<p>If in low inflation future users refuse to voluntarily pay high fees and reward is too low and for some reason network computing power (A.K.A. hash rate) falls, can we then expect consensus would try to soft fork higher minimum fees?</p>
<hr />
<ul>
<li>Scenario:
<ul>
<li>Time: Undefined future (low inflation future).
<ul>
<li>Consequence 1: Reward is low.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Proposition 2: Users won't voluntarily pay high fees.</li>
<li>Proposition 3: Price will stabilize eventually.</li>
<li>Proposition 4: Because (1), (2) and (3) the network computing power will fall.
<ul>
<li>Consequence 5: Alternative chains gain relative network power compared to Bitcoin.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Proposition 6: In an attempt to stop (5) bleeding, Core would try to soft fork higher minimum fees.</li>
</ul>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-10-21T20:18:22.197Z
related: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/3111/5406
Murch
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-10-21T21:36:15.623Z
What does failure in this way actually look like? I don't think falling hashrate is it, more likely it is an extremely unstable chain-tip / ongoing majority attacks.
chytrik
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-10-22T20:19:54.340Z
@chytrik I'm not sure I understand, but I would be keen to chat about it. :)
Mercedes
CC BY-SA 4.0
2021-10-22T20:43:25.380Z
@Mercedes this site has a chatroom here if you'd like: https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/8089/mempool
chytrik
<reward-schedule><money-supply><inflation><shrinking-money-supply><supply>
If hashrate falls for other main chains, will we be brave enough to enforce higher fees?
Mercedes
# If hashrate falls for other main chains, will we be brave enough to enforce higher fees?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2021-10-21)

If in low inflation future users refuse to voluntarily pay high fees and reward is too low and for some reason network computing power (A.K.A. hash rate) falls, can we then expect consensus would try to soft fork higher minimum fees?

---

* Scenario:
  + Time: Undefined future (low inflation future).
    - Consequence 1: Reward is low.
* Proposition 2: Users won't voluntarily pay high fees.
* Proposition 3: Price will stabilize eventually.
* Proposition 4: Because (1), (2) and (3) the network computing power will fall.
  + Consequence 5: Alternative chains gain relative network power compared to Bitcoin.
* Proposition 6: In an attempt to stop (5) bleeding, Core would try to soft fork higher minimum fees.

**Tags:** reward-schedule, money-supply, inflation, shrinking-money-supply, supply

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: related: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/3111/5406  
> **username_2**: What does failure in this way actually look like? I don't think falling hashrate is it, more likely it is an extremely unstable chain-tip / ongoing majority attacks.  
> **username_0**: @username_2 I'm not sure I understand, but I would be keen to chat about it. :)  
> **username_2**: @username_0 this site has a chatroom here if you'd like: https://chat.stackexchange.com/rooms/8089/mempool  

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## 0 answers

