AS THE weeks and months go by we see the USPTO moving further and further away from software patents; it's hardly a surprise that patent litigation has nosedived and many patent trolls have gone out of 'business' (they never had a legitimate business, only a litigation/extortion pipeline). Cemented by a long series of Federal Circuit decisions (especially in 2017) and a growing demand for Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) inter partes reviews (IPRs), this trend carries on pretty much unabated. It has been pleasing to watch because we started campaigning on the matter a very long time ago, well over a decade.
Power Integrations, Inc. owns U.S. Patent Nos. 6,212,079 ("the '079 patent") and 6,538,908 ("the '908 patent"). Power Integrations sued Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation and Fairchild (Taiwan) Corporation (collectively "Fairchild") for infringement.
Notice that these have nothing to do with software. It recently wrote about this rejection of a patent leading to accusations that a company had "committed fraud because it did not notify shareholders" (yes, fraud).
Citron does not allege, and could not credibly allege, that the PolarityTE has been lying to the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Nor did Citron allege subterfuge surround the technology or science underlying the patent application in question. Indeed, Citron specifically says in the report that they "will not discuss the science behind PolarityTE". Instead, the astonishing claim is made that PolarityTE has committed fraud because it did not notify shareholders that the patent examiner issued a non-final rejection in a patent application.
This week in Huawei v. Samsung delivered two more sethacks for the Chinese Android device maker and increasingly aggressive patent enforcer (I don't want to call them a "patent bully" just yet, though it may be an appropriate label at a later stage).
It certainly looks like Huawei is losing its momentum; its case against Samsung — like Apple's cases — is becoming a "winner" only for patent lawyers.
On July 13, 2018, United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain (S.D.N.Y.) granted a motion by Plaintiff— BroadSign International, LLC ("BroadSign") —for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint against Defendant T-Rex Property AB ("T-Rex"), seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgments of noninfringement and invalidity of U.S. Patent No. RE39,470, U.S. Patent No. 7,382,334, and U.S. Patent No. 6,430,603 (collectively, the "Patents-in-Suit").
BroadSign supplies hardware and software solutions to operators of networks of digital signs. T-Rex has sued several of BroadSign's customers that make, use, or sell digital signage systems, for direct patent infringement on one or more of the Patents-in-Suit.
It's too early to tell what will happen, but by the sound of it Section 101 might be applicable here.
In the simple case outlined above, the courts all agree that the disclosures found in an issued patent or published application count as prior art as of the patent's filing date. The difficulty comes when we bring priority-claims into play (such as priority to a provisional application).
In this case, the Federal Circuit ruled that a published application can count as prior art as of its provisional filing date — but only as to features actually claimed in the application. According to the court, features disclosed in the provisional but not claimed in the published application will only be prior art as of their date of public disclosure.
The patent challenger argues that this interpretation is wrong — and particularly that the effect of the priority claim should be governed by 35 U.S.C. §§ 119(e)(1) and 120, which provide for applications properly claiming priority back to an earlier filing "shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on" the earlier date. On the other side – the statutory hook for the Federal Circuit's limitation here is the fact that the statute gives priority for "the invention" — i.e., the claimed invention — but not for the disclosure as a whole. In addition Sections 119 and 120 develop the rules for patents claiming priority — not for prior art.
Indecision here too (for now)?
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment that they did not willfully infringe plaintiff's winch system patent because plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of knowledge through the knowledge of defendants' outside prosecution counsel.
So it's better not to be aware or to not to do one's 'homework'.