<p>Whenever you perform a transaction on OT, you must submit the signed transaction. After the server verifies your signed transaction, which includes your current balance, the server countersigns it, and this becomes your receipt.</p>

<p>The server is unable to forge your balance, and unable to forge any transactions, because the server is unable to forge your signature on the receipt.</p>

<p>(This "last signed receipt" actually constitutes your account. Your "account" is nothing more than the last receipt itself, signed by both you and the OT server, agreeing to a certain balance.)</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-01-28T09:32:20.410Z
2012-01-28T09:32:20.410Z
Fellow Traveler
<p>It is not possible for the OT server to forge your signature because you retain the private key. Sure, it could issue fakes but anyone actually checking the signature would immediately see that it is incorrect and reject the transaction.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-01-24T15:18:10.430Z
2012-01-24T15:18:10.430Z
Gary
<p>FellowTraveller <a href="https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/2710/78">claimed here</a> that :</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>OT cannot lie on your receipt. It cannot change your balance or forge
  any of your transactions. (Bitcoin also is like this, but it's still
  worth mentioning.) Combined with an auditing protocol, this makes it
  possible to run low-trust servers.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Can anyone elaborate on this? What prevents the operator of an OT server from changing balances and forging transactions?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2012-01-24T12:02:16.310Z
I guess I should just spend a few hours on the OT wiki, there seems to be a lot of info there to be digested - https://github.com/FellowTraveler/Open-Transactions/wiki
ripper234
<open-transactions>
Why "Open Transactions cannot lie on your receipt"?
ripper234
# Why "Open Transactions cannot lie on your receipt"?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2012-01-24)

FellowTraveller [claimed here](https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/2710/78) that :

> OT cannot lie on your receipt. It cannot change your balance or forge
> any of your transactions. (Bitcoin also is like this, but it's still
> worth mentioning.) Combined with an auditing protocol, this makes it
> possible to run low-trust servers.

Can anyone elaborate on this? What prevents the operator of an OT server from changing balances and forging transactions?

**Tags:** open-transactions

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: I guess I should just spend a few hours on the OT wiki, there seems to be a lot of info there to be digested - https://github.com/username_1/Open-Transactions/wiki  

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## 2 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2012-01-24. Score: 4 | Accepted answer

It is not possible for the OT server to forge your signature because you retain the private key. Sure, it could issue fakes but anyone actually checking the signature would immediately see that it is incorrect and reject the transaction.


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### Answer by username_1 on 2012-01-28. Score: 2

Whenever you perform a transaction on OT, you must submit the signed transaction. After the server verifies your signed transaction, which includes your current balance, the server countersigns it, and this becomes your receipt.

The server is unable to forge your balance, and unable to forge any transactions, because the server is unable to forge your signature on the receipt.

(This "last signed receipt" actually constitutes your account. Your "account" is nothing more than the last receipt itself, signed by both you and the OT server, agreeing to a certain balance.)


---

