<p>Remember, the bitcoin protocol and the code for most clients is open source. You can check it yourself.</p>

<p>If there was a "master key", then we would know. It's very hard to hide such things in code when it will be reviewed by tons of others. (Yes, hiding malicious code can be <a href="http://underhanded.xcott.com/" rel="noreferrer">done</a>, but not at this level).</p>

<p>However, note that Satoshi and a few others have access to <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Alerts" rel="noreferrer">update</a> your client. What would happen if they pushed a malicious update? Simple: the community would notice. They would spread the news, and a new blockchain would be branched from the last block created before the malicious update.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-10T09:02:08.743Z
2013-04-10T09:02:08.743Z
Manishearth
<p>Satoshi likely has the key corresponding to the address the coinbase of the genesis block was sent to. This is no different then any subsidy (mining income) produced by any later block. It does not grant any special privileges beyond that.</p>

<p>Actually, not even that, as because of either a bug or a conscious choice, the output of the genesis block cannot be spent.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-09T19:45:54.040Z
So you say that the bitcoin system is not vulnerable to a master key attack? I belive that any system should be unless there is responsibility sharing, does bitcoin guarantee this type of democratic self regulation as a network?
marscom
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-10T00:15:48.993Z
I don't think you understand how Bitcoin works. There is no such thing as a 'master key'.
Pieter Wuille
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-09T19:31:22.060Z
2013-04-09T19:31:22.060Z
Pieter Wuille
<p>Similar to how terrible laws get passed during a crisis (e.g., the Federal Reserve's passage on Christmas eve, or after journalists call it a night on Friday), there is the potential risk that developers would release software during a crisis in which proper vetting hasn't occurred.</p>

<p>But most of the major players build the Bitcoin-Qt/bitcoind from source and can evaluate changes themselves.  For instance, Slush pool used an emergency fix shared by a member of the Bitcoin-Qt/bitcoind core development team to cause the v0.8 client to ignore the offending block following the March 11th, 2013 hard fork emergency.  The patch involved a few lines of source code changes that could be shared via any method, including a direct personal message.</p>

<p>If instead that change happened to be quite large, the risk of not recognizing code that is malicious increases.  For this reason, if either the complexity or urgency of an informal fix grows, the resistance to implement it until a formal release arrives should increase.  Formal releases are signed by the Bitcoin Foundation and are distributed through normal channels (and not passed as patches directly from developers to miners.)</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-10T09:56:04.353Z
2013-04-10T09:56:04.353Z
Stephen Gornick
<p>No one holds a key that gives them special control of the blockchain.</p>

<p>The closest thing to a "master key" was the <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Alerts" rel="nofollow noreferrer">alerts system</a>, which allowed signed messages to be sent to every client, for example, to tell users to update their client in response to a security issue.  This feature was for alerts only and can in no way affect the blockchain, transactions, or user balances.  This key was possessed by Satoshi, Gavin Andresen, and theymos.</p>

<p>Update: The alerts system was <a href="https://bitcoin.org/en/posts/alert-key-and-vulnerabilities-disclosure" rel="nofollow noreferrer">retired in the summer of 2018</a>, due to risk of DOS attack vectors (full nodes could be DOS attacked by carefully crafted alert messages), and increasingly widespread knowledge of the alert keys. </p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2013-04-09T20:01:52.697Z
2019-01-22T02:43:04.190Z
2019-01-22T02:43:04.190Z
Dust
<p>If the creator of Bitcoin was the one that started the blockchain and with every cryptographic operation deriving from that initial key, would the network be under the complete control of the creator?</p>
<p>The only way I could see this not being the case if the key was disseminated into the network, but I am unsure if that is the case.</p>
<p>If the key is control over the block-chain and if the key generator still holds the key, then regardless of the fact that it is decentralized in operation, it is still centralized in control, like a bank.</p>
<p>I guess I'm really asking whether the creator had/has any advantage in the network (i.e reversing transactions, creating new coins, etc). Unless he specifically programmed the network not to be under his control, it would be right? I mean he IS the creator of the network and unless we have proof (source code inspection?) that the network has been 'turned over' so to speak to the users, we cannot guarantee safety can we?</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-09T20:05:37.933Z
Are you aware that bitcoin is an open source project? You speak as if it's a black box that the users can't see inside. Anyone can see exactly how everything works by looking at the source code: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin
Cory J
CC BY-SA 3.0
2013-04-10T09:58:40.507Z
Related: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/4335/153 and http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/8236/153
Stephen Gornick
<satoshi-nakamoto>
Does the creator of Bitcoin hold a 'master' private key?
marscom
# Does the creator of Bitcoin hold a 'master' private key?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2013-04-09)

If the creator of Bitcoin was the one that started the blockchain and with every cryptographic operation deriving from that initial key, would the network be under the complete control of the creator?

The only way I could see this not being the case if the key was disseminated into the network, but I am unsure if that is the case.

If the key is control over the block-chain and if the key generator still holds the key, then regardless of the fact that it is decentralized in operation, it is still centralized in control, like a bank.

I guess I'm really asking whether the creator had/has any advantage in the network (i.e reversing transactions, creating new coins, etc). Unless he specifically programmed the network not to be under his control, it would be right? I mean he IS the creator of the network and unless we have proof (source code inspection?) that the network has been 'turned over' so to speak to the users, we cannot guarantee safety can we?

**Tags:** satoshi-nakamoto

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Are you aware that bitcoin is an open source project? You speak as if it's a black box that the users can't see inside. Anyone can see exactly how everything works by looking at the source code: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin  
> **username_2**: Related: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/4335/153 and http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/8236/153  

---

## 4 answers

### Answer by username_5 on 2013-04-09. Score: 17 | Accepted answer

No one holds a key that gives them special control of the blockchain.

The closest thing to a "master key" was the [alerts system](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Alerts), which allowed signed messages to be sent to every client, for example, to tell users to update their client in response to a security issue. This feature was for alerts only and can in no way affect the blockchain, transactions, or user balances. This key was possessed by Satoshi, Gavin Andresen, and theymos.

Update: The alerts system was [retired in the summer of 2018](https://bitcoin.org/en/posts/alert-key-and-vulnerabilities-disclosure), due to risk of DOS attack vectors (full nodes could be DOS attacked by carefully crafted alert messages), and increasingly widespread knowledge of the alert keys.


---

### Answer by username_3 on 2013-04-10. Score: 5

Remember, the bitcoin protocol and the code for most clients is open source. You can check it yourself.

If there was a "master key", then we would know. It's very hard to hide such things in code when it will be reviewed by tons of others. (Yes, hiding malicious code can be [done](http://underhanded.xcott.com/), but not at this level).

However, note that Satoshi and a few others have access to [update](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Alerts) your client. What would happen if they pushed a malicious update? Simple: the community would notice. They would spread the news, and a new blockchain would be branched from the last block created before the malicious update.


---

### Answer by username_4 on 2013-04-09. Score: 5

Satoshi likely has the key corresponding to the address the coinbase of the genesis block was sent to. This is no different then any subsidy (mining income) produced by any later block. It does not grant any special privileges beyond that.

Actually, not even that, as because of either a bug or a conscious choice, the output of the genesis block cannot be spent.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: So you say that the bitcoin system is not vulnerable to a master key attack? I belive that any system should be unless there is responsibility sharing, does bitcoin guarantee this type of democratic self regulation as a network?  
> **username_4**: I don't think you understand how Bitcoin works. There is no such thing as a 'master key'.  

---

### Answer by username_2 on 2013-04-10. Score: 3

Similar to how terrible laws get passed during a crisis (e.g., the Federal Reserve's passage on Christmas eve, or after journalists call it a night on Friday), there is the potential risk that developers would release software during a crisis in which proper vetting hasn't occurred.

But most of the major players build the Bitcoin-Qt/bitcoind from source and can evaluate changes themselves. For instance, Slush pool used an emergency fix shared by a member of the Bitcoin-Qt/bitcoind core development team to cause the v0.8 client to ignore the offending block following the March 11th, 2013 hard fork emergency. The patch involved a few lines of source code changes that could be shared via any method, including a direct personal message.

If instead that change happened to be quite large, the risk of not recognizing code that is malicious increases. For this reason, if either the complexity or urgency of an informal fix grows, the resistance to implement it until a formal release arrives should increase. Formal releases are signed by the Bitcoin Foundation and are distributed through normal channels (and not passed as patches directly from developers to miners.)


---

