Daily Papers

The optimal policy in various real-world strategic decision-making problems depends both on the environmental configuration and exogenous events. For these settings, we introduce Contextual Bilevel Reinforcement Learning (CB-RL), a stochastic bilevel decision-making model, where the lower level consists of solving a contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP). CB-RL can be viewed as a Stackelberg Game where the leader and a random context beyond the leader's control together decide the setup of many MDPs that potentially multiple followers best respond to. This framework extends beyond traditional bilevel optimization and finds relevance in diverse fields such as RLHF, tax design, reward shaping, contract theory and mechanism design. We propose a stochastic Hyper Policy Gradient Descent (HPGD) algorithm to solve CB-RL, and demonstrate its convergence. Notably, HPGD uses stochastic hypergradient estimates, based on observations of the followers' trajectories. Therefore, it allows followers to use any training procedure and the leader to be agnostic of the specific algorithm, which aligns with various real-world scenarios. We further consider the setting when the leader can influence the training of followers and propose an accelerated algorithm. We empirically demonstrate the performance of our algorithm for reward shaping and tax design.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Reinforcement finetuning (RFT) has become a standard approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, its impact on model trustworthiness remains underexplored. In this work, we identify and systematically study a critical side effect of RFT, which we term the hallucination tax: a degradation in refusal behavior causing models to produce hallucinated answers to unanswerable questions confidently. To investigate this, we introduce SUM (Synthetic Unanswerable Math), a high-quality dataset of unanswerable math problems designed to probe models' ability to recognize an unanswerable question by reasoning from the insufficient or ambiguous information. Our results show that standard RFT training could reduce model refusal rates by more than 80%, which significantly increases model's tendency to hallucinate. We further demonstrate that incorporating just 10% SUM during RFT substantially restores appropriate refusal behavior, with minimal accuracy trade-offs on solvable tasks. Crucially, this approach enables LLMs to leverage inference-time compute to reason about their own uncertainty and knowledge boundaries, improving generalization not only to out-of-domain math problems but also to factual question answering tasks.

Legislation can be viewed as a body of prescriptive rules expressed in natural language. The application of legislation to facts of a case we refer to as statutory reasoning, where those facts are also expressed in natural language. Computational statutory reasoning is distinct from most existing work in machine reading, in that much of the information needed for deciding a case is declared exactly once (a law), while the information needed in much of machine reading tends to be learned through distributional language statistics. To investigate the performance of natural language understanding approaches on statutory reasoning, we introduce a dataset, together with a legal-domain text corpus. Straightforward application of machine reading models exhibits low out-of-the-box performance on our questions, whether or not they have been fine-tuned to the legal domain. We contrast this with a hand-constructed Prolog-based system, designed to fully solve the task. These experiments support a discussion of the challenges facing statutory reasoning moving forward, which we argue is an interesting real-world task that can motivate the development of models able to utilize prescriptive rules specified in natural language.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

How capable are large language models (LLMs) in the domain of taxation? Although numerous studies have explored the legal domain in general, research dedicated to taxation remain scarce. Moreover, the datasets used in these studies are either simplified, failing to reflect the real-world complexities, or unavailable as open source. To address this gap, we introduce PLAT, a new benchmark designed to assess the ability of LLMs to predict the legitimacy of additional tax penalties. PLAT is constructed to evaluate LLMs' understanding of tax law, particularly in cases where resolving the issue requires more than just applying related statutes. Our experiments with six LLMs reveal that their baseline capabilities are limited, especially when dealing with conflicting issues that demand a comprehensive understanding. However, we found that enabling retrieval, self-reasoning, and discussion among multiple agents with specific role assignments, this limitation can be mitigated.