The same night, two barges were also sunk north of Sio Island. When General Berryman saw Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the commander of the Allied Naval Forces, on 14 December, he made a point of congratulating him on the work his PT boats were doing. Lieutenant General Tsutomu Yoshihara, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Eighteenth Army recalled:
Offensive against the Japanese supply system
Battle of Sio
Battle of Sio | Offensive against the Japanese supply system
To remove the Japanese control over the region. Sorry. I cannot find the answer based on the context. Sorry. I cannot find the answer based on the context. Because Japanese did not leave the area.
in which country did the battle of sio take place?
user
Papua New Guinea.
assistant
on what date did this fight begin?
user
December 1943.
assistant
whom was it fought between?
user
Australian and Papuan forces , and the Japanese.
assistant
what were the causes which led to this clash?
user
The Battle of Sio, fought between December 1943 and March 1944, was the break-out and pursuit phase of General Douglas MacArthur's Huon Peninsula campaign, part of the New Guinea campaign of World War II. After the defeat of the Japanese in the Battle of Sattelberg, Australian Army forces broke through the Japanese positions around Finschhafen. Constant pressure from US Navy PT boats, Australian land forces and Allied aircraft brought the Japanese logistical system to the brink of collapse, resulting in disease, malnutrition, and privation for the Japanese soldiers. Meanwhile, the Allied supply system grappled with the problems of terrain and climate, particularly inclement weather and rough monsoonal seas that hampered and occasionally prevented delivery of supplies by sea.
Battle of Sio | Introduction
Australian and Papuan troops advanced along the coast of the Huon Peninsula, using infantry, tanks, and air strikes against the Japanese positions, which were generally sited at creek crossings in the jungle. The advancing infantry kept strictly within range of the supporting artillery, which was liberally employed in the early stages of the operation. Using tactics that exploited the firepower of Australian artillery and armour, the Australian and Papuan troops inflicted heavy and disproportionate casualties on the Japanese as they advanced, ultimately linking up with the American forces at Saidor. Hundreds of Japanese soldiers were killed; thousands more died from disease, malnutrition, exhaustion and suicide.
Battle of Sio | Introduction
Early in October 1943, a special staff was established at II Corps Headquarters to study the Japanese supply system. It did not include an officer with experience in maintaining a large force over a native carrier line, and therefore took time to realise that the Japanese force could not be maintained over an inland track, as was first assumed. Operations soon confirmed that the Japanese were dependent on a coastal supply line. During the Battle of Sattelberg, the Allies set out to cut this supply line. A three-pronged approach was taken: By December, the pitiful condition of Japanese prisoners confirmed for the Australians that "the Japanese logistic system was in the final stages of breakdown".
Battle of Sio | Offensive against the Japanese supply system
The main Australian advance was by infantry-tank-engineer teams moving along the coastal tracks. Japanese positions were generally sited at creek crossings in the jungle. The advancing infantry kept strictly within range of the supporting artillery, except for short periods during the latter stages of the operation when Japanese opposition was negligible and the difficulty of moving the artillery forward quickly was too great. A secondary outflanking movement was made inland, over the higher ground, which was usually coral cliffs covered by kunai grass and rising as high as . Since the Japanese intent was to delay rather than fight to the death, a threat to their escape route usually prompted a withdrawal.
Battle of Sio | Tactics and logistics
The next morning, Bengari and his five companions ambushed the Japanese and killed them all before they could fire a shot. Wirraway and Boomerang aircraft of No. 4 Squadron RAAF scouted ahead of the advance. Its aerial reconnaissance work let the Australians and Papuans know where opposition could be expected, thereby speeding up the advance. The pilots noted Japanese parachutes, signs that the Japanese were receiving supplies by air. On 4 February, the Australians were also forced onto air supply, as swollen rivers washed out a number of bridges. Each day the Papuans killed 12 to 15 Japanese, but not until 8 February was the Japanese rearguard encountered at Weber Point and a formal attack made.
Battle of Sio | Saidor
Whenever the Japanese Army attempted to make a stand, Berryman attacked with 25-pounder artillery barrages and Matilda tanks. Berryman was aware that seasonal changes were making the surf rougher and making it ever harder to operate the US Army landing craft (LCMs) and Australian Army amphibious trucks (DUKWs) that he depended on for the logistical support of his troops, but he realised that the Japanese Army's supply difficulties were greater than his own, and he gambled that if he pushed hard enough the Japanese would be unable to regroup and organise a successful defence. In the first phase of the Battle of Sio, the advance from Finschhafen to Sio, 3,099 Japanese dead were counted and 38 prisoners taken, at a cost of 8 Australians killed and 48 wounded.
Frank Berryman | New Guinea
Both sides managed to accomplish their objectives; the Japanese withdrew, while the Australians exacted a terrible toll. The balance of losses was overwhelmingly against the Japanese, both in terms of men and equipment. It seems that only about 4,300 of the 7,000 troops under the command of the Japanese 20th Division who had originally been forward of Sio survived the withdrawal, and many of them were rendered ineffective through wounds, sickness, malnutrition and exhaustion. The opportunity to destroy the Japanese 51st Division was not seized. These troops lived to fight the Americans at the Battle of Driniumor River later in the year, and the Australians in the Aitape–Wewak campaign in 1945.
Battle of Sio | Aftermath
Five Japanese were killed. In all, 53 Japanese were killed and four captured that day. Two Australians were wounded. The next day another 61 Japanese were killed and 9 captured, this time without any Australian casualties. On 10 February, the 30th Infantry Battalion encountered two American soldiers at Yagomai, thereby linking up with the American force at Saidor.
Battle of Sio | Saidor
Wareo was captured by the Australians on 8 December and the last Japanese rearguards left the area on 15 December. Meanwhile, Berryman's coastal advance had commenced on 5 December.
Battle of Sio | Background
It also still had the support of the 2/12th Field Regiment, 532nd EBSR, and A Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion. The brigade suffered its first casualties on the night of 21/22 January in a friendly fire incident, which was a common occurrence with units inexperienced in jungle warfare. Two Australians were killed and two wounded by their own comrades. On 22 January a native reported seeing seven Japanese in the hills south-west of Sio and a patrol was sent out under Corporal Bengari to investigate. On arriving in the vicinity on 24 January, a local reported that another 22 Japanese had arrived.
Battle of Sio | Saidor
The Battle of Wareo (27 November – 8 December 1943) was fought by Australian and Japanese forces in New Guinea during the Huon Peninsula campaign of World War II in the later part of 1943. Coming after the capture of Sattelberg by the Allies, the battle took place amidst the Australian advance north towards Sio. The Australians committed elements from four infantry brigades from the Australian 9th Division with supporting elements including artillery, engineers and tank support, while the Japanese force consisted primarily of two depleted infantry regiments from the 20th Division, with limited artillery support. The Australian advance in this region developed into three drives.
Battle of Wareo | Introduction
The same night, two barges were also sunk north of Sio Island. When General Berryman saw Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the commander of the Allied Naval Forces, on 14 December, he made a point of congratulating him on the work his PT boats were doing. Lieutenant General Tsutomu Yoshihara, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Eighteenth Army recalled:
Battle of Sio | Offensive against the Japanese supply system
General Blamey insisted that Christmas fare be available to all units, and extraordinary efforts were made to carry out his directive. In one instance, a Piper Cub of No. 4 Squadron RAAF dropped Christmas fare to a Papuan Company on a long-range patrol. The advance resumed on 27 December, preceded by air strikes by 18 B-25 Mitchell and 12 Boston bombers. The 2/15th Infantry Battalion and tanks of A Squadron, 1st Tank Battalion took the lead on 31 December; they reached Sialum on 2 January 1944. This had a sheltered beach which served as a maintenance area. That day, the American landing at Saidor placed a large force across the Japanese escape route.
Battle of Sio | Sio
In the aftermath, the Australian commander, Brigadier Kenneth Eather, perceiving that the attack could not be held any further and that Ioribaiwa Ridge was unsuited to launching a counter-attack, withdrew his force back to Imita Ridge. The Japanese, however, had reached the limit of their supply line, and strategic factors and reverses elsewhere forced the Japanese commander, Major General Tomitaro Horii, to pursue a more defensive approach in Papua and New Guinea. As a result, in October the Japanese began to withdraw towards their beachheads at Buna–Gona, with the Australians in pursuit.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Introduction
The 2nd Battalion, 238th Infantry Regiment was to act as a rearguard on the coast. Lieutenant General Frank Berryman, the commander of Australian II Corps, now urged Wootten to commence a coastal advance to cut the Japanese supply lines and force Adachi to retreat from the Huon Peninsula if he were not already doing so. Wootten took a more cautious approach. The Battle of Wareo proved that the Japanese intended to defend the area. After a fierce fight, Wootten managed to drive the Japanese from the high ground around Sattelberg and Gusika. In early December, Adachi ordered all his troops to withdraw to Sio.
Battle of Sio | Background
Flank protection on the left was provided by the 2/4th Commando Squadron and a platoon from the Papuan Infantry Battalion. The search was unsuccessful and after minor clashes occurred, the Australians dispatched two platoons to Fior in an effort to link up with the 2/23rd. Short of Fior, the Japanese had established themselves in strength in well dug-in positions amidst a thick bamboo grove. As the 2/24th's platoons approached, they were fired upon and forced to halt their advance, establishing a night defensive position. During the night the Japanese withdrew silently and moved back across the Song, destroying the suspension bridge that spanned it as they went.
Battle of Wareo | Drive on Kuanko and Wareo
Halted by fire, the Australians called in fire support to overwhelm the Japanese with fire superiority, and resorting to employing the indirect method that would characterise their operations during this phase of the advance, and which was necessitated by the depleted state of their forces. Moving up a steep slope that was covered by kunai grass, one of the tanks broke down, nevertheless the Australian armour was able to deliver a significant bombardment which enabled the infantry to take the position early in the evening.
Battle of Wareo | Japanese stand at Horace's Ears
It would have been a formidable position if defended, but it was not. The main body of the battalion followed the next day. The Goaling River was crossed in small boats left behind by the Japanese on 13 January and it entered Nambariwa, where one prisoner was taken, six Japanese were shot, and nine found dead. On 15 January, Sio was taken. The Sio-Nambariwa area was found to have been the principal Japanese supply area, and a large number of fuel, supply, and stores dumps were found. During the advance from Fortification Point to Sio, 303 Japanese had been killed or found dead, and 22 captured.
Battle of Sio | Sio
Here, in mid-September, the Australians finally managed to fight the Japanese to a standstill before withdrawing further to Imita Ridge, where they established a final defensive line for a last stand. Before this climactic battle could take place, though, the Japanese reached the limit of their supply line and the strategic situation elsewhere in the Pacific – specifically the defeats around Milne Bay and on Guadacanal – resulted in the tide shifting towards the Australians. By late September, the Japanese commander, Horii, received orders to assume a defensive posture rather than continuing the drive on Port Moresby. Horii had been ordered to withdraw – initially, to the Isurava–Kokoda area to secure these as "a base for future operations".
Second Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Background
Over the next few days, the Australians established themselves, and began patrolling operations. After bringing up mortars and Vickers medium machine guns, they began to attack the Japanese resupply parties moving through the area, inflicting heavy casualties. As a result of the occupation of Pabu, and the general movement of Australian forces towards Wareo–Bonga, the Japanese infantry were threatened with being trapped. In response, the Japanese commander, Katagiri, diverted some of the effort away from the recapture of Finschhafen, and resolved to recapture the North Hill–Pabu area. A strong force of Japanese subsequently advanced south along the coastal track from Bonga, attempting to retake North Hill and the ground north of the Song River.
Battle of Wareo | Prelude
For the Japanese, the supply situation around Sattelberg was worsening. Although some supplies were successfully air dropped, the defenders were reduced to consuming only a third of the standard daily ration and Katagiri's supply of artillery shells was very low, despite adherence to strict fire discipline. Given the desperate supply situation, which was made all the worse when the 24th Brigade cut the track between Gusika and Wareo, the Japanese 18th Army commander, Adachi, gave Katagiri approval to withdraw from Sattelberg after 20 November. Katagiri subsequently ordered Colonel Sadahiko Miyake, the commander of the 80th Infantry Regiment, to inflict as many casualties upon the Australians as possible and then begin a progressive withdrawal to Wareo.
Battle of Sattelberg | Japanese counter-attack
As the Australians advanced, a large force of Japanese – consisting largely of the 79th and 80th Infantry Regiments, part of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment and a battalion of the 238th Infantry Regiment, which were grouped together as the 20th Division under Lieutenant General Shigeru Katagiri – launched an unsuccessful counter-attack in October before retreating inland towards an abandoned German mission that sat atop a peak at Sattelberg.
Battle of Wareo | Background
The Allies failed to seize the opportunity to completely destroy the Japanese forces.
Battle of Sio | Introduction
After crossing the Goaling River the Papuans entered the village of Nambariwa, which had been a used previously by the Japanese. Six Japanese were killed, while the bodies of nine more were located in remains of the settlement. On 15 January the 20th Brigade captured Sio, completing the 9th Division's quick sweep up the coast against light Japanese resistance. The 9th Division was then relieved by the Australian 5th Division for the continuing pursuit of the Japanese as they withdrew. A Company Headquarters next moved to Sio, while on 18 January three Japanese were killed by a patrol behind the mission there.
Papuan Infantry Battalion | Saidor–Sio, January – March 1944
In the face of this, the Japanese fell back. At the same time, a platoon advanced north from Pabu and occupied a position named "Exchange" by the Australians, capturing a 75 mm artillery piece in the process. The two companies from the 2/32nd Infantry Battalion around Pabu had been reinforced by the remaining two companies which had fought their way through on 26 November, having also captured "Pino Hill" with four Matilda tanks and artillery support. They were then relieved by the 2/43rd, who were warned out to begin an advance to the west. The following morning, 29 November, the 2/28th Infantry Battalion once again led the Australian advance.
Battle of Wareo | Pursuit of Japanese forces to Bonga
Initially there was no opposition and by the afternoon they established a defensive position near a waterfall. The following morning, the advance continued. The ground astride the coastal track, although flat, was covered in dense jungle, which was not suitable for tracked vehicles to move across. The result of this was that the Australian tanks had to remain on the track, advancing behind the infantry, which limited the rate of their advance and prevented them from being able to apply the full weight of their firepower. As the Australians advanced, the engineers used bulldozers to improve the track to facilitate the flow of supplies, nevertheless the advance was slow.
Battle of Wareo | Pursuit of Japanese forces to Bonga
Between 9 and 13 December, PT boats sank 23 barges, most of them south of Sio. On 7 January, the PT boats also attacked a submarine. No less than twelve barges were destroyed on the night of 8 January, one of which was loaded with ammunition and another with around 70 troops. On 9 January, PT boats attacked a group of six barges, which attempted to fight back. One barge was seen to sink. Another patrol engaged eight barges and destroyed two. A third patrol found six barges on a beach and destroyed them. Then on 10 January, three PT boats sank three troop-carrying barges, taking one Japanese prisoner.
Battle of Sio | Offensive against the Japanese supply system
As a result, the surviving elements of the Japanese 20th and 51st Divisions on the Huon Peninsula were compelled to withdraw over the Finisterre Range. Yet the Americans ultimately failed to seize the opportunity to destroy the withdrawing Japanese and despite a heavy toll from disease and starvation they succeeded in reaching Madang, with many Japanese surviving to continue fighting before they were finally cornered by the Australians during the Aitape–Wewak campaign in 1945. Meanwhile, during 4 Platoon's patrol they had been attacked by hostile natives before reaching Karako. On 4 January they clashed with the Japanese north of Walingi, killing four.
Papuan Infantry Battalion | Saidor–Sio, January – March 1944
Commencing on 22 November, the Japanese made heavy assaults around North Hill, on positions which were defended by Australians from the 2/43rd Infantry Battalion and the 2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion. The 2/32nd, with two companies isolated to the north around Pabu, was also in the thick of the fighting, and over the space of 10 days it was subjected to repeated attacks. Despite being short of food and receiving repeated mortar fire, the 2/32nd held its ground with the assistance of strong artillery support, and in doing so inflicted heavy casualties upon the Japanese. Later at least 195 bodies were found around the 2/32nd's position; their own losses amounted to 25 killed and 51 wounded.
Battle of Wareo | Prelude
This closed the gap on the east flank. The Australian official historian David Dexter concluded that: There were daily clashes between American and Japanese patrols. The most significant occurred on 28 January. A patrol from the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment led by First Lieutenants George J. Hess and James E. Barnett, with 48 enlisted men, set out to reconnoitre the area around Cape Iris. The patrol initially moved parallel to the coast, but near the village of Teterei it changed direction and headed towards the beach. On reaching it, the patrol was attacked by the Japanese. It attempted to withdraw along the beach, but found it blocked and was forced to return to the beach near Teterei.
Landing at Saidor | Junction with the Australians
After being forced off Steeple Tree Hill, Miyake, commanding the main Japanese defensive unit, the 80th Infantry Regiment, decided to concentrate his defence upon the saddle at "Point 10" which was positioned to the west of the 2,200 feature, at Sattelberg itself and on the 3,200 feature to the north-west. An intense five-day Allied aerial bombardment, which had begun on 19 November, had destroyed the majority of the Japanese guns around Sattelberg, and the ammunition and food situation had become critical, despite the arrival of several tonnes of rice at Wareo the day before. Throughout 21 November, there was a lull in the battle as the Australians paused for resupply.
Battle of Sattelberg | Australian attack resumed
Part of an area that later became known as "Horace the Horse" to the Australians due to its shape as viewed from the air, it was within artillery range of the Australian forward positions at North Hill and as such could be occupied and held by a small party who could then disrupt the Japanese supply line. In October, the Japanese had launched a counter-attack in the region and as the Australians had been forced back, they were forced to abandon Pabu. The October counter-attack was turned back. The commander of the Japanese XVIII Army, Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi, visited Katagiri's command post, and ordered a renewal of the attack, which Katagiri scheduled for 23 November.
Battle of Wareo | Prelude
While the fighting had been taking place further along the Kokoda Track, and around Milne Bay and Buna and Gona, small forces of Australians from the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles and commandos from Kanga Force had attempted to maintain contact with the Japanese in the north around Wau, Mubo and Salamaua. Operating in vicinity of the Japanese bases that had been established in the Huon Gulf region, during this time, the Australians limited themselves mainly to reconnaissance and observation operations, although in June 1942 raids were launched against Salamaua and against Heath's Plantation in Lae. In response, the Japanese brought in reinforcements and they subsequently advanced to Mubo and then Guadagasai.
Battle of Mubo | Background
The Australian advance had been hampered by bad weather, steep terrain, supply problems, fatigue and the strong defence mounted by the Japanese, nevertheless they had secured the Wareo–Gusika spur and the track that ran between Wareo and Bonga. In the face of the Australian advance on Wareo, early in December the Japanese commander, Katagiri, had ordered his troops, who were weary from the fighting and hungry due to a lack of supplies, to fall back to the north. The 79th Infantry Regiment, which had been defending the area around the Lakes, was ordered to move back to Kalasa and Sio, while the 80th Infantry Regiment, having been located around Kuanko, followed the 79th and moved east towards the coast.
Battle of Wareo | Aftermath
Two companies were sent out late in the afternoon, each with armoured support in the shape of two Matildas, tasked with taking the position known by the Australians as "Horace's Ears" by advancing through an area of low ground dubbed "Lilac Valley" by the Australians. The Japanese had developed the position considerably, establishing a complex defensive network and, whereas up until that point they had usually withdrawn in the face of the advancing Australians, they decided to make a stand. Employing a 75 mm gun, which was fired over open sights due to the closeness of the fighting, along with some 37 mm guns and a number of machine guns of varying calibre, they fought fiercely.
Battle of Wareo | Japanese stand at Horace's Ears
As a result, distribution of supplies once they had been landed was undertaken by resupply parties which were drawn largely from combat units. These parties moved overland on foot using a number of key tracks that existed north of the Wareo–Gusika ridge.
Battle of Wareo | Japanese
Pressing on to Efogi against little opposition, in late October the Australians reached Eora Creek and Templeton's Crossing, which had earlier been the scene of heavy fighting during the Japanese advance. A second battle was subsequently fought there as the Australians gained the vital ridge overlooking the creek at heavy cost against stiff opposition determined to buy time for the remainder of their comrades to make good their escape. As service politics within the upper echelons of the Australian and US high commands increased pressure for the Australians to speed up the pursuit, the 16th Brigade arrived to reinvigorate the advance which had been slow to that point due to restrictions of the terrain and supply difficulties.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Aftermath
As the 29th Brigade advanced toward the Mivo River, torrential rain and flooding ultimately brought the advance to a halt. The height of the river rose . The Buin Road was reduced, in the words of Gavin Long, "to a sea of mud" and many of the bridges upon which the Australian supply system was dependent were washed away. This rendered large-scale offensive infantry operations impossible and as the situation worsened for a period of time the Australians even ceased patrolling operations across the Mivo; meanwhile, the Japanese continued to harass the Australians, probing their positions and setting mines and traps, targeting the Australian line of communications.
Battle of the Hongorai River | Aftermath
As the advance continued, new beachheads were opened up while rearward ones were closed. The advance was halted on occasion to allow for the guns to be brought forward or sufficient supplies to be accumulated at the forward beachhead. The major problem was the weather. The monsoon caused rough seas that precluded the use of the small Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVPs) and restricted the operations of the larger LCMs. Because of the extremely rough seas—the most difficult that the 532nd EBSR had ever encountered—most supply missions were by night when tidal conditions were most favourable. Wootten insisted that at least seven days' supplies be available in forward areas in case the weather prevented the LCMs from running.
Battle of Sio | Tactics and logistics
By 30 November, the Australian commander, Wootten, had concentrated a significant force, consisting of 12 infantry battalions, a machine gun battalion, a Matilda tank squadron, a battalion of pioneers, a squadron of commandos, and artillery and engineer support, and was ready to begin the next stage of the advance. The advance began that morning with the 2/28th Infantry Battalion advancing on the Australian right in concert with the Matildas from 3 Troop, 1st Tank Battalion. Crossing the Kalueng River, they penetrated only before meeting Japanese resistance, which was overcome with the assistance of an artillery barrage and mortars. At the same time, the 2/43rd, which had relieved the 2/32nd around Pabu earlier, also advanced.
Battle of Wareo | Japanese stand at Horace's Ears
They were supported by American landing craft equipped with rockets, which bombarded Japanese positions along the coast, while the expansion of the airfield around Finschhafen and the establishment of a naval facility there enabled the Allies to use Consolidated PBY Catalina aircraft and PT boats to further attack Japanese resupply efforts. As they advanced, the Australians came up against stiff resistance, as Japanese forces in the area fought hard to buy time for the forces falling back from Wareo by delaying the Australian advance. Initially, the 22nd's attack was turned back; however, fire support from artillery and armour helped overcome this opposition, and the advance continued with the 22nd and 29th/46th Infantry Battalions advancing in turns up the coast with the 37th/52nd moving on their left further inland.
Huon Peninsula campaign | Sio
On 21 July 1942, Japanese forces landed on the northern Papuan coast around Buna and Gona, as part of a plan to capture the strategically important town of Port Moresby via an overland advance along the Kokoda Track following the failure of a seaborne assault during the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. During the next three months, the Australians fought a series of delaying actions along the Kokoda Track, as the Japanese had advanced steadily south towards Port Moresby. Following reverses around Milne Bay and Guadalcanal, and a climactic battle around Ioribaiwa, in early September the Japanese reached the limits of their supply line and were ordered to assume a defensive posture until conditions became more favourable for a renewed effort on Port Moresby.
Battle of Oivi–Gorari | Background
The first contact came on 17 January when the 31st/51st Infantry Battalion's advanced elements—drawn mainly from 'D' Company, under Captain Thomas Titley—moved north from Rukussia and proceeded towards the Genga River. Reaching a clearing north of Puto, a platoon-sized patrol came across several huts in a cleared area and proceeded to attack it. One Japanese was killed in the initial assault, but as the Australians took the huts and pushed beyond them, they were engaged from entrenchments in front of them. The Japanese then launched a counter-attack using light and heavy machine guns. In response, the Australians brought up another platoon and over the course of two days the counter-attack was repulsed, with six to eight Japanese estimated to have been killed and others wounded, while two Australians were wounded.
Battle of Tsimba Ridge | Battle
In the fighting that ensued, the two Australian brigades – Lloyd's 16th and Eather's 25th – consisting of 3,700 men, engaged the remnants of the Japanese 41st Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Kiyomi Yazawa, and 144th Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Tsukamoto Hiroshi. Together these regiments formed the South Seas Detachment ("Nankai Shintai"), a 2,800-strong formation under the command of General Tomitaro Horii, supported by 15 mountain guns from the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment and 30 heavy machine guns. Camouflaged and strengthened with palm logs, with interlocking fields of fire and snipers in rubber and palm trees, the positions were well established, having been constructed over several weeks and the Japanese defenders were determined to make a stand.
Battle of Oivi–Gorari | Battle
Before this climactic battle could take place though; the Japanese reached the limit of their supply line and the strategic situation elsewhere in the Pacific – specifically the defeats around Milne Bay and on Guadacanal – resulted in the tide shifting towards the Australians, as the Japanese commander, Horii, received orders to assume a defensive posture rather than continuing the drive on Port Moresby. After the Japanese withdrew from Ioribaiwa in late September, troops from the Australian 25th Brigade, under Brigadier Kenneth Eather, later reinforced by Brigader John Lloyd's 16th Brigade, both under Major General Arthur Allen, commander of the Australian 7th Division, began advancing north from Imita Ridge along the Kokoda Track.
First Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Aftermath
This drive would ultimately be unsuccessful in preventing the bulk of the Japanese forces on the Huon Peninsula from escaping. At the same time, once Sattelberg was secured, a simultaneous drive was undertaken to clear the Wareo plateau, which provided good observation towards Scarlet Beach as well as serving as a junction for Japanese lines of communication south. Once Wareo was secure, the Allies advanced along the coast towards Sio, while US forces landed at Saidor to follow up the withdrawing Japanese. Nevertheless, the US and Australian forces would come up against the same forces throughout the remainder of the war around Madang and Aitape–Wewak.
Battle of Finschhafen | Aftermath
Meanwhile, the Australians sought to regain the initiative. Wootten decided to establish a position in depth behind the Japanese forward line, and subsequently further efforts were made to establish a force at Pabu in front of the Australian forward line at North Hill. Three companies from the 2/32nd Infantry Battalion under Major Bill Mollard, were sent to occupy it in mid-November, and after striking north of the Song River from North Hill, with the help of native scouts, they moved between the Japanese positions as "Exchange" and "Pino Hill". Following a heavy bombardment from the field guns of the 2/12th Field Regiment firing from Heldsbach Plantation, they captured the position.
Battle of Wareo | Prelude
The tanks were kept in reserve at this stage and one broke down early in the advance. Together, the force penetrated close to the Lakes, but a Japanese force moved to cut off their rear, forcing them back. A second company from the 2/43rd, also with tank support, was then thrown forward to conduct a move to flank towards the larger of the two water features, approaching from the south. The Japanese were positioned in strength in a heavily wooded area and began firing on the Australians with machine guns, which pinned them down until two tanks came up and destroyed the Japanese position, firing from point blank range.
Battle of Wareo | Kalueng Lakes
When this did not occur, the position was reduced by a combination of manoeuvre and tank, mortar, and artillery fire. During the early part of the advance, 4,700 rounds were fired in one day; but during the entire 5th Division advance from Sio to Saidor, only 30 rounds were fired. The advance was made in a series of bounds, the objective of which was usually to secure sheltered beachheads. Allied supply was entirely by sea. Amphibian scouts from the US 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EBSR) of the US 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, wearing Australian uniforms, advanced with the infantry and reconnoitred beaches from the landward side as they were secured.
Battle of Sio | Tactics and logistics
As night fell, 'C' Company dug in before resuming the attack the next morning. Engineers were brought forward, as was a bulldozer, and the gap was bridged. Amidst heavy fighting, the Australians forced their way across the creek. By the time that the position had been taken in the afternoon and the infantry had advanced to the line of exploitation beyond the creek, 37 Japanese had been killed for the loss of seven Australians killed and 19 wounded. After this, the Australians continued their advance towards Sindou Creek, which was a further to the southeast. In response, the Japanese launched a number of determined counterattacks over the course of the following week, although these were turned back.
Battle of the Hongorai River | Advance to the Hongorai
While a rearguard force screened his preparations, this was successively withdrawn without contact being made. Aola was entered on 30 October and airdrops there alleviated supply problems as the Australian line-of-communication extended from Myola. On 2 November, a patrol of the 2/31st Battalion entered Kokoda and found that it had been abandoned. Vasey had re-gained access to the village's vital airstrip which helped relieve the pressure on the supply chain which had largely relied upon Papuan carriers. The two brigades then fought the final battle of the campaign around Oivi and Gorari between 4 and 11 November 1942. After this, the Japanese abandoned most of their artillery and completed their withdrawal across the Kumusi River, falling back to Buna and Gona, where heavy fighting followed in December 1942 and January 1943.
Second Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Aftermath
Upon arrival at the forward Australian positions on 20 August, Potts was ordered to retake Kokoda. However, as the size of the Japanese force – roughly equal to that of the Australians – and the extent of their own supply problems became apparent to the Australian high command, an attack was ruled out. Potts' orders were therefore changed on 29 August to mounting a stand around Isurava, in an effort to block the Japanese advance into the Owen Stanleys on their way towards Port Moresby. In total, the Australians had about 2,292 personnel including those from the 53rd Infantry Battalion, positioned further back from Isurava, as well as support units including the 14th and 2/6th Field Ambulances, the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, the Royal Papuan Constabulary and the PIB.
Battle of Isurava | Opposing forces
Australian resistance was strong despite giving up the advantage of the high ground, with field and anti-aircraft artillery engaging at ranges as short as "over open sights". As result, the Japanese attack was turned away from Scarlet Beach and channelled down Siki Creek. Nevertheless, they succeeded in breaking through to Siki Cove by 18 October and effectively drove a wedge between the 24th Brigade in the north and the 20th Brigade in the south. In doing so, they captured a considerable amount of Allied supplies, including ammunition, weapons and rations, helping to replenish their own dwindling supplies.
Huon Peninsula campaign | Japanese counterattack
The start of the Japanese attack halted the forward movement of the 2/31st and 2/33rd Infantry Battalions as they came into line with the defensively postured units, which inadvertently extended the Australian line on either side of the ridge.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Battle
Their capacity was not as great as it could have been because, due to fear of Japanese air attacks, they had to quickly unload in the darkness. Some 800 men were employed by day and 800 by night unloading craft on the beaches. By 1 November, there were 12,000 rounds of 25 pounder ammunition in the Finschhafen area, and stocks were increasing at a rate of two LCM loads per day. After unloading at Finschhafen, supplies were moved overland to where they were needed by jeeps, and where the terrain prevented this, by hand. In this regard, some New Guinean labourers were employed, but a shortage of such personnel resulted in the Australians allocating some of their combat troops to this role.
Battle of Wareo | Allied
As the Japanese were advancing to make their flanking maneuver after crossing the river, Australians from the C company opened fire on the unit, causing significant casualties including one of their company commanders and injuring the regimental commander. In response, the Japanese sent in their reserves and deployed two additional companies in the fighting, but could not initially break through or flank the Australian lines. The B company of the Australian Machine Gun Battalion and the A company of the Pioneers were also deployed to support the C company. After some more fighting in the surrounding paddy fields and an artillery barrage from Japanese guns, Japanese units managed to outflank the Australians and by 4 p.m.
Battle of Leuwiliang | Battle
In this vein, a bridge at Wairopi was destroyed by the withdrawing PIB troops who had been reinforced by a platoon of Australians from the 39th Infantry Battalion, with a brief fire-fight on 24 July, before the Japanese began forcing a crossing of the Kumusi River in rubber assault boats supported by mortars and machine gun fire. The following day, a force of around 100 Australians and Papuans ambushed the Japanese around Gorari, killing two Japanese and wounding 13 more before withdrawing towards the higher ground. As the Australians and Papuans began massing in some numbers, with several plane loads being landed at Kokoda on 26 July and moving north, they attempted a stand around Oivi under Captain Sam Templeton, commander of 'B' Company, 39th Infantry Battalion.
Battle of Kokoda | Background
By this tactic of withdrawing through the lines of other Australian units in defensive positions, to set up new defensive positions, the Australians of the raw militia battalions together with the hardened AIF battalions returned from the Middle East were able to avoid pincer assaults by the Japanese, who were in superior strength, while stretching Japanese supply lines to unsustainable lengths. His forces moved back to Imita Ridge, a naturally strong position, from which they held the Japanese to their southernmost land-based advance of the war, supported by battery of 25 pounders, which had been brought up the Track. While Imita Ridge had the disadvantage that it was the last defensive position on the Kokoda Trail before Port Moresby, the Japanese did not attack.
Kenneth Eather | Papua New Guinea – Kokoda Trail, Buna, Gona
There, Maroubra Force was able to consolidate and regain its strength following the tempo of the previous stage of the fighting. In the days that followed, there were only small-scale actions. The Australians sent out regular patrols towards Ioribaiwa to determine Japanese dispositions and intent, while the Japanese worked solidify their hold on Ioribaiwa, digging-in, and sending out foraging parties. Imita Ridge, only a short distance from Port Moresby, ultimately proved to be the limit of the Japanese advance south. Having exhausted their supply line, which was increasingly being interdicted by US and Australian aircraft, and as events elsewhere, particularly Guadalcanal, coupled with the earlier defeat around Milne Bay, turned in favour of the Allies, the Japanese were forced into adopting a more defensive posture in New Guinea.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Aftermath
On 19/20 November, three companies from the 2/32nd Infantry Battalion, under the command of Major Bill Mollard, occupied the position, and began to attack the Japanese resupply parties that were moving through the area, inflicting heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the commander of the Japanese XVIII Army, Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi, ordered Katagiri to launch another counterattack. The supply situation was acute by this stage, with ammunition running low and troops being limited to one-third of their daily rations, nevertheless the counterattack was scheduled for 23/24 November. However, the Australian occupation of Pabu and the threat it posed to the Japanese supply route, forced the Japanese commander to bring his schedule forward, and to divert some of the effort away from the recapture of Finschhafen and upon the Australian forces advancing towards Sattelberg in the south.
Huon Peninsula campaign | Pabu
The 20th Infantry Brigade had lost 3 killed and 13 wounded, but 958 had been evacuated sick, mostly with malaria, and an epidemic of dengue had also taken its toll. Large quantities of Japanese equipment had been captured, including six 75 mm guns, three 37 mm guns and three 20 mm guns.
Battle of Sio | Sio
On 21 July 1942, Japanese forces landed on the northern Papuan coast around Buna and Gona. The landing was part of a plan to capture the strategically important town of Port Moresby via an overland advance along the Kokoda Track following the failure of a seaborne attempt at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. While more forces were gradually committed to face the advancing Japanese, the South Seas Detachment, under command of Major General Tomitaro Horii advanced steadily south towards their objective on the southern coast. During a series of battles along the track in August and September, the Japanese force fought the Australians back to Ioribaiwa, near the southern end of the Kokoda Track.
Second Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Background
Sabotage of the bridges that spanned the various creeks that crossed the track held up the tanks, which were forced to wait while engineers came forward. While a bridge was being prepared for the tanks to cross a stream, attempts were made to attack the Japanese with infantry, however the ground was too rough and hard to penetrate and after suffering two casualties, the attack was called off. The Japanese attempted to delay the oncoming Australian units with snipers and suicide actions, however the supporting fire from the Australian tanks, which had joined the combat after crossing the stream and which at some points closed to to fire at the Japanese, was used effectively where Japanese resistance was heaviest.
Battle of Wareo | Pursuit of Japanese forces to Bonga
The operation jumped off on 5 December, with the 29th/46th Infantry Battalion passing through the bridgehead established by the 22nd. It soon came under sporadic enemy fire, and a tank was disabled by a land mine. In the face of mounting opposition, the advance was halted near the lagoon. It resumed the next day, and the Japanese withdrew after an artillery bombardment, their orders being "while avoiding any decisive engagement" to "carry out successful resistance to try to delay the enemy advance". This became the pattern, with the Japanese preferring to withdraw rather than suffer heavy casualties. On 10 December, Edgar brought all three of his battalions into the line and by 14 December they were closing in on Lakona, a key position on the 20th Division's retreat route.
Battle of Sio | Fortification Point
The Huon Peninsula campaign was a series of battles fought in north-eastern Papua New Guinea in 1943–1944 during the Second World War. The campaign formed the initial part of an offensive that the Allies launched in the Pacific in late 1943 and resulted in the Japanese being pushed north from Lae to Sio on the northern coast of New Guinea over the course of a four-month period. For the Australians, a significant advantage was gained through the technological edge that Allied industry had achieved over the Japanese by this phase of the war, while the Japanese were hampered by a lack of supplies and reinforcements due to Allied interdiction efforts at sea and in the air.
Huon Peninsula campaign | Introduction
Two Japanese battalions from the 144th Infantry Regiment forming Horii's South Seas Detachment had pursued the Australians from Efogi, while the main Japanese force had remained behind waiting for permission to continue the advance. The Japanese pursuit group subsequently launched their attack on Ioribaiwa Ridge just as the two Australian battalions began to deploy into their attacking positions on either side of the defensive line: the 2/33rd was positioned to the left of the 2/14th and 2/16th on a knoll on the western side of the east–west ridge line, and the 2/33rd was on the right of line, to the east of the 3rd Infantry Battalion.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Battle
Initially only limited Australian forces were available to oppose them, and after making rapid progress, the Japanese South Seas Force under Horii clashed with understrength Australian forces at Awala on 23 July, before forcing them back to Kokoda. During the PIB's first engagement Lieutenant John Chalk's platoon had participated in an ambush of the Japanese troops advancing towards Kokoda. Chalk and a scout party had moved to Sangara on the night of 22 July where they observed a Japanese force camped. The next morning he reported their arrival by runner and was ordered by Watson to engage them. That night, Chalk and his 40-man platoon ambushed Japanese forces from a hill overlooking the Gona–Sangara road, killing several before withdrawing into the jungle as they quickly responded with small arms and mortar fire.
Papuan Infantry Battalion | Buna to Kokoda, June 1942 – January 1943
Nevertheless, a lack of supplies forward of Port Moresby continued to limit the ability of the Allies to concentrate troops along the Kokoda Track throughout much of the campaign, as the native carrier system was stretched and aerial resupply – a technique that was still developing – was less effective than initially envisaged. Shortly afterwards, a bridge at Wairopi was destroyed by the withdrawing PIB troops who had been reinforced by a platoon of Australians from the 39th Infantry Battalion. There was a brief fire-fight on 24 July, before the Japanese began forcing a crossing of the Kumusi River in rubber assault boats supported by mortars and machine gun fire.
Battle of Isurava | Strategic situation
The 2/28th Infantry Battalion put a patrol over the Kalueng River on 1 December. The previous day artillery had been used to reduce the Japanese presence in the area of the "Lagoon" – north of Gusika – and, as a consequence, the patrol was able to penetrate deep to the north, almost reaching the Lagoon before turning around. On the return leg, the Australians located a Japanese position and attacked it, killing one and wounding three others before skirting around the position and moving south in an effort to regain Australian lines. A second Japanese force, however, blocked their way and after a firefight at sunset in which a further three Australians were wounded, they were forced back to the north, where they established a defensive position.
Battle of Wareo | Kalueng Lakes
The 79th Infantry Regiment crossed the Song River and attacked Scarlet Beach from the west, while the 2nd Battalion, 238th Infantry Regiment, which had been detached from the 41st Division, attacked south from Gusika. By using infiltration tactics the Japanese skirted around the lead elements of the 24th Brigade in an attack that was intended to roll up the Australian rear elements, however, the Australians in turn attacked the flanks of the Japanese units, mauling their supply columns and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. This had the effect of squeezing the strength out of the Japanese counterattack and forcing them into undertaking piecemeal attacks which were dealt with by the Australians with relative ease.
Battle of Sattelberg | Japanese counter-attack
Before moving over the mountains, the 20th Division headquarters elected to destroy its cryptographic materials rather than carry them. As the wet weather made burning them page by page a slow and difficult process, and a fire might attract the attention of the Allied Air Forces, someone decided to simply bury them in a steel trunk in a stream bed. An Australian sapper checking the stream bed for booby traps with a metal detector discovered it, and it was dug up in the belief that it was a mine. An intelligence officer recognised the contents as code books and soon it was on its way to the Central Bureau in Brisbane.
Battle of Sio | Sio
While the lead company fixed the Japanese position, the other two conducted a passage of lines manoeuvre and bypassed the Japanese machine gun position as they continued the advance towards Nongora. The lead company then also broke contact and followed them, and in the early afternoon, finding themselves confronted by a high feature to their front which blocked their path east towards Nongora, they established a defensive position short of their objective; meanwhile, the 2/15th's fourth company, following up in reserve, found the Japanese machine gun position abandoned and subsequently occupied it. On 1 December, the Australians began to prepare to capture the high ground to their front.
Battle of Wareo | Nongora and Christmas Hills
From there the Australians withdrew to their final defensive line around Imita Ridge. But there was no climactic battle at Imita Ridge, as Horii finally cancelled his offensive on 14 September and began withdrawing north to shorten his line of communication and bring supplies forward for his troops to regain their strength. On 23 September, the Japanese 17th Army ordered the withdrawal of part of Horii's force back to the beachheads around Buna. Five days later, the Australians began tentative moves forward of Imita Ridge. Finding Ioribaiwa abandoned, they began their pursuit of the Japanese that were withdrawing north. Further actions were fought at Templeton's Crossing and around Oivi and Gorari throughout October, with the latter concluding on 11 November.
Battle of Isurava | Subsequent operations
Supplies were landed by US troops from the 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, and then brought up and cached around Jivevaneng and Kumawa, but heavy rain hampered the Australian efforts until mid-November. The Australians subsequently were able to reduce and then secure the Japanese strong hold around Sattelberg against determined resistance following a hard slog through dense jungle, working in concert with the Matilda tanks. Elsewhere, further actions were planned, with the 7th Division preparing to advance through the Markham and Ramu Valleys as part of the inland advance towards Shaggy Ridge and then the north coast, in order to cut off the Japanese withdrawal route from the Huon Peninsula.
Battle of Finschhafen | Aftermath
In March 1942, the Japanese landed troops around Lae and Salamaua in the Australian mandated territory of New Guinea. A seaborne assault on Port Moresby was turned back in May at the Battle of the Coral Sea, after which the Japanese established a beachhead at Buna–Gona in late July as plans were made to capture Port Moresby via an overland route from the northern Papuan coast. Subsequently, heavy fighting took place during the Kokoda Track campaign and around Milne Bay. The Japanese advance ended just before their objective and subsequently the Australians went on the offensive, eventually pursuing the withdrawing Japanese back to their beachheads around Buna and Gona where the Australians linked up with US forces and heavy fighting followed against the Japanese between November 1942 and January 1943.
Battle of Mubo | Background
Shortly after the Australians had landed at Scarlet Beach in late September, they began to patrol the area north of there towards Bonga and Gusika. Several key tracks and junctions were located by troops from the 2/43rd Infantry Battalion, who named them "Imperial", "Oriental", "Norfolk" and "Exchange", after Adelaide pubs. Through the use of aerial reconnaissance evidence was found that the Japanese were using these tracks to traverse the area and to move supplies west towards Sattelberg. Observation posts were established and it became apparent to the Australians that one hill in particular, a feature later dubbed "Pabu" by the Australians after one of their native scouts, was the key terrain in the area.
Battle of Wareo | Prelude
The two combined battalions began digging in around Isurava. A headquarters had been set up at the top of the hill, which was vital to the defence of the position. While the Australians dug themselves in, the Japanese, led by Japanese Major General Tomitarō Horii, prepared to attack. On 28 August, the Japanese launched their offensive. The Australians, who had initially been outnumbered but were now roughly equal in strength, resisted in the face of heavy machine-gun fire and hand-to-hand combat. On 29 August, the Japanese broke through the right flank, pushing the Australians back with heavy fire, threatening to cut off their headquarters.
Bruce Kingsbury | Battle of Isurava
Amidst torrential rain and stiff defence, progress was slow as each defensive position had to be dealt with individually. As the water level in the creek rose steadily, the troops came under heavy mortar fire and were attacked with grenades lobbed from the heights above. The supply situation grew desperate too, but by 28 October the 2/3rd Battalion had managed to work its way around the Japanese right flank in preparation for an attack. In the afternoon, the battalion launched its attack, breaking through the Japanese outposts and into the main position. The defenders were overwhelmed and many of them abandoned their weapons as they fled.
2/3rd Battalion (Australia) | Fighting in New Guinea, 1942–1943
In aftermath of the battle, as the Australians withdrew towards Eora Creek the Japanese pushed over the crest of the ridge south of the Isurava rest house and then occupied Alola. There they secured a large amount of small arms ammunition and grenades, as well as rations which were eagerly consumed by the troops who were now beginning to feel the effects of hunger as a result of an already strained supply line. On 28 August, Horii had received orders to secure an advanced position south of the Owen Stanleys, but to keep the majority of his force to the north while the situation around Guadalcanal was resolved.
Battle of Isurava | Subsequent operations
In the centre, though, the Japanese were able to break through to Siki Cove, and in the process isolated several Australian units, including those fighting on the western flank around Jivevenang, forcing the Australians to resort to air drops to keep their forces supplied. While the Japanese briefly managed to force the Australians to contract their forces around the beachhead, and Japanese aircraft were able to attack the Allied ground troops around the area over three successive nights between 19 and 21 October, the attack eventually ran out of momentum on 24 October, at which point the Japanese commander, Yamada, ordered his forces to concentrate around the high ground at Sattelberg, where they planned to make further attacks.
Landing at Scarlet Beach | Aftermath
Heavy fighting ensued, but Finschhafen fell to the Australians on 2 October. Following this, the 9th Division was tasked with advancing towards Sio, further around the coast on the northern side of the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese in the area around Finschhafen were growing in strength, however, as a large number of the 4,000 to 5,000 men that had garrisoned Finschhafen had managed to escape inland, while the rest of the 20th Division, under the command of Lieutenant General Shigeru Katagiri, was being moved from Bogadjim, south of Madang, to provide reinforcements. Wootten considered that the threat posed by this force meant that Sattelberg would have to be captured before the 9th Division could undertake its advance towards Sio.
Battle of Sattelberg | Background
Both battles consisted of a series of engagements that occurred in the upper reaches of the Eora Creek valley. The first battle was fought from 31 August 1942 to 5 September 1942, as the Australian forces were withdrawing in the face of the Japanese advance. The second battle was fought from 11 to 28 October 1942, as the Australian forces pursued the Japanese forces withdrawing back to the north coast of Papua. In each battle, a significant engagement was fought in the vicinity of Templeton's Crossing.
Templeton's Crossing | Introduction
On 21 July 1942, Japanese forces landed on the northern Papuan coast around Buna and Gona, as part of a plan to capture the strategically important town of Port Moresby via an overland advance along the Kokoda Track following the failure of a seaborne attempt at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. After minor skirmishes with small groups of Australian and Papuan forces around Awala, Australian resistance along the track grew and throughout July and August a number of battles were fought along the Kokoda Track as the Japanese advanced force, Colonel Yosuke Yokoyama's 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, advanced steadily south towards their objective on the southern coast.
First Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Background
These troops were initially tasked with proving the route over the Owen Stanleys before the main body of the landing force, Major General Tomitaro Horii's South Seas Detachment, arrived. Following the landing, several minor skirmishes took place between the advanced elements of the Japanese landing force – Yokoyama Force – and small groups of Australian and Papuan forces primarily from the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) around Awala and Giruwa. Brushing these aside, the Japanese began advancing steadily towards their objective on the southern coast. Meanwhile, the Australians, who had deployed only limited forces north of Port Moresby attempted to delay the Japanese along the track long enough to bring reinforcements forward.
Battle of Kokoda | Background
This continued until torrential rain and flooding brought the advance to a halt short of the objective, washing away many bridges and roads upon which the Australians relied for supplies. As the Australian advance stalled, the Japanese began harassing the Australian line of communications, and as the rain stopped and the flooding subsided in late-July and into August, the Australians began making preparations to resume the advance towards Buin again. Ultimately, though, the war came to an end before the final Australian advance began, bringing the campaign to an end.
Battle of the Hongorai River | Introduction
The next day Company Headquarters moved to Sialum by barge. A Company, PIB started moving along the coast, while a four-man patrol from 4 Platoon tasked with probing inland moved in front of a platoon from D Company, 2/24th Battalion. This patrol located the bodies of number of Japanese who had starved to death, while a number of others in ill health were also killed in clashes, being indicative of the acute supply problems the Japanese were now experiencing. On 9 January Company Headquarters moved to Kelanoa Harbour, then coming under command of the 20th Brigade (less 4 Platoon). Moving rapidly, the Papuans supported a company of the 2/17th Battalion, crossing the Kapugara River on 13 January.
Papuan Infantry Battalion | Saidor–Sio, January – March 1944
In the Australian 5th Division's advance from Sio to Saidor between 20 January and the end of February, 734 Japanese were killed, 1,793 found dead, and 48 Japanese prisoners were taken. Australian and Papuan casualties came to 3 killed and 5 wounded. The US 32nd Infantry Division at Saidor killed 119 Japanese and captured 18, while losing 40 killed, 11 wounded, 16 missing.
Landing at Saidor | Casualties
The Japanese began to adapt their tactics in other ways also. To negate the effectiveness of the Australian tanks, the Japanese began to position themselves off the roads, forcing the infantry to fight without their armoured support. Additionally, the Japanese began to concentrate their artillery with increasing accuracy upon the advancing infantry, which they kept under constant observation and fire.
Battle of the Hongorai River | Advance to the Hongorai
Further negotiations the week after did not resolve the issue. On 13 October, the sides met again and Kido asserted that the Japanese forces would not transfer further weapons to the Indonesian authorities. Japanese authorities were later informed that the Indonesian side had decided to forcefully acquire the weapons.
Battle of Semarang | Background
Following the advance to the Hongorai, there was a pause of about a week as the Australians had to wait for roads to be improved and supplies to be brought up, before attempting to cross the Hongorai en masse. This allowed Savige to re-evaluate the situation and to issue new orders for the advance towards the Hari and Mivo Rivers. As they waited for the advance to resume, the Australians carried out reconnaissance patrols deep into Japanese held territory and there were a couple of significant engagements during this time. As a part of these, the 24th Infantry Battalion sent a company across the Hongorai and subsequently located a strong Japanese position on a feature that became known as Egan's Ridge, which, due to its location, commanded the main Australian axis of advance.
Battle of the Hongorai River | Crossing the Hongorai
Meanwhile, patrols had been undertaken searching for isolated pockets of Japanese on the western side of the river, while reinforcements in the shape of the ad hoc Chaforce, consisting of one company from each battalion of the 21st Brigade, began arriving to reinforce the 25th Brigade. Late on 16 November, the Australians had completed their crossing, and the pursuit of the withdrawing Japanese forces continued. The surviving Japanese from the Kokoda campaign subsequently gathered at the mouth of the Kumusi, joining up with Japanese reinforcements that were landed there in early December. The months that followed saw heavy fighting on the northern coast of Papua, around Buna and Gona, as the Allies undertook a costly frontal assault against the Japanese beachheads, which had been heavily fortified.
Battle of Oivi–Gorari | Aftermath
In August, the Japanese 48th Division—commanded by Lieutenant General Yuitsu Tsuchihashi—began arriving from the Philippines and garrisoned Kupang, Dili and Malacca, relieving the Ito detachment. Tsuchihashi then launched a major counter-offensive in an attempt to push the Australians into a corner on the south coast of the island. Strong Japanese columns moved south—two from Dili and one from Manatuto on the northeast coast. Another moved eastward from Dutch Timor to attack Dutch positions in the central south of the island. The offensive ended on 19 August when the main Japanese force was withdrawn to Rabaul, but not before they secured the central town of Maubisse and the southern port of Beco.
Battle of Timor | Japanese counter-offensive, August 1942
After this, rearguard actions were fought around Eora Creek and Templeton's Crossing, as well as around Efogi, before the Australians fell back towards Menari, where their rearguard clashed with the pursuing Japanese in the Maguli Range, before the withdrawal continued on to Ioribaiwa in mid-September. The fighting around Ioribaiwa saw the remnants of the Australian 21st Brigade reinforced by the 25th Brigade, clash with Japanese forces from the 144th Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Masao Kusunose, which had been leading the Japanese advance south. In the lead up to the battle, Brigadier Arnold Potts, the commander of Maroubra Force, was relieved of his command following the defeat around Efogi.
Battle of Ioribaiwa | Background
On 19 January, the 31st/51st Infantry Battalion's 'A' Company, under Captain Clyde Downs, sent a platoon-sized patrol out to outflank the Japanese forward positions; this patrol moved first to the right flank and then north along the jungle tracks around Totokei and Goton. Discovering evidence of Japanese movement in the area, they proceeded to the village of Kunamatoro, about north of Junapopo. Here they encountered a force of around 30 to 50 Japanese and after the initial contact, in which the Australian platoon commander was wounded, the patrol attacked the village. Within 10 minutes the battle was over: 14 Japanese had been killed, along with a further five wounded, while the Australians lost one killed, one wounded and one missing.
Battle of Tsimba Ridge | Battle
In the days that followed, skirmishes were fought around Gorari and at Oivi, before the Australians and Papuans were forced back to Deniki. From there, a small force was sent north to Kokoda, with the intent of holding the village and its logistically important airfield. Over the course of a fortnight, two important engagements were fought around Kokoda in late July and early August. This was followed by a short but sharp engagement around Deniki before the Australians withdrew towards Isurava on 14 August. In the short lull that followed, the Japanese began landing the main body of Horii's South Seas Detachment on the northern coast, while minor patrol actions resulted in several skirmishes north of Isurava.
Battle of Isurava | Strategic situation
A forward observation post had also been established on the Isurava ridgeline. The Australians maintained a patrol presence forward of their occupied areas. Throughout 24 and 25 August, as the Japanese force began pressing forward, patrols from the 53rd Infantry Battalion clashed with groups of Japanese in front of Isurava, and on the other side of Eora Creek around Missima. Potts, realising that Horii had launched a major attack, decided to deploy the 2/14th under Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Key to Isurava, using the 39th to screen their movement. The 2/16th, under Lieutenant Colonel Albert Caro, was brought forward to Alola, where it would be held in reserve.
Battle of Isurava | Japanese assault
The Japanese force was supported by four artillery pieces and an engineer platoon, while Australians had only a single 3-inch mortar for indirect fire support. Although the withdrawal resulted in the loss of their supply dump around the dry lake at Myola, the action was a successful rearguard action for the Australians, with the slowness of the Japanese pursuit contributing to this. The foodstuffs captured at Myola by the Japanese were later found to have been contaminated by the withdrawing Australians, rendering them useless. Following the fighting around Eora Creek, the Japanese 41st Regiment was criticised, particularly by members of its sister regiment, the 144th, and by Horii, for its slow rate of advance towards Efogi and its inability to destroy the Australian force, thus allowing it to regroup.
First Battle of Eora Creek – Templeton's Crossing | Aftermath
Throughout 11 October, around Pallier's Hill, elements of the 2/14th Infantry Battalion had clashed with Japanese troops that were threatening to cut off the 2/27th's supply line to the south. Meanwhile, the 2/27th had continued to advance, securing two features to the east of Shaggy Ridge, these were dubbed "John's Knoll" and "Trevor's Ridge" by the Australians. Shortly afterwards, the 2/27th came under heavy attack by Japanese troops, starting early on 12 October. The capture of John's Knoll threatened the Japanese supply lines between their forward positions along the Surinam River and, as a result, Captain Shoichi Kagawa, in command of II/78th, was ordered to retake the position.
Battle of John's Knoll–Trevor's Ridge | Battle
A firefight ensued in which six Japanese and seven Australians were killed, before the Australian attack was turned back.
Battle of Wareo | Nongora and Christmas Hills
A later patrol resulted in four Japanese being taken prisoner. The 57th/60th and 58th/59th Infantry Battalions continued to patrol heavily across a wide area around the Bogadjim Road, and they subsequently joined up with US troops around Sungum. The Japanese had re-orientated themselves into positions at various locations including Alibu, Rereo, Wenga, Redu and Kaliko. During this time, a number of small unit actions were undertaken as the Japanese attempted to ambush the Australians while the Australians in turn sought to infiltrate the Japanese positions. On 22 April, large amounts of Japanese supplies were found abandoned by a patrol from the 57th/60th as it became clear that the Japanese were withdrawing from the area in a hasty fashion.
Battle of Madang | Battle