All posts in category Ecuador
Ecuador's Return to the Past
By John Polga-Hecimovich and Francisco Sánchez*
Inauguration of the President of Ecuador, Guillermo Lasso/ Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador/ Flickr/ Creative Commons License
Ecuador's underlying political and economic pathologies bode ill for its governability and democratic stability as President Guillermo Lasso, inaugurated in May, attempts a return to the neoliberalism, fiscal austerity, and minority government that marked the contentious politics of the 1990s and 2000s.
This "return to the past" is the result of successive governments' inability to resolve longstanding structural deficiencies. The Revolución Ciudadana of President Rafael Correa (2007‑17) reflected an illusory stability that depended on favorable political-economic conditions. Correa promised political, economic, and social transformation; promulgated a new Constitution to achieve it; and touted a national plan of buen vivir. He survived 10 years in office, more than double any other president in Ecuador's history, but his change was not fundamental or durable – a consequence of the inefficiency, centralization, and personalization of decision-making under one man.
Under the Lenín Moreno government (2017‑21), Ecuador's pathologies reemerged salient as ever. Correa's acolyte in the recent presidential election, Andrés Arauz, lost in the runoff against Lasso, who campaigned on a platform of fiscal austerity that was hardly an attractive proposition for an electorate battered by the COVID‑19 pandemic and years of slow economic growth.
While breaking with one version of its past – correísmo – the electorate seems to have resigned itself to another. Ecuador's longstanding political dysfunction, driven by multiple factors, looms large.
Ever-changing rules of play. Since independence from Spain in 1820, Ecuador has had 20 constitutions and myriad electoral rules. In moments of crisis, especially since Ecuador's democratic transition (1978‑79), elites have generally sought to alter the formal rules of the game – as a kind of restart button. Although Correa proclaimed that the Constitution he pushed through would endure for 300 years, it was modified 23 times in nine years to correct errors and alter citizens' rights.
Weak rule of law and persistent corruption. "Extractive elites" siphon resources from the people and often support institutions and policies inimical to sustained economic growth. Stories abound of the cultivation of party adherents and votes through clientelism, and corruption has politicized the judiciary. Correa created a breeding ground for scandal. In 2017, the court sentenced him in absentia to eight years in prison and banned him from politics for 25 years, whereby he fled to exile in Belgium.
Fragmented parties. Ecuador's party system is one of the most fragmented and weakly institutionalized in the world. Since returning to civilian rule, the parties have proven unable to sustain electoral support – most last only a handful of elections before they disappear. Despite high party turnover in the legislature, voters lack clear institutional channels of representation.
Slow growth and surging debt. Since the mid-2010s, economic, political, and social crises have reversed many of the gains made during the greatest economic boom in the country's history. Correa's large investments in infrastructure, such as roads, hydroelectric plants, schools, and health facilities, reduced political pressures. But the average annual deficit jumped to 3.5 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2017, and total foreign debt jumped from $10.5 billion to $31.5 billion, and reached $40 billion by 2020, while domestic debt grew fourfold. President Moreno's efforts to change course provoked outrage and social unrest.
Significant interbranch conflict. Ecuadorian executives have been politically weak despite an institutional structure that strengthens the presidency relative to the legislature. They have to build coalitions through the distribution of pork and other perks, leading to weak and corrupt governance.
These factors drastically reduce Lasso's policy options. In legislative elections held last February, moreover, his Creando Oportunidades (CREO) party won only 12 of the 137 seats in the National Assembly. His 4.8-point margin of victory in the second presidential round gives a false sense of a popular mandate. It was a case of "outcome inversion" – when the first-round winner is defeated in the runoff – in a context of low party-system institutionalization.
Another challenge is that the country's long-standing pathologies and the turmoil they cause have undermined Ecuadorians' support for democracy, which fell from 66.7 percent in 2014 to 54.4 percent in 2019, a trend that is mirrored in several other Latin American states. Satisfaction with how democracy works in Ecuador, peaking at 68.8 percent in 2014, has once again become a minority position.
After the promises of reformist leaders, stability, and favorable economic conditions, Ecuador – like much of Latin America – seems to have returned to, or to never have actually escaped from, the volatility of its past. Its social, political, and economic weaknesses are mutually reinforcing. Economic hardship exacerbates the highly transactional and patrimonial nature of the political system and weakens the party system as lawmakers switch allegiances and votes based on whichever political broker can offer more.
Limited political and economic resources handicap Lasso's efforts to address urgent problems, including the pandemic, that would sorely challenge even an experienced leader. Without a team with public-sector know-how, inexperienced politicians often end up absorbed by the pathologies of a political system that make their weaknesses more acute. From a historical perspective, there is no evidence to suggest that Lasso will succeed where previous presidents have failed.
* John Polga-Hecimovich is associate professor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Francisco Sánchez is professor of political science and administration and director of the Iberoamérica Institute at the University of Salamanca. This article is adapted from their recent essay in the July issue of Journal of Democracy.
by clalsstaff on July 27, 2021 • Permalink
Posted in Ecuador
Tagged Democratic Governance, Politics
Posted by clalsstaff on July 27, 2021
https://aulablog.net/2021/07/27/ecuadors-return-to-the-past/
Ecuador: Beyond the Presidential Contenders
By Christopher Kambhu*
Andrés Arauz Galarza / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License (Modified) | Profile photo of Guillermo Lasso / Mabel Velástegui / Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons License (Modified)
When Ecuadoreans head to the polls this Sunday to vote in the presidential election runoff, the two candidates on the ballot represent the country's dominant political movements, but February's first-round and legislative votes demonstrate a changing political context that will constrain the next president.
Andrés Arauz, a little-known economist until he launched his campaign, won the first round with 33 percent and is favored by analysts to win the runoff. His support lies in his ties to former President Rafael Correa, who anointed him to lead his leftist political movement. Correa intended to be Arauz's running mate but was barred from seeking office due to corruption convictions from his time as president. Arauz's policies are largely a continuation of Correa's in substance and style; he has pledged to provide cash payments to a million families during his first week in office and vowed to scrap an austerity plan put in place by outgoing President Lenín Moreno as part of a loan package with the International Monetary Fund.
Guillermo Lasso, a major shareholder in one of Ecuador's biggest banks and former economy minister, has reached the runoff for the third time in as many attempts, with just under 20 percent of the vote. He has the support of the business community, especially in Quito and the coastal commercial hub of Guayaquil. His name recognition and significant finances put him in a strong position heading into the second round, but his role as minister during the country's 1999 financial crisis and long career in the banking sector remain liabilities. His campaign is working to unite rivals who lost the first round.
This is the third consecutive election in which a rightwing challenger is taking on the leftist politics of Correa, but an environmental lawyer and the third-place finisher in the first round, Yaku Pérez, is poised to play a decisive role in the outcome. Positioning himself as a leftist alternative to the establishment politics that Arauz and Lasso represent, Pérez calls for stronger environmental protections and support for renewable energy – positions that have been adopted, at least rhetorically, by both runoff campaigns.
While analysts predict Arauz and Correismo will triumph, the polls are close. Further uncertainty stems from how Pérez's supporters will vote; for them, deciding between a Correista and a banker is to choose the lesser of two evils. So far, Pérez is not endorsing either candidate and has told his supporters to spoil their ballots. (Voting is mandatory.) Voters are apparently listening; polls show up to 20 percent of respondents will not vote for either candidate.
Whoever wins, they will face several immediate challenges. Cases of COVID-19 are nearing the record levels set a year ago, when scenes of bodies lying in the streets of Guayaquil made international headlines. The outgoing Moreno administration has struggled to obtain vaccines and changed health minsters three times due to poor results and various scandals. Engineering economic recovery from the pandemic will also be a huge test. Both candidates support expansion of extractive industries, which were key drivers of Ecuador's economic growth during Latin America's commodities boom in the 2000s. However, this tactic will face resistance from the growing environmental movement energized by Pérez's campaign.
The runoff victor must also contend with the National Assembly, which saw a significant electoral shakeup in February. The Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement, the indigenous party which Pérez represented in the presidential campaign, had the best results in its history and will be the second largest party in the legislature after Arauz's Unión por la Esperanza. Pachakutik generally played a minor role on the national stage until it and other indigenous groups lead nationwide 2019 protests against the Moreno administration's attempt to end fossil fuel subsidies as part the IMF loan deal. Pachakutik parlayed its new national profile into electoral success and is in a strong position to influence most legislation, regardless of who wins the presidency.
*Christopher Kambhu is a Program Coordinator at CLALS.
by clalsstaff on April 8, 2021 • Permalink
Tagged Politics
Posted by clalsstaff on April 8, 2021
https://aulablog.net/2021/04/08/ecuador-beyond-the-presidential-contenders/
Ecuador: Growing Political and Economic Repercussions of COVID-19
By John Polga-Hecimovich*
Lenín Moreno, presidente de Ecuador/Flickr/Creative Commons
Despite early aggressive measures against COVID‑19, Ecuador has suffered one of the world's most devastating outbreaks that, combined with the drop in international oil prices, may be catastrophic for the country's economy and for President Lenín Moreno. Since March 16, the President declared a national state of emergency and curfew throughout the country; imposed strict social isolation (until May 4) that suspended all face-to-face activities; and established a special security zone in the province of Guayas, epicenter of the pandemic. Even so, Ecuador currently has the second-highest number of documented cases in South America, after Brazil, and the death toll from COVID‑19 may have reached between 7,600 and 11,000 during April.
Ecuador's first case of COVID-19 was detected on February 27 in the port city of Guayaquil. As the virus spread in March and early April, the city experienced an unprecedented humanitarian crisis due to the much-publicized accumulation of hundreds of corpses in homes and on the streets. The local government's response was erratic, with mayor Cynthia Viteri at one point ordering officials to block the runway at the airport to prevent a flight from Spain from landing, and later comparing the devastation to "the Hiroshima bomb." Viteri has since estimated that perhaps as many as one-third of guayaquileños have COVID‑19.
Despite the lockdown measures, the national government has also shown a lack of capacity in addressing the public health crisis. Moreno created a task force to deal with the situation in Guayaquil, but even then, the government possessed a limited ability to determine who had the virus, to say nothing of addressing shortages of suits, masks, gloves, and ventilators for hospital personnel. In a national address in early April, the President acknowledged that official coronavirus figures had significantly understated the extent of the country's health emergency. There have also been worrying accusations of corruption against officials in the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security (IESS) in outfitting hospitals, and the Attorney General's office charged the now ex-National Secretary of Risk Management Alexandra Ocles with influence-peddling.
The combined impact of the pandemic and oil crisis on the country's economy may be catastrophic. Petroleum is Ecuador's largest export commodity and accounts for about a third of its public-sector revenue. The 2020 national budget was planned with an oil price of $51.30 per barrel (currently hovering around $30.00), which will increase the country's deficit. Ecuador also has little savings to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy and is on the brink of defaulting on its $50 billion debt. Adding to the troubles, due to dollarization, it cannot devalue its currency to reduce its deficit. The collapse of export revenues and massive foreign debt payments have greatly compounded the economic cost of the pandemic, and the country's GDP may shrink by as much as 7-8 percentage points.
The government is just barely muddling through. Private bondholders have accepted the government's request to defer interest payments on the country's debt until August 15, freeing up $811 million and buying Moreno some breathing room. However, this could merely postpone a default: a fragmented and intransigent legislature and social sectors have balked at emergency austerity measures. Responding to the country's social needs and economic well-being is a difficult line to walk. The government has issued a $60 stimulus (bono) that will benefit some 400,000 people, while at the same time it submitted a bill to the National Assembly that proposes an extraordinary tax on both companies and individuals to bring unbudgeted resources into the national treasury.
While the government confronts its public health and economic problems, general elections are nine months away and the National Electoral Council is already debating ways to carry them out. There is too much uncertainty at the moment to determine any potential frontrunner. Moreno is not running for re-election; ex-Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot has suffered due to his city's lack of preparedness at confronting the pandemic; and the fate of Interior Minister María Paula Romo may rest on the Moreno government's (so far unconvincing) response. Like leaders around the globe, Moreno is faced with the unpleasant challenge of keeping the country's economy shuttered longer or risking a resurgence of the virus. The success or failure of his strategy will undoubtedly shape the country's political and economic future.
* John Polga-Hecimovich is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
by clalsstaff on May 15, 2020 • Permalink
Tagged COVID-19, Ecuador
Posted by clalsstaff on May 15, 2020
https://aulablog.net/2020/05/15/ecuador-growing-political-and-economic-repercussions-of-covid-19/
Ecuador: President Moreno's Pyrrhic Victory
President Lenín Moreno greets an indigenous leader on September 12, 2019/ Asemblea Nacional del Ecuador/ Flickr/ Creative Commons
Ecuadorean President Lenín Moreno's agreement with opponents to rescind the austerity measures that sparked the recent crisis has restored calm but leaves his government irreparably weakened. The immediate trigger of the crisis was the president's announcement on October 1 of a package of austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit as part of his government's $4.2 billion credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The key measure was elimination of a $1.3 billion gasoline subsidy expected to result in a 25-75 percent increase in the price of gasoline. Transport unions, student groups, and thousands of members of the country's largest indigenous organization, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), took to the streets, paralyzing roads around the country and demanding Moreno step down.
Moreno declared a 60-day state of siege, temporarily suspended the right to freedom of association; and on October 7, flanked by the military high command, said he would not back down against what he called a "destabilization plan" orchestrated by his predecessor, Rafael Correa, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Perhaps cognizant that a combination of social pressure and legislative and military action removed all three of Ecuador's democratically elected presidents from 1996 to 2006, Moreno temporarily moved the seat of government from Quito to Guayaquil and imposed a curfew in Quito.
CONAIE President Jaime Vargas and other indigenous leaders, encouraged by the United Nations and the Catholic Church, agreed to direct negotiations on October 12. Two days later, the president signed a decree rescinding the austerity measures and reinstating fuel subsidies, and CONAIE decamped. Moreno removed the head of the military Joint Command and the commander of the army, and on October 15 returned to Quito. (He has so far resisted calls to replace Interior Minister María Paula Romo, a possible 2021 presidential aspirant, and Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrín.)
The crisis has deeply altered prospects for the Moreno presidency.
Moreno survived a degree of social protest and political resistance that toppled previous presidents, but he failed to anticipate the popular reaction to lifting energy subsidies, employed a heavy-handed response to protestors, and ultimately backed away from one of the few significant political decisions his government has made. As a result, Moreno lost an opportunity to make structural economic changes and suffered irreparable damage to his political capital and credibility.
Indigenous groups and a resurgent CONAIE – after largely disappearing from national political decision-making under Correa – are once again a key national political actor and informal public policy veto player. They not only forced Moreno and the government to reverse course on energy subsidies, but also literally and figuratively earned a seat at the negotiating table. CONAIE appears more unified than it has been at any moment since the early 2000s and may be emboldened to seek further concessions from the government.
Correísmo may well be the biggest political loser. Moreno remains in power despite calls from ex-President Correa and his Revolución Ciudadana party to debate the possibility of impeachment and early elections. Correístas were excluded from discussions over the executive decree that restored the gas subsidies. Moreover, CONAIE tweeted a stinging rebuke of Correa, accusing him of opportunism and holding him responsible for the deaths of three indigenous leaders under his government.
Moreno is a lame duck just a little over halfway through his presidency. It is difficult to imagine any policymaking of consequence in his remaining 18 months in office. The government is severely handicapped politically and economically, and the political space for negotiation until elections is almost nonexistent. Moreno's government is likely to resemble the interim governments of Fabián Alarcón (1997-1998) or Alfredo Palacio (2005-2007), which essentially served as placeholder administrations without ambitious policy agendas. Against all odds, Moreno – with a legislative minority – neutralized Correa and shifted government policy to the right during his first two-plus years in office, which throws his failure to remove the subsidy into sharper relief.
Economically, the picture is not much different. The protests forced Moreno to kick the can down the road on energy subsidies, while making it more difficult for the government to close its fiscal deficit. The weight of these necessary reforms will therefore fall to whoever wins the 2021 elections. The failed implementation of this economic reform and subsequent reversal of policy show the limits of Moreno's political acumen while laying bare the country's governability challenges.
*John Polga-Hecimovich is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
by clalsstaff on October 17, 2019 • Permalink
Tagged Business & Finance, Civil Society, Economy, Ecuador, Indigenous Peoples
Posted by clalsstaff on October 17, 2019
https://aulablog.net/2019/10/17/ecuador-president-morenos-pyrrhic-victory/
Ecuador: Moreno Reverses Another Correa Policy
President Lenín Moreno / Flickr / Archivo Medios Públicos EP / Creative Commons
Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno's announcement last week that he had withdrawn diplomatic immunity for Wikileaks co-founder Julian Assange was long in coming and consistent with his efforts to reverse the excesses of his predecessor, ex-President Rafael Correa. In a three-minute-fifteen-second speech via Twitter, Moreno listed the reasons for his decision: Assange's disrespectful and aggressive conduct, Wikileaks statements against Ecuador and, above all, Assange's transgression of "international conventions." Predictably, Correa, who originally offered the asylum protection, accused Moreno of being "the greatest traitor in Ecuadorian and Latin American history" who had committed a crime "that humanity will never forget." Wikileaks accused Moreno of trading Assange to the United States for debt relief. Rhetoric and accusations aside, Assange had long been on shaky ground with the Moreno administration, and recent leaks of the president's personal information made the decision seemingly inevitable.
Correa offered Assange asylum in 2012 to thumb his nose at the United States and contest claims that he did not protect freedom of the press. After Wikileaks leaked hundreds of Democratic Party campaign emails in 2016, he restricted Assange's internet access at the embassy in London but, for ideological consistency, continued to support his infamous houseguest. Moreno possessed no such ties when he took office in May 2017 and called Assange "an inherited problem." Assange's asylum impeded Moreno's ability to seek greater security and commercial cooperation with the United States.
The Wikileaks founder did not seem to understand the significance of this change. Not only was he messy, demanding, and abusive toward embassy staff; he reportedly violated his asylum conditions and, according to Moreno, tried to use the embassy as a "center for spying" – prompting Ecuador last October to impose a protocol regulating his visits, communications, and other matters. The tipping point for the Ecuadorian government was in February, when an anonymous source sent a trove of emails, phone communications, and expense receipts to Ecuadorian journalists, supposedly linking the president and his family to a series of corrupt and criminal dealings, including money laundering and offshore accounts, leading to a corruption investigation by Ecuador's attorney general. A website also published leaked personal material unrelated to corruption, including photos of Moreno and his family lifted directly from his phone.
Moreno's decision is unlikely to significantly affect his political capital. Although polls show his approval rating continues to decline as he pursues fiscal austerity policies, public opinion on this issue is likely to split along existing pro-Correa and anti-Correa lines. Further, given that personal information was already leaked, Moreno does not seem to fear potential reprisals from Wikileaks or others for his action. Nor does he appear to harbor additional political ambitions: he has all but ruled out running in the 2021 elections, and his once-dominant Alianza País (AP) party performed poorly in the March 24 regional elections, managing to win a paltry two of 23 governorships and only 28 of the 221 mayoralties. If anything, Moreno should be more worried about the attorney general's investigation than the fallout from booting Assange.
Little by little in his two years in office Moreno has neutralized Correa's political power and reversed his predecessor's policies – often provoking the ex-president (see previous posts here and here). In the last six weeks alone, Moreno announced he would launch an international anti-corruption commission; hosted and expressed his support for Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, saying that Venezuela and Ecuador "are both on the way out of the abyss in which we were placed: this poorly named 21st century socialism"; and signed a $4.2 billion loan from the IMF – all actions that would have been unthinkable from 2007 to 2017. Ultimately, giving Julian Assange asylum was politically costly and brought no benefits to a government that's too weak to waste political capital on an international troublemaker. Recent events may have triggered his ouster from the embassy, but the writing has been on the wall for some time now.
by clalsstaff on April 18, 2019 • Permalink
Tagged Ecuador, Migration
Posted by clalsstaff on April 18, 2019
https://aulablog.net/2019/04/18/ecuador-moreno-reverses-another-correa-policy/
Ecuador: Lenín Moreno's Balancing Act
Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno (far right) meets with members of the National Assembly in October 2018. / Diego Cevallos / Asamblea Nacional / Flickr / Creative Commons
As Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno begins the post-honeymoon phase of his presidency, he appears firmly committed to positioning himself as a judicious voice and centrist in a region where ideological moderation and restrained oratory are the exception rather than the norm. This might be unexpected given his political background and four years as vice president under leftist firebrand Rafael Correa (2007-17), but it makes sense given the country's challenging economic situation and political constraints. As previously noted, Moreno had two choices when taking office: remain loyal to his socialist roots, govern through his Alianza PAIS legislative bloc, and double down on Correa's (fiscally unsustainable) "Citizens' Revolution;" or move towards the political center, splinter his legislative majority, and abandon Correa and many of his policies. He has decisively opted for the latter, attempting to navigate a middle ground between the left and the right.
No issue depicts the thin line Moreno walks more than Ecuador's foreign policy, and no foreign policy issue reflects that tug-of-war better than his handling of Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. Assange—to whom Correa granted asylum in 2012 at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London—is now a costly and increasingly undesirable houseguest. He is a liability in Moreno's quest for technical assistance, international loans, and greater security and commercial cooperation with the United States, which is still seeking justice for Wikileaks's publication of U.S. classified material. Although Moreno has called Assange "more than a nuisance" and "an inherited problem," the president has been reluctant to push him out over concern for his human rights. In July, Moreno suggested Ecuador was seeking guarantees that Assange would not face the death penalty. Maintaining its delicate dance, however, in October, the government broke from its longstanding dialogue with British authorities over Assange's situation and announced that it will no longer pay for his food and medical care.
Ecuador is also seeking closer relations with its right-of-center neighbors, beginning to distance itself from the region's leftist governments, and attempting to rebuild ties with the United States. Since June, Moreno has attended the inauguration of Colombian President Iván Duque, met with Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra, welcomed U.S. Vice President Mike Pence to Quito, and launched a security agreement with Washington. Moreno has also changed his tone with regards to Venezuela. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, he spoke of the burden caused by arrival of more than 6,000 Venezuelan migrants a day and called for a national dialogue in that country, provoking an acrimonious back-and-forth between the two capitals that culminated in the Ecuadorian government tweeting that "corrupt, murderous, and lying socialism of the 21st century is still alive in Venezuela and producing the most massive migration in the country's history."
Moreno's strategy to confront the country's fiscal deficit, which was 5.5 percent of GDP in 2017, is an even greater departure from his predecessor's approach. Whereas Correa pursued financing primarily through oil-for-loan deals from China after Ecuador's selective default in 2008, Moreno has turned to other global lenders such as the World Bank and Japan. He has also pursued new commercial relationships and market-friendly policies, including a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association, beginning accession talks with the pro-market Pacific Alliance, and continuing to encourage foreign investment in Ecuador's hydrocarbon industry. However, Moreno has not fully committed to Washington consensus-style reforms: the government announced measures in August to reduce its $60 billion debt, but it also authorized over $1.2 billion in loans to the housing sector, agriculture, and small and medium-sized business to reactivate the domestic economy.
Although not an ideological rightist like Chilean President Sebastián Piñera or Colombian President Iván Duque, Lenín Moreno has reoriented many of Rafael Correa's domestic and foreign policies out of necessity as he confronts Ecuador's difficult economic situation. Given that the country's fiscal deficit and outstanding debt are strategic challenges, it seems likely that he will continue to judiciously tread this middle path. Although fiscal austerity measures have lowered Moreno's approval rating and provoked protests from the Correista left, it would be a mistake to bet against him. Moreno has not only upended expectations but also proven far more resourceful and politically sophisticated than his critics—and probably even his admirers—expected. He may also send Julian Assange at some point an eviction notice.
*John Polga-Hecimovich is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
by clalsstaff on November 6, 2018 • Permalink
Tagged Business & Finance, Economy, Ecuador, Politics
Posted by clalsstaff on November 6, 2018
https://aulablog.net/2018/11/06/ecuador-lenin-morenos-balancing-act/
Ecuador: Referendum Marks Critical Juncture for Moreno and Correa
Current President of Ecuador Lenín Moreno (left) and ex-President Rafael Correa (right) during the presidential transition last spring. / Micaela Ayala V / ANDES / Flickr / Creative Commons
A national referendum in Ecuador this Sunday appears likely to give a boost to President Lenín Moreno in his political struggle against his predecessor, Rafael Correa (2007-2017). The central item on the seven-question ballot will be whether or not presidential term limits should be reinstated into the Constitution – an initiative that Correa, who would like to run for a fourth term in 2021, is campaigning against. The country appears poised to move on from the thrice-elected yet polarizing Correa to the more conciliatory Moreno; at the time of writing, citizens resoundingly endorse all seven referendum questions, with no question polling lower than 66 percent approval. A "yes" vote on term limits would end Correa's future presidential aspirations and position Moreno – Correa's hand-picked successor – as the standard bearer of the political left in Ecuador.
The feud between Moreno and Correa – and within their ruling Alianza PAIS (AP) party – has been building for nearly a year and a half. Last November, one of Moreno's closest advisors, Eduardo Mangas, alleged in a leaked recording that Correa hoped Moreno would lose the election. Correa purportedly provided no logistical or financial support for his chosen successor while saddling him with the deeply unpopular Jorge Glas as running mate. According to Mangas, Correa preferred that AP lose the presidential election and instead govern through its control of the vast state bureaucracy and National Assembly – with Correa returning to the presidency in 2021. Eking out a narrow victory (51.6 percent against Guillermo Lasso's 48.8 percent), Moreno upended this plan.
The morenista and correista factions have divided the AP since Moreno took office in May 2017. Vice President Glas, a Correa ally accused of taking $13.5 million in bribes from the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht, was sentenced to six years in prison and impeached as part of Moreno's campaign against corruption. The AP Secretary, a correista assemblywoman, tried to remove Moreno as party head after he alleged the party put a hidden camera in his office. Correa and 28 legislative deputies have left the party and formed what they are calling the "Citizen's Revolution Party."
Moreno took office facing a polarized political environment and daunting fiscal deficit and weak GDP, but his sound policies and astute political strategy have given him the highest approval ratings in Latin America. His focus on the popular valence issues of corruption and re-election – about which citizens will usually share a common preference regardless of ideology – has also helped distract voters from the tepid economy. The referendum is a particularly smart gambit. It proposes seven different changes that would reverse actions taken during Correa's rule – and that happen to enjoy broad popular support. Instead of trying to push them through established institutional channels staffed with correistas, like the National Assembly or the courts, the President is turning directly to the public to give the measures legality.
Absent any bombshell announcements or drastic changes in public opinion, Moreno looks set to coast to victory in the referendum, quite remarkably establishing him as the country's most powerful politician. However, he faces a number of challenges to governance over the remainder of his four-year term. The defection of Correa and his faction from Alianza PAIS left him with only 46 seats in the 137-member National Assembly. This means Moreno's bloc will continue to depend on ephemeral voting alliances with the center-right to govern – exactly like much of the 1979-2006 period when no popularly elected president finished his term. Moreover, after 2.7 percent GDP growth in 2017, the IMF predicts that Ecuador's economy – vulnerable because of its dependence on oil exports – will grow by only 2.2 percent in 2018 and 1.7 percent in 2019. Moreno should enjoy his victory on Sunday, but he will soon face challenges greater than Rafael Correa: long-term governance in a country that has long proven averse it. Whether he is up to the challenge remains to be seen, although he has so far proven resourceful.
*John Polga-Hecimovich is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the US Naval Academy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
by clalsstaff on February 2, 2018 • Permalink
Tagged Democratic Governance, Ecuador, Elections, Politics
Posted by clalsstaff on February 2, 2018
https://aulablog.net/2018/02/02/ecuador-referendum-marks-critical-juncture-for-moreno-and-correa/
The "Invisibility Bargain" Constrains Migrants' Identities and Rights
By Jeffrey D. Pugh*
Colombian migrants in Ecuador carry home groceries. / Michelle Snow / USAID / Flickr / Creative Commons
Migrants win tolerance for their presence in host countries by striking an "invisibility bargain" with local citizens – contributing labor but settling for constraints on their identities and political participation – that slows their integration and leaves them vulnerable to discrimination and violence. Through surveys of Colombians forced into Ecuador by conflict and violence, I have found that migrants feel pressure to conform to host communities' expectations of their economic contribution and political and social "invisibility." (Full text of my recent article in International Migration Review is here.) Migrants whose visible characteristics and practices violate norms that the host society deems to be unacceptable or who engage in overt political claim-making on the state often risk sparking a nativist backlash. In response, Colombian migrants have employed a range of survival strategies:
Many who seek to integrate into Ecuadorian society sacrifice important elements of their Colombian identity, making a conscious effort to "unlearn" their accent, speak more softly and slowly, and use diminutive forms of speech to fit in better with Ecuadorians. Those who blend in better tend to have an easier time finding a job, getting housing, and building constructive relationships with Ecuadorians.
Others, particularly racial minority migrants, often choose to avoid contact with Ecuadorians, but this strategy of self-isolation removes them from potential spaces where they can negotiate access to rights, protection, and resources. Afro-Colombians are less likely than mestizo Colombians, for instance, to live in neighborhoods with mostly Ecuadorian neighbors. As a result, they are less resilient against attacks or discriminatory behavior because they lack a support network in the host society.
Yet others employ a strategy that emphasizes the similarity between the experiences of Ecuadorian emigrants to Europe and Colombian immigrants in Ecuador. They propose a boundary-blurring strategy recognizing migrant rights everywhere and legitimizing migrants' political participation in countries of both origin and residence.
The rhetoric of "universal citizenship" of former Ecuadorian President Correa (2007-2017) – a concept in which every person has a right to migrate and should therefore have access to basic rights – appeared to offer escape from the invisibility bargain and its consequences. The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution prohibited discrimination based on migration status and guaranteed refugees many of the same rights as Ecuadorians. This "open borders" rhetoric promised a commitment to human security above national security and promoted a reciprocal protection to Ecuador's large diaspora in Spain and the United States. Crafted to undergird politically beneficial policies, however, Correa's approach faced political constraints and was undercut by the populist nature of his government style – and made only limited progress at the level of implementation. Surveys show that the legal distinction between refugees and other migrants is still lost in practice in Ecuador. The formal institutions of democratic states fail to provide security for everyone living in their territory in their responses to constituent pressure to scapegoat migrants.
In the absence of concrete progress toward concepts like universal citizenship, migrants will continue to face the trade-off between maintaining their identities and customs and successfully integrating into host communities and gaining political rights and participation. Although informal mechanisms of political participation pale in comparison to the exercise of full citizen rights, they can be important sources of protection and assistance. The evidence from Ecuador shows that the frequency and quality of interaction between Ecuadorians and Colombians seem to influence their attitudes toward one another. Migrants reporting daily interaction with Ecuadorians had nearly double the level of positive perceptions of the native population compared to those who interacted less frequently – and broader acceptance by local communities at least offers a glimmer of hope of liberating other migrants from the pain of the invisibility bargain in the future.
*Jeffrey D. Pugh is an Assistant Professor of conflict resolution at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and executive director of the Center for Mediation, Peace, and Resolution Conflict (CEMPROC).
Posted in Colombia, Ecuador
https://aulablog.net/2017/10/25/the-invisibility-bargain-constrains-migrants-identities-and-rights/
Ecuador: Moreno's Victory Probably Not Enough
President-elect Lenín Moreno at a meeting to discuss the presidential transition in April 2017. / Agencia Noticias ANDES / Flickr / Creative Commons
President-elect Lenín Moreno's narrow victory and modest legislative majority fall short of what he needs to push his costly leftist agenda while simultaneously bridging deep socio-political divisions and struggling with vexing economic challenges. Moreno, of the ruling Alianza PAIS, narrowly defeated Guillermo Lasso of the CREO movement, 51.16 to 48.84 percent, in Ecuador's presidential runoff election on April 2. As a referendum on outgoing president Rafael Correa and his "Citizen's Revolution," the election marks a victory for Latin America's ideological left after setbacks in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. The splintered opposition vote largely coalesced behind Lasso's candidacy – he earned only 28.09 percent in the first round – but an uneven electoral playing field (including support from state-run media and Correa's deployment of thugs to intimidate Lasso supporters) and his affiliation with the banking crisis of 1999 appear to have hurt him.
The incoming government appears committed to continuing Correa's economic and social policies. Moreno is reassembling many of the further left members of Correa's team for his own government, including powerful ex-ministers Fander Falconí and María Belén Moncayo. Although he is more rhetorically moderate than his predecessor, Moreno is an avowed socialist. As a young man, he was a member of the fringe Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Left Movement, and as president-elect he has already promised an additional US$2 billion on top of the government's already unsustainable social spending. At the same time, Moreno has adopted a more conciliatory tone with the United States than Correa and has already made overtures to social movement leaders that had fallen afoul of the outgoing president.
Although Moreno will enjoy a legislative majority, he is taking office under difficult political and economic circumstances that will test his leadership. The outgoing government's politicization of public agencies like the National Electoral Council (CNE) has hurt the president-elect's legitimacy. The slim difference in the vote spawned protests outside the CNE in Quito by mostly middle-class members of the opposition. What is more, despite assurances from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the local NGO Participación Ciudadana that the final vote closely aligned to their internal quick counts, a number of opposition voices maintain that there was electoral fraud. There are more challenges:
In the National Assembly, Moreno and his party won 54 percent of the seats (74 of 137) with just 39 percent of popular support due to clever districting and a seat allocation formula that favors large parties. Although this provides for unified government in a constitutional environment that can harshly penalize legislative gridlock, it is also disproportional to the popular support for the party.
Moreover, Moreno's majority may also be more illusory than it appears. As many as 24 of Alianza PAIS's 74 legislators, 32 percent of the movement's total seats, were elected via electoral alliance between PAIS and a different party: seven from the Ecuadorian Socialist Party and the remainder from a panoply of inchoate provincial-level movements. These legislators' support for PAIS is not guaranteed.
Maintaining his heterogeneous alliance in a country with notoriously high levels of party switching will require a great deal of negotiating skill and flexibility of the inexperienced Moreno. He possesses limited policymaking options to confront an unviable fiscal situation – the deficit doubled in 2016 – and economic slowdown – according to the IMF, the economy contracted by 2.2 percent in 2016 and is expected to decrease by an additional 1.6 percent in 2017 – and an overvalued currency in real terms. The Moreno administration confronts the unenviable task of continuing and even expanding an economically costly political project in the midst of fiscal constraints, a fragile political majority, and a limited popular mandate among deep social divisions. Less daunting situations have felled more experienced leaders in Ecuador's history.
by clalsstaff on May 8, 2017 • Permalink
Tagged Ecuador, Elections, Politics, Socialism
Posted by clalsstaff on May 8, 2017
https://aulablog.net/2017/05/08/ecuador-morenos-victory-probably-not-enough/
A Return to Political Instability for Ecuador?
Presidential candidate Guillermo Lasso (center, blue shirt) in Cuenca, Ecuador during a campaign rally last month. / Samurai Juan / Flickr / Creative Commons
General elections on Sunday could mark the beginning of the end of an impressive period of stability in Ecuador. Ecuadorians will elect a new congress and a replacement for the powerful and populist Rafael Correa, the longest-serving chief executive in the country's history. Although the president's handpicked successor, ex-Vice President Lenín Moreno is leading public opinion polls with 32 percent of likely voters in a crowded eight-candidate field, the chances of him winning a first-round victory outright are slim. Public approval of Correa and his ruling Alianza PAIS (AP) has fallen over the past two years as economic growth has slowed, and the administration is embroiled in allegations of corruption, including those against Jorge Glas Espinel, incumbent vice-president and Moreno's running mate. Given Ecuador's two-round presidential system, in which candidates must win by 10 percent or gain 40 percent of the vote, Moreno probably will end up in a run-off election on April 2.
The other seven candidates are vying for the chance to face Moreno in the second round. Three of them poll between 8 and 21 percent, and the rest appear to have 4 percent or less of the vote. However, rejection of the entire field is high – nearly 12 percent of respondents say they will cast a null vote – and a whopping 35 percent maintain that they are undecided.
Moreno does not appear likely to win the runoff. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that voters will coalesce around an opposition candidate – most likely the CREO movement's Guillermo Lasso, a conservative former economy minister and banker who ran a distant second to Correa in the 2013 presidential race – who would then defeat Moreno.
If Moreno and Glas win, they will likely continue Correa's leftist "Citizens' Revolution," especially its improvements to social welfare and emphasis on science and technology, and maintain close ties with China, which has become a key partner in trade and infrastructure investment over the past decade. If the opposition wins, it will try to repeal some of Correa's onerous taxes, reverse stringent regulation of the media, shrink the size of the state, and seek improved relations with the U.S.
Regardless of who wins, the fragmented support for the candidates and their parties bodes poorly for Ecuador's political stability, especially in the context of fiscal constraints, a stagnant economy, and burden of recovery from last April's 7.8-magnitude earthquake. The so-called muerte cruzada (mutual death) in Article 148 of the country's 2008 Constitution, moreover, will loom larger under a divided government. This clause gives the president a political "nuclear option" to dissolve the National Assembly in the event of gridlock, triggering new legislative and presidential elections – while the incumbent president is allowed to rule by decree on urgent economic matters in the interim. Correa, who enjoyed majority or near-majority government throughout his unprecedented ten-year presidency, never invoked the muerte cruzada, but his successor will feel stronger temptation to dissolve the Assembly in order to govern unilaterally. Ecuadorians should brace for an end to the country's unprecedented political stability – and for the specter of Correa, much like the possibility of muerte cruzada, to loom large over the new government's economic and political decisions.
by clalsstaff on February 17, 2017 • Permalink
Tagged Ecuador, Elections
Posted by clalsstaff on February 17, 2017
https://aulablog.net/2017/02/17/a-return-to-political-instability-for-ecuador/