabilities of modern LLMs.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

We evaluate a range of recent LLMs on English creative writing, a challenging and complex task that requires imagination, coherence, and style. We use a difficult, open-ended scenario chosen to avoid training data reuse: an epic narration of a single combat between Ignatius J. Reilly, the protagonist of the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel A Confederacy of Dunces (1980), and a pterodactyl, a prehistoric flying reptile. We ask several LLMs and humans to write such a story and conduct a human evalution involving various criteria such as fluency, coherence, originality, humor, and style. Our results show that some state-of-the-art commercial LLMs match or slightly outperform our writers in most dimensions; whereas open-source LLMs lag behind. Humans retain an edge in creativity, while humor shows a binary divide between LLMs that can handle it comparably to humans and those that fail at it. We discuss the implications and limitations of our study and suggest directions for future research.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently transformed from text-based assistants to autonomous agents capable of planning, reasoning, and iteratively improving their actions. While numerical reward signals and verifiers can effectively rank candidate actions, they often provide limited contextual guidance. In contrast, natural language feedback better aligns with the generative capabilities of LLMs, providing richer and more actionable suggestions. However, parsing and implementing this feedback effectively can be challenging for LLM-based agents. In this work, we introduce Critique-Guided Improvement (CGI), a novel two-player framework, comprising an actor model that explores an environment and a critic model that generates detailed nature language feedback. By training the critic to produce fine-grained assessments and actionable revisions, and the actor to utilize these critiques, our approach promotes more robust exploration of alternative strategies while avoiding local optima. Experiments in three interactive environments show that CGI outperforms existing baselines by a substantial margin. Notably, even a small critic model surpasses GPT-4 in feedback quality. The resulting actor achieves state-of-the-art performance, demonstrating the power of explicit iterative guidance to enhance decision-making in LLM-based agents.

We present Multi-expert Prompting, a novel enhancement of ExpertPrompting (Xu et al., 2023), designed to improve the large language model (LLM) generation. Specifically, it guides an LLM to fulfill an input instruction by simulating multiple experts, aggregating their responses, and selecting the best among individual and aggregated responses. This process is performed in a single chain of thoughts through our seven carefully designed subtasks derived from the Nominal Group Technique (Ven and Delbecq, 1974), a well-established decision-making framework. Our evaluations demonstrate that Multi-expert Prompting significantly outperforms ExpertPrompting and comparable baselines in enhancing the truthfulness, factuality, informativeness, and usefulness of responses while reducing toxicity and hurtfulness. It further achieves state-of-the-art truthfulness by outperforming the best baseline by 8.69% with ChatGPT. Multi-expert Prompting is efficient, explainable, and highly adaptable to diverse scenarios, eliminating the need for manual prompt construction.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

This study investigates the consistency of feedback ratings generated by OpenAI's GPT-4, a state-of-the-art artificial intelligence language model, across multiple iterations, time spans and stylistic variations. The model rated responses to tasks within the Higher Education (HE) subject domain of macroeconomics in terms of their content and style. Statistical analysis was conducted in order to learn more about the interrater reliability, consistency of the ratings across iterations and the correlation between ratings in terms of content and style. The results revealed a high interrater reliability with ICC scores ranging between 0.94 and 0.99 for different timespans, suggesting that GPT-4 is capable of generating consistent ratings across repetitions with a clear prompt. Style and content ratings show a high correlation of 0.87. When applying a non-adequate style the average content ratings remained constant, while style ratings decreased, which indicates that the large language model (LLM) effectively distinguishes between these two criteria during evaluation. The prompt used in this study is furthermore presented and explained. Further research is necessary to assess the robustness and reliability of AI models in various use cases.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Recent work has explored the capability of large language models (LLMs) to identify and correct errors in LLM-generated responses. These refinement approaches frequently evaluate what sizes of models are able to do refinement for what problems, but less attention is paid to what effective feedback for refinement looks like. In this work, we propose looking at refinement with feedback as a composition of three distinct LLM competencies: (1) identification of bad generations; (2) fine-grained natural language feedback generation; (3) refining with fine-grained feedback. The first step can be implemented with a high-performing discriminative model and steps 2 and 3 can be implemented either via prompted or fine-tuned LLMs. A key property of this approach is that the step 2 critique model can give fine-grained feedback about errors, made possible by offloading the discrimination to a separate model in step 1. We show that models of different capabilities benefit from refining with this approach on the task of improving factual consistency of document grounded summaries. Overall, our proposed method consistently outperforms existing end-to-end refinement approaches and current trained models not fine-tuned for factuality critiquing.

This paper examines the zero-shot ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to detect multiple-choice questions with no correct answer, a crucial aspect of educational assessment quality. We explore this ability not only as a measure of subject matter knowledge but also as an indicator of critical thinking within LLMs. Our experiments, utilizing a range of LLMs on diverse questions, highlight the significant performance gap between questions with a single correct answer and those without. Llama-3.1-405B stands out by successfully identifying the lack of a valid answer in many instances. These findings suggest that LLMs should prioritize critical thinking over blind instruction following and caution against their use in educational settings where questions with incorrect answers might lead to inaccurate evaluations. This research sets a benchmark for assessing critical thinking in LLMs and emphasizes the need for ongoing model alignment to ensure genuine user comprehension and assistance.

Given the rapid ascent of large language models (LLMs), we study the question: (How) can large language models help in reviewing of scientific papers or proposals? We first conduct some pilot studies where we find that (i) GPT-4 outperforms other LLMs (Bard, Vicuna, Koala, Alpaca, LLaMa, Dolly, OpenAssistant, StableLM), and (ii) prompting with a specific question (e.g., to identify errors) outperforms prompting to simply write a review. With these insights, we study the use of LLMs (specifically, GPT-4) for three tasks: 1. Identifying errors: We construct 13 short computer science papers each with a deliberately inserted error, and ask the LLM to check for the correctness of these papers. We observe that the LLM finds errors in 7 of them, spanning both mathematical and conceptual errors. 2. Verifying checklists: We task the LLM to verify 16 closed-ended checklist questions in the respective sections of 15 NeurIPS 2022 papers. We find that across 119 {checklist question, paper} pairs, the LLM had an 86.6% accuracy. 3. Choosing the "better" paper: We generate 10 pairs of abstracts, deliberately designing each pair in such a way that one abstract was clearly superior than the other. The LLM, however, struggled to discern these relatively straightforward distinctions accurately, committing errors in its evaluations for 6 out of the 10 pairs. Based on these experiments, we think that LLMs have a promising use as reviewing assistants for specific reviewing tasks, but not (yet) for complete evaluations of papers or proposals.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in accelerating the scientific research pipeline. A key capability for this process is the ability to generate novel research ideas, and prior studies have found settings in which LLM-generated research ideas were judged as more novel than human-expert ideas. However, a good idea should not simply appear to be novel, it should also result in better research after being executed. To test whether AI-generated ideas lead to better research outcomes, we conduct an execution study by recruiting 43 expert researchers to execute randomly-assigned ideas, either written by experts or generated by an LLM. Each expert spent over 100 hours implementing the idea and wrote a 4-page short paper to document the experiments. All the executed projects are then reviewed blindly by expert NLP researchers. Comparing the review scores of the same ideas before and after execution, the scores of the LLM-generated ideas decrease significantly more than expert-written ideas on all evaluation metrics (novelty, excitement, effectiveness, and overall; p < 0.05), closing the gap between LLM and human ideas observed at the ideation stage. When comparing the aggregated review scores from the execution study, we even observe that for many metrics there is a flip in rankings where human ideas score higher than LLM ideas. This ideation-execution gap highlights the limitations of current LLMs in generating truly effective research ideas and the challenge of evaluating research ideas in the absence of execution outcomes.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting helps Large Language Models (LLMs) tackle complex reasoning by eliciting explicit step-by-step rationales. However, CoT's verbosity increases latency and memory usage and may propagate early errors across long chains. We propose the Reasoning Capsule (R-Capsule), a framework that aims to combine the efficiency of latent reasoning with the transparency of explicit CoT. The core idea is to compress the high-level plan into a small set of learned latent tokens (a Reasoning Capsule) while keeping execution steps lightweight or explicit. This hybrid approach is inspired by the Information Bottleneck (IB) principle, where we encourage the capsule to be approximately minimal yet sufficient for the task. Minimality is encouraged via a low-capacity bottleneck, which helps improve efficiency. Sufficiency is encouraged via a dual objective: a primary task loss for answer accuracy and an auxiliary plan-reconstruction loss that encourages the capsule to faithfully represent the original textual plan. The reconstruction objective helps ground the latent space, thereby improving interpretability and reducing the use of uninformative shortcuts. Our framework strikes a balance between efficiency, accuracy, and interpretability, thereby reducing the visible token footprint of reasoning while maintaining or improving accuracy on complex benchmarks. Our codes are available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Reasoning-Capsule-7BE0

Language models (LMs) have recently shown remarkable performance on reasoning tasks by explicitly generating intermediate inferences, e.g., chain-of-thought prompting. However, these intermediate inference steps may be inappropriate deductions from the initial context and lead to incorrect final predictions. Here we introduce REFINER, a framework for finetuning LMs to explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps while interacting with a critic model that provides automated feedback on the reasoning. Specifically, the critic provides structured feedback that the reasoning LM uses to iteratively improve its intermediate arguments. Empirical evaluations of REFINER on three diverse reasoning tasks show significant improvements over baseline LMs of comparable scale. Furthermore, when using GPT-3.5 or ChatGPT as the reasoner, the trained critic significantly improves reasoning without finetuning the reasoner. Finally, our critic model is trained without expensive human-in-the-loop data but can be substituted with humans at inference time.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

With the exponential growth of research facilitated by modern technology and improved accessibility, scientific discoveries have become increasingly fragmented within and across fields. This makes it challenging to assess the significance, novelty, incremental findings, and equivalent ideas between related works, particularly those from different research communities. Large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strong quantitative and qualitative reasoning abilities, and multi-agent LLM debates have shown promise in handling complex reasoning tasks by exploring diverse perspectives and reasoning paths. Inspired by this, we introduce Tree-of-Debate (ToD), a framework which converts scientific papers into LLM personas that debate their respective novelties. To emphasize structured, critical reasoning rather than focusing solely on outcomes, ToD dynamically constructs a debate tree, enabling fine-grained analysis of independent novelty arguments within scholarly articles. Through experiments on scientific literature across various domains, evaluated by expert researchers, we demonstrate that ToD generates informative arguments, effectively contrasts papers, and supports researchers in their literature review.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

When provided with sufficient explanatory context, smaller Language Models have been shown to exhibit strong reasoning ability on challenging short-answer question-answering tasks where the questions are unseen in training. We evaluate two methods for further improvement in this setting. Both methods focus on combining rationales generated by a larger Language Model with longer contexts created from a multi-hop dense retrieval system. The first method (RR) involves training a Rationale Ranking model to score both generated rationales and retrieved contexts with respect to relevance and truthfulness. We then use the scores to derive combined contexts from both knowledge sources using a number of combinatory strategies. For the second method (RATD) we utilise retrieval-augmented training datasets developed by Hartill et al. 2023 to train a smaller Reasoning model such that it becomes proficient at utilising relevant information from longer text sequences that may be only partially evidential and frequently contain many irrelevant sentences. We find that both methods significantly improve results. Our single best Reasoning model materially improves upon strong comparable prior baselines for unseen evaluation datasets (StrategyQA 58.9 rightarrow 61.7 acc., CommonsenseQA 63.6 rightarrow 72.7 acc., ARC-DA 31.6 rightarrow 52.1 F1, IIRC 25.5 rightarrow 27.3 F1) and a version utilising our prior knowledge of each type of question in selecting a context combination strategy does even better. Our proposed models also generally outperform direct prompts against much larger models (BLOOM 175B and StableVicuna 13B) in both few-shot chain-of-thought and standard few-shot settings.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

In this work, we introduce a novel evaluation paradigm for Large Language Models, one that challenges them to engage in meta-reasoning. This approach addresses critical shortcomings in existing math problem-solving benchmarks, traditionally used to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of agents. Our paradigm shifts the focus from result-oriented assessments, which often overlook the reasoning process, to a more holistic evaluation that effectively differentiates the cognitive capabilities among models. For example, in our benchmark, GPT-4 demonstrates a performance ten times more accurate than GPT3-5. The significance of this new paradigm lies in its ability to reveal potential cognitive deficiencies in LLMs that current benchmarks, such as GSM8K, fail to uncover due to their saturation and lack of effective differentiation among varying reasoning abilities. Our comprehensive analysis includes several state-of-the-art math models from both open-source and closed-source communities, uncovering fundamental deficiencies in their training and evaluation approaches. This paper not only advocates for a paradigm shift in the assessment of LLMs but also contributes to the ongoing discourse on the trajectory towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). By promoting the adoption of meta-reasoning evaluation methods similar to ours, we aim to facilitate a more accurate assessment of the true cognitive abilities of LLMs.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

Large Language Models (LLMs) leverage step-by-step reasoning to solve complex problems. Standard evaluation practice involves generating a complete reasoning trace and assessing the correctness of the final answer presented at its conclusion. In this paper, we challenge the reliance on the final answer by posing the following two questions: Does the final answer reliably represent the model's optimal conclusion? Can alternative reasoning paths yield different results? To answer these questions, we analyze intermediate reasoning steps, termed subthoughts, and propose a method based on our findings. Our approach involves segmenting a reasoning trace into sequential subthoughts based on linguistic cues. We start by prompting the model to generate continuations from the end-point of each intermediate subthought. We extract a potential answer from every completed continuation originating from different subthoughts. We find that aggregating these answers by selecting the most frequent one (the mode) often yields significantly higher accuracy compared to relying solely on the answer derived from the original complete trace. Analyzing the consistency among the answers derived from different subthoughts reveals characteristics that correlate with the model's confidence and correctness, suggesting potential for identifying less reliable answers. Our experiments across various LLMs and challenging mathematical reasoning datasets (AIME2024 and AIME2025) show consistent accuracy improvements, with gains reaching up to 13\% and 10\% respectively. Implementation is available at: https://github.com/hammoudhasan/SubthoughtReasoner.

We introduce PRELUDE, a benchmark for evaluating long-context understanding through the task of determining whether a character's prequel story is consistent with the canonical narrative of the original book. Our task poses a stronger demand for global comprehension and deep reasoning than existing benchmarks -- as the prequels are not part of the original story, assessing their plausibility typically requires searching and integrating information that is only indirectly related. Empirically, 88% of instances require evidence from multiple parts of the narrative. Experimental results highlight the challenge of our task: in-context learning, RAG and in-domain training with state-of-the-art LLMs, and commercial DeepResearch services, lag behind humans by >15%. A further human study reveals that models often produce correct answers with flawed reasoning, leading to an over 30% gap in reasoning accuracy compared to humans. These findings underscore the substantial room for improvement in long-context understanding and reasoning.

Peer assessment has been widely applied across diverse academic fields over the last few decades and has demonstrated its effectiveness. However, the advantages of peer assessment can only be achieved with high-quality peer reviews. Previous studies have found that high-quality review comments usually comprise several features (e.g., contain suggestions, mention problems, use a positive tone). Thus, researchers have attempted to evaluate peer-review comments by detecting different features using various machine learning and deep learning models. However, there is no single study that investigates using a multi-task learning (MTL) model to detect multiple features simultaneously. This paper presents two MTL models for evaluating peer-review comments by leveraging the state-of-the-art pre-trained language representation models BERT and DistilBERT. Our results demonstrate that BERT-based models significantly outperform previous GloVe-based methods by around 6% in F1-score on tasks of detecting a single feature, and MTL further improves performance while reducing model size.

Peer review is a cornerstone of quality control in scientific publishing. With the increasing workload, the unintended use of `quick' heuristics, referred to as lazy thinking, has emerged as a recurring issue compromising review quality. Automated methods to detect such heuristics can help improve the peer-reviewing process. However, there is limited NLP research on this issue, and no real-world dataset exists to support the development of detection tools. This work introduces LazyReview, a dataset of peer-review sentences annotated with fine-grained lazy thinking categories. Our analysis reveals that Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to detect these instances in a zero-shot setting. However, instruction-based fine-tuning on our dataset significantly boosts performance by 10-20 performance points, highlighting the importance of high-quality training data. Furthermore, a controlled experiment demonstrates that reviews revised with lazy thinking feedback are more comprehensive and actionable than those written without such feedback. We will release our dataset and the enhanced guidelines that can be used to train junior reviewers in the community. (Code available here: https://github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2025-lazy-review)

Current large language models can perform reasonably well on complex tasks that require step-by-step reasoning with few-shot learning. Are these models applying reasoning skills they have learnt during pre-training and reason outside of their training context, or are they simply memorizing their training corpus at finer granularity and have learnt to better understand their context? To tease apart these possibilities, we introduce ALERT, a benchmark and suite of analyses for assessing language models' reasoning ability comparing pre-trained and finetuned models on complex tasks that require reasoning skills to solve. ALERT provides a test bed to asses any language model on fine-grained reasoning skills, which spans over 20 datasets and covers 10 different reasoning skills. We leverage ALERT to further investigate the role of finetuning. With extensive empirical analysis we find that language models learn more reasoning skills such as textual entailment, abductive reasoning, and analogical reasoning during finetuning stage compared to pretraining state. We also find that when language models are finetuned they tend to overfit to the prompt template, which hurts the robustness of models causing generalization problems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) agents are increasingly pivotal for addressing complex tasks in interactive environments. Existing work mainly focuses on enhancing performance through behavior cloning from stronger experts, yet such approaches often falter in real-world applications, mainly due to the inability to recover from errors. However, step-level critique data is difficult and expensive to collect. Automating and dynamically constructing self-critique datasets is thus crucial to empowering models with intelligent agent capabilities. In this work, we propose an iterative self-training framework, Agent-R, that enables language Agent to Reflect on the fly. Unlike traditional methods that reward or penalize actions based on correctness, Agent-R leverages MCTS to construct training data that recover correct trajectories from erroneous ones. A key challenge of agent reflection lies in the necessity for timely revision rather than waiting until the end of a rollout. To address this, we introduce a model-guided critique construction mechanism: the actor model identifies the first error step (within its current capability) in a failed trajectory. Starting from it, we splice it with the adjacent correct path, which shares the same parent node in the tree. This strategy enables the model to learn reflection based on its current policy, therefore yielding better learning efficiency. To further explore the scalability of this self-improvement paradigm, we investigate iterative refinement of both error correction capabilities and dataset construction. Our findings demonstrate that Agent-R continuously improves the model's ability to recover from errors and enables timely error correction. Experiments on three interactive environments show that Agent-R effectively equips agents to correct erroneous actions while avoiding loops, achieving superior performance compared to baseline methods (+5.59%).

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

Code generation has attracted increasing attention with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). Many studies have developed powerful code LLMs by synthesizing code-related instruction data and applying supervised fine-tuning. However, these methods are limited by teacher model distillation and ignore the potential of iterative refinement by self-generated code. In this paper, we propose Adaptive Critique Refinement (ACR), which enables the model to refine itself by self-generated code and external critique, rather than directly imitating the code responses of the teacher model. Concretely, ACR includes a composite scoring system with LLM-as-a-Judge to evaluate the quality of code responses and a selective critique strategy with LLM-as-a-Critic to critique self-generated low-quality code responses. We develop the RefineCoder series by iteratively applying ACR, achieving continuous performance improvement on multiple code generation benchmarks. Compared to the baselines of the same size, our proposed RefineCoder series can achieve comparable or even superior performance using less data.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

With the recent advances of large language models (LLMs), it is no longer infeasible to build an automated debate system that helps people to synthesise persuasive arguments. Previous work attempted this task by integrating multiple components. In our work, we introduce an argument mining dataset that captures the end-to-end process of preparing an argumentative essay for a debate, which covers the tasks of claim and evidence identification (Task 1 ED), evidence convincingness ranking (Task 2 ECR), argumentative essay summarisation and human preference ranking (Task 3 ASR) and metric learning for automated evaluation of resulting essays, based on human feedback along argument quality dimensions (Task 4 SQE). Our dataset contains 14k examples of claims that are fully annotated with the various properties supporting the aforementioned tasks. We evaluate multiple generative baselines for each of these tasks, including representative LLMs. We find, that while they show promising results on individual tasks in our benchmark, their end-to-end performance on all four tasks in succession deteriorates significantly, both in automated measures as well as in human-centred evaluation. This challenge presented by our proposed dataset motivates future research on end-to-end argument mining and summarisation. The repository of this project is available at https://github.com/HarrywillDr/ArgSum-Datatset

Large language models have exhibited emergent abilities, demonstrating exceptional performance across diverse tasks for which they were not explicitly trained, including those that require complex reasoning abilities. The emergence of such abilities carries profound implications for the future direction of research in NLP, especially as the deployment of such models becomes more prevalent. However, one key challenge is that the evaluation of these abilities is often confounded by competencies that arise in models through alternative prompting techniques, such as in-context learning and instruction following, which also emerge as the models are scaled up. In this study, we provide the first comprehensive examination of these emergent abilities while accounting for various potentially biasing factors that can influence the evaluation of models. We conduct rigorous tests on a set of 18 models, encompassing a parameter range from 60 million to 175 billion parameters, across a comprehensive set of 22 tasks. Through an extensive series of over 1,000 experiments, we provide compelling evidence that emergent abilities can primarily be ascribed to in-context learning. We find no evidence for the emergence of reasoning abilities, thus providing valuable insights into the underlying mechanisms driving the observed abilities and thus alleviating safety concerns regarding their use.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated the capacity to improve summary quality by mirroring a human-like iterative process of critique and refinement starting from the initial draft. Two strategies are designed to perform this iterative process: Prompt Chaining and Stepwise Prompt. Prompt chaining orchestrates the drafting, critiquing, and refining phases through a series of three discrete prompts, while Stepwise prompt integrates these phases within a single prompt. However, the relative effectiveness of the two methods has not been extensively studied. This paper is dedicated to examining and comparing these two methods in the context of text summarization to ascertain which method stands out as the most effective. Experimental results show that the prompt chaining method can produce a more favorable outcome. This might be because stepwise prompt might produce a simulated refinement process according to our various experiments. Since refinement is adaptable to diverse tasks, our conclusions have the potential to be extrapolated to other applications, thereby offering insights that may contribute to the broader development of LLMs.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.