<p>With a look up table you can avoid calculating the hash of a given input twice. Indeed, the block chain can be considered as a giant look up table, but one with very special forms of inputs: It links blocks and transactions to their hashes.</p>

<p>Though, why should someone choose a transaction or block as her password? Further, why would an attacker even try to look up a hash of a password in the block chain? He would have to assume in advance that the password is a transaction or a block (don't forget that even looking something up consumes some resources).</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T09:58:27.967Z
True, but the target has a very specific format starting with many 0000 so you are also testing hash inputs to create a specific subset of possible outputs. I'm not suggesting the results of bitcoin mining hashes are the raw data for the lookup table but are useful in creating a bigger lookup table. Generally used passwords are often under 12 characters length so SHA256 hashing of 2 different short passwords has a huge amount of the same (blank characters) input c.f. target 000000s.
user3023094
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T11:15:36.530Z
It would reduce the amount of work you would need to make a complete table if that is what you're trying to do. How useful this part is itself is a good question.
LJNielsenDk
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T19:15:20.987Z
Have a look at crackstation.net. They have a partial lookup table for SHA256 for short passwords, it works and is fast.
user3023094
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T09:33:14.840Z
2013-11-23T09:33:14.840Z
jnnk
<p>Theoretical answer: yes and no.</p>

<p>Practical answer: not at all.</p>

<hr>

<p>SHA-2, or specifically SHA-256, is a good hashing algorithm as far as we know. It has all the properties desired and there are no real attacks on it. It has already been battle-tested a lot in the past years. That Bitcoin uses SHA-256 makes it an even more interesting algorithm to try to crack (there is 'money' behind it now), and with all the ASIC producers popping up it becomes less work to also create ASICs that try to crack passwords hashed with this.</p>

<p>So with all the extra attention SHA-256 gets, it is now more likely that flaws are found rather sooner than later. However, SHA-2 is a very widely used algorithm as it is, regardless of its use in Bitcoin. If there were any great and obvious flaws, they would have been found already.</p>

<p>It can be compared with RSA, which now powers many of today's financial transactions and encrypted connections. That too draws a lot of attention to it, but good algorithms don't become bad just because they are in the picture.</p>

<p>So while all the extra ASIC production for Bitcoin mining may also provide for better password cracking tools and brings more people to look at the algorithm, this is no practical problem. Also, you should not use SHA-2 directly as a password hashing mechanism anyway. For that, see this question: <a href="https://security.stackexchange.com/q/211/10863">https://security.stackexchange.com/q/211/10863</a></p>

<p>Edit: Read your question more thoroughly now instead of responding to the title.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Is bitcoin mining with its daily 4000+ TH/s power, funded and manned entirely by users of the hardware hoping to gain Bitcoins (and hoping they are worth some real $$) really performing a service for the NSA (or someone) and effectively "hiding in plain sight"?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>No. That's just tinfoil hattery and not even worth the "thought experiment" (nice try, conspiracy theorist) since it can readily be disproved. See other answers about what we're hashing (hint: we're not finding hashes for actual passwords or other purposes).</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-12-02T07:55:12.943Z
2013-12-02T08:03:56.080Z
2017-03-17T10:46:12.247Z
Luc
<p>Regardless of any conspiracy theory. The fact that ASIC machines are now commercially available (both hardware and completed systems) makes it easier for any agency to buy them and use them. In my opinion, this does compromise SHA-256.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-12-23T17:40:16.430Z
Yes, it makes a sha256 has easier to guess, by buying dedicated ASICS.   Scrypt is a better hash because you can tweak the ram requirement up to the point where ASICs are not practical.
Erik Aronesty
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-12-09T22:48:28.343Z
2013-12-09T22:48:28.343Z
Peter
<p>Following good scientific practice I propose a Theory/Hypothesis and now ask you to test it.</p>

<p>Initially this is a "thought" experiment but may progress to real testing depending on your thoughts. Back to the initial question first; My question: Is bitcoin mining itself compromising the security of SHA256?</p>

<p>Possible answers:</p>

<ol>
<li>Yes (maybe qualified by "in some way" ,etc).</li>
<li>No (Not at all because...xxx ,Not unless...YYY).</li>
<li>Maybe (??).</li>
</ol>

<p>The hypothesis is this:</p>

<p>SHA256 is extensively used in many applications (including Bitcoin).
It would be of great advantage for many persons, organisations and (not least) governments/military/NSA (etc) to be able to "crack" it.</p>

<p>Cryptographic experts have so far failed to crack SHA256 and only a small number of defects (possible collision scenarios) have been declared which although reducing the theoretical security (of a brute force attack) do not compromise SHA256 in practical use.</p>

<p>SHA256 look up tables exist for e.g. dictionary attacks and are very fast to use particularly for shorter passwords (&lt;8 character). To extend the possibility of using look up tables for longer inputs a huge amount of computing power is needed to run many Terra inputs through SHA256.</p>

<p>This power is impractical to set up and run (cost of hardware, manpower, etc) and if it were set up e.g. by NSA using a super-computer it existence would be apparent and therefore usage of SHA256 would decline as it would be assumed that they wouldn't do that unless they thought they would get a result so users of SHA256 would migrate to a more secure system (e.g. SHA3 series). Therefore what NSA (or whoever) need is a "covert" way of "testing/running" SHA256 and gathering the results.</p>

<p>Is bitcoin mining with its daily 4000+ TH/s power, funded and manned entirely by users of the hardware hoping to gain Bitcoins (and hoping they are worth some real $$) really performing a service for the NSA (or someone) and effectively "hiding in plain sight"?</p>

<p>Methods of testing this hypothesis are invited.  </p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T10:12:01.907Z
Related question: Has mining created enough technology to solve SHA256, such as ASICs, that SHA256 is weaker for other purposes than it would be otherwise? In other words, can the NSA, its foreign counterparts and other hackers now break some encryption more easily than before the advent of SHA256 ASICs?
Random Walker
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T11:53:29.843Z
This should maybe be posted as a separate question and linked.
LJNielsenDk
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-11-23T19:24:57.460Z
Thanks Random Walker for putting a different spin on my question. Certainly there is now a lot of SHA256 specific hardware about in the hands of bitcoin miners and the development of ASIC for SHA256 has been enhanced. Who knows how much of the ASIC chips have been sold "elsewhere" (other than mining rig manufacture) ? It certainly helps offset the developement cost if we have a real world customer base (miners) as well as XXX code cracking company.
user3023094
CC BY-SA 3.0
2015-02-08T19:18:07.710Z
possible duplicate http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/9320/can-the-bitcoin-network-be-used-for-cracking
Nick ODell
<blockchain><sha256><satoshi-nakamoto>
Is bitcoin mining itself compromising the security of SHA256
user3023094
# Is bitcoin mining itself compromising the security of SHA256

(Asked by: username_0 on 2013-11-23)

Following good scientific practice I propose a Theory/Hypothesis and now ask you to test it.

Initially this is a "thought" experiment but may progress to real testing depending on your thoughts. Back to the initial question first; My question: Is bitcoin mining itself compromising the security of SHA256?

Possible answers:

1. Yes (maybe qualified by "in some way" ,etc).
2. No (Not at all because...xxx ,Not unless...YYY).
3. Maybe (??).

The hypothesis is this:

SHA256 is extensively used in many applications (including Bitcoin).
It would be of great advantage for many persons, organisations and (not least) governments/military/NSA (etc) to be able to "crack" it.

Cryptographic experts have so far failed to crack SHA256 and only a small number of defects (possible collision scenarios) have been declared which although reducing the theoretical security (of a brute force attack) do not compromise SHA256 in practical use.

SHA256 look up tables exist for e.g. dictionary attacks and are very fast to use particularly for shorter passwords (<8 character). To extend the possibility of using look up tables for longer inputs a huge amount of computing power is needed to run many Terra inputs through SHA256.

This power is impractical to set up and run (cost of hardware, manpower, etc) and if it were set up e.g. by NSA using a super-computer it existence would be apparent and therefore usage of SHA256 would decline as it would be assumed that they wouldn't do that unless they thought they would get a result so users of SHA256 would migrate to a more secure system (e.g. SHA3 series). Therefore what NSA (or whoever) need is a "covert" way of "testing/running" SHA256 and gathering the results.

Is bitcoin mining with its daily 4000+ TH/s power, funded and manned entirely by users of the hardware hoping to gain Bitcoins (and hoping they are worth some real $$) really performing a service for the NSA (or someone) and effectively "hiding in plain sight"?

Methods of testing this hypothesis are invited.

**Tags:** blockchain, sha256, satoshi-nakamoto

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Related question: Has mining created enough technology to solve SHA256, such as ASICs, that SHA256 is weaker for other purposes than it would be otherwise? In other words, can the NSA, its foreign counterparts and other hackers now break some encryption more easily than before the advent of SHA256 ASICs?  
> **username_2**: This should maybe be posted as a separate question and linked.  
> **username_0**: Thanks username_1 for putting a different spin on my question. Certainly there is now a lot of SHA256 specific hardware about in the hands of bitcoin miners and the development of ASIC for SHA256 has been enhanced. Who knows how much of the ASIC chips have been sold "elsewhere" (other than mining rig manufacture) ? It certainly helps offset the developement cost if we have a real world customer base (miners) as well as XXX code cracking company.  
> **username_3**: possible duplicate http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/9320/can-the-bitcoin-network-be-used-for-cracking  

---

## 3 answers

### Answer by username_4 on 2013-11-23. Score: 11

With a look up table you can avoid calculating the hash of a given input twice. Indeed, the block chain can be considered as a giant look up table, but one with very special forms of inputs: It links blocks and transactions to their hashes.

Though, why should someone choose a transaction or block as her password? Further, why would an attacker even try to look up a hash of a password in the block chain? He would have to assume in advance that the password is a transaction or a block (don't forget that even looking something up consumes some resources).

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: True, but the target has a very specific format starting with many 0000 so you are also testing hash inputs to create a specific subset of possible outputs. I'm not suggesting the results of bitcoin mining hashes are the raw data for the lookup table but are useful in creating a bigger lookup table. Generally used passwords are often under 12 characters length so SHA256 hashing of 2 different short passwords has a huge amount of the same (blank characters) input c.f. target 000000s.  
> **username_2**: It would reduce the amount of work you would need to make a complete table if that is what you're trying to do. How useful this part is itself is a good question.  
> **username_0**: Have a look at crackstation.net. They have a partial lookup table for SHA256 for short passwords, it works and is fast.  

---

### Answer by username_5 on 2013-12-02. Score: 2

Theoretical answer: yes and no.

Practical answer: not at all.

---

SHA-2, or specifically SHA-256, is a good hashing algorithm as far as we know. It has all the properties desired and there are no real attacks on it. It has already been battle-tested a lot in the past years. That Bitcoin uses SHA-256 makes it an even more interesting algorithm to try to crack (there is 'money' behind it now), and with all the ASIC producers popping up it becomes less work to also create ASICs that try to crack passwords hashed with this.

So with all the extra attention SHA-256 gets, it is now more likely that flaws are found rather sooner than later. However, SHA-2 is a very widely used algorithm as it is, regardless of its use in Bitcoin. If there were any great and obvious flaws, they would have been found already.

It can be compared with RSA, which now powers many of today's financial transactions and encrypted connections. That too draws a lot of attention to it, but good algorithms don't become bad just because they are in the picture.

So while all the extra ASIC production for Bitcoin mining may also provide for better password cracking tools and brings more people to look at the algorithm, this is no practical problem. Also, you should not use SHA-2 directly as a password hashing mechanism anyway. For that, see this question: <https://security.stackexchange.com/q/211/10863>

Edit: Read your question more thoroughly now instead of responding to the title.

> Is bitcoin mining with its daily 4000+ TH/s power, funded and manned entirely by users of the hardware hoping to gain Bitcoins (and hoping they are worth some real $$) really performing a service for the NSA (or someone) and effectively "hiding in plain sight"?

No. That's just tinfoil hattery and not even worth the "thought experiment" (nice try, conspiracy theorist) since it can readily be disproved. See other answers about what we're hashing (hint: we're not finding hashes for actual passwords or other purposes).


---

### Answer by username_6 on 2013-12-09. Score: 2

Regardless of any conspiracy theory. The fact that ASIC machines are now commercially available (both hardware and completed systems) makes it easier for any agency to buy them and use them. In my opinion, this does compromise SHA-256.

> **Comments:**
> **username_7**: Yes, it makes a sha256 has easier to guess, by buying dedicated ASICS.   Scrypt is a better hash because you can tweak the ram requirement up to the point where ASICs are not practical.  

---

