What, And Where, To Shut?
Easwaran Kanason
Co - founder of NrgEdge
Consensus estimates indicate that the full extent of the Covid-19 pandemic will wipe out at least 18.5 mmb/d of oil demand in 2020 alone. Some analysts have gone even further, suggesting that the number could go as high as 30 mmb/d. As supply reacts to demand, there is no doubt that producers must throttle back production to avoid a destructive oversupply that has already decimated crude oil prices. OPEC+'s new two-year supply deal promises to take 9.7 mmb/d off the market through June 2020, then declining gently. At its best, this will only account for half of the demand shortfall, leaving an excess of at least another 9 mmb/d. In the extraordinary OPEC+ and G20 meetings that surrounded the coordinated deal, it was stated that the free market producers – mainly the US, Canada, Brazil and Norway – would make up a further cut of 5 mmb/d through natural 'market adjustments'. The question, then, is how?
For the OPEC nations, this is relatively easy. Most are oligarchies, controlled environments where difficult decisions can be implemented swiftly. In many cases, there is only a single firm controlling its vast oil wealth. Thus, Saudi Arabia, though it may have joint ventures with foreign firms, has full control over the entire Saudi crude oil production mechanism. The dictate to reduce production by 2.5 mmb/d is a (relatively) straight forward matter of recalibrating the Kingdom's integrated production infrastructure. This applies to OPEC states as well, such as Kuwait, the UAE and Angola, where Kuwait Petroleum, ADNOC or Sonangol have tightly integrated crude production infrastructure where control of national output levels is centralised.
Even in countries within OPEC or OPEC+ where the industry is more competitive, this holds true. In Russia, Rosneft, Gazprom and Lukoil may all compete with each other, but they will not ignore an order from the Kremlin to reduce output proportionately in accordance to the supply deal. In OPEC countries such as Iran and Iraq, the small number of national producers makes collusion easier. This even applies in countries within OPEC+ where free market ideals hold more strongly. Petronas may not be able to dictate the output levels of PTTEP, Shell or ConocoPhillips' Malaysian assets, but it owns enough control in key assets to influence the national output level. Ditto for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Oman, even if the state oil firms there have extensive partnerships with supermajors such as BP, Chevron and Shell.
Adherence aside, it should be relatively easy for the OPEC+ club to meet their target of 9.7 mmb/d if the temptation to cheat doesn't take hold. But what about the large free market producers? The pact between these countries and OPEC+ calls for the former to reduce production 'naturally' according to market pressure. That, again, is relatively easier for Norway and Brazil, where the reins of production are concentrated in the hands of Equinor and Petrobras. But what about the thorn in the oil industry's side, the USA? There is no American state oil firm, and neither is there a federal body tasked to coordinate national output levels. It can happen on a state-level, like the Alberta state government in Canada or the Texas Railroad Commission – but players in these markets still cannot be compelled to follow through. The US oil industry is a matrix of many, many private players large, medium and small, each driven by a capitalist drive for profit, which is counter intuitive to controlling output.
So, in the absence of top-level control, each player in the US is left to their own devices to control their own output, in hope that each of its rivals will do the same to allow an optimal level of national output. A true expression of game theory. So what is going to happen?
Well, the first – and quickest – way to reduce output is to target onshore wells, particularly in the shale patch. This can happen voluntarily, or enforced through the growing number of bankruptcies. In North Dakota, where the shale revolution took root early, some 6200 wells have been shut, almost a third of all wells. Stopping wells temporarily is easy, but halting them forever is considerably tougher. So the question facing these producers is: which wells to shut, and for how long? For most, the target will be painted on newer wells, where the marginal cost to extract abundant oil is lower, essentially saving the crude for a better price. And running older, less productive wells, with the idea of closing those fully once the resources expire, rather than going through the expensive stop-and-restart process in newer wells. It is a strategy that supermajors ExxonMobil and Chevron have taken in the US shale patch, who announced that they would be slashing rigs in the prolific Permian Basin by 75% (to 15 sites) and 71% (to 5 sites) over 2020. Closures will be on the newer, more prolific wells – a testament to shale's steep production drop-off curve and, as ExxonMobil put it, 'better off deferring higher production rates into a period with better pricing.' This strategy seems to be replicated across the American club of producers, from the giants to regional players such as Continental Resources. And once again, the American shale patch's flexibility can run both ways, as easy as it is to close down an onshore shale rig (compared to a vast offshore rig), it is equally easy to restart them once market conditions change.
In April alone, estimates from the IEA show that the US, Canada and Brazil accounted for most of the month's 2.2 mmb/d decline in production. That's nearly half of what was requested of the free market oil producers. With the OPEC+ deal entering force in May and US oil prices in the doldrums, it would seem that there is enough political will and market pressure to enforce nearly 15 mmb/d of output cuts across the industry. That will go a long way to supporting prices in their current weak state. The hope is that this bitter pill won't have to last long, and once demand improves and economies re-open, oil producers from across the spectrum will be able to return to business as usual. Or, at least, business as usual in the new normal.
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U.S. oil and natural gas production to fall in 2021, then rise in 2022
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO)
In its January 2020 Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that annual U.S. crude oil production will average 11.1 million b/d in 2021, down 0.2 million b/d from 2020 as result of a decline in drilling activity related to low oil prices. A production decline in 2021 would mark the second consecutive year of production declines. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic led to supply and demand disruptions. EIA expects crude oil production to increase in 2022 by 0.4 million b/d because of increased drilling as prices remain at or near $50 per barrel (b).
The United States set annual natural gas production records in 2018 and 2019, largely because of increased drilling in shale and tight oil formations. The increase in production led to higher volumes of natural gas in storage and a decrease in natural gas prices. In 2020, marketed natural gas production fell by 2% from 2019 levels amid responses to COVID-19. EIA estimates that annual U.S. marketed natural gas production will decline another 2% to average 95.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2021. The fall in production will reverse in 2022, when EIA estimates that natural gas production will rise by 2% to 97.6 Bcf/d.
EIA's forecast for crude oil production is separated into three regions: the Lower 48 states excluding the Federal Gulf of Mexico (GOM) (81% of 2019 crude oil production), the GOM (15%), and Alaska (4%). EIA expects crude oil production in the U.S. Lower 48 states to decline through the first quarter of 2021 and then increase through the rest of the forecast period. As more new wells come online later in 2021, new well production will exceed the decline in legacy wells, driving the increase in overall crude oil production after the first quarter of 2021.
Associated natural gas production from oil-directed wells in the Permian Basin will fall because of lower West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices and reduced drilling activity in the first quarter of 2021. Natural gas production from dry regions such as Appalachia depends on the Henry Hub price. EIA forecasts the Henry Hub price will increase from $2.00 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in 2020 to $3.01/MMBtu in 2021 and to $3.27/MMBtu in 2022, which will likely prompt an increase in Appalachia's natural gas production. However, natural gas production in Appalachia may be limited by pipeline constraints in 2021 if the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) is delayed. The MVP is scheduled to enter service in late 2021, delivering natural gas from producing regions in northwestern West Virginia to southern Virginia. Natural gas takeaway capacity in the region is quickly filling up since the Atlantic Coast Pipeline was canceled in mid-2020.
So, Why Is Saudi Arabia Doing This?
Just when it seems that the drama of early December, when the nations of the OPEC+ club squabbled over how to implement and ease their collective supply quotas in 2021, would be repeated, a concession came from the most unlikely quarter of all. Saudi Arabia. OPEC's swing producer and, especially in recent times, vocal judge, announced that it would voluntarily slash 1 million barrels per day of supply. The move took the oil markets by surprise, sending crude prices soaring but was also very unusual in that it was not even necessary at all.
After a day's extension to the negotiations, the OPEC+ club had actually already agreed on the path forward for their supply deal through the remainder of Q1 2021. The nations of OPEC+ agreed to ease their overall supply quotas by 75,000 b/d in February and 120,000 b/d in March, bringing the total easing over three months to 695,000 b/d after the UAE spearheaded a revised increase of 500,000 b/d for January. The increases are actually very narrow ones; there were no adjustments for quotas for all OPEC+ members with the exception of Russia and Kazakshtan, who will be able to pump 195,000 additional barrels per day between them. That the increases for February and March were not higher or wider is a reflection of reality: despite Covid-19 vaccinations being rolled out globally, a new and more infectious variant of the coronavirus has started spreading across the world. In fact, there may even be at least of these mutations currently spreading, throwing into question the efficacy of vaccines and triggering new lockdowns. The original schedule of the April 2020 supply deal would have seen OPEC+ adding 2 million b/d of production from January 2021 onwards; the new tranches are far more measured and cognisant of the challenging market.
Then Saudi Arabia decides to shock the market by declaring that the Kingdom would slash an additional million barrels of crude supply above its current quota over February and March post-OPEC+ announcement. Which means that while countries such as Russia, the UAE and Nigeria are working to incrementally increase output, Saudi Arabia is actually subsidising those planned increases by making a massive additional voluntary cut. For a member that threw its weight around last year by unleashing taps to trigger a crude price war with Russia and has been emphasising the need for strict compliant by all members before allowing any collective increases to take place, this is uncharacteristic. Saudi Arabia may be OPEC's swing producer, but it is certainly not that benevolent. Not least because it is expected to record a massive US$79 billion budget deficit for 2020 as low crude prices eat into the Kingdom's finances.
The last time the Saudis did this was in July 2020, when the severity of the Covid-19 pandemic was at devastating levels and crude prices needed some additional propping up. It succeeded. In January 2021, however, global crude prices are already at the US$50/b level and the market had already cheered the resolution of OPEC+'s positions for the next two months. There was no real urgent need to make voluntary cuts, especially since no other OPEC member would suit especially not the UAE with whom there has been a falling out.
The likeliest reason is leadership. Having failed to convince the rest of the OPEC+ gang to avoid any easing of quotas, Saudi Arabia could be wanting to prove its position by providing a measure of supply security at a time of major price sensitivity due to the Covid-19 resurgence. It will also provide some political ammunition for future negotiations when the group meets in March to decide plans for Q2 2021, turning this magnanimous move into an implicit threat. It could also be the case that Saudi Arabia is planning to pair its voluntary cut with field maintenance works, which would be a nice parallel to the usual refinery maintenance season in Asia where crude demand typically falls by 10-20% as units shut for routine inspections.
It could also be a projection of soft power. After isolating Qatar physically and economically since 2017 over accusations of terrorism support and proximity to Iran, four Middle Eastern states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt – have agreed to restore and normalise ties with the peninsula. While acknowledging that a 'trust deficit' still remained, the accord avoids the awkward workarounds put in place to deal with the boycott and provides for road for cooperation ahead of a change on guard in the White House. Perhaps Qatar is even thinking of re-joining OPEC? As Saudi Arabia flexes its geopolitical muscle, it does need to pick its battles and re-assert its position. Showcasing political leadership as the world's crude swing producer is as good a way of demonstrating that as any, even if it is planning to claim dues in the future.
It worked. It has successfully changed the market narrative from inter-OPEC+ squabbling to a more stabilised crude market. Saudi Arabia's patience in prolonging this benevolent role is unknown, but for now, it has achieved what it wanted to achieve: return visibility to the Kingdom as the global oil leader, and having crude oil prices rise by nearly 10%.
Market Outlook:
Crude price trading range: Brent – US$55-57/b, WTI – US$51-53/b
Global crude oil benchmarks jumped several levels to a new higher range, as Saudi Arabia supplemented OPEC+'s decision to allow a minor increase in supply quotas for February and March with a massive 1 mmb/d voluntary cut over the same period
There are signs that the elevated level of crude pricing is tempting American drillers back to work, with Baker Hughes reporting a massive 67-site gain in active rigs over the first week of 2021; this will present another headache for OPEC+ when it comes time to debate the supply deal path forward for April and beyond
Forecast Highlights
This edition of the Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) is the first to include forecasts for 2022.
The January STEO remains subject to heightened levels of uncertainty because responses to COVID-19 continue to evolve. Reduced economic activity and changes to consumer behavior in response to the COVID-19 pandemic caused energy demand and supply to decline in 2020. The ongoing pandemic and the success of vaccination programs will continue to affect energy use in the future.
Economic assumptions are among the most important drivers of the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) forecasts. EIA's U.S. macroeconomic assumptions are based on forecasts by IHS Markit and EIA's global economic assumptions are based on forecasts from Oxford Economics. After falling by 3.5% in 2020, IHS Markit forecasts that U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 4.2% in 2021 and 3.8% in 2022. Rising GDP contributes to EIA's forecast of rising total energy use in the United States during 2021 and 2022. After falling by 7.8% in 2020, EIA forecasts that total U.S. energy consumption will rise by 2.6% in 2021 and by 2.5% in 2022, reaching 97.3 quadrillion British thermal units (quads), 3.0 quads less than in 2019.
EIA forecasts Brent crude oil spot prices to average $53 per barrel (b) in both 2021 and 2022 compared with an average of $42/b in 2020.
EIA estimates that global consumption of petroleum and liquid fuels averaged 92.2 million barrels per day (b/d) for all of 2020, down by 9.0 million b/d from 2019. EIA expects global liquid fuels consumption will grow by 5.6 million b/d in 2021 and 3.3 million b/d in 2022.
EIA forecasts crude oil production from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will average 27.2 million b/d in 2021, up from an estimated 25.6 million b/d in 2020. Forecast growth in output reflects OPEC's announced increases to production targets and continuing rise in Libya's production. On January 5, 2021, OPEC and partner countries (OPEC+) announced that they will maintain the previously agreed-upon January 2021 production increase of 0.5 million b/d. The latest OPEC+ agreement also calls for production increases from Russia and Kazakhstan in February and March. However, additional voluntary cuts by Saudi Arabia for February and March result in lower overall OPEC+ production in early 2021. EIA forecasts that OPEC crude oil production will rise by 1.1 million b/d in 2022.
EIA estimates global liquid fuels inventories rose at a rate of 6.5 million b/d in the first half of 2020 before declining at a rate of 2.4 million b/d in the second half of 2020. EIA forecasts global inventories will continue to fall in the forecast, declining at a rate of 0.6 million b/d in 2021 and 0.5 million b/d in 2022.
U.S. regular gasoline retail prices averaged $2.18 per gallon (gal) in 2020, compared with an average of $2.60/gal in 2019. EIA forecasts motor gasoline prices to average $2.40/gal in 2021 and $2.42/gal in 2022 U.S. diesel fuel prices averaged $2.55/gal in 2020, compared with $3.06/gal in 2019, and EIA forecasts them to average $2.71/gal in 2021 and $2.74/gal in 2022.
EIA estimates that U.S. crude oil production fell from the 2019 record level of 12.2 million b/d to 11.3 million b/d in 2020. EIA expects that annual average production will fall to 11.1 million b/d in 2021 before rising to 11.5 million b/d in 2022.
U.S. liquid fuels consumption in 2020 averaged 18.1 million b/d, down 2.5 million b/d (12%) from 2019 consumption. EIA forecasts U.S. liquid fuels consumption will rise to 19.5 million b/d in 2021 and then to 20.5 million b/d in 2022 (almost equal to the 2019 level).
Henry Hub natural gas spot prices averaged $2.03 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in 2020. EIA expects Henry Hub prices will rise to an annual average of $3.01/MMBtu in 2021, limiting natural gas use for power generation amid reduced natural gas production. EIA forecasts Henry Hub prices will rise to an average of $3.27/MMBtu in 2022.
U.S. working natural gas in storage ended October at more than 3.9 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), 5% more than the five-year (2015–19) average and the fourth-highest end-of-October level on record. EIA forecasts that declines in U.S. natural gas production this winter compared with last winter will more than offset the declines in natural gas consumption, which will contribute to inventory withdrawals outpacing the five-year average during the remainder of the winter, which ends in March. Forecast natural gas inventories end March 2021 at 1.6 Tcf, 12% lower than the 2016–20 average.
EIA estimates that U.S. natural gas consumption averaged 83.1 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2020, down 2.5% from 2019. EIA expects that natural gas consumption will decline by 2.8% in 2021 and by 2.1% in 2022. Most of the decline in natural gas consumption is the result of less natural gas use in the power sector, which EIA forecasts to decline because of rising natural gas prices. These declines are partly offset by rising natural gas use in other sectors.
EIA estimates that 2020 dry natural gas production averaged 90.8 Bcf/d, down 2.5% from 2019. EIA expects U.S. dry natural gas production to average 88.2 Bcf/d in 2021, down by 2.8% from 2020, and then rise to 89.7 Bcf/d in 2022.
EIA forecasts that total consumption of electricity in the United States will increase by 1.5% in 2021 after falling by 4.0% in 2020. The pandemic significantly affected electricity consumption in the commercial and industrial sectors in 2020. EIA estimates retail sales of electricity to the two sectors fell by 6.0% and 7.9%, respectively. EIA expects commercial electricity use in 2021 to rise by 0.9% and industrial electricity use to rise by 1.2%. Social distancing guidelines have caused people to spend more time at home, resulting in increased residential electricity use. In 2020, retail sales of electricity to the residential sector were 1.3% higher despite a mild winter earlier in the year. EIA expects residential electricity use will rise by 2.4% in 2021 as colder winter weather leads to more heating demand. Total forecast electricity consumption in 2022 will rise by 1.7%.
EIA expects the share of U.S. electric power sector generation from natural gas will decline from 39% in 2020 to 36% in 2021 and 34% in 2022 in response to significantly higher natural gas fuel costs and increased generation from renewable energy sources. Coal's forecast share of electricity generation will rise from 20% in 2020 to 22% in 2021 and 24% in 2022, which is close to its share in 2019. Electricity generation from renewable energy sources will rise from 20% in 2020 to 21% in 2021 and 23% in 2022. The nuclear share of U.S. generation will decline from 21% in 2020 to 20% in 2021 and 19% in 2022.
During the next two years, EIA expects electricity generation capacity from renewable energy sources to continue growing. Although EIA expects both wind and solar capacity growth, solar capacity grows at a faster rate in the forecast. Based on EIA survey data, large-scale solar capacity growth in gigawatts (GW) will exceed wind growth for the first time in 2021.
EIA estimates that total U.S. coal production decreased by 24% to 537 million short tons (MMst) in 2020. This decline largely reflected lower demand for coal from the electric power sector and the coal export market. Lower natural gas prices made coal less competitive for power generation. In 2021, EIA expects coal production to increase by 12% to 603 MMst because of a forecast 41% increase in natural gas prices for electricity generators, making coal more competitive in the electric power sector. EIA forecasts coal production will rise to 628 MMst in 2022.
After declining by 11.1% in 2020, EIA forecasts that total energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will increase by 4.7% in 2021 and by 3.2% in 2022. Even with growth over the next two years, forecast CO2 emissions in 2022 remain 3.9% lower than 2019 levels. Energy-related CO2 emissions are sensitive to changes in weather, economic growth, energy prices, and fuel mix.