<blockquote>
<p>all the miners would have to wait before sending the block</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since miners are in competition, they have a large financial incentive to publish their block and reap the rewards before some miner outside the conspiracy does so.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-01-26T15:52:53.760Z
Hmm, so my scenario would actually turn the probability of finding a block into a block propagation race, which would be especially detrimental to miners who have higher hash rates?
LeaBit
CC BY-SA 4.0
2024-01-26T14:18:43.987Z
2024-01-26T14:18:43.987Z
RedGrittyBrick
<p>What encourages miners (all miners; regardless of how much hash rate they have) to include real time in the block and not to agree among themselves to include a time such as if it took them 10 minutes to create the block. I mean, it wouldn't change the probability ratio of &quot;finding the correct block and distributing the rewards&quot; if all the miners together pretend they need 10 minutes (we just lower the necessary threshold). In that case, the miners together would mine the block in 2/3/4 minutes or less on average (I put a random number), and set the time in the timestamp as if they needed 10 minutes (of course, all the miners would have to wait before sending the block , in order to comply with the +2h rule). <strong>I can only see good for them here because in this way all miners would benefit greatly as they would spend a significantly smaller amount of electricity to find one block.</strong></p>
<p>So, what incentive do miners have not to lie about the time it takes them to mine a block <strong>and to reject such an agreement</strong>?</p>

<mining-theory>
What incentive do miners have not to lie about the time it takes them to mine a block?
LeaBit
# What incentive do miners have not to lie about the time it takes them to mine a block?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2024-01-26)

What encourages miners (all miners; regardless of how much hash rate they have) to include real time in the block and not to agree among themselves to include a time such as if it took them 10 minutes to create the block. I mean, it wouldn't change the probability ratio of "finding the correct block and distributing the rewards" if all the miners together pretend they need 10 minutes (we just lower the necessary threshold). In that case, the miners together would mine the block in 2/3/4 minutes or less on average (I put a random number), and set the time in the timestamp as if they needed 10 minutes (of course, all the miners would have to wait before sending the block , in order to comply with the +2h rule). **I can only see good for them here because in this way all miners would benefit greatly as they would spend a significantly smaller amount of electricity to find one block.**

So, what incentive do miners have not to lie about the time it takes them to mine a block **and to reject such an agreement**?

**Tags:** mining-theory


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## 1 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2024-01-26. Score: 1

> all the miners would have to wait before sending the block

Since miners are in competition, they have a large financial incentive to publish their block and reap the rewards before some miner outside the conspiracy does so.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: Hmm, so my scenario would actually turn the probability of finding a block into a block propagation race, which would be especially detrimental to miners who have higher hash rates?  

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