The particular challenge that populism presents for constitutional democracy, in Finchelstein's reading, is precisely its ability to jostle the foundations of institutional democracy without tipping over the entire structure. In the wake of 1945, when fascism became an obsolete "third way" between liberalism and socialism, the emergence of populism produced another alternative. "Globally, populism represented an authoritarian response to an extended crisis of democratic representation," Finchelstein writes. In this sense, fascism became populism—not by accumulating all of its specific strategies—but rather by carving out a place for authoritarian rule into electoral politics. "Populism is an authoritarian form of democracy," Finchelstein said, "It's not a dictatorship.
This is a nuanced argument, and one that pushes back against a tendency to equate populism with fascism in every case. Indeed, above all else, Finchelstein suggests that it is too simplistic to suggest that populism constitutes fascism in a new wrapping. As he puts it, this manner of one-dimensional interpretation limits our ability to, "explain the persistence of modern populism and its formidable ability to undermine democratic tolerance and oppose pluralistic forms of popular sovereignty." The knack of populists to wear away at institutions, while still obeying the results of democratic elections, makes their power particularly pernicious.
But when pressed to suggest what advice a historian might provide about how to combat populism in its current instantiation, Finchelstein was quick to clarify that historical analysis does not produce such recommendations.