Daily Papers

Text-to-image based object customization, aiming to generate images with the same identity (ID) as objects of interest in accordance with text prompts and reference images, has made significant progress. However, recent customizing research is dominated by specialized tasks, such as human customization or virtual try-on, leaving a gap in general object customization. To this end, we introduce AnyMaker, an innovative zero-shot object customization framework capable of generating general objects with high ID fidelity and flexible text editability. The efficacy of AnyMaker stems from its novel general ID extraction, dual-level ID injection, and ID-aware decoupling. Specifically, the general ID extraction module extracts sufficient ID information with an ensemble of self-supervised models to tackle the diverse customization tasks for general objects. Then, to provide the diffusion UNet with the extracted ID as much while not damaging the text editability in the generation process, we design a global-local dual-level ID injection module, in which the global-level semantic ID is injected into text descriptions while the local-level ID details are injected directly into the model through newly added cross-attention modules. In addition, we propose an ID-aware decoupling module to disentangle ID-related information from non-ID elements in the extracted representations for high-fidelity generation of both identity and text descriptions. To validate our approach and boost the research of general object customization, we create the first large-scale general ID dataset, Multi-Category ID-Consistent (MC-IDC) dataset, with 315k text-image samples and 10k categories. Experiments show that AnyMaker presents remarkable performance in general object customization and outperforms specialized methods in corresponding tasks. Code and dataset will be released soon.

Semantic IDs are discrete identifiers generated by quantizing the Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) embeddings, enabling efficient multi-modal content integration in recommendation systems. However, their lack of collaborative signals results in a misalignment with downstream discriminative and generative recommendation objectives. Recent studies have introduced various alignment mechanisms to address this problem, but their two-stage framework design still leads to two main limitations: (1) inevitable information loss during alignment, and (2) inflexibility in applying adaptive alignment strategies, consequently constraining the mutual information maximization during the alignment process. To address these limitations, we propose a novel and flexible one-stage Dual-Aligned Semantic IDs (DAS) method that simultaneously optimizes quantization and alignment, preserving semantic integrity and alignment quality while avoiding the information loss typically associated with two-stage methods. Meanwhile, DAS achieves more efficient alignment between the semantic IDs and collaborative signals, with the following two innovative and effective approaches: (1) Multi-view Constrative Alignment: To maximize mutual information between semantic IDs and collaborative signals, we first incorporate an ID-based CF debias module, and then design three effective contrastive alignment methods: dual user-to-item (u2i), dual item-to-item/user-to-user (i2i/u2u), and dual co-occurrence item-to-item/user-to-user (i2i/u2u). (2) Dual Learning: By aligning the dual quantizations of users and ads, the constructed semantic IDs for users and ads achieve stronger alignment. Finally, we conduct extensive offline experiments and online A/B tests to evaluate DAS's effectiveness, which is now successfully deployed across various advertising scenarios at Kuaishou App, serving over 400 million users daily.

Recent advancements in text-to-image generation have spurred interest in personalized human image generation, which aims to create novel images featuring specific human identities as reference images indicate. Although existing methods achieve high-fidelity identity preservation, they often struggle with limited multi-ID usability and inadequate facial editability. We present DynamicID, a tuning-free framework supported by a dual-stage training paradigm that inherently facilitates both single-ID and multi-ID personalized generation with high fidelity and flexible facial editability. Our key innovations include: 1) Semantic-Activated Attention (SAA), which employs query-level activation gating to minimize disruption to the original model when injecting ID features and achieve multi-ID personalization without requiring multi-ID samples during training. 2) Identity-Motion Reconfigurator (IMR), which leverages contrastive learning to effectively disentangle and re-entangle facial motion and identity features, thereby enabling flexible facial editing. Additionally, we have developed a curated VariFace-10k facial dataset, comprising 10k unique individuals, each represented by 35 distinct facial images. Experimental results demonstrate that DynamicID outperforms state-of-the-art methods in identity fidelity, facial editability, and multi-ID personalization capability.

The ability to synthesize personalized group photos and specify the positions of each identity offers immense creative potential. While such imagery can be visually appealing, it presents significant challenges for existing technologies. A persistent issue is identity (ID) leakage, where injected facial features interfere with one another, resulting in low face resemblance, incorrect positioning, and visual artifacts. Existing methods suffer from limitations such as the reliance on segmentation models, increased runtime, or a high probability of ID leakage. To address these challenges, we propose ID-Patch, a novel method that provides robust association between identities and 2D positions. Our approach generates an ID patch and ID embeddings from the same facial features: the ID patch is positioned on the conditional image for precise spatial control, while the ID embeddings integrate with text embeddings to ensure high resemblance. Experimental results demonstrate that ID-Patch surpasses baseline methods across metrics, such as face ID resemblance, ID-position association accuracy, and generation efficiency. Project Page is: https://byteaigc.github.io/ID-Patch/

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

We propose an efficient framework, called Simple Swap (SimSwap), aiming for generalized and high fidelity face swapping. In contrast to previous approaches that either lack the ability to generalize to arbitrary identity or fail to preserve attributes like facial expression and gaze direction, our framework is capable of transferring the identity of an arbitrary source face into an arbitrary target face while preserving the attributes of the target face. We overcome the above defects in the following two ways. First, we present the ID Injection Module (IIM) which transfers the identity information of the source face into the target face at feature level. By using this module, we extend the architecture of an identity-specific face swapping algorithm to a framework for arbitrary face swapping. Second, we propose the Weak Feature Matching Loss which efficiently helps our framework to preserve the facial attributes in an implicit way. Extensive experiments on wild faces demonstrate that our SimSwap is able to achieve competitive identity performance while preserving attributes better than previous state-of-the-art methods. The code is already available on github: https://github.com/neuralchen/SimSwap.

Drawing on recent advancements in diffusion models for text-to-image generation, identity-preserved personalization has made significant progress in accurately capturing specific identities with just a single reference image. However, existing methods primarily integrate reference images within the text embedding space, leading to a complex entanglement of image and text information, which poses challenges for preserving both identity fidelity and semantic consistency. To tackle this challenge, we propose Infinite-ID, an ID-semantics decoupling paradigm for identity-preserved personalization. Specifically, we introduce identity-enhanced training, incorporating an additional image cross-attention module to capture sufficient ID information while deactivating the original text cross-attention module of the diffusion model. This ensures that the image stream faithfully represents the identity provided by the reference image while mitigating interference from textual input. Additionally, we introduce a feature interaction mechanism that combines a mixed attention module with an AdaIN-mean operation to seamlessly merge the two streams. This mechanism not only enhances the fidelity of identity and semantic consistency but also enables convenient control over the styles of the generated images. Extensive experimental results on both raw photo generation and style image generation demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed method.

Advanced diffusion-based Text-to-Image (T2I) models, such as the Stable Diffusion Model, have made significant progress in generating diverse and high-quality images using text prompts alone. However, T2I models are unable to accurately map identities (IDs) when non-famous users require personalized image generation. The main problem is that existing T2I models do not learn the ID-image alignments of new users. The previous methods either failed to accurately fit the face region or lost the interactive generative ability with other existing concepts in T2I models (i.e., unable to generate other concepts described in given prompts such as scenes, actions, and facial attributes). In this paper, we focus on accurate and semantic-fidelity ID embedding into the Stable Diffusion Model for personalized generation. We address this challenge from two perspectives: face-wise region fitting, and semantic-fidelity token optimization. Specifically, we first visualize the attention overfit problem, and propose a face-wise attention loss to fit the face region instead of the whole target image. This key trick significantly enhances the ID accuracy and interactive generative ability with other existing concepts. Then, we optimize one ID representation as multiple per-stage tokens where each token contains two disentangled features. This expansion of the textual conditioning space enhances semantic-fidelity control. Extensive experiments validate that our results exhibit superior ID accuracy and manipulation ability compared to previous methods.

In the field of personalized image generation, the ability to create images preserving concepts has significantly improved. Creating an image that naturally integrates multiple concepts in a cohesive and visually appealing composition can indeed be challenging. This paper introduces "InstantFamily," an approach that employs a novel masked cross-attention mechanism and a multimodal embedding stack to achieve zero-shot multi-ID image generation. Our method effectively preserves ID as it utilizes global and local features from a pre-trained face recognition model integrated with text conditions. Additionally, our masked cross-attention mechanism enables the precise control of multi-ID and composition in the generated images. We demonstrate the effectiveness of InstantFamily through experiments showing its dominance in generating images with multi-ID, while resolving well-known multi-ID generation problems. Additionally, our model achieves state-of-the-art performance in both single-ID and multi-ID preservation. Furthermore, our model exhibits remarkable scalability with a greater number of ID preservation than it was originally trained with.

Recent advances in text-to-image generation have made remarkable progress in synthesizing realistic human photos conditioned on given text prompts. However, existing personalized generation methods cannot simultaneously satisfy the requirements of high efficiency, promising identity (ID) fidelity, and flexible text controllability. In this work, we introduce PhotoMaker, an efficient personalized text-to-image generation method, which mainly encodes an arbitrary number of input ID images into a stack ID embedding for preserving ID information. Such an embedding, serving as a unified ID representation, can not only encapsulate the characteristics of the same input ID comprehensively, but also accommodate the characteristics of different IDs for subsequent integration. This paves the way for more intriguing and practically valuable applications. Besides, to drive the training of our PhotoMaker, we propose an ID-oriented data construction pipeline to assemble the training data. Under the nourishment of the dataset constructed through the proposed pipeline, our PhotoMaker demonstrates better ID preservation ability than test-time fine-tuning based methods, yet provides significant speed improvements, high-quality generation results, strong generalization capabilities, and a wide range of applications. Our project page is available at https://photo-maker.github.io/

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

There has been significant progress in personalized image synthesis with methods such as Textual Inversion, DreamBooth, and LoRA. Yet, their real-world applicability is hindered by high storage demands, lengthy fine-tuning processes, and the need for multiple reference images. Conversely, existing ID embedding-based methods, while requiring only a single forward inference, face challenges: they either necessitate extensive fine-tuning across numerous model parameters, lack compatibility with community pre-trained models, or fail to maintain high face fidelity. Addressing these limitations, we introduce InstantID, a powerful diffusion model-based solution. Our plug-and-play module adeptly handles image personalization in various styles using just a single facial image, while ensuring high fidelity. To achieve this, we design a novel IdentityNet by imposing strong semantic and weak spatial conditions, integrating facial and landmark images with textual prompts to steer the image generation. InstantID demonstrates exceptional performance and efficiency, proving highly beneficial in real-world applications where identity preservation is paramount. Moreover, our work seamlessly integrates with popular pre-trained text-to-image diffusion models like SD1.5 and SDXL, serving as an adaptable plugin. Our codes and pre-trained checkpoints will be available at https://github.com/InstantID/InstantID.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Recently, Text-to-Image (T2I) synthesis technology has made tremendous strides. Numerous representative T2I models have emerged and achieved promising application outcomes, such as DALL-E, Stable Diffusion, Imagen, etc. In practice, it has become increasingly popular for model developers to selectively adopt various pre-trained text encoders and conditional diffusion models from third-party platforms, integrating them to build customized (personalized) T2I models. However, such an adoption approach is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In this work, we propose a Combinational Backdoor Attack against Customized T2I models (CBACT2I) targeting this application scenario. Different from previous backdoor attacks against T2I models, CBACT2I embeds the backdoor into the text encoder and the conditional diffusion model separately. The customized T2I model exhibits backdoor behaviors only when the backdoor text encoder is used in combination with the backdoor conditional diffusion model. These properties make CBACT2I more stealthy and flexible than prior backdoor attacks against T2I models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of CBACT2I with different backdoor triggers and different backdoor targets on the open-sourced Stable Diffusion model. This work reveals the backdoor vulnerabilities of customized T2I models and urges countermeasures to mitigate backdoor threats in this scenario.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

With the rise of deep learning in various applications, privacy concerns around the protection of training data has become a critical area of research. Whereas prior studies have focused on privacy risks in single-modal models, we introduce a novel method to assess privacy for multi-modal models, specifically vision-language models like CLIP. The proposed Identity Inference Attack (IDIA) reveals whether an individual was included in the training data by querying the model with images of the same person. Letting the model choose from a wide variety of possible text labels, the model reveals whether it recognizes the person and, therefore, was used for training. Our large-scale experiments on CLIP demonstrate that individuals used for training can be identified with very high accuracy. We confirm that the model has learned to associate names with depicted individuals, implying the existence of sensitive information that can be extracted by adversaries. Our results highlight the need for stronger privacy protection in large-scale models and suggest that IDIAs can be used to prove the unauthorized use of data for training and to enforce privacy laws.

In latest years plethora of identity-preserving adapters for a personalized generation with diffusion models have been released. Their main disadvantage is that they are dominantly trained jointly with base diffusion models, which suffer from slow multi-step inference. This work aims to tackle the challenge of training-free adaptation of pretrained ID-adapters to diffusion models accelerated via distillation - through careful re-design of classifier-free guidance for few-step stylistic generation and attention manipulation mechanisms in decoupled blocks to improve identity similarity and fidelity, we propose universal FastFace framework. Additionally, we develop a disentangled public evaluation protocol for id-preserving adapters.

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

Identity document (ID) image analysis has become essential for many online services, like bank account opening or insurance subscription. In recent years, much research has been conducted on subjects like document localization, text recognition and fraud detection, to achieve a level of accuracy reliable enough to automatize identity verification. However, there are only a few available datasets to benchmark ID analysis methods, mainly because of privacy restrictions, security requirements and legal reasons. In this paper, we present the DocXPand-25k dataset, which consists of 24,994 richly labeled IDs images, generated using custom-made vectorial templates representing nine fictitious ID designs, including four identity cards, two residence permits and three passports designs. These synthetic IDs feature artificially generated personal information (names, dates, identifiers, faces, barcodes, ...), and present a rich diversity in the visual layouts and textual contents. We collected about 5.8k diverse backgrounds coming from real-world photos, scans and screenshots of IDs to guarantee the variety of the backgrounds. The software we wrote to generate these images has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/) under the terms of the MIT license, and our dataset has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/releases/tag/v1.0.0) under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

With the growing popularity of personalized human content creation and sharing, there is a rising demand for advanced techniques in customized human image generation. However, current methods struggle to simultaneously maintain the fidelity of human identity and ensure the consistency of textual prompts, often resulting in suboptimal outcomes. This shortcoming is primarily due to the lack of effective constraints during the simultaneous integration of visual and textual prompts, leading to unhealthy mutual interference that compromises the full expression of both types of input. Building on prior research that suggests visual and textual conditions influence different regions of an image in distinct ways, we introduce a novel Dual-Pathway Adapter (DP-Adapter) to enhance both high-fidelity identity preservation and textual consistency in personalized human image generation. Our approach begins by decoupling the target human image into visually sensitive and text-sensitive regions. For visually sensitive regions, DP-Adapter employs an Identity-Enhancing Adapter (IEA) to preserve detailed identity features. For text-sensitive regions, we introduce a Textual-Consistency Adapter (TCA) to minimize visual interference and ensure the consistency of textual semantics. To seamlessly integrate these pathways, we develop a Fine-Grained Feature-Level Blending (FFB) module that efficiently combines hierarchical semantic features from both pathways, resulting in more natural and coherent synthesis outcomes. Additionally, DP-Adapter supports various innovative applications, including controllable headshot-to-full-body portrait generation, age editing, old-photo to reality, and expression editing.

In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

The rapid development of diffusion models has triggered diverse applications. Identity-preserving text-to-image generation (ID-T2I) particularly has received significant attention due to its wide range of application scenarios like AI portrait and advertising. While existing ID-T2I methods have demonstrated impressive results, several key challenges remain: (1) It is hard to maintain the identity characteristics of reference portraits accurately, (2) The generated images lack aesthetic appeal especially while enforcing identity retention, and (3) There is a limitation that cannot be compatible with LoRA-based and Adapter-based methods simultaneously. To address these issues, we present ID-Aligner, a general feedback learning framework to enhance ID-T2I performance. To resolve identity features lost, we introduce identity consistency reward fine-tuning to utilize the feedback from face detection and recognition models to improve generated identity preservation. Furthermore, we propose identity aesthetic reward fine-tuning leveraging rewards from human-annotated preference data and automatically constructed feedback on character structure generation to provide aesthetic tuning signals. Thanks to its universal feedback fine-tuning framework, our method can be readily applied to both LoRA and Adapter models, achieving consistent performance gains. Extensive experiments on SD1.5 and SDXL diffusion models validate the effectiveness of our approach. Project Page: \url{https://idaligner.github.io/}

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence have enabled the creation of highly realistic image forgeries, raising significant concerns about digital media authenticity. While existing detection methods demonstrate promising results on benchmark datasets, they face critical limitations in real-world applications. First, existing detectors typically fail to detect semantic inconsistencies with the person's identity, such as implausible behaviors or incompatible environmental contexts in given images. Second, these methods rely heavily on low-level visual cues, making them effective for known forgeries but less reliable against new or unseen manipulation techniques. To address these challenges, we present a novel personalized vision-language model (VLM) that integrates low-level visual artifact analysis and high-level semantic inconsistency detection. Unlike previous VLM-based methods, our approach avoids resource-intensive supervised fine-tuning that often struggles to preserve distinct identity characteristics. Instead, we employ a lightweight method that dynamically encodes identity-specific information into specialized identifier tokens. This design enables the model to learn distinct identity characteristics while maintaining robust generalization capabilities. We further enhance detection capabilities through a lightweight detection adapter that extracts fine-grained information from shallow features of the vision encoder, preserving critical low-level evidence. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 94.25% accuracy and 94.08% F1 score, outperforming both traditional forgery detectors and general VLMs while requiring only 10 extra tokens.

The proliferation of large AI models trained on uncurated, often sensitive web-scraped data has raised significant privacy concerns. One of the concerns is that adversaries can extract information about the training data using privacy attacks. Unfortunately, the task of removing specific information from the models without sacrificing performance is not straightforward and has proven to be challenging. We propose a rather easy yet effective defense based on backdoor attacks to remove private information such as names of individuals from models, and focus in this work on text encoders. Specifically, through strategic insertion of backdoors, we align the embeddings of sensitive phrases with those of neutral terms-"a person" instead of the person's name. Our empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our backdoor-based defense on CLIP by assessing its performance using a specialized privacy attack for zero-shot classifiers. Our approach provides not only a new "dual-use" perspective on backdoor attacks, but also presents a promising avenue to enhance the privacy of individuals within models trained on uncurated web-scraped data.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

Creating content for a specific identity (ID) has shown significant interest in the field of generative models. In the field of text-to-image generation (T2I), subject-driven content generation has achieved great progress with the ID in the images controllable. However, extending it to video generation is not well explored. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective subject identity controllable video generation framework, termed Video Custom Diffusion (VCD). With a specified subject ID defined by a few images, VCD reinforces the identity information extraction and injects frame-wise correlation at the initialization stage for stable video outputs with identity preserved to a large extent. To achieve this, we propose three novel components that are essential for high-quality ID preservation: 1) an ID module trained with the cropped identity by prompt-to-segmentation to disentangle the ID information and the background noise for more accurate ID token learning; 2) a text-to-video (T2V) VCD module with 3D Gaussian Noise Prior for better inter-frame consistency and 3) video-to-video (V2V) Face VCD and Tiled VCD modules to deblur the face and upscale the video for higher resolution. Despite its simplicity, we conducted extensive experiments to verify that VCD is able to generate stable and high-quality videos with better ID over the selected strong baselines. Besides, due to the transferability of the ID module, VCD is also working well with finetuned text-to-image models available publically, further improving its usability. The codes are available at https://github.com/Zhen-Dong/Magic-Me.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Although recent personalization methods have democratized high-resolution image synthesis by enabling swift concept acquisition with minimal examples and lightweight computation, they also present an exploitable avenue for high accessible backdoor attacks. This paper investigates a critical and unexplored aspect of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models - their potential vulnerability to backdoor attacks via personalization. Our study focuses on a zero-day backdoor vulnerability prevalent in two families of personalization methods, epitomized by Textual Inversion and DreamBooth.Compared to traditional backdoor attacks, our proposed method can facilitate more precise, efficient, and easily accessible attacks with a lower barrier to entry. We provide a comprehensive review of personalization in T2I diffusion models, highlighting the operation and exploitation potential of this backdoor vulnerability. To be specific, by studying the prompt processing of Textual Inversion and DreamBooth, we have devised dedicated backdoor attacks according to the different ways of dealing with unseen tokens and analyzed the influence of triggers and concept images on the attack effect. Our empirical study has shown that the nouveau-token backdoor attack has better attack performance while legacy-token backdoor attack is potentially harder to defend.

Recent learning-based approaches have made astonishing advances in calibrated medical imaging like computerized tomography (CT), yet they struggle to generalize in uncalibrated modalities -- notably magnetic resonance (MR) imaging, where performance is highly sensitive to the differences in MR contrast, resolution, and orientation. This prevents broad applicability to diverse real-world clinical protocols. We introduce Brain-ID, an anatomical representation learning model for brain imaging. With the proposed "mild-to-severe" intra-subject generation, Brain-ID is robust to the subject-specific brain anatomy regardless of the appearance of acquired images (e.g., contrast, deformation, resolution, artifacts). Trained entirely on synthetic data, Brain-ID readily adapts to various downstream tasks through only one layer. We present new metrics to validate the intra- and inter-subject robustness of Brain-ID features, and evaluate their performance on four downstream applications, covering contrast-independent (anatomy reconstruction/contrast synthesis, brain segmentation), and contrast-dependent (super-resolution, bias field estimation) tasks. Extensive experiments on six public datasets demonstrate that Brain-ID achieves state-of-the-art performance in all tasks on different MRI modalities and CT, and more importantly, preserves its performance on low-resolution and small datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/peirong26/Brain-ID.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Identity-consistent generation has become an important focus in text-to-image research, with recent models achieving notable success in producing images aligned with a reference identity. Yet, the scarcity of large-scale paired datasets containing multiple images of the same individual forces most approaches to adopt reconstruction-based training. This reliance often leads to a failure mode we term copy-paste, where the model directly replicates the reference face rather than preserving identity across natural variations in pose, expression, or lighting. Such over-similarity undermines controllability and limits the expressive power of generation. To address these limitations, we (1) construct a large-scale paired dataset MultiID-2M, tailored for multi-person scenarios, providing diverse references for each identity; (2) introduce a benchmark that quantifies both copy-paste artifacts and the trade-off between identity fidelity and variation; and (3) propose a novel training paradigm with a contrastive identity loss that leverages paired data to balance fidelity with diversity. These contributions culminate in WithAnyone, a diffusion-based model that effectively mitigates copy-paste while preserving high identity similarity. Extensive qualitative and quantitative experiments demonstrate that WithAnyone significantly reduces copy-paste artifacts, improves controllability over pose and expression, and maintains strong perceptual quality. User studies further validate that our method achieves high identity fidelity while enabling expressive controllable generation.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Despite recent advances in video generation, existing models still lack fine-grained controllability, especially for multi-subject customization with consistent identity and interaction. In this paper, we propose PolyVivid, a multi-subject video customization framework that enables flexible and identity-consistent generation. To establish accurate correspondences between subject images and textual entities, we design a VLLM-based text-image fusion module that embeds visual identities into the textual space for precise grounding. To further enhance identity preservation and subject interaction, we propose a 3D-RoPE-based enhancement module that enables structured bidirectional fusion between text and image embeddings. Moreover, we develop an attention-inherited identity injection module to effectively inject fused identity features into the video generation process, mitigating identity drift. Finally, we construct an MLLM-based data pipeline that combines MLLM-based grounding, segmentation, and a clique-based subject consolidation strategy to produce high-quality multi-subject data, effectively enhancing subject distinction and reducing ambiguity in downstream video generation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PolyVivid achieves superior performance in identity fidelity, video realism, and subject alignment, outperforming existing open-source and commercial baselines.

With the help of simple fine-tuning, one can artificially embed hidden text into large language models (LLMs). This text is revealed only when triggered by a specific query to the LLM. Two primary applications are LLM fingerprinting and steganography. In the context of LLM fingerprinting, a unique text identifier (fingerprint) is embedded within the model to verify licensing compliance. In the context of steganography, the LLM serves as a carrier for hidden messages that can be disclosed through a designated trigger. Our work demonstrates that embedding hidden text in the LLM via fine-tuning, though seemingly secure due to the vast number of potential triggers (any sequence of characters or tokens could serve as a trigger), is susceptible to extraction through analysis of the LLM's output decoding process. We propose a novel approach to extraction called Unconditional Token Forcing. It is premised on the hypothesis that iteratively feeding each token from the LLM's vocabulary into the model should reveal sequences with abnormally high token probabilities, indicating potential embedded text candidates. Additionally, our experiments show that when the first token of a hidden fingerprint is used as an input, the LLM not only produces an output sequence with high token probabilities, but also repetitively generates the fingerprint itself. We also present a method to hide text in such a way that it is resistant to Unconditional Token Forcing, which we named Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

This paper aims to bring fine-grained expression control to identity-preserving portrait generation. Existing methods tend to synthesize portraits with either neutral or stereotypical expressions. Even when supplemented with control signals like facial landmarks, these models struggle to generate accurate and vivid expressions following user instructions. To solve this, we introduce EmojiDiff, an end-to-end solution to facilitate simultaneous dual control of fine expression and identity. Unlike the conventional methods using coarse control signals, our method directly accepts RGB expression images as input templates to provide extremely accurate and fine-grained expression control in the diffusion process. As its core, an innovative decoupled scheme is proposed to disentangle expression features in the expression template from other extraneous information, such as identity, skin, and style. On one hand, we introduce ID-irrelevant Data Iteration (IDI) to synthesize extremely high-quality cross-identity expression pairs for decoupled training, which is the crucial foundation to filter out identity information hidden in the expressions. On the other hand, we meticulously investigate network layer function and select expression-sensitive layers to inject reference expression features, effectively preventing style leakage from expression signals. To further improve identity fidelity, we propose a novel fine-tuning strategy named ID-enhanced Contrast Alignment (ICA), which eliminates the negative impact of expression control on original identity preservation. Experimental results demonstrate that our method remarkably outperforms counterparts, achieves precise expression control with highly maintained identity, and generalizes well to various diffusion models.

We present a Multimodal Backdoor Defense technique TIJO (Trigger Inversion using Joint Optimization). Recent work arXiv:2112.07668 has demonstrated successful backdoor attacks on multimodal models for the Visual Question Answering task. Their dual-key backdoor trigger is split across two modalities (image and text), such that the backdoor is activated if and only if the trigger is present in both modalities. We propose TIJO that defends against dual-key attacks through a joint optimization that reverse-engineers the trigger in both the image and text modalities. This joint optimization is challenging in multimodal models due to the disconnected nature of the visual pipeline which consists of an offline feature extractor, whose output is then fused with the text using a fusion module. The key insight enabling the joint optimization in TIJO is that the trigger inversion needs to be carried out in the object detection box feature space as opposed to the pixel space. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on the TrojVQA benchmark, where TIJO improves upon the state-of-the-art unimodal methods from an AUC of 0.6 to 0.92 on multimodal dual-key backdoors. Furthermore, our method also improves upon the unimodal baselines on unimodal backdoors. We present ablation studies and qualitative results to provide insights into our algorithm such as the critical importance of overlaying the inverted feature triggers on all visual features during trigger inversion. The prototype implementation of TIJO is available at https://github.com/SRI-CSL/TIJO.

Existing state-of-the-art AI-Generated image detection methods mostly consider extracting low-level information from RGB images to help improve the generalization of AI-Generated image detection, such as noise patterns. However, these methods often consider only a single type of low-level information, which may lead to suboptimal generalization. Through empirical analysis, we have discovered a key insight: different low-level information often exhibits generalization capabilities for different types of forgeries. Furthermore, we found that simple fusion strategies are insufficient to leverage the detection advantages of each low-level and high-level information for various forgery types. Therefore, we propose the Adaptive Low-level Experts Injection (ALEI) framework. Our approach introduces Lora Experts, enabling the backbone network, which is trained with high-level semantic RGB images, to accept and learn knowledge from different low-level information. We utilize a cross-attention method to adaptively fuse these features at intermediate layers. To prevent the backbone network from losing the modeling capabilities of different low-level features during the later stages of modeling, we developed a Low-level Information Adapter that interacts with the features extracted by the backbone network. Finally, we propose Dynamic Feature Selection, which dynamically selects the most suitable features for detecting the current image to maximize generalization detection capability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method, finetuned on only four categories of mainstream ProGAN data, performs excellently and achieves state-of-the-art results on multiple datasets containing unseen GAN and Diffusion methods.

The vulnerability of Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) to jailbreak attacks appears as no surprise. However, recent defense mechanisms against these attacks have reached near-saturation performance on benchmark evaluations, often with minimal effort. This dual high performance in both attack and defense raises a fundamental and perplexing paradox. To gain a deep understanding of this issue and thus further help strengthen the trustworthiness of VLLMs, this paper makes three key contributions: i) One tentative explanation for VLLMs being prone to jailbreak attacks--inclusion of vision inputs, as well as its in-depth analysis. ii) The recognition of a largely ignored problem in existing defense mechanisms--over-prudence. The problem causes these defense methods to exhibit unintended abstention, even in the presence of benign inputs, thereby undermining their reliability in faithfully defending against attacks. iii) A simple safety-aware method--LLM-Pipeline. Our method repurposes the more advanced guardrails of LLMs on the shelf, serving as an effective alternative detector prior to VLLM response. Last but not least, we find that the two representative evaluation methods for jailbreak often exhibit chance agreement. This limitation makes it potentially misleading when evaluating attack strategies or defense mechanisms. We believe the findings from this paper offer useful insights to rethink the foundational development of VLLM safety with respect to benchmark datasets, defense strategies, and evaluation methods.

Recent advances in generative modeling have enabled the generation of high-quality synthetic data that is applicable in a variety of domains, including face recognition. Here, state-of-the-art generative models typically rely on conditioning and fine-tuning of powerful pretrained diffusion models to facilitate the synthesis of realistic images of a desired identity. Yet, these models often do not consider the identity of subjects during training, leading to poor consistency between generated and intended identities. In contrast, methods that employ identity-based training objectives tend to overfit on various aspects of the identity, and in turn, lower the diversity of images that can be generated. To address these issues, we present in this paper a novel generative diffusion-based framework, called ID-Booth. ID-Booth consists of a denoising network responsible for data generation, a variational auto-encoder for mapping images to and from a lower-dimensional latent space and a text encoder that allows for prompt-based control over the generation procedure. The framework utilizes a novel triplet identity training objective and enables identity-consistent image generation while retaining the synthesis capabilities of pretrained diffusion models. Experiments with a state-of-the-art latent diffusion model and diverse prompts reveal that our method facilitates better intra-identity consistency and inter-identity separability than competing methods, while achieving higher image diversity. In turn, the produced data allows for effective augmentation of small-scale datasets and training of better-performing recognition models in a privacy-preserving manner. The source code for the ID-Booth framework is publicly available at https://github.com/dariant/ID-Booth.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

We propose a novel framework for ID-preserving generation using a multi-modal encoding strategy rather than injecting identity features via adapters into pre-trained models. Our method treats identity and text as a unified conditioning input. To achieve this, we introduce FaceCLIP, a multi-modal encoder that learns a joint embedding space for both identity and textual semantics. Given a reference face and a text prompt, FaceCLIP produces a unified representation that encodes both identity and text, which conditions a base diffusion model to generate images that are identity-consistent and text-aligned. We also present a multi-modal alignment algorithm to train FaceCLIP, using a loss that aligns its joint representation with face, text, and image embedding spaces. We then build FaceCLIP-SDXL, an ID-preserving image synthesis pipeline by integrating FaceCLIP with Stable Diffusion XL (SDXL). Compared to prior methods, FaceCLIP-SDXL enables photorealistic portrait generation with better identity preservation and textual relevance. Extensive experiments demonstrate its quantitative and qualitative superiority.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

Diffusion-based technologies have made significant strides, particularly in personalized and customized facialgeneration. However, existing methods face challenges in achieving high-fidelity and detailed identity (ID)consistency, primarily due to insufficient fine-grained control over facial areas and the lack of a comprehensive strategy for ID preservation by fully considering intricate facial details and the overall face. To address these limitations, we introduce ConsistentID, an innovative method crafted for diverseidentity-preserving portrait generation under fine-grained multimodal facial prompts, utilizing only a single reference image. ConsistentID comprises two key components: a multimodal facial prompt generator that combines facial features, corresponding facial descriptions and the overall facial context to enhance precision in facial details, and an ID-preservation network optimized through the facial attention localization strategy, aimed at preserving ID consistency in facial regions. Together, these components significantly enhance the accuracy of ID preservation by introducing fine-grained multimodal ID information from facial regions. To facilitate training of ConsistentID, we present a fine-grained portrait dataset, FGID, with over 500,000 facial images, offering greater diversity and comprehensiveness than existing public facial datasets. % such as LAION-Face, CelebA, FFHQ, and SFHQ. Experimental results substantiate that our ConsistentID achieves exceptional precision and diversity in personalized facial generation, surpassing existing methods in the MyStyle dataset. Furthermore, while ConsistentID introduces more multimodal ID information, it maintains a fast inference speed during generation.

Generating high fidelity human video with specified identities has attracted significant attention in the content generation community. However, existing techniques struggle to strike a balance between training efficiency and identity preservation, either requiring tedious case-by-case finetuning or usually missing the identity details in video generation process. In this study, we present ID-Animator, a zero-shot human-video generation approach that can perform personalized video generation given single reference facial image without further training. ID-Animator inherits existing diffusion-based video generation backbones with a face adapter to encode the ID-relevant embeddings from learnable facial latent queries. To facilitate the extraction of identity information in video generation, we introduce an ID-oriented dataset construction pipeline, which incorporates decoupled human attribute and action captioning technique from a constructed facial image pool. Based on this pipeline, a random face reference training method is further devised to precisely capture the ID-relevant embeddings from reference images, thus improving the fidelity and generalization capacity of our model for ID-specific video generation. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of ID-Animator to generate personalized human videos over previous models. Moreover, our method is highly compatible with popular pre-trained T2V models like animatediff and various community backbone models, showing high extendability in real-world applications for video generation where identity preservation is highly desired. Our codes and checkpoints will be released at https://github.com/ID-Animator/ID-Animator.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Text anonymization is essential for responsibly developing and deploying AI in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, social services, and law. In this work, we propose a novel methodology for privacy-preserving synthetic text generation that leverages the principles of de-identification and the Hiding In Plain Sight (HIPS) theory. Our approach introduces entity-aware control codes to guide controllable generation using either in-context learning (ICL) or prefix tuning. The ICL variant ensures privacy levels consistent with the underlying de-identification system, while the prefix tuning variant incorporates a custom masking strategy and loss function to support scalable, high-quality generation. Experiments on legal and clinical datasets demonstrate that our method achieves a strong balance between privacy protection and utility, offering a practical and effective solution for synthetic text generation in sensitive domains.

Leveraging Stable Diffusion for the generation of personalized portraits has emerged as a powerful and noteworthy tool, enabling users to create high-fidelity, custom character avatars based on their specific prompts. However, existing personalization methods face challenges, including test-time fine-tuning, the requirement of multiple input images, low preservation of identity, and limited diversity in generated outcomes. To overcome these challenges, we introduce IDAdapter, a tuning-free approach that enhances the diversity and identity preservation in personalized image generation from a single face image. IDAdapter integrates a personalized concept into the generation process through a combination of textual and visual injections and a face identity loss. During the training phase, we incorporate mixed features from multiple reference images of a specific identity to enrich identity-related content details, guiding the model to generate images with more diverse styles, expressions, and angles compared to previous works. Extensive evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, achieving both diversity and identity fidelity in generated images.

Securing personal identity against deepfake attacks is increasingly critical in the digital age, especially for celebrities and political figures whose faces are easily accessible and frequently targeted. Most existing deepfake detection methods focus on general-purpose scenarios and often ignore the valuable prior knowledge of known facial identities, e.g., "VIP individuals" whose authentic facial data are already available. In this paper, we propose VIPGuard, a unified multimodal framework designed to capture fine-grained and comprehensive facial representations of a given identity, compare them against potentially fake or similar-looking faces, and reason over these comparisons to make accurate and explainable predictions. Specifically, our framework consists of three main stages. First, fine-tune a multimodal large language model (MLLM) to learn detailed and structural facial attributes. Second, we perform identity-level discriminative learning to enable the model to distinguish subtle differences between highly similar faces, including real and fake variations. Finally, we introduce user-specific customization, where we model the unique characteristics of the target face identity and perform semantic reasoning via MLLM to enable personalized and explainable deepfake detection. Our framework shows clear advantages over previous detection works, where traditional detectors mainly rely on low-level visual cues and provide no human-understandable explanations, while other MLLM-based models often lack a detailed understanding of specific face identities. To facilitate the evaluation of our method, we built a comprehensive identity-aware benchmark called VIPBench for personalized deepfake detection, involving the latest 7 face-swapping and 7 entire face synthesis techniques for generation.

Diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in image generation and editing tasks. Inversion within these models aims to recover the latent noise representation for a real or generated image, enabling reconstruction, editing, and other downstream tasks. However, to date, most inversion approaches suffer from an intrinsic trade-off between reconstruction accuracy and editing flexibility. This limitation arises from the difficulty of maintaining both semantic alignment and structural consistency during the inversion process. In this work, we introduce Dual-Conditional Inversion (DCI), a novel framework that jointly conditions on the source prompt and reference image to guide the inversion process. Specifically, DCI formulates the inversion process as a dual-condition fixed-point optimization problem, minimizing both the latent noise gap and the reconstruction error under the joint guidance. This design anchors the inversion trajectory in both semantic and visual space, leading to more accurate and editable latent representations. Our novel setup brings new understanding to the inversion process. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DCI achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple editing tasks, significantly improving both reconstruction quality and editing precision. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that our method achieves strong results in reconstruction tasks, implying a degree of robustness and generalizability approaching the ultimate goal of the inversion process.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have shown significant success in personalized text-to-image generation, which aims to generate novel images with human identities indicated by the reference images. Despite promising identity fidelity has been achieved by several tuning-free methods, they usually suffer from overfitting issues. The learned identity tends to entangle with irrelevant information, resulting in unsatisfied text controllability, especially on faces. In this work, we present MasterWeaver, a test-time tuning-free method designed to generate personalized images with both faithful identity fidelity and flexible editability. Specifically, MasterWeaver adopts an encoder to extract identity features and steers the image generation through additional introduced cross attention. To improve editability while maintaining identity fidelity, we propose an editing direction loss for training, which aligns the editing directions of our MasterWeaver with those of the original T2I model. Additionally, a face-augmented dataset is constructed to facilitate disentangled identity learning, and further improve the editability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our MasterWeaver can not only generate personalized images with faithful identity, but also exhibit superiority in text controllability. Our code will be publicly available at https://github.com/csyxwei/MasterWeaver.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

Adversarial attacks are widely used to evaluate model robustness, and in black-box scenarios, the transferability of these attacks becomes crucial. Existing generator-based attacks have excellent generalization and transferability due to their instance-agnostic nature. However, when training generators for multi-target tasks, the success rate of transfer attacks is relatively low due to the limitations of the model's capacity. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Dual-Flow framework for multi-target instance-agnostic adversarial attacks, utilizing Cascading Distribution Shift Training to develop an adversarial velocity function. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Dual-Flow significantly improves transferability over previous multi-target generative attacks. For example, it increases the success rate from Inception-v3 to ResNet-152 by 34.58%. Furthermore, our attack method shows substantially stronger robustness against defense mechanisms, such as adversarially trained models.

Batch prompting, which combines a batch of multiple queries sharing the same context in one inference, has emerged as a promising solution to reduce inference costs. However, our study reveals a significant security vulnerability in batch prompting: malicious users can inject attack instructions into a batch, leading to unwanted interference across all queries, which can result in the inclusion of harmful content, such as phishing links, or the disruption of logical reasoning. In this paper, we construct BATCHSAFEBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 150 attack instructions of two types and 8k batch instances, to study the batch prompting vulnerability systematically. Our evaluation of both closed-source and open-weight LLMs demonstrates that all LLMs are susceptible to batch-prompting attacks. We then explore multiple defending approaches. While the prompting-based defense shows limited effectiveness for smaller LLMs, the probing-based approach achieves about 95% accuracy in detecting attacks. Additionally, we perform a mechanistic analysis to understand the attack and identify attention heads that are responsible for it.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Existing face identity (FaceID) customization methods perform well but are limited to generating identical faces as the input, while in real-world applications, users often desire images of the same person but with variations, such as different expressions (e.g., smiling, angry) or angles (e.g., side profile). This limitation arises from the lack of datasets with controlled input-output facial variations, restricting models' ability to learn effective modifications. To address this issue, we propose CrossFaceID, the first large-scale, high-quality, and publicly available dataset specifically designed to improve the facial modification capabilities of FaceID customization models. Specifically, CrossFaceID consists of 40,000 text-image pairs from approximately 2,000 persons, with each person represented by around 20 images showcasing diverse facial attributes such as poses, expressions, angles, and adornments. During the training stage, a specific face of a person is used as input, and the FaceID customization model is forced to generate another image of the same person but with altered facial features. This allows the FaceID customization model to acquire the ability to personalize and modify known facial features during the inference stage. Experiments show that models fine-tuned on the CrossFaceID dataset retain its performance in preserving FaceID fidelity while significantly improving its face customization capabilities. To facilitate further advancements in the FaceID customization field, our code, constructed datasets, and trained models are fully available to the public.

Automatic black-and-white image sequence colorization while preserving character and object identity (ID) is a complex task with significant market demand, such as in cartoon or comic series colorization. Despite advancements in visual colorization using large-scale generative models like diffusion models, challenges with controllability and identity consistency persist, making current solutions unsuitable for industrial application.To address this, we propose ColorFlow, a three-stage diffusion-based framework tailored for image sequence colorization in industrial applications. Unlike existing methods that require per-ID finetuning or explicit ID embedding extraction, we propose a novel robust and generalizable Retrieval Augmented Colorization pipeline for colorizing images with relevant color references. Our pipeline also features a dual-branch design: one branch for color identity extraction and the other for colorization, leveraging the strengths of diffusion models. We utilize the self-attention mechanism in diffusion models for strong in-context learning and color identity matching. To evaluate our model, we introduce ColorFlow-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark for reference-based colorization. Results show that ColorFlow outperforms existing models across multiple metrics, setting a new standard in sequential image colorization and potentially benefiting the art industry. We release our codes and models on our project page: https://zhuang2002.github.io/ColorFlow/.

Model merging has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple single-task fine-tuned models into a unified one that can perform well on multiple tasks. However, existing model merging techniques primarily focus on resolving conflicts between task-specific models, they often overlook potential security threats, particularly the risk of backdoor attacks in the open-source model ecosystem. In this paper, we first investigate the vulnerabilities of existing model merging methods to backdoor attacks, identifying two critical challenges: backdoor succession and backdoor transfer. To address these issues, we propose a novel Defense-Aware Merging (DAM) approach that simultaneously mitigates task interference and backdoor vulnerabilities. Specifically, DAM employs a meta-learning-based optimization method with dual masks to identify a shared and safety-aware subspace for model merging. These masks are alternately optimized: the Task-Shared mask identifies common beneficial parameters across tasks, aiming to preserve task-specific knowledge while reducing interference, while the Backdoor-Detection mask isolates potentially harmful parameters to neutralize security threats. This dual-mask design allows us to carefully balance the preservation of useful knowledge and the removal of potential vulnerabilities. Compared to existing merging methods, DAM achieves a more favorable balance between performance and security, reducing the attack success rate by 2-10 percentage points while sacrificing only about 1% in accuracy. Furthermore, DAM exhibits robust performance and broad applicability across various types of backdoor attacks and the number of compromised models involved in the merging process. We will release the codes and models soon.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Recent advances in large pretrained text-to-image models have shown unprecedented capabilities for high-quality human-centric generation, however, customizing face identity is still an intractable problem. Existing methods cannot ensure stable identity preservation and flexible editability, even with several images for each subject during training. In this work, we propose StableIdentity, which allows identity-consistent recontextualization with just one face image. More specifically, we employ a face encoder with an identity prior to encode the input face, and then land the face representation into a space with an editable prior, which is constructed from celeb names. By incorporating identity prior and editability prior, the learned identity can be injected anywhere with various contexts. In addition, we design a masked two-phase diffusion loss to boost the pixel-level perception of the input face and maintain the diversity of generation. Extensive experiments demonstrate our method outperforms previous customization methods. In addition, the learned identity can be flexibly combined with the off-the-shelf modules such as ControlNet. Notably, to the best knowledge, we are the first to directly inject the identity learned from a single image into video/3D generation without finetuning. We believe that the proposed StableIdentity is an important step to unify image, video, and 3D customized generation models.

Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet. To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this paper presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solution achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different implementations in support of these two claim model properties are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.

Subject-driven generation is a critical task in creative AI; yet current state-of-the-art methods present a stark trade-off. They either rely on computationally expensive, per-subject fine-tuning, sacrificing efficiency and zero-shot capability, or employ feed-forward architectures built on diffusion models, which are inherently plagued by slow inference speeds. Visual Auto-Regressive (VAR) models are renowned for their rapid sampling speeds and strong generative quality, making them an ideal yet underexplored foundation for resolving this tension. To bridge this gap, we introduce EchoGen, a pioneering framework that empowers VAR models with subject-driven generation capabilities. The core design of EchoGen is an effective dual-path injection strategy that disentangles a subject's high-level semantic identity from its low-level fine-grained details, enabling enhanced controllability and fidelity. We employ a semantic encoder to extract the subject's abstract identity, which is injected through decoupled cross-attention to guide the overall composition. Concurrently, a content encoder captures intricate visual details, which are integrated via a multi-modal attention mechanism to ensure high-fidelity texture and structural preservation. To the best of our knowledge, EchoGen is the first feed-forward subject-driven framework built upon VAR models. Both quantitative and qualitative results substantiate our design, demonstrating that EchoGen achieves subject fidelity and image quality comparable to state-of-the-art diffusion-based methods with significantly lower sampling latency. Code and models will be released soon.

We consider a scenario where we have access to the target domain, but cannot afford on-the-fly training data annotation, and instead would like to construct an alternative training set from a large-scale data pool such that a competitive model can be obtained. We propose a search and pruning (SnP) solution to this training data search problem, tailored to object re-identification (re-ID), an application aiming to match the same object captured by different cameras. Specifically, the search stage identifies and merges clusters of source identities which exhibit similar distributions with the target domain. The second stage, subject to a budget, then selects identities and their images from the Stage I output, to control the size of the resulting training set for efficient training. The two steps provide us with training sets 80\% smaller than the source pool while achieving a similar or even higher re-ID accuracy. These training sets are also shown to be superior to a few existing search methods such as random sampling and greedy sampling under the same budget on training data size. If we release the budget, training sets resulting from the first stage alone allow even higher re-ID accuracy. We provide interesting discussions on the specificity of our method to the re-ID problem and particularly its role in bridging the re-ID domain gap. The code is available at https://github.com/yorkeyao/SnP.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Aligned LLMs are secure, capable of recognizing and refusing to answer malicious questions. However, the role of internal parameters in maintaining such security is not well understood yet, further these models can be vulnerable to security degradation when subjected to fine-tuning attacks. To address these challenges, our work uncovers the mechanism behind security in aligned LLMs at the parameter level, identifying a small set of contiguous layers in the middle of the model that are crucial for distinguishing malicious queries from normal ones, referred to as ``safety layers". We first confirm the existence of these safety layers by analyzing variations in input vectors within the model's internal layers. Additionally, we leverage the over-rejection phenomenon and parameters scaling analysis to precisely locate the safety layers. Building on these findings, we propose a novel fine-tuning approach, Safely Partial-Parameter Fine-Tuning (SPPFT), that fixes the gradient of the safety layers during fine-tuning to address the security degradation. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach can significantly preserve LLM security while maintaining performance and reducing computational resources compared to full fine-tuning.

Moderators and automated methods enforce bans on malicious users who engage in disruptive behavior. However, malicious users can easily create a new account to evade such bans. Previous research has focused on other forms of online deception, like the simultaneous operation of multiple accounts by the same entities (sockpuppetry), impersonation of other individuals, and studying the effects of de-platforming individuals and communities. Here we conduct the first data-driven study of ban evasion, i.e., the act of circumventing bans on an online platform, leading to temporally disjoint operation of accounts by the same user. We curate a novel dataset of 8,551 ban evasion pairs (parent, child) identified on Wikipedia and contrast their behavior with benign users and non-evading malicious users. We find that evasion child accounts demonstrate similarities with respect to their banned parent accounts on several behavioral axes - from similarity in usernames and edited pages to similarity in content added to the platform and its psycholinguistic attributes. We reveal key behavioral attributes of accounts that are likely to evade bans. Based on the insights from the analyses, we train logistic regression classifiers to detect and predict ban evasion at three different points in the ban evasion lifecycle. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in predicting future evaders (AUC = 0.78), early detection of ban evasion (AUC = 0.85), and matching child accounts with parent accounts (MRR = 0.97). Our work can aid moderators by reducing their workload and identifying evasion pairs faster and more efficiently than current manual and heuristic-based approaches. Dataset is available https://github.com/srijankr/ban_evasion{here}.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

We propose Pure and Lightning ID customization (PuLID), a novel tuning-free ID customization method for text-to-image generation. By incorporating a Lightning T2I branch with a standard diffusion one, PuLID introduces both contrastive alignment loss and accurate ID loss, minimizing disruption to the original model and ensuring high ID fidelity. Experiments show that PuLID achieves superior performance in both ID fidelity and editability. Another attractive property of PuLID is that the image elements (e.g., background, lighting, composition, and style) before and after the ID insertion are kept as consistent as possible. Codes and models will be available at https://github.com/ToTheBeginning/PuLID

Recent advancements in personalized Text-to-Video (T2V) generation highlight the importance of integrating character-specific identities and actions. However, previous T2V models struggle with identity consistency and controllable motion dynamics, mainly due to limited fine-grained facial and action-based textual prompts, and datasets that overlook key human attributes and actions. To address these challenges, we propose MotionCharacter, an efficient and high-fidelity human video generation framework designed for identity preservation and fine-grained motion control. We introduce an ID-preserving module to maintain identity fidelity while allowing flexible attribute modifications, and further integrate ID-consistency and region-aware loss mechanisms, significantly enhancing identity consistency and detail fidelity. Additionally, our approach incorporates a motion control module that prioritizes action-related text while maintaining subject consistency, along with a dataset, Human-Motion, which utilizes large language models to generate detailed motion descriptions. For simplify user control during inference, we parameterize motion intensity through a single coefficient, allowing for easy adjustments. Extensive experiments highlight the effectiveness of MotionCharacter, demonstrating significant improvements in ID-preserving, high-quality video generation.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct private training data by abusing access to machine learning models. Contemporary MI attacks have achieved impressive attack performance, posing serious threats to privacy. Meanwhile, all existing MI defense methods rely on regularization that is in direct conflict with the training objective, resulting in noticeable degradation in model utility. In this work, we take a different perspective, and propose a novel and simple Transfer Learning-based Defense against Model Inversion (TL-DMI) to render MI-robust models. Particularly, by leveraging TL, we limit the number of layers encoding sensitive information from private training dataset, thereby degrading the performance of MI attack. We conduct an analysis using Fisher Information to justify our method. Our defense is remarkably simple to implement. Without bells and whistles, we show in extensive experiments that TL-DMI achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI robustness. Our code, pre-trained models, demo and inverted data are available at: https://hosytuyen.github.io/projects/TL-DMI

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly powerful but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs cause the model to deviate from its intended instructions. This paper introduces Sentinel, a novel detection model, qualifire/prompt-injection-sentinel, based on the \answerdotai/ModernBERT-large architecture. By leveraging ModernBERT's advanced features and fine-tuning on an extensive and diverse dataset comprising a few open-source and private collections, Sentinel achieves state-of-the-art performance. This dataset amalgamates varied attack types, from role-playing and instruction hijacking to attempts to generate biased content, alongside a broad spectrum of benign instructions, with private datasets specifically targeting nuanced error correction and real-world misclassifications. On a comprehensive, unseen internal test set, Sentinel demonstrates an average accuracy of 0.987 and an F1-score of 0.980. Furthermore, when evaluated on public benchmarks, it consistently outperforms strong baselines like protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2. This work details Sentinel's architecture, its meticulous dataset curation, its training methodology, and a thorough evaluation, highlighting its superior detection capabilities.

The rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) technologies, particularly in video generation, has led to unprecedented creative capabilities but also increased threats to information integrity, identity security, and public trust. Existing detection methods, while effective in general scenarios, lack robust solutions for human-centric videos, which pose greater risks due to their realism and potential for legal and ethical misuse. Moreover, current detection approaches often suffer from poor generalization, limited scalability, and reliance on labor-intensive supervised fine-tuning. To address these challenges, we propose AvatarShield, the first interpretable MLLM-based framework for detecting human-centric fake videos, enhanced via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Through our carefully designed accuracy detection reward and temporal compensation reward, it effectively avoids the use of high-cost text annotation data, enabling precise temporal modeling and forgery detection. Meanwhile, we design a dual-encoder architecture, combining high-level semantic reasoning and low-level artifact amplification to guide MLLMs in effective forgery detection. We further collect FakeHumanVid, a large-scale human-centric video benchmark that includes synthesis methods guided by pose, audio, and text inputs, enabling rigorous evaluation of detection methods in real-world scenes. Extensive experiments show that AvatarShield significantly outperforms existing approaches in both in-domain and cross-domain detection, setting a new standard for human-centric video forensics.

Many datasets contain personally identifiable information, or PII, which poses privacy risks to individuals. PII masking is commonly used to redact personal information such as names, addresses, and phone numbers from text data. Most modern PII masking pipelines involve machine learning algorithms. However, these systems may vary in performance, such that individuals from particular demographic groups bear a higher risk for having their personal information exposed. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of three off-the-shelf PII masking systems on name detection and redaction. We generate data using names and templates from the customer service domain. We find that an open-source RoBERTa-based system shows fewer disparities than the commercial models we test. However, all systems demonstrate significant differences in error rate based on demographics. In particular, the highest error rates occurred for names associated with Black and Asian/Pacific Islander individuals.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced the factual accuracy and domain adaptability of Large Language Models (LLMs). This advancement has enabled their widespread deployment across sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and enterprise applications. RAG mitigates hallucinations by integrating external knowledge, yet introduces privacy risk and security risk, notably data breaching risk and data poisoning risk. While recent studies have explored prompt injection and poisoning attacks, there remains a significant gap in comprehensive research on controlling inbound and outbound query flows to mitigate these threats. In this paper, we propose an AI firewall, ControlNET, designed to safeguard RAG-based LLM systems from these vulnerabilities. ControlNET controls query flows by leveraging activation shift phenomena to detect adversarial queries and mitigate their impact through semantic divergence. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four different benchmark datasets including Msmarco, HotpotQA, FinQA, and MedicalSys using state-of-the-art open source LLMs (Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral). Our results demonstrate that ControlNET achieves over 0.909 AUROC in detecting and mitigating security threats while preserving system harmlessness. Overall, ControlNET offers an effective, robust, harmless defense mechanism, marking a significant advancement toward the secure deployment of RAG-based LLM systems.

The great success of the diffusion model in image synthesis led to the release of gigantic commercial models, raising the issue of copyright protection and inappropriate content generation. Training-free diffusion watermarking provides a low-cost solution for these issues. However, the prior works remain vulnerable to rotation, scaling, and translation (RST) attacks. Although some methods employ meticulously designed patterns to mitigate this issue, they often reduce watermark capacity, which can result in identity (ID) collusion. To address these problems, we propose MaXsive, a training-free diffusion model generative watermarking technique that has high capacity and robustness. MaXsive best utilizes the initial noise to watermark the diffusion model. Moreover, instead of using a meticulously repetitive ring pattern, we propose injecting the X-shape template to recover the RST distortions. This design significantly increases robustness without losing any capacity, making ID collusion less likely to happen. The effectiveness of MaXsive has been verified on two well-known watermarking benchmarks under the scenarios of verification and identification.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

With the availability of diverse sensor modalities (i.e., RGB, Depth, Infrared) and the success of multi-modal learning, multi-modal face anti-spoofing (FAS) has emerged as a prominent research focus. The intuition behind it is that leveraging multiple modalities can uncover more intrinsic spoofing traces. However, this approach presents more risk of misalignment. We identify two main types of misalignment: (1) Intra-domain modality misalignment, where the importance of each modality varies across different attacks. For instance, certain modalities (e.g., Depth) may be non-defensive against specific attacks (e.g., 3D mask), indicating that each modality has unique strengths and weaknesses in countering particular attacks. Consequently, simple fusion strategies may fall short. (2) Inter-domain modality misalignment, where the introduction of additional modalities exacerbates domain shifts, potentially overshadowing the benefits of complementary fusion. To tackle (1), we propose a alignment module between modalities based on mutual information, which adaptively enhances favorable modalities while suppressing unfavorable ones. To address (2), we employ a dual alignment optimization method that aligns both sub-domain hyperplanes and modality angle margins, thereby mitigating domain gaps. Our method, dubbed Dual Alignment of Domain and Modality (DADM), achieves state-of-the-art performance in extensive experiments across four challenging protocols demonstrating its robustness in multi-modal domain generalization scenarios. The codes will be released soon.

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in generating high-quality contents from text prompts. However, their reliance on publicly available data and the growing trend of data sharing for fine-tuning make these models particularly vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. In this work, we introduce the Silent Branding Attack, a novel data poisoning method that manipulates text-to-image diffusion models to generate images containing specific brand logos or symbols without any text triggers. We find that when certain visual patterns are repeatedly in the training data, the model learns to reproduce them naturally in its outputs, even without prompt mentions. Leveraging this, we develop an automated data poisoning algorithm that unobtrusively injects logos into original images, ensuring they blend naturally and remain undetected. Models trained on this poisoned dataset generate images containing logos without degrading image quality or text alignment. We experimentally validate our silent branding attack across two realistic settings on large-scale high-quality image datasets and style personalization datasets, achieving high success rates even without a specific text trigger. Human evaluation and quantitative metrics including logo detection show that our method can stealthily embed logos.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct privacy-sensitive training data from released models by utilizing output information, raising extensive concerns about the security of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Recent advances in generative adversarial networks (GANs) have contributed significantly to the improved performance of MI attacks due to their powerful ability to generate realistic images with high fidelity and appropriate semantics. However, previous MI attacks have solely disclosed private information in the latent space of GAN priors, limiting their semantic extraction and transferability across multiple target models and datasets. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method, Intermediate Features enhanced Generative Model Inversion (IF-GMI), which disassembles the GAN structure and exploits features between intermediate blocks. This allows us to extend the optimization space from latent code to intermediate features with enhanced expressive capabilities. To prevent GAN priors from generating unrealistic images, we apply a L1 ball constraint to the optimization process. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous approaches and achieves state-of-the-art results under various settings, especially in the out-of-distribution (OOD) scenario. Our code is available at: https://github.com/final-solution/IF-GMI

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) and generative AI (GenAI) are increasingly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries embed triggers into inputs to cause models to misclassify or misinterpret target labels. Beyond traditional single-trigger scenarios, attackers may inject multiple triggers across various object classes, forming unseen backdoor-object configurations that evade standard detection pipelines. In this paper, we introduce DBOM (Disentangled Backdoor-Object Modeling), a proactive framework that leverages structured disentanglement to identify and neutralize both seen and unseen backdoor threats at the dataset level. Specifically, DBOM factorizes input image representations by modeling triggers and objects as independent primitives in the embedding space through the use of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). By leveraging the frozen, pre-trained encoders of VLMs, our approach decomposes the latent representations into distinct components through a learnable visual prompt repository and prompt prefix tuning, ensuring that the relationships between triggers and objects are explicitly captured. To separate trigger and object representations in the visual prompt repository, we introduce the trigger-object separation and diversity losses that aids in disentangling trigger and object visual features. Next, by aligning image features with feature decomposition and fusion, as well as learned contextual prompt tokens in a shared multimodal space, DBOM enables zero-shot generalization to novel trigger-object pairings that were unseen during training, thereby offering deeper insights into adversarial attack patterns. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB demonstrate that DBOM robustly detects poisoned images prior to downstream training, significantly enhancing the security of DNN training pipelines.

Redacting Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from unstructured text is critical for ensuring data privacy in regulated domains. While earlier approaches have relied on rule-based systems and domain-specific Named Entity Recognition (NER) models, these methods fail to generalize across formats and contexts. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising alternative, yet the effect of architectural and training choices on redaction performance remains underexplored. LLMs have demonstrated strong performance in tasks that require contextual language understanding, including the redaction of PII in free-form text. Prior work suggests that with appropriate adaptation, LLMs can become effective contextual privacy learners. However, the consequences of architectural and training choices for PII Redaction remain underexplored. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of LLMs as privacy-preserving PII Redaction systems. We evaluate a range of LLM architectures and training strategies for their effectiveness in PII Redaction. Our analysis measures redaction performance, semantic preservation, and PII leakage, and compares these outcomes against latency and computational cost. The results provide practical guidance for configuring LLM-based redactors that are accurate, efficient, and privacy-aware. To support reproducibility and real-world deployment, we release PRvL, an open-source suite of fine-tuned models, and evaluation tools for general-purpose PII Redaction. PRvL is built entirely on open-source LLMs and supports multiple inference settings for flexibility and compliance. It is designed to be easily customized for different domains and fully operable within secure, self-managed environments. This enables data owners to perform redactions without relying on third-party services or exposing sensitive content beyond their own infrastructure.

Text-to-image diffusion models have shown remarkable success in generating a personalized subject based on a few reference images. However, current methods struggle with handling multiple subjects simultaneously, often resulting in mixed identities with combined attributes from different subjects. In this work, we present MuDI, a novel framework that enables multi-subject personalization by effectively decoupling identities from multiple subjects. Our main idea is to utilize segmented subjects generated by the Segment Anything Model for both training and inference, as a form of data augmentation for training and initialization for the generation process. Our experiments demonstrate that MuDI can produce high-quality personalized images without identity mixing, even for highly similar subjects as shown in Figure 1. In human evaluation, MuDI shows twice as many successes for personalizing multiple subjects without identity mixing over existing baselines and is preferred over 70% compared to the strongest baseline. More results are available at https://mudi-t2i.github.io/.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have rapidly advanced, enabling the generation of high-quality images from text prompts across various domains. However, these models present notable safety concerns, including the risk of generating harmful, biased, or private content. Current research on assessing T2I safety remains in its early stages. While some efforts have been made to evaluate models on specific safety dimensions, many critical risks remain unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce T2ISafety, a safety benchmark that evaluates T2I models across three key domains: toxicity, fairness, and bias. We build a detailed hierarchy of 12 tasks and 44 categories based on these three domains, and meticulously collect 70K corresponding prompts. Based on this taxonomy and prompt set, we build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K manually annotated images and train an evaluator capable of detecting critical risks that previous work has failed to identify, including risks that even ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs cannot correctly detect. We evaluate 12 prominent diffusion models on T2ISafety and reveal several concerns including persistent issues with racial fairness, a tendency to generate toxic content, and significant variation in privacy protection across the models, even with defense methods like concept erasing. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/adwardlee/t2i_safety.

Federated Domain-specific Instruction Tuning (FedDIT) utilizes limited cross-client private data together with server-side public data for instruction augmentation, ultimately boosting model performance within specific domains. To date, the factors affecting FedDIT remain unclear, and existing instruction augmentation methods primarily focus on the centralized setting without considering distributed environments. Our experiments reveal that the cross-client domain coverage, rather than data heterogeneity, drives model performance in FedDIT. In response, we propose FedDCA, which optimizes domain coverage through greedy client center selection and retrieval-based augmentation. For client-side computational efficiency and system scalability, FedDCA^*, the variant of FedDCA, utilizes heterogeneous encoders with server-side feature alignment. Extensive experiments across four distinct domains (code, medical, financial, and mathematical) substantiate the effectiveness of both methods. Additionally, we investigate privacy preservation against memory extraction attacks utilizing various amounts of public data. Results show that there is no significant correlation between the volume of public data and the privacy-preserving capability. However, as the fine-tuning rounds increase, the risk of privacy leakage reduces or converges.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

Safety backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) enable the stealthy triggering of unsafe behaviors while evading detection during normal interactions. The high dimensionality of potential triggers in the token space and the diverse range of malicious behaviors make this a critical challenge. We present BEEAR, a mitigation approach leveraging the insight that backdoor triggers induce relatively uniform drifts in the model's embedding space. Our bi-level optimization method identifies universal embedding perturbations that elicit unwanted behaviors and adjusts the model parameters to reinforce safe behaviors against these perturbations. Experiments show BEEAR reduces the success rate of RLHF time backdoor attacks from >95% to <1% and from 47% to 0% for instruction-tuning time backdoors targeting malicious code generation, without compromising model utility. Requiring only defender-defined safe and unwanted behaviors, BEEAR represents a step towards practical defenses against safety backdoors in LLMs, providing a foundation for further advancements in AI safety and security.

Multimodal contrastive learning models like CLIP have demonstrated remarkable vision-language alignment capabilities, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses critical security risks. Attackers can implant latent triggers that persist through downstream tasks, enabling malicious control of model behavior upon trigger presentation. Despite great success in recent defense mechanisms, they remain impractical due to strong assumptions about attacker knowledge or excessive clean data requirements. In this paper, we introduce InverTune, the first backdoor defense framework for multimodal models under minimal attacker assumptions, requiring neither prior knowledge of attack targets nor access to the poisoned dataset. Unlike existing defense methods that rely on the same dataset used in the poisoning stage, InverTune effectively identifies and removes backdoor artifacts through three key components, achieving robust protection against backdoor attacks. Specifically, InverTune first exposes attack signatures through adversarial simulation, probabilistically identifying the target label by analyzing model response patterns. Building on this, we develop a gradient inversion technique to reconstruct latent triggers through activation pattern analysis. Finally, a clustering-guided fine-tuning strategy is employed to erase the backdoor function with only a small amount of arbitrary clean data, while preserving the original model capabilities. Experimental results show that InverTune reduces the average attack success rate (ASR) by 97.87% against the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks while limiting clean accuracy (CA) degradation to just 3.07%. This work establishes a new paradigm for securing multimodal systems, advancing security in foundation model deployment without compromising performance.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

We propose ID-to-3D, a method to generate identity- and text-guided 3D human heads with disentangled expressions, starting from even a single casually captured in-the-wild image of a subject. The foundation of our approach is anchored in compositionality, alongside the use of task-specific 2D diffusion models as priors for optimization. First, we extend a foundational model with a lightweight expression-aware and ID-aware architecture, and create 2D priors for geometry and texture generation, via fine-tuning only 0.2% of its available training parameters. Then, we jointly leverage a neural parametric representation for the expressions of each subject and a multi-stage generation of highly detailed geometry and albedo texture. This combination of strong face identity embeddings and our neural representation enables accurate reconstruction of not only facial features but also accessories and hair and can be meshed to provide render-ready assets for gaming and telepresence. Our results achieve an unprecedented level of identity-consistent and high-quality texture and geometry generation, generalizing to a ``world'' of unseen 3D identities, without relying on large 3D captured datasets of human assets.

Recent advancements in image customization exhibit a wide range of application prospects due to stronger customization capabilities. However, since we humans are more sensitive to faces, a significant challenge remains in preserving consistent identity while avoiding identity confusion with multi-reference images, limiting the identity scalability of customization models. To address this, we present UMO, a Unified Multi-identity Optimization framework, designed to maintain high-fidelity identity preservation and alleviate identity confusion with scalability. With "multi-to-multi matching" paradigm, UMO reformulates multi-identity generation as a global assignment optimization problem and unleashes multi-identity consistency for existing image customization methods generally through reinforcement learning on diffusion models. To facilitate the training of UMO, we develop a scalable customization dataset with multi-reference images, consisting of both synthesised and real parts. Additionally, we propose a new metric to measure identity confusion. Extensive experiments demonstrate that UMO not only improves identity consistency significantly, but also reduces identity confusion on several image customization methods, setting a new state-of-the-art among open-source methods along the dimension of identity preserving. Code and model: https://github.com/bytedance/UMO

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Numerous companies have started offering services based on large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, which inevitably raises privacy concerns as users' prompts are exposed to the model provider. Previous research on secure reasoning using multi-party computation (MPC) has proven to be impractical for LLM applications due to its time-consuming and communication-intensive nature. While lightweight anonymization techniques can protect private information in prompts through substitution or masking, they fail to recover sensitive data replaced in the LLM-generated results. In this paper, we expand the application scenarios of anonymization techniques by training a small local model to de-anonymize the LLM's returned results with minimal computational overhead. We introduce the HaS framework, where "H(ide)" and "S(eek)" represent its two core processes: hiding private entities for anonymization and seeking private entities for de-anonymization, respectively. To quantitatively assess HaS's privacy protection performance, we propose both black-box and white-box adversarial models. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to evaluate HaS's usability in translation and classification tasks. The experimental findings demonstrate that the HaS framework achieves an optimal balance between privacy protection and utility.

Large Language Models (LLM) are typically trained on vast amounts of data from various sources. Even when designed modularly (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts), LLMs can leak privacy on their sources. Conversely, training such models in isolation arguably prohibits generalization. To this end, we propose a framework, NoEsis, which builds upon the desired properties of modularity, privacy, and knowledge transfer. NoEsis integrates differential privacy with a hybrid two-staged parameter-efficient fine-tuning that combines domain-specific low-rank adapters, acting as experts, with common prompt tokens, acting as a knowledge-sharing backbone. Results from our evaluation on CodeXGLUE showcase that NoEsis can achieve provable privacy guarantees with tangible knowledge transfer across domains, and empirically show protection against Membership Inference Attacks. Finally, on code completion tasks, NoEsis bridges at least 77% of the accuracy gap between the non-shared and the non-private baseline.

Due to the data-driven nature of current face identity (FaceID) customization methods, all state-of-the-art models rely on large-scale datasets containing millions of high-quality text-image pairs for training. However, none of these datasets are publicly available, which restricts transparency and hinders further advancements in the field. To address this issue, in this paper, we collect and release FaceID-6M, the first large-scale, open-source FaceID dataset containing 6 million high-quality text-image pairs. Filtered from LAION-5B schuhmann2022laion, FaceID-6M undergoes a rigorous image and text filtering steps to ensure dataset quality, including resolution filtering to maintain high-quality images and faces, face filtering to remove images that lack human faces, and keyword-based strategy to retain descriptions containing human-related terms (e.g., nationality, professions and names). Through these cleaning processes, FaceID-6M provides a high-quality dataset optimized for training powerful FaceID customization models, facilitating advancements in the field by offering an open resource for research and development. We conduct extensive experiments to show the effectiveness of our FaceID-6M, demonstrating that models trained on our FaceID-6M dataset achieve performance that is comparable to, and slightly better than currently available industrial models. Additionally, to support and advance research in the FaceID customization community, we make our code, datasets, and models fully publicly available. Our codes, models, and datasets are available at: https://github.com/ShuheSH/FaceID-6M.

A face morph is created by combining the face images usually pertaining to two distinct identities. The goal is to generate an image that can be matched with two identities thereby undermining the security of a face recognition system. To deal with this problem, several morph attack detection techniques have been developed. But these methods do not extract any information about the underlying bonafides used to create them. Demorphing addresses this limitation. However, current demorphing techniques are mostly reference-based, i.e, they need an image of one of the identities to recover the other. In this work, we treat demorphing as an ill-posed decomposition problem. We propose a novel method that is reference-free and recovers the bonafides with high accuracy. Our method decomposes the morph into several identity-preserving feature components. A merger network then weighs and combines these components to recover the bonafides. Our method is observed to reconstruct high-quality bonafides in terms of definition and fidelity. Experiments on the CASIA-WebFace, SMDD and AMSL datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks when handling untrusted data. In this paper we propose CaMeL, a robust defense that creates a protective system layer around the LLM, securing it even when underlying models may be susceptible to attacks. To operate, CaMeL explicitly extracts the control and data flows from the (trusted) query; therefore, the untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow. To further improve security, CaMeL relies on a notion of a capability to prevent the exfiltration of private data over unauthorized data flows. We demonstrate effectiveness of CaMeL by solving 67% of tasks with provable security in AgentDojo [NeurIPS 2024], a recent agentic security benchmark.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have significantly advanced the development of artificial intelligence, enabling the generation of high-quality images in diverse contexts based on specific text prompts. However, existing T2I-based methods often struggle to accurately reproduce the appearance of individuals from a reference image and to create novel representations of those individuals in various settings. To address this, we leverage the pre-trained UNet from Stable Diffusion to incorporate the target face image directly into the generation process. Our approach diverges from prior methods that depend on fixed encoders or static face embeddings, which often fail to bridge encoding gaps. Instead, we capitalize on UNet's sophisticated encoding capabilities to process reference images across multiple scales. By innovatively altering the cross-attention layers of the UNet, we effectively fuse individual identities into the generative process. This strategic integration of facial features across various scales not only enhances the robustness and consistency of the generated images but also facilitates efficient multi-reference and multi-identity generation. Our method sets a new benchmark in identity-preserving image generation, delivering state-of-the-art results in similarity metrics while maintaining prompt alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

Generalist web agents have evolved rapidly and demonstrated remarkable potential. However, there are unprecedented safety risks associated with these them, which are nearly unexplored so far. In this work, we aim to narrow this gap by conducting the first study on the privacy risks of generalist web agents in adversarial environments. First, we present a threat model that discusses the adversarial targets, constraints, and attack scenarios. Particularly, we consider two types of adversarial targets: stealing users' specific personally identifiable information (PII) or stealing the entire user request. To achieve these objectives, we propose a novel attack method, termed Environmental Injection Attack (EIA). This attack injects malicious content designed to adapt well to different environments where the agents operate, causing them to perform unintended actions. This work instantiates EIA specifically for the privacy scenario. It inserts malicious web elements alongside persuasive instructions that mislead web agents into leaking private information, and can further leverage CSS and JavaScript features to remain stealthy. We collect 177 actions steps that involve diverse PII categories on realistic websites from the Mind2Web dataset, and conduct extensive experiments using one of the most capable generalist web agent frameworks to date, SeeAct. The results demonstrate that EIA achieves up to 70% ASR in stealing users' specific PII. Stealing full user requests is more challenging, but a relaxed version of EIA can still achieve 16% ASR. Despite these concerning results, it is important to note that the attack can still be detectable through careful human inspection, highlighting a trade-off between high autonomy and security. This leads to our detailed discussion on the efficacy of EIA under different levels of human supervision as well as implications on defenses for generalist web agents.

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language models (LLMs) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically scrape and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly visible user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to assess the feasibility of such threats in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents, who work collaboratively to collect and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset demonstrate that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and can be easily deployed on a web scale. We demonstrate that the inferred attributes are both sensitive and identifiable, posing significant risks of privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization and sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat to online pseudonymity.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents powered by Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have emerged as a revolutionary approach to automating human-machine interactions, capable of autonomously operating personal devices (e.g., mobile phones) or applications within the device to perform complex real-world tasks in a human-like manner. However, their close integration with personal devices raises significant security concerns, with many threats, including backdoor attacks, remaining largely unexplored. This work reveals that the visual grounding of GUI agent-mapping textual plans to GUI elements-can introduce vulnerabilities, enabling new types of backdoor attacks. With backdoor attack targeting visual grounding, the agent's behavior can be compromised even when given correct task-solving plans. To validate this vulnerability, we propose VisualTrap, a method that can hijack the grounding by misleading the agent to locate textual plans to trigger locations instead of the intended targets. VisualTrap uses the common method of injecting poisoned data for attacks, and does so during the pre-training of visual grounding to ensure practical feasibility of attacking. Empirical results show that VisualTrap can effectively hijack visual grounding with as little as 5% poisoned data and highly stealthy visual triggers (invisible to the human eye); and the attack can be generalized to downstream tasks, even after clean fine-tuning. Moreover, the injected trigger can remain effective across different GUI environments, e.g., being trained on mobile/web and generalizing to desktop environments. These findings underscore the urgent need for further research on backdoor attack risks in GUI agents.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

We introduce Omni-ID, a novel facial representation designed specifically for generative tasks. Omni-ID encodes holistic information about an individual's appearance across diverse expressions and poses within a fixed-size representation. It consolidates information from a varied number of unstructured input images into a structured representation, where each entry represents certain global or local identity features. Our approach uses a few-to-many identity reconstruction training paradigm, where a limited set of input images is used to reconstruct multiple target images of the same individual in various poses and expressions. A multi-decoder framework is further employed to leverage the complementary strengths of diverse decoders during training. Unlike conventional representations, such as CLIP and ArcFace, which are typically learned through discriminative or contrastive objectives, Omni-ID is optimized with a generative objective, resulting in a more comprehensive and nuanced identity capture for generative tasks. Trained on our MFHQ dataset -- a multi-view facial image collection, Omni-ID demonstrates substantial improvements over conventional representations across various generative tasks.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

With the rapid advancement of 3D representation techniques and generative models, substantial progress has been made in reconstructing full-body 3D avatars from a single image. However, this task remains fundamentally ill-posedness due to the limited information available from monocular input, making it difficult to control the geometry and texture of occluded regions during generation. To address these challenges, we redesign the reconstruction pipeline and propose Dream3DAvatar, an efficient and text-controllable two-stage framework for 3D avatar generation. In the first stage, we develop a lightweight, adapter-enhanced multi-view generation model. Specifically, we introduce the Pose-Adapter to inject SMPL-X renderings and skeletal information into SDXL, enforcing geometric and pose consistency across views. To preserve facial identity, we incorporate ID-Adapter-G, which injects high-resolution facial features into the generation process. Additionally, we leverage BLIP2 to generate high-quality textual descriptions of the multi-view images, enhancing text-driven controllability in occluded regions. In the second stage, we design a feedforward Transformer model equipped with a multi-view feature fusion module to reconstruct high-fidelity 3D Gaussian Splat representations (3DGS) from the generated images. Furthermore, we introduce ID-Adapter-R, which utilizes a gating mechanism to effectively fuse facial features into the reconstruction process, improving high-frequency detail recovery. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can generate realistic, animation-ready 3D avatars without any post-processing and consistently outperforms existing baselines across multiple evaluation metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in diverse tasks such as text generation, data analysis, and software development, making them indispensable across domains like education, business, and creative industries. However, the rapid proliferation of LLMs (with over 560 companies developing or deploying them as of 2024) has raised concerns about their originality and trustworthiness. A notable issue, termed identity confusion, has emerged, where LLMs misrepresent their origins or identities. This study systematically examines identity confusion through three research questions: (1) How prevalent is identity confusion among LLMs? (2) Does it arise from model reuse, plagiarism, or hallucination? (3) What are the security and trust-related impacts of identity confusion? To address these, we developed an automated tool combining documentation analysis, self-identity recognition testing, and output similarity comparisons--established methods for LLM fingerprinting--and conducted a structured survey via Credamo to assess its impact on user trust. Our analysis of 27 LLMs revealed that 25.93% exhibit identity confusion. Output similarity analysis confirmed that these issues stem from hallucinations rather than replication or reuse. Survey results further highlighted that identity confusion significantly erodes trust, particularly in critical tasks like education and professional use, with declines exceeding those caused by logical errors or inconsistencies. Users attributed these failures to design flaws, incorrect training data, and perceived plagiarism, underscoring the systemic risks posed by identity confusion to LLM reliability and trustworthiness.

Person Re-identification (ReID) aims to retrieve the specific person across non-overlapping cameras, which greatly helps intelligent transportation systems. As we all know, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Transformers have the unique strengths to extract local and global features, respectively. Considering this fact, we focus on the mutual fusion between them to learn more comprehensive representations for persons. In particular, we utilize the complementary integration of deep features from different model structures. We propose a novel fusion framework called FusionReID to unify the strengths of CNNs and Transformers for image-based person ReID. More specifically, we first deploy a Dual-branch Feature Extraction (DFE) to extract features through CNNs and Transformers from a single image. Moreover, we design a novel Dual-attention Mutual Fusion (DMF) to achieve sufficient feature fusions. The DMF comprises Local Refinement Units (LRU) and Heterogenous Transmission Modules (HTM). LRU utilizes depth-separable convolutions to align deep features in channel dimensions and spatial sizes. HTM consists of a Shared Encoding Unit (SEU) and two Mutual Fusion Units (MFU). Through the continuous stacking of HTM, deep features after LRU are repeatedly utilized to generate more discriminative features. Extensive experiments on three public ReID benchmarks demonstrate that our method can attain superior performances than most state-of-the-arts. The source code is available at https://github.com/924973292/FusionReID.

Personalized text-to-image generation has emerged as a powerful and sought-after tool, empowering users to create customized images based on their specific concepts and prompts. However, existing approaches to personalization encounter multiple challenges, including long tuning times, large storage requirements, the necessity for multiple input images per identity, and limitations in preserving identity and editability. To address these obstacles, we present PhotoVerse, an innovative methodology that incorporates a dual-branch conditioning mechanism in both text and image domains, providing effective control over the image generation process. Furthermore, we introduce facial identity loss as a novel component to enhance the preservation of identity during training. Remarkably, our proposed PhotoVerse eliminates the need for test time tuning and relies solely on a single facial photo of the target identity, significantly reducing the resource cost associated with image generation. After a single training phase, our approach enables generating high-quality images within only a few seconds. Moreover, our method can produce diverse images that encompass various scenes and styles. The extensive evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our approach, which achieves the dual objectives of preserving identity and facilitating editability. Project page: https://photoverse2d.github.io/

We explore Cross-lingual Backdoor ATtacks (X-BAT) in multilingual Large Language Models (mLLMs), revealing how backdoors inserted in one language can automatically transfer to others through shared embedding spaces. Using toxicity classification as a case study, we demonstrate that attackers can compromise multilingual systems by poisoning data in a single language, with rare tokens serving as specific effective triggers. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in the fundamental architecture that enables cross-lingual transfer in these models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/himanshubeniwal/X-BAT.

Training a high-performance deep neural network requires large amounts of data and computational resources. Protecting the intellectual property (IP) and commercial ownership of a deep model is challenging yet increasingly crucial. A major stream of watermarking strategies implants verifiable backdoor triggers by poisoning training samples, but these are often unrealistic due to data privacy and safety concerns and are vulnerable to minor model changes such as fine-tuning. To overcome these challenges, we propose a safe and robust backdoor-based watermark injection technique that leverages the diverse knowledge from a single out-of-distribution (OoD) image, which serves as a secret key for IP verification. The independence of training data makes it agnostic to third-party promises of IP security. We induce robustness via random perturbation of model parameters during watermark injection to defend against common watermark removal attacks, including fine-tuning, pruning, and model extraction. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed watermarking approach is not only time- and sample-efficient without training data, but also robust against the watermark removal attacks above.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .

Automated ad targeting on social media is opaque, creating risks of exploitation and invisibility to external scrutiny. Users may be steered toward harmful content while independent auditing of these processes remains blocked. Large Language Models (LLMs) raise a new concern: the potential to reverse-engineer sensitive user attributes from exposure alone. We introduce a multi-stage auditing framework to investigate these risks. First, a large-scale audit of over 435,000 ad impressions delivered to 891 Australian Facebook users reveals algorithmic biases, including disproportionate Gambling and Politics ads shown to socioeconomically vulnerable and politically aligned groups. Second, a multimodal LLM can reconstruct users' demographic profiles from ad streams, outperforming census-based baselines and matching or exceeding human performance. Our results provide the first empirical evidence that ad streams constitute rich digital footprints for public AI inference, highlighting urgent privacy risks and the need for content-level auditing and governance.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Face swapping transfers the identity of a source face to a target face while retaining the attributes like expression, pose, hair, and background of the target face. Advanced face swapping methods have achieved attractive results. However, these methods often inadvertently transfer identity information from the target face, compromising expression-related details and accurate identity. We propose a novel method DynamicFace that leverages the power of diffusion models and plug-and-play adaptive attention layers for image and video face swapping. First, we introduce four fine-grained facial conditions using 3D facial priors. All conditions are designed to be disentangled from each other for precise and unique control. Then, we adopt Face Former and ReferenceNet for high-level and detailed identity injection. Through experiments on the FF++ dataset, we demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art results in face swapping, showcasing superior image quality, identity preservation, and expression accuracy. Our framework seamlessly adapts to both image and video domains. Our code and results will be available on the project page: https://dynamic-face.github.io/

To ensure a balance between open access to justice and personal data protection, the South Korean judiciary mandates the de-identification of court judgments before they can be publicly disclosed. However, the current de-identification process is inadequate for handling court judgments at scale while adhering to strict legal requirements. Additionally, the legal definitions and categorizations of personal identifiers are vague and not well-suited for technical solutions. To tackle these challenges, we propose a de-identification framework called Thunder-DeID, which aligns with relevant laws and practices. Specifically, we (i) construct and release the first Korean legal dataset containing annotated judgments along with corresponding lists of entity mentions, (ii) introduce a systematic categorization of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and (iii) develop an end-to-end deep neural network (DNN)-based de-identification pipeline. Our experimental results demonstrate that our model achieves state-of-the-art performance in the de-identification of court judgments.

Generating high-fidelity human videos that match user-specified identities is important yet challenging in the field of generative AI. Existing methods often rely on an excessive number of training parameters and lack compatibility with other AIGC tools. In this paper, we propose Stand-In, a lightweight and plug-and-play framework for identity preservation in video generation. Specifically, we introduce a conditional image branch into the pre-trained video generation model. Identity control is achieved through restricted self-attentions with conditional position mapping, and can be learned quickly with only 2000 pairs. Despite incorporating and training just sim1\% additional parameters, our framework achieves excellent results in video quality and identity preservation, outperforming other full-parameter training methods. Moreover, our framework can be seamlessly integrated for other tasks, such as subject-driven video generation, pose-referenced video generation, stylization, and face swapping.

Person re-identification (ReID) aims to extract accurate identity representation features. However, during feature extraction, individual samples are inevitably affected by noise (background, occlusions, and model limitations). Considering that features from the same identity follow a normal distribution around identity centers after training, we propose a Training-Free Feature Centralization ReID framework (Pose2ID) by aggregating the same identity features to reduce individual noise and enhance the stability of identity representation, which preserves the feature's original distribution for following strategies such as re-ranking. Specifically, to obtain samples of the same identity, we introduce two components:Identity-Guided Pedestrian Generation: by leveraging identity features to guide the generation process, we obtain high-quality images with diverse poses, ensuring identity consistency even in complex scenarios such as infrared, and occlusion.Neighbor Feature Centralization: it explores each sample's potential positive samples from its neighborhood. Experiments demonstrate that our generative model exhibits strong generalization capabilities and maintains high identity consistency. With the Feature Centralization framework, we achieve impressive performance even with an ImageNet pre-trained model without ReID training, reaching mAP/Rank-1 of 52.81/78.92 on Market1501. Moreover, our method sets new state-of-the-art results across standard, cross-modality, and occluded ReID tasks, showcasing strong adaptability.

This paper presents a new synthetic dataset of ID and travel documents, called SIDTD. The SIDTD dataset is created to help training and evaluating forged ID documents detection systems. Such a dataset has become a necessity as ID documents contain personal information and a public dataset of real documents can not be released. Moreover, forged documents are scarce, compared to legit ones, and the way they are generated varies from one fraudster to another resulting in a class of high intra-variability. In this paper we trained state-of-the-art models on this dataset and we compare them to the performance achieved in larger, but private, datasets. The creation of this dataset will help to document image analysis community to progress in the task of ID document verification.

The rapid advancement of generative models, facilitating the creation of hyper-realistic images from textual descriptions, has concurrently escalated critical societal concerns such as misinformation. Traditional fake detection mechanisms, although providing some mitigation, fall short in attributing responsibility for the malicious use of synthetic images. This paper introduces a novel approach to model fingerprinting that assigns responsibility for the generated images, thereby serving as a potential countermeasure to model misuse. Our method modifies generative models based on each user's unique digital fingerprint, imprinting a unique identifier onto the resultant content that can be traced back to the user. This approach, incorporating fine-tuning into Text-to-Image (T2I) tasks using the Stable Diffusion Model, demonstrates near-perfect attribution accuracy with a minimal impact on output quality. We rigorously scrutinize our method's secrecy under two distinct scenarios: one where a malicious user attempts to detect the fingerprint, and another where a user possesses a comprehensive understanding of our method. We also evaluate the robustness of our approach against various image post-processing manipulations typically executed by end-users. Through extensive evaluation of the Stable Diffusion models, our method presents a promising and novel avenue for accountable model distribution and responsible use.