2015 April/June
Once and for Good
Noble Idealism
Anatoly Adamishin
Cacophony Instead of European Concert
Vladimir Tchernega
The Future of Central Eurasia
The Scalene Triangle
Dmitriy Novikov
Adapting to a "New Normal"
The Ukrainian Cauldron
Forgetting about Ukraine?
Vladimir Bruter
To Bring Ukraine Back
Eduard Ponarin, Boris Sokolov
Spontaneous Decentralization
Alexei Slavich-Pristupa
Renewing Russia and the World
Mikhail Korostikov
The G7 and BRICS in the Post-Crimea World Order
The Return of Realpolitik
William Wohlforth
Interests and Strategies
Politics for Everyone?
Andrei Skriba
Why Are National Interests Necessary?
Mikhail Troitsky
No Need to Look Far Afield?
Andrey Frolov
Worlds Apart?
Simon Saradzhyan
"The Hegemonic Way" and "the Kingly Way"
Yaroslav Zaitsev
Policy Choices: Motifs and Unintended Consequences
Samuel Charap, Cory Welt
National Interest and International Law
The year 2014 has gone down in history as a time of the collapse of the previous model of relations between Russia and the rest of the world. The year 2015 will most likely show that the changes are irreversible and have gone beyond the point of return. We can draw a line under the bygone era, but we still cannot say what the new one will be like.
From the standpoint of peace prospects, the outcome of the end of the Cold War was quite acceptable for Russia. It is an entirely different matter as to how the opportunities for peaceful Russian-Western cooperation that opened up in the early 1990s were used and what has taken us to the crisis of 2014.
In the longer term, Russia will have to make a choice: either to follow "a different road," away from the mainstream of European development, inevitably leading into a dead end, or to start searching for ways of real rapprochement with the European Union.
The rise of Central Eurasia is one of the three components of Russia's new global strategy. The other two are relations with Europe and Russia's current turn towards the Asia-Pacific region. Russia's internal development should be meaningfully linked to its main foreign policy imperatives.
The Russian factor can play a greater role in Sino-U.S. relations and, ultimately, in the Asia-Pacific region if Moscow uses the differences between Washington and Beijing and if these differences become transformed from subjective into objective.
Xi Jinping's policy is aimed at ensuring continued reforms. But ideological liberalization is not on the agenda. The ruling party seeks to strengthen its control over public opinion, leaving no room for spontaneous growth of opposition sentiment.
Russia has already lost Ukraine – not now but years ago, for good or at least for long. Yet it is very likely that very soon the loss of Ukraine will no longer seem very important. Indeed, an ability to find and use one's chance is much more important than emotions over phantom losses.
Mounting economic problems will exacerbate Ukrainians' ressentiment towards the West as well as mistrust and even hatred towards their own political elites. Russia should make use of Ukrainian society's disappointment with Ukrainian nationalism and pro-European liberalism.
In the next three to five years, Ukraine's political system will most likely be a mosaic of virtually independent autonomous territories nominally united in a single state. Such a compromise would be acceptable to all the main actors – Moscow, the West, and the central Ukrainian government.
BRICS offers Russia a chance to steer clear of the whirlpool of economic and political problems with self-respect intact and international weight increased thanks to the solution of global challenges. BRICS' field of activity is enormous.
While the BRICS countries are willing to protect Russia to some degree, their capacity to go along with Moscow is conditioned by their conviction that doing so does not hurt their ties to the West.
Power politics is not "back" after having been away on some vacation. It has always been here. What is different today is that power plays are more visible because other countries are pushing back harder.
Society is ready for new national interests to appear that will pave the way for effective and long-term policies "for all." Now the situation hinges on those who will formulate them correctly.
As a manifestation of higher-order wisdom than just the election needs of concrete leaders or political parties, national interests should discipline politicians and significantly restrict the freedom of their action. The selfrestricting function of the declaration of national interests is particularly important for Russia.
In the absence of a large number of allies, bases and airfields in various parts of the world, Russia's capability for global presence and defending its national interests far from Russian borders is limited.
Theoretically, a convergence of Russia's and the U.S.'s vital interests may pave the way to mending fences between the two countries, with joint counteraction to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda being the most evident opportunity to start such a rapprochement.
The main content of Russia's national interest must be self-development, which includes general economic development and the improvement of the quality of human capital. These indicators will be the main criteria by which to judge Russia as a great power.
Russian foreign policy in the Putin era has drawn particular attention, and even praise, from the realist school of international relations scholars. John J. Mearsheimer, for example, has written that "Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates" in their policy towards Ukraine.
References to international law are an important part of Russia's official rhetoric. While criticizing other countries for violating international law, Russia's leaders declare that Russia respects international law, protects it, and upholds its principles. However, a closer look at statements by top leaders reveal some changes not so much in their content as in their tone.
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