<p>I am not sure if this is the answer you were aiming at, but... what about the revelation principle?</p>
<p>There is no requirement to communicate with the designer. However, researchers are ofter first interested in what the optimal allocation rule is. In that search, it is wlog to consider direct mechanisms by the revelation principle: Suppose an indirect mechanism without communication to the designer implements the optimal allocation, then we can obtain the same allocation if every agent simply reports their type to the mechanism designer who then computes the equilibrium allocation of this indirect mechanism and implements it. See my reply with more details <a href="https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/25921/are-direct-mechanisms-always-truthful/27320#27320">here</a>.</p>
<p>If you want to know if there is a general approach of how to find equivalent indirect mechanisms for the optimal direct revelation mechanism, <a href="https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/30736/going-from-drms-to-indirect-mechanisms">I am not aware of an answer.</a></p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-09-10T08:54:20.217Z
2020-09-10T08:54:20.217Z
Bayesian
<p>From what I've read in mechanism design theory, it seems to me that the mechanism designer always plays an essential role in a mechanism. Information is sent to the designer who designs incentives that aim to enforce the truthful revelation of information from the strategic agents of the mechanism.</p>
<p>But, within the mechanism design theory, is it possible to remove the requirement of agents communicating their information to a central authority (aka the designer)?</p>
<p>For example, design a framework where the agents communicate with each other based on certain rules and figure out by themselves the designer's desirable outcome without any communication between the agents and the designer.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-08-05T21:04:07.530Z
Try Googling: [mechanism design without commitment](https://www.google.com/search?q=mechanism+design+without+commitment&oq=mechanism+design+without+commitment)
Herr K.
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-07-26T00:05:19.583Z
OP did you find the answer to your questions? If so, please share.
user36522
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-07-27T02:58:39.657Z
@user36522 No, I'm afraid. I might try again soon. If I'm successful, I'll share it, of course.
johnny09
<mechanism-design>
Decentralized Mechanism Design
johnny09
# Decentralized Mechanism Design

(Asked by: username_0 on 2020-08-05)

From what I've read in mechanism design theory, it seems to me that the mechanism designer always plays an essential role in a mechanism. Information is sent to the designer who designs incentives that aim to enforce the truthful revelation of information from the strategic agents of the mechanism.

But, within the mechanism design theory, is it possible to remove the requirement of agents communicating their information to a central authority (aka the designer)?

For example, design a framework where the agents communicate with each other based on certain rules and figure out by themselves the designer's desirable outcome without any communication between the agents and the designer.

**Tags:** mechanism-design

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Try Googling: [mechanism design without commitment](https://www.google.com/search?q=mechanism+design+without+commitment&oq=mechanism+design+without+commitment)  
> **username_2**: OP did you find the answer to your questions? If so, please share.  
> **username_0**: @username_2 No, I'm afraid. I might try again soon. If I'm successful, I'll share it, of course.  

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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_3 on 2020-09-10. Score: 1 | Accepted answer

I am not sure if this is the answer you were aiming at, but... what about the revelation principle?

There is no requirement to communicate with the designer. However, researchers are ofter first interested in what the optimal allocation rule is. In that search, it is wlog to consider direct mechanisms by the revelation principle: Suppose an indirect mechanism without communication to the designer implements the optimal allocation, then we can obtain the same allocation if every agent simply reports their type to the mechanism designer who then computes the equilibrium allocation of this indirect mechanism and implements it. See my reply with more details [here](https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/25921/are-direct-mechanisms-always-truthful/27320#27320).

If you want to know if there is a general approach of how to find equivalent indirect mechanisms for the optimal direct revelation mechanism, [I am not aware of an answer.](https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/30736/going-from-drms-to-indirect-mechanisms)


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