<p>That makes sense to me.</p>

<p>You see, you can generate a wallet completely offline. If so, the private key of that wallet would have never been on a internet-connected computer. That's a safe key.</p>

<p>However, you cannot (as far as I understand) send money without putting the private key of that wallet onto a computer that touches the internet.</p>

<p>Makes sense to completely empty that wallet and create a band new one offline again. Transfer partial money to where ever you want, then transfer the rest to the public key of a new wallet that has never had its private key on an internet-connected computer.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-16T02:46:17.093Z
You can indeed send bitcoin without putting a private key onto an online computer. That's what hardware (offline) wallets do. They **sign** the transaction so that the online computer can transmit it. Signing requires the private key but does not require disclosure of the private key, which never leaves the hardware wallet.
brec
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-18T00:02:44.483Z
Thanks Brec. I didn't know that. That's good to hear. I can image a hardware wallet having a hidden wifi component (turned off mostly), to where every few days it could attempt to find a open wifi connection just long enough to transmit a private key back to base.
Lonnie Best
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-18T03:06:47.050Z
Hardware wallets are manufactured and sold by companies whose business is security. They may make mistakes, but egregious mistakes are improbable. What you imagine would require an egregious mistake.
brec
CC BY-SA 3.0
2017-12-15T23:52:34.217Z
2017-12-15T23:52:34.217Z
Lonnie Best
<p>I've seen on <a href="https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/24816/bitcoin-cold-storage-question?rq=1">This question</a> that you should not make partial withdrawal from a cold storage address; because it could compromise the security of the cold wallet. Can someone explain the related security concerns?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2018-02-14T11:02:04.893Z
Hello PPC! You can help Bitcoin.SE by marking an answer as accepted if it has answered your question so that the question does not remain as "unanswered".
Willtech
CC BY-SA 3.0
2018-02-15T18:10:10.347Z
Sadly it is not. The only answer takes wrong assumptions, though it brings good discussion on taht assumption.
PPC
<coldstorage><wallet-security>
Why is a full sweep of a cold wallet more secure than a withdrawal?
PPC
# Why is a full sweep of a cold wallet more secure than a withdrawal?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2017-11-17)

I've seen on [This question](https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/24816/bitcoin-cold-storage-question?rq=1) that you should not make partial withdrawal from a cold storage address; because it could compromise the security of the cold wallet. Can someone explain the related security concerns?

**Tags:** coldstorage, wallet-security

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Hello PPC! You can help Bitcoin.SE by marking an answer as accepted if it has answered your question so that the question does not remain as "unanswered".  
> **username_0**: Sadly it is not. The only answer takes wrong assumptions, though it brings good discussion on taht assumption.  

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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2017-12-15. Score: 2

That makes sense to me.

You see, you can generate a wallet completely offline. If so, the private key of that wallet would have never been on a internet-connected computer. That's a safe key.

However, you cannot (as far as I understand) send money without putting the private key of that wallet onto a computer that touches the internet.

Makes sense to completely empty that wallet and create a band new one offline again. Transfer partial money to where ever you want, then transfer the rest to the public key of a new wallet that has never had its private key on an internet-connected computer.

> **Comments:**
> **username_3**: You can indeed send bitcoin without putting a private key onto an online computer. That's what hardware (offline) wallets do. They **sign** the transaction so that the online computer can transmit it. Signing requires the private key but does not require disclosure of the private key, which never leaves the hardware wallet.  
> **username_2**: Thanks username_3. I didn't know that. That's good to hear. I can image a hardware wallet having a hidden wifi component (turned off mostly), to where every few days it could attempt to find a open wifi connection just long enough to transmit a private key back to base.  
> **username_3**: Hardware wallets are manufactured and sold by companies whose business is security. They may make mistakes, but egregious mistakes are improbable. What you imagine would require an egregious mistake.  

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