Cyclists injured on a bike path after running into a downed tree, could not recover because the association that assisted in taking care of the bike path owed no duty to the cyclists.
Posted: June 17, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Case Analysis, Cycling, Land Owner, Mountain Biking, Texas, Uncategorized | Tags: balancing, bicycle, Bike Path, cases, Cause of action, City Park, contemporaneous, Dangerous Condition, Downed Tree, factors, Falling, Foreseeability, general negligence, grant summary judgment, Gross negligence, hearsay, injuries, Legal Duty, Mountain bike, negligence claim, no evidence, nonmovant, pet, Premises, Premises Liability, premises liability theory, scintilla, Summary judgment, summary judgment motion, Trail, Tree, Trial court, Yacht Club | Leave a comment
If there is no duty, there is no liability. Always check to make sure there really is a duty owed to someone before you start to claim or defend negligence actions.
Citation: DeLamar v. Fort Worth Mt. Biker's Ass'n, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 466, 2019 WL 311517
State: Texas; Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth
Plaintiff: Norman Delamar
Defendant: Fort Worth Mountain Biker's Association
Plaintiff Claims: general negligence and gross negligence
Defendant Defenses: No Duty
Holding: For the Defendants
City parks had an agreement with the local cycling group to assist in keeping the bike pats in good shape. The ultimate responsibility for the bike paths was still held by the city. An injured cyclist who ran into a downed tree could not sue the cycling group because they owed no duty to the cyclists because the association did not have the authority from the city and did not accept a duty with the agreement with the city.
On July 12, 2014, Norman was riding his mountain bike on a trail in Gateway, a park owned by the City, when he came upon a downed tree resting across the trail at head level. Although known to be a "really good rider," Norman asserts that because he did not have time to stop or avoid the tree, the tree "clotheslined" his head and neck and knocked him off of his bicycle, causing him injuries.
Norman sued the City, asserting claims of general negligence and gross negligence. In a single pleading, the City filed an answer and identified the Association as a responsible third party because of an "Adopt-A-Park Agreement" (Contract) that made the Association "responsible for constructing and maintaining the bike trail in question." Norman then amended his petition and added the Association as a defendant in the suit.
The city's contract with the association outlined things the association was to do to assist the city in keeping the trail available and generally covered trail maintenance. The city did not give up its right to control and manage the park where the trails were located.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, and this appeal ensued.
The first issue the court reviewed was this, a negligence claim or a premises liability claim.
Although premises liability is a form of negligence, "[n]egligence and premises liability claims . . . are separate and distinct theories of recovery, requiring plaintiffs to prove different, albeit similar, elements to secure judgment in their favor."
The differences are subtle, but:
To prevail on a premises-liability claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises by the owner; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the owner did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that the owner's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, whereas under the common law doctrine of negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach.
The difference is, one is based on the actions of the defendant, and the other is based on a condition of the land.
While, theoretically, a litigant may maintain causes of action for both general negligence and premises liability, to be viable, the general negligence theory of recovery must be based not upon an injury resulting from the condition of the property, but upon the defendant's contemporaneous activity. (analyzing claimant's negligence and premises liability claims together). If the injury is one caused by a premises defect, rather than a defendant's contemporaneous activity, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the true nature of the premises defect claim by pleading it as one for general negligence.
As similar as they may appear to be, you cannot recover on the same set of facts for both a negligence action and a premise's liability action. Even the court stated understanding the differences could be "tricky."
The trial court and appellate court found the plaintiff's claims sounded in premise's liability.
However, the court went on to discuss the plaintiff's allegations that his claim was a negligence claim. The issue was whether the association had a legal duty to the plaintiff.
The question of legal duty is a "multifaceted issue" requiring courts to balance a number of factors such as the risk and foreseeability of injury, the social utility of the actor's conduct, the consequences of imposing the burden on the actor, and any other relevant competing individual and social interests implicated by the facts of the case. "Although the formulation and emphasis varies with the facts of each case, three categories of factors have emerged: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and (3) public policy considerations."
Of the three, foreseeability as the dominant consideration, but not the sole consideration the court must review. Foreseeability alone is not sufficient to create a duty. "Foreseeability means that a person who possesses ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger that his negligent act would create for others."
Although the association had some contractual responsibility for the trails, there was nothing the association could do about the trees. Only the city had the use of the chainsaws, and only the city could determine if a tree could be removed and then remove it.
And although it was foreseeable, a tree could fall on the trail; the issue required more analysis than that. The bike path was surrounded by thousands of trees. The plaintiff had ridden that path just two days earlier and admitted that the tree could have fallen two hours before he hit it. Although a tree falling was foreseeable, it was outside of the scope of something that you can do anything about, and on top of that the association had no authority to do anything about trees.
Finally, the agreement between the city and the association said nothing about the association agreeing to assume a legal duty to maintain the safety of the trails.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that Norman failed to establish that the Association owed him a legal duty to protect him from the downed tree across the trail that the Association did not cause to fall, that may have fallen only hours-but no later than a day or two-before Norman struck it, and that the Association was not even authorized to unilaterally remove.
Because there could be no gross negligence if there was no general negligence, the plaintiffs gross and ordinary negligence claims were dismissed.
Foreseeability is a good thing for non-lawyers running a business or program to understand. Are your actions or inactions going to create a danger to someone.
The case does not state whether the city had any liability to the plaintiff, only the issues discussed in this decision were between the plaintiff and the defendant association.
More importantly, the court looked at trees falling as something that no one could really control. It was not liked anyone, the association or the city could come close to identifying trees that may fall in parks.
trail, summary judgment, general negligence, premises liability, premises, trial court, legal duty, no evidence, summary judgment motion, pet, hearsay, grant summary judgment, premises liability theory, mountain bike, balancing, nonmovant, falling, dangerous condition, gross negligence, negligence claim, downed tree, contemporaneous, foreseeability, factors, cause of action, yacht club, scintilla, injuries, bicycle, cases
A fly-fishing lawsuit, a first.
Posted: January 14, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Case Analysis, Montana, Paddlesports, Whitewater Rafting | Tags: abnormally, amend, Assumption of risk, bridge, drowning, emotional distress, Fishing, Float Trip, Fly Fishing, genuine, Inherent Risks, Issue of Material Fact, James Yeager, Jim Yeager Outfitters, loss of consortium, matter of law, negligence claim, Personal Flotation Device, PFD, provider's, Raft, reasonable care, Recreation, recreational, recreational opportunity, recreationists, River, secondary, severe, Skier, skiing, Sport, Summary judgment, unconstitution-ally vague, Whitewater, Wyoming Act's | 3 Comments
Montana Federal Court covers a lot of interesting legal issues for the OR industry in this decision. However, defendant is in a tough position because the statutes provide no help, he can't use a release and probably like most fly-fishing guides; he believes he won't be sued.
McJunkin v. James Yeager d/b/a Jim Yeager Outfitters, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169321
Plaintiff: Charles P. McJunkin, deceased, by and through his executor and personal representative, Rhett McJunkin, and Rhett McJunkin, executor and personal representative, on behalf of the heirs of Charles P. McJunkin
Defendant: James Yeager d/b/a Jim Yeager Outfitters
Plaintiff Claims: negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium
Defendant Defenses: Montana Recreation Responsibility Act
Holding: Split, mostly for the defendant
At the end of a float fly fishing trip, the boat hit a rock throwing the deceased into the river. While attempting to get the deceased back in the boat the deceased partner fell in. The deceased yelled to grab her because she could not swim. The defendant grabbed the girlfriend and maneuvered the boat through rapids.
The deceased drowned, (supposedly). Neither were wearing PFDs.
Yeager is a professional fishing guide and outfitter. On July 17, 2014, Yeager took a paying client, Charles P. McJunkin on a guided fishing trip in a raft on the Stillwater River. As Yeager was guiding and operating the raft, McJunkin fell into the river and drowned. McJunkin was 81 years old at the time of his death.
McJunkin had gone on similar guided fishing trips with Yeager for approximately 20 years. In fact, in the week preceding the July 17, 2014 accident, McJunkin had floated and fished the Stillwater River three times with Yeager. On each occasion, Yeager put-in at the Johnson Bridge Fishing Access, and used the Swinging Bridge Fishing Access Site for a take-out at the end of the day. The Swinging Bridge take-out is approximately one-quarter mile above a set of rapids known as the Beartooth Drop. Yeager had never floated through the Beartooth Drop with McJunkin.
On the date of the accident, Yeager was guiding McJunkin and his partner, Julia Garner ("Garner"). The plan was to again float from Johnson Bridge to the Swinging Bridge take-out. The river conditions encountered by Yeager that day were characteristic of, and consistent with conditions he previously encountered on that stretch of the river. Yeager approached the Swinging Bridge take-out in the same manner as he had on the three earlier days of fishing. As he approached the take-out, the raft crossed an underwater shelf of rocks. When the rear of the raft passed the shelf, the boat rocked and McJunkin fell into the water. Although the raft was equipped with personal floatation devices (PFDs), McJunkin was not wearing one at the time.
McJunkin swam toward the raft, and Yeager attempted to position the raft so that McJunkin could grab ahold of the side. During this process, the party floated past the Swinging Bridge take-out. To complicate matters further, as Yeager attempted to pull McJunkin into the raft, Garner fell into the water. The parties dispute what caused Garner's fall. Plaintiffs contend Yeager accidentally hit her with an oar. Yeager indicated he didn't know what caused her to fall in, testifying "I don't know if I hit a rock or a wave or whatever, Julie went in." Garner yelled to Yeager that she could not swim. Yeager made the split-second decision to let go of McJunkin and attempt to save Garner, fearing she would drown otherwise. Yeager was able to pull her back into the raft as they entered the Beartooth Drop. Meanwhile, McJunkin lost contact with Yeager and the raft and floated through the rapid. He ultimately did not survive.
Only the legal issues affecting fly fishing or the outdoor industry will be reviewed. This decision is a result of both parties filing motions for summary judgment, so there is no chronological hierarchy of how the decision is written. Each motion is tackled by the judge in the order to make the following arguments more manageable.
A few things to remember. Montana does not allow an outfitter or guide to use a release. See Montana Statutes Prohibits Use of a Release.
Both parties filed motions concerning the Montana Recreation Responsibility Act (MRRA). The MRRA is similar to the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act, both of which are solely assumption of the risk statutes and weak overall. The plaintiff argued the MRRA was unconstitutional on several grounds, all of which were denied. The defendant argued the MRRA should bar the plaintiff's claims which were also denied.
The first issue was inherent risks under the MRRA are not defined per activity or in general.
Under the plain language of the MRRA, a risk must satisfy two requirements to constitute an "inherent risk" and thus fall within the Act's protection. There must be (1) a danger or condition that is characteristic of, or intrinsic to the activity, and (2) the danger or condition must be one that cannot be prevented by the use of reasonable care. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-752(2).
This leaves a monstrous gap in the protection it affords, in fact, does not afford outfitters and guides in Montana any real protection.
The court did not agree that the MRRA was broad enough to protect the defendant in this case.
Here, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the risk encountered by McJunkin was an inherent risk to the sport of float fishing, or whether Yeager could have prevented the risk using reasonable care. Yeager's expert opined that drowning is an inherent risk of floating in a raft on a river, and McJunkin's death was a result of that inherent risk. But Plaintiffs' expert states the risk of drowning can be prevented by the use of reasonable care. Plaintiffs' expert also opined that Yeager increased the risks to McJunkin, and failed to adhere to industry standards by not taking basic safety precautions and not having a plan or equipment to retrieve McJunkin from the water.
Because there was a genuine issue of material fact (a mix of plausible opinions) the MRRA was not broad or strong enough to stop the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's motion failed.
The plaintiff argued the MRRA was void because it was vague, it did not define inherent risk.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine chiefly applies to criminal statutes, but can apply to civil laws as well. Civil statutes, however, generally receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has held "[t]o find a civil statute void for vagueness, the statute must be so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." The Montana Supreme Court has similarly declared that a statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face only if it is shown "that the statute is vague 'in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" "[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance are not required." A statute is not vague "simply because it can be dissected or subject to different interpretations."
The plaintiff also argued that because the MRRA did not define risk that it was void.
A person of common intelligence can understand the risks associated with river sports or activities. There is no indication McJunkin would not have been able to appreciate such risks, including the potential risk involved in floating and fishing. Indeed, in their depositions Plaintiffs were able to articulate risks associated with floating on a river, such as falling out of the boat and drowning.
The plaintiff argued they should be able to sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NEID").
To constitute 'serious' or 'severe,' the emotional distress must be 'so severe no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.'" The question of whether the threshold level of emotional dis-tress can be found is for the Court to determine. ("It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe [serious] emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.").
In Feller, the Montana Supreme Court considered several factors in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress, including: (1) whether the plaintiff had any physical manifestations of grief; (2) whether counseling was sought or recommended; (3) whether the plaintiff took medication or the use of medication dramatically increased; (4) whether the plain-tiff had continuous nights of sleeplessness or days without appetite; (5) whether the plaintiff maintained close relationships with family members and friends; (6) the duration of the emotional dis-tress; and (7) the circumstances under which the infliction incurred, including whether the plaintiff witnessed the distressing event.
The plaintiff also argued they should be able to sue for loss of consortium.
Montana law recognizes loss of consortium claims by an adult child of an injured parent. In Stucky, the Montana Supreme Court held an adult child must meet the following two-part test to establish a claim for loss of parental consortium: "1) a third party tortuously caused the parent to suffer a serious, permanent and disabling mental or physical injury compensable under Montana law; and 2) the parent's ultimate condition of mental or physical impairment was so overwhelming and severe that it has caused the parent-child relationship to be destroyed or nearly destroyed."
In establishing a loss of parental consortium claim, the plaintiff may present evidence of the following factors, which the jury may consider in determining both whether the two-part test has been satisfied, and what damages are appropriate: "the severity of injury to the parent; the actual effect the parent's injury has had on the relationship and is likely to have in the future; the child's age; the nature of the child's relationship with the parent; and the child's emotional, physical and geographic characteristics."
The court then looked at the issue of abnormally dangerous. A finding of that an activity is abnormally dangerous brings more damages and fewer requirements to prove part of the negligence of the defendant.
"Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is a question of law." No court has held float fly fishing is an abnormally dangerous activity, and this Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to be the first to do so.
A statute that protects defendants based on assumption of the risk does so because it identifies specific risk and broadens the definitions of what an inherent risk is. An example would be the Colorado Skier Safety Act. That act describes the inherent risk of skiing and then adds dozens of more risk, which are beyond the normal scope of inherent.
Both the MRRA and the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act statutorily defines the common law but does nothing to broaden or strengthen the common law. They could better be defined as politically pandering, an attempt by a politician to make constituents feel better by giving them something, which, in reality, has no value.
The fly-fishing outfitter was caught in Montana's lack of available defenses, no statutory protection and no availability of a release. He might be able to strengthen his defenses by having his clients sign an Assumption of the Risk Document. He also might offer them PFDs.
Furthermore, remember in most whitewater or cold-water deaths drowning is not the cause of the death. Most people die of a heart attack. risk or Wikipedia: Cold Shock Response.
Posted: January 7, 2019 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, Montana, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways, Statutes | Tags: abnormally, amend, Assumption of risk, bridge, drowning, emotional distress, Fishing, Float Trip, Fly Fishing, genuine, Inherent Risks, Issue of Material Fact, James Yeager, Jim Yeager Outfitters, loss of consortium, matter of law, negligence claim, Personal Flotation Device, PFD, provider's, Raft, reasonable care, Recreation, recreational, recreational opportunity, recreationists, River, secondary, severe, Skier, skiing, Sport, Summary judgment, unconstitution-ally vague, Whitewater, Wyoming Act's | Leave a comment
Charles P. Mcjunkin, deceased, by and through his executor and personal representative, Rhett Mcjunkin, and Rhett Mcjunkin, executor and personal representative, on behalf of the heirs of Charles P. Mcjunkin, Plaintiffs, vs. James Yeager d/b/a Jim Yeager Outfitters, Defendant.
CV 17-12-BLG-TJC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, BILLINGS DIVISION
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169321
September 28, 2018, Filed
COUNSEL: [*1] For Charles P. McJunkin, deceased, by and through his executor and personal representative, Rhett McJunkin, Rhett McJunkin, executor and personal representative, on behalf of the heirs of Charles P. McJunkin, Plaintiffs: Philip L. McGrady, LEAD ATTORNEY, McGRADY LAW, Whitefish, MT.
For James Yeager, doing business as, Jim Yeager Outfitters, Defendant: Ross Daniel Tillman, LEAD ATTORNEY, John M. Newman, BOONE KARLBERG, P.C., Missoula, MT.
JUDGES: TIMOTHY J. CAVAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
OPINION BY: TIMOTHY J. CAVAN
Rhett McJunkin, as personal representative of the estate of Charles P. McJunkin, and on behalf of the heirs of Charles P. McJunkin ("Plaintiffs"), brings this action against Defendant James Yeager, doing business as Jim Yeager Outfitters ("Yeager" or "Defendant"), in relation to a fatal boating accident that occurred on the Stillwater River near Columbus, Montana. Plaintiffs assert claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. (Doc. 1.)
Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 23), Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the Constitutionality of the Montana Recreation Responsibility Act [*2] (Doc. 28), and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
Having considered the parties' submissions, the Court finds Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend should be DENIED, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
1 The background facts set forth here are relevant to the Court's determination of the pending motions for summary judgment and are taken from the parties' submissions and are undisputed except where indicated.
Yeager is a professional fishing guide and outfitter. On July 17, 2014, Yeager took a paying client, Charles P. McJunkin ("McJunkin"), on a guided fishing trip in a raft on the Stillwater River. As Yeager was guiding and operating the raft, McJunkin fell into the river and drowned. McJunkin was 81 years old at the time of his death.
McJunkin had gone on similar guided fishing trips with Yeager for approximately 20 years. In fact, in the week preceding the July 17, 2014 accident, McJunkin had floated and fished the Stillwater River three times with Yeager. On each occasion, Yeager put-in at the Johnson Bridge Fishing Access, and used the Swinging Bridge Fishing Access Site for a take-out at the end of the day. The Swinging Bridge take-out is approximately one-quarter mile above a set [*3] of rapids known as the Beartooth Drop. Yeager had never floated through the Beartooth Drop with McJunkin.
McJunkin swam toward the raft, and Yeager attempted to position the raft so that McJunkin could grab ahold of the side. During this process, the party floated past the Swinging Bridge take-out. To complicate matters further, as Yeager attempted to pull McJunkin into the raft, Garner fell into the water. The parties dispute what caused Garner's fall. Plaintiffs [*4] contend Yeager accidentally hit her with an oar. Yeager indicated he didn't know what caused her to fall in, testifying "I don't know if I hit a rock or a wave or whatever, Julie went in." Garner yelled to Yeager that she could not swim. Yeager made the split-second decision to let go of McJunkin and attempt to save Garner, fearing she would drown otherwise. Yeager was able to pull her back into the raft as they entered the Beartooth Drop. Meanwhile, McJunkin lost contact with Yeager and the raft and floated through the rapid. He ultimately did not survive.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[HN1] Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
[HN2] The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine [*5] issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
[HN3] If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings and by 'the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The opposing party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [*6] nonmoving party's position is not sufficient.") (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Related to the Montana Recreation Responsibility Act
Plaintiffs assert Yeager's negligence caused McJunkin's death. Yeager contends Plaintiffs' negligence claim fails as a matter of law because it is barred by Montana's Recreation Responsibility Act (the "MRRA"), Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-751, et seq. Thus, Yeager argues summary judgment on the negligence claim is warranted.
Plaintiffs counter that the MRRA is unconstitutionally vague, and violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection and right to full legal redress. Plaintiffs, therefore, move for partial summary judgment declaring the MRRA unconstitutional. Plaintiffs further assert that even if the MRRA is constitutional, there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.
1. Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment under the MRRA
[HN4] The MRRA limits the liability of recreational opportunity providers for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of sports or recreational opportunities.2 Specifically, the MRRA provides in relevant part:
(1) A person who participates in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in [*7] that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for all injury or death to the person and for all damage to the person's property that result from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.
(2) A provider is not required to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity that is provided.
(3)(a) Sections 27-1-751 through 27-1-754 do not preclude an action based on the negligence of the provider if the injury, death, or damage is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity.
Mont. Code. Ann. § 27-1-753.
2 "Sport or recreational opportunity" is defined broadly in the MRRA as "any sporting activity, whether undertaken with or without permission, include but not limited to baseball, softball, football, soccer, basketball, bicycling, hiking, swimming, boating, hockey, dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing, snowboarding, snow sliding, mountain climbing, river floating, whitewater rafting, canoeing, kayaking, target shooting, hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding and other equine activity, snowmobiling, off-highway vehicle use, agritourism, an on-farm educational opportunity, and any similar recreational activity." Mont. Code. Ann. § 27-1-752(4).
The MRRA defines "Inherent risks" as:
[T]hose dangers or conditions that are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational activity and that cannot be prevented by the use of reasonable care.
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-752(2).
[HN5] When interpreting a statute, a court is required to look to the plain meaning of the words. Clarke v. Massey, 271 Mont. 412, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1995). A court will only resort to the legislative history of a statute if the legislative intent cannot be determined from the statute's plain wording. Id. "[T]he office of judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert [*8] what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-101.
Yeager maintains that the statute has a simple, straight-forward application to the facts of this case. He argues McJunkin's death was caused by drowning; falling out of a boat and drowning is an inherent risk of fishing from a raft; therefore, Plaintiffs' negligence claim is barred under the MRRA as a matter of law. In short, Yeager asserts because the injury in this case involved drowning while fishing from a raft, the MRRA precludes Plaintiffs' claim. (Doc. 32 at 15.)
Yeager reads the MRRA much too broadly. Construing the statute in this fashion would immunize providers of recreational activities from their own negligence. The Court finds that such a construction would be contrary to the statute's plain words, the legislative intent in enacting the legislation, and would likely render the MRRA unconstitutional.
[HN6] Under the plain language of the MRRA, a risk must satisfy two requirements to constitute an "inherent risk" and thus fall within the Act's protection. There must be (1) a danger or condition that is characteristic of, or intrinsic to the activity, and (2) the danger or condition must be one that cannot be prevented [*9] by the use of reasonable care. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-752(2). Therefore, the MRRA does not insulate a provider from all risks which are characteristic of, or intrinsic to the activity. It only provides protection for those risks which cannot be prevented with the use of reasonable care. In order to make this determination, it is necessary to look at the facts and circumstances of each case and the specific risk or condition involved.
Wyoming has a similar "Recreation Safety Act." Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-121 through 1-1-123. Like the MRRA, the Wyoming Act provides that "[a]ny person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risk in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown . . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(a). It also similarly states that a provider of the "recreational opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter, or control the inherent risks" of the activity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(b). One critical difference between the two acts, however, is the definition of an inherent risk. The MRRA and the Wyoming Act both define inherent risk to mean "those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part" of the activity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i). But the Wyoming Act's definition does not also include the MRRA's requirement [*10] that the risk "cannot be prevented by the use of reasonable care."
Nevertheless, the construction of the Wyoming Act is instructive as far as the similarities go. Courts which have construed and applied the Wyoming statute have rejected the broad, general interpretation advanced by Yeager in this case. To determine what risks are inherent, decisions under the Wyoming Act have consistently required that a court "go beyond a broad characterization and inquire into the specific circumstances of both [the plaintiff's] actions and those of the recreation provider." Creel v. L & L, Inc., 2012 WY 124, 287 P.3d 729, 736 (Wyo. 2012).
In Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000), for example, the plaintiff was injured during a guided horseback trail ride. The injury occurred when the plaintiff's saddle slipped around to the belly of the horse, causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground. The defendant moved for summary judgment under the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, arguing that a slipping saddle is an inherent risk of horseback riding. In determining the application of the Act, the Tenth Circuit made clear that the risk in question must be not be evaluated broadly or generally, but in the context of the specific factual setting presented.
Horseback riding undoubtedly carries some inherent risk [*11] that the rider will fall off the horse and get injured. A horse could stumble on an uneven path, or rear, or simply begin to gallop for no apparent reason. All of these risks clearly would qualify as inherent risks of horseback riding. Simply because some risks are inherent in horseback riding, however, does not mean that all risks of falling from a horse are necessarily inherent; instead, it is necessary to look factually at the specific risk to which the rider was exposed. When attempting to determine whether a risk is inherent to a sport, we can not look at the risk in a vacuum, apart from the factual setting to which the rider was exposed. And, we must evaluate the risk at the greatest level of specificity permitted by the factual record. See Madsen, 31 F.Supp.2d at 1328 ("The Court believes that one must look to the specific facts of a case to see whether there is a duty, and not simply look to the abstract character of the risk.").
Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1167.
The same evaluation must be conducted under the MRRA. It is not enough to find that falling out of a boat and drowning is a general risk of fishing from a raft; therefore, drowning is an inherent risk in fishing. Although there may be circumstances where the risk of drowning [*12] cannot be prevented with the use of reasonable care, it is undoubtedly true the risk may be prevented in many other circumstances.
Therefore, each case must be examined in light of the specific factual context of the case to determine whether the specific risk involved could have been prevented using reasonable care. As the Wyoming Supreme Court points out, "[s]ome risks may occur from the choices a recreation provider makes on behalf of the participant and from the conditions in which the recreational opportunity is provided. Thus, atypical or uncharacteristic risks can arise even in those specific sports the Wyoming legislature clearly intended to exempt from liability for inherent risks." Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 1148–49 (10th Cir.2004).
In addition, Yeager's broad interpretation of the MRRA would effectively immunize providers of a recreational opportunity from their own negligence. If providers were protected from all fishing-related drownings under the MRRA, they would be relieved of liability where the death was caused by negligence, or even by willful or wanton misconduct. For example, it would apply not only to situations where a participant falls out of a raft and drowns without negligent conduct by the provider; it would [*13] also apply where the provider negligently causes a raft to collide with a bridge abutment or other known obstruction in the river.
Such an application would be contrary to the legislative intent of the MRRA, which expressly provides that the Act does not "preclude an action based on the negligence of the provider. . . ." Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-753. As recognized under the Wyoming Act, the "intent behind the Recreation Safety Act was not to preclude parties from suing for a provider's negligence, it was merely to stop people from suing providers for those risks that were inherent to a sport." Madsen v. Wyoming River Trips, 31 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1328 (D. Wyo. 1999).
Finally, construing the MRRA as Yeager urges would likely render the Act unconstitutional. [HN7] Statutes should be construed "to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation if possible." Hernandez v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2008 MT 251, 345 Mont. 1, 189 P.3d 638, 642 (Mont. 2008). The Montana Supreme Court found a prior version of Montana's Skier Responsibility Act unconstitutional because it prohibited a skier "from obtaining legal recourse against an operator even if the injury is proximately caused by the negligent or even intentional actions of the operator."3
Brewer v. Ski-Lift, Inc., 234 Mont. 109, 762 P.2d 226, 230 (Mont. 1988). The Court found that although the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the economic vitality of the ski industry, there was no rational relationship [*14] between that purpose and requiring that skiers assume all risks for injuries regardless of the presence of negligence by the ski area operator. Id. at 230. See also, Oberson v. U.S. Dept. of Ag., Forest Serv., 2007 MT 293, 339 Mont. 519, 171 P.3d 715 (Mont. 2007) (snowmobile liability statute's gross negligence standard, which relieved snowmobile operators from their negligent conduct, violated equal protection).
3 The statute at issue in Brewer barred recovery from a ski area operator if the skier suffered an injury resulting "from participating in the sport of skiing." Brewer, 762 P.2d at 229 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-736(1)).
The purpose of the MRRA is substantially the same as the skier and snowmobile liability statutes — protection of providers of recreational activities from liability for risks over which the provider has no control. Under Yeager's interpretation of the MRRA, providers of float fly fishing would be immune from liability for drownings, even when caused by the provider's own negligence. Under Brewer and Oberson, such a construction would violate Plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and access to the courts.
Therefore, whether the MRRA protects a provider of recreational opportunities from certain risks cannot be determined by looking at the broad, abstract character of the risk. Instead, the specific facts and circumstances in each case must be examined to determine whether the risk involved can be prevented by the use of reasonable care. If so, the MRRA does not [*15] shield the provider from liability.
That being established, the determination of whether McJunkin's drowning resulted from an inherent risk of floating and fly fishing is not appropriate for summary judgment. While there may be cases where there are no genuine issue of material fact, and the issue may be appropriately decided as a matter of law, [HN8] the determination of whether a risk is an inherent risk is generally a factual determination for the jury to decide. See e.g. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 872 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Mont. 1994) (holding whether an inherent risk had been established under the Skier Responsibility Act was a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact); Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1169 (noting the question of what is an inherent risk is normally a question of fact for the jury); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 (Wyo. 1995) ("when genuine issues of material fact exist, it is proper to present the issue to the jury of whether a risk is inherent to a particular activity.").4
4 At the time the Halpern case was decided, the Wyoming Act's definition of inherent risk was similar to the MRRA. It was defined as "any risk that is characteristic of or intrinsic to any sport or recreational opportunity and which cannot reasonably be eliminated, altered or controlled." Halpern, 890 P.2d at 564. The highlighted portion of the definition was subsequently removed by the Wyoming legislature.
Here, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the risk encountered by McJunkin was an inherent risk to the sport of float fishing, or whether Yeager could have prevented the risk using reasonable care. Yeager's expert opined that drowning [*16] is an inherent risk of floating in a raft on a river, and McJunkin's death was a result of that inherent risk. But Plaintiffs' expert states the risk of drowning can be prevented by the use of reasonable care. Plaintiffs' expert also opined that Yeager increased the risks to McJunkin, and failed to adhere to industry standards by not taking basic safety precautions and not having a plan or equipment to retrieve McJunkin from the water.
Accordingly, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the risks encountered by McJunkin could have been prevented by the use of reasonable care.
As such, Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Count I of the Complaint.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
McJunkin challenges the constitutionality of the MRRA on due process and equal protection grounds. [HN9] Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and "the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Globe v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99, 374 Mont. 453, 325 P.3d 1211, 1216 (Mont. 2014). "'The question of constitutionality is not whether it is possible to condemn, but whether it is possible to uphold the legislative action . . . .'" Davis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 282 Mont. 233, 937 P.2d 27, 31 (1997) (quoting Fallon County v. State 231 Mont. 443, 753 P.2d 338, 340 (Mont. 1988). "[E]very [*17] possible presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of the Act." Id. Thus, courts "will construe a statute to further, rather than to frustrate, the Legislature's intent according to the plain meaning of the statute's language." In re Custody and Parental Rights of D.S., 2005 MT 275, 329 Mont. 180, 122 P.3d 1239, 1243 (Mont. 2005). See also Hernandez, 189 P.3d at 642 (stating it is the court's duty "to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation if possible").
a. The MRRA is not Unconstitutionally Vague
Plaintiffs argue the MRRA is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and as applied. Plaintiffs contend the MRRA purports to limit liability for injuries that result from inherent risks, but it does not define "inherent risk" in any clear manner. Thus, Plaintiffs argue there is no fair way to apply the statute because it is unclear what constitutes an "inherent risk."
[HN10] The void-for-vagueness doctrine chiefly applies to criminal statutes, but can apply to civil laws as well. Civil statutes, however, generally receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has held "[t]o find a civil statute void for vagueness, the statute must be so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S. Ct. 1563, 18 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1967). The Montana Supreme Court has similarly declared that a statute is unconstitutionally [*18] vague on its face only if it is shown "that the statute is vague 'in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" In re Custody, 2005 MT 275, 329 Mont. 180, 122 P.3d 1239, 1243 (Mont. 2005). "[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance are not required." Id. A statute is not vague "simply because it can be dissected or subject to different interpretations." Montana Media, Inc. v. Flathead Cty., 2003 MT 23, 314 Mont. 121, 63 P.3d 1129, 1140 (Mont. 2003).
Here, the Court finds the MRRA is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Section 27-1-752(2) plainly provides a standard for assessing what constitutes an "inherent risk." The standard is established with common, readily-understood terms, and it incorporates the familiar negligence standard of reasonable care. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-752(2).
Further, contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the fact the MRRA does not specifically enumerate the risks inherent in each of the 30 recreational activities listed in the statute does not make the Act unconstitutional. [HN11] The Montana Supreme Court has recognized that even if a term in a statute is not exhaustively defined, and allows the court some discretion in determining whether the evidence presented satisfies the statute, the statute will not be rendered unconstitutionally vague. See In re Custody, 122 P.3d at 1243 (holding that although § 41-3-423(2)(a) did not contain an exhaustive list of conduct that constitutes the term "aggravated circumstances," [*19] the statute was not void for vagueness). Moreover, even the more specific recreational liability statutes that Plaintiffs uses for comparison, provide non-exclusive lists of inherent risks. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-702(2) ("'Inherent dangers and risks of skiing' means those dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including: . . ."); § 23-2-822(2) ("Risks inherent in the sport of off-highway vehicle operation include . . ."); § 27-1-726(7) ("'Risks inherent in equine activities' means dangers or conditions that are an integral part of equine activities, including but not limited to: . . .").
The Court further finds the MRRA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. A person of common intelligence can understand the risks associated with river sports or activities. There is no indication McJunkin would not have been able to appreciate such risks, including the potential risk involved in floating and fishing. Indeed, in their depositions Plaintiffs were able to articulate risks associated with floating on a river, such as falling out of the boat and drowning. Therefore, McJunkin could have understood that the MRRA may limit Yeager's liability for accidents on the river.
Accordingly, the Court finds the MRRA is not [*20] void for vagueness.
b. The MRRA Does Not Violate the Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Protection
Plaintiffs also argue the MRRA violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in two ways. First, Plaintiffs assert the Act eliminates any theory of negligence on the part of recreational providers, essentially excusing them from the consequences of their own negligence. Second, Plaintiffs argue the MRRA arbitrarily treats certain groups of recreationalists differently. Plaintiffs assert that participants in activities covered by the MRRA are treated differently from those participating in activities covered under other activity-specific recreation statutes because the MRRA is vague, whereas the other statutes are not. Plaintiffs further assert the MRRA treats recreationists covered by the Act differently because the MRRA attempts to resurrect the "secondary" assumption of risk defense, and inserts a "primary" assumption of risk defense.
i. The MRRA Does not Eliminate All Theories of Negligence
As discussed above, although a provider is not liable for, or required to eliminate, alter, or control inherent risks under the MRRA, the provider still owes a duty of care for risks that [*21] can be prevented by the use of reasonable care. Thus, the Court finds the MRRA continues to permit negligence claims against a provider if the risk could have been prevented by the use of reasonable care. Thus, the MRRA does not violate Plaintiffs' equal protection rights by immunizing providers from their own negligence.
ii. The MRRA Does Not Arbitrarily Treat Groups of Recreationists Differently
The MRRA is drawn broadly and defines "sport or recreational opportunity" by reference to a non-exhaustive list of 30 activities. Mont. Code. Ann. § 27-1-752(4). Some of the listed activities are also covered by their own activity-specific recreation liability statutes, such as skiing, snowmobiling and off-road vehicle use. Id.; §§ 23-2-651, et seq.; 23-2-702, et seq.; 23-2-822. Therefore, the MRRA goes on to exclude those activities from its scope. Mont. Code Ann § 27-1-754 (stating the MRRA does "not apply to duties, responsibilities, liability, or immunity related to" activities that are already subject to an activity-specific recreational statute).
Plaintiffs assert that this statutory scheme causes different groups of recreationists to be treated differently. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the recreationists who fall under the MRRA are disadvantaged in several [*22] respects.
First, Plaintiffs argue the MRRA's alleged vagueness only affects the subset of recreationists who participate in activities covered by the Act. Whereas, recreationists engaging in other sports, such as skiing or snowmobiling, have specific notice of their rights and the provider's responsibilities. The Court has determined, however, that the MRRA is not unconstitutionally vague. Further, as noted above, even the activity-specific recreation statutes that specifically identify certain inherent risks do so in a non-exhaustive fashion. Thus, there is no significant difference in treatment between the recreationists who fall under the MRRA, and those who fall under other recreational statutes with respect to notice.
Next, Plaintiffs assert the MRRA departs from other recreational statutes by attempting to revive the "secondary" assumption of risk defense and by suggesting a "primary" assumption of risk defense. Historically, Montana has not used the terms "primary" and "secondary" assumption of risk. Nevertheless, legal commentators have explained [HN12] "primary" assumption of risk refers to the concept of duty, and "secondary" assumption of risk refers to contributory negligence.
[*23] See Dan B. Dobbs, et al., Dobbs' Law of Torts § 238 (2d ed. 2018) ("[T]he term 'primary assumption of risk' is used to indicate the no-duty or no-breach conception and its attendant complete-bar effect; and the term 'secondary assumption of risk' is used to indicate the contributory negligence conception."); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 398 (2018) ("Primary assumption of risk limits the duty which a person owes to another. Secondary assumption of risk, on the other hand, which is a type of contributory negligence and is an affirmative defense, may be raised by the defendant after the plaintiff has met the burden of showing that the defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff."); W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, 480-81 (5th Ed. 1984) (stating "primary" assumption of risk "is really a principle of no duty," and explaining that under the duty perspective, "the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against one or more future risks that may arise from the relation . . . the legal result is that the defendant is simply relieved of the duty which would otherwise exist.").
With regard to [*24] "secondary" assumption of risk, Plaintiffs assert the MRRA, "unlike any other recreation act in Montana," resurrects the "secondary" assumption of risk defense, without articulating any specific inherent risks the participant would be assuming. (Doc. 29 at 15.) As Yeager points out, however, the MRRA is in fact similar to the other recreation statutes in that they also provide that the participant assumes the risks inherent in the particular activity. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-736(4) ("A skier shall accept all legal responsibility for injury or damage of any kind to the extent that the injury or damage results from inherent dangers and risks of skiing."); § 23-2-822 (1) ("An off-highway vehicle operator shall accept all legal responsibility for injury or damage of any kind to the extent that the injury or damage results from risks inherent in the sport of off-highway vehicle use. . . ."); 23-2-654(3) ("A snowmobiler shall accept all legal responsibility for injury or damage of any kind to the extent that the injury or damage results from risks inherent in the sport of snowmobiling."). Further, as discussed in regard to Plaintiff's vagueness challenge, the MRRA does not fail to put participants on notice of the inherent [*25] risks they are assuming. As such, recreationists participating in activities that fall under the MRRA are not on significantly different legal footing than participants in other recreational activities. Finally, Plaintiffs contend the MRRA's suggestion of a "primary" assumption of risk defense amounts to an end-run around comparative negligence. As used here, the assumption of risk terminology in the MRRA refers to a principle of no duty. In Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995), the Wyoming Supreme Court found the assumption of risk language in the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act, "was intended to limit the duty to which a provider owes to a participant." The Court explained that because primary assumption of risk was only intended to limit the provider's duty, it did not affect the comparative negligence scheme. Id. Likewise, here, the Court finds the assumption of risk language in the MRRA affects only the provider's duty. It does not revive contributory negligence or undermine Montana's comparative negligence law. Moreover, as noted, the other activity-specific recreation statutes contain similar assumption of risk language. Thus, recreationists are treated the same under both the MRRA and other activity-specific recreation [*26] statutes, and there is no violation of equal protection.
c. The MRRA Does Not Unconstitutionally Interfere With the Right to Trial by Jury
Finally, Plaintiffs argue the MRRA infringes upon the province of the jury by injecting questions of ultimate fact into preliminary legal questions. As discussed above, however, whether McJunkin's death was the result of an inherent risk of float fly fishing, and whether it could have been prevented by the use of reasonable care, are jury questions. Thus, the Court finds the MRRA does not unconstitutionally interfere with Plaintiffs' fundamental right to trial by jury.
B. Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Yeager contends Plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NEID") fails as a matter of law because there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find Plaintiffs suffered serious or severe emotional distress.5 The Court agrees.
5 Yeager also asserts Plaintiffs' NIED claim fails because there is no actionable predicate act of negligence since the MRRA bars Plaintiffs' negligence claim. As discussed, however, the Court has found there are disputed issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff's negligence claim. Accordingly, Yeager's argument fails in this regard.
[HN13] Under Montana law, an independent cause of action for NIED arises "under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent act or omission." Sacco v. High Country Ind. Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411, 426 (Mont. 1995). [*27] "To constitute 'serious' or 'severe,' the emotional distress must be 'so severe no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.'" Feller v. First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc., 2013 MT 90, 369 Mont. 444, 299 P.3d 338, 344 (Mont. 2013). The question of whether the threshold level of emotional distress can be found is for the Court to determine. Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425 ("It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe [serious] emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j at 78).
In Feller, the Montana Supreme Court considered [HN14] several factors in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress, including: (1) whether the plaintiff had any physical manifestations of grief; (2) whether counseling was sought or recommended; (3) whether the plaintiff took medication or the use of medication dramatically increased; (4) whether the plaintiff had continuous nights of sleeplessness or days without appetite; (5) whether the plaintiff maintained close relationships with family members and friends; (6) the duration of the emotional distress; and (7) the circumstances under which the infliction incurred, including whether the plaintiff witnessed the distressing event. Feller, 299 P.3d at 345.
Here, the Court finds [*28] Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of the type of emotional distress necessary to demonstrate serious or severe compensable emotional distress. Rhett McJunkin and Charles McJunkin, Jr. testified at deposition that they have both experienced grief, trouble sleeping and have had nightmares. Rhett McJunkin also testified he took sleep medication approximately one year after the accident, but could not recall what the medication was, who prescribed the medication, or how long own long it was taken. Rhett McJunkin also stated he has also experienced "angst" and "anxiety," and Charles McJunkin, Jr. indicated his focus has been affected.
Nevertheless, there is no indication of any physical manifestation of grief, and neither has sought counseling, taken or increased medication to manage their emotional distress, have suffered a loss of appetite, are unable to maintain close family relationships, and neither witnessed the accident. The Court finds that consideration of the Feller factors does not lead to the conclusion that Plaintiffs' emotional distress rises to the level where severe emotional distress may be found.
The Court certainly sympathizes with Plaintiffs' grief for their loss [*29] of their father. Nevertheless, their testimony does not show their emotional distress was so severe that "no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Feller, 299 P.3d at 344.
Accordingly, Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on Count II of the Complaint.
C. Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Loss of Consortium Claim
Yeager argues Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim also fails as a matter of law because there is insufficient evidence to support the claim.6 The Court finds there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
6 Yeager again asserts Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim fails because there is no actionable predicate act of negligence. As discussed, this argument is again rejected because there are disputed issues of material fact regarding Plaintiffs' negligence claim.
[HN15] Montana law recognizes loss of consortium claims by an adult child of an injured parent. N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Stucky, 2014 MT 299, 377 Mont. 25, 338 P.3d 56, 61 (Mont. 2014). In Stucky, the Montana Supreme Court held an adult child must meet the following two-part test7 to establish a claim for loss of parental consortium: "1) a third party tortuously caused the parent to suffer a serious, permanent and disabling mental or physical injury compensable under Montana law; and 2) the parent's ultimate condition of mental or physical impairment was so overwhelming and severe that it has caused the parent-child relationship to be destroyed or nearly destroyed." Id. at 66.
7 The Court adopted the two-part test from Keele v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 258 Mont. 158, 852 P.2d 574 (Mont. 1993), which recognized parental loss of consortium claims by minor children. The Montana Supreme Court stated it found no reason to adopt a different standard for an adult child's claim of loss of parental consortium. Stucky, 338 P.3d at 65. The Court specifically rejected adopting the more stringent "extraordinarily close and interdependent relationship" test from Hern v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 2005 MT 301, 329 Mont. 347, 125 P.3d 597 (Mont. 2005), which applies to loss of consortium claims brought by the parent of an adult child.
[HN16] In establishing a loss of parental consortium claim, the plaintiff [*30] may present evidence of the following factors, which the jury may consider in determining both whether the two-part test has been satisfied, and what damages are appropriate: "the severity of injury to the parent; the actual effect the parent's injury has had on the relationship and is likely to have in the future; the child's age; the nature of the child's relationship with the parent; and the child's emotional, physical and geographic characteristics." Id.
Stucky involved an injury to a parent, rather than the death of a parent. Nevertheless, an adult child's loss of a parent would readily meet the requirements established in Stucky for the maintenance of a consortium claim. The fact McJunkin died is sufficient to establish the first prong of the test, which requires serious permanent injury. Second, death is obviously an injury so "overwhelming and severe" as to destroy the parent-child relationship. Thus, the second prong of the test is clearly established.
Yeager points out that Plaintiffs are in their late 50's/early 60's, they lived hundreds of miles away from their father, received no financial support from him, and saw him only occasionally. Plaintiffs counter that they had [*31] a tight bond with their father, and that Charles McJunkin, Jr. talked to his father on a regular basis. This is evidence for the jury to assess. Stucky, 338 P.3d at 65.
Accordingly, the Court finds there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim. Yeager's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of the Complaint is therefore, DENIED.
III. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiffs seek to add a new theory of liability to the existing negligence claim. In particular, Plaintiffs seek to add the theory of strict liability based upon an abnormally dangerous activity. Yeager opposes the motion, arguing Plaintiffs were not diligent in moving to amend, and the proposed amendment is futile.
On June 1, 2017, the Court issued a Scheduling order setting the deadline to amend pleadings for July 3, 2017. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking leave to amend on November 29, 2017. (Doc. 23.)
[HN17] In situations where the deadline for amendments to pleadings has passed, a party must show good cause for not seeking leave to amend within the Court's scheduling order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4) ("[a] schedule may [*32] only be modified for good cause and with the judge's consent"); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit explained that "[u]nlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal [HN18] amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)'s 'good cause' standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment." Good cause to excuse noncompliance with the scheduling order exists if the pretrial schedule "cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Committee's Notes (1983 Amendment)).
Prejudice to the opposing party may provide an additional reason to deny a motion to amend, but "the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification." Id. at 609. "If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end." Id.; see also In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding denial of motion to amend where "the party seeking to modify the scheduling order has been aware of the facts and theories supporting amendment since the inception of the action").
[HN19] If good cause exists for seeking amendment after the scheduling order's deadline, the Court then turns to Rule 15(a) to determine whether amendment should be allowed. [*33] "Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so requires,' it 'is not to be granted automatically.'" In re Western States, 715 F.3d at 738 (quoting Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1990)). Under Rule 15(a), the Ninth Circuit directs that courts consider the following five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: "(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint." Id. Each of these factors is not given equal weight, however. "Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
A. Lack of Diligence
As noted above, Plaintiffs seek to amend the Complaint to include an additional theory of strict liability. The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not act diligently in seeking to amend the Complaint. The motion to amend was filed nearly five months after the Court's deadline to amend pleadings. Plaintiffs' explanation for the delay is that the additional theory of liability is premised upon Yeager's expert report, which they did not receive until November 13, 2017.
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiffs were aware of the facts and theories supporting the amendment long prior to receipt of [*34] Yeager's expert report. The expert report did not provide any new facts, but rather offered opinion evidence that fly fishing from a raft is inherently dangerous, and that the danger cannot be eliminated by reasonable precautions. But Plaintiffs have been aware that Yeager intended to raise an inherent risk defense since Yeager filed his answer on March 6, 2017, and raised the MRRA as an affirmative defense. (Doc. 4 at 7.) Yeager also filed a Preliminary Pretrial Statement approximately six months before the expert report was produced that put Plaintiffs on further notice of this theory of defense. (See Doc. 18 at 6) (stating that "[f]alling out of a raft on a river is a danger that cannot be prevented by the use of reasonable care.") Therefore, Plaintiffs' argument that they did not possess information supporting the abnormally dangerous activity theory of liability until after they received the expert report is not persuasive. See Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845 (holding a motion to amend may be denied "where the movant presents no new facts but only new theories and provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally").
B. Futility of Amendment
Even if the Court found "good cause," under [*35] Rule 16, application of the Rule 15 factors dictate denial of the motion to amend. Although there is no indication Plaintiffs are acting in bad faith, or that amendment would unduly prejudice Yeager, the Court has found undue delay. Moreover, the Court finds the amendment would be futile.
In seeking to impose strict liability, Plaintiffs conflate the concept of inherent risk with an abnormally dangerous activity. The activity at issue here — fly fishing from a raft — is not the kind of activity that has been recognized as abnormally dangerous. [HN20] Simply because an activity has inherent risks, does not mean the activity is abnormally dangerous for purposes of strict liability. A comparison of activities that are considered abnormally dangerous illustrates the point. See e.g. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow Cty., 2000 MT 112, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348 (Mont. 2000) (trenching); Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 338 Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007) (operating a gas refinery near residences and a school); Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (Mont. 1932) (highway construction); and Stepanek v. Kober Const., 191 Mont. 430, 625 P.2d 51 (Mont. 1981) (construction scaffolding). The Court does not find the characteristics and risks of fly fishing equate in any meaningful way with these types of activities.8
8 Likewise, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519, which has been adopted by the Montana Supreme Court, identifies the following as abnormally dangerous activities: "Water collected in quantity in unsuitable or dangerous place," "Explosives in quantity in a dangerous place," "Inflammable liquids in quantity in the midst of a city," "Blasting, in the midst of a city," "Pile driving, with abnormal risk to surroundings," "Release into air of poisonous gas or dust," "Drilling oil wells or operating refineries in thickly settled communities," and "production of atomic energy." Again, these activities are of a wholly different nature than float fly fishing.
"Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is a question of law." Chambers v. City of Helena, 2002 MT 142, 310 Mont. 241, 49 P.3d 587, 591 (Mont. 2002), overruled on other grounds, Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, 338 Mont. 19, 162 P.3d 134 (Mont. 2007). No court has held float fly fishing is an abnormally dangerous activity, and [*36] this Court declines Plaintiffs' invitation to be the first to do so.
In addition, the Court has determined the MRRA is constitutional and applies to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The MRRA limits a recreational provider's liability. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-752(3); 27-1-753. The Montana Legislature enacted the MRRA to protect recreational providers from liability for injuries that are caused by the very characteristics of a particular activity that make it attractive to participants. 2009 Mt. Laws Ch. 331 (H.B. 150), preamble. The Legislature specifically intended to limit providers' liability and to discourage claims based on damages that result from inherent risks in a sport or activity. Id. The Legislature enacted the MRRA to further the State's interest in maintaining the economic viability of Montana's sports and recreational industries. Id.
Imposing strict liability would eviscerate the purpose of the MRRA. Instead of limiting recreational provider's liability for inherent risks, it would render them strictly liable for those risks. See Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2015 MT 255, 380 Mont. 495, 358 P.3d 131, 150 (Mont. 2015) ("A claim based upon strict liability for the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity . . . means that the defendant is liable for harm resulting from the activity, even [*37] if the defendant acted with reasonable care."). In short, it would accomplish the exact opposite of what the MRRA was intended to do.
Therefore, because Plaintiffs have not shown good cause for their delay in seeking amendment, and because the amendment would be futile, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint is DENIED.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend (Doc. 23) is DENIED;
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) is DENIED; and
(3) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS ORDERED.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2018.
/s/ Timothy J. Cavan
TIMOTHY J. CAVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
A loss of consortium claim started as a way to compensate a husband for the loss of his wife and the duties she performed in the home, including sex.
Posted: July 2, 2018 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Case Analysis, Maine, Racing, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: bleachers, Cause of action, citation omitted, civil action, claimant, common law, consortium, contractual, contractually, crew, derivative, Derivative Claim, extinguish, Indemnification, indemnity agreements, indirectly, loss of consortium, married, negligence claim, negligence liability, occasioned, own name, own negligence, particularity, pit, plain language, Public Policy, raceway, Release, releasee, spouse, tort action | Leave a comment
In most states, a loss of consortium claim is a derivative claim, meaning that the claim is successful if the original claim, the husband's claim is successful.
In Maine, a loss of consortium claim may be derivative or independent and is based on a statute.
Hardy et al. v. St. Clair d/b/a Wiscasset Raceway,1999 ME 142; 739 A.2d 368; 1999 Me. LEXIS 161
State: Maine, Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Plaintiff: Brent D. Hardy et al.
Defendant: David St. Clair d/b/a Wiscasset Raceway
Plaintiff Claims:
In the majority of states, a loss of consortium claim is a derivative claim, and a release stops those claims as well as the original claim of the injured plaintiff. In Maine, a loss of consortium claim is a separate claim and not stopped when the plaintiff signs a release.
The husband was part of a pit crew for a race car. He signed a release to enter the track and work on the race car he crewed for. During the race, a specific set of seats in the bleachers were reserved for the pit crew. While sitting in the bleachers, a plank on a set of bleachers collapsed, injuring him.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the husband's claim but allowed the wife's loss of consortium claim to continue.
Maine's loss of consortium claims originally only available to a husband when a wife was injured. When the first claims from wives appeared based on husband's injuries the courts determined it was not their job to make that decision on whether the wife had a claim, that it was the legislature's responsibility. "However, "under common law, a wife had no cause of action for her loss of consortium occasioned by her husband's injuries."
The Maine legislature passed a law giving both husband and wife, when married, loss of consortium claims. The statute stated the claims were available to be brought in the person's own name or in their spouse's name.
In most states, a loss of consortium claim is a derivative claim. Meaning the claim is brought with the injured spouse's claim and is subject to the defenses to the injured spouses claim. Alternatively, the non-injures spouse can only win if the injured spouse wins.
Based on the language of the Maine Statute, the trial court determined the loss of consortium claim of the non-injured spouse could continue. The defendant appealed that decision and this is the Maine Supreme Court's decision on that issue.
The court started by reviewing the release, and Maine release law. As in most states the court started its analysis with:
Courts have traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability and have exercised a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny when interpreting contractual language [that] allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negligence."
Under Maine's law, this means that a release must "expressly spell out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability" That means the court must look at the plain language of the agreement and determine the intent of the parties as set forth in the agreement.
Although the release was mainly written to cover injuries received as a member of the pit crew and stock-car racing, the court found that since the seating area where the injury occurred could only be occupied by members of a pit crew, the release covered the injuries the plaintiff suffered when the plank broke. The court stated.
…had Brent not been participating in the race events, he would not have been on the section of bleachers that collapsed because that section was reserved for members of the pit crews and not open to the general public
The plaintiff's injuries were determined to have risen directly from the racing event. Overall, the court determined the agreement was written to extinguish negligence liability.
Finding the release prevented the claims of the husband, the court then turned to the issue of the loss of consortium claim of the spouse.
Looking at the law of releases, a release only bar's claims of the person who signed the release. If the wife's claims are derivative, then her claims would be barred also when the husband signed the release.
States adopting the derivative approach generally conclude that a cause of action for loss of consortium is subject to the same defenses available in the injured spouse's underlying tort action. States adopting the independent approach generally conclude that a consortium claim is not subject to such defenses.
However, under the statute, the court found that loss of consortium claims in Maine are separate, independent causes of action. The wife's loss of consortium claim could continue.
In Maine, and the minority of states that follow this line of reasoning, to bar all claims for injuries, a defendant is going to have to get a signature on a release for everyone who might have a claim based upon the injury of the injured person.
That could mean the spouse would have to sign a release, minor children if they are allowed, heirs of the plaintiff if he dies, or anyone else that could bring a claim all would have to release any possible defendant.
Understand if you live in a state where loss of consortium claims is derivative and covered by a release or stand alone and not covered by your release.
Posted: June 25, 2018 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Legal Case, Maine, Release (pre-injury contract not to sue) | Tags: bleachers, Cause of action, citation omitted, civil action, claimant, common law, consortium, contractual, contractually, crew, derivative, extinguish, Indemnification, indemnity agreements, indirectly, loss of consortium, married, negligence claim, negligence liability, occasioned, own name, own negligence, particularity, pit, plain language, Public Policy, raceway, releasee, spouse, tort action | Leave a comment
Brent D. Hardy et al. v. David St. Clair d/b/a Wiscasset Raceway
Wal-99-107
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE
1999 ME 142; 739 A.2d 368; 1999 Me. LEXIS 161
September 10, 1999, Argued
October 15, 1999, Decided
DISPOSITION: [***1] Judgment affirmed.
CORE TERMS: consortium, spouse, loss of consortium, cause of action, derivative, raceway, public policy, common law, negligence liability, negligence claim, indemnity agreements, releasee, own negligence, own name, civil action, citation omitted, indemnification, contractual, extinguish, indirectly, occasioned, claimant, married, bleachers, crew, pit, plain language, tort action, particularity, contractually
COUNSEL: Attorneys for plaintiffs: James C. Munch III, Esq., (orally), Marvin G. Glazier, Esq., Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, Bangor, ME.
Attorneys for defendant: Richard L. Suter, Esq., (orally, George D. Hepner III, Esq., Suter & Hepner, P.A., Falmouth, ME.
JUDGES: Panel: RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
OPINION BY: RUDMAN
[**369] RUDMAN, J.
[*P1] Brent D. Hardy and Carie Hardy appeal and David St. Clair cross-appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Waldo County, Marsano, J.) concluding that a release signed by Brent D. Hardy barred his negligence claim, but did not bar his wife's claim for loss of consortium. We agree with the trial court and affirm the judgment.
[*P2] This action arises from injuries allegedly sustained by Brent D. Hardy at the Wiscasset Raceway, a facility owned by David St. Clair. As a condition to Brent's service as a member of a pit crew supporting a race car racing at the raceway, Brent was required to sign a document entitled "Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement." Brent was injured when a plank on a set of bleachers at the raceway reserved for members of the [***2] pit crews collapsed under him. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the raceway on the basis that the agreement barred Brent's negligence claim, but concluded that the agreement did not bar Carie's loss of consortium claim. This appeal ensued.
[*P3] The Hardys contend that the agreement is ambiguous and violates Maine law and public policy and that the peril which caused Brent's injury was not contemplated by the parties. "Courts [HN1] have traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability and have exercised a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny when interpreting contractual language [that] allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negligence." 1 [HN2] Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1207 (Me. 1979). Accordingly, a release must "expressly spell out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability." Id. (internal quotations omitted). To discern the parties' intention, we look to the plain language of the agreement.
1 Wiscasset Raceway cites Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1207-08 (Me. 1979) and Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 993 (Me. 1983). In support of its contention that, "under Maine law, release and indemnity agreements exempting the releasee/indemnitee from liability for his or her own negligence are considered lawful and are not against public policy." In Doyle, 403 A.2d at 1207 n.2, we declined to address whether such agreements were unlawful and contrary to public policy, stating:
Because we do not construe the documents executed … as releases or indemnification agreements, we have no occasion to reach the further issue whether contractual provisions which relieve a party from liability for that party's own negligence would be unenforceable and void as contravening public policy. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963); Prosser, Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
In Emery Waterhouse Co., 467 A.2d at 993, we stated that "indemnity [HN3] clauses to save a party harmless from damages due to negligence may lawfully be inserted in contracts . . ., and such clauses are not against public policy."
[*P4] [***3] The pertinent provisions of the Agreement state that, by signing the document, Brent:
2. HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE [Wiscasset Raceway] FROM ALL LIABILITY [sic]… FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE, AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDS THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY … ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.
[**370] 4. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY RISK OF BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE arising out of or related to the EVENT(S) whether caused by the NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES or otherwise.
6. HEREBY agrees that this Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement extends to all acts of negligence by the Releasees . . . and is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the laws. . . .
The Agreement further provides:
I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY, ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS, UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND INTEND MY SIGNATURE TO BE A COMPLETE AND [***4] UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.
[*P5] According to the second and fourth paragraphs of the Agreement, Brent cannot recover for any injuries "arising out of or related to the EVENT(S)." The term "EVENT(S)" refers to Wiscasset Raceway's "Regular Races & 50 Lap Heavyweight." Although Brent did not receive injuries directly "arising out of or related to the events," his injuries were related to the events and indirectly resulted from them. The race events did not directly cause the bleachers to collapse under Brent. However, had Brent not been participating in the race events, he would not have been on the section of bleachers that collapsed because that section was reserved for members of the pit crews and not open to the general public.
[*P6] In light of other broader language in the Agreement, however, this appeal does not turn on whether the Agreement expressly extinguishes Wiscasset Raceway's negligence liability for injuries indirectly arising out of the racing events. The sixth paragraph provides that the scope of the Agreement "extends to all acts of negligence by [Wiscasset Raceway] . . . And is intended to be as broad [***5] and inclusive as is permitted by the laws." Further, the last portion of the Agreement indicates that Brent intended his signature to be "A COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW." Even when strictly construed against Wiscasset Raceway, the Agreement "expressly spell[s] out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability." Doyle, 403 A.2d at 1207 (internal quotations omitted). In light of the plain language of the Agreement, the trial court did not err in concluding that the Agreement barred Brent's negligence claim.
[*P7] By way of cross-appeal, Wiscasset Raceway contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agreement did not bar Carie's loss of consortium claim. Wiscasset Raceway argues that, "under Maine law, although a loss of consortium claim is often referred to as being both 'derivative' and 'independent,' such claims are often greatly limited by statutory and common law defenses associated with the injured spouse's cause of action." Wiscasset Raceway further contends that, regardless, the indemnification provision bars Carie's [***6] loss of consortium claim. 2 In response, the Hardys argue that Carie's consortium claim was independent, and [**371] that Brent did not have the ability to release her claim without her consent.
2 Although we recognize that the indemnification clause contained in the Agreement may render this determination a pyrrhic victory, the existence of that clause, by itself, cannot eliminate the noninjured spouse's claim.
[*P8] "For centuries[,] courts have recognized a husband's right to recover damages for the loss of consortium 3 when a tortious injury to his wife detrimentally affects the spousal relationship." Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986). However, "under common law, a wife had no cause of action for her loss of consortium occasioned by her husband's injuries." Dionne v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 621 A.2d 414, 417 (Me. 1993). In 1965, in Potter v. Schafter, we declined to "judicially legislate" such a cause of action and, instead, deferred to the Legislature [***7] so that "the diverse interests affected by such proposition may be heard." Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 341-43, 211 A.2d 891, 892-93 (1965). In 1967, "fun response to our decision in Potter v. Schafter, the Legislature enacted section 167-A of Title 19[,] [which] provided that '[a] married woman may bring a civil action in her own name for loss of consortium of her husband.'" Dionne, 621 A.2d at 417 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Thereafter, the Legislature repealed section 167-A and replaced it with the gender-neutral section 302 of Title 14, which provides that [HN4] "[a] married person may bring a civil action in that person's own name for loss of consortium of that person's spouse." 14 M.R.S.A. § 302.
3 [HN5] The term "consortium" refers to "the nonpecuniary interests a person may have in the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of another." BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 208 (2d ed. 1995). "Consortium" [HN6] means the "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 309 (6th ed. 1990). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY further states:
Loss of "consortium" consists of several elements, encompassing not only material services but such intangibles as society, guidance, companionship, and sexual relations. Damages for loss of consortium are commonly sought in wrongful death actions, or when [a] spouse has been seriously injured through [the] negligence of another, or by [a] spouse against [a] third person alleging that he or she has caused [the] breaking-up of [the] marriage. [A] cause of action for
"consortium" occasioned
by injury to [a] marriage partner[] is a separate cause of
action belonging to
spouse of
married partner and [,]
in the sense
of being occasioned by injury to [the]
spouse, is a
injury to the spouse
who has lost the
consortium.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[*P9] [***8] As an initial matter, the Agreement did not directly bar Carie's consortium claim because she did not sign it and was not a party to the contract. [HN7] A release is a contract that can only bar a claim if the claimant was a party to the agreement. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St. 3d 84, 585 N.E.2d 384, 392 (Ohio 1992); Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc'y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Wis. 1983). Hence, the issue facing us is whether, by expressly barring Brent's negligence claim, the Agreement indirectly barred Carie's consortium claim. Stated otherwise, we must determine whether a consortium claim is "derivative" or "independent."
[*P10] Jurisdictions are divided over whether to treat a loss of consortium claim as a "derivative" or "independent" cause of action with regard to the underlying tort claim. 4
See, e.g., McCoy v. Colonial Baking [**372] Co., 572 So. 2d 850, 856-61 (Miss. 1990) (comparing positions of state courts); Carol J. Miller, Annotation, Injured Party's Release of Tortfeasor as Barring
of Consortium, 29 A.L.R.4th 1200 (1981) [***9] (analyzing state and federal cases). States adopting the derivative approach generally conclude that a cause of action for loss of consortium is subject to the same defenses available in the injured spouse's underlying tort action. See Miller, supra. States adopting the independent approach generally conclude that a consortium claim is not subject to such defenses. See id.
4 The terms "derivative" and "independent" are imprecise, and may be misleading. See, Jo-Anne M. Balo, Loss of Consortium: A Derivative Injury Giving Rise to a Separate Cause of Action, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1344, 1351-54 (1982) (noting that "there is no precise definition of a derivative action"). According to another commentator:
Writers have observed that the conflict which has developed in such cases "suggests the need for basic explanations of which there has been something of a shortage" and that a court's adoption of either the derivative or independent approach "sounds more like a conclusion than a reason." The question confusing courts is whether the consortium claim is dependent upon the injury or the injured spouse's cause of action.
Antonios P. Tsarouhas, Bowen v.
Kil-Kare,
Inc.: The Derivative
Independent Approach to Spousal Consortium, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[*P11] [***10] Although we have heretofore declined to address whether a consortium claim is "derivative" or "independent," see, e.g., Morris v. Hunter, 652 A.2d 80, 82 (Me. 1994); Box v. Walker, 453 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1983), 5 our case law lends support for the trial court's conclusion that consortium claims are separate, independent causes of action. In Taylor v. Hill, 464 A.2d 938, 944 (Me. 1983), we recognized that [HN8] a consortium claim, "though derived from an alleged injury to the person of [the claimant's spouse], constitutes a distinct and separate cause of action." Similarly, in Dionne, 621 A.2d at 418, we indicated that a wife's statutory right to bring a consortium claim "belongs to the wife and is separate and apart from the husband's right to bring his own action against the party responsible for his injuries."
5 In Box v. Walker, 453 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1983), we declined to decide whether a consortium claim is "derivative" or "independent," but noted that [HN9] "an independent cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is damaged by the negligent conduct of the defendant; the law will imply nominal damages from any violation of the plaintiffs rights." Box v. Walker, 453 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1983).
[*P12] [***11] The express language of section 302 offers no support for the conclusion that a consortium claim is entirely "derivative." See 14 M.R.S.A. § 302. To the contrary, section 302's provision that a consortium claimant may bring a civil action "in that person's own name" suggests that the cause of action is independent and separate from the underlying tort action of the victim spouse. 14 M.R.S.A. § 302. Further, we have recognized that the Legislature, by enacting the statutory predecessor to section 302, "established a separate right to the wife." Dionne, 621 A.2d at 418 (holding that damages wife recovered under consortium claim were not subject to husband's employer's lien). Although derivative in the sense that both causes of action arise from the same set of facts, the injured spouse's claim is based on the common law of negligence while the claim of the other spouse is based on statutory law. Each claim is independent of the other and the pre- or post-injury release of one spouse's claim does not bar the other spouse's claim. A consortium claim is an independent cause of action, and, therefore, the trial court committed no error in ruling that [***12] the Agreement failed to bar Carie's consortium claim. 6
6 We need not determine whether a loss of consortium claim may be subject to traditional common law or statutory defenses to the claims of the injured spouse. We decide only that [HN10] a release of the injured spouse's claim does not simultaneously release the loss of consortium claim of the noninjured spouse.
The entry is:
To prove gross negligence under Washington State law you have to show intentional or reckless misconduct. Assumption of the risk prevents river tuber for suing for his injuries hitting a strainer.
Posted: August 28, 2017 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Case Analysis, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways, Washington | Tags: Assumption of risk, assumption of the risk, comparative negligence, contributory negligence, Duty to Warn, encounter, fallen, fault, Gross negligence, Hazard, impliedly, Inherent Risks, Inner Tube, Livery, log, negligence claim, Outdoor, peril, Reckless, relieve, Rental, risks inherent, River, River Tubing, site, Sport, Summary judgment, Survive, swift, tuber, Tubing, Tubing Livery, warn, Water Sports | Leave a comment
Washington defines assumption of the risk the same way most other courts do. However, the names they sue to describe assumption of the risk are different in some cases and confusing in others.
Here, assumption of the risk stopped claims both for negligence and gross negligence for this tubing case.
Assumption of the risk is growing again as a defense to different types of claims by plaintiffs. In this case, the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries for a tubing accident which barred his negligence claim and his gross negligence claim. The standard of proof needed to prove a claim that cannot be defeated by assumption of the risk in Washington is a much higher level of action on the part of the defendant.
Here the plaintiff failed to plead or allege that level of acts by the defendant.
Washington also uses different names for the types of assumption of the risk that are applied to cases, which can lead to greater confusion.
If you are a defendant, instead of attempting to understand what is or is not assumption of the risk. Spend your time educating your customers, so they know and assume the risk they may be facing.
Pellham, v. Let's Go Tubing, Inc., et al., 199 Wn. App. 399; 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1525
State: Washington, Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three
Plaintiff: Brian Pellham
Defendant: Let's Go Tubing, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff Claims: presented sufficient evidence of gross negligence because Let's Go Tubing chose the excursion lo-cation, knew of the existence of a hazard, and failed to warn Pellham of the hazard. He argues that the rental company's gross negligence supersedes any release of liability and assumption of the risk contained in the form he signed.
Defendant Defenses: that summary judgment was appropriate because Pellham failed to establish a duty, the liability release disposes of the claim, and Pelham's evidence does not create [**7] a genuine issue as to any fact material to establishing gross negligence.
The plaintiff rented an inner tube from the defendant. The rental included delivery to the put in by the defendant. This is commonly described as a livery operation as compared to a pure rental where the renter takes the inner tube and goes wherever.
Upon arrival, the plaintiff signed a release and rented an inner tube. The plaintiff uses releases in his business, although what type of business was never discussed by the court.
The bus driver for the defendant told most of the tubers that upon entry they should push off to the far side of the river to avoid a tree that had fallen into the river immediately downriver but out of sight of the put in.
The plaintiff did not hear this warning. The plaintiff and four friends tied their inner tubes together. The current was swift and they quickly rounded the bend where they saw the tree across the river. The rental company gave each renter a Frisbee to use as a paddle. Everyone used the Frisbee to paddle away from the tree, but the plaintiff hit the tree. Falling into the river the plaintiff broke his ear drum. He went under the tree and upon resurfacing; he struck a large branch which gave him a whiplash.
The plaintiff swam to shore and ended his tubing trip. The plaintiff eventually underwent a neck fusion surgery.
The defendant was legally not allowed to remove the strainer from the river.
The plaintiff sued the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.
Washington has defined four types of assumption of the risk and has identified them slightly differently than most other states.
Washington law and most other states' jurisprudence recognize four taxonomies of the assumption of risk doctrine: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable.
The first two, Express Assumption of the Risk and Implied Assumption of the Risk are still complete bars to a claim of negligence. The second two, Implied Unreasonable and Implied Reasonable have merged into contributory negligence and simply reduce the plaintiff's damages.
Washington defines the types of assumption of the risk the same way most other states do.
Express assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff explicitly consents to relieve the defendant of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff regarding specific known risks.
Implied primary assumption of risk follows from the plaintiff engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent.
Implied unreasonable assumption of risk, by contrast, focuses not so much on the duty and negligence of the defendant as on the further issue of the objective unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in assuming the risk.
Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that the plaintiff assumed a risk but acted reasonably in doing so.
Washington also names Implied Primary Assumption of the Risk as Inherent Peril Assumption of the Risk.
Inherent peril assumption bars a claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed often in advance of any negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff's consent to relieve the defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff's decision to engage in an activity that involves those known risks. One who participates in sports impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport.
How the plaintiff was injured defines whether or not Inherent Peril Assumption of the Risk applies. The court went on to define the inherent peril assumption of the risk as:
One who engages in sports assumes the risks that are inherent in the sport. To the extent a risk inherent in the sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. A defendant simply does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of a sport.
Inherent peril assumption of the risk extends to water sports. One who plays in the water assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity. Water sports include inner tubing and canoe rentals. Inherent risk applies because "Bodies of water often undergo change, and changing conditions in the water do not alter the assumption of risk. There is no duty to warn of the presence of natural transitory conditions."
For the plaintiff to assume the risk, three elements must be found.
Inherent peril assumption, like express assumption of risk, demands the presence of three elements. The evidence must show (1) the plaintiff possessed full subjective understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk.
Washington also requires the plaintiff to understand the risk. "The rule of both express and inherent peril assumptions of risk requires a finding that the plaintiff had full subjective understanding of the presence and nature of the specific risk."
However, that does not require knowledge of the specific issues that caused the injury, just knowledge that the injury could occur. Meaning, if the injured party knows that trees fall into rivers, would be enough. There is no requirement that the injured plaintiff knew that a tree fell into the river.
…Brian Pellham assumed the risks involved in river tubing, including the fallen tree. Pellham may not have precisely and subjectively known how the combination of a swift current, a bend in the river, and a fallen tree would produce his injury. Nevertheless, he knew of the potential of all factors. He may not have known of the location of any fallen tree in the river, but he knew of the potential of a fallen tree somewhere in the river.
However, even if the plaintiff assumed the risks, a plaintiff cannot assume the risk where the defendant unduly enhanced the risk.
While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude a recovery for negligent acts that unduly enhance such risks.
This difference places a burden on the plaintiff, in what he or she has to prove to win their claim and a burden on the courts to define what is an increase in the level of danger.
Courts have struggled to properly distinguish between inherent peril assumption of risk (implied primary assumption of risk), which bars the plaintiff's claim, and increased danger assumption of risk (implied unreasonable assumption of risk), which simply reduces the plaintiff's damages.
However, here any negligence upon the part of the defendant did not increase the risk. The negligence occurred prior to the plaintiff entering the water. The danger was the tree in the river which the defendant could not do anything about.
When he noticed the risk, he lacked time to avoid the hazard. Pellham did not voluntarily proceed after knowing of the alleged negligence of Let's Go Tubing. Any alleged negligence of Let's Go Tubing occurred before Pellham entered the river. Therefore, increased danger assumption of risk does not apply.
The plaintiff also argued in this complaint, that the actions of the defendant were grossly negligent. Gross negligence in Washington is defined as failure to exercise slight care.
Gross negligence claims survive when a release has been signed. The issue before the court was whether gross negligence claims can be stopped if the plaintiff assumed the risk.
At the same time, gross negligence claims survive a release against liability. A sporting participant's assumption of inherent risks effectively acts as a release from liability. Since gross negligence claims survive a release, gross negligence maybe should survive inherent peril assumption of risk.
The court then redefined how gross negligence was going to be reviewed in Washington applying an intentional reckless standard as the level required proving gross negligence when a plaintiff assumes the risk.
We join the other jurisdictions in imposing an intentional and reckless standard, rather than a gross negligence standard, when the plaintiff assumes the risks of inherent perils in a sporting or outdoor activity.
There is a difference between gross negligence and reckless misconduct under Washington's law.
Gross negligence consists of the failure to exercise slight care. Reckless misconduct denotes a more serious level of misconduct than gross negligence. An actor's conduct is in "reckless disregard" of the safety of another if he or she intentionally does an act or fails to do an act that it is his or her duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him or her.
Because reckless conduct is a higher burden to meet, assumption of the risk becomes a defense that can beat a gross negligence claim in some situations in Washington. The plaintiff never pleaded reckless conduct on the part of the defendant so the plaintiff's gross negligence claim was also denied.
Brian Pellham does not allege that Let's Go Tubing engaged in reckless conduct. No evidence supports a conclusion that the inner tube rental company bus driver purposely omitted a warning to Pellham with knowledge that Pellham would suffer substantial harm.
Understanding the different slight subtlest between the various forms of assumption of the risk is difficult. Comparing them between states does nothing but create a confusing group of definitions that cross one another and at best confuse one another.
Better, set up a system to educate your guests or clients on the risks they may encounter. That time spent educating the guests can pay dividends both in keeping you out of court and keeping your guests happy and coming back.
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Posted: August 27, 2017 | Author: Recreation Law | Filed under: Assumption of the Risk, Legal Case, Paddlesports, Rivers and Waterways, Washington | Tags: Assumption of risk, comparative negligence, contributory negligence, Duty to Warn, encounter, fallen, fault, Gross negligence, Hazard, impliedly, Inherent Risks, Inner Tube, log, negligence claim, Outdoor, peril, Reckless, relieve, Rental, risks inherent, River, site, Sport, Strainer, Summary judgment, Survive, swift, tuber, Tubing, warn, Water Sports | 1 Comment
Brian Pellham, Appellant, v. Let's Go Tubing, Inc., et al., Respondents.
No. 34433-9-III
COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION THREE
199 Wn. App. 399; 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1525
March 21, 2017, Oral Argument
June 27, 2017, Filed
WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY Nature of Action: A participant in an inner tube float on a river sought damages for personal injury incurred when his tube struck a fallen log. The plaintiff sued the company and its owners who rented him the inner tube and who selected the site where participants entered the river, claiming that the defendants owed him a duty to warn about a fallen log in the river that was hidden from but was near the entry site. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated the Consumer Protection Act.
Nature of Action: A participant in an inner tube float on a river sought damages for personal injury incurred when his tube struck a fallen log. The plaintiff sued the company and its owners who rented him the inner tube and who selected the site where participants entered the river, claiming that the defendants owed him a duty to warn about a fallen log in the river that was hidden from but was near the entry site. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated the Consumer Protection Act.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Chelan County, No. 13-2-00663-9, Lesley A. Allan, J., on April 14, 2016, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the defendants did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff about the fallen log because the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fallen log and swift current by voluntarily participating in the activity, the court affirms the judgment.
HEADNOTES WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES
[1] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — River Float — Assumed Risks — Fallen Trees — Swift Current. By voluntarily participating in a float on a wild river, one assumes the inherent risks of fallen trees in the water and a swift current. The assumption of risk may relieve the organizer of the activity of an actionable duty to warn about or to prevent injury from trees in the river.
[2] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Nature of Assumed Risk. Assumption of risk in the context of participating in a sport is in reality the principle of no duty to warn of the hazards of the sport, in which case there can be no breach of duty and no actionable claim for negligence.
[3] Negligence — Duty — Necessity — In General. A cause of action for negligence will not lie absent the existence of a duty of care.
[4] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Effect — Relief From Duty. The tort concept of duty overlaps with the contract and tort principles of assumption of risk. An assumption of risk can sometimes relieve a defendant of a duty.
[5] Negligence — Duty — Question of Law or Fact — In General. Whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff is a question of law.
[6] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Classifications. The term "assumption of risk" expresses several distinct common law theories, derived from different sources, that apply when one is knowingly exposed to a particular risk. The general rubric of assumption of risk does not signify a singular doctrine but, rather, encompasses a cluster of discrete concepts. The law recognizes four taxonomies of assumption of risk: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable.
[7] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Effect — In General. Express assumption of risk and implied primary assumption of risk operate as complete bars to a plaintiff's recovery. Implied unreasonable assumption of risk and implied reasonable assumption of risk are merely alternative names for contributory negligence and merely reduce a plaintiff's recoverable damages based on comparative fault pursuant to RCW 4.22.005 and RCW 4.22.015.
[8] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Express Assumption — What Constitutes — In General. Express assumption of risk arises when one explicitly consents to relieve another of a duty regarding specific known risks.
[9] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Primary Assumption — What Constitutes — In General. Implied primary assumption of risk follows from one's engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent.
[10] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Unreasonable Assumption — Focus of Inquiry. Implied unreasonable assumption of risk primarily focuses on the objective unreasonableness of one's conduct in assuming a risk.
[11] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Reasonable Assumption — What Constitutes. Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that one assumes a risk, but acts reasonably in doing so.
[12] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Unreasonable Assumption — Implied Reasonable Assumption — Comparison. The gist of implied reasonable and implied unreasonable assumption of risk is that a defendant performed conduct that increased the risk of an activity or situation beyond the inherent risks thereof and the plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encountered the increased risk. The categories of implied unreasonable and implied reasonable assumption of risk hold no meaningful distinction since both reduce rather than bar a plaintiff's recovery.
[13] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Risk of Activity — Assuming the Dangers. Inherent peril assumption of risk–also known as implied primary assumption of risk–bars a plaintiff's claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed, often in advance of any negligence by the defendant. A plaintiff's consent to relieve a defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff's decision to engage in an activity that involves the known risks.
[14] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Implied Assumption. One who participates in a sport impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport.
[15] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Applicability — Sports — In General. Under the theory of inherent peril assumption of risk, a plaintiff assumes the dangers that are inherent in and necessary to a particular activity. To the extent a risk inherent in a sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. A defendant does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of the sport.
[16] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Applicability — Sports — Water Sports. Inherent peril assumption of risk extends to water sports. One who engages in a water sport assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity. This assumption of risk includes inner tubing on water. Bodies of water often undergo change, and changing conditions in the water do not alter the assumption of risk. There is no duty to warn of the presence of natural transitory conditions in the water.
[17] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Test. Inherent peril assumption of risk requires evidence that (1) the plaintiff possessed at least an understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk. In the usual case, a plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of a danger is a question of fact, but if it is clear that any person in the plaintiff's position would have understood the danger, the issue may be decided by a court as a matter of law.
[18] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Negligence Enhancing Assumed Risk. While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude recovery for the negligent acts of others that unduly enhance such risks.
[19] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Limited Application. Inherent peril assumption of risk is the exception rather than the rule in assumption of risk situations.
[20] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Increased Danger — What Constitutes. Increased danger assumption of risk–also known as implied unreasonable assumption of risk and implied reasonable assumption of risk–does not involve a plaintiff's consent to relieve a defendant of a duty. In this type of assumption of risk, the defendant breached a duty that created a risk of harm, and the plaintiff chose to take that risk. Increased danger assumption of risk involves a plaintiff's voluntary choice to encounter a risk created by a defendant's negligence. Increased danger assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff knows of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to encounter it. In such a case, the plaintiff's conduct is not truly consensual, but is a form of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists of making the wrong choice and voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk.
[21] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Increased Danger — Applicability. Increased danger assumption of risk does not apply in circumstances where the defendant did not create and could not remove the risk and where the plaintiff did not voluntarily take the risk because the plaintiff did not know the precise nature of the risk beforehand and lacked time to avoid the risk once it became apparent.
[22] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Knowledge of Risk — Warning — Statements in Written Release — Sufficiency. A recitation in a release of liability warning of dangers inherent in an activity can be sufficient to notify a person of the risks of the activity that may give rise to inherent peril assumption of risk where the person chooses to engage in the activity and sustains injury from such dangers.
[23] Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Scope of Defense — Gross Negligence — Intentional or Reckless Conduct. Inherent peril assumption of risk in a sporting or outdoor activity may allow a defendant to avoid liability for gross negligence but not for intentional or reckless conduct. A recklessness standard encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. An actor's conduct is in "reckless disregard" of the safety of another if the actor intentionally does an act or fails to do an act that it is the actor's duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to the other. Fearing, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
COUNSEL: Richard D. Wall (of Richard D. Wall PS), for appellant.
Kristen Dorrity (of Andrews o Skinner PS), for respondents.
JUDGES: Authored by George Fearing. Concurring: Kevin Korsmo, Laurel Siddoway.
OPINION BY: George Fearing
[*403] ¶1 Fearing, C.J. — This appeal asks: does an inner tube rental company owe a duty to warn a renter about a fallen log in a river when the log is hidden from but near the launch site, the river's current draws the tuber toward the log, the company knows of the fallen log, the company warns other tubers of the log, and the company chooses the launch site? To answer this question, interests such as exhilarating and uninhibited outdoor recreation, retaining the natural environment, and freedom to contract compete with cautious business practices, full disclosure of risks, and compensation for injury. Based on the doctrine of inherent peril assumption of risk, we answer the question in the negative. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of renter Brian Pellham's suit for personal injury against the tube [**2] rental company, Let's Go Tubing, Inc.
¶2 Brian Pellham sues for injuries suffered while inner tubing on the Yakima River. Because the trial court dismissed Pellham's suit on summary judgment, we write the facts in a light favorable to Pellham.
¶3 Melanie Wells invited Brian Pellham and his domestic partner to join her and three others on a leisurely unguided excursion floating the Yakima River. Wells arranged the expedition and reserved equipment and transportation from Let's Go Tubing, Inc.
¶4 [*404] On July 30, 2011, Brian Pellham met the Wells party at the Let's Go Tubing's Umtanum gathering site, where additional tubers waited. Before boarding a bus, each participant signed a release of liability and assumption of risk form. Pellham felt rushed but read and signed the form. The form provided:
I, the renter of this rental equipment, assume and understand that river tubing can be HAZARDOUS, and that rocks, logs, bridges, plants, animals, other people, other water craft, exposure to the elements, variations in water depth and speed of current, along with other structures and equipment, and many other hazards or obstacles exist in the river environment. In using the rental equipment or any facilities [**3] or vehicles related thereto such dangers are recognized and accepted whether they are marked or unmarked. River tubing can be a strenuous and physically demanding activity. It requires walking, bending, lifting, paddling, swimming, and awareness of the outdoor environment. I realize that slips, falls, flips, and other accidents do occur and serious injuries or death may result and I assume full responsibility for these risks … . "IN CONSIDERATION FOR THIS RENTAL AND ANY USE OF THE FACILITIES, VEHICLES, OR ENVIRONMENT RELATED TO THE USE OF THIS EQUIPMENT, I HEREBY RELEASE HOLD HARMLESS AND INDEMNIFY LET'S GO TUBING, INC. ITS SUBSIDIARIES AND ITS AGENTS FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS AND LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THIS RENTAL EQUIPMENT."
Clerk's Papers at 46. On other occasions, such as a rafting trip, Brian Pellham has signed a waiver. In his business, he employs release forms.
¶5 Let's Go Tubing launches its customers from the Umtanum site unless the Yakima River level runs low. With low water, the company buses customers to one of two other Yakima River sites, Big Horn or Ringer Loop.
¶6 On July 30, 2011, Let's Go Tubing's shuttle bus, because [**4] of a low river level, transported Brian Pellham, his group members, and other customers eight miles upstream [*405] to Ringer Loop. Ringer Loop maintains a public concrete boat ramp and public restroom. The total number of customers on the excursion approached twenty. During transport, Steff Thomas, the Let's Go Tubing bus driver, told Melanie Wells and a handful of others seated at the front of the bus to push into the middle of the river once they embarked, because a fallen tree obstructed the river immediately downriver but out of sight from the launch site. We do not know the number of customers the driver warned. Thomas did not warn Pellham of the obstructing tree. Nor did anyone else. Someone, possibly Thomas, warned everyone not to leave the river except at designated spots because private owners own most of the riverbank.
¶7 At the launch site, Let's Go Tubing handed each person a Frisbee to use as a paddle. Brian Pellham requested a life jacket, but Steff Thomas ignored him. Fifteen inner tubers entered the river first. Pellham and four others followed in a second group with their tubes tied together. They encountered a swift current. As soon as the flotilla of five rounded the [**5] first bend in the river, they saw a fallen tree extending halfway across the river. Many branches extended from the tree trunk. Each paddled furiously with his or her Frisbee, but the fleet of five inner tubes struck the tree. Brian Pellham held the tree with his left hand and attempted to steer around the tree. The current grabbed the inner tubes and Pellham fell backward into the river. The fall broke Pellham's eardrum. The current forced Pellham under the tree and the water level. When Pellham resurfaced, his head struck a large branch. He sustained a whiplash injury. His chest also hit the branch.
¶8 Brian Pellham swam to shore and ended his river excursion. Pellham told Steff Thomas of his dangerous encounter, and the driver admitted he knew about the fallen tree but laws prevented Let's Go Tubing from removing the obstacle.
[*406] ¶9 Brian Pellham later underwent a neck fusion surgery. The accident also caused damage to a low back disk, and the damage creates pain radiating to his left foot.
¶10 Brian Pellham sued Let's Go Tubing for negligent failure to warn and Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, violations. Let's Go Tubing answered the complaint and raised affirmative defenses, including release of liability and [**6] assumption of the risk. The company filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal based on the release and on assumption of risk. In response to the motion, Pellham argued that he did not waive liability because Let's Go Tubing committed gross negligence. He also argued he did not expressly or impliedly assume the risk of floating into a hazard. Pellham agreed to dismissal of his consumer protection claim. The trial court granted summary dismissal of all of Pellham's claims.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶11 On appeal, Brian Pellham contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claim because he presented sufficient evidence of gross negligence because Let's Go Tubing chose the excursion location, knew of the existence of a hazard, and failed to warn Pellham of the hazard. He argues that the rental company's gross negligence supersedes any release of liability and assumption of the risk contained in the form he signed. On appeal, he does not argue liability against Let's Go Tubing for failing to provide a life vest.
[1] ¶12 Let's Go Tubing responds that summary judgment was appropriate because Pellham failed to establish a duty, the liability release disposes of the claim, and Pellham's evidence does not create [**7] a genuine issue as to any fact material to establishing gross negligence. We affirm based on the inherent risks in river tubing. Because of Pellham's [*407] voluntary participation in the outdoor recreation activity, he assumed the risk of a fallen log and swift current. Conversely, Pellham's assumption of the risk created no duty for Let's Go Tubing to warn Pellham of or prevent injury to him from trees in the river. Because we rely on the inherent risks in river tubing, we do not address whether the written agreement signed by Pellham bars his suit.
¶13 Because we hold that Brian Pellham assumed the risk and thereby rendered Let's Go Tubing dutyless, we do not address whether Pellham created an issue of fact with regard to gross negligence. We conclude that, to avoid application of inherent peril assumption of risk, Pellham needed to show intentional or reckless misconduct of the rental company, and Pellham does not show or argue either.
Summary Judgment Principles
¶14 We commence with our obligatory recitation of summary judgment principles. [HN1] This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976); Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wn.2d 679, 683, 732 P.2d 510 (1987). [HN2] Summary judgment is proper if the records on file with the [**8] trial court show "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). [HN3] This court, like the trial court, construes all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Brian Pellham, as the nonmoving party. Barber v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 81 Wn.2d 140, 142, 500 P.2d 88 (1972); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). [HN4] A court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).
[*408] Defenses on Review
¶15 Let's Go Tubing seeks affirmation of the summary judgment dismissal of Brian Pellham's claim based on both an absence of duty and Pellham's assumption of risk. In turn, Pellham argues that, under RAP 2.5(a), the rental company may not assert a lack of duty because the company did not raise this defense before the trial court.
[2] ¶16 We need not address Brian Pellham's objection to Let's Go Tubing's argument of lack of duty. We base our decision on inherent peril assumption of risk, and the rental company raised the defense of assumption of risk below. Anyway, assumption of risk in this context is equivalent to a lack of duty. [HN5] Assumption of the risk in the sports participant context is in [**9] reality the principle of no duty and hence no breach and no underlying cause of action. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. 519, 523, 984 P.2d 448 (1999); Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 45 Wn. App. 393, 401-02, 725 P.2d 1008 (1986).
Assumption of Risk
[3, 4] ¶17 [HN6] A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) a proximate cause between the breach and the injury. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wn.2d 121, 127-28, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). Thus, to prevail on his negligence claim, Brian Pellham must establish that Let's Go Tubing owed him a duty of care. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 671, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). [HN7] The tort concept of duty overlaps with the contract and tort principles of assumption of risk. As previously mentioned, sometimes assumption of risk relieves the defendant of a duty. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523 (1999); Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 45 Wn. App. at 402 (1986).
[5] ¶18 [HN8] The threshold determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological [*409] Society, 124 Wn.2d at 128; Coleman v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 853, 858, 64 P.3d 65 (2003). We hold that, because of Brian Pellham's assumption of the risk of fallen trees in the water, Let's Go Tubing, as a matter of law, had no duty to warn Pellham of the danger or, at the least, the rental company possessed only a restricted duty to not intentionally injure Pellham or engage in reckless misconduct.
[6] ¶19 We first briefly explore the variegated versions of assumption of risk in order to later analyze the application of inherent peril assumption of risk. [HN9] The term "assumption of the risk" expresses [**10] several distinct common law theories, derived from different sources, which apply when a plaintiff knowingly exposes himself to particular risks. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 807 A.2d 1274, 1281 (2002); Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (pt. 1), 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 15-30 (1906); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 (5th ed. 1984). Stated differently, the general rubric of assumption of risk does not signify a singular doctrine but rather encompasses a cluster of discrete concepts. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d 448, 453, 746 P.2d 285 (1987). Washington law and most other states' jurisprudence recognize four taxonomies of the assumption of risk doctrine: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d 628, 636, 244 P.3d 924 (2010) (plurality opinion); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. 788, 794, 368 P.3d 531 (2016); 16 David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Washington Practice: Tort Law and Practice § 9:11, at 398-99 (4th ed. 2013).
[7] ¶20 Before the enactment of comparative negligence and comparative fault statutes, practitioners and courts encountered little reason to distinguish the four versions of assumption of risk because at common law all assumption of the risk completely barred recovery. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484, 496, 834 P.2d 6 (1992). [*410] Today, [HN10] the first two categories of assumption of risk, express assumption and implied primary assumption, on the one hand, continue to operate as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453-54; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 794. On the other hand, implied unreasonable and implied [**11] reasonable assumption meld into contributory negligence and merely reduce the plaintiff's recoverable damages based on comparative fault pursuant to RCW 4.22.005 and .015. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 497. The last two types are merely alternative names for contributory negligence. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d at 636 (2010). Our decision relies on implied primary assumption, but we will discuss other renderings of assumption of risk in order to sculpt our decision.
[8-11] ¶21 [HN11] Express assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff explicitly consents to relieve the defendant of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff regarding specific known risks. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d at 636; Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453. [HN12] Implied primary assumption of risk follows from the plaintiff engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453; Erie v. White, 92 Wn. App. 297, 303, 966 P.2d 342 (1998). [HN13] Implied unreasonable assumption of risk, by contrast, focuses not so much on the duty and negligence of the defendant as on the further issue of the objective unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in assuming the risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 454. [HN14] Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that the plaintiff assumed a risk but acted reasonably in doing so. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 454.
[12] ¶22 We confront difficulty in distinguishing among at least three of the four categories because of the [**12] nondescript identifiers and near homophonic labels of some classifications. Therefore, we recommend that the Supreme [*411] Court rechristen the categories as express assumption, inherent peril assumption of risk, and increased danger assumption of risk. [HN15] The gist of implied reasonable and implied unreasonable assumption of risk is that the defendant performed conduct that increased the risk of an activity or situation beyond the risks inherent in the activity or situation and the plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encountered this increased risk. The traditional categories of implied unreasonable and implied reasonable assumption of risk hold no meaningful distinction since both reduce rather than bar the plaintiff's recovery, and so we urge combining the two concepts into increased danger assumption of risk. We hereafter use these new terms.
Inherent Peril Assumption of Risk
[13, 14] ¶23 We now focus on inherent peril assumption of risk. [HN16] Inherent peril assumption bars a claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed often in advance of any negligence of the defendant. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 497 (1992); Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657, 666-67, 862 P.2d 592 (1993). Plaintiff's consent to relieve the defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff's decision [**13] to engage in an activity that involves those known risks. Egan v. Cauble, 92 Wn. App. 372, 376, 966 P.2d 362 (1998); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797 (2016). [HN17] One who participates in sports impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. at 667.
[15] ¶24 [HN18] Whether inherent peril assumption of risk applies depends on whether the plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk of an activity. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797. The plaintiff assumes the dangers that are inherent in and necessary to a particular activity. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wn.2d at 144 (1994); Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 500-01; Gleason [*412] v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797; Lascheid v. City of Kennewick, 137 Wn. App. 633, 641-42, 154 P.3d 307 (2007); Taylor v. Baseball Club of Seattle, LP, 132 Wn. App. 32, 37-39, 130 P.3d 835 (2006); Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 420, 427, 927 P.2d 1148 (1996).
¶25 [HN19] The classic example of inherent peril assumption involves participation in sports when a participant knows that the risk of injury is a natural part of such participation. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. One who engages in sports assumes the risks that are inherent in the sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. To the extent a risk inherent in the sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. A defendant simply does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of a sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798.
[16] ¶26 [HN20] Inherent peril assumption extends to water sports. One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 275 A.D.2d 1011, 713 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (2000). This assumption of risk includes inner tubing on water and canoe rentals. Record v. Reason, 73 Cal. App. 4th 472, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1999); Ferrari v. Bob's Canoe Rental, Inc., 143 A.D.3d 937, 39 N.Y.S.3d 522 (2016). Bodies of water often undergo change, and changing conditions in the water [**14] do not alter the assumption of risk. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 594. There is no duty to warn of the presence of natural transitory conditions. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
¶27 DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 275 A.D.2d 1011 is illustrative of the application of inherent peril assumption in the context of water. Trina Kerrick and Daniel DeWick [*413] drowned in Keuka Lake on June 19, 1995. Kerrick allegedly gained access to the lake from the beach at Indian Pines Park, which was owned by defendant Village of Penn Yan. While wading in the water, she stepped from a sandbar where the lake bottom drops off and became caught in an undertow or current. DeWick drowned trying to save her. Neither could swim. The accident occurred on a hot day, four days before the beach officially opened for the season. The plaintiffs alleged that the village failed to warn specifically about the dangers of the drop-off and swift current. The court summarily dismissed the suit. The risk of reaching a drop-off was a reasonably foreseeable risk inherent in wading into a lake.
[17] ¶28 [HN21] Inherent peril assumption, like express assumption of risk, demands the presence of three elements. The evidence must show (1) the plaintiff possessed full subjective understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily [**15] chose to encounter the risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453 (1987). The participant must know that the risk is present, and he or she must further understand its nature; his or her choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523. In the usual case, his or her knowledge and appreciation of the danger will be a question for the jury; but where it is clear that any person in his or her position must have understood the danger, the issue may be decided by the court. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523; Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 489.
¶29 [HN22] The rule of both express and inherent peril assumption of risk requires a finding that the plaintiff had full subjective understanding of the presence and nature of the specific risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453. Depending on how specific the risk must be, this statement of the rule taken literally would abrogate the rule of inherent peril assumption because one rarely, if ever, anticipates the full particulars of an accident producing injury. One can never predict all of the variables that [*414] combine to cause an accident and injury. Also, the doctrine might not apply in wrongful death cases, because the judge or jury will lack evidence of the subjective understanding of the decedent. Washington courts' applications of the rule suggest, however, that the plaintiff need only know [**16] the general nature of the risk. One case example is Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657 (1993).
¶30 In Boyce v. West, a mother brought a suit against a college and its scuba diving instructor after the death of her son, who died during a scuba diving accident while engaging in the college course. The mother claimed the instructor negligently taught and supervised her son. The son, Peter Boyce, signed a document acknowledging the possibility of death from scuba diving and assuming all risks in connection with the course, whether foreseen or unforeseen. This court affirmed summary judgment dismissal of the claims against the school and the instructor. The court reasoned that negligent instruction and supervision are risks associated with being a student in a scuba diving course and were encompassed by the broad language of the contract. Although Peter may not have specifically considered the possibility of instructor negligence when he signed the release, this lack of consideration did not invalidate his express assumption of all risks associated with his participation in the course. [HN23] Knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary when the plaintiff, by express agreement, assumes all risks.
¶31 Boyce v. West entails express assumption of [**17] risk, but [HN24] the same rule of subjective knowledge of risk applies to both express assumption and inherent peril assumption. Based on Boyce v. West and cases involving water sports, we hold that Brian Pellham assumed the risks involved in river tubing, including the fallen tree. Pellham may not have precisely and subjectively known how the combination of a swift current, a bend in the river, and a fallen tree would produce his injury. Nevertheless, he knew of the potential of all factors. He may not have known of the location of any [*415] fallen tree in the river, but he knew of the potential of a fallen tree somewhere in the river. He had more reason to know of the dangers that caused his injury when he started his excursion than Peter Boyce had reason to know of the risks that led to his death when Boyce signed his college course form. In the setting of inherent peril assumption, New York courts have ruled that, [HN25] if the participant fully comprehends the risks of the activity or if those risks are obvious or reasonably foreseeable, he or she has consented to those risks and the defendant has performed its duty. Ferrari v. Bob's Canoe Rental, Inc., 143 A.D.3d at 938 (2016); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1986).
[18] ¶32 [HN26] While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks [**18] inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude a recovery for negligent acts that unduly enhance such risks. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 501; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. This principle leads us to a discussion of increased danger assumption.
[19] ¶33 [HN27] Courts have struggled to properly distinguish between inherent peril assumption of risk (implied primary assumption of risk), which bars the plaintiff's claim, and increased danger assumption of risk (implied unreasonable assumption of risk), which simply reduces the plaintiff's damages. Barrett v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 179 Wn. App. 1, 6, 324 P.3d 688 (2013). This court warned long ago that courts must carefully draw the line between these two types of assumption of risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 795; Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. at 425-26 (1996). A rigorous application of inherent peril assumption of risk could undermine the purpose of comparative negligence. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 455-56. Significantly, [HN28] inherent peril assumption is the exception rather than the rule in assumption of risk situations.
[20] ¶34 [HN29] Increased danger assumption of risk does not involve a plaintiff's consent to relieve the defendant of a [*416] duty. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. In this type of assumption of risk, the defendant breached a duty that created a risk of harm, and the plaintiff chose to take that risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. Specifically, increased danger assumption involves the plaintiff's voluntary choice to encounter a risk created [**19] by the defendant's negligence. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 499; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. Increased danger assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff knows of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to encounter it. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 499 (1992); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. In such a case, a plaintiff's conduct is not truly consensual but is a form of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists of making the wrong choice and voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796.
¶35 Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 420, 927 P.2d 1148 (1996) presents a good illustration of increased danger assumption of risk. Michael Dorr entered a forest where his friend John Knecht cut trees. Dorr knew of the phenomenon of "widow-makers," large limbs caught in surrounding trees after a tree is felled. Nevertheless, after Knecht cut a tree, Knecht waved Dorr forward to meet him. As Dorr proceeded, a large limb fell on him. This court affirmed a verdict favoring Dorr. Although Dorr in general assumed the risk of "widow-makers," Knecht's misleading directions led to implied unreasonable or secondary assumption of risk. The jury could still find and did find Dorr comparatively at fault for proceeding with the knowledge of "widow-makers," but Dorr's fault would be compared with Knecht's fault. The negligence of Knecht [**20] arose after Dorr entered the forest.
[21] ¶36 Brian Pellham alleges that Let's Go Tubing was negligent by reason of sending him and others on inner tubes in fast moving water with a downed tree in the middle [*417] of the water without warning to the tuber. Let's Go Tubing did not create the risk and could not remove the risk. Although Pellham knew of the risks of logs and current, Pellham did not know of the precise risk when he first encountered it. When he noticed the risk, he lacked time to avoid the hazard. Pellham did not voluntarily proceed after knowing of the alleged negligence of Let's Go Tubing. Any alleged negligence of Let's Go Tubing occurred before Pellham entered the river. Therefore, increased danger assumption of risk does not apply.
¶37 Let's Go Tubing performed no act that created the swift current or felled the log into the water. [HN30] The cases that decline application of inherent peril assumption involve a positive act of the defendant, such as the implanting of a post or snow shack adjacent to a ski run. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484 (1992); Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 521 (1999).
¶38 One might argue that Let's Go Tubing's failure to warn increased the risk attended to the fallen log in the Yakima River. [HN31] A defendant may be held liable when a reasonable person would customarily [**21] instruct a plaintiff in respect to the dangers inherent in an activity. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1288. Thus, a defendant may be held liable if the plaintiff alleges that a reasonable person would customarily warn, advise, inform, and instruct regarding the risk of injury to participants and the manner in which such risks could be minimized and their failure to do so caused the plaintiff's injuries. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1288. Brian Pellham presents no evidence that those who rent out watercrafts customarily warn of fallen natural objects in the water.
[22] ¶39 The document signed by Brian Pellham contained terms in addition to releasing Let's Go Tubing from liability. In the instrument, Pellham also recognized that the hazards of river tubing included the existence of rocks, logs, plants, and variations in water depth and speed of [*418] current. Pellham agreed to assume full responsibility for all risks involved in river tubing, including serious injuries and death resulting from the hazards. Although we do not base our holding on express assumption of risk, we note that the release's recitation of dangers warned Pellham of the inherent perils attended to inner tubing and those dangers that led to Pellham's injuries.
Gross Negligence
¶40 Brian Pellham argues that the waiver [**22] form he signed does not bar a claim for gross negligence. The parties, in turn, devote much argument to the issue of whether Pellham creates a question of fact as to gross negligence. Since we do not rely on express assumption of risk, we need not directly address this argument. Instead, we must ask and answer whether a tuber may overcome the defense of inherent peril assumption of risk by showing gross negligence by the inner tube rental company.
¶41 [HN32] When inherent peril assumption of risk applies, the plaintiff's consent negates any duty the defendant would have otherwise owed to the plaintiff. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498 (1992); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798 (2016). Based on this premise of inherent peril assumption, the defendant should avoid liability for gross negligence. Gross negligence constitutes the failure to exercise slight care. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322, 331, 407 P.2d 798 (1965). The lack of duty resulting from inherent peril assumption should extend to an absence of any obligation to exercise slight care.
¶42 At the same time, [HN33] gross negligence claims survive a release against liability. A sporting participant's assumption of inherent risks effectively acts as a release from liability. Since gross negligence claims survive a release, gross negligence maybe should survive inherent peril assumption of risk. [**23]
¶43 No Washington case directly holds that a claim for gross negligence survives the plaintiff's express assumption [*419] of risk. Nevertheless, in at least two decisions, Washington courts assumed that a gross negligence cause of action endured. Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657 (1993); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981). In Boyce v. West, the surviving mother failed to present evidence of gross negligence. In Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., an injured climber did not argue gross negligence. Other jurisdictions have held that express assumption of risk does not bar a claim for gross negligence since public policy does not allow one to exonerate oneself from gross negligence. Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 193 n.3 (Mo. 2014); Kerns v. Hoppe, 128 Nev. 910, 381 P.3d 630 (2012); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1994).
¶44 [HN34] Since express assumption of risk and inherent peril assumption of risk both result in the bar of the plaintiff's claim and arise from the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of risk, one might argue that a gross negligence claim should survive assumption of risk by inherent peril if it survives express assumption of risk. Nevertheless, the two varieties of assumption of risk promote different interests and raise disparate concerns. A signed assumption of all risks could be the result of unequal bargaining power and apply to activities that involve little, or no, risks. The bargaining [**24] power with regard to inherent peril assumption is immaterial. Assumption follows from hazards the plaintiff voluntarily assumes because of the thrill and enjoyment of an activity.
[23] ¶45 We find no foreign decisions in which the court holds that a cause of action for gross negligence survives the application of inherent peril assumption of risk in the context of sports or outdoor recreation. Instead, other courts addressing the question consistently [HN35] limit the liability of the defendant, when inherent peril assumption applies, to intentional or reckless conduct of the defendant. Ellis v. Greater Cleveland R.T.A., 2014-Ohio-5549, 25 N.E.3d 503, 507 (Ct. App.); Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83, [*420] 980 N.E.2d 933, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2012); Cole v. Boy Scouts of America, 397 S.C. 247, 725 S.E.2d 476, 478 (2011); Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 404 (Ind. 2011); Yoneda v. Tom, 110 Haw. 367, 133 P.3d 796, 808 (2006); Peart v. Ferro, 119 Cal. App. 4th 60, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 885, 898 (2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1281 (2002); Behar v. Fox, 249 Mich. App. 314, 642 N.W.2d 426, 428 (2001); Estes v. Tripson, 188 Ariz. 93, 932 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Ct. App. 1997); Savino v. Robertson, 273 Ill. App. 3d 811, 652 N.E.2d 1240, 1245, 210 Ill. Dec. 264 (1995); King v. Kayak Manufacturing Corp., 182 W. Va. 276, 387 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1989). A recklessness standard encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. Behar v. Fox, 642 N.W.2d at 428 (2001). We join the other jurisdictions in imposing an intentional and reckless standard, rather than a gross negligence standard, when the plaintiff assumes the risks of inherent perils in a sporting or outdoor activity.
¶46 [HN36] Gross negligence consists of the failure to exercise slight care. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d at 331 (1965). Reckless misconduct denotes a more serious level of misconduct than gross negligence. An actor's conduct is in "reckless disregard" of the safety of another if he or she intentionally [**25] does an act or fails to do an act that it is his or her duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him or her. Adkisson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wn.2d 676, 685, 258 P.2d 461 (1953); Brown v. Department of Social & Health Services, 190 Wn. App. 572, 590, 360 P.3d 875 (2015). Brian Pellham does not allege that Let's Go Tubing engaged in reckless conduct. No evidence supports a conclusion that the inner tube rental company bus driver purposely omitted a warning to Pellham with knowledge that Pellham would suffer substantial harm.
[*421] CONCLUSION
¶47 We affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of Brian Pellham's suit against Let's Go Tubing.
Korsmo and Siddoway, JJ., concur.
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