Is American culture locked in a death spiral? Have we misused the gifts of the Enlightenment? These are some of the questions EconTalk host Russ Roberts invited this week's guest to explore. Richard Reinsch, host of the Liberty Law Talk podcast and editor of Law and Liberty joined Russ for a wide-ranging conversation on the Enlightenment, the role of tradition in our culture, and the rise of populism.
And now it's your turn. Let us know your reaction to the prompts below, or pose some questions of your own. Let's continue the conversation!
1- How do Roberts's and Reinsch's definitions of Enlightenment compare? Their definitions of liberalism? And, as Roberts asks, why does it matter?
2- To what extent do you agree that people feel more alienated today than in times past? What does that mean, and what might be the causes of such feelings? To what extent does Reinsch correctly identify the cause(s) of alienation?
3- What does Reinsch mean when he says, "Citizenship is not just rent-seeking." What does citizenship mean to you? How does one become a good citizen, and whose responsibility is it to ensure good citizens?
4- Reinsch acknowledges that some traditions have been mistakes, such as racism and slavery. He also notes that tradition is not simply "blind adherence." What then is tradition for Reinsch, and how does he reconcile the value of tradition's permanence with the periodic need to revive or retire certain traditions? To what extent are traditions emergent?
5- How do Reinsch's and Roberts's views on the current political climate in America compare? Who's the more optimistic? Who do you think better describes today's climate, and why?
Citizenship = The two part agreement to abstain from actions that harm other citizens [except in self defense or defense of other citizens] and to aid other citizens who are harmed or threatened.
Becoming a good citizen is as simple as recognizing the terms of the contract and abiding by them.
Citizens hold each other accountable to the contract. Failure to abide the terms of the contract results in revocation of citizen status and all the obvious protections it affords. Going to jail is the most obvious expression of this "outing" from society, probably because banishment is unfriendly to one's neighbors and the banished are likely to show up inside your territories some time later.
Citizenship, properly understood, both defines and prevents "rent seeking." Said another way, anywhere you can identify rent seeking, you have also identified a violation of the citizenship agreement.
I disagree that "Failure to abide the terms of the contract results in revocation of citizen status and all the obvious protections it affords" either in practice or in the ideal.
When you go to prison – what you say is the obvious expression of revocation – you do not lose either your citizen status or the rights it affords you. You lose one thing – your freedom, for a while. Perhaps also your right to vote, depending on the country. But you do not lose your right to own property, or your right to justice. If someone hurts you or steals something from you, you still have legal protection. This is the nature of 'inalienable rights' and to remove them under xyz criteria is to walk down a slippery slope in my view.
You make some good arguments. I'd like to explore them. A detailed explanation of the words in the model in question may help you understand my position better and help me understand yours.
Justice is do no harm, remedy harm done.
Citizenship is the commitment to justice plus a common defense pact.
Jailing someone—where "you lose one thing—your freedom, for a while"—is without question harmful. Blood or visible marks are not the definition of harm. Harm is defined, for the most part, by the individual suffering the act and, to a lesser extent, by the others around that individual. The only way imprisonment could not be considered harmful is if the imprisoned person did not consider it as such. Possible, but unlikely. In the likely scenario, the imprisoned feels that they are being harmed. If they were citizens, then, they would have the contractual right to call on the help of all other citizens in their own defense against their oppressor. Most of the time, however, such a call will go unheeded, even if heard. The reason, literally, is because they are not citizens. They violated justice (presumably) against another citizen, which means they violated the citizenship agreement, which means they are in breach of contract. Having breached the agreement of citizenship, they are no longer considered a party to it. Thus any harm done to them—imprisonment in this case, or the death penalty, or whatever justice deems appropriate—is done by the citizenry to that individual who is outside of the contract. That has to be the case, because the terms of the citizenship agreement would not allow it otherwise.
Now, once a prisoner has served his term—if there is a term—and released back into society, the harm is considered remedied, justice is satisfied, and the offer of citizenship extended again to that individual. "You are welcome back to society so long as you agree not hurt other citizens in the future, remedy any hurt you cause accidentally, and agree to aid others who are being hurt." They accept. They become part of society again.
Next, you made an excellent point about property. While in jail, property is sometimes not seized. Sometimes it is, though. Often times the easiest way to satisfy justice is through exchange. Selling off property to pay for the losses incurred by the victim does that. But the fact that property is not always seized is interesting and noteworthy. In that circumstance, it is as if society has an expectation that the offender will be returning to society, and so society holds their place—so to speak. Given that is sometimes the case, I don't think it would be wrong to say their citizenship was suspended, not revoked, and reinstated later. Perhaps this was your point. If so, I can accept that as an improvement to the model I presented.
That's a good point. There are some limited protections afforded to inmates. It's not citizenship, though, since it is not voluntary. It is not even contractual. It is more of an understanding. If you do what you are told, you won't get injured. Society sets a floor under how forceful it is willing to tolerate in the treatment of prisoners, but that's common convention—law in the common law sense.
On a somewhat separate note, Chris mentioned 'inalienable rights' and I honestly do not know what that means. Rights are contractual obligations. All contractual obligations are potentially alienable, otherwise there would be no need to place them in a contract. To discuss rights, therefore, we must discuss a contract. If you disagree with my conclusions, then I assume you found a flaw in my logic or have a different contract in mind. And if the latter is the case, please describe that contract so we can discuss it.