<p>For example, on macOS:</p>
<pre class="lang-bash prettyprint-override"><code>brew install --cask bitcoin-core
</code></pre>
<p>Or on Ubuntu:</p>
<pre class="lang-bash prettyprint-override"><code>snap install bitcoin-core
</code></pre>
<p>Etc.</p>
<p>In particular, what attack vectors might I be exposing myself to if I choose to install Bitcoin Core using a package manager?</p>
<p>Using Homebrew as an example:</p>
<ol>
<li>I presume that <a href="https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-cask/blob/efe28792b2f57bc57e364fc5afd9b875b1127e37/Casks/b/bitcoin-core.rb" rel="nofollow noreferrer">download hashes are checked</a> in Homebrew?</li>
<li>Are hash signatures checked?</li>
<li>Does Homebrew have a mechanism that ensures that only a Bitcoin Core maintainer can update a package on Homebrew?</li>
<li>Could I still be vulnerable to a malicious/compromised Homebrew maintainer who changes the download URL and hash?</li>
<li>Are there any other similar issues or risks?</li>
</ol>
<p>(N.B.: If the only &quot;safe&quot; method is to build from source or to download Bitcoin Core directly, it's fine to note this and why, but I ask that you please keep answers focused on any risks associated with using a package manager instead.)</p>
<p>Thanks!</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2023-09-08T03:29:44.640Z
Homebrew checks download hashes to ensure the integrity of downloaded files. It does not natively support cryptographic signature verification for packages. There is a potential risk of a malicious or compromised Homebrew maintainer changing the download URL and hash for a package.
Mani T
CC BY-SA 4.0
2023-09-08T17:43:39.167Z
Thank you, @ManiT! It sounds like a more niche package manager is needed (and may eventually develop) that maintains an appropriate chain of verifiable trust for higher risk packages like various Bitcoin and LN implementations, etc, though I am likely underappreciating the complexities in this idea.
Jonathan Wheeler
<security><installation><bitcoin-qt-setup>
Is it safe to install Bitcoin Core using a package manager?
Jonathan Wheeler
# Is it safe to install Bitcoin Core using a package manager?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2023-09-07)

For example, on macOS:

```bash
brew install --cask bitcoin-core

```

Or on Ubuntu:

```bash
snap install bitcoin-core

```

Etc.

In particular, what attack vectors might I be exposing myself to if I choose to install Bitcoin Core using a package manager?

Using Homebrew as an example:

1. I presume that [download hashes are checked](https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-cask/blob/efe28792b2f57bc57e364fc5afd9b875b1127e37/Casks/b/bitcoin-core.rb) in Homebrew?
2. Are hash signatures checked?
3. Does Homebrew have a mechanism that ensures that only a Bitcoin Core maintainer can update a package on Homebrew?
4. Could I still be vulnerable to a malicious/compromised Homebrew maintainer who changes the download URL and hash?
5. Are there any other similar issues or risks?

(N.B.: If the only "safe" method is to build from source or to download Bitcoin Core directly, it's fine to note this and why, but I ask that you please keep answers focused on any risks associated with using a package manager instead.)

Thanks!

**Tags:** security, installation, bitcoin-qt-setup

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Homebrew checks download hashes to ensure the integrity of downloaded files. It does not natively support cryptographic signature verification for packages. There is a potential risk of a malicious or compromised Homebrew maintainer changing the download URL and hash for a package.  
> **username_0**: Thank you, @username_1! It sounds like a more niche package manager is needed (and may eventually develop) that maintains an appropriate chain of verifiable trust for higher risk packages like various Bitcoin and LN implementations, etc, though I am likely underappreciating the complexities in this idea.  

---

## 0 answers

