Daily Papers

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced performance through the Thinking then Responding paradigm, where models generate internal thoughts before final responses (aka, System 2 thinking). However, existing research lacks a systematic understanding of the mechanisms underlying how thinking patterns affect performance across model sizes. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the impact of various thinking types on model performance and introduce ThinkPatterns-21k, a curated dataset comprising 21k instruction-response pairs (QA) collected from existing instruction-following datasets with five thinking types. For each pair, we augment it with five distinct internal thinking patterns: one unstructured thinking (monologue) and four structured variants (decomposition, self-ask, self-debate and self-critic), while maintaining the same instruction and response. Through extensive evaluation across different model sizes (3B-32B parameters), we have two key findings: (1) smaller models (<30B parameters) can benefit from most of structured thinking patterns, while larger models (32B) with structured thinking like decomposition would degrade performance and (2) unstructured monologue demonstrates broad effectiveness across different model sizes. Finally, we released all of our datasets, checkpoints, training logs of diverse thinking patterns to reproducibility, aiming to facilitate further research in this direction.

Role-playing language agents (RPLAs) have emerged as promising applications of large language models (LLMs). However, simulating established characters presents a challenging task for RPLAs, due to the lack of authentic character datasets and nuanced evaluation methods using such data. In this paper, we present CoSER, a collection of a high-quality dataset, open models, and an evaluation protocol towards effective RPLAs of established characters. The CoSER dataset covers 17,966 characters from 771 renowned books. It provides authentic dialogues with real-world intricacies, as well as diverse data types such as conversation setups, character experiences and internal thoughts. Drawing from acting methodology, we introduce given-circumstance acting for training and evaluating role-playing LLMs, where LLMs sequentially portray multiple characters in book scenes. Using our dataset, we develop CoSER 8B and CoSER 70B, i.e., advanced open role-playing LLMs built on LLaMA-3.1 models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the value of the CoSER dataset for RPLA training, evaluation and retrieval. Moreover, CoSER 70B exhibits state-of-the-art performance surpassing or matching GPT-4o on our evaluation and three existing benchmarks, i.e., achieving 75.80% and 93.47% accuracy on the InCharacter and LifeChoice benchmarks respectively.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel at visual understanding, they often struggle in complex scenarios that require visual planning and imagination. Inspired by how humans use sketching as a form of visual thinking to develop and communicate ideas, we introduce Latent Sketchpad, a framework that equips MLLMs with an internal visual scratchpad. The internal visual representations of MLLMs have traditionally been confined to perceptual understanding. We repurpose them to support generative visual thought without compromising reasoning ability. Building on frontier MLLMs, our approach integrates visual generation directly into their native autoregressive reasoning process. It allows the model to interleave textual reasoning with the generation of visual latents. These latents guide the internal thought process and can be translated into sketch images for interpretability. To realize this, we introduce two components: a Context-Aware Vision Head autoregressively produces visual representations, and a pretrained Sketch Decoder renders these into human-interpretable images. We evaluate the framework on our new dataset MazePlanning. Experiments across various MLLMs show that Latent Sketchpad delivers comparable or even superior reasoning performance to their backbone. It further generalizes across distinct frontier MLLMs, including Gemma3 and Qwen2.5-VL. By extending model's textual reasoning to visual thinking, our framework opens new opportunities for richer human-computer interaction and broader applications. More details and resources are available on our project page: https://latent-sketchpad.github.io/.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective method for training reasoning models. However, existing RL approaches typically bias the model's output distribution toward reward-maximizing paths without introducing external knowledge. This limits their exploration capacity and results in a narrower reasoning capability boundary compared to base models. To address this limitation, we propose TAPO (Thought-Augmented Policy Optimization), a novel framework that augments RL by incorporating external high-level guidance ("thought patterns"). By adaptively integrating structured thoughts during training, TAPO effectively balances model-internal exploration and external guidance exploitation. Extensive experiments show that our approach significantly outperforms GRPO by 99% on AIME, 41% on AMC, and 17% on Minerva Math. Notably, these high-level thought patterns, abstracted from only 500 prior samples, generalize effectively across various tasks and models. This highlights TAPO's potential for broader applications across multiple tasks and domains. Our further analysis reveals that introducing external guidance produces powerful reasoning models with superior explainability of inference behavior and enhanced output readability.

One of the long-standing aspirations in conversational AI is to allow them to autonomously take initiatives in conversations, i.e., being proactive. This is especially challenging for multi-party conversations. Prior NLP research focused mainly on predicting the next speaker from contexts like preceding conversations. In this paper, we demonstrate the limitations of such methods and rethink what it means for AI to be proactive in multi-party, human-AI conversations. We propose that just like humans, rather than merely reacting to turn-taking cues, a proactive AI formulates its own inner thoughts during a conversation, and seeks the right moment to contribute. Through a formative study with 24 participants and inspiration from linguistics and cognitive psychology, we introduce the Inner Thoughts framework. Our framework equips AI with a continuous, covert train of thoughts in parallel to the overt communication process, which enables it to proactively engage by modeling its intrinsic motivation to express these thoughts. We instantiated this framework into two real-time systems: an AI playground web app and a chatbot. Through a technical evaluation and user studies with human participants, our framework significantly surpasses existing baselines on aspects like anthropomorphism, coherence, intelligence, and turn-taking appropriateness.

Humans organize knowledge into compact categories through semantic compression by mapping diverse instances to abstract representations while preserving meaning (e.g., robin and blue jay are both birds; most birds can fly). These concepts reflect a trade-off between expressive fidelity and representational simplicity. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable linguistic abilities, yet whether their internal representations strike a human-like trade-off between compression and semantic fidelity is unclear. We introduce a novel information-theoretic framework, drawing from Rate-Distortion Theory and the Information Bottleneck principle, to quantitatively compare these strategies. Analyzing token embeddings from a diverse suite of LLMs against seminal human categorization benchmarks, we uncover key divergences. While LLMs form broad conceptual categories that align with human judgment, they struggle to capture the fine-grained semantic distinctions crucial for human understanding. More fundamentally, LLMs demonstrate a strong bias towards aggressive statistical compression, whereas human conceptual systems appear to prioritize adaptive nuance and contextual richness, even if this results in lower compressional efficiency by our measures. These findings illuminate critical differences between current AI and human cognitive architectures, guiding pathways toward LLMs with more human-aligned conceptual representations.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Test-time scaling has emerged as a widely adopted inference-time strategy for boosting reasoning performance. However, its effectiveness has been studied almost exclusively in English, leaving its behavior in other languages largely unexplored. We present the first systematic study of test-time scaling in multilingual settings, evaluating DeepSeek-R1-Distill-LLama-8B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B across both high- and low-resource Latin-script languages. Our findings reveal that the relative gains from test-time scaling vary significantly across languages. Additionally, models frequently switch to English mid-reasoning, even when operating under strictly monolingual prompts. We further show that low-resource languages not only produce initial reasoning thoughts that differ significantly from English but also have lower internal consistency across generations in their early reasoning. Building on our findings, we introduce MITT (Multilingual Initial Thought Transfer), an unsupervised and lightweight reasoning prefix-tuning approach that transfers high-resource reasoning prefixes to enhance test-time scaling across all languages, addressing inconsistencies in multilingual reasoning performance. MITT significantly boosts DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B's reasoning performance, especially for underrepresented languages.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as OpenAI's o1-series have demonstrated compelling capabilities for complex reasoning tasks via the extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning mechanism. However, recent studies reveal substantial redundancy in the CoT reasoning traces, which not only increases inference latency but also negatively impacts model performance by diverting attention to unnecessary reasoning paths. To address this issue, we investigate the internal reasoning structures of LLMs and categorize them into three primary thought types: execution, reflection, and transition thoughts. Moreover, our analysis reveals that excessive reflection and transition thoughts are strongly correlated with failure cases and these thought categories exhibit clear separation in the latent space. Based on these, we introduce SEAL (Steerable reasoning calibration), a training-free approach that seamlessly calibrates the CoT process, improving accuracy while demonstrating significant efficiency gains. SEAL consists of an offline stage for extracting the reasoning steering vector in the latent space, followed by an on-the-fly calibration of the reasoning trace through representation intervention using the steering vector. Notably, the steering vector exhibits strong transferability across various tasks. Extensive experiments across multiple models (DeepSeek-R1-Distill and QwQ-32B-Preview) and benchmarks (Math500, GSM8K, LiveCodeBench) validate the effectiveness of SEAL, up to a 11% improvement in accuracy while reducing reasoning tokens by 11.8% to 50.4%. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/SEAL.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly expected to navigate the nuances of human emotion. While research confirms that LLMs can simulate emotional intelligence, their internal emotional mechanisms remain largely unexplored. This paper investigates the latent emotional representations within modern LLMs by asking: how, where, and for how long is emotion encoded in their neural architecture? To address this, we introduce a novel, large-scale Reddit corpus of approximately 400,000 utterances, balanced across seven basic emotions through a multi-stage process of classification, rewriting, and synthetic generation. Using this dataset, we employ lightweight "probes" to read out information from the hidden layers of various Qwen3 and LLaMA models without altering their parameters. Our findings reveal that LLMs develop a surprisingly well-defined internal geometry of emotion, which sharpens with model scale and significantly outperforms zero-shot prompting. We demonstrate that this emotional signal is not a final-layer phenomenon but emerges early and peaks mid-network. Furthermore, the internal states are both malleable (they can be influenced by simple system prompts) and persistent, as the initial emotional tone remains detectable for hundreds of subsequent tokens. We contribute our dataset, an open-source probing toolkit, and a detailed map of the emotional landscape within LLMs, offering crucial insights for developing more transparent and aligned AI systems. The code and dataset are open-sourced.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Despite their vast capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle with generating reliable outputs, frequently producing high-confidence inaccuracies known as hallucinations. Addressing this challenge, our research introduces InternalInspector, a novel framework designed to enhance confidence estimation in LLMs by leveraging contrastive learning on internal states including attention states, feed-forward states, and activation states of all layers. Unlike existing methods that primarily focus on the final activation state, InternalInspector conducts a comprehensive analysis across all internal states of every layer to accurately identify both correct and incorrect prediction processes. By benchmarking InternalInspector against existing confidence estimation methods across various natural language understanding and generation tasks, including factual question answering, commonsense reasoning, and reading comprehension, InternalInspector achieves significantly higher accuracy in aligning the estimated confidence scores with the correctness of the LLM's predictions and lower calibration error. Furthermore, InternalInspector excels at HaluEval, a hallucination detection benchmark, outperforming other internal-based confidence estimation methods in this task.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

While the problem of hallucinations in neural machine translation has long been recognized, so far the progress on its alleviation is very little. Indeed, recently it turned out that without artificially encouraging models to hallucinate, previously existing methods fall short and even the standard sequence log-probability is more informative. It means that characteristics internal to the model can give much more information than we expect, and before using external models and measures, we first need to ask: how far can we go if we use nothing but the translation model itself ? We propose to use a method that evaluates the percentage of the source contribution to a generated translation. Intuitively, hallucinations are translations "detached" from the source, hence they can be identified by low source contribution. This method improves detection accuracy for the most severe hallucinations by a factor of 2 and is able to alleviate hallucinations at test time on par with the previous best approach that relies on external models. Next, if we move away from internal model characteristics and allow external tools, we show that using sentence similarity from cross-lingual embeddings further improves these results.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly capable, but the mechanisms of their thinking and decision-making process remain unclear. Chain-of-thoughts (CoTs) have been commonly utilized to monitor LLMs, but this strategy fails to accurately reflect LLMs' thinking process. Techniques based on LLMs' hidden representations provide an inner perspective to monitor their latent thinking. However, previous methods only try to develop external monitors instead of making LLMs themselves easier to monitor. In this paper, we propose a novel method TELLME, improving the transparency of LLMs and helping monitors identify unsuitable and sensitive behaviors. Furthermore, we showcase the applications of TELLME on trustworthiness tasks (\eg, safety risks monitoring tasks and detoxification tasks), where LLMs achieve consistent improvement in transparency and task performance. More crucially, we theoretically analyze the improvement of TELLME on LLMs' generalization ability through optimal transport theory.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized decision-making by breaking down complex problems into more manageable language sequences referred to as ``thoughts''. An effective thought design should consider three key perspectives: performance, efficiency, and flexibility. However, existing thought can at most exhibit two of these attributes. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel thought prompting approach called ``Everything of Thoughts'' (XoT) to defy the law of ``Penrose triangle of existing thought paradigms. XoT leverages pretrained reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to incorporate external domain knowledge into thoughts, thereby enhancing LLMs' capabilities and enabling them to generalize to unseen problems efficiently. Through the utilization of the MCTS-LLM collaborative thought revision framework, this approach autonomously produces high-quality comprehensive cognitive mappings with minimal LLM interactions. Additionally, XoT empowers LLMs to engage in unconstrained thinking, allowing for flexible cognitive mappings for problems with multiple solutions.

Internal world models (WMs) enable agents to understand the world's state and predict transitions, serving as the basis for advanced deliberative reasoning. Recent large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), such as OpenAI o3, GPT-4o and Gemini, exhibit potential as general-purpose WMs. While the latest studies have evaluated and shown limitations in specific capabilities such as visual understanding, a systematic evaluation of VLMs' fundamental WM abilities remains absent. Drawing on comparative psychology and cognitive science, we propose a two-stage framework that assesses Perception (visual, spatial, temporal, quantitative, and motion) and Prediction (mechanistic simulation, transitive inference, compositional inference) to provide an atomic evaluation of VLMs as WMs. Guided by this framework, we introduce WM-ABench, a large-scale benchmark comprising 23 fine-grained evaluation dimensions across 6 diverse simulated environments with controlled counterfactual simulations. Through 660 experiments on 15 latest commercial and open-source VLMs, we find that these models exhibit striking limitations in basic world modeling abilities. For instance, almost all models perform at near-random accuracy when distinguishing motion trajectories. Additionally, they lack disentangled understanding -- e.g., some models tend to believe blue objects move faster than green ones. More rich results and analyses reveal significant gaps between VLMs and human-level world modeling.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

We introduce Graph of Thoughts (GoT): a framework that advances prompting capabilities in large language models (LLMs) beyond those offered by paradigms such as Chain-of-Thought or Tree of Thoughts (ToT). The key idea and primary advantage of GoT is the ability to model the information generated by an LLM as an arbitrary graph, where units of information ("LLM thoughts") are vertices, and edges correspond to dependencies between these vertices. This approach enables combining arbitrary LLM thoughts into synergistic outcomes, distilling the essence of whole networks of thoughts, or enhancing thoughts using feedback loops. We illustrate that GoT offers advantages over state of the art on different tasks, for example increasing the quality of sorting by 62% over ToT, while simultaneously reducing costs by >31%. We ensure that GoT is extensible with new thought transformations and thus can be used to spearhead new prompting schemes. This work brings the LLM reasoning closer to human thinking or brain mechanisms such as recurrence, both of which form complex networks.

Solving complex tasks usually requires LLMs to generate long multi-step reasoning chains. Previous work has shown that verifying the correctness of individual reasoning steps can further improve the performance and efficiency of LLMs on such tasks and enhance solution interpretability. However, existing verification approaches, such as Process Reward Models (PRMs), are either computationally expensive, limited to specific domains, or require large-scale human or model-generated annotations. Thus, we propose a lightweight alternative for step-level reasoning verification based on data-driven uncertainty scores. We train transformer-based uncertainty quantification heads (UHeads) that use the internal states of a frozen LLM to estimate the uncertainty of its reasoning steps during generation. The approach is fully automatic: target labels are generated either by another larger LLM (e.g., DeepSeek R1) or in a self-supervised manner by the original model itself. UHeads are both effective and lightweight, containing less than 10M parameters. Across multiple domains, including mathematics, planning, and general knowledge question answering, they match or even surpass the performance of PRMs that are up to 810x larger. Our findings suggest that the internal states of LLMs encode their uncertainty and can serve as reliable signals for reasoning verification, offering a promising direction toward scalable and generalizable introspective LLMs.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for recommendation in a generative manner has delivered promising results, but encounters significant inference overhead due to autoregressive decoding in the language space. This work explores bypassing language-space decoding by directly matching candidate items with the LLM's internal thought representations in the latent space, eliminating the time-consuming autoregressive process to reduce computational costs. Towards this, we introduce Light Latent-space Decoding (L2D), an effective and efficient latent-space decoding method. L2D represents user-preferred items by using the hidden states of test sequences reflecting the LLM's internal thought, and obtains candidate item representations from the hidden states of training sequences labeled with the corresponding candidate items. It then matches the two types of representations to decode items, achieving latent-space decoding. In this way, it enables efficient decoding without altering the LLM's generative tuning paradigm, thereby preserving performance. Extensive empirical results demonstrate that L2D is more than 10x faster than language-space decoding while maintaining or enhancing performance.

In Decentralized Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), the development of Emergent Communication has long been constrained by the ``Joint Exploration Dilemma'', leading agents to fall into a ``Communication Vacuum Equilibrium'' . Traditional methods address this by introducing inductive biases to facilitate communication emergence . This study fundamentally questions whether such artificial inductive biases are, in fact, over-engineering. Through experiments with the ``AI Mother Tongue'' (AIM) framework, based on a Vector Quantized Variational Autoencoder (VQ-VAE), we demonstrate that when agents possess an endogenous symbol system, their neural representations naturally exhibit spontaneous semantic compression and Nash equilibrium-driven semantic convergence, achieving effective symbolic communication without external inductive biases. This aligns with recent neuroscience findings suggesting that the human brain does not directly use human language for internal thought , and resonates with research on ``soft thinking'' capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) . Compared to traditional explicit communication methods, AIM demonstrates stronger generality and efficiency. The interpretable analysis toolkit developed in this study confirms that symbol usage exhibits a significant power-law distribution, leading to three major theoretical insights: the ``Neural Communication Hypothesis'', the ``Tool-First Principle'', and the ``Semantic Interpretability Paradigm''. Future research will explore the integration of Hierarchical Quantized Variational Autoencoders (HQ-VAE) to enhance AIM's complex expressive capabilities and investigate the potential for ``Reinforcement Learning (RL) Low-Level Pre-training''. This discovery offers new avenues for bridging symbolism and connectionism.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Spoken Language Models (SLMs) are designed to take speech inputs and produce spoken responses. However, current SLMs lack the ability to perform an internal, unspoken thinking process before responding. In contrast, humans typically engage in complex mental reasoning internally, enabling them to communicate ideas clearly and concisely. Thus, integrating an unspoken thought process into SLMs is highly desirable. While naively generating a complete chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before starting to talk can enable thinking for SLMs, this induces additional latency for the speech response, as the CoT reasoning can be arbitrarily long. To solve this issue, we propose Stitch, a novel generation method that alternates between the generation of unspoken reasoning chunks and spoken response chunks. Since the audio duration of a chunk of spoken response is much longer than the time to generate the tokens in a chunk of spoken response, we use the remaining free time to generate the unspoken reasoning tokens. When a chunk of audio is played to the user, the model continues to generate the next unspoken reasoning chunk, achieving simultaneous thinking and talking. Remarkably, Stitch matches the latency of baselines that cannot generate unspoken CoT by design while outperforming those baselines by 15% on math reasoning datasets; Stitch also performs equally well on non-reasoning datasets as those baseline models. Some animations and demonstrations are on the project page: https://d223302.github.io/STITCH.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".