<p>The set of rationalizable strategies is the set of strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, i.e., strategies that are never a best response. It is a weaker concept than Nash equilibrium.</p>
<p>For player 1, you can eliminate strategy M, which is strictly dominated by T. You cannot eliminate any strategy for player 2 as there is only a weak dominance.</p>
<p>In a second step, you can eliminate A which is dominated by C.</p>
<p>As far as I can see, you cannot eliminate any other strategy in the next step and, hence, all remaining strategies are rationalizable.</p>

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2021-01-20T10:55:02.247Z
2021-01-20T10:55:02.247Z
Bayesian
<p>I would like to find the set of rationalizable strategies for this 4x4 game:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.sstatic.net/fmkkv.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.sstatic.net/fmkkv.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>The first thing I did was try and find all PSNE. I found two, the ones I bolded.</p>
<p>Thus, my answer to this question is that the set of rationalizable strategies for Player 1 is {T, Y} and the set of rationalizable strategies for Player 2 is {B, C}.</p>
<p>Is this answer correct?</p>

<microeconomics><game-theory><nash-equilibrium><dominant-strategy>
Set of rationalizable strategies for this 4 x 4 matrix
Friendlyperson2020
# Set of rationalizable strategies for this 4 x 4 matrix

(Asked by: username_0 on 2020-12-11)

I would like to find the set of rationalizable strategies for this 4x4 game:

[![enter image description here](https://i.sstatic.net/fmkkv.png)](https://i.sstatic.net/fmkkv.png)

The first thing I did was try and find all PSNE. I found two, the ones I bolded.

Thus, my answer to this question is that the set of rationalizable strategies for Player 1 is {T, Y} and the set of rationalizable strategies for Player 2 is {B, C}.

Is this answer correct?

**Tags:** microeconomics, game-theory, nash-equilibrium, dominant-strategy


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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2021-01-20. Score: 1

The set of rationalizable strategies is the set of strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, i.e., strategies that are never a best response. It is a weaker concept than Nash equilibrium.

For player 1, you can eliminate strategy M, which is strictly dominated by T. You cannot eliminate any strategy for player 2 as there is only a weak dominance.

In a second step, you can eliminate A which is dominated by C.

As far as I can see, you cannot eliminate any other strategy in the next step and, hence, all remaining strategies are rationalizable.


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