<blockquote>
  <p>There is a big digital trail of the transaction. To me, that is like mail delivered to the wrong house, but opened anyway.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>This analogy is off - with most "wrong address" scenarios, it is more along the lines of the piece of mail disappearing into nothing. There is no guarantee that an incorrect address belongs to anyone at all. The vast majority of the address space is unused.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>I have suggested to the Bitcoin site I use, to have the sender and receiver have a "password" to open the wallet.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>If the address you are sending to is not using the same wallet service you are, this is not enforceable. A wallet cannot impose requirements like this on a receiving wallet.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>This way the unintended wallet has to return the BTC not intended for that wallet. </p>
</blockquote>

<p>This isn't how Bitcoin works - as long as someone holds the private keys for an address, they are free to move or keep the coins as they wish.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>What is the point to have a long list of transactions and confirmations if Bitcoins promotes crime?</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Bitcoin solves many problems, but granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>On my transaction, I entered the correct wallet, but on the "sending" part, a different un-"intended Wallet ID" replaced the wallet I have</p>
</blockquote>

<p>It sounds like your device was compromised by one of many Bitcoin address changing malwares - they are specifically designed to wait for people to copy Bitcoin addresses, and then replace them with one belonging to the malware author.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>There is an "order ID, a "destination wallet address, a Transaction hash," and other ID's on the receipt, so I think if I presented this to anybody, crime would halt because crime is unacceptable</p>
</blockquote>

<p>The order ID here is irrelevant. All that matters is the transaction hash and destination wallet. As long as the transaction has been confirmed, no one can help you. In fact, you can't even prove that the destination address does not belong to you, as it is impossible to prove that you don't have a private key for it.</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Besides, how does a TYPO turn into a "real wallet?"</p>
</blockquote>

<p>In nearly all cases, it does not. Bitcoin addresses contain a checksum specifically to prevent against this. The probability of a typo producing a valid address is 2^32, so you almost certainly either copied an incorrect address to begin with, or have a malware changing copied addresses.</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-15T22:07:08.623Z
I noticed that I am not the only person, who has done this.  Most Bitcoin sites have a digital ID to replace entering a typo.  This is why I suggest there be a grace period of a certain amount of days before the money is available to be used by that wallet.  This way, the secure Bitcoins are safer to buy because if the wallet is uncontrolled, then the Bitcoins remain in my wallet where I can give permission if the receiver also approves or signs this as a real payment.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-15T22:14:51.707Z
I noticed that I am not the only person, who has done this.  Most Bitcoin sites have a digital ID to replace entering a typo.  This is why I suggest there be a grace period of a certain amount of days before the money is available to be used by that wallet.  This way, the secure Bitcoins are safer to buy because if the wallet is uncontrolled, then the Bitcoins remain in my wallet where I can give permission if the receiver also approves or signs this as a real payment.
I suggest an safer way to cancel than just "cancel" because the mouses slip, so it has to be maybe a pattern to authorize
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-15T22:15:27.317Z
This process can end fraud because it requires 2 approvals.  Any ""cancellation can only be done by the sender, and if the receiver approves, it is overridden by the cancel, but , or a return payment issued by the bank.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T03:15:47.810Z
so you almost certainly either copied an incorrect address to begin with, or have a malware changing copied addresses.
Impossible.  I had the wallet on My PC and I had to type  it twice into the destination wallet, twice.  Besides, it was the first time I tried from my cellphone, so no Malware could be present.

granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T03:35:52.333Z
granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.

Impossible.  I had the wallet on My PC so I had to type it into the destination wallet, twice.  Besides, it was the first time I tried from my cellphone, so no Malware could be present.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T03:39:10.463Z
If the address you are sending to is not using the same wallet service you are, this is not enforceable. A wallet cannot impose requirements like this on a receiving wallet.

It is just a suggestion to prevent others from losing funds, too.  I did a search And I am NOT the only person with this error.  I Just had unanswered suggestions that are not requirements, so they can be suggested.  Only You took this as a requirement.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T03:41:36.780Z
This analogy is off - with most "wrong address" scenarios, it is more along the lines of the piece of mail disappearing into nothing.

If it went nowhere, then Bitcoins can Easily be reversed.  I mean, the BTC or BCH is in nobody's hands, so the funds are still available.  The analogy is right on target.  You just said the address probably does not exist and the funds are in an unknown address.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T06:46:58.020Z
@BitcoinH4ndl3r It is impossible to prove that it went nowhere - you cannot tell just by looking at an address if someone can spend funds from it. Additionally, reversals are impossible by design. Funds sent to an uncontrolled address are permanently lost.
Raghav Sood
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-03T19:07:27.523Z
Then why are there so many "trails?"  In the receipt, there is a destination, there is the sender, there is the transaction amount.  All show evidence that Anything can be done.  Besides, someone posted that a typo is nonexistent.  He said that there is a checksum to guarantee that a typo will not send BTC to a non-existent wallet.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-04T15:40:41.417Z
They are uncontrolled addresses, but I think it was another of my addresses, so how do I find out the site where it was sent?  How is it impossible to prove it went nowhere, if there is a digital trail?  I think it is very possible because of the digital trail.  If it was all paper, the trail would lead to a location.  Bitcoins is supposed to be safe, but humans make errors, I think the sent BTC ought to stay in a secure vault as a grace period to make sure the intended wallet is real, unlike the typo that was created.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-04T22:25:44.737Z
Cybercriminals Stole $1.4 Billion of Crypto in the First Half of 2020
• 2020: $1.4 Billion in crypto stolen so far
• Crimes are mostly instances of fraud
• Wotoken: Ponzi scheme stole $1 billion
 
(Read time: only 2 minutes)
Cover all the little holes, then stuff like this is more secure, too.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T02:34:58.497Z
2020-06-01T02:34:58.497Z
Raghav Sood
<p>This is similar to a question already asked, but I disagree with the answers.  There is a big digital trail of the transaction.  To me, that is like mail delivered to the wrong house, but opened anyway.  It is a crime as is, I have suggested to the Bitcoin site I use, to have the sender and receiver have a "password" to open the wallet.  This way the unintended wallet has to return the BTC not intended for that wallet.  What is the point to have a long list of transactions and confirmations if Bitcoins promotes crime?<br>
On my transaction, I entered the correct wallet, but on the "sending" part, a different un-"intended Wallet ID" replaced  the wallet I have. 
I cannot find that other wallet anywhere on my PC, my cellphone, nor in any e-mail search I performed???.  There is an "order ID, a "destination wallet address, a Transaction hash," and other ID's on the receipt, so I think if I presented this to anybody, crime would halt because crime is unacceptable.
Besides, how does a TYPO turn into a "real wallet?"</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T20:36:24.183Z
Your proposed solution wouldn't solve the problem anyway. Anything that could make bitcoin go to the wrong address could cause it to be secured with the wrong password as well.
David Schwartz
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-01T22:59:19.813Z
How do you suppose that?  I think the password is not venerated at the moment of purchase, but something already confirmed with Bitcoin, the sender, and the receiver.  You see, three confirmations needed; although just 2 are all needed.  How could the wrong address be associated, IF The wrong address was a typo that probably does not exist anyway?  It was already confirmed the checksum does not allow a typo to confirm a non-existent address.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-02T17:59:34.747Z
Typos are already handled by the address checksum. The problem is either an attacker changing the destination or the sender using a previous destination. Both of those things could affect the password equally. You could accidentally reuse an old password/address and same problem. An attacker could swap in both their address and their password and steal funds.
David Schwartz
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-02T22:12:03.423Z
Thanks for the information.  We are getting away from the topic, the wallet was my other wallet on a different Bitcoin site, Oops :).  The question I have is the trail is left with all the ID's so I think the BTC could be reversed.  I mean, the site knows the receiver, who claimed money not for actually intended for that wallet, so I think the transaction can be reversed.  If there is a fee, then it is understood because I made the mistake, but it was sent to my wallet, I just want it to go to a different wallet.
BitcoinH4ndl3r
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-06-03T15:06:17.640Z
The value proposition of bitcoin is that its transactions are irreversible. There are no administrators or administrative functions whatsoever. If you want reversible transactions, you want something other than the bitcoin blockchain.
David Schwartz
<transactions><wallet>
The digital trail is a "warrant" to recover transactions sent to BTC that were sent to wrong address
BitcoinH4ndl3r
# The digital trail is a "warrant" to recover transactions sent to BTC that were sent to wrong address

(Asked by: username_0 on 2020-06-01)

This is similar to a question already asked, but I disagree with the answers. There is a big digital trail of the transaction. To me, that is like mail delivered to the wrong house, but opened anyway. It is a crime as is, I have suggested to the Bitcoin site I use, to have the sender and receiver have a "password" to open the wallet. This way the unintended wallet has to return the BTC not intended for that wallet. What is the point to have a long list of transactions and confirmations if Bitcoins promotes crime?  
On my transaction, I entered the correct wallet, but on the "sending" part, a different un-"intended Wallet ID" replaced the wallet I have.
I cannot find that other wallet anywhere on my PC, my cellphone, nor in any e-mail search I performed???. There is an "order ID, a "destination wallet address, a Transaction hash," and other ID's on the receipt, so I think if I presented this to anybody, crime would halt because crime is unacceptable.
Besides, how does a TYPO turn into a "real wallet?"

**Tags:** transactions, wallet

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Your proposed solution wouldn't solve the problem anyway. Anything that could make bitcoin go to the wrong address could cause it to be secured with the wrong password as well.  
> **username_0**: How do you suppose that?  I think the password is not venerated at the moment of purchase, but something already confirmed with Bitcoin, the sender, and the receiver.  You see, three confirmations needed; although just 2 are all needed.  How could the wrong address be associated, IF The wrong address was a typo that probably does not exist anyway?  It was already confirmed the checksum does not allow a typo to confirm a non-existent address.  
> **username_1**: Typos are already handled by the address checksum. The problem is either an attacker changing the destination or the sender using a previous destination. Both of those things could affect the password equally. You could accidentally reuse an old password/address and same problem. An attacker could swap in both their address and their password and steal funds.  
> **username_0**: Thanks for the information.  We are getting away from the topic, the wallet was my other wallet on a different Bitcoin site, Oops :).  The question I have is the trail is left with all the ID's so I think the BTC could be reversed.  I mean, the site knows the receiver, who claimed money not for actually intended for that wallet, so I think the transaction can be reversed.  If there is a fee, then it is understood because I made the mistake, but it was sent to my wallet, I just want it to go to a different wallet.  
> **username_1**: The value proposition of bitcoin is that its transactions are irreversible. There are no administrators or administrative functions whatsoever. If you want reversible transactions, you want something other than the bitcoin blockchain.  

---

## 1 answers

### Answer by username_2 on 2020-06-01. Score: 1

> There is a big digital trail of the transaction. To me, that is like mail delivered to the wrong house, but opened anyway.

This analogy is off - with most "wrong address" scenarios, it is more along the lines of the piece of mail disappearing into nothing. There is no guarantee that an incorrect address belongs to anyone at all. The vast majority of the address space is unused.

> I have suggested to the Bitcoin site I use, to have the sender and receiver have a "password" to open the wallet.

If the address you are sending to is not using the same wallet service you are, this is not enforceable. A wallet cannot impose requirements like this on a receiving wallet.

> This way the unintended wallet has to return the BTC not intended for that wallet.

This isn't how Bitcoin works - as long as someone holds the private keys for an address, they are free to move or keep the coins as they wish.

> What is the point to have a long list of transactions and confirmations if Bitcoins promotes crime?

Bitcoin solves many problems, but granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.

> On my transaction, I entered the correct wallet, but on the "sending" part, a different un-"intended Wallet ID" replaced the wallet I have

It sounds like your device was compromised by one of many Bitcoin address changing malwares - they are specifically designed to wait for people to copy Bitcoin addresses, and then replace them with one belonging to the malware author.

> There is an "order ID, a "destination wallet address, a Transaction hash," and other ID's on the receipt, so I think if I presented this to anybody, crime would halt because crime is unacceptable

The order ID here is irrelevant. All that matters is the transaction hash and destination wallet. As long as the transaction has been confirmed, no one can help you. In fact, you can't even prove that the destination address does not belong to you, as it is impossible to prove that you don't have a private key for it.

> Besides, how does a TYPO turn into a "real wallet?"

In nearly all cases, it does not. Bitcoin addresses contain a checksum specifically to prevent against this. The probability of a typo producing a valid address is 2^32, so you almost certainly either copied an incorrect address to begin with, or have a malware changing copied addresses.

> **Comments:**
> **username_0**: so you almost certainly either copied an incorrect address to begin with, or have a malware changing copied addresses. Impossible.  I had the wallet on My PC and I had to type  it twice into the destination wallet, twice.  Besides, it was the first time I tried from my cellphone, so no Malware could be present.  granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.  
> **username_0**: granting you access to funds that you claim are yours at an address that doesn't belong to you isn't one of them.  Impossible.  I had the wallet on My PC so I had to type it into the destination wallet, twice.  Besides, it was the first time I tried from my cellphone, so no Malware could be present.  
> **username_0**: If the address you are sending to is not using the same wallet service you are, this is not enforceable. A wallet cannot impose requirements like this on a receiving wallet.  It is just a suggestion to prevent others from losing funds, too.  I did a search And I am NOT the only person with this error.  I Just had unanswered suggestions that are not requirements, so they can be suggested.  Only You took this as a requirement.  
> **username_0**: This analogy is off - with most "wrong address" scenarios, it is more along the lines of the piece of mail disappearing into nothing.  If it went nowhere, then Bitcoins can Easily be reversed.  I mean, the BTC or BCH is in nobody's hands, so the funds are still available.  The analogy is right on target.  You just said the address probably does not exist and the funds are in an unknown address.  
> **username_2**: @username_0 It is impossible to prove that it went nowhere - you cannot tell just by looking at an address if someone can spend funds from it. Additionally, reversals are impossible by design. Funds sent to an uncontrolled address are permanently lost.  
> **username_0**: Then why are there so many "trails?"  In the receipt, there is a destination, there is the sender, there is the transaction amount.  All show evidence that Anything can be done.  Besides, someone posted that a typo is nonexistent.  He said that there is a checksum to guarantee that a typo will not send BTC to a non-existent wallet.  
> **username_0**: They are uncontrolled addresses, but I think it was another of my addresses, so how do I find out the site where it was sent?  How is it impossible to prove it went nowhere, if there is a digital trail?  I think it is very possible because of the digital trail.  If it was all paper, the trail would lead to a location.  Bitcoins is supposed to be safe, but humans make errors, I think the sent BTC ought to stay in a secure vault as a grace period to make sure the intended wallet is real, unlike the typo that was created.  
> **username_0**: Cybercriminals Stole $1.4 Billion of Crypto in the First Half of 2020 • 2020: $1.4 Billion in crypto stolen so far • Crimes are mostly instances of fraud • Wotoken: Ponzi scheme stole $1 billion   (Read time: only 2 minutes) Cover all the little holes, then stuff like this is more secure, too.  
> **username_0**: I noticed that I am not the only person, who has done this.  Most Bitcoin sites have a digital ID to replace entering a typo.  This is why I suggest there be a grace period of a certain amount of days before the money is available to be used by that wallet.  This way, the secure Bitcoins are safer to buy because if the wallet is uncontrolled, then the Bitcoins remain in my wallet where I can give permission if the receiver also approves or signs this as a real payment.  
> **username_0**: I noticed that I am not the only person, who has done this.  Most Bitcoin sites have a digital ID to replace entering a typo.  This is why I suggest there be a grace period of a certain amount of days before the money is available to be used by that wallet.  This way, the secure Bitcoins are safer to buy because if the wallet is uncontrolled, then the Bitcoins remain in my wallet where I can give permission if the receiver also approves or signs this as a real payment. I suggest an safer way to cancel than just "cancel" because the mouses slip, so it has to be maybe a pattern to authorize  
> **username_0**: This process can end fraud because it requires 2 approvals.  Any ""cancellation can only be done by the sender, and if the receiver approves, it is overridden by the cancel, but , or a return payment issued by the bank.  

---

