<blockquote>
<p>REQUEST: If you downvote because you disagree, please specifically
point out where the answer either (1) got the facts wrong, or (2) made a
reasoning error. Just saying you disagree with the conclusions may be
expressive, but does nothing to improve the answer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>First a technicality: It does not matter what 51% of the nodes do. Despite common opinion, , bitcoin nodes have very little say in rule enforcement and changes. You know this must be true since you can currently <a href="https://pt.aliexpress.com/item/1005002430421097.html?spm=a2g03.12010612.8148356.1.78616d5aF8D7Qj" rel="nofollow noreferrer">set up a node for less than $25</a> and run it for <a href="https://frinklang.org/fsp/frink.fsp?fromVal=%28%28%28154%20watt%20hour%29%2Fday%29%20*%20%280.25USD%2F%28kilowatt%20hour%29%29%29%20*%20%281%20month%29&amp;toVal=#calc" rel="nofollow noreferrer">less than $1 per month</a>. Additionally, it is not hard to make one physical node look like a huge number of logical nodes to the bitcoin network.</p>
<p>Practically speaking, the rules are set by an interplay between the miners and a few influential participants. If a segment of miners that controlled a significant part of the total hash power on the network implemented a rule change, and a few influential participants (like, say, Coinbase.com) followed along, then the change would effectively become a new bitcoin consensus rule. In fact, according to the <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki" rel="nofollow noreferrer">current rules about how the rules change</a>, all changes are based solely on votes cast by miners.</p>
<p>So instead I will answer the more general version of your question: &quot;What prevents the bitcoin consensus rules from being updated to allow more than 21 million total coins?&quot;</p>
<p>This is a very interesting question, and it is rarely discussed seriously.</p>
<p>Today, the thing that prevents the coin limit from being modified is: incentives. Miners control the rules, and large miners (actors who control large parts of the hash power) are currently very profitable due to the current combination of (1) the current price of bitcoin, (2) the current cost of mining a bitcoin, and (3) the current block reward. As long as large miners can make excess profits while mining with the current consensus rules (including the 21 million coin limit rule), they will continue to do so.</p>
<p>But miners will only mine when it is profitable to do so, and this fact will eventually create incentives to increase the bitcoin money supply.</p>
<p>Bitcoin users want both low transaction fees and high network security (aka hash power). Today they can have both because block reward massively subidizes mining operations. For example, in the <a href="https://btc.com/btc/block/696959" rel="nofollow noreferrer">most recent block mined</a> when I wrote this answer, the miner earned <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=6.25%20BTC&amp;rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS881US882&amp;sxsrf=ALeKk01KD1R48MN-tP1QG82IaZlVegr05A%3A1629605762607&amp;ei=gs8hYYy8JLG0gge55IVQ&amp;oq=6.25%20BTC&amp;gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyBAgAEEMyBAgAEEMyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEB4yBQgAEIYDMgUIABCGAzoGCAAQBxAeOggIABAIEAcQHkoECEEYAFCy5gJYoe0CYNHvAmgAcAB4AIABPYgByQKSAQE2mAEAoAEBwAEB&amp;sclient=gws-wiz&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiMherE4sPyAhUxmuAKHTlyAQoQ4dUDCA4&amp;uact=5" rel="nofollow noreferrer">$305,000 from the block reward</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=0.00317456%20BTC&amp;rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS881US882&amp;oq=0.00317456%20BTC&amp;aqs=chrome..69i57&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8" rel="nofollow noreferrer">$155 from transaction fees</a>.</p>
<p>Today we get both low fees and high security because almost all of the costs of mining blocks are paid for by block rewards.</p>
<p>But this will not always be true. The 21 million coin cap - by definition - limits the total number amount of block rewards payable. Each block reward is effectively a one time sale of a limited resource, and the proceeds from each sale are used to pay for hash power.</p>
<p>As we run out of block rewards to pay to miners, either (1) fees will need to rise, or (2) network security will need to go down (or some combination of those). A lot. Really, really a lot.</p>
<p>Realistically this will not happen. A bitcoin network with massively higher fees or massively lower security is not viable. So as fees start to rise and/or security starts to fall, we will eventually reach a point where something has to be fixed. But of course the only possible fix is to increase (or at least mitigate further reductions in) the block reward.</p>
<p>Remember the 21 million coin limit is not a rule itself, it is a result of the of the ever-decreasing block reward. If you increase (or even stop decreasing) the block reward, then you inherently increase the total number of bitcoins that can mined, and you debase the currency.</p>
<p>So that is how it will happen that the 21 million coin absolute limit myth will dissolve. It will make total sense then. There will be a few loud people screaming &quot;but if we raise the limit then we completely destroy the original basis of value of the system!&quot;  And they will be right. But no one will care because the only other options will be to massively raise the transaction fees or massively lower the network security, and either one of those options would destroy the value of the system.</p>
<p>Does all this sound familiar? Remember that the number of possible dollars was once limited by a rule (the number of gold atoms available). When that rule was changed, pretty much everyone went along with it for the same reasons as they will when the bitcoin rules are changed. Bitcoin is subject to the same inflationary politics as (almost<sup>1</sup>) every other currency.</p>
<ol>
<li>There is exactly one unit of money that truly has a fixed supply. I'm going to write an article about it soon, so sign up for updates at <a href="https://wp.josh.com" rel="nofollow noreferrer">josh.com</a>.</li>
</ol>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-22T06:30:01.503Z
I understand that you strongly disagree, but I want to hear counter arguments with supporting information about why you disagree. How about moving this to a better forum where we can explore your objections point by point? A stackexchange public chat room perhaps?
bigjosh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-22T06:35:50.007Z
The Taproot rule change was literally was voted on by miners. They cast their votes by putting special values into their mined blocks that indicated if they approved of the change. The only way to vote was to produce a mined block - which by definition only miners can do. Google BIP9 to see how this voting mechanism works.
bigjosh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-22T08:01:45.237Z
RE Cherry picking: I just checked the last 100 or so blocks and the average block reward is more than 100x bigger than the transaction fees with many bigger than 1000x.  This is a page that displays the most recent blocks in a table with reward and fees broken out...
https://btc.com/btc/blocks
bigjosh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-22T08:05:08.160Z
Let us [continue this discussion in chat](https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/128824/discussion-between-bigjosh-and-prayank).
bigjosh
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-22T05:42:04.940Z
2021-08-22T07:51:16.053Z
2021-08-22T07:51:16.053Z
bigjosh
<p>The reward schedule is a consensus rule in the Bitcoin network. Consensus rules are enforced by each full node independently. Node operators choose which consensus rules they enforce per the Bitcoin implementation they are running.</p>
<p>If a subset of the nodes were to increase the block subsidy, this would be a hardfork: a non-forward compatible consensus rule change.<br />
Blocks following the new rules with a higher block subsidy would be in conflict with the original rules and invalid to any nodes that did not update to the new rule set. Depending on whether either one, the other, or both resulting p2p networks have sufficient hashrate, this would potentially split the network irreconcilably, as nodes allowing the new higher reward would get disconnected and banned for sending invalid data by nodes enforcing the original rules. Since the old rules remain a subset of the new rules, a majority of the hashrate siding with the old rules would wipe-out the chain with new rules as nodes with new rules would follow that chain. Every new block with new rules would interrupt the node topology again, though.</p>
<p>It is irrelevant how many nodes are participating in the rule change. Nodes enforcing the original rules would never follow the chain with new blocks, the only way to switch over to the new rules would be by switching to new client software that implements the new rules. The node count would also only indirectly affect the survival of the competing chains as that would chiefly depend on which ruleset garners the majority of the hashrate, which in itself would depend on the rules that are adopted by the economic majority and user population.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-08-12T22:34:45.007Z
2021-08-13T01:43:41.403Z
2021-08-13T01:43:41.403Z
Murch
<p>Is it possible for 51% of the Bitcoin nodes to pool and vote to increase the money supply limit? Is that allowed in the protocol?</p>

<nodes><consensus><money-supply>
Can Bitcoin nodes vote to increase the money supply beyond 21 million?
mattsmith5
# Can Bitcoin nodes vote to increase the money supply beyond 21 million?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2021-08-12)

Is it possible for 51% of the Bitcoin nodes to pool and vote to increase the money supply limit? Is that allowed in the protocol?

**Tags:** nodes, consensus, money-supply


---

## 2 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2021-08-12. Score: 6 | Accepted answer

The reward schedule is a consensus rule in the Bitcoin network. Consensus rules are enforced by each full node independently. Node operators choose which consensus rules they enforce per the Bitcoin implementation they are running.

If a subset of the nodes were to increase the block subsidy, this would be a hardfork: a non-forward compatible consensus rule change.  
Blocks following the new rules with a higher block subsidy would be in conflict with the original rules and invalid to any nodes that did not update to the new rule set. Depending on whether either one, the other, or both resulting p2p networks have sufficient hashrate, this would potentially split the network irreconcilably, as nodes allowing the new higher reward would get disconnected and banned for sending invalid data by nodes enforcing the original rules. Since the old rules remain a subset of the new rules, a majority of the hashrate siding with the old rules would wipe-out the chain with new rules as nodes with new rules would follow that chain. Every new block with new rules would interrupt the node topology again, though.

It is irrelevant how many nodes are participating in the rule change. Nodes enforcing the original rules would never follow the chain with new blocks, the only way to switch over to the new rules would be by switching to new client software that implements the new rules. The node count would also only indirectly affect the survival of the competing chains as that would chiefly depend on which ruleset garners the majority of the hashrate, which in itself would depend on the rules that are adopted by the economic majority and user population.


---

### Answer by username_1 on 2021-08-22. Score: -2

> REQUEST: If you downvote because you disagree, please specifically
> point out where the answer either (1) got the facts wrong, or (2) made a
> reasoning error. Just saying you disagree with the conclusions may be
> expressive, but does nothing to improve the answer.

First a technicality: It does not matter what 51% of the nodes do. Despite common opinion, , bitcoin nodes have very little say in rule enforcement and changes. You know this must be true since you can currently [set up a node for less than $25](https://pt.aliexpress.com/item/1005002430421097.html?spm=a2g03.12010612.8148356.1.78616d5aF8D7Qj) and run it for [less than $1 per month](https://frinklang.org/fsp/frink.fsp?fromVal=%28%28%28154%20watt%20hour%29%2Fday%29%20*%20%280.25USD%2F%28kilowatt%20hour%29%29%29%20*%20%281%20month%29&toVal=#calc). Additionally, it is not hard to make one physical node look like a huge number of logical nodes to the bitcoin network.

Practically speaking, the rules are set by an interplay between the miners and a few influential participants. If a segment of miners that controlled a significant part of the total hash power on the network implemented a rule change, and a few influential participants (like, say, Coinbase.com) followed along, then the change would effectively become a new bitcoin consensus rule. In fact, according to the [current rules about how the rules change](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki), all changes are based solely on votes cast by miners.

So instead I will answer the more general version of your question: "What prevents the bitcoin consensus rules from being updated to allow more than 21 million total coins?"

This is a very interesting question, and it is rarely discussed seriously.

Today, the thing that prevents the coin limit from being modified is: incentives. Miners control the rules, and large miners (actors who control large parts of the hash power) are currently very profitable due to the current combination of (1) the current price of bitcoin, (2) the current cost of mining a bitcoin, and (3) the current block reward. As long as large miners can make excess profits while mining with the current consensus rules (including the 21 million coin limit rule), they will continue to do so.

But miners will only mine when it is profitable to do so, and this fact will eventually create incentives to increase the bitcoin money supply.

Bitcoin users want both low transaction fees and high network security (aka hash power). Today they can have both because block reward massively subidizes mining operations. For example, in the [most recent block mined](https://btc.com/btc/block/696959) when I wrote this answer, the miner earned [$305,000 from the block reward](https://www.google.com/search?q=6.25%20BTC&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS881US882&sxsrf=ALeKk01KD1R48MN-tP1QG82IaZlVegr05A%3A1629605762607&ei=gs8hYYy8JLG0gge55IVQ&oq=6.25%20BTC&gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAMyBAgAEEMyBAgAEEMyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEB4yBQgAEIYDMgUIABCGAzoGCAAQBxAeOggIABAIEAcQHkoECEEYAFCy5gJYoe0CYNHvAmgAcAB4AIABPYgByQKSAQE2mAEAoAEBwAEB&sclient=gws-wiz&ved=0ahUKEwiMherE4sPyAhUxmuAKHTlyAQoQ4dUDCA4&uact=5) and [$155 from transaction fees](https://www.google.com/search?q=0.00317456%20BTC&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS881US882&oq=0.00317456%20BTC&aqs=chrome..69i57&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8).

Today we get both low fees and high security because almost all of the costs of mining blocks are paid for by block rewards.

But this will not always be true. The 21 million coin cap - by definition - limits the total number amount of block rewards payable. Each block reward is effectively a one time sale of a limited resource, and the proceeds from each sale are used to pay for hash power.

As we run out of block rewards to pay to miners, either (1) fees will need to rise, or (2) network security will need to go down (or some combination of those). A lot. Really, really a lot.

Realistically this will not happen. A bitcoin network with massively higher fees or massively lower security is not viable. So as fees start to rise and/or security starts to fall, we will eventually reach a point where something has to be fixed. But of course the only possible fix is to increase (or at least mitigate further reductions in) the block reward.

Remember the 21 million coin limit is not a rule itself, it is a result of the of the ever-decreasing block reward. If you increase (or even stop decreasing) the block reward, then you inherently increase the total number of bitcoins that can mined, and you debase the currency.

So that is how it will happen that the 21 million coin absolute limit myth will dissolve. It will make total sense then. There will be a few loud people screaming "but if we raise the limit then we completely destroy the original basis of value of the system!" And they will be right. But no one will care because the only other options will be to massively raise the transaction fees or massively lower the network security, and either one of those options would destroy the value of the system.

Does all this sound familiar? Remember that the number of possible dollars was once limited by a rule (the number of gold atoms available). When that rule was changed, pretty much everyone went along with it for the same reasons as they will when the bitcoin rules are changed. Bitcoin is subject to the same inflationary politics as (almost1) every other currency.

1. There is exactly one unit of money that truly has a fixed supply. I'm going to write an article about it soon, so sign up for updates at [josh.com](https://wp.josh.com).

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: I understand that you strongly disagree, but I want to hear counter arguments with supporting information about why you disagree. How about moving this to a better forum where we can explore your objections point by point? A stackexchange public chat room perhaps?  
> **username_1**: The Taproot rule change was literally was voted on by miners. They cast their votes by putting special values into their mined blocks that indicated if they approved of the change. The only way to vote was to produce a mined block - which by definition only miners can do. Google BIP9 to see how this voting mechanism works.  
> **username_1**: RE Cherry picking: I just checked the last 100 or so blocks and the average block reward is more than 100x bigger than the transaction fees with many bigger than 1000x.  This is a page that displays the most recent blocks in a table with reward and fees broken out... https://btc.com/btc/blocks  
> **username_1**: Let us [continue this discussion in chat](https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/128824/discussion-between-username_1-and-prayank).  

---

