Assessing social-scientific theories of religion
Robert A. Segal
A common conviction is that no objective criteria exist for evaluating rival social-scientific theories of religion. The choice of a theory—for example, of a psychological rather than sociological theory, or, within psychology, of Freud's theory rather than Jung's—seemingly reflects mere personal, subjective preference. Thus only an author's use of a social-scientific theory, not the theory itself, ever typically gets evaluated. Various social sciences or specific social-scientific theories do often get promoted—most recently, for example, a sociological approach to ancient Israel and early Christianity. But a sociological approach invariably gets measured against a philological or theological one, not against other social-scientific ones. The failure to compare rival social sciences or theories within them doubtless stems partly from the difficulty of the task: from the need for the kind of breadth which specialization in a single discipline or theory bars. The failure surely stems more deeply from the assumed impossibility of the task: from the assumed absence of objective criteria for evaluating competing theories. What "subjectivists" assume is threefold. First, they assume that to explain a phenomenon one must have an approach of some kind, whether labeled a perspective, pattern, paradigm, gestalt, or worldview. Undeniably, this assumption is correct. Without some approach one would have no organized analysis, or explanation, at all, which is exactly what a discipline or theory provides.
Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline
Acumen Publishing Limited
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Segal, R. A. (2012). Assessing social-scientific theories of religion. In Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline (pp. 69-76). Acumen Publishing Limited.
Assessing social-scientific theories of religion. / Segal, Robert A.
Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline. Acumen Publishing Limited, 2012. p. 69-76.
Segal, RA 2012, Assessing social-scientific theories of religion. in Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline. Acumen Publishing Limited, pp. 69-76.
Segal RA. Assessing social-scientific theories of religion. In Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline. Acumen Publishing Limited. 2012. p. 69-76
Segal, Robert A. / Assessing social-scientific theories of religion. Reinventing Religious Studies: Key Writings in the History of a Discipline. Acumen Publishing Limited, 2012. pp. 69-76
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title = "Assessing social-scientific theories of religion",
abstract = "A common conviction is that no objective criteria exist for evaluating rival social-scientific theories of religion. The choice of a theory—for example, of a psychological rather than sociological theory, or, within psychology, of Freud's theory rather than Jung's—seemingly reflects mere personal, subjective preference. Thus only an author's use of a social-scientific theory, not the theory itself, ever typically gets evaluated. Various social sciences or specific social-scientific theories do often get promoted—most recently, for example, a sociological approach to ancient Israel and early Christianity. But a sociological approach invariably gets measured against a philological or theological one, not against other social-scientific ones. The failure to compare rival social sciences or theories within them doubtless stems partly from the difficulty of the task: from the need for the kind of breadth which specialization in a single discipline or theory bars. The failure surely stems more deeply from the assumed impossibility of the task: from the assumed absence of objective criteria for evaluating competing theories. What "subjectivists" assume is threefold. First, they assume that to explain a phenomenon one must have an approach of some kind, whether labeled a perspective, pattern, paradigm, gestalt, or worldview. Undeniably, this assumption is correct. Without some approach one would have no organized analysis, or explanation, at all, which is exactly what a discipline or theory provides.",
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N2 - A common conviction is that no objective criteria exist for evaluating rival social-scientific theories of religion. The choice of a theory—for example, of a psychological rather than sociological theory, or, within psychology, of Freud's theory rather than Jung's—seemingly reflects mere personal, subjective preference. Thus only an author's use of a social-scientific theory, not the theory itself, ever typically gets evaluated. Various social sciences or specific social-scientific theories do often get promoted—most recently, for example, a sociological approach to ancient Israel and early Christianity. But a sociological approach invariably gets measured against a philological or theological one, not against other social-scientific ones. The failure to compare rival social sciences or theories within them doubtless stems partly from the difficulty of the task: from the need for the kind of breadth which specialization in a single discipline or theory bars. The failure surely stems more deeply from the assumed impossibility of the task: from the assumed absence of objective criteria for evaluating competing theories. What "subjectivists" assume is threefold. First, they assume that to explain a phenomenon one must have an approach of some kind, whether labeled a perspective, pattern, paradigm, gestalt, or worldview. Undeniably, this assumption is correct. Without some approach one would have no organized analysis, or explanation, at all, which is exactly what a discipline or theory provides.
AB - A common conviction is that no objective criteria exist for evaluating rival social-scientific theories of religion. The choice of a theory—for example, of a psychological rather than sociological theory, or, within psychology, of Freud's theory rather than Jung's—seemingly reflects mere personal, subjective preference. Thus only an author's use of a social-scientific theory, not the theory itself, ever typically gets evaluated. Various social sciences or specific social-scientific theories do often get promoted—most recently, for example, a sociological approach to ancient Israel and early Christianity. But a sociological approach invariably gets measured against a philological or theological one, not against other social-scientific ones. The failure to compare rival social sciences or theories within them doubtless stems partly from the difficulty of the task: from the need for the kind of breadth which specialization in a single discipline or theory bars. The failure surely stems more deeply from the assumed impossibility of the task: from the assumed absence of objective criteria for evaluating competing theories. What "subjectivists" assume is threefold. First, they assume that to explain a phenomenon one must have an approach of some kind, whether labeled a perspective, pattern, paradigm, gestalt, or worldview. Undeniably, this assumption is correct. Without some approach one would have no organized analysis, or explanation, at all, which is exactly what a discipline or theory provides.
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