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01b6e21a-761e-484d-a658-3389e5083cb1
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/carbon-budget-delivery-plan_19fa3072ff04d7abab9199e50abfb92c.pdf
| 2,023
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[
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Rebalancing will generate the clear short- term price signal necessary to shift households and businesses to lower- technologies such as heat pumps. CB 4 This policy is intended to support delivery from CB4 onwards by ensuring consumers are not penalised for making green choices through reducing running costs of low carbon heating, relative to fossil fuel alternatives. reduction in pigs. Endemic production- limiting disease is a major at on efficient livestock production and will have an impact on the carbon footprint of livestock farming. Improving health status would be expected to lead to reductions in emissions intensity. The Animal Health and Welfare Pathway aims to improve farm animal health and welfare across our national herds and flocks, including an in-development Porcine Reproductive Improving the health status of pigs would be expected to lead to reductions in the emissions intensity of pork production. This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research. Defra is currently undertaking research to quantify the emissions savings associated with improved pig health but this has not
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ and Respiratory Syndrome virus control Development of more sustainable protein sources for human diets. Alternative proteins could offer environmental benefits. However, the sector is diverse and at different stages of readiness and investment, and so further research is needed to overcome technological barriers, increase understand consumer acceptance preferences and accomplish an optimal regulatory alignment that meets the needs of the sector and consumer safety. Within a broad and varied market, some alternative proteins may offer environmental benefits through low emissions intensity associated with production. Emissions savings towards the carbon budgets could be delivered via a shift in the agricultural sector in response to market drivers. This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research and market drivers. Developing the evidence base on controlled environment agriculture (CEA) systems/vertical agriculture. These systems make it possible to consistently and reliably control and/or manipulate the growing environment. This effectively controls crop nutrition and growth along with potential pathogens (pests and diseases) on the crop, and CEA/vertical farming could improve the energy efficiency of production (including reducing transport emissions). This could lead to reductions in the emissions intensity of the arable/horticulture sector. This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research. These systems are likely to increase GHG emissions until renewable energy sources become more widely available. We continue to undertake research and monitor the
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ increases the potential to reduce transport/import emissions and improve Methanisation, methane capture and combustion. Additional mitigation intervention whereby the methane generated during storage of liquid manure is collected and burnt, converting it to carbon dioxide, a less potent GHG. There may also be potential to utilise heat or energy produced on combustion Methane, generated during storage of liquid manure, is collected and burnt. This converts the methane to carbon dioxide, a less potent greenhouse gas, which may deliver carbon savings. There may also be potential to utilise the heat and energy produced. This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research. Although initial quantification has been attempted, significant uncertainty remains and further work is needed, and further Biorefinery as nutrient recovery. We continue to support research and development in this area such as through the Farming Innovation Programme. The Programme funds industry-led research and development to drive innovation that will enhance the productivity and profitability of England’s farming sectors, whilst enhancing the environment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It has already supported a range of projects, including ones which focus on biorefinery as nutrient recovery. For instance, the ‘Bringing H2OPE to Agriculture’ project looks at on-site Producing high-value products, such as livestock feed or fertilisers from waste could support a more circular economy in which emissions are avoided or reduced from feed or fertiliser production. This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research. Although initial quantification has been attempted, significant uncertainty remains, and further work is needed. No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ transformation of dairy cow slurry into valuable byproducts including fertiliser Using insect protein as animal feed. Feeding insect protein to animals has the potential to reduce overall global emissions from feed production (in comparison to conventional protein production e.g. soya grown overseas) and support a circular economy (e.g. if insects are raised on waste). There is ongoing research to determine the potential of these measures and the sector is at an early stage of development. This measure is unlikely to have significant UK GHG or land use impacts. It could, however, reduce supply chain emissions from feed supply occurring outside the scope of UK carbon Feeding insect protein to animals may reduce overall global emissions from feed production by displacing soya grown in deforested areas and support a more circular economy. Whilst this may be an important technology to reduce emissions across the livestock supply chain, it may have limited impacts on UK emissions. Further work is required to understand the impacts on UK territorial emissions within scope of the Climate Change Act versus wider international This is emerging work and the potential emissions reductions are contingent on research (including an assessment of any potential impacts on animal and public
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ Policy roadmap for the safe use of timber in construction. Increasing the safe use of timber in construction was a commitment in the England Trees Action Plan and the Net Zero Strategy, as it can support storing carbon safely, for example through using timber to build houses. This work will be taken forward in particular through the cross-government and industry timber in construction working group, which will design a policy roadmap identifying key actions for government and industry to safely increase timber use in construction.
|
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| 35
|
01b8584a-5af0-4fb4-922e-d190a3929d43
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/clean-power-2030-action-plan_9a166355c3212349aff192a8697f8558.pdf
| 2,024
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Following the consultation we are now progressing a range of actions The U K and the Scottish Government share the view that the consenting regime for larger scale electricity infrastructure in Scotland is not fit for purpose. Delays are caused by inefficient and outdated features of the existing legislative framework. The U K government, with the support of the Scottish Government, agree that the most pragmatic route to speeding up the deployment of low carbon electricity infrastructure is to reform the existing legislative framework. We will seek powers to reform the current legislative framework for electricity infrastructure consenting in Scotland, with changes deployed by the Scottish Government. The Electricity Act 1989 could, and remove inefficiencies, whilst giving communities and statutory consultees meaningful opportunities to influence The U K and Scottish Governments have worked together closely on reforms to electricity infrastructure consenting in Scotland referenced above. The recent consultation gathered evidence on a package of proposals which would help to streamline the existing outdated system in Scotland, which will encourage investment and acceleration towards our Additionally, with specific regard to consenting for offshore electricity infrastructure, the Scottish Government has been actively engaged with the U K government in the development and implementation of the reforms being delivered via the Offshore Wind Environmental Improvement Package under the Energy Act 2023, which will enable more efficient regulation of adverse environmental impacts arising from Scottish offshore wind developments. The Scottish Government also continues to pursue a continuous improvement approach to Scottish consenting processes through its Consenting Streamlining Unit, implementing more streamlined procedures where beneficial. The Welsh Government has recently taken action to accelerate their infrastructure planning decisions. Immediate action has including enabling Planning and Environmental Decisions Wales (P E D W ) to take decision on energy projects up to 50 MW, and prioritising applications for Developments of National Significance which have the greatest public benefits. Longer term, the Infrastructure (Wales) Act sets out the new consenting process for significant infrastructure projects in Wales both on land and in the territorial 56 Welsh Government (2024), ‘Implementing the Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024’ (viewed in December 2024). . This replaces multiple existing consenting processes with a single process. It will provide confidence and certainty in the decision-making process which is underpinned by clear policy that strikes the right balance between the need for infrastructure projects to help combat climate change whilst respecting our They have produced a consultation paper on development of a resilient and high performing planning service, including proposals for funding, performance monitoring, and increasing staffing skills 57 Welsh Government (2024), ‘Promoting a resilient and high performing planning service’ (viewed in December 2024). Our grid infrastructure needs strengthening. Failure to do so risks holding back our energy security, economic growth and other important infrastructure with lengthy delays. Across many walks of life, people see grid infrastructure as a massive In truth, Great Britain’s electricity network must undergo unprecedented expansion, as the economy electrifies, to deliver decarbonisation, energy affordability and energy security, and support economic growth. T o connect new generation and meet future demand, around twice as much new transmission network infrastructure will be needed in Great Britain by 2030 as has been delivered in the past decade 58 NESO (2024), ‘Clean Power 2030’ (viewed in December 2024). In addition to relevant cross-cutting actions on planning, supply chains, and skills we will take action to deliver the network we need at the right Fundamentally reforming the connections process T O s and D N O s to prioritise viable projects that align with the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan. Without these critical reforms, the queue will not align with our strategic needs and the projects we need will be delayed. Regulatory reform to ensure that the Clean Power 2030 target is better integrated into planning and investment decision making, enabling investment in networks ahead of need. This includes working with Ofgem to explore the appropriateness of tightening the incentives and penalties to drive the acceleration of network build- Improving networks planning and consenting to provide the levers to accelerate the expansion and upgrades required across our transmission and distribution network to ensure energy infrastructure can support the delivery of the 2030 target. Engaging with communities to enable them to benefit from living near new transmission network infrastructure. Urgent action is required to ensure that the grid we need is in place for the connection of low-carbon generation and electrification of sectors such as transport, heating, and industry. Network build must be accelerated to address annual constraint costs, which are projected to increase without action from the already high level of around £2 billion 59 National Grid E S O (2022), ‘Monthly Balancing Services Summary’ (viewed in December 2024). 60 Undiscounted, 2022/23 prices. (or £80 per household per year) in 61 D E S N Z (2023), ‘Community benefits for electricity transmission network government response’ (viewed in December 2024). to network build persist. This cannot be Network constraints occur when the electricity system is unable to transmit power to electricity users because the maximum capacity of the circuit is reached. Constraint costs arise when NESO has to manage this problem by paying generators to reduce (turn-down) their electricity output in areas that are congested and switch on (turn-up) in locations closer to electricity users. Work is required to significantly reduce the end-to-end delivery time for new transmission infrastructure. In the 62 D E S N Z (2023), ‘Independent Accelerating electricity transmission network Electricity Networks Commissioner,s recommendations’ (viewed in December 2024). (Advisory Commissioner to the Clean Power 2030 Mission), he set out recommendations to halve timelines from 14 to 7 years, starting with strategic spatial planning of energy projects which would allow the network to be planned holistically ahead of need.
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/the-clean-growth-strategy_af15f03cfcd3b9529c696ef513762900.pdf
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This means that we have reduced emissions faster than any other G7 nation, while leading the G7 group of countries in growth in national This progress has meant that we have outperformed the target emissions reductions of our first carbon budget (2008 to 2012) by one per cent5 and we project that we will outperform against our second and third budgets, covering the years 2013 to 2022, by almost five per cent and four per cent respectively 6. Our economy is expected to grow by 12 per cent over that time7. This will be a significant achievement. We have made progress across every sector of 1 There are several greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to climate change, the most abundant of which is carbon dioxide. Because of this, we measure emissions of GHGs in terms of millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt). One tonne of carbon dioxide fills roughly the same space as a small house. 2 BEIS (2017) BEIS provisional UK emissions statistics 1990-2016 3 ONS (2016) Quarterly National Accounts Statistical bulletins (Series ABMI. Seasonally adjusted chained volume measures) grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/abmi 4 Figures on per capita basis. OECD (retrieved September 2017) World Resources Institute (2017) CAIT Climate Data 5 DECC (2014) 6 BEIS (2017) Energy and Emissions Projections 2016 7 OBR (March 2017) Economic and Fiscal Outlook OBR (January 2017) Fiscal Sustainability Report
UNFCCC; World Bank; BEIS1990 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy • In 2016, 47 per cent of our electricity came from low carbon sources, around double the level in 20109, and we now have the largest installed offshore wind capacity in the world. Our homes and commercial buildings have become more efficient in the way they use energy which helps to reduce emissions and also cut energy bills, for example average household energy consumption has fallen by 17 per cent since 1990 10. Automotive engine technology has helped drive down emissions per kilometre driven by up to 16 per cent and driving a new car bought in 2015 will save car owners up to £200 on their annual fuel bill, compared to a car bought new in 2000 11. England also recycles nearly four times more than it did 8 UNFCCC Data Interface (retrieved September 2017) World Bank, World Development Indicators (retrieved September 2017) .GDP .MKTP .PP .KD; BEIS (2017) Final GHG Emissions Inventory Statistics final-uk-greenhouse-gas-emissions-national-statistics-1990-2015 9 BEIS (2017): Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2017 10 BEIS (2017) Energy Consumption in the UK Change in average consumption per 11 Annual average household saving from driving a car purchased new in 2015 (the latest year for which data is available) compared to driving a car purchased new in 2000. Fuel savings valued using 2015 prices. DfT (2017) National Travel Survey; DfT (2017) Vehicles Statistics; ICCT (2015) From Laboratory to Road; BEIS (2016) Green Book supplementary appraisal guidance 12 Defra (2016) ENV18 - Local authority collected annual results env18-local-authority-collected-waste-annual-results-tables
• This progress has been aided by the falling costs of many low carbon renewable power sources like solar and wind are comparable in cost to coal and gas in many countries 13; energy efficient light bulbs are over 80 per cent cheaper today than in 201014; and the cost of electric vehicle battery packs has tumbled by over • As a result of this technological innovation, new high value jobs, industries and companies have been created. And this is driving a new, technologically innovative, high growth and high value “low carbon” sector of the UK economy. Not only are we rapidly decarbonising parts of the domestic economy, but thanks to our world leading expertise in technologies such as offshore wind, power electronics for low carbon vehicles and electric motors, and global leadership in green finance, we are successfully exporting goods and services around the world – for example, one in every five electric vehicles driven in Europe is made in the UK 16. This progress now means there are more than 430,000 jobs in low carbon businesses and their supply chains, employing people in locations right This progress has altered the way that we see many of the trade-offs between investing in low carbon technologies that help secure our future but that might incur costs today. It is clear that actions to cut our emissions can be a win- cutting consumer bills, driving economic growth, creating high value jobs and helping to Of course, greenhouse gas emissions are a global problem and action is needed from all countries. The UK has played a key role in demonstrating international leadership on tackling climate change through its domestic action, climate diplomacy and financial support. The UK was among the first to recognise climate change as an economic and political issue as opposed to solely an environmental one and has used its world leading economic, science and technical skills to shape the global debate around climate change, for instance making the economic case for climate action in the landmark Stern Report in 200618. The UK has also used its influence and resources to help developing countries with their own clean growth – and our actions to date are expected to save almost 500 million tonnes of carbon dioxide over the lifetime of the projects19, more than the entire annual emissions of France 20.
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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1095952/jet-zero-strategy.pdf
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The Future Aviation Skills research project will look to determine what skills the aviation workforce will need in order to fully integrate emerging aviation technologies, including ZEF technologies, and will provide recommendations as to how industry and government can best ensure that these skills needs are met. This is especially important as a better understanding of the novel zero emission technologies will result in effective support during its rapid development and then into commercialisation. We are also building partnerships with colleges and universities to help build and upskill a future talent pipeline capable of taking forward long-term innovation work including in green skills and ZEF. 3.40 We will support the development Hydrogen Hub, including through industry engagement, to generate demonstration activity at Teesside International Airport, supporting future demand and investment in the region. The Government published the British Energy Security Strategy42 in April 2022, which details our new ambition of achieving 1GW and 10GW of low carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2025 and 2030 respectively. This is supported by the UK Hydrogen Strategy43 which provides the key steps needed in the 2020s to meet our targets and has set the context for further scale up on the way to net zero. 3.41 Government and industry will work jointly through the newly established Group. The Jet Zero Council provides a platform which will be used to consider the wider enabling framework for zero emission flight, including the infrastructure, regulatory and commercialisation requirements. It will consider how best to take forward the conclusions of the FlyZero and ZEFI projects, and support the delivery of our ambition for zero emissions routes in the UK this decade. 3.42 We will encourage the adoption of innovative zero emission aircraft and aviation technology in GA. GA is a diverse sector and includes activities such as business aviation, emergency services (e.g. Search and Rescue), pilot training, and recreational flying. Often referred to as the 'grass roots' of aviation, GA can be a critical enabler and testbed for the development and implementation of new, greener technologies across all forms of aviation. Now is the ideal window of opportunity for GA to support and accelerate this implementation both within GA but also within the commercial sector where large scale benefits can also be realised. We will engage closely with the sector on how it can adapt, support and engage with the opportunities that decarbonisation brings. 3.43 We will use newly commissioned research, which aims to provide an evidence baseline in carbon emissions emitted by GA operations. This new evidence base will support the development of ambitious new policies to enable government to support the implementation of new technologies, procedures and regulation in supporting the GA sector adopt and introduce new technologies and greener ground-based infrastructure. Jet Zero Delivering net zero aviation by 2050
• Zero emission routes in the UK by 2030 • Successful demonstration of zero emission technologies, including those funded through the ATI Programme. • Increased public awareness of hydrogen aircraft by 2027 via the biannual public attitudes 'Transport Technology Tracker'44. Rolls-Royce ‘Spirit of Innovation’ aircraft. UK government investment, through the ATI Programme, helped enable Rolls-Royce to achieve the world’s fastest all-electric plane in 2021. • Increased number of zero emission flight projects across aircraft support that have developed from R&D to pilot testing and initial stage small scale commercialisation. • Diverse stakeholder representation within the Jet Zero Council ZEF DG
3.44 Successful carbon markets and investment in Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR) technologies are vital for the aviation sector to meet the UK’s net zero target. Carbon markets, where airline operators can obtain and surrender allowances, are now well established and also have the potential to facilitate investment in GGR technologies through enabling the integration of negative emissions. Carbon markets can provide a mechanism for decarbonisation to occur where it is most cost-effective to do so and provide a useful price signal for investors. This will be especially beneficial for the aviation sector and other hard-to-abate sectors that are likely to have emissions by 2050. 3.45 But we know that there are also challenges in deploying and scaling up nascent GGR technologies as well as building industry- wide support for their use. An international approach to carbon markets, for example by working through organisations such as ICAO, is required to help maximise value for money, maintain competitiveness and attract investment. The Government is committed to showing leadership in setting standards and targets to reduce carbon emissions but will engage purposefully with the aviation sector to ensure that targets and standards established by a markets and removals framework are achievable and properly costed. 3.46 The UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) covers all domestic flights in the UK as well as flights from the UK to the EEA, and to and from Gibraltar. This Strategy draws on UK ETS Authority proposals in the Developing the UK ETS consultation to increase the ambition of the scheme by aligning the cap with a clear net zero trajectory, and new carbon price assumptions which illustrate the potential costs faced by airline operators in future. This Strategy also reflects the need to expand the reach and impact of carbon markets by facilitating interaction between UK ETS and other international schemes such as CORSIA. Case Carbon Engineering Direct Air Capture system Since 2009, Carbon Engineering (CE) has pioneered a liquid sorbent-based Direct Air Capture (DAC). The DAC system is optimised for scale and can be used to support aviation decarbonisation in two complementary ways. Its AIR TO FUELSTM process produces highly scalable, low carbon intensity synthetic fuels. It also produces permanent, verifiable carbon removal that captures and stores atmospheric CO2 underground. This provides a flexible tool that has the potential to address aviation’s ‘hard to abate’ residual emissions at scale. CE’s DAC platform can be built in one or more modules, each capable of capturing 500,000 tonnes of CO2 annually. CE is now working with global partners to deploy at commercial scale.
|
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https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2017/12/scottish-energy-strategy-future-energy-scotland-9781788515276/documents/00529523-pdf/00529523-pdf/govscot%3Adocument/00529523.pdf
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Led by local authorities, working closely with their communities, this will set out a long term prospectus for investment in new energy efficiency, district heating, and other heat 2 Scotland’s Energy Efficiency Second Consultation on Local Heat & Energy Efficiency Strategies, and Regulation of District and Communal Navigating the Scottish Energy Strategy We conducted an open consultation3 on this Strategy, which drew 254 responses, with over half from businesses and representative organisations. Those responses, as well as feedback from the Scottish Energy Advisory Board, have helped shape, inform and influence This Strategy sets out our vision for 2050. It includes two indicative scenarios of how that future system might look (Chapter 2), a focus on our priorities and near-term actions (Chapter 3) and a review of the economic opportunities for We know that setting a vision is only just the beginning. Our 2050 energy system will depend ultimately on how we, society, businesses, the UK and international community, respond to challenges and opportunities along the way. We need to work on this together, right across Scottish society. All stakeholders and actors in the system – local government, organisations, regulators, individuals, businesses and others – will have a part to play in getting Scotland to the vision we set out above. Chapter 5 looks at how we intend to make this happen. 3 The consultation on a Scottish Energy The future of energy in Scotland sought views on a draft Energy Strategy and ran from January to May 2017. The consultation document, responses and independent analysis report are available on the Scottish Government’s Consultation gov.scot/energy-and-climate-change-directorate/draft- ScotRenewables SR2000 floating tidal turbine at Hatston Pier
Scotland’s electricity supply today is largely decarbonised. We are well on the way to our target of generating 100% of our electricity demand from renewables in 2020 – provisional statistics show 54% of Scotland’s electricity needs were met from renewables in 2016, with major new capacity due to connect to the system in the coming years. We are determined now to tackle the challenges of decarbonising heat and transport, in order to meet our longer term energy and climate change targets. Indigenous Production & Imports Scotland has long been an energy rich nation. That reputation, forged in the development of our coal, oil and gas reserves and engineering prowess, has since grown through the rapid development of our renewable resource. Scottish Energy Strategy 18/19 More than half (51%) of the energy we consume in our homes and businesses is used for heating, the majority of which is supplied by natural gas. An estimated 79% of homes used natural gas as their primary heating fuel in 2016. Transport accounts for 25% of total energy demand. The majority of this is for road transport. In recent years biofuel has been introduced into road fuel, and currently accounts for 3.1% of total Electricity accounts for just under a quarter of total energy demand, with 77% of electricity generation in 2015 coming from zero or low carbon sources, and 27% from wind energy alone. The installed capacity of renewables in Scotland reached 9.5 GW in June 2017. Energy consumption in Scotland in 2015 was 157 Terawatt-hours (TWh), significantly lower than a decade earlier. Total final energy consumption fell by 15.4% compared with the mid 2000s. Energy efficiency played a big part in this, as did the impact of the economic cycles, prevalent We have always prioritised tackling fuel poverty and, by the end of 2021, we will have allocated over £1 billion pounds since 2009 on tackling fuel poverty and improving energy efficiency. Scottish Government programmes, coupled with new building standards, have significantly increased energy efficiency. The Scottish House Condition Survey shows that just over two-fifths (43%) of homes in 2016 rated EPC band C or above, an increase of 77% since 2010. Scotland now has proportionately 38% more homes with a good EPC rating (C or above) than England. Source consumption-at-sub-national-level In 2015, total final energy consumption was 15.4% lower than the 2005-07 baseline, achieving our 12% energy efficiency target 6 years early. 2008 2009 2010 2 011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Change in Final Energy Consumption,
The cost of energy to consumers has risen considerably over the past two decades. In 2016 26.5% (or around 649,000 households) Domestic consumers in Scotland are now paying over 50% more for an average duel fuel energy bill than they were in 1998, with the cost of gas rising at a faster rate than electricity. Prices for non-domestic consumers have also risen substantially, with large industrial consumers in particular now paying some of the highest prices Producing useful energy for Scotland and Oil and gas remain vital, accounting for around 90% of total primary energy in 2015 meet the majority of Scotland’s heating and transport demand, as well as significant export Scotland (including Scottish adjacent waters) produced 63% of total UK gas production in 2016-17. While the UK as a whole has significant dependency on imported gas, in 2015, Scottish gas production represented roughly six times The share of renewable energy as a proportion of the energy we generate and consume has increased considerably over the past decade. Renewable energy sources now supply the equivalent of almost 18% of Scottish final energy consumption, up from around 8% in 2009. 4 The current definition of fuel poverty is “A household is in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, it would be required to spend more than 10% of its income on all household fuel use.” This definition has been reviewed and a new definition is currently being consulted on as part of the wider consultation on fuel 5 Primary energy represents the energy inputs to the energy system before transformation, including those which are exported, and excludes imports of petroleum products and electricity.
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Table 1.2 shows the comparison between the forecasts at Autumn Statement and Summer Budget. There are currently no published estimates for Public Sector Net Borrowing (
PSNB
) and Public Sector Net Debt (
PSND
) including Housing Associations before 2013-14. The reduction in the deficit as a share of
GDP
between 2015-16 and 2019-20 is mainly due to lower spending as a share of
GDP
. Total managed expenditure is forecast to decline by 3.2% of
GDP
, from 39.7% in 2015-16 to 36.5% in 2019-20, while public sector current receipts rise by only 1.1% of
GDP
(Chart 1.3). At
, the government set out that around £37 billion of further discretionary consolidation would be needed to deliver the surplus in 2019-20. Summer Budget 2015 set out around £17 billion of that total: £5 billion from tax avoidance, evasion and imbalances in the tax system, and £12 billion from welfare. The improvements to the forecast since
mean that the remaining consolidation now required is £18 billion as set out in Table 1.3. Spending Review 2015 delivers £12 billion of savings to overall
RDEL
spending. As announced at Summer Budget 2015, the government is introducing the
which will be worth £3 billion by 2019-20 and funds 3 million apprenticeships. The remaining £3 billion is being delivered through reforms such as Making Tax Digital and further measures to tackle tax avoidance. The
commits to achieving a surplus on the headline measure of the deficit,
PSNB
, in 2019-20 and to maintain a surplus in normal times in order to bring down debt as a share of
GDP
over the long term. Independent monetary policy now delivers low and stable medium-term inflation, to the benefit of the whole economy. This contrasts with the experience after World War II, when very high inflation, together with artificially low interest rates, played a major role in reducing debt. Responsible fiscal policy must also take into account the fact that the UK economy will continue to be hit by shocks in the future. Once future economic shocks are allowed for, running a deficit to finance capital investment (balancing only the current budget) and relying on trend economic growth is insufficient to bring down debt, as set out in HM Treasury analysis at Budget 2014. In a low inflationary environment, with economic shocks, the only reliable way to bring down debt as a share of
GDP
is to run an overall surplus in normal times. The
, approved by the House of Commons on 14 October 2015, defines the government’s targets as debt falling as a share of
GDP
each year until a surplus on the headline measure of
PSNB
is achieved by 2019-20, and to maintain a surplus in normal times thereafter. The simplicity and clarity of the metric ensure that governments will be held to account for their fiscal policy when the economy is performing well. Under the updated Charter, the surplus rule will be suspended if the economy is hit by a significant negative shock (defined as 4 quarter-on-4 quarter
GDP
growth below 1%). This provides flexibility to allow the automatic stabilisers to operate freely when needed. Following a shock, the government of the day will be required to set a plan to return to surplus, including appropriate fiscal targets. The framework does not prescribe what the targets should be, allowing the government of the day to respond to the circumstances. However, the targets will be voted on by the House of Commons and assessed by the
OBR
. The end goal is to ensure that long-term debt reduction continues, leaving the country better placed to withstand future economic shocks. Returning to a surplus in normal times will provide the government of the day with the fiscal space to allow appropriate action to be taken in the face of future shocks. The
OBR
’s November 2015
provides an assessment of the government’s performance against its fiscal targets. It confirms the government is on course to achieve a surplus on public sector net borrowing of £10.1 billion in the target year of 2019‑20 and to maintain a surplus in the following year, 2020-21. The
OBR
’s judgement is that the government’s policies are consistent with a roughly 55% chance of achieving the mandate in 2019-20. The government’s fiscal strategy is to reduce the deficit by around 1.1% of
GDP
a year on average for the next four years – the same pace as over the last Parliament. Chart 1.5 shows
PSND
as a percentage of
GDP
. At the beginning of the last Parliament, the government inherited the largest deficit in the post-war period. Since 2010, the government has taken action to cut the deficit, but
PSND
has more than doubled since the pre-recession period. The gap between the outturn and the forecast series in Chart 1.5 in 2014-15 is due to the reclassification of Housing Associations. The government’s fiscal mandate is supplemented by a target for
PSND
as a percentage of
GDP
to be falling in each year until 2019-20. The
OBR
forecasts that the debt target will be met with debt falling by 0.6% of
GDP
between 2014-15 and 2015-16. Public sector net debt continues to fall as a share of
GDP
across the forecast, reaching 71.3% of
GDP
by 2020-21. The government remains committed to bringing the UK’s Treaty deficit in line with the 3% target set out in the Stability and Growth Pact. The
OBR
’s forcast indicates that this target will be met in 2016-17. The government introduced the welfare cap at Budget 2014 to strengthen control of welfare spending, support fiscal consolidation and improve Parliamentary accountability for the level of welfare spending. The cap applies to welfare spending in Annually Managed Expenditure with the exception of the state pension and the automatic stabilisers. A full list of benefits and tax credits that are within scope of the welfare cap is set out at Annex B.
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Advances over the course of last year reinforce the view that this could be an important solution with an impact beyond 2050. Research and innovation will focus on demonstrating the commercial viability of fusion, by building a prototype fusion power plant in the UK that puts energy on the grid. The aim is for the UK to build a world-leading fusion industry which can export fusion technology in subsequent decades. 48 | UK Net Zero Research and Innovation Delivery Plan Challenge Current Programme Summary DESNZ Low-Cost Nuclear Challenge, part of the £385m Advanced Nuclear Fund (ANF), is funding industry led innovation, which aims to develop a compact, standardised nuclear power station product based around a UK-designed small modular reactor (SMR), using modern production methods. SMRs can then be built quickly by the UK supply chain, enabling new deployment in the UK by the early 2030s. These are intended to produce cost-competitive low-carbon electricity and export opportunities for UK businesses. DESNZ Advanced Modular Reactor (AMR) Research, Development and Demonstration Programme, part of the £385m Advanced Nuclear Fund (ANF), is aiming to develop and demonstrate High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technology. The programme is designed to identify and deliver the optimal technology demonstration, to maximise the impact that HTGRs could have on the UK’s net zero target, minimising the cost of energy and incentivising private investment. This includes funding for reactor and fuel design, maturity development and supporting complimentary ancillary and cross-cutting R&D. AMRs could also provide an important heat source for industry. DESNZ Advanced Fuel Cycle Programme (AFCP), part of the £385m Advanced Nuclear Fund, aims to develop skills, knowledge and capabilities in the areas of advanced fuels, recycling and waste management, through development of new technologies, processes and intellectual property, that can contribute towards a reduction in the whole lifecycle costs of nuclear energy. Other programmes, such as DESNZ NZIP Low Carbon Hydrogen Supply 2, will investigate integrating nuclear with other To enhance the UK’s engagement in international nuclear research and innovation activities, the Engage Programme is intended to help reduce the time, risk and cost of delivering policy objectives on advanced nuclear technologies (ANTs). The international collaboration undertaken as part of the programme helps to de-risk projects by working with partners to overcome challenges associated with ANTs and will provide access to peer review from
UK Net Zero Research and Innovation Delivery Plan | 49 Challenge Current Programme Summary UKRI continues to support an extensive Nuclear Fission Research Programme, £105m, including maintaining the UK’s capabilities in areas of strength, such as decommissioning; facilitating safe, cost- effective clean-up and waste disposal; addressing challenges in new build and alternative, safer fuels; and continuing to strengthen international collaborations to share best practise and accelerate the implementation of technologies. This includes the Transcend Consortium £1.4m SR22-25, (£4.5m overall) – which is focussing on the successful delivery of decommissioning, immobilisation and management of nuclear waste solutions. The Government has committed over £700m towards UK Fusion Programmes and facilities over 2022/23-2024/25, to design a UK fusion power plant (known as ‘STEP’ – Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production) and transform the UK’s research facilities into a hub for the global fusion industry (which will increasingly include commercial entities and a variety of technologies). The STEP Programme aims to develop and build a prototype energy demonstrator in the UK by 2040. By 2024, the programme will complete a concept design, identify key technical solutions and select a site. Five locations have been shortlisted, with the Government committed to announcing the preferred site by the UKRI Fusion Research Programme 2022-2027, £46m SR22-25, (£77m overall) – is innovating to make designs easier and cheaper, reducing uncertainties in design, and working with world-leaders from other sectors to exploit digital design methods. See above for DESNZ Advanced Fuel Cycle Programme, Challenge 3.2 & 3.3, also UKRI’s Nuclear Fission Research Programme and Transcend Consortium, Challenge 3.4. 8 Investment in fusion is with a view to longer-term energy options beyond 2050. R&D funding for fusion is therefore not included in the totals of net zero R&D outlined in this Delivery Plan. 50 | UK Net Zero Research and Innovation Delivery Plan The forthcoming Biomass Strategy will set out the Government’s position on future biomass use and the policies needed to support this across the economy. Public R&D will focus on priority uses of biomass including how to stimulate the production of sustainable domestic biomass, understanding the availability of sustainable biomass and improving the evidence base around production to support future biomass sustainability criteria. The Net Zero Strategy set an ambition to deploy 5 MT of greenhouse gas removals by 2030 and there is potential for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) to deliver the majority of this. New approaches to bioenergy, including the use of advanced bioengineering are being
UK Net Zero Research and Innovation Delivery Plan | 51 Challenge Current Programme Summary The UKRI Bioenergy Supergen Hub, £0.6m SR22-25, (£5.2m overall) – brings together UK bioenergy research groups to develop sustainable bioenergy systems. This will synthesise previous research work on land and feedstock availability to assess the potential resource for UK bioenergy and examine new crops that could deliver ecosystem benefits as well as biomass resource. Internationally, the UK is a supporting member of the Mission Innovation Integrated Biorefineries Mission co-led by India and the Netherlands. The aim of the Mission is to develop and demonstrate innovative solutions to accelerate the commercialisation of biorefineries, with a target of an additional 10% of fossil carbon replaced by sustainable bio-carbon by 2030 in fuels, chemicals and materials typically produced in domestic biorefineries. The DESNZ Net Zero Innovation Portfolio (NZIP) Biomass Feedstocks Innovation Programme, £36m, aims to increase the production of sustainable domestic biomass by funding innovative ideas that address barriers to biomass feedstock production. It will support improvements in productivity, through breeding, planting, cultivating and harvesting. 11 innovations will be developed along with a demonstrator operating across multiple UK sites.
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Discrepancies at a category level relate primarily to differences in allocation between the energy and IPPU sectors (e.g. for lubricants), and between the waste and ‘Other’ sectors (e.g.
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DESNZ, the Department for Transport, Defra, the Office of National Statistics and British Geological Survey) qualify as UK National Statistical Agencies (as defined in UN Guidance21) and abide by strict statistical QA/QC standards. Other organisations (e.g.
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"low-visibility 4.1 August mean temperature prediction in France based on ML approaches and synoptic predictive variables from reanalysis . 4.2 Experimental results and research issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Input variables from one reanalysis node . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Exploiting spatial diversity of reanalysis data to improve ML accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Extension to several input reanalysis nodes . . . . . . . 4.2.4 ML-based oversampling and undersampling approaches 4.3 Case study outlook",
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The last step consists in obtaining the output layer weights by means of the following expression: where Y T stands for the transpose of the training output vector Y = [y 1 , . . . , y n ] and H refers to the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the hidden-layer matrix H [77]. 5. Then, the predicted or classified output is obtained as: Y (x) = H. The hidden nodes number N can be tuned for improving the ELM performance. When used for predictive modeling, Machine Learning revolves around modeling the statistical correlation between variables with respect to the target variable to be predicted. In problems dealing with spatial and/or temporal data (such as image classification or time series forecasting), such a correlation emerges from the relationship among data points over such domains. As a result, Machine Learning models can be either used in their seminal form to tackle spatio-temporal modeling tasks (by e.g. extracting tabular features from data) or, instead, specialised into archetypes capable of supporting the modeling requirements stemming from such tasks (invariance to spatial transformations of the input or the characterization of long-term correlations over sequential data). Furthermore, continued advances in massive parallel computing and the explosion of non-relational databases containing information of assorted nature (e.g., image, video, audio, text) have spurred research efforts towards the derivation of neural network models of ever-growing modeling complexity, capable of efficiently discovering relevant predictors from highly dimensional data, and endowing mechanisms to meet the requirements mentioned previously. Advances over the past two decades have blossomed into what is now known as Deep Learning [80], which crystallizes in two main neural architectures: Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs [81]) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs [82]). Figure 6 When the correlation is held in the spatial domain, any model should be made invariant with respect to transformations of the input data that should not affect the prediction. This is the case of translational invariance in image classification, by which visual features relevant for the target to be predicted should retain their predictive importance no matter where they are located in the image. The way the human visual cortex operates to satisfy this requisite was the inspiration behind the design of CNNs, which, in their seminal form, comprise a series of hierarchically arranged neural processing layers. Layers closer to the input contain several convolutional neurons (also referred to as convolutional filters or kernels), which extract features from the input data by performing a convolution between the data themselves and the weights at their core. A CNNs for complex modeling tasks may stack several convolutional layers, one after another, so that each layer processes through its filters the output produced by the preceding layer. Some further processing layers can be placed in between convolutional ones, such as pooling layers, which serve to create information bottlenecks that help distil more high-level information while drastically reducing the number of parameters. After the convolutional part of the network, additional layers may be added depending on the application. For instance, in image classification a fully connected multi-layer perceptron is often attached to the end of a CNN to map this output to the target variables to be predicted. Analogously to MLPs, trainable parameters (weights and biases) of the CNN network can be learned by backpropagating error gradients through the network, which also holds for the weights of the convolutional kernels. Since gradients can be computed also for these special neural processing units, their weight values can be adjusted by means of different stochastic gradient descent solvers. Beyond their benefits in terms of spatial invariance, learnable convolutional layers in CNNs provide several other advantages. First, the fact that gradients can be propagated allows for a massively parallel iterative update of their weights and biases, paving the way for implementations deployable on Graphical Processing Units (GPU) and Tensor Processing Units (TPU). Another advantage of CNNs is the hierarchy of visual features learned by the network, which becomes progressively more specialized for the task at hand as more convolutional layers are stacked on top of each other. This offers a more structured interpretability of the knowledge captured by the layers, which can be disentangled by using deconvolutional filters or local explainability techniques [83]. But perhaps most interestingly, coarse visual features modeled in the first convolutional layers (edges, primitive shapes, etc.) learned on one task can be useful for others. Such tasks could leverage this general-purpose learned knowledge by importing pretrained weights and biases of such layers into their CNN architectures, so that the requirements in terms of learnable parameters or annotated data can be reduced. This simple yet effective knowledge exchange mechanism is referred to as transfer learning [84,85] and has helped the adoption of CNNs in environments with scarcely annotated data or limited computational resources. Sophisticated CNN architectures nowadays constitute the state-of-the-art for image and video classification modeling tasks, incorporating new ideas that boost even further their performance and/or efficiency. This is the case of capsule networks [86], attention mechanisms [87], or patch-based learning in visual transformers [88]. When it comes to efficiency, the inner working of spiking neural networks [89] has been investigated to alleviate the consumption of computing resources of these models. It is worth noting that the number of trainable parameters in CNNs may amount up to several tens of millions in very deep models, leading to problematically long training times, large storage requirements, and energy consumption footprints [90]. Finally, an important area of research is on the development of interpretability techniques for CNNs, which aim to dissect the knowledge captured by the layers of an already trained CNN [91]. The result of this dissection, which can take many forms (e.g., attribution maps, counterfactual explanations, or simplified rule sets) is offered as an interpretable interface for the user to understand how and why the CNN provides its output. We will later elaborate on the plethora of possibilities of explanation techniques for CNNs used in EEs modeling and characterization tasks.
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Natural England has recently undertaken the first stage of research into the interactions between people and nature on protected sites with the aim to enable the public to learn about and engage with their local protected areas in a way that minimises any disturbance to wildlife and enhances the achievement of biodiversity targets , keeping sites in good Natural England are also working to improve digital access to protected sites evidence and to better meet the needs of the organisation and the public. 16. We recommend that areas contributing towards 30 by 30 should comply with the guidance set out by the IUCN which requires that protected areas are “clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long -term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values”. Further, we recommend that the longevity criteria for ‘long-term’ conservation be set at more than 30 years. (Paragraph 54) 34. Recommendation : We recommend that the Government launch a consultation to identify and classify potential OECMs in England and the contribution they could make to 30
36. Recommendation : We recommend that the Government set out those ELMS they believe have the best potential to identify sites to count towards the 30 by 30 target in line with international guidance and ensure protection for more than 30 years. (Paragraph 111) 40. We recommend that any BNG sites that contribute to 30 by 30 must have specific nature conservation objectives, effective management to deliver these, proper monitoring and a guarantee of sufficient longevity beyond the normal requirement of the BNG regime (more than 30 years). (Paragraph 121) Our approach to the assessment of areas contributing towards 30 by 30 is based on decisions adopted by the Convention on Biological Diversity. We recognise that there is global best practice and international guidance, including that published by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. We expect our approach to support the delivery of the interim and long-term biodiversity targets in the Environmental Improvement Plan 2023. Defra recognises the important role that OECMs could play in meeting 30 by 30 alongside Protected Areas. We want to continue working with stakeholders to recognise the value of all land that is delivering improved outcomes for nature in the long term and how this can We recognise the need to work with farmers, as custodians of the countryside, to help manage these important sites and to ensure we can balance farming and food production with nature recovery. Our new Environmental Land Management (ELM) schemes will collectively pay farmers and land managers to deliver, alongside food production, significant and important outcomes for the climate and environment that can only be delivered by farmers and other land managers in the wider countryside. We welcome the Committee’s recognition of the potential role for areas under ELM schemes to contribute towards 30 by 30 where this works effectively for farmers and farm businesses. We welcome the Committee’s recognition of the role that Biodiversity Net Gain could play in achieving our 30 by 30 target. Offsite biodiversity gain sites will create or enhance habitat. Landowners who choose to provide biodiversity gains will have to ensure that they undertake effective management and meet the monitoring and reporting obligations set out in their legal agreement. 17. Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), Special Protection Areas (SPAs) and Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) on land and at sea and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) should have been monitored in the last six years or in the six years preceding
the target date of 2030, as is consistent with the JNCC common standards monitoring for designated sites. Sites that achieve a condition status other than “destroyed” could be included in the 30 by 30 target. They should have a management plan and actionab le timeframe for delivery. Sites that are declared to be “destroyed” do not meet the criteria for 30 by 30 and should not be included. (Paragraph 55) Our approach to 30 by 30 continues to be based on international guidance. Our protected sites can play a key role in achieving our goal and we are committed to improving their condition so that they are delivering improved outcomes for nature in the long -term, as set As discussed in response to recommendation 10, for terrestrial sites the interim target will ensure all sites will have an up-to-date assessment by 31 January 2028. Natural England is developing a long-term, prioritised monitoring programme based on a variety of risk factors to determine when individual sites need to be reassessed in the future. It should be noted that JNCC standards have moved away from the 6 yearly cycle to a risk-based process. As part of the a ssessment the actions needed to res tore sites to or maintain sites in a favourable condition will be identified and be used to inform site management plans. Natural England are tracking actions as part of the interim target to have 50% of SSSI with actions on track to achieve favourable condition and will report on progress annually. For marine sites, our MPA network already covers 40% of English waters . Our statutory target is for 70% of designated features to be in favourable condition by 2042 , with the remainder in recovering condition. We work closely with JNCC and Natural England as they continue to monitor MPA s and develop plans to determine the most effective monitoring approaches for MPA assessment in line with the statutory MPA target (70% of designated features in the MPA network to be in favourable condition by 2042, with the remainder in recovering condition) and in attaining site conservation outcomes . The JNCC Common Standards refer to the condition of features, rather than the condition of the whole site. 19.
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The government approved the First official report of the Third National Action Plan on Climate Change. The paper summarizes the progress made on the measures aimed at introducing lowcarbon, energy-efficient and non-waste technologies, the recycling and recovery of more waste contributing not only to the overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions but also to increasing productivity and resource efficiency. Implementation of measures creates opportunities for new sources of growth and jobs through cost savings, market innovation and better resource management. The overall effect of the implementation of sectoral policies and measures ensures the achievement of the legally binding targets for our country in international and national terms, with an annual reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 10 060 537 tCO2 eq. implementation of the Plan. Besides the leading role of the competent institutions it underlines the specific role and functions of municipalities. A special feature of the activities on climate change is that they cover a large number of institutions and bodies both from the central and the local authorities because of their horizontal and cross-cutting nature.
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There is a total potential range of 10% variability in the fossil fuel carbon content of FAME (i.e. judging from the contents of the different fatty acid types used to synthesize the FAME, the highest content is around 44.8g/kg, whilst the lowest is 40.2g/kg).
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Renewables and energy efficiency 3. An EU target of at least 27% is set for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 2030. This target will be binding at EU level. It will be fulfilled through Member States contributions guided by the need to deliver collectively the EU target without preventing Member States from setting their own more ambitious national targets and supporting them, in line with the state aid guidelines, as well as taking into account their degree of integration in the internal energy market. The integration of rising levels of intermittent renewable energy requires a more interconnected internal energy market and appropriate back up, which should be coordinated as necessary at regional level. An indicative target at the EU level of at least 27% is set for improving energy efficiency in
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This initiative will explore the role of coordinated action on public procurement to create demand for green industrial products. We want to bring together a coalition of willing countries to set out a collective intention to use public procurement to drive the adoption of green practices, underpinned by a common plan and timetable to collaborate and coordinate our actions. By acting together, countries can increase the demand pull for low carbon products, helping to achieve economies of scale and drive down costs for all, reducing the risk of carbon leakage and allowing a broader market to develop. International collaboration will support our work to deliver our net zero target. Changes in public procurement behaviour offer an important opportunity to accelerate the adoption of low carbon products in the There are existing measures in place to allow us to consider broader environmental and societal impacts within the commercial process in the UK. This includes Social Value, Balanced Scorecard and the Greening Government Commitments. These measures will be strengthened by forthcoming definitions of low carbon products, and the development and implementation of low carbon product standards and labelling (see Actions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). This will ensure a systematic approach is taken to achieving net zero by 2050. Government is in the process of reforming public procurement policy to reflect our values and respond to national priorities. Green Paper on procurement reform The end of the transition period provides a golden opportunity to reform the UK’s public procurement regulations, to make public procurement simpler and better able to meet the needs of this country, while still complying with our international obligations. Our aim is for bold reforms that improve commercial outcomes, deliver simplification and flexibility, reduce administrative burdens, drive innovation, get small and medium enterprises winning public sector business and provide more transparency. On 15 December 2020, Cabinet Office published a Green Paper consultation on Transforming Public Procurement ahead of bringing forward primary legislation in the summer. The Green Paper includes a number of proposals to enable procurement to better deliver government policy and maximise societal benefits, such as amending the basis on which contracts are awarded from most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) to most advantageous tender (MAT) and retaining the requirement for criteria to be linked to the “subject matter of the contract” but allowing specific exceptions set by government. National Procurement Policy Statement The government will publish a National Procurement Policy Statement setting out national priorities of strategic importance in public procurement, including tackling climate change. The government intends to legislate to require all contracting authorities to have regard to these priorities in their procurement and commercial Action 3.5: Support businesses to make greener Alongside government, the private sector can create demand for low carbon industrial products. We want to ensure that businesses have the knowledge and resources available to make greener choices as low carbon products become more widely available. We want to help private companies combine their purchasing power by facilitating the formation of voluntary buyers’ alliances. By acting together through buyers alliances, businesses could benefit from economies of scale while supporting demand for low carbon products. We will engage closely with stakeholders to understand how government can bring businesses together to achieve this outcome. Efforts to create a market for low carbon products can benefit significantly from global collaboration. A joint green procurement approach would increase and consolidate demand for low carbon products, improving investors’ confidence in decarbonisation. Shared definitions of low carbon products and common product standards can simplify processes for industry and make international trade between countries smoother. The UK intends to be a key player in a coalition of progressive countries leading the way for the rest of the world in seeking a joint approach on creating demand for low carbon products. We will use key upcoming international meetings, including COP26, to seek joint commitments on these issues. More information on our approach is set out in
A net zero target requires a major change in how industry makes goods and consumes energy. This transformation is unprecedented in terms of scale, pace and cost. Based on what we know today, our analysis shows that net zero for industry is likely to • Overall, we expect that emissions need to fall by about two thirds by 2035 and by at least 90% by 2050, compared to today’s level6. The remaining emissions will need to • Efficiency maximised to make best use of energy and materials, including how materials are used, repaired and recycled (Chapter 5) • Carbon capture usage and storage playing a vital role. We expect that, in all future scenarios, around 3 MtCO2 is the level of capture required in industry by 2030 to be • Low carbon fuels such electricity, hydrogen and bioenergy replacing fossil fuels, unless combined with carbon capture. To be on track to deliver net zero, we expect that the minimum, in all future scenarios, is 20 TWh per year of fossil fuel use replaced with low carbon alternatives in 2030. This is our expectation with current information, and we will revisit this as part of the analysis for the Net Zero Strategy later this year and as relative costs evolve over time. By the mid-2020s, we will already see change on the ground, notably our first two clusters connected to infrastructure for capturing, transporting and storing carbon dioxide, supported by the £1 billion CCUS Infrastructure Fund and our new CCUS business models. In another five years, we aim to have another two clusters connected, as well as low carbon fuels being tested and adopted across many industrial users. With a challenge of this scale, a successful strategy means being adaptive as we learn more about decarbonisation and the future shape of industry, but not losing sight of our goals.
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We must ensure that the market
works in tandem with support schemes to deliver the right investment and operational signals and that any sector-specific barriers to deployment are addressed, to enable the huge volume of deployment that will A significant increase in short-duration 2030 under the D E S N Z ‘Clean Power Capacity Range’. Differences in total figures are due to rounding. storage, consumer led flexibility and interconnection capacity from 2023 levels will reduce the amount of more costly generation and associated network infrastructure that needs to be built, whilst maintaining security of supply. Reforming the transmission network charging (Transmission Network Use of System (T N U oS) charges) is critical in order to enable the increased deployment of future generation. The REMA Autumn Update outlines our ambition to conclude the policy development phase of the REMA programme by around mid-2025 and confirms that the timetable for REMA decisions will align with the timetable for the next allocation round (A Contracts for Difference (CfD) scheme in As we build an energy system reliant increasingly on variable renewables, improving the flexibility of the wider electricity system is key. A Low Carbon Flexibility Roadmap will be published next year, with new actions to drive clean power flexibility by 2030. We will introduce new market reforms to provide batteries and consumer-led flexibility with appropriate and fair access to, and utilisation within, relevant markets, and we will consult on how grid-scale batteries could be referenced in future planning reforms, and on including grid-scale batteries within the Environmental We will consider financing options for retrofit works, including batteries, in the Warm Homes Plan in England. We will consult to remove external display requirements for device meters from the Measuring Instrument regulations, and, in Summer 2025, we will publish a consultation on consumer engagement, including on how to help coordinate and amplify accurate messaging on consumer-led flexibility. We will also consider reform on the Maximum Resale Price and will introduce new Guaranteed Standards of Performance relating to smart We will respond to recent consultations on Energy Smart Appliance interoperability, a new licensing regime for service providers for consumer-led flexibility and load controllers, and tariff data accessibility. These will be followed up with detailed consultations on draft ‘first phase’ Energy Smart Appliance legislation, establishing minimum cyber security requirements for appliances in scope and a smart mandate for heat pumps; draft consumer-led flexibility service providers and load controller regulations and licence conditions, and measures to improve time of use tariff data accessibility. We will implement Capacity Market policy proposals, including permitted augmentation of storage, adjustments to Extended Performance T esting Requirements and making 3-year Capacity Markets agreements to low carbon technologies requiring no capital expenditure. We are projected to need 40-50 GW technologies are ones which combust fuel to produce electricity and, by varying the rate at which fuel is burned, can respond to meet the needs of the grid with varying levels of flexibility. dispatchable and long-duration flexible capacity in 2030 to support our power 14
system in extended periods of low renewable output. We are determined to drive the development of low carbon long-duration flexibility, which presents a substantial opportunity. We have announced Final Investment Decision for Net Zero Teesside, the world’s first at scale gas power plant with carbon capture, and we are also developing a Hydrogen to Power business model which will de-risk investment and bring forward capacity. We also need to scale up deployment of pump storage hydropower and foster further innovation in more nascent long-duration storage technologies such as liquid air energy storage. The cap and floor scheme, which could open in Q2 2025, will support investment in the sector. Unabated gas will continue to play a back-up role throughout the transition to clean power, ensuring security of supply. This means that we will retain sufficient capacity until it can be safely replaced by low carbon technologies. Clean power by 2030 is a signal to investors to locate in the U K and build strong domestic supply chains for key aspects of our clean power system. Actions to support and accelerate delivery will give developers greater route-to-market certainty, but we will go further, including with the forthcoming Industrial Strategy, which will include a sector plan for clean energy industries. We will convene a new supply chains and workforce industry forum for key Clean Power 2030 sectors, including trade unions, to develop a deep understanding of system-level supply chain and workforce planning needs for Clean Power 2030 delivery and devise targeted collective actions to ensure they are met. The Clean Industry Bonus will support manufacturing in coastal and energy communities and cleaner, more sustainable supply chains, while increased transparency and predictability in future Contracts for Difference allocation rounds will support investment. The National Wealth Fund will focus at least £5.8 billion of its capital on green hydrogen, carbon capture, ports, gigafactories, and green steel, while Great British Energy will support the growth of clean power supply chains around the U K . The clean power transition also needs a skilled workforce, with thousands of new jobs throughout low carbon sectors. Details of the Clean Energy Skills Challenge have been published alongside this Plan. The Office for Clean Energy Jobs will work with the sector, trade unions and the devolved governments to support regions transitioning from carbon-intensive industries to clean energy sectors, to ensure jobs are high quality, with fair pay, favourable terms, and good working conditions. This work includes targeted interventions to reskill and upskill workers across the economy, supporting access to training schemes, and promoting the opportunities of clean energy jobs so that a lack of skilled workers does not become a bottleneck in the achievement of our Clean How we will work, as government and with everyone involved, to deliver The Clean Power 2030 Unit will look across delivery of the key 2030 projects, working to identify blockages and ensuring that the clean power programme stays on track.
|
d71959a5-3dfe-4210-9d55-e671cf4f3ce6
| 3
|
01ea1036-ab58-4633-9381-2631fe6f8e95
|
https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/forest-law-enforcement-governance-and-trade-amendment-regulations-2016-si-no-940-of-2016-lex-faoc158481/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=596
| 2,016
|
[
"development",
"management",
"objective",
"emission",
"protection",
"cooperation",
"procedure",
"article",
"international",
"control"
] |
ecolex.org
|
These Regulations amend the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Regulations 2012 (S.I. 2012/178) in regulation 5A (Fee for the verification of a FLEGT licence)so as to reduce the fee that is payable to the Secretary of State on an application for verification of a FLEGT licence. Also regulation 13 (Review) is amended so as to extend the deadline by which the Secretary of State is required to publish the first report under that regulation.
|
a767e995-828a-4b2e-8569-47c420aa79f7
| 0
|
01ed318e-f40a-40a4-b389-be83a6d582eb
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6482f5aa5f7bb7000c7fa775/tfpp-uk-international-climate-finance-strategy-2023.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"climate",
"finance",
"additional",
"international"
] |
www.gov.uk
|
The UK is delivering on our pledge to double our ICF to £11.6bn between 2021/22 and 2025/26, including at least £3bn on development solutions that protect and restore nature. This funding will result in strong outcomes for climate mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity and poverty reduction through creating jobs and supporting sustainable economic growth for communities acutely at risk. The Prime Minister announced at COP27 that we are tripling our adaptation finance from £500 million in 2019 to £1.5 billion in 2025. We will work to accelerate the global shift to net zero by giving developing countries access to more, better and faster finance, using British Investment Partnerships
P) to build stronger, more transparent economic partnerships and drawing economic partners closer to major free-market democracies. We will use public finance to help mobilise the trillions that are urgently needed from the private sector to meet our climate and nature goals. The UK will balance our ICF between support for mitigation and adaptation. We will invest in mitigation where emissions are growing rapidly and in nature-rich countries that play a role as major carbon sinks to reduce future climate impacts. At the same time we will support the most vulnerable to adapt and become more resilient. We will strengthen the gender-responsiveness and inclusivity of UK climate finance for both adaptation and mitigation, including by increasing the proportion of climate finance that has gender equality as a principal or significant objective as defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee Gender Equality policy marker. Over the five years covered by the strategy, UK ICF will focus on driving the rapid transformation and systemic shifts required to achieve the Paris Agreement goals and deliver on the Glasgow Climate Pact across the • Clean Reducing global reliance on f ossil fuels is critical. Our ICF programming will support accelerating the clean energy transition in both energy-producing and energy- consuming sectors to help countries provide access to affordable, reliable, and clean energy for all. This transition will reduce or avoid high emissions pathways, making use of innovation, different technologies, and carbon pricing and addressing social and gender barriers to clean • Nature for Climate and I n line with the recommendations from the Dasgupta Review and the commitments set out in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, we will protect, sustainably manage and restore nature, reviving natural and degraded terrestrial and marine ecosystems. We will work to reduce demands on nature by ensuring our global financial and economic systems tackle unsustainable production and consumption while supporting communities and livelihoods. We will help the transition to nature positive economies by supporting governments, central banks, businesses, and financial institutions to integrate the value of nature into their decision-making. • Adaptation and Climate impacts have been observed in all regions of the world, affecting people, economies and ecosystems. Without action, hard won development gains risk being reversed. Those living in poverty, women and girls, indigenous and local communities, people with disabilities and other marginalised and crisis-affected groups are already being hit hardest and they stand to suffer most unless urgent action is taken. We will build the capacity of people and communities to adapt and become more resilient to the impacts of climate change, supporting transformation of systems, and helping countries and communities deal with impacts when they occur. • Sustainable Cities, Infrastructure and W ith 68% o f the world population projected to live in urban areas by 2050 and cities accounting for 75% of global CO2 emissions today, investment in sustainable cities is vital if we are to meet both our development and climate goals. In the context of rapid urban growth, we will support low- carbon, green and resilient urbanisation in order to promote sustainable and accessible cities, along with enabling access to clean and reliable infrastructure, including by attracting investment across the transport, digital, built environment, water and waste sectors. Effective delivery and UK leadership will harness the overlap and common approaches across these four separate themes. For example, ecosystem-based adaptation and other nature-based solutions can reduce a range of climate change risks to people, biodiversity and ecosystem services with multiple co-benefits. Urban greening using trees and other vegetation can provide local cooling. Natural river systems, wetlands and upstream forest ecosystems can reduce flood risk by storing water and slowing water flow. Coastal wetlands can protect against coastal erosion and flooding associated with storms and sea level rise. Building on our Record of Accomplishment of Results The UK has a strong track record of growing our economy whilst reducing our emissions. We were the first major economy to legislate for net zero emissions by 2050 and to set statutory targets in the Climate Change Act 2008. Our net zero commitment was backed up by our increased and world leading pledge (Nationally Determined Contribution) under the Paris Agreement. Our Adaptation Communication to the UNFCCC (2021) and the National Mitigation Communication to the UNFCCC (2022) set out actions we are taking at home to ensure we are following through on our NDC commitments, as well as being resilient and prepared for current and future climate risks. As part of our Powering up Britain plans, we are publishing a new Net Zero Growth Plan and the Energy Security Plan alongside this ICF strategy. These are complemented by the 2023 Green Finance Strategy, and the 2030 Strategic Framework for International Climate and Nature Action. This package of announcements builds on the UK’s Net Zero Strategy, Environmental Improvement Plan 2023, support for the Montreal Protocol and our commissioning of and response to the Dasgupta Review on the Economics of Biodiversity, evidencing the UK’s commitment to climate leadership following our COP26 Presidency. We have led international efforts on adaptation, resilience and tackling environmental degradation.
|
449b84d7-e172-4b27-a508-5c79f1300e76
| 1
|
01eebfca-b2fc-462a-9bf4-d3ace046a436
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.150.01.0195.01.ENG
| 2,014
|
[
"Industry",
"Fluorinated gases",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
A comprehensive review should be carried out by the Commission by the end of 2022 in time to adapt the provisions of this Regulation, in the light of its implementation and of new developments and international commitments, and to propose, if appropriate, further reduction measures. (22)
In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7). (23)
In order to amend certain non-essential elements of this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU ) should be delegated to the Commission. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level.
|
dcf5daad-8123-488e-af4c-483a250a65a3
| 4
|
01f62005-9eb6-4ce9-b85f-858964281a24
|
https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/landholding-control-act-2015-no-2-of-2015-lex-faoc166972/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=870
| 2,015
|
[
"development",
"management",
"objective",
"emission",
"protection",
"cooperation",
"procedure",
"article",
"international",
"control"
] |
ecolex.org
|
This Act concerns control of holding of interests in land in Montserrat by foreigners, i.e. persons other than a person belonging to Montserrat (as defined in section 2(2)(b) of the Immigration Act). Subject to the provisions of this Act, neither land in Montserrat nor a mortgage on land in Montserrat shall, be held by a person not belonging to Montserrat, and any land or mortgage so held shall be forfeited to Her Majesty. Land may be acquired, however, be acquired and held by a person not belonging to Montserrat under a lease for a term of five years or an annual tenancy or for any less interest for the purposes of residence, trade, or business, but such person shall not so hold more than five acres of land in all. The Governor acting on the advice of Cabinet may, from time to time, grant to any person not belonging to Montserrat a licence in Form A of the Schedule to hold land as owner or tenant or mortgagee of any estate or interest therein, which may subject to conditions.
|
672c9673-2a61-400e-aa68-6a91018ae473
| 0
|
01f858a8-0eec-43a0-9747-ad9a62c4f88b
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.00269v1
| 2,019
|
[
"carbon",
"damage",
"forest",
"rotation",
"risk"
] |
arxiv.org
|
New rotation begins after final fellings or damage, and incurs a regeneration cost R.
Let Z 1 , Z 2 , ... be a sequence of random variables that represent the stand ages at which a damage event would occur for each subsequent rotation. If final fellings occur at age T , the n th rotation ends in harvest if T ≤ Z n . Otherwise the damage destroys the stand and a new rotation follows. 1 Assume that the random variables are independent and identically distributed. Denote the probability density for Z n = t with p(t). This approach is very similar to that of Reed (1984), but here the function that defines the probability is generic, allowing the probability to depend on the stand age. It is worth to note, however, that the stand age is used merely as a proxy for the evolution of the stand's physical characteristics, like density. To determine the land expectation value in this setting, let us first split the net revenue calculation from a single rotation into two mutually exclusive cases. D(t) indicates net revenues if forest damage occurs at time t, with t < T :
In these equations, v(t) denotes the stem volume at age t (in m 3 /ha)2 and α is the total carbon content of living biomass per stem volume (in t CO 2 /m 3 , as P c is given in terms of €/t CO2 ), γ and β are respectively the fractions of carbon remaining stored in cases of forest damage and final fellings. That is, the forest owner is required to pay for the fraction (1 -γ) or (1 -β) of the trees' carbon content following forest damage or harvest. The expressions D(t) and H(T ) cover only a single rotation. The objective is, however, to maximize the expected net present value from an infinite chain of rotations. As the problem setting is identical for each rotationprices and other parameters are assumed to remain constant over time -it is possible to use a simple recursive formulation. Let V (T ) be a value function, portraying the expected net present value subject to the rotation length T . Then, the expected land value for rotation length T can be expressed as
(3) This formulation incorporates the expected value of subsequent rotations recursively through the expected land value V (T ), discounted to the start of the first rotation. Upon rearranging, V (T ) can be presented as a function of the optimal rotation length:
This formula resembles the expression for bare land value in a nonprobabilistic setting -i.e. without the possibility of forest damage -only that the net revenues in the dividend and the recursion factor in the divisor are now calculated in the form of expected values. The first-order optimality Ekholm Forest rotation, carbon pricing and damage risk conditions in this general setting could be stated by finding the rotation age T * for which the value function (4) has a derivative of zero. So far the damage probability p(t) has been described to be an arbitrary function conditional on the stand age. To present a more concrete case, the annual damage probability is assumed in the following to remain constant over the stand's lifetime. Consequently, the damages follow a Poisson process and occur at intervals that are exponentially distributed:
where λ denotes the average rate of forest damages per year. Under this probability assumption, upon some algebraic manipulation on the first-order condition V ′ (T * ) = 0, one can arrive at the following expression
which allows to solve the optimal rotation length T * numerically. As the problem setting is a generalization from the problem settings of both Reed (1984) and van Kooten et al. (1995), equation ( 6) simplifies to the optimality conditions of these cases with appropriate parameters. Setting P c = 0 eliminates carbon pricing, and with a constant timber price P F (T ) = P F the equation ( 6) simplifies to the first-order conditions proposed by Reed (1984). Similarly, setting λ = 0, R = 0 and P F (T ) = P F eliminates the damage risk and regeneration costs, making (6) correspond the formula presented by van Kooten et al. (1995). Substitutions P c = 0, P F (T ) = P F and λ = 0 together simplify (6) to the first-order condition of the Faustmann problem. Last, one should note that the parameters γ and β provide considerable flexibility in determining the carbon costs due to damage or harvest, respectively. In the numerical examples of Section 3, I assume that carbon is Ekholm Forest rotation, carbon pricing and damage risk released gradually to the atmosphere after harvest or a damage event, and that this gradual decay is priced with P c . The net present value of this can be represented as a cost to the forest owner during the harvest or damage through β and γ. Although in the case of harvests, these costs would be borne by some other actor in the economy, efficient markets would pass this cost to the price of timber, and this affects the forest-owners decision-making. As P f (t) was assumed to exclude the value of carbon embodied in the sold timber, this lower price due to the carbon cost can be captured through β. Moreover, γ can be used to represent that a fraction δ of the timber value can be salvaged and sold after a damage event, including the salvage cost and lower value of the salvaged wood. Assume that a fraction γ of the carbon is retained after damage. Then, one can write γ = γ + δP F αPc . By inserting this into (1), one arrives at two terms representing the carbon costs and salvage value after a damage event. One can also set γ = 0 if no payments are required for the carbon release from forest damage.
|
b6e3a6d7-914a-4d66-9016-17f4e3e9c523
| 1
|
01fa81dc-36fe-42bf-9740-89d672e91ddc
|
https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/community-right-to-buy-scotland-regulations-2015-ssi-no-400-of-2015-lex-faoc149844/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=749
| 2,015
|
[
"energy",
"development",
"article",
"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
"resource"
] |
ecolex.org
|
These Regulations make provision in connection with the community right to buy under Part 2 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. They, among other things: set out the types of area that can be used by a community body when describing the area of the community to which it relates; state that the specifications to which maps, plans or other drawings are to be prepared for the purposes of their inclusion in the Register of Community Interests in Land; state that the form of application to register a community interest in land under section 37(1) of the Act is set out in Schedule 2; set out the kinds of information which must accompany an application to register or re-register a community interest in land.
|
38612395-8d74-4bc5-b0e4-a345bd6aecf3
| 0
|
01fad26e-d3b1-417a-8f02-129cc700bfa7
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
This spending includes new programmes set out in this Strategy such as £60m Heat Pump Ready programme. • Take a leadership role in Mission Innovation 2.0, a global initiative working to accelerate clean energy innovation.1 Net Zero Build Back Greener
1. Innovation is central to our approach to delivering net zero. It will require a step change in the rate of new technologies and processes being developed and deployed into the market and being adopted by businesses and consumers. Continued investment in cutting-edge research, development, and demonstration, will be integral to achieving this transformation and to the UK leading the world in areas of existing and potential competitive advantage. This investment will also support businesses to grow and solutions to be delivered at scale. Research, development, and innovation are needed to allow government, industry and business to make decisions about what new technologies and systems are promising. To respond, government must enable the efficient scaling of technologies, systems, and business models to pull them through to commercialisation for 2050 - and beyond. 2. Our goal is for the UK to be a global leader in the technologies, processes, services, and business models needed to decarbonise our economies, protect our environment, and adapt to a changing climate. We will support our world class innovators, entrepreneurs, and financial institutions to develop and deploy the key technologies of the future. This will need to take place alongside other cross-cutting policies, regulatory changes, 3. By supporting innovation, we could unlock the potential for 300,000 jobs in exports and domestic industry through new commercial opportunities across low carbon sectors. 4. In the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution,2 we restated our commitment to raise total private and public R&D investment to 2.4% of GDP by 2027 – enabling the next phase of green innovation to help bring down the cost of the net zero transition, nurture the development of better products and business models, and understand consumer choices. We have started delivering on this with funding announced for programmes across the portfolio including renewables, energy storage and flexibility, and hydrogen.3 This is contributing to levelling up across all regions of the UK whilst helping us to achieve our Chapter 4 – Supporting the Transition across the Economy
5. Innovation can significantly reduce costs of the technologies, processes, and systems needed to reach net zero. This goes beyond just developing technologies. It also means exploring new business models, approaches to financing, the regulatory environment and how consumers respond. Taking a whole systems approach to innovation will be integral to maintaining and developing the UK’s global leadership in areas where we have, or can develop, an international comparative advantage or unique capability. We must harness the UK’s international reputation to attract inward investment and anchor existing and emerging supply chains in the UK. International collaboration will also be critical to ensure that clean technologies become cheaper and more readily available. 6. Innovation is a process which occurs within an ecosystem of interacting actors, technologies, and institutions. This requires technologies, systems or processes to progress through multiple phases of development – from basic research, through to commercialisation and diffusion. However, innovation does not flow neatly in one direction from one phase to the next; it is unpredictable and serendipitous, involving constant cycles of learning, testing, refining, and discovery. At each phase of the innovation process there are different market failures and barriers, requiring distinct interventions. In the early stages, there are often minimal incentives for private actors to invest in innovation and direct funding policies can help ‘push’ technologies towards demonstration and early commercialisation. In the later stages, the importance of attracting private finance grows. Market incentive policies support the development of markets and leverage private finance to ‘pull’ technologies towards 7. The Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, our Plan for Growth and our new Innovation Strategy bring together ambitious policies and significant public investment to achieve net zero, whilst seeking to mobilise substantial private investment. These commitments will position the UK to take advantage of export opportunities in global markets presented by these low carbon technologies and services. Net Zero Build Back Greener
Case Glass Futures with Encirc pilot project Through government’s 2016-21 Energy Innovation Programme, BEIS funded Encirc (a glass container manufacturer) and Glass Futures (an industry research and technology organisation) to lead a trial project based in Derrylin, Northern Ireland to help determine the most effective approach to using low carbon fuels in manufacturing in the glass sector. This revolutionary project has proven that new bottles can be made from 100% recycled glass by using energy only from burning low carbon biofuels. It is thought that this world-first initiative will set a global standard and make way for an industry-wide reduction in carbon emissions in the glass sector. When made from waste organic materials, biofuels are a renewable and much more sustainable fuel source than those traditionally used by the glass sector and can reduce the carbon footprint of each bottle by up to 90%. By using up to 100% recycled glass to create new bottles, the trial has further minimised the lifetime impact of these new products. Supporting innovation for net zero 8. Achieving net zero will require profound changes to the UK economy. It will mean increasing our low carbon electricity supply, making the transition to low carbon buildings, decarbonising transport, building a hydrogen economy, decarbonising industry, rolling-out carbon capture and storage, transforming the way land and marine spaces are used, improving agricultural management, adopting better waste management, and deploying technologies to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. This should include innovation to mitigate any environmental impacts from new technologies on our 9. In each of these sectors, known technologies, business models, services and approaches will need to be demonstrated and then deployed at scale, while novel technologies need R&D support now to determine whether they can be affordable and viable options in the longer-term.
|
368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37
| 61
|
01fc806d-9267-45ac-afc8-cd5b99994679
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0554&from=EN
| -1
|
[
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
The delegated acts referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 shall be adopted by 31 October 2020 for the period from 2021 to 2025. ;
(7)Article 9 is amended as follows:
(a)the title is replaced by the following:
Carbon storage products ;
(b)paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
2. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 16 in order to amend paragraph 1 of this Article and Annex V by adding new categories of carbon storage products, including harvested wood products, that have a carbon sequestration effect, based on IPCC Guidelines as adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC or the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, and ensuring environmental integrity. ;
(8)Article 10 is amended as follows:
(a)paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
At the end of the period from 2021 to 2025, Member States may exclude from their accounts for afforested land and managed forest land greenhouse gas emissions, resulting from natural disturbances, that exceed the average emissions caused by natural disturbances in the period from 2001 to 2020, excluding statistical outliers ( background level ). That background level shall be calculated in accordance with this Article and Annex VI. ;
(b)in paragraph 2, point (b), 2030 is replaced by 2025 :
(9)Article 11 is amended as follows:
(a)the title is replaced by the following:
Flexibilities and governance ;
(b)paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
(c) 1. A Member State may use:
(a) the general flexibilities set out in Article 12; and
(b) in order to comply with the commitment in Article 4, the managed forest land flexibility set out in Articles 13 and 13b. Finland may, besides the flexibilities referred to in the first subparagraph, points (a) and (b), use additional compensations pursuant to Article 13a. (10)Article 12 is amended as follows:
(a)paragraph 3 is deleted;
(b)the following paragraphs 5 and 6 are added:
5. Member States may use revenues generated by transfers pursuant to paragraph 2 to tackle climate change in the Union or in third countries and shall inform the Commission of any such actions taken. 6.
|
6305f6c7-4e72-4dc0-a09c-8e54d845c295
| 20
|
02001767-0008-40bf-97a3-3c1a72d39425
|
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224.en07.pdf
| 2,007
|
[
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] |
register.consilium.europa.eu
|
722407
12
EN
Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 89 March 2007
34. The European Council notes the increasing share of greenhouse gas emissions from
developing countries and the need for these countries to address the increase in these
emissions by reducing the emission intensity of their economic development, in line with the
general principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The European Council stands ready to continue and further strengthen its support for
developing countries in lessening their vulnerability and adapting to climate change. 35. Given the central role of emission trading in the EUs long-term strategy for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, the European Council invites the Commission to review the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme in good time with a view to increasing transparency and
strengthening and broadening the scope of the scheme and to consider, as part of the EU ETS
review, a possible extension of its scope to land use, land-use change and forestry and surface
transport. The European Council stresses the necessity of an efficient, safe and sustainable European
transport policy. In this context, it is important to proceed with actions to increase the
environmental performance of the European transport system. The European Council notes
the European Commissions ongoing work regarding the assessment of external costs for
transport and their internalisation. Energy Policy
36. Global warming, together with the need to ensure security of supply and enhance business
competitiveness, make it ever more vital and pressing for the EU to put in place an integrated
policy on energy combining action at the European and the Member States level. As a
milestone in the creation of an Energy Policy for Europe EPE and a spring board for further
action, the European Council adopts a comprehensive energy Action Plan for the period
2007-2009 Annex I, based on the Commissions Communication An Energy Policy for
Europe. The European Council notes that Member States choice of energy mix may have
effects on the energy situation in other Member States and on the Unions ability to achieve
the three objectives of the EPE. 722407
13
EN
Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 89 March 2007
37. The Action Plan sets out the way in which significant progress in the efficient operation and
completion of the EUs internal market for gas and electricity and a more interconnected and
integrated market can be achieved. It envisages the nomination of EU coordinators for four
priority projects of European interest. It also addresses the crucial issue of security of energy
supply and the response to potential crises. As regards security of supply the European
Council stresses the importance of making full use of the instruments available to improve the
EUs bilateral cooperation with all suppliers and ensure reliable energy flows into the Union. It develops clear orientations for an effective European international energy policy speaking
with a common voice. It fixes highly ambitious quantified targets on energy efficiency,
renewable energies and the use of biofuels and calls for a European Strategic Energy
Technology plan, including environmentally safe Carbon Capture and Sequestration, to be
examined at the Spring 2008 European Council meeting. 38. The European Council calls on all parties concerned to press ahead rapidly and with
determination in order to implement all of the elements contained in the Action Plan in line
with its provisions and conditions. In particular, it invites the Commission to submit the
proposals requested in the Action Plan as speedily as possible. Follow-up
39. In the light of the integrated approach to climate and energy policy the Energy Action Plan
will be kept under regular review within the context of an annual examination by the
European Council of the progress made and results achieved in implementing the EUs energy
and climate change policies. The Commission is invited to put forward an updated Strategic
Energy Review in early 2009, which will serve as the basis for the new Energy Action Plan
from 2010 onwards to be adopted by the Spring 2010 European Council. 722407
14
EN
Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 89 March 2007
IV.
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(5) “Contribution rate adjustments” means such adjustments— (a) to the rates of contributions to the scheme by its members in respect of defined
Part 14 – Civil nuclear sector Chapter 3 – Relevant nuclear pension schemes Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (b) to the salary bands to which such contribution rates apply, as are considered appropriate by the designated person (acting on actuarial advice) to ensure that the average contribution rate for members of the scheme in respect of defined benefits is as close as reasonably practicable to 8.2%. (6) Where a person is required by regulations under this section to amend the provisions of a relevant nuclear pension scheme, the amendments may be made— (a) free from any consent requirements set out in the scheme, and (b) notwithstanding provision made by or under any other Act of Parliament, or any rule of law, that would otherwise prevent or limit, or impose conditions on, the making of the amendments. (7) Amendments made by virtue of subsection (1)(a)— (a) must not relate to service prior to the date on which the amendments are made; (b) may be made in the case of a particular scheme on one occasion only. (8) Nothing in this section limits any power that a designated person has to amend a relevant nuclear pension scheme. (9) A person may not be designated in relation to a relevant nuclear pension scheme unless it appears to the Secretary of State that the person has the power to amend the scheme. (10) In this section, “designated” means designated by regulations under this section. I406 S. 311 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(o) 312 Meaning of “relevant nuclear pension scheme” (1) In this Chapter, “relevant nuclear pension scheme” means— (a) a pension scheme maintained by or on behalf of the NDA under or by virtue of section 8(1)(a) or (b) of the Energy Act 2004, or (b) subject to subsections (2) and (3), a scheme that provides for the payment of pensions or other benefits to or in respect of persons who are, or have been, employed to perform duties relating to matters that correspond or are similar to matters in respect of which the NDA has functions. (2) A scheme of a kind mentioned in subsection (1)(b) is a relevant nuclear pension scheme only to the extent that the pensions or other benefits are provided in connection with employment by a person with public functions. (3) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to— (a) a UKAEA pension scheme (within the meaning given by paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2004); (b) a scheme that provides for the payment of pensions or other benefits to or in respect of persons specified in section 1(2) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 (schemes for persons in public service). (4) In this section, “the NDA” means the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. Part 14 – Civil nuclear sector Chapter 3 – Relevant nuclear pension schemes Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) I407 S. 312 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(o) (1) This section applies where a person (“P”) is required by regulations under section 311 to amend a relevant nuclear pension scheme. (2) P may require a person who holds relevant information to provide it to P. (3) “Relevant information” means any information or data that P reasonably requires in connection with deciding whether, or how, to amend the scheme. (4) Except as provided by subsection (5), the disclosure of information under this section (a) any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, or (b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed). (5) This section does not require a disclosure of information if the disclosure would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether a disclosure would do so, a requirement imposed under subsection (2) is to be taken into account). I408 S. 313 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(o) (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Chapter. (2) References to the amendment of a relevant nuclear pension scheme include references to the amendment of any one or more of the following— (a) the trust deed of the scheme, if there is one; (c) any other instrument relating to the constitution, management or operation of (3) References to a relevant nuclear pension scheme include references to any section into (4) A “career average revalued earnings structure” is a structure where— (a) the pension payable to or in respect of a person, so far as it is based on the person’s pensionable service, is determined by reference to the person’s pensionable earnings in each year of pensionable service, and (b) those earnings, or a proportion of those earnings accrued as a pension, are under the structure revalued each year until the person leaves pensionable (5) “Consumer prices index” means— (a) the general index of consumer prices (for all items) published by the Statistics
Part 14 – Civil nuclear sector Chapter 3 – Relevant nuclear pension schemes Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (b) where that index is not published for a month, any substituted index or figures (6) “Defined benefits” are benefits— (a) that are not money purchase benefits (within the meaning of the Pension (b) that are not provided under an injury or compensation scheme (within the meaning of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013).
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12.23 We describe below the approach we took to estimate the number of affected firms and their size for the three broad populations of firms A, B and C. This approach is broadly similar to the approach taken in our original CBA, although we have updated our population estimates using the latest data and information. 12.24 Population A is the population of asset managers that provide in-scope products. We estimate the total population A by filtering our regulatory data for relevant permissions and portfolios. We create 4 sub-populations for the purpose estimating compliance • Sub-populations we estimate the number of UK-based funds affected by the labelling and naming and marketing rules to be at least approximately 630. This related terms in their name or objectives (eg, ‘sustainable’ , ‘ESG’) and (ii) limiting the sample to funds that are actively marketed in the UK. This estimate is based on a sample of existing funds in Morningstar data which may not have full market coverage. The total funds affected will also change over time as new funds are launched. Therefore, we expect this estimate to represent a minimum. For the purposes of the CBA, we assume that 45% (sub-population A1) of the products (and corresponding firms) that currently have sustainability-related terms in their
names and marketing materials will use the investment labels under our rules, and the remaining 55% (sub-population A2) will be subject to our naming and marketing rules. The analysis is based on our supervisory knowledge and our assumptions of actions that firms may take. While this is the same approach as in our original CBA, we have updated our assumptions and re-run the analysis with the latest Morningstar data. We expect label uptake to be higher than assumed in the original CBA due to the changes we have made in response to consultation feedback, such as introducing the additional Sustainability Mixed Goals label, so we expect more funds to be eligible for a label. We assume this sub-population are • Sub-population This sub-population is comprised of the asset managers that do not use sustainability labels or sustainability-related terms, estimated by subtracting sub-population A1 and A2 from the total population A (all asset managers). We estimate the size of asset managers using internal data and supervisory analysis of the distribution of AUM across asset managers. • Sub-population This is the total number of asset managers with AUM of £5bn or more based on our regulatory data. We estimate the additional costs to this sub-population to produce entity-level disclosures that would be incurred in addition to costs for populations A1-A3. We estimate the number of asset managers of £5 billion or more AUM (on a 3-year rolling average) using our regulatory data on AUM (MIF003 reporting) at the last reporting date. 12.25 Population B is the population of distributors, including advisers and platforms, that distribute in-scope products. We estimate the total number of advisers (sub- population B1) and platforms (sub-population B2) by filtering our regulatory data for relevant permissions and portfolios. We estimate the number of S/M/L advisers based on supervisory analysis and we assume that all platforms are medium on average. The proportion of S/M/L firms has changed, as we have revised our assumptions with 12.26 Population C1 is the total population of authorised firms in scope of the anti- greenwashing rules. Population C2 is the population of authorised firms in scope of the anti-greenwashing rule, excluding asset managers and distributors in scope of other rules. We exclude these populations from our estimates specifically for the anti- greenwashing rule as the familiarisation and gap analysis costs related to the anti- greenwashing rule for asset managers and distributors are already included in our estimates for populations A and B. We estimate the number of S/M/L firms by deducting the number of S/M/L asset managers and distributors from the total S/M/L firms estimated in our SCM. The SCM uses underlying tariff base data to give each firm a rank among all firms that use the same tariff base (eg, annual income, gross premium income) and then takes each firm’s maximum rank (many firms use multiple tariff bases) to order firms. The top 250 firms are classified as large, firms from 251 to 1,750 as medium, and all the rest as small. 12.27 In T able 21 below, we provide a summary of the estimated firm population by sub-group T able 21: Estimated population impacted by policy for the purposes of estimating Asset managers, including wealth managers level, including disclosure of A3 Naming and marketing rules 33 A4 Entity-level disclosures Advisers 3 B1 Expectations for distributors 3 All remaining authorised firms managers using labels and sustainability-related terms is likely to be a minimum. As this population of asset managers is based on an estimate of the proportion of asset managers we assume to use labels for their fund, we cannot observe their size. We assume that the relevant costs for asset managers using labels or sustainability-related terms are equivalent to those for medium-sized firms in our SCM. 3. T able 1 (page 91) of the CBA in CP22/20 incorrectly labelled populations G and H (advisers) as large and medium. The cost estimations in the CBA were based on populations G and H being
Revised compliance costs to firms 12.28 Following updates to our estimation to reflect the final policy, feedback received and latest evidence, we now estimate the total one-off cost to industry to be approximately £204.8m and the ongoing annual cost to be £34.2m. 12.29 A summary of the estimated costs by the affected population of firms and policy is set T able 22: Estimated compliance cost to population in scope sub-group One-off costs Ongoing (annual) Advisers £128.3m £23k £9.2m £2k Platforms £6.3m £180k £0.2m £7k Tot a l cos t s £204.8m - £34.2m - T able 1. All costs are presented in 2023 values through this section. 2.
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[
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Under Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Portugal submitted a National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP), setting the 2020 national targets for the share of energy from renewable in gross final energy consumption (overall target), also on RES sources consumed in electricity production (RES-E), transport (RES-T) and heating and cooling (RES-H&C), as well as their penetration paths, in accordance with the implementation pace of the measures and actions envisaged for each of these sectors, considering the effects of other policies related to energy efficiency on energy consumption. In its NREAP, Portugal committed to attaining the targets set in the Directive, in particular the overall target of 31% of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption and 10% in final energy consumption within the transport sector.
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
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On 28 August 2019, the Federal Council decided that Switzerland would aim to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050 and gave the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) the task of drawing up a long-term climate strategy, thus ensur- ing that Switzerland meets a requirement of the Paris Agreement. This document 'Switzerland's Long- Term Climate Strategy' is the result of this work.
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(2) The revenues are treated as arising in connection with accommodation if they arise (a) the provision of accommodation, or (b) the provision of services, goods or other property in relation to accommodation, in connection with the provision of the accommodation on (3) The revenues are treated as arising in connection with land if they arise in connection (a) the sale of an estate, interest or right in or over land, or (b) the provision of services, goods or other property in relation to land, in connection with the sale of an estate, interest or right in or over the land on (a) any reference to providing or selling anything includes offering to provide or (b) any reference to providing goods or other property includes providing it (c) “online marketplace revenues” means revenues arising in connection with an 43 Meaning of “digital services activity” etc (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) “Digital services activity” means providing— (b) an internet search engine, or (3) “Social media service” means an online service that meets the following conditions— (a) the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the service is to promote interaction between users (including interaction between users and user- (b) making content generated by users available to other users is a significant (4) “Internet search engine” does not include a facility on a website that merely enables (a) the material on that website, or
Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (b) the material on that website and on closely related websites. (5) “Online marketplace” means an online service that meets the following conditions— (a) the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the service is to facilitate the sale by users of particular things, and (b) the service enables users to sell particular things to other users, or to advertise or otherwise offer particular things for sale to other users. (a) “thing” means any services, goods or other property; (b) any reference to the sale of a thing includes hiring it. (7) Any reference to providing a social media service, internet search engine or online marketplace includes carrying on an associated online advertising service; and any reference to a social media service, internet search engine or online marketplace is to (8) In this section “associated online advertising service” means an online service that— (a) facilitates online advertising, and (b) derives significant benefit from its association with the social media service, internet search engine or online marketplace. (9) Where an associated online advertising service derives significant benefit from its association with more than one type of digital services activity, revenues arising from the service are to be treated as attributable to each of the types of digital services activity in question to such extent as is just and reasonable. (10) See also section 45 (exclusion for online financial marketplaces). 44 Meaning of “user” and “UK user” (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) Any reference to a user, in relation to a digital services activity of a person (the “provider”), does not include— (a) the provider or a member of the same group as the provider, or (b) an employee of a person within paragraph (a), acting in the course of that (3) “UK user” means any user who it is reasonable to assume— (a) in the case of an individual, is normally in the United Kingdom; (b) in any other case, is established in the United Kingdom. 45 Exclusion for online financial marketplaces (1) In this Part any reference to an online marketplace excludes one that is for the time being an online financial marketplace. (2) An online marketplace is an “online financial marketplace” for a relevant accounting period if more than half of the revenues arising to the provider in the accounting period in connection with the online marketplace arise in connection with the provider’s facilitation of the trading of financial instruments, commodities or foreign exchange. Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (a) the reference to the trading of financial instruments includes the creation of (b) the reference to the trading of commodities is to the kind of commodities, and the kind of trading, occurring on a commodities exchange. (a) a financial instrument within the meaning of the applicable accounting standards (see section 64), or (b) a contract of insurance as defined by section 64 of FA 2012; “provider” means the person providing the online marketplace; “relevant accounting period” means an accounting period of the group of which the provider is a member. 46 Meaning of “the threshold conditions” (1) For the purposes of this Part “the threshold conditions”, in relation to a group, for an (a) that the total amount of digital services revenues arising in that period to members of the group exceeds £500 million, and (b) that the total amount of UK digital services revenues arising in that period to members of the group exceeds £25 million. (2) But if the duration of the accounting period is less than a year, the amounts mentioned in subsection (1)(a) and (b) are proportionately reduced. (1) This section applies where the threshold conditions are met in relation to a group for (2) Each person who was a member of the group in the accounting period (a “relevant person”) is liable to digital services tax in respect of UK digital services revenues (3) To find the liability of a relevant person to digital services tax in respect of the accounting period, take the following steps. Take the total amount of UK digital services revenues arising to members of the group in the accounting period. Deduct £25million from the amount found under step 1. Calculate 2% of the amount calculated under step 2. The result is “the group amount”. The relevant person’s liability to digital services tax in respect of the accounting period is the appropriate proportion of the group amount.
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https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.344.01.0001.01.ENG
| 2,016
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[
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"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
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eur-lex.europa.eu
|
For the purposes of assessing applications for adjustments, the emission reduction commitments for the period between 2020 and 2029 should be considered to have been set on 4 May 2012, the date when the Gothenburg Protocol was revised. (18)
Each Member State should draw up, adopt and implement a national air pollution control programme with a view to complying with its emission reduction commitments, and to contributing effectively to the achievement of the air quality objectives. To that effect, Member States should take account of the need to reduce emissions, in particular of nitrogen oxides and fine particulate matter, in zones and agglomerations affected by excessive air pollutant concentrations and/or in those zones and agglomerations that contribute significantly to air pollution in other zones and agglomerations, including in neighbouring countries. National air pollution control programmes should, to that end, contribute to the successful implementation of air quality plans established under Article 23 of Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). (19)
In order to reduce emissions from anthropogenic sources, national air pollution control programmes should consider measures applicable to all relevant sectors, including agriculture, energy, industry, road transport, inland shipping, domestic heating and use of non-road mobile machinery and solvents. However, Member States should be entitled to decide on the measures to adopt in order to comply with the emission reduction commitments set out in this Directive.
|
63956a1e-4381-4026-b28c-f728a6bd85e1
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.13224v1
| 2,024
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[
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arxiv.org
|
For each configuration C, each method m is assigned to a performance variable that quantifies the method's performance compared to the best-performing method [64], s m (C) = P m (C)/ max m ′ {P m ′ (C)}. We average this variable across all configurations. The results, shown in Fig. S5, are largely consistent with those shown in Fig. 2 of main text. We show here the results for different seed set sizes. Compared to the seed set size used in main text (z = 0.025), we consider here both a smaller seed set size (z = 0.0125) and a larger one (z = 0.05). The results for the smaller seed set size are in qualitative agreement with those in the main text (see Figs. S6-S7). The results for the larger seed set size are in qualitative agreement with those in the main text (see Figs. S8-S9), except for the relative performance of the methods in the preference-based cost scenario. In this scenario, the calibrated complex centrality is the best performing metric, and not the neighborhood susceptibility. The reason is arguably that with only one focal seed node selected by the neighborhood susceptibility metric, there is no guarantee that the additional seeds around the focal node require low cost. This limitation might be attenuated by network homophily, which we will investigate in a follow-up article. On the other hand, the calibrated complex centrality benefits from maximizing spreading size by taking into account clustered seeding in its calculation. A,B) Relative performance of seeding policies under a preference-based cost structure, measured through the mean rank metric used in main text, for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. In the simulations calibrated with the AA study results, the neighborhood susceptibility policy is not anymore the best-performing metric: For a larger seed set, the threshold information encoded in a node's nearest neighborhood is not anymore sufficient to identify an effective focal seed. (C, D) Relative performance of seeding policies under a centrality-based cost structure for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. The complex centrality policy based on the estimated thresholds significantly outperforms the other policies. Overall the results are in qualitative agreement with those obtained with z = 0.025 (Fig. 2 in the main text). Fig. S9: Relative performance of seeding policies for a larger seed set size (z = 0.05), according to the ratio-to-best metric. (A, B) Relative performance of seeding policies under a preference-based cost structure, measured through the ratio-to-best metric defined above, for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. Again, in the simulations calibrated with the AA study results, the neighborhood susceptibility policy is not anymore the best-performing policy. (C, D) Relative performance of seeding policies under a centrality-based cost structure for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. The complex centrality policy based on the estimated thresholds significantly outperforms the other policies. C. Results in scenarios with partial threshold data
We consider scenarios where the social change practitioner has been only able to survey a fraction ρ of the network's nodes. In this scenario, we assume that the low-threshold and neighborhood-susceptibility policies only consider as candidate focal seed nodes those nodes that have been surveyed. For simplicity, we do not consider the calibrated complex centrality here, and narrow our focus to the preference-based cost scenario. As anticipated in the main text, we find that for both experiments, the relative advantage of the neighborhood susceptibility policy is robust with respect to incomplete data as far as more than the large majority of the nodes is surveyed (e.g., 75%, see Figs. S10-S14). At the same time, it remains robust with respect to highly incomplete data (e.g., 50% or fewer surveyed nodes) only in the PS experiment, but not in the AA experiment. This is arguably due to the larger number of low-threshold nodes in the PS experiment, which makes the identification of low-threshold nodes simpler even with highly incomplete data. We note that in order to save computational time, for the simulations carried out in this Section, we only used one realization of the simulated conjoint survey performed by the change practitioner to estimate the thresholds (as opposed to five in all other Sections, see Supplementary Note S3). Fig. S10: Relative performance of seeding policies when 90% of the nodes are surveyed. Relative performance of seeding policies under a preference-based cost structure, measured through the mean rank metric used in main text (A, B) and through the ratio-to-best metric defined above (C, D) for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. The neighborhood susceptibility policy based on the estimated thresholds outperforms the other policies, although its edge over the closeness policy is slim in the simulations calibrated with the AA study. Fig. S11: Relative performance of seeding policies when 75% of the nodes are surveyed. Relative performance of seeding policies under a preference-based cost structure, measured through the mean rank metric used in main text (A, B) and through the ratio-to-best metric defined above (C, D) for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. The neighborhood susceptibility policy based on the estimated thresholds outperforms the other policies, although its edge over the closeness policy is slim in the simulations calibrated with the AA study. Fig. S12: Relative performance of seeding policies when 50% of the nodes are surveyed. Relative performance of seeding policies under a preference-based cost structure, measured through the mean rank metric used in main text (A, B) and through the ratio-to-best metric defined above (C, D) for the policy support experiment and the app adoption experiment, respectively. In the simulations calibrated with the AA experiment, the neighborhood susceptibility policy based on the estimated thresholds does not outperforms the others anymore. Fig. S13: Relative performance of seeding policies when 25% of the nodes are surveyed.
|
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021be2cb-afc9-45c3-aa4c-cebde9ff382f
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http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.15177v1
| 2,024
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[
""
] |
ArXiv
|
Solution of the time-independent Schrodinger equation in spherical coordinates (Levine 1975) shows that the location of P-and R-branch lines relative to 2 is given by Here h is Planck's constant, J = 0, 1, 2, ... is the rotational quantum number, E J is the energy of rotational state J, and the rotational constant B = h/8 2 I, with moment of inertia I = 2m O a 2 e . In addition, a e is the equilibrium C-O separation in CO 2 . For lines in the Q branch, there is no change in J, while in the P and R branches, J = +/-1. For 12 C 16 O 2 , transitions involving odd values of J are missing, because of selection rules arising from the zero spin of the oxygen atoms (Levine 1975). Given that a e = 116 pm, B = h/16 2 m O a 2 e = 11.7 GHz (0.39 cm 1 ), so the spacing between the P-and R-branch lines is about 2 x 2B = 47 GHz (1.6 cm 1 ). In the Q-branch, transitions with different rotational energies are not exactly colocated because of subtle effects such as Coriolis interactions, but for our purposes the lines can be treated as unseparated in frequency. Rotational line spacing is further affected by centrifugal and anharmonic effects, but these complications are not important to climate forcing and so will be ignored here. All spectral lines have a shape that is determined by a combination of natural broadening, Doppler and collisional effects (Goody & Yung 1995). Line shape is dependent on both temperature and pressure. A full analysis of this problem could become complicated quickly, but in keeping with our aim of getting a rough estimate of CO 2 radiative forcing only, we take a simple approach here. In the troposphere, thermal infrared absorption lines are Lorentzian to a close approximation, with lineshape where mn is the frequency of the transition from state m to n and is the linewidth (halfwidth at half maximum) in Hz. scales approximately linearly with pressure. This can be shown by noting that the root mean square speed of a molecule in a gas of temperature where k B is Boltzmann's constant, and m is the mean molecular mass of air. The mean relative collision speed is larger than this by a factor of 2, v rel = 2v. The mean free path, or average distance travelled by a molecule between collisions, is (Chapman & Cowling 1990, ) where c is intermolecular collision cross-section, n is number density, T is temperature, p is pressure, and p = nk B T from the ideal gas law. The linewidth in frequency units can be written as = 1/(2 c ) = v rel /(2l mf p ), where c is the mean collision time between molecules 8 . Finally we have Here n b = 0.5, the reference values p 0 , T 0 are taken to be surface values , and For CO 2 in N 2 , c = x (3.75 x 10 10 m) 2 = 0.44 (nm) 2 (Chapman & Cowling 1990), so 0 = 1.76 GHz (0.06 cm 1 ). The HITRAN database (Gordon et al. 2017) gives values for 0 in the CO 2 2 band that range between 1.5 and 3 GHz (0.05 cm 1 and 0.1 cm 1 ), and n b between 0.5 and 0.8, so our simple method slightly underestimates 0 and n b . These differences are not important for the analysis that follows. Determining line intensity is one of the most challenging aspects of quantum spectroscopy. However, in the range of CO 2 concentrations over which radiative forcing scales approximately logarithmically according to (1), F is not sensitive to the absolute values of line intensity in the 2 band (e.g., Jeevanjee et al. 2021b). Hence we can also take an approximate approach here. The most important quantities in line intensity calculations are the Einstein coefficients, which express the rate of absorption or emission of a photon by a CO 2 molecule. Analysis of the Schrodinger equation in the presence of a time-dependent perturbation due to an oscillating electric field leads to the following expression for the Einstein coefficient for spontaneous emission 9 : Here m and n are any two quantum states of energy E m and E n such that E m > E n and mn = (E m E n )/h. In addition, c is the speed of light and 0 is the vacuum permittivity. The term m|d|n is the transition dipole moment, which is defined as Here d is the dipole moment operator of the molecule and k is the eigenfunction of quantum state k. The transition dipole moment has typical magnitude 3.34 x 10 31 C m (0.1 D) for CO 2 transitions in the 2 vibration-rotation band. This is similar to the permanent dipole of the ground state of CO, 4.07 x 10 31 C.m (0.122 D) (Muenter 1975). Taking mn = 20 THz yields A mn 1 s 1 . Comparison with HITRAN data shows that this is a reasonable approximation at the center of the 2 band, although the values of A mn decrease away from the band center. Line intensity expresses the frequency-integrated absorption cross-section of a line, independent of lineshape. In SI units of Hz m 2 molecule 1 , it is defined as 10 1, as in The dimensionless term O mn (T ) incorporates multiple additional effects, of which the most important here is energy level occupancy. The rate of absorption of photons by molecules in a given energy state must depend on the number density of molecules in that state, relative to the total number density. At temperatures in the 250-290 K range, most CO 2 molecules are in the 2 vibrational ground state 11 , so the fundamental band vibrational occupancy factor can be approximated as 1 for our purposes.
|
d8a91fc2-5770-45fa-8596-00853ed300d8
| 2
|
0221e93f-bde1-469a-b360-d4d678e9e461
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000R1980
| 2,000
|
[
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
3. The application shall be presented to a competent body in accordance with the following:
(a) where a product originates in a single Member State, the application shall be presented to the competent body of that Member State;
(b) where a product originates in the same form in several Member States, the application may be presented to a competent body in one of those Member States. In such cases the competent body concerned, in assessing the application, shall consult the competent bodies in those other Member States;
(c) where a product originates outside the Community, the application may be presented to a competent body in any one of the Member States in which the product is to be or has been placed on the market. 4. The decision to award the label shall be taken by the competent body receiving the application, after:
(a) verifying that the product complies with the criteria published under Article 6(5);
(b) verifying that the application conforms with the assessment and verification requirements; and
(c) consulting competent bodies where necessary under paragraph 3. 5. Where eco-label criteria require production facilities to meet certain requirements they shall be met in all facilities where the product is manufactured. 6. Competent bodies shall recognise tests and verifications performed by bodies which are accredited under the standards of EN 45000 series or equivalent international standards.
|
314479ac-5956-4a00-8a10-c21910b1bead
| 15
|
0223921c-7e21-4e4f-881b-7767f68efc98
| 2,025
|
[
"largest annual change",
"emissions",
"ghg emissions",
"level",
"kt co₂ eq"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
The largest annual change occurred from 2008 to 2009 when emissions decreased by level of GHG emissions ever reported in Ireland. Emissions then plateaued until 2008 with steadily from 54,823.2 kt CO₂ eq in 1990 to 70,923.6 kt CO₂ eq in 2001, which is the highest
|
f718e6cc-67ec-4972-8519-723bf15f21c4
| 0
|
|
02243712-72be-4849-8a39-f914e4881614
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2116
| 2,013
|
[
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
3. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 102 supplementing this Regulation with rules on the rate and duration of suspension of payments and the condition for reimbursing or reducing those amounts with regard to the multi-annual performance monitoring. Article 42
Suspension of payments in relation to deficiencies in the governance systems
1. In the event of serious deficiencies in the proper functioning of the governance systems, the Commission shall, where necessary, ask the Member State concerned to submit an action plan including the necessary remedial actions and clear progress indicators. That action plan shall be established in consultation with the Commission. The Member State concerned shall respond within a period of two months of the Commission s request in order to assess the need for an action plan. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts laying down rules on the structure of the action plans and the procedure for setting up the action plans. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 103(3). 2. If the Member State fails to submit or to implement the action plan referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, or if that action plan is manifestly insufficient to remedy the situation, or if it has not been implemented in accordance with the written request of the Commission referred to in that paragraph, the Commission may adopt implementing acts suspending the monthly payments referred to in Article 21(3) or the interim payments referred to in Article 32. The suspension shall be applied in accordance with the principle of proportionality to the relevant expenditure effected by the Member State where the deficiencies exist, for a period to be determined in the implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph which shall not exceed 12 months. If the conditions for the suspension continue to be met, the Commission may adopt implementing acts prolonging that period for further periods not exceeding 12 months in total. The amounts suspended shall be taken into account when adopting the implementing acts referred to in Article 55. 3. The implementing acts provided for in paragraph 2 shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 103(2). Before adopting such implementing acts, the Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its intention and shall ask it to respond within a period which shall not be less than 30 days. 4. The implementing acts determining the monthly payments referred to in Article 21(3) or the interim payments referred to in Article 32 shall take into account implementing acts adopted under paragraph 2 of this Article. Article 43
Keeping separate accounts
1. Each paying agency shall keep a set of separate accounts for the appropriations entered in the Union budget for the EAGF and EAFRD. 2. The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying down further rules on the obligation laid down in this Article and the specific conditions applying to the information to be booked in the accounts kept by the paying agencies.
|
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| 51
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| 2,025
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[
"low- carbon buildings",
"greener future",
"regional circumstances",
"bills",
"skilled jobs"
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
The strategy sets out the vision for a greener future, which creates hundreds of thousands of green, skilled jobs, drives the levelling up agenda and generates opportunities for the growth of British businesses. The transition to high-efficiency low- carbon buildings can and must take account of individual, local and regional circumstances. Interventions need to be tailored to the people and markets they serve. The strategy outlines a transition that focuses on reducing bills and improving comfort through energy efficiency, and building the markets required to transition to low-carbon heat and reducing costs, while testing the viability of hydrogen for heating. This will provide a huge opportunity for levelling up-supporting 240,000 skilled, green jobs by 2035, concentrated on areas of the UK where investment is needed most. This section sets out:
|
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/united-kingdom-biennial-transparency-report-btr1_0e77f9e4d928e6e9d64ea26cd95945e1.pdf
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
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This long history of oil and gas production in the UK means our offshore basin is mature and production is naturally declining. Through the North Sea Transition Deal, the oil and gas industry is committed to reducing its production emissions by 10% by 2025, 25% by 2027 and 50% by 2030, against a 2018 baseline35.
|
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| 107
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-reports-br-br-3-national-communication-nc-nc-7_dabcc5bcde8c5a69cb06295558ac6b22.pdf
| 2,017
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
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Those provisions already apply in respect to any plant newly permitted since Three compliance routes were available to generating plants; to abate emissions and comply with more stringent limits by 2020; to comply with less stringent limits but face a 1,500 hour per year load factor constrain; or to close Capacity Mechanism 1 * Energy CO2, (CH4, To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables electricity Part of the government’s Electricity Market Reform package, the Capacity Market ensures that sufficient capacity is available to meet peak demand, encouraging construction and use of new low carbon To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables Offers Contracts for Difference (CfDs) in the electricity generation market for low carbon and renewable sources, CfDs will replace Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) which are due to be phased out from 2017. Current policy offers CfD for new capacity through auctions should Government’s choose to hold them. There is also a bilateral negotiation underway for Hinkley point C Nuclear plant. Sectors affected GHG affected Objective and or activity affected Type of Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables electricity Grouped savings produced by a selection of post-2009 - 12,952 36,170 42,863 43,240 47,279 To increase in the proportion of electricity generation and supply from renewables. Sets an annual obligation on electricity suppliers to source a proportion of their generation from renewable sources. Targets can be met by providing Renewable Energy Certificates (ROCs) or paying into the RO buy-out fund. The RO closed to new applicants on 31 March 2017. To reduce the use of emissions intensive fossil fuels and increase the use of renewables. It sets an emissions target (cap) for installations covered by the system (across the EU), with the carbon market determining the carbon price, and therefore where emissions can be reduced most cheaply. It guarantees that total emissions in the sectors covered will not exceed the cap set, and in doing so drives investments in low-carbon technologies, leading to cutting emissions of carbon 2) and other greenhouse gases at least cost. To improve air quality by limiting industrial emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide and dust. This indirectly acts to mitigate GHG emission by reducing the use of high carbon (coal) generation in the electricity supply industry. The Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD, 2001/80/EC) sets limits on emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and dust from combustion plants with a thermal capacity of 50 MW or greater. Has now been replaced by the Industrial To further increase in the proportion of electricity generation and supply from renewables. Increases Renewable Obligation (RO) targets in electricity supply so as meet the UK’s overall renewables target for 2020 as set out in the Renewables Directive Feed in Tariffs (FITS) * Energy CO2, (CH4, Encourage small-scale, low carbon generation. Regulatory, Implemented Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) support organisations, businesses, communities and individuals to generate low-carbon electricity using small-scale (5 MW or less total installed capacity) systems. Electricity suppliers are obliged to pay the regulated tariffs to eligible generators. Consolidates and strengthens several air quality measures, including the LCPD. Further reduce the use of high carbon (coal) generation in the As transposed into UK law, the IED replaced the LCPD from 1 January 2016 with similar although more stringent provisions set out in chapter III of the Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU) (IED). Those provisions already apply in respect to any plant newly permitted since Three compliance routes were available to generating plants; to abate emissions and comply with more stringent limits by 2020; to comply with less stringent limits but face a 1,500 hour per year load factor constrain; or to close Capacity Mechanism 1 * Energy CO2, (CH4, To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables electricity Part of the government’s Electricity Market Reform package, the Capacity Market ensures that sufficient capacity is available to meet peak demand, encouraging construction and use of new low carbon To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables Offers Contracts for Difference (CfDs) in the electricity generation market for low carbon and renewable sources, CfDs will replace Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) which are due to be phased out from 2017. Current policy offers CfD for new capacity through auctions should Government’s choose to hold them. There is also a bilateral negotiation underway for Hinkley point C Nuclear plant. 84 7th National Communication Sectors affected GHG affected Objective and or activity affected Type of Brief Description Start Year of Greenhouse Gas Saving (ktCO2 eq) To increase the proportion of low carbon (Nuclear, CCS) and renewables generation. Planned continuation of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) for new low carbon capacity after 2020. Carbon Price Floor 1 * Energy CO2, (CH4, To reduce the use of emissions intensive fossil fuels and increase the use of renewables in The Carbon Price Floor (CPF) is designed to further reduce the use of emission-intensive fossil fuels and increase the proportion of electricity generation and supply from low Improve energy efficiency of buildings. Regulatory Implemented Building Regulations set minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and when people carry out controlled ‘building work’ to existing properties including extensions, conversions and certain categories of renovation and replacement windows and boilers. 5,544 8,801 10,140 7,70 8 5,110 2,733 Improve energy efficiency of buildings. Regulatory Implemented Building Regulations set minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and when people carry out controlled ‘building work’ to existing properties including extensions, conversions and certain categories of renovation and replacement windows and boilers. - 3,232 5,382 6,376 4,832 3,772 Improve energy efficiency of buildings. Regulatory Implemented Building Regulations set minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and when people carry out controlled ‘building work’ to existing properties including extensions, conversions and certain categories of renovation and replacement windows and boilers.
|
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
- GOVERNMENT OF ESPA LONG-TERM DECARBONISATION STRATEGY 2050 Long-term strategy for a modern, competitive, and climate-neutral Spanish economy by 2050 FOURTH VICE PRESIDENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRY FOR TRAKA YELACTO DEHOGAnco IARC STRATEGIC ENERGY AND CLIMATE
|
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|
|
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https://civitas.eu/sites/default/files/civitas_guide_for_the_urban_transport_professional.pdf
| 2,001
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[
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civitas.eu
|
Local businesses may also be opposed to
cle can be hindered by all kinds of vehicle regulations. 52
CIVITAS GuI de for T he u rbA n TrAnS po rT p ro feSSIonAl
3.4 MOB IL ITY MANAg EMENT
3.4 Mobility management
whAT IS ThE SOLUTION? CIVITAS cities try to influence travel behaviour through
promotion and information are the means to foster an
mobility management, which includes marketing, com-
integrated use of this package of so-called alternative
munication, education and information campaigns. mobility options i.e. public transport, car-sharing, car-
The aim of mobility management is to change attitudes
pooling, cycling, walking in certain cases in combina-
and travel behaviour with the ultimate goal to create
tion with private car use co-modality. a new mobility culture. Initiatives include for instance
Several types of mobility agencies exist from a
mobility management or travel plans for companies32
simple commercial desk where the main task is ticket
to get employees to travel to work using sustainable
sales to at the other end of the spectrum the so-
modes of transport, and awareness-raising campaigns
called eco-mobility agencies or agencies of time
and educational programmes at schools. management. Almost all CIVITAS cities opened new mobility
A mobility agency is a service where different us-
agencies, or developed an integrated website for the
ers are encouraged to rationalise their mobility practice
promotion of their mobility services. Where a sustain-
and modal choice in accordance with a set of socio-
able mobility plan can be considered as the integrating
economic criteria health, budget, time management,
tool at the level of planning, the mobility agency fosters
etc. and environmental criteria impacts on air quality,
the integration at the service level. In all cases the drive
noise, energy and space consumption, etc..
|
a20264eb-0ca9-4fb5-983a-e64bfbff96ce
| 52
|
023905a8-e620-4b44-aaf5-f3c4cc206eb5
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0105
| 2,006
|
[
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] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Such agreements can include provisions on market opening, investment, regulatory convergence on issues such as transit and access to pipelines, and competition. Reinforced market-based provisions on energy and trade related energy issues would thus be incorporated in the EU s existing and future agreements with third countries.(v) Energy to promote developmentFor developing countries, access to energy is a key priority, and Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest access in the world to modern energy services. At the same time, only 7% of Africa s hydropower potential is tapped. The EU should promote a twin-track approach through the European Union Energy Initiative and through raising the profile of energy efficiency in development programmes. Focusing on developing renewable energy and micro-generation projects, for instance, could help many countries reduce reliance on imported oil and improve the lives of millions. The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol clean development mechanism could spur investment in such energy projects in developing countries.3. ConclusionsThis Green Paper has set out the new energy realities facing Europe, outlined questions for debate and suggested possible actions at the European level. In taking the debate forward, it is essential to act in an integrated way.
|
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| 17
|
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|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.07465v2
| 2,021
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arxiv.org
|
The matrix also integrates any intermediate effects as
Sun's causal effects on global warming, for example, could accumulate for many years and repeatedly through many intermediates (e.g., oceanic evaporation and ozone). Finally, for an empirical Ω, the indirect influences eventually become stable over time, lim
where 1 n is the n × 1 vector with all ones, π i ≥ 0, and
Therefore, the average direct and indirect influence also have the same limit,
In the limits, the ith column remains the same across all rows. It is y i 's causality to the movement of the whole vector y .t . So we call π i to be y i 's global causality. The row vector π = (π 1 , π 2 , • • • , π k ) also satisfies the following counterbalance equilibrium (Hu and Shapley, 2003) over the directional network Ω:
In the counterbalance, on the one hand, y i 's causality π i to the movements of y .t derives from its effect on all components of y .t . On the other hand, it also distributes its π i to others which cause y i 's changes. In the distribution of π i , the fair division is through the ith row of Ω, which is the percentages of y i 's variability explained by each individual time series. So y j gets π i ω ij from π i . Similarly, π j also distributes π j to others and y i gets π j ω ji . Looping on all j in N , we get the following equation (16) and (15). So, the ith column of Ω stipulates the weights with which y i collects its causality distribution. The causality distribution π is a mixed cooperative and non-cooperative solution. It is noncooperative because i∈N π i = 1; one series' gain means another's loss. It is also cooperative because (16) implies that a larger π j improves π i more, as long as ω ji > 0 remains the same. Also by (16), increasing ω ji also enhances π i . A long-run of competitions and cooperations finally reaches the ultimate solution π. The distribution π could also come from an endogenously weighting. Ignoring the spillover effects, the ith row of Ω is a proper assignment of responsibility or reason for y i 's movement alone; but it is not a proper measurement for the whole vector of y .t . We assign a number π i to weigh the ith row where important variable gets more weight and less important one gets less weight. Then the weighted assignment of responsibility is πΩ, which also measures each variable's contribution to the movement of the vector y .t . So π is proportional to πΩ. Setting n i=1 π i = 1, we get the equation (15). Another application of the counterbalance equilibrium can be found in a sorting algorithm for big data (Hu, 2020). Instead of using Ω in the equilibrium, one could also apply the frequency decompositions (Geweke 1982; Kaminski et al. 2001) or the generalized variance decomposition (Lanne and Nyberg, 2016). Both these two decompositions also have a unit sum for each row. An iterative algorithm for (15) is
for a given nonnegative vector π (0) such that it has a unit sum. The limit of π (t) would be π for an empirical Ω. The general unrestricted VAR in (1) is highly artificial as it ignores the causeeffect relations within the vector y .t . Consequently, this may result in overwhelmingly many insignificant elements in Ω. One solution is to iteratively identify the causal relations and then re-specify the VAR model using already identified relations. For example, hypothesis tests could be used to make the VAR from general to specific and from unrestricted to restricted. By speculating a possible relation after observing some signals, one generally sets up a hypothesis on the relation. Finally, he or she extracts the evidence from the data to approve or reject the hypothesis. The distribution π mitigates the uncertainty in Ω by its spillover effects from the third parties. Indeed, the spillover effects take two further actions: confirmation of real comparative causality and off-setting of noisy ones. Consequently, π i could still be insignificant even if many elements of Ω's ith column are statistically significant. If y i has a real comparative causality in the directional network, then Ω has consistent large values in the i's column, especially for variables with large values in π. If the advantage is a noise, on the other hand, then the sampling errors could largely account for the positive entires in the ith column. To see the effects of a small variation of Ω on π, let us first shock both Ω(j, i) and Ω(k, i) by δ. This can be seen as y i has some real improvement. Secondly, we shock Ω(j, i) by δ and Ω(k, i) by -δ. This can be a case of pure white noise. By Theorem 5, the effects add up when two shocks have the same sign while they offset each other when the shocks are opposite. The small-sized derivative in Theorem 5 also indicates that π i 's standard error is small compared to those for the elements in Ω's ith column. In the theorem, we use three notations for simplicity: the matrix Z i is the transpose of Ω with the ith row and the ith column removed; the column vector α ji takes the jth row from Ω and then drops its ith element; and π -i is the row vector when π i is removed from π. Theorem 5. For any i, j ∈ N ,
Proof. See Appendix A5. The filtration could also be explained by the chains of direct influences. The unit sum in each row of Ω places a zero-sum restriction on the noise of each row. So some noise are positive while others are negative.
|
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| 3
|
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|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:306E:0182:0188:EN:PDF
| 2,006
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] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
air, noise, water and waste
directives, energy efficiency and climate policy to allow for comparisons and benchmarking between Euro-
pean cities
9. Considers that the SUMP should take into consideration among others the following documents
Waste management plan Directive 75442EEC on waste, as amended 1
Noise maps and action plans, if available Directive 200249EC relating to the assessment and manage-
ment of environmental noise 2
Local air pollution plan or programme if available Directive 9662EC on ambient air quality assess-
ment and management 3
Local Environmental Plans and Programmes pursuant to Directive 200142EC on the assessment of the
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment 4
1 OJ L 194, 25.7.1975, p. 39. Directive as last amended by Regulation EC No 18822003 OJ L 284, 31.10.2003,
p. 1. 2 OJ L 189, 18.7.2002, p. 12. 3 OJ L 296, 21.11.1996, p. 55. 4 OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30.
|
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| 2
|
0248081b-afde-4ca7-acf1-58ff60090415
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007R0715
| 2,007
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Done at Strasbourg, 20 June 2007. For the European Parliament
The President
H.-G. PÃTTERING
For the Council
The President
G. GLOSER
(1)
OJ C 318, 23.12.2006, p. 62. (2) Opinion of the European Parliament of 13 December 2006 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and Council Decision of 30 May 2007. (3)
OJ L 42, 23.2.1970, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive 2006/96/EC (OJ L 363, 20.12.2006, p. 81). (4) Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards. (5) Council Directive 70/220/EEC of 20 March 1970 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States on measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 76, 6.4.1970, p. 1). Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2003/76/EC (OJ L 206, 15.8.2003, p. 29). (6) Council Directive 72/306/EEC of 2 August 1972 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the measures to be taken against the emission of pollutants from diesel engines for use in vehicles (OJ L 190, 20.8.1972, p. 1). Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2005/21/EC (OJ L 61, 8.3.2005, p. 25). (7) Council Directive 74/290/EEC of 28 May 1974 adapting to technical progress Council Directive No 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by gases from positive-ignition engines of motor vehicles (OJ L 159, 15.6.1974, p. 61). Directive as amended by Directive 2006/101/EC (OJ L 363, 20.12.2006, p. 238). (8) Council Directive 80/1268/EEC of 16 December 1980 relating to the carbon dioxide emissions and the fuel consumption of motor vehicles (OJ L 375, 31.12.1980, p. 36). Directive as last amended by Directive 2004/3/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 49, 19.2.2004, p. 36). (9) Council Directive 83/351/EEC of 16 June 1983 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by gases from positive-ignition engines of motor vehicles (OJ L 197, 20.7.1983, p. 1). (10) Council Directive 88/76/EEC of 3 December 1987 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by gases from the engines of motor vehicles (OJ L 36, 9.2.1988, p. 1). (11) Council Directive 88/436/EEC of 16 June 1988 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by gases from engines of motor vehicles (Restriction of particulate pollutant emissions from diesel engines) (OJ L 214, 6.8.1988, p. 1). (12) Council Directive 89/458/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending with regard to European emission standards for cars below 1,4 litres Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 226, 3.8.1989, p. 1). (13) Council Directive 91/441/EEC of 26 June 1991 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 242, 30.8.1991, p. 1). (14) Council Directive 93/59/EEC of 28 June 1993 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 186, 28.7.1993, p. 21). (15) Directive 94/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 100, 19.4.1994, p. 42). (16) Directive 96/69/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 1996 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 282, 1.11.1996, p. 64). (17) Directive 98/69/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 350, 28.12.1998, p. 1). (18) Directive 2001/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 January 2001 amending Council Directive 70/220/EEC concerning measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 35, 6.2.2001, p. 34). (19) Directive 2001/100/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 December 2001 amending Council Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States on measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 16, 18.1.2002, p. 32). (20) Directive 2004/3/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 amending Council Directives 70/156/EEC and 80/1268/EEC as regards the measurement of carbon dioxide emissions and fuel consumption of N1 vehicles (OJ L 49, 19.2.2004, p. 36). (21)
OJ L 275, 20.10.2005, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 2006/51/EC (OJ L 152, 7.6.2006, p. 11). (22)
OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.
|
136546c3-39a6-4713-b370-77343ca7186c
| 15
|
0255c364-1427-4441-b9b3-9bf77669e71e
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.19737v1
| 2,025
|
[
"Natural disasters",
"urbanization",
"climate change",
"human mobility",
"prediction models",
"disaster scenarios",
"early warning",
"rescue resources",
"LLMs",
"mobility intention",
"intention predictor",
"intention refiner",
"location prediction",
"RAG",
"Acc@1",
"F1-score",
"immobility",
"DisasterMobLLM",
"deep learning",
"framework",
"integration",
"knowledge transfer",
"city",
"vulnerability."
] |
arxiv.org
|
RELATED WORKS
Traditional Deep Learning Models in Mobility Prediction Since mobility prediction tasks have been widely studiedin recent years,,, there are many mobility prediction models using deep learning methods. Feng et. al. proposed DeepMove to use RNN and attention to extract time and location embeddings fortrajectory prediction. Flashback enhances the prediction performance of RNNs by emphasizing periodic and contextual information. STiSAN+
further refines predictions by considering both daily and hourly timing along with spatial relationships. SSDL represents the complex human mobility semantics in different hidden spaces by decoupling the time-invariant and timevarying factors, and the POI graph structure is designed to explore the heterogeneous cooperation signals in the historical mobility. STAR captures spatio-temporal correspondence by designing different spatio-temporal maps and building a stay branch to simulate the stay time in different locations, which is ultimately optimized through adversarial training. There are also works using transfer learning to extract knowledge from other cities to enhance the prediction in the current city.
|
cd67e4bc-13b7-43ce-a7d3-43539ef47fcf
| 1
|
0256962c-bdfe-4134-ac7a-f61013dc64fe
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/united-kingdom-biennial-transparency-report-btr1_0e77f9e4d928e6e9d64ea26cd95945e1.pdf
| 2,024
|
[
"climate",
"change",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
It will include an overview of our adaptation plans up to 2023 and our international climate finance contributions over 2021-2022. The UK’s 2030 NDC covers England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
|
2ae0b548-ef04-451f-aba3-617d0f3c41f8
| 5
|
02584c46-ff1b-49a8-86de-6412555c0af8
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.13994v1
| 2,025
|
[
"CMIIP",
"global climate models",
"GCMs",
"climate models",
"intercomparison",
"climate change",
"climate assessment",
"research",
"science",
"data",
"projections",
"atmosphere",
"ocean",
"Earth system",
"models",
"analysis",
"prediction",
"warming",
"greenhouse gases"
] |
arxiv.org
|
Appendix B. In relation to Section 3.1, the figure below illustrates the infrared light spectra obtained using [MODTRAN (available at the web page: https://climatemodels.uchicago.edu/modtran/) in a standard](https://climatemodels.uchicago.edu/modtran/) atmosphere under the physical conditions shown in the right-hand inset. The MODTRAN model simulates the emission and absorption of infrared radiation in the atmosphere. The curves represent theoretical emission spectra at different atmospheric CO 2 concentrations: (green) 0 ppm, (blue) 400 ppm, and (red) 800 ppm. The top-left panel displays the infrared light spectra observed at the surface of the atmosphere looking upward. The top-right panel shows the spectra at the top of the atmosphere looking downward; this figure closely aligns with the results obtained by van Wijngaarden and Happer. The total energy flux from all infrared light is labeled as Upward IR Heat Flux, F , measured in units of W / m . The quantities ∆ Fin the upper inserts indicate the variation in radiative forcing relative to the baseline value at 400 ppm. The bottom panel illustrates how radiative forcing changes as a function of CO 2 concentration relative to the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm. The blue curve represents ∆ F values obtained with MODTRAN, while the red curve corresponds to the traditionally used approximation function ∆ F = 3.7 log 2 .
|
c118d41e-0f6f-4d15-bab3-659618775684
| 11
|
02588cd2-beee-47e7-a082-e02e962ef691
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.07847v1
| 2,021
|
[
"climate",
"change",
"economic",
"nordhaus",
"global"
] |
arxiv.org
|
The most important tipping points, in their view, have a threshold temperature tipping value of 3 • C or higher (such as the destruction of the Amazon rain forest) or have a time scale of at least 300 years (the Greenland Ice Sheet and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet). Their review finds no critical tipping elements with a time horizon less than 300 years until global temperatures have increased by at least 3 • C. [13, p. 60. Emphasis added] Nordhaus also referenced [7] in the manual for DICE [1] to justify the use of a simple quadratic function to relate the increase in global temperature ∆T to the damages to global economic production D(∆T ):
The current version assumes that damages are a quadratic function of temperature change and does not include sharp thresholds or tipping points, but this is consistent with the survey by Lenton et al. (2008). [1, p. 11
The climate damage function is defined as the fraction by which future GDP would be reduced, relative to what it would be in the complete absence of climate change. In the current version of DICE, it is quantified as
where a = 0.00227. Nordhaus observed that this formula predicts "damage of 2.1 percent of income at 3 • C, and 7.9 percent of global income at a global temperature rise of 6 [13] and [1]. There is currently a huge gulf between natural scientists' understanding of climate tipping points and economists' representations of climate catastrophes in integrated assessment models (IAMs). [15, p. 585] Nordhaus noted [13, Note 11 to Chapter 5, p. 334)] that his assertion that there are "no critical tipping elements with a time horizon less than 300 years until global temperatures have increased by at least 3 • C" [13, p. 60. Emphasis added] relied in part on a table by Lenton in another publication, where Lenton constructed what he described as a "simple 'straw man' example of tipping element risk assessment" [16,Table 7.1,p. 185]. This table assessed the 8 tipping elements on two metrics, "Likelihood of passing a tipping point (by 2100)" and "Relative impact of change in state (by 3000)", and gave Arctic summer sea-ice the highest ranking on the first metric, and the lowest on the second. It is conceivable that this was the basis of Nordhaus's conclusion that there were no critical tipping elements this century. However, Lenton explicitly noted that his impact rating was a relative rating of the eight tipping elements against each other, not an absolute ranking of their climatic significance: Lenton 2008 "Tipping elements in the Earth's climate system" [7] Nordhaus 2013 DICE Manual & The Climate Casino [1,13] Society may be lulled into a false sense of security by smooth projections of global change. [7, p.1792] The current version assumes that damages are a quadratic function of temperature change and does not include sharp thresholds or tipping points, but this is consistent with the survey by Lenton et al. (2008) [1, p. 11] Our synthesis of present knowledge suggests that a variety of tipping elements could reach their critical point within this century under anthropogenic climate change. [7, p.1792] Their review finds no critical tipping elements with a time horizon less than 300 years until global temperatures have increased by at least 3 • C. [13, p. 60] The greatest threats are tipping the Arctic sea-ice [0.5-2 The most important tipping points, in their view, have a threshold temperature tipping value of 3 • C or higher (such as the destruction of the Amazon rain forest) . . . [13, p. 60] Arctic . . . summer ice-loss threshold, if not already passed, may be very close and a transition could occur well within this century. [7, p.1789. Emphasis added] . . . or have a time scale of at least 300 years (the Greenland Ice Sheet and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet). [13, p. 60] Impacts are considered in relative terms based on an initial subjective judgment (noting that most tipping-point impacts, if placed on an absolute scale compared to other climate eventualities, would be high) [16, p. 186. Emphasis added]. The "transition timescale" column in Lenton's Table 1 [7, p. 1788] 1 was also an estimate of the time the complete transition would take from its initial tipping, not the years until a tipping event would be triggered, as Nordhaus implied. While Lenton et al. did give a timeframe of more than 300 years for the complete melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS), for example, they noted that they considered only tipping elements whose fate would be decided this century: Thus, we focus on the consequences of decisions enacted within this century that trigger a qualitative change within this millennium, and we exclude tipping elements whose fate is decided after 2100. [7, p. 1787] Therefore, contrary to Nordhaus's assertions, Lenton's research warned that tipping elements were likely to be triggered by temperature rises expected this century, and noted that if triggered, these would have significant impacts upon the climate and biosphere, including its suitability for human life-and therefore, significant impacts upon the economy. Subsequent research by Lenton and associates has explicitly criticised the treatment of tipping points by economists in general (and Nordhaus in particular) [15], calculated that including tipping points in Nordhaus's own DICE model can increase the "Social Cost of Carbon" (by which optimal carbon pricing is calculated) by a factor of greater than eight [8], and proposed 2 • C as a critical level past which "tipping cascades" could occur [9,10,15]. This criticism of economists by scientists has not caused economists in general to recognise tipping points. While some economists have been influenced by Lenton's work on tipping points [8,17], subsequent use of the DICE model to inform policy (e.g.
|
0807d868-1f43-466f-9748-f450aeea607b
| 1
|
0262c03a-fe1f-4c3e-aeae-85c20bc6ce65
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/643583fb877741001368d815/mobilising-green-investment-2023-green-finance-strategy.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"strategy",
"green",
"finance",
"published"
] |
www.gov.uk
|
The T P T w ill also begin work to develop sector-specific transition plan guidance and develop the T P T S andbox to accelerate new capabilities to support preparers and 30. Transition plans have the potential to mobilise green and transition finance at a transformative scale globally, creating new economic opportunities. The T P T i ntends to raise international ambition for a global baseline standard on transition plans and has prioritised interoperability by working towards alignment with elements of the draft I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards. The T P T h as proposed to align with I S S B g uidance by encouraging company transition plans to use the same reporting boundary as their wider corporate reporting. This approach would enable integration of international financial flows within company transition reporting. The T P T i s also working with initiatives such as G F A N Z to align guidance and support transition U K s upport for transition plans 31. Given the important role of transition planning, the U K g overnment committed to moving toward mandatory disclosure of transition plans during our COP 2 6 Presidency. The F C A h as now introduced and updated rules for asset managers/owners and listed companies with comply or explain requirements to publish transition plans. 32. The Government commits to consulting on the introduction of requirements for the U K ’s largest companies to disclose their transition plans if they have them. This will complement existing requirements in place from the F C A , and as such will ensure parity between listed and private companies, and ensure requirements are consistent and comparable across the economy. This consultation will take place once the T P T has completed its work in autumn/winter 2023. It will look to align with the F C A ’s existing obligations for transition plans, which require plans to be produced on a 33. The government wishes to encourage companies to plan for their transition but does not wish to place undue burdens onto companies whose size or scale makes mandatory disclosure unreasonable. Therefore, we will consult on proposals with
proportionality in mind and within the context of the U K ’s non-financial reporting review, which will consider the thresholds used to determine which companies must comply with reporting obligations under the Companies Act 2006. As a result, any future obligations will only apply to the U K ’s most economically significant entities – the vast majority of companies will not have additional burdens placed on them by 34. The government will also work with the F C A t o ensure transition plan requirements are delivered across the financial services sector alongside requirements across listed and 35. The government will also take proactive steps to encourage other jurisdictions to mandate transition plan requirements. This will include encouraging consistency with the T P T s guidance, which will go beyond the baseline for transition plans set out under the I S S B . We will advocate for the importance of international alignment and best practice in transition planning- collaborating with our partners through key forums such as the G 7 , G 2 0 Sustainable Finance Working Group (S F W G ) and our leadership of the private finance workstream at the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. 2.2.3 I F R S Sustainability Disclosure Standards 36. Over the last decade, many voluntary sustainability reporting standards and frameworks have been created in the market, responding to the increased demand for climate and sustainability information from market participants. Between 2013 and 2016, the number of reporting frameworks that focus on sustainability in a broad 37. Given the global nature of financial systems, harmonisation and interoperability between jurisdictions is a priority for the U K i n developing our approach to greening the financial sector. This can help facilitate growth by reducing unnecessary regulatory burden for businesses and financial service providers working across jurisdictions and maximise efficient flow of capital. 38. Recognising the importance of international harmonisation, at COP 2 6 the International Financial Reporting Standards (I F R S ) Foundation announced the creation of the International Sustainability Standards Board (I S S B ) to develop I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards, with the objective to set a global baseline for sustainability reporting. The final version of the first two standards – a general requirement standard and a climate-related standard – are expected to be published in June 2023. 39. At CBD COP 15 in December 2022, the I S S B f urther announced that it would incorporate water, biodiversity and ecosystems into its development of future standards, drawing on the work of the Task Force for Nature-Related Financial Disclosures (T N F D ) and other relevant initiatives. 40. The U K g overnment, financial regulators and many market participants have strongly welcomed the initiative to create the I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards. This builds on the U K s long history of support for the I F R S F oundation’s financial reporting standards, which are used by the U K a nd approximately 125 other countries. 41. Establishing the I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards is a ground-breaking step which recognises that many businesses and financial firms are global and have activities that cross borders. Sustainability Disclosure Standards will provide these
organisations with a high-quality reporting framework and ensure investors have access to globally consistent and comparable information. 42. The U K g overnment will continue to show international leadership in its support for the I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards. Meeting the recommendation of the independent Net Zero Review, we intend to launch a formal assessment mechanism as soon as the first two standards are published (expected in June 2023).
|
56ee4d88-2ab4-4059-810e-e3d833392a95
| 14
|
0270be12-8ad2-4817-8899-92b7a00fbfeb
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2015/infrastructure-act-2015_fb5ac70eeceb97277b5a2dd914ba86ed.pdf
| 2,015
|
[
"Energy",
"Transport",
"Cycling",
"Infrastructure",
"Walking",
"section",
"highways",
"strategic",
"company",
"insert"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
(9) Regulations under this Act may include incidental, supplementary, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision. (10) Subsections (8) and (9) do not apply to regulations under section 57. (1) Part 1 (strategic highways companies) extends to England and Wales only, save that— (a) sections 16 and 18 to 20 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern (b) an amendment or repeal made by that Part, other than the amendment made by section 17(7), has the same extent as the provision to which it relates. (2) Part 2 (Cycling and Walking Investment Strategies) extends to England and Wales (3) In Part 3 (powers of British Transport Police Force)— (a) section 22(1) extends to England and Wales only, and (b) section 22(2) extends to England and Wales and Scotland. (4) Part 4 (environmental control of animal and plant species) extends to England and (5) In Part 5 (planning, land and buildings)— (a) an amendment or repeal has the same extent as the provision to which it (b) sections 30(2) to (4), 32 (11) and (12) and 33 (2), Part 4 of Schedule 5 and section 34 so far as applying to that Part and section 37(6) extend to England (a) sections 38 and 39, sections 41 and 42, sections 51 to 53 and Schedules 6 and 7 extend to England and Wales and Scotland, (b) section 40 and section 49 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern (c) sections 43 to 48 and section 50 extend to England and Wales only. (7) Part 7 (Public Works Loan Commissioners) extends to England and Wales, Scotland (8) This Part extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. (1) Part 1 (strategic highways companies) comes into force—
66 Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (a) in so far as it confers power to make regulations, on the day on which this (b) for all other purposes, on such day as the Secretary of State appoints by (2) Part 2 (Cycling and Walking Investment Strategies) comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State appoints by regulations. (3) Part 3 (powers of British Transport Police Force) comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed. (4) Part 4 (environmental control of animal and plant species)— (a) so far as it relates to England, comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State appoints by regulations, and (b) so far as it relates to Wales, comes into force on such day as the Welsh Ministers appoint by regulations. (5) In Part 5 (planning, land and buildings)— (a) sections 26, 27 and 37 come into force on such day as the Secretary of State (b) section 28 comes into force— (i) in so far as it confers power to make regulations, on the day on which (ii) for all other purposes, on such day as the Secretary of State appoints (c) sections 29 and 33 come into force on the day on which this Act is passed, (d) section 30 and Schedule 4 come into force— (i) in so far as they confer power to make provision by regulations or by development order within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, on the day on which this Act is passed, and (ii) for all other purposes, on such day as the Secretary of State appoints (e) sections 31, 32, 34, 35 and 36 and Schedule 5 come into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed. (6) In the case of section 34 and Schedule 5, subsection (5) has effect subject to Part 4 (a) sections 38 and 39 and Schedule 6 come into force on 1 June 2016, (b) section 40 and sections 43 to 49 come into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, (c) sections 41 and 42, section 50, section 52 and Schedule 7 come into force on such day as the Secretary of State appoints by regulations, and (d) section 51 and section 53 come into force on the day on which this Act is (8) Part 7 (Public Works Loan Commissioners) comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed. (9) This Part comes into force on the day on which this Act is passed. Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (10) Regulations under subsection (1)(b), (4), (5)(a), (b)(ii) or (d)(ii) or (7)(c) may appoint different days for different purposes or areas. (11) The Secretary of State may by regulations make transitional, transitory or saving provision in connection with the coming into force of any provision of this Act, other than Part 4 so far as it relates to Wales. (12) The Welsh Ministers may by regulations make transitional, transitory or saving provision in connection with the coming into force of Part 4 so far as it relates to Wales. This Act may be cited as the Infrastructure Act 2015. 68 Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) SCHEDULE 1 – Strategic highways consequential and supplemental amendments Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). 1 The Highways Act 1980 is amended as follows. 2 (1) Section 1 (highway general provision) is amended as follows.
|
079fda04-5438-4ec9-9c30-a7a0396093f2
| 25
|
0279d2ce-e561-4650-a715-754c819a5786
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0394:FIN:EN:PDF
| 2,000
|
[
"Electricity and heat",
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Indicators Transport and
Environment Reporting
Mechanism TERM
Negotiated agreement with
the car industry supporting
its commitment to reach
140gkm by 20089
European and Japanese
carmakers on track to meet
their commitments, Korean
car industry still somewhat
lagging behind. Directive 200330EC on the
promotion of bio-fuels and
other renewable fuels for
transport adopted in 2003
with an indicative target of
5.75 of biofuels
contribution to diesel and
gasoline consumption by
2010
Final Council and European
Parliament positions on the
Commissions ship
emissions strategy,
December 2003
Adoption of directive
200317EC introducing
requirements on the sulphur
content of road transport
fuels. By 2003 only 5 Member
States had ratified Annex VI
to the MARPOL convention
on the prevention of air
pollution from ships
EN
12
EN
Reduce noise originating from transport source
1999 Integration Strategy, White Paper on
Transport Policy, 6th EAP
Safer and cleaner maritime transport source
1999 Integration Strategy, White Paper on
Transport Policy, 6th EAP
Amended proposal for a
directive on the shipment of
waste COM 2004 172
Proposal for a revised
directive on sulphur in
marine fuels COM 2002
595. Proposals from the
Commission March 2003 to
implement international rules
to prevent deliberate
discharges of waste or cargo
residues to the sea and on
imposing criminal sanctions
on those responsible for
pollution by ships.
|
84e2ea09-1d7f-46b5-b066-7956ace9a8aa
| 10
|
027b6e38-9c3d-4c0e-b3d6-7a676b09d6e6
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
The inventory method for 2011 onwards therefore aligns to the total reported to the PI/SPRI across all sources, and an estimate of venting emissions has been modelled based on previously reported source estimates and the trend in annual site Method Assumptions and Observations • EEMS data for venting are provided as emissions data without any underlying activity and emission factor information. The UK inventory method is to aggregate those operator - reported data and conduct QC against other reported data (such as production data to identify when installations start and cease production) to ensure completeness of reporting. In a small number of cases, operators may report gases other than CO 2, CH4
Other Detailed Methodological Descriptions A3 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 802 and NMVOC under venting in EEMS; where there are reports of small amounts of N 2O, NOX and CO reported as venting in EEMS, these data are included in the inventory, assuming that there are some waste combustion gases recorded as vented, e.g. from maintenance activities. This happens rarely and the mass of these gases is always very low; they may be misallocated, but it is a minor issue. • In the UK there are no known omissions, the scope of reporting is complete. Time-series checks by the Inventory Agency are used to assess the completeness of reporting each year; there are a small number of terminals that regularly report notable venting emissions, whilst offshore there are tens of installations that report notable venting of hydrocarbons (methane and NMVOC), and a small number (Elgin, Shearwater, Brae only in recent years) that report venting of CO2. Onshore terminals that routinely report notable venting emissions Flotta, Theddlethorpe, SAGE -St. Fergus, Shell-St Fergus, Barrow and Bacton. • The method is Tier 2/3 across the time series, using the best available data from operator reporting throughout. Noting that in many cases the operator estimates are not presented via an “activity” and “emission factor” but rather are direct estimates of the gases vented from monitoring of the gas throughput and an assumed ga s composition, the accuracy is hard to evaluate. Where there are installation-specific processes (e.g. acid gas stripping) that lead to high emissions of vented gases (e.g. Shearwater and Elgin often encounter high -CO2 produced gases that cannot be flared; several terminals vent the process gases from fuel gas treatment facilities) the composition of the gases is monitored by operators. Smaller -scale vented emissions may be estimated through engineering calculations and default data on gas composition. • Time Series The method is compromised by the lack of fully detailed data for the 1990 -1997 period, where only aggregate emissions data across all sources in 1A1cii and 1B2 are available from the industry submissions to UK Government. However, the Inventory Agency has conducted validation checks across the UKOOA dataset versus EEMS data in overlap years, which indicates good time series consistency, and the Inventory Agency has deployed gap -filling methods consistent with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines to develop time series consistent reporting per source category back to the early 1990s. Therefore, the time series consistency is as good as practicable, given the limited resolution of the available industry emissions and activity data. Scope for future research and improvement • The method is reliant on the operator reporting to EEMS. The PPRS monthly reports also include data on venting. Comparisons of PPRS and EEMS data during this project have indicated that for many sites there is good correlation betw een EEMS and PPRS, whilst for other sites there are gaps in the PPRS data where EEMS includes venting estimates. This indicates that PPRS is not always reliable for QC of EEMS and/or to inform better estimates. The NSTA has recently begun to consider revisions to the system of flare and vent consents, and there may be scope to establish better quality routine reporting of gas venting through the PPRS system, which could then provide an additional data source or • The uncertainty parameters applied at category-gas level are presented in Annex 2.3. • Uncertainties of emissions reported are based on expert judgement, informed by the understanding of the available data and the likelihood of error compensation across all UK • In the latest year of the time series, the uncertainty for venting is estimated to be ±5% for CO2, 100% for CH4, whilst in the Base Year (1990) the uncertainty is assumed to be ±20%
Other Detailed Methodological Descriptions A3 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 803 for CO2 and 100% for CH4 due to the more limited information available from industry and assumptions applied to estimate venting emissions. • The limited alternative data against which the EEMS data can be validated undermines confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the venting estimates. Other Detailed Methodological Descriptions A3 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 804 1B2c2i: Upstr eam Oil Production, Gas Flaring; 1B2c2ii Upstream Gas Production, Gas • Upstream oil gas flaring • Onshore oil gas flaring • Upstream gas gas flaring This source category comprises emissions from the flaring of waste gases that arise through production activities for all upstream oil and gas installations on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and onshore, i.e. including at offshore assets (platforms, FPSOs, MODUs), at onshore terminals and at onshore production sites. The gases may need to be flared to address operational issues (e.g. excess gas supply), structural issues (e.g. some platforms/FPSOs that produce crude oil and associated gas do not have any gas export line), safety issues. In operator reporting by offshore operators to OPRED, via EEMS, flaring sub -sources routine operations, gross, maintenance, upsets / other. Flaring of gases is also conducted at oil and gas terminals, again to manage waste gas and maintain operational and safety standards across the sites. For all offshore production sites and terminals, gas flaring emissions are reported by operators under UK ETS (formerly EU ETS) since 2008, i.e.
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11 (1) The regulations may make provision for recognising any of the following as equivalent to allowances or credits under the trading scheme- U.K. (a) allowances, credits or certificates under another trading scheme for which provision is made by regulations under this Part of this Act; (b) units under any other trading scheme (at United Kingdom, European or international level) relating to greenhouse gas emissions. (2) The regulations may provide- (a) for determining the value for the purposes of the scheme of any such allowances, credits, certificates or units, and (b) for the use for the purposes of the scheme of any such allowances, credits, certificates or units to be subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in or determined in accordance with the regulations.
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This will provide a framework for corporate and financial institutions to report and act on evolving nature-related risks to support a shift in global financial flows away from nature-negative outcomes and toward nature-positive outcomes. This market-led, global initiative will build, consult on, and test, its framework over the next year and a half and will be designed to complement the TCFD by building on its 4-pillar approach and drawing on its lessons learnt. These interventions are important to driving the desired ‘nature-positive’ future. As set out in the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan, we hope that the UK will also become a leader in high- quality voluntary carbon markets (VCMs). For these private markets to scale successfully in support of net zero, their integrity and use as an addition (rather than alternative) to rapid decarbonisation will be critical. The government is closely following the important work of various sector-led initiatives the Taskforce for Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets (TSVCM); the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative UK VCM Forum; and the Financing In 2021, the UK issued two Green Gilts with a total transaction size of £16bn. The first transaction of £10bn represented the largest debut transaction size for any country and achieved the biggest ever order book for a sovereign green transaction (in excess of £100bn). The second 32-year bond was also the longest maturity of such bond to date. In doing so the UK has become the third largest national issuer of green bonds just a month after beginning its issuance programme. This followed the successful publication of the UK Government Green Financing Framework on 30 June 2021, which outlines how proceeds raised from the green gilts will help tackle climate change, biodiversity loss and other We have also launched via NS&I the world’s first sovereign retail green savings bond which allows savers to contribute towards the Government’s green initiatives. These are the first standalone retail product to be tied to a sovereign’s green bond framework and will allow 120 Chaired by Mark Carney, is bringing together over 160 firms from the leading net zero initiatives across the financial system to accelerate the transition to net zero emissions by 2050 at the latest. 121 Chancellor sets out how UK financial services can create prosperity at home and project values abroad in first Mansion House services-can-create-prosperity-at-home-and-project-values-abroad-in-first-mansion-house-speech
234 8th National Communication all UK savers to contribute to the fight against climate change and the government’s other environmental objectives. It gives UK savers the opportunity to take part in this collective effort to tackle climate change by contributing to public spending on green, whilst increasing awareness in the government’s green initiatives. We are also committed to tracking finance flows, to complement how we measure carbon. Hence, we will be working with external partners and data providers to better track private investment into the net zero economy going forward. This will enable the UK to robustly, and regularly, assess the alignment of the UK’s financial flows with net zero. The UK launched the Green Finance Education Charter in our 2019 Green Finance Strategy122, reflecting the need for UK and global financial services industries to develop the capabilities of their workforce in green finance principles and practice. Since then, twelve leading professional bodies representing over 1 million finance professionals have signed up to the Charter, hosted by the Green Finance Institute. To further build UK capacity, capability and climate leadership, we will look to expand Charter membership to universities and others, and work with the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (IfATE). We will also seek to internationalise the Charter by encouraging similar development overseas. Financing the technologies required for our transition to net zero is only part of the solution. The transition represents both a risk and an opportunity for the real economy and the financial system that supports it. It is therefore vital that climate-related financial risks and impacts are factored into investment decisions and reflected in the cost of finance for different technologies and companies. To achieve this, we will harness the international reputation of the UK’s leading financial sector to encourage private investment to support low carbon innovation and manage climate-related financial risk. As the Chancellor outlined in his Mansion House speech123, the Government intends to introduce economy-wide Sustainability Disclosure Requirements covering the whole economy. This will include requirements to report on businesses and investment products impact on the climate and environment, as well as the risks and opportunities these impacts pose to business. Our approach is detailed in Greening A Roadmap to The UK has already established itself as a world leader on green finance regulation, becoming the first G20 country to make disclosures aligned with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations fully mandatory across the economy by 2025. As part of the roadmap to delivery, the Government implemented mandatory climate- related financial disclosures by publicly quoted companies, large private companies and the largest Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs), which came into force from 6th April 2022. Following widespread support for the proposals, we will shortly be setting out regulations to bring this into force, including a requirement for scenario analysis – a powerful tool to support companies in their assessment of climate-related risks and opportunities. Alongside measures to implement mandatory disclosures aligned with the TCFD recommendations for companies and 122 BEIS (2019), ‘Green Finance Strategy’, 123 Chancellor sets out how UK financial services can create prosperity at home and project values abroad in first Mansion House services-can-create-prosperity-at-home-and-project-values-abroad-in-first-mansion-house-speech
Chapter 3 Policies and Measures 235 • The Financial Conduct Authority intr oduced a listing rule for premium listed companies which commenced on 1 January 2021. This requires companies to include a statement in their annual financial report which sets out whether their disclosures are consistent with the recommendations of the TCFD, and to explain nment introduced regulations, in force from 1 October 2021, to require pension schemes with £5 billion or more in assets to report line with the TCFD’s recommendations.
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For example, operator data for the consumption of coking coal in coke ovens for the years 2003 -2020 is mostly higher than the figures given in DUKES, and the operator data are used in preference. The coal consumption figures for other industrial use are also modified by an equal and opposite amount so that overall coal consumption in the GHGI is the same as in DUKES. DUKES also excludes a small quantity of coke oven gas generated at one steelworks which is then supplied as a fuel to a co-located process, and so we have used operator data on this fuel in the inventory. In this case, it would not be appropriate to maintain consistency w ith overall UK demand figures in DUKES (since this fuel is missing from DUKES, not classified to a different sector). Finally, some small deviations are made for 2009, where operator data on consumption of coal and coke oven coke in blast furnaces are some what higher. The changes to coal are treated as misallocations in DUKES (so UK totals for coal consumption are adhered to), whereas for coke oven coke, it is necessary to increase UK consumption to above the level given in DUKES, The main recalculation is the reallocation of emissions from blast furnace gas and coke oven gas from 1A2a to 2C1b, this has no impact on the national total. There have been no changes to the methodology for this version of the inventory, and no improvement work is planned, though all input data and assumptions are kept under review. Specific QA/QC and validation exercises relevant to these source categories • the comparison of the reference/sectoral approach; • comparison of inventory estimates based on the carbon balance, with UK ETS data and detailed emission estimates provided by the operators; • comparison of DUKES data with industry-reported activity data (e.g. from ISSB); • comparison of carb on emission factors derived from the carbon balance, with IPCC default emission factors; and, • checks on the time -series consistency of carbon emission factors generated by the The energy AD used in these estimates that come from DUKES are subject to the UK Statistics Authority’s Code of Practice for Statistics50. EU ETS data is subject to its own QA process. A bilateral exchange was undertaken in May 2015 with the Inventory Agency from Germany, which included a review of the revisions to the iron and steel sector method in the 2014
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 160 All activity data used are available for the full time series of the estimates. Carbon factors for key inputs such as coking coal and blast furnace coal are available from operators only for some recent years (2005-2014 in the case of coking coal, 2007 -2014 for other fuels) so the same values must be assumed to be appropriate in earlier years. Data are not available for 2015 onwards, partly due to the Teesside works closing in September 2015, and the sale of the Scunthorpe works to a new operator in ear ly 2016, so 2014 values for some parameters have been assumed to be correct for 2015 -2020 as well. While this does introduce some additional uncertainty for parts of the time -series, the assumed factors for coking coal and blast furnace coal, and the deriv ed factors for coke oven coke, coke oven gas and blast furnace gas for these years are all within the ranges suggested in the IPCC 2006 Guidelines. Note that the implied emission factor for 1B1b is very sensitive to the weighting of emissions between coke manufacture and other solid fuel transformation; this is discussed further in MS Uncertainties for both activity and emission fac tors are based on expert judgement. The uncertainty analysis set out in Annex 2 provides details of these uncertainty values. Uncertainties in fuel use statistics are typically low. The carbon emission factors are based on UK specific data. Since there is a direct link between the carbon emitted and the carbon content of the fuel, it is possible to estimate CO2 emissions accurately. MS 5 Other stationary combustion Relevant Categories, source names 1A4ai : Miscellaneous industrial/commercial combustion Railways - stationary combustion 1A4ci : Agriculture - stationary combustion Miscellaneous industrial/commercial combustion Anthracite, Biogas, Biomass, Burning oil, Charcoal, Coal, Coke, Fuel oil, Gas oil, LPG, Natural gas, Peat, Petroleum coke, SSF, Straw, Wood This method statement covers emissions from fuel combustion by non -industrial sectors including commercial, agricultural, public and residential sectors. Most stationary plants are small-scale, apart from a few large installations providing energy for large commercial or public sector buildings (e.g. banks, hospitals, schools, sport centres). Emissions from stationary railway sources are reported under 1A4a where the fuel is used in stationary combustion of burning oil and fuel oil to heat buildings, as well as natural gas combustion. This gas usage
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 161 may include fuel used for electricity generation for own use by the railw ay sector. The ‘miscellaneous’ source includes energy use by a range of other users including the sewage and refuse disposal sector, and fuels used by television and radio broadcasters. DUKES (BEIS, 2022a) Emission Baggott et al., 2004, IPCC, 2006 An accompanying spreadsheet “Energy_background_data_uk_20 23.xlsx” lists all emission information for common activity data sources. Emissions for this category are calculated based on multiplying activity data by an emission factor. Activity data are taken directly from DUKES, with a few exceptions (see assumptions and observations). A full list of emission factors is included in Annex 3. Carbon emission factors are largely UK specific, whereas non-CO2 emissions use default emission factors. The source representing public sector combustion includes emission s from stationary combustion at military installations, which should ideally be reported under 1A5a Stationary. However, we do not currently have separate data for the military fuel component. Bottom up estimates are made for a number of categories using g as oil (railways, off-road machinery etc.).
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By establishing initiatives such as the Adaptation Action Coalition and Adaptation Research Alliance, the UK is bringing countries together to co-develop solutions and innovations for some of the most challenging impacts of climate change and in doing so, helping embed best practice on adaptation into We have a proven track record in delivering research into climate change risk and adaptation, through the Global Challenges Research Fund and Newton Fund-funded programmes such as those delivered by the Met Office, UKRI, the UK Space Agency and the National Academies. However, we accept that we need further research to fully understand the direct and indirect links between action taken overseas to improve adaptation and how that impacts the UK’s own climate resilience. We understand the need to reduce underlying vulnerabilities overseas alongside its work to respond to disasters and has increased support for disaster risk preparedness, including capacity building. The UK announced £120 million in new funding at the G7 last year to protect those most at risk and help reduce losses and damage to communities, infrastructure and livelihoods caused by climate change. Furthermore, the UK recognises the myriad of ways that climate and environmental change can impact on public health systems and global health more widely. We need to learn from the challenges in the climate-environment-health nexus and from the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. Health systems are on the frontline of protecting populations from the health threats of a changing and more variable climate such food and water insecurity; extreme weather; flooding; heat stress; reduced air quality (including increasing ground level ozone); increased land pressure from a landscape changing; vector-borne diseases and zoonoses, amongst others. With UK leadership, over 50 countries committed to build more resilient and low-carbon sustainable health systems at COP26. Working with international partners, we will support mechanisms to help implement these commitments, aiming to increase access to finance, technical assistance and capacity building and knowledge, for the development of climate-sensitive health systems that can effectively respond to increased and new health
330 8th National Communication risks and emergencies. We will pursue a One Health approach, working with partners across government, to ensure lessons from the current and previous pandemics translate into greater pandemic preparedness. We will seek to strengthen our evidence base to explore further efforts to address the challenges in this nexus, and link health more firmly to We recognise the need to increase focus on embedding climate resilience into UK supply chains if sustainable and resilient growth is to be achieved and is considering future policy that will help address this. DIT has established the Global Supply Chains Directorate to improve the resilience of the UK’s critical supply chains against shocks, including climate change. We understand that there are limits to what the UK government can do alone to control vulnerability factors globally. 5.6.9 Flooding and coastal erosion CCRA2 set the risks of flooding and coastal change to communities, businesses and infrastructure as a priority risk area. Although the Advice Report does not include the effects of flooding and coastal change as a priority risk area, we fully recognise that flood risk to people from rivers, surface water and coastal flooding remains high both now and Our policy statement published in July 2020, alongside the National Strategy on flood and coastal erosion, sets out our ambition to create a nation more resilient to future flood and coastal erosion risk. The Policy Statements sets out over 40 actions which will accelerate progress to better protect and better prepare the country against flooding and As part of this, we are investing a record £5.2 billion to build up to 2,000 new flood defences. This investment will better protect 336,000 properties from flooding and coastal erosion. In addition, we are providing £200 million to inform future approaches to improving resilience to flooding and coastal erosion in communities across the country. Within the programme 25 local areas will take forward wider innovative actions that improve their resilience to flooding and coastal erosion including natural flood management, property flood resilience and community engagement. The programme will also support four areas across the country to help plan future investment in flood and coastal resilience by adopting a long-term adaptive Surface water is the most widespread form of flooding in England, with around 3.2 million properties at risk. Managing surface water flooding requires strong collaboration between a wide range of stakeholders, recognised in the government’s Surface Water Management Action Plan which includes 22 actions to improve understanding and strengthen delivery. In July 2021 we published an update report on progress to date with its Surface Water Management Action Plan and its response to the independent review into surface water and To help places better plan and adapt to future risks from flooding from rivers, the sea and surface water, the Environment Agency (EA) is working to produce a new national assessment of flood risk (NaFRA2) by 2024. As part of our reforms to the planning system, we will consider what mechanisms and policy may be needed to ensure wider flood risk issues are considered during decision making. This includes future flood risk from rivers and the sea, surface water and ground water flood risk. Using the power of nature is part of our solution to tackling flood and coastal erosion risks. We are taking a holistic approach to flood risk management including encouraging more natural flood management where appropriate, alongside engineered defences. We have
Chapter 5 Vulnerability assessment, climate change impact and adaptation measures 331 committed to doubling the number of government-funded projects which include nature- based solutions to reduce flood and coastal erosion risk. We have committed to joining up our plans for trees, peat, soil and nature to secure multiple benefits including for flood risk, carbon sequestration and net gain. For example, the England Woodland Creation Offer provides ‘Additional Contributions’ in locations identified by EA as benefitting from natural flood management. We will continue to develop our evidence base and understanding of the effectiveness of these interventions.
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Land use - getting the best from our land: strategy 2021 to 2026 sets out long term vision for sustainable land use in Scotland, objectives and key policies for delivery. It looks beyond its formal five year duration to 2032 and 2045 targets and efforts to tackle the twin crises of climate change and biodiversity loss.
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Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Climate Smart Agriculture in Africa 10.0 13.5 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General Improved knowledge, policies and longer-term incentives to drive increased uptake of Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) in Eastern and Southern Africa member states. Investments in Forests and Sustainable Land Use 7.5 10.1 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting Forestry To support public-private partnerships that demonstrate how companies, communities, smallholders and governments can work collaboratively to reduce deforestation and benefit forest Scaling up of the Energy and Environment Partnership with Southern and East Africa 7.5 10.1 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General Greater access to clean energy services achieved through fast tracking of renewable energy project demonstration and deployment, including through technology learning, donor coordination and private sector investment. International Forestry Knowledge (KnowFor) 7.0 9.5 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting Forestry Uptake of international forestry knowledge, evidence and tools for international forestry policy and practice. Sustainable Energy for Women and Girls (SEWG) 7.0 9.4 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General Programme aims to shift clean energy markets and delivery systems towards improving the health, safety and economic opportunities of low income girls and women in developing countries, principally in DFID and International Climate Fund (ICF) Climate and Development Knowledge Network 6.7 9.1 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General To improve access for developing countries to high quality research and information in designing climate change policies CDKN – Climate and Development Knowledge 6.6 8.9 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General The purpose is that developing countries have improved access to high quality research and information in designing climate change policies and programmes by 2015. Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Regional Transboundary Water Resources 6.5 8.7 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General To improve governance of shared water resources in Southern Africa, by sustainably improving local water-management capability (helping to manage current and future climate risks of extreme flood and drought events) and supporting development of key water infrastructure. This will indirectly benefit populations in the 13 shared river basins of the SADC region, in which 95 million people reside, through more equitable sharing of water resources, reduced vulnerability to flooding, improved access to drinking water, as well as reducing risk of conflict and better food security. These outcomes will contribute to MDG 1 (“Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger”) and MDG7 (“Ensure Environmental Sustainability”). Kenya – Strengthening Regional Economic 5.8 7.8 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting Transport and To improve the pace of infrastructure development and enhance regional trade competitiveness, by delivering improvement to the managerial capacity and physical layout for cargo handling at the Port of Mombasa, including climate resilient infrastructure and lower emission transport systems, and improved regulatory framework for trade. This will contribute to increased exports and regional trade in East Africa benefitting the regional population. Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus (StARCK+) 5.4 7.3 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General To achieve transformational change by helping Kenya to scale up private sector innovation and investment in low carbon and adaptation products, services and assets (e.g. clean energy, sustainable agriculture, water management, weather forecasting). Enabling this change will require targeted support to critical aspects of climate change governance, and stimulation of civil society demand. This contributes to the UK Government’s International Climate Fund (ICF) commitments and will benefit 828,000 people able to cope with the effects of climate change and 17,600 people with improved access to clean energy. Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Kenya Market Assistance Programme (MAP) 4.9 6.7 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting Industry To reduce poverty in Kenya by enabling poor people to benefit from better functioning markets, including through mainstreaming climate resilience into market interventions, and by building greater awareness among influential decision makers of how markets can work better for the poor. This will increase household incomes of 148,000 small scale farmers and entrepreneurs – of whom 33% are women – by an average of over 20% by 2018. 36,000 jobs for women and 73,000 for men and male youth will also be created. WISER – Weather and climate Information and 4.4 5.9 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting General WISER will help at least 24 million people across Africa (focusing initially on East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) to be more resilient to natural disasters and climate change by 2030 by improving early warning systems (giving more time to prepare for heavy rains for example) as well as helping them make better decisions by knowing what the weather and climate is likely to be (enabling them to make better crop choices or alter planting times in farming, for example). We estimate that this will save over £190 million in terms of avoided damage to health, homes, livelihoods and infrastructure between now and 2030. The WISER programme will initially benefit the East African fishing and farming communities, as well as a wide range of African people, including young, old, men and boys and Northern Transforming the Economy through Climate Smart Agribusiness (NU-TEC) 4.2 5.7 Provided ODA Grant Cross cutting Agriculture To increase the resilience to climate change of poor farmers in Northern Uganda, and to increase their incomes. This will be achieved by working with agricultural businesses to supply farmers with cheaper, better and more varied agricultural inputs and services, and to create stronger markets for farmer produce. This will benefit 250,000 households in Northern Uganda, who will adopt new practices, products and markets that will make them more resilient to climate change, while 150,000 households will see measurable increases to income.
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This is why CLCA should be systematically used when a social responsibility paradigm is addressed by the assessment (Weidema et al., 2018), e.g. for transportation public policies.
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Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (c) provision specifying the maximum time period for which a suspension under the regulations may take effect; (d) provision for review of any suspension or waiver of provisions under a (3) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the negative procedure. I733 Sch. 11 para. 85 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I734 Sch. 11 para. 85 in force at 29.8.2023 by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(ddd)(xi) 86 (1) The Bank may, in making a resolution instrument, share transfer instrument or property transfer instrument in relation to a CCP, direct that CCP to pay the Bank a specified fee to cover expenses reasonably incurred by the Bank in connection with (2) The Treasury may direct a CCP in relation to which the Bank has made a resolution instrument, share transfer instrument or property transfer instrument to pay the Treasury a specified fee to cover expenses reasonably incurred by the Treasury in connection with the exercise by the Bank of that power in relation to the CCP. I735 Sch. 11 para. 86 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I736 Sch. 11 para. 86 in force at 31.12.2023 by S.I. 2023/1382, reg. 8(b) 87 (1) The Treasury may by regulations make provision for protecting the financial interests of relevant persons in connection with the making of a stabilisation instrument in (2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) regulations may make provision establishing a scheme, which may for example include provision— (a) for determining whether relevant persons should be paid compensation or providing for relevant persons to be paid compensation; (b) for paying any compensation (including payments in instalment or subject (c) under which specified relevant persons become entitled to the proceeds of disposal of things transferred under a share transfer instrument or property (3) In making regulations under this paragraph the Treasury must have regard (among other matters) to the desirability of ensuring that any person who is a relevant person before the making of a stabilisation instrument does not receive less favourable treatment than they would have received had— (a) the CCP entered insolvency immediately before the stabilisation instrument
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 11 – Central counterparties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (b) all the relevant rules of the CCP been applied in the period leading up to (4) The regulations may provide for the amount of compensation payable to relevant persons to be determined by a person appointed in accordance with the regulations (5) The regulations may make such further provision about independent valuers as the Treasury consider to be appropriate, including (among other things)— (a) provision about appointment and tenure, (b) provision for remuneration of independent valuers and their staff, (c) provision conferring functions on independent valuers (including conferring (d) provision specifying principles to be applied by independent valuers to determine the amount of compensation, (e) provision about the procedure to be followed by independent valuers, (f) provision about the liability of independent valuers, and (g) provision about appeals against decisions by independent valuers (including conferring jurisdiction on a court or tribunal). (6) The regulations may provide for compensation or other payments to be made by— (b) any other specified persons. references to “insolvency” include a reference to— (d) a composition with creditors, and “relevant person”, in relation to a CCP, means— (a) clearing members of the CCP; (d) clients within the meaning of Article 2 of EMIR where they have a contractual relationship as principal with the CCP. (8) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the affirmative procedure. I737 Sch. 11 para. 87 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I738 Sch. 11 para. 87 in force at 29.8.2023 by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(ddd)(xii) notification of members and creditors 88 (1) This paragraph applies where the Bank has applied one or more of the stabilisation
320 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 11 – Central counterparties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (2) Except where securities issued by the CCP have been admitted to trading on a regulated market (within the meaning given in section 103(1) of FSMA 2000), the Bank must send a copy of any property transfer instrument, share transfer instrument or resolution instrument made in respect of the CCP to each of the following persons (a) the CCP’s shareholders or, if the CCP is an unincorporated association, its I739 Sch. 11 para. 88 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I740 Sch. 11 para. 88 in force at 31.12.2023 by S.I. 2023/1382, reg.
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(2007), UNFCCC ( 2009 The economic adaptation literature is hardly the first to identify the difficulties in incorporating uncertainty into models, nor the first to fail to act on these challenges. But within the literature of the economics of adaptation, there are additional unique challenges to incorporating uncertainty. As Hallegatte et al. (2012) observe, we cannot eliminate deep uncertainties in the short-term (and probably not even in the long-term) in the climate space. The authors suggest that because of this, we must pursue estimates of uncertainty, even if they are imperfect. Montier et al. (2022) note that there are trade-offs when including uncertainty in estimates, often between accuracy and timing. But they note that it is necessary to include a "good enough" estimate. But the issue is not simply uncertainty itself. Hallegatte et al. (2011) further note that the issue with insufficient incorporation of uncertainty goes beyond uncertainty about the trajectories of climate change. As adaptation is not necessarily a specific single action aimed at a single outcome, it can be difficult to capture the spillover outcomes of adaptive actions as well as the compounding economic effects, hence generating more uncertainty.5 Further, climate uncertainty is unique, as its very trajectory depends on how quickly and in what way we collectively take action on the greenhouse gas emissions side of the equation. And so, this uncertainty limits the methods used by most studies estimating the value of investment in adaptation. Despite the challenges, there is work that includes and incorporates uncertainty and provides a model to do so in other contexts (Hallegatte et al., 2012;Hallegatte, 2013;Watkiss and Cimato, 2016;Abadie et al., 2017a;Wilby et al., 2021). Discounting has been noted as a potential method for addressing uncertainty (Stern, 2006;Chambwere et al, 2014;Trück et al., 2020Wise et al., 2022) though evidence is still emerging about its application in practice. Jafino et al. (2021) go further and argue that an emphasis on the differences across climate scenarios may result in bad adaptation policy advice. By focusing on climate impacts and their minimization over the achievement outcomes such as reduced inequality, inferior outcomes may result. The authors instead propose that work should focus on how policies influence the absolute level of metrics of interest (such as inequality) in scenarios with climate change, rather than focusing on how adaptation policies may attenuate or affect incremental climate impacts. Van Ginkel et al. (2020) propose that analysis should be based around tipping points, focusing on those drivers which affect step changes in impacts. However, the uncertainty in estimates of climate change, and the uncertainty around the cost of climate change, has been used by policymakers to justify inaction. Lonsdale et al. (2008) observes that what has occurred with respect to adaptation is effectively "policy paralysis in response to what is a highly uncertain phenomena…". But, instead, we should follow the note of the Tunis Roundtable ( 2010) which observes that "The current state of knowledge is not good enough to provide firm projections. It is inappropriate to design adaptation strategies against a single future projection of modeled climate. ", suggesting flexibility in adaptation in response to uncertainties. Regardless of this challenge, it is essential to use the tools developed to generate better estimates of the economic costs of climate adaptation. Dessai et al. (2009) state that "society can (and must indeed) make effective adaptation decisions in the absence of accurate and precise climate predictions." And Abidoye (2021) notes: "uncertainty does not imply ignorance". As he suggests, the difficulty of incorporating uncertainty into models is still frequently used as an excuse for inaction relative to improving methods and models -or worse, to the real world, beyond the literature, in protecting life, property and ecosystems. A second issue highlighted throughout the literature, including Stern (2006), UNFCCC ( 2009), World Bank (2009), Watkiss (2015), Asplund and Hjerpe (2020), Bharadwaj et al. (2023), and others is the difficulty in estimating economic values for things that may have no "natural" dollar (e.g., economic) value. Economists identify this as a problem of missing and/or misaligned markets. Entities traded in a market can be valued with a common currency, and tools readily exist for their valuation (Fowler and Dunn, 2014). However, in this case, it's "what you don't count that counts'' as Keen (2020) writes. Thus, non-market valuation is a constant and often contentious issue in the literature in the economic case for climate adaptation. There is an extensive literature about this, outside of the adaptation literature, discussing how, why, and when to place a dollar value on various non-market resources such as the existence value or the value of biodiversity. Tröltzsch et al. (n.d.) present a synthesis of the available literature on non-monetary metrics employed in adaptation assessments, including for use in cost-effectiveness analysis and multi-criteria analysis. Within the economic adaptation literature, there is some discussion of the shortcomings of non-market valuation, particularly in cost-benefit analysis. As Downing (2012) notes, it is difficult to price things that are truly irreplaceable: "Where the adaptation options involve market exchanges -such as the cost of land -adaptation falls within conventional decision frameworks. However, where adaptation requires solving socially contingent values -such as the loss of a culture associated with a vulnerable island -economic valuation is not easily achieved." Many of the studies in sub-Saharan Africa exemplify the inappropriate cost estimates of climate change by using the average income of people on the continent in order to ascertain the value of damage from climate change. This might be the "correct" way for this to be done. However, it may result in undervaluing the damage, due to the prevalence of poverty on the continent and the fact that adaptive actions may create pathways out of hunger and poverty that are unaccounted for. This may also be the case in Kull et al. (2008), who show that benefits do not outweigh the costs of adaptation, perhaps due to the low monetary value assigned to individuals and property who benefit from the adaptation.
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377 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero 5. The need to adapt to a changing climate This section summarises the evidence that indicates climate impacts will continue to increase even under a rapid reduction in global emissions and could be greater still if global emissions reductions are not sufficiently rapid to achieve the Paris This emphasises the need for the UK to adapt to the effects of a changing climate and support climate-vulnerable countries around the world to adapt to climate impacts as part of its contribution to the global effort to address climate change. Planning for a range of climate outcomes is prudent even while also aiming to a) Climate risks continue to increase with additional warming The overall level of impacts from climate change will increase with every additional small increment in warming. A growing body of research, summarised by the recent IPCC Special Reports and Fifth Assessment Report, shows how higher levels of warming levels result in increasingly severe and pervasive impacts with effects on humans and ecosystems • 1°C above preindustrial Today’s level of warming is already having significant impacts around the world. The frequency of heatwaves has increased in most land regions.37 There are demonstrable impacts on heat- related mortality particularly for elderly and vulnerable people.38 Patterns of water availability are changing due to melting land-ice and shifting rainfall in some parts of the world. The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation has increased at a global scale due to climate change, with knock-on implications for flood risks. Flooding is also increasing in coastal areas as climate change pushes up sea-levels. Climate change is being increasingly linked with making the conditions for wildfires more likely.39 Ecosystems and species have been impacted by climate change, with many species changing their geographical extent and/or migratory patterns. Climate change has affected crop yields, with more negative impacts than positive effects.40 • 1.5°C above preindustrial Impacts at 1.5°C warming will be more severe than at present. Hot temperature extremes will increase more rapidly than the global average temperature, and over twice as fast in some parts of the world (e.g. mid-latitude summers). Across the globe there would be around twice as many people affected by river flooding than over the recent past.41 The intensity and frequency of heavy rainfall will generally increase. Around 6% of insects, 4% of vertebrates, and 8% of plants would lose >50% of their current species ranges.42 There will be very large impacts on some ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C). 2°C above preindustrial At 2°C warming many regions will experience considerable and damaging climate change impacts including extreme weather and associated detrimental effects on water availability and food production. Heat-related mortality risks increase beyond the risks at 1.5°C. Across the globe there would be around a 170% increase in the number of people affected by river flooding than over the Significant climate impacts are
Chapter 8: Scientific context for setting the UK’s Sixth Carbon Budget 378 recent past. Widespread damage to ecosystems would occur with the rate of climate change likely too fast for many species to be able to migrate to regions with compatible climates. Around 18% of insects, 8% of vertebrates, and 16% of plants would lose >50% of their geographical range. The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems (e.g. coral reefs) increases significantly for warming at 2°C and above. Risks of 'large-scale singularities' in the climate system (e.g. triggering inevitable loss of major ice sheets or collapse in the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation) would be ‘moderate’ at this level of warming. • 3°C above preindustrial Major and severe impacts would be experienced worldwide. For example heat waves would become prevalent across large parts of the world, with around 4.5 billion people exposed to associated serious health risks.43 Risks to land-based ecosystems would be very high with around 25% of species expected to lose over half of their geographical range by 2100.44 There would be a high risk of 'large- scale singular events' at 3°C. • 4°C above preindustrial Warming and increases in humidity in many regions could make outdoor working, for example in agriculture, very difficult or even impossible based on people’s current tolerance to heat extremes. Many freshwater and land-based species would face substantial risk of extinction. Large risks to the functioning of the global food system could occur with a substantial chance of large-scale crop failures. Large- scale failures of food systems and increases in climate-related extreme events could contribute to large-scale migration of people around the world creating pressures on social and economic systems with difficult to predict geopolitical consequences. Any additional warming is associated with increases in climate change impacts. Poorer and more vulnerable parts of society are expected to be relatively more exposed to impacts from many of these increasing climate risks. However, the UK is not immune from these risks and needs to adapt to the changing climate, even for the lower levels of warming. Box 8.8 summarises the impact of different levels of global average warming for the UK. Climate change risks for the UK under different global warming levels The UK is experiencing climate change impacts today which are predicted to increase further under additional future global warming. The UK Climate Change Risk As sessment (CCRA) provides a regular assessment of the climate risks (and opportunities) associated with different levels of global average • Current warming level (~1.1 °C above preindustrial levels) : The UK’s average annual temperature has increased by around 1.2°C relative to pre -industrial levels, sea level has risen by ~16 cm sinc e 1900, there is some evidence of increasing heavy rainfall depending on the metric used. The likelihood of summer heatwaves such as that in 2018 has doubled over the pa st few decades.
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Delivering on this promise, whilst meeting our ambitious climate and environmental targets, will be in a large part dependent on having a sufficiently skilled workforce and robust, competitive supply chains in the UK. 2. Recent developments have thrown into sharp relief the inherent vulnerabilities associated with complex global supply chains and shocks to the global economic system. The transition to net zero will change the nature of the UK’s critical supply chains. Our aim is to help ensure that supply chains critical for the transition to net zero are secure, ensuring that we have access to the materials, minerals, and chemicals that our growing green economy will need. Our approach is that there is no “one size fits all” model for building resilience in individual supply often a combination of levers may be the best solution 3. We will need tens of thousands of engineers to build and maintain new offshore wind farms off the coasts of northern England and Scotland, construct nuclear power stations in the South of England, and manufacture electric vehicles in the Midlands; skilled builders and trades people to retrofit homes and buildings across the country; and conservation and biodiversity professionals to deliver nature-based solutions 4. Alongside a broader shift to digitisation and automation, we can expect the transition to net zero to be one of the dominant labour market trends in the next 30 approximately 6.3 million jobs in the UK, about one in five, are likely to be affected by the transition to a green economy, with workers experiencing either an increase or decrease in the demand for their skills.19 Net Zero Build Back Greener
5. The government’s ambition is • Support up to 440,000 jobs across net zero industries in 2030, contributing towards a broader pivot to a greener economy which could support 2 million jobs in green sectors or by greening – Working with business to grow green industries, supply chains and skills in the UK, and ensure our resilience to international changes in – Using our net zero policy and funding to promote the growth of green skills • Enable workers, industries, and places to transition to a net zero economy by 2050, and support industry to develop the skilled workforce to deliver a green – Reforming the skills system to make it more responsive to the needs of employers, so that training providers, employers, and workers are incentivised and equipped to support – Ramping up support for workers – Working with business to ensure people from all backgrounds can access the opportunities in the green economy, including through – Providing children and young people with the high-quality education and training they need to work in a future green career, through improving teacher training and development in STEM and other key subjects, and expanding post-16 training programmes in line with the needs of Chapter 4 – Supporting the Transition across the Economy
To better understand how the UK could grasp opportunities of the Green Industrial Revolution, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Department of Education launched the Green Jobs Taskforce in November 2020. The Taskforce provided an independent assessment of the potential skills and labour market impacts of the net zero transition, including how we can ensure green jobs are open to all and support workers to transition to the green economy. The independent Taskforce, which included representatives from industry, trade unions, the skills sector and community organisations, took a broad view of green jobs, as “employment in an activity that directly contributes to, or indirectly supports, the achievement of the UK’s net zero emissions target and other environmental goals, such as nature restoration and mitigation against climate risks.” Its report, published in July 2021, included 15 recommendations for government, industry and the skills sector, which focused on three themes across the “life cycle” of green driving investment in net zero to support good quality green jobs in the UK; building pathways into good green careers; and supporting workers in the high carbon The ideas generated through the Taskforce and its engagement with industry have informed the development of this Strategy. Net Zero Build Back Greener
Working with business to grow green UK industries and resilient 6. The investment needed for the transition to net zero will primarily be delivered by the private sector. As such, our first priority is to provide businesses, investors, workers, and skills providers with policy certainty to unlock investment, ensuring we support green industries to develop in the UK. 7. In line with Build Back Our Plan for Growth, we are taking action across a range of low carbon industries with the greatest economic potential and competitive strength. In doing so, we will support the growth of UK supply chains and create new opportunities for UK businesses and level up the country. We are acting to build green industries such as offshore wind in North East England and in Scotland, carbon capture and hydrogen production in our industrial heartlands, electric vehicles manufacture in the midlands and Northeast of England, and the restoration and protection of nature in rural areas. 8. We also recognise that the starting position when building resilience in critical supply chains should be to take a market- first approach. The UK prospers under an open economy and openness itself confers resilience.
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This includes embedding the use of telematics or similar technology to manage fuel use, and guidance will be published later this year. We will continue to support this work through the work of the EST, who will engage closely with the Crown Commercial Services and other key partners to enable and disseminate best practice. The benefits of training and better information can decline over time. Previous examples have shown that after a year savings from a single efficient driving lesson fall from 15% to around 2% to 6%. Technology looks to be the best means for delivering substantial reductions in the long-term. Evidence suggests a low willingness to pay for technology if not embedded in the vehicle at the point of purchase. This is down to a lack of awareness of the fuel cost and emissions benefits, and because other than fuel savings, there are few incentives for owners and drivers to make use of the technology. Telematics technology is in use by some insurers to assess risk and set conditions around the premiums, particularly of young or novice drivers. It can be used to monitor fuel use and safe and fuel-efficient driving as ●● improve our understanding of the scope to use technology to embed best practice, examining driver trials, both for on-road safety and fuel efficiency, driver and owner attitudes to wider adoption and appropriate messaging looking to lessons learned from our fleet support ●● set up a task force with the motoring and insurance industry to assess the extent to which vehicle technology is being actively used and the benefits that it brings, understand the challenges to greater use and work with that industry to develop and put in place interventions to address Part 2: Vehicle Supply and Demand
Part 2b: Driving uptake of the cleanest new cars This part sets out government support for ensuring new cars and vans are as clean as possible and accelerating the uptake of ultra Since 2010, we have invested more than £500 million into one of the most comprehensive support packages in the world for ultra low emission vehicles. It is thanks to this stable and consistent package that the UK today has one of the largest ultra low emission vehicle markets in Europe. In recent months, ultra low emission vehicles have accounted for as many as 2.7% of all But while we have made a strong start, we cannot be complacent. Consumer acceptance and adequate supply of ultra low emission cars and vans and consumer acceptance remain challenges. Part 3 outlines the steps we are taking to support the development of a fit for purpose We will respond to these challenges ●● regulation is one of the most important levers to ensure manufacturers deliver cleaner and more fuel-efficient vehicles to the market and help provide a stable environment for industry investment. As we leave the EU, we will pursue a future approach to vehicle emissions regulation that is at least as ambitious as current arrangements. ●● ultra low emission vehicles in many cases are still more expensive to purchase than their conventional equivalents. We will continue to bring down the cost of purchasing and owning ultra low emission vehicles through grants and other incentives. Further innovation is Cars (Category 1) Cars (Category 2&3) Total number of vehicles ordered using grant schemes Cumulative total of vehicles bought through grant schemes DfT, Vehicle Licensing Statistics 2017 The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
a vital part of bringing the price down of ultra low emission vehicles in the long term. In Part 2d, we set out how we will continue to support the development of new ultra low emission vehicle ●● Consumer supporting consumers and businesses with the information they need to make informed decisions about the environmental impact of their vehicle choices. We will continue to work with industry to promote the benefits of switching to ultra low emission vehicles to consumers and fleets. ●● Leading the we will use government’s buying power to lead the way in the transition to ultra low emission *Includes plug-in hybrids, 100% electric, range extended electric and fuel cell electric cars New electric cars as a % of all new car registrations (RHS) CO2 emissions Zero emission Price Cap (battery electric, hydrogen, and <50 70+ N/A (plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) (plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) Part 2: Vehicle Supply and Demand
Environmental performance of battery electric, fuel cell electric Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are highly energy efficient and have zero tailpipe emissions. They also have substantially lower greenhouse gas emissions than conventional vehicles, even when taking into account the electricity source and the electricity used for battery production. Assuming the current UK energy mix, battery electric vehicles produce the lowest greenhouse gas emissions of all the energy sources and fuels assessed, irrespective of vehicle type and operation. electric car is estimated to have greenhouse gas emissions around 66% lower than a petrol car and 60% lower than a diesel car. Between now and 2050, we project electricity grid emissions will fall by around 90%, with total greenhouse gas emissions from electric vehicles falling in parallel. These vehicles deliver both air pollutant and greenhouse gas emission reductions under The results are battery electric vehicles have substantially lower greenhouse gas emissions than conventional vehicles, even when taking into account the electricity source and electricity used for battery production. Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) also have zero harmful tailpipe emissions. Like battery electric vehicles, greenhouse gas emissions from FCEVs depend on the method of energy production. Based on steam methane reformation (SMR), FCEVs deliver greenhouse gas emissions savings of between 10% (compared with a diesel HGV) and around 43% (compared with a petrol car). A range of production pathways and technological improvements in hydrogen production are under development, with the potential to significantly reduce greenhouse FCEVs have two advantages over early models of fast refuelling with high- pressure hydrogen (typically 5 minutes) and longer range (typically over 300 miles).
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The portion of spend recorded here relates to spend on climate change in the major industrialising countries. Negative ODA flow -7.7 -11.8 Provided ODA Returned money Cross cutting Forestry A number of projects have returned ODA, until this money is respent is counts as negative ODA which we have recorded against the appropriate themes. Negative ODA flow -0.2 -0.4 Provided ODA Returned money Adaptation General A number of projects have returned ODA, until this money is respent is counts as negative ODA which we have recorded against the appropriate themes. Negative ODA flow -1.3 -1.9 Provided ODA Returned money Adaptation Water and A number of projects have returned ODA, until this money is respent is counts as negative ODA which we have recorded against the appropriate themes. Negative ODA flow -1.4 -2.2 Provided ODA Returned money Adaptation General A number of projects have returned ODA, until this money is respent is counts as negative ODA which we have recorded against the appropriate themes. Total contributions through bilateral, regional Monetary figures are rounded to the nearest (£/$)100,000. Provision of public financial contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels 2016 Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Productive Safety Net Programme Phase 4 58.3 78.6 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation Other social To reduce hunger, improve livelihoods and reduce the risk of famine in rural Ethiopia by (i) providing cash and food transfers, livelihoods advice and access to microfinance to 1.2 million extremely poor Ethiopians and (ii) creating local infrastructure which reverses environmental degradation and improves access to markets and basic services. 85% of participant households receive transfers as wages for labour on public works projects (including 32,000 km of hillside terraces, 3,000 km of rural roads and 400 new or expanded schools); while the remainder (the elderly, those with disabilities, and pregnant women) receive cash and/or food without a labour requirement. This programme contributes towards national and international development goals and DFID’s own targets for reducing poverty and hunger and for building household resilience to climate change and Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate 30.6 41.3 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation General To help up to 10 million people, especially women and children, in developing countries cope with extreme climate and weather events such as droughts, cyclones and floods (climate extremes). This will be achieved by doing three things. By making grants to civil society organisations to scale up proven technologies and practices in the Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia that help people withstand, and more quickly recover, from climate extremes. By identifying the best ways of doing this, and share this knowledge globally to increase the programme’s overall impact. By supporting national governments to strengthen their policies and actions to respond to climate extremes. These will all contribute to the Millennium Development Goals on the eradication poverty and hunger, and environmental sustainability, and also respond to the Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review recommendation that DFID should integrate the threat from climate change into a Disaster Risk Reduction. Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Sahel 17.9 24.2 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation General To provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in the Sahel and help them to cope with future disasters, including strengthening early-warning mechanisms and disaster preparedness. This will be linked to the seasonal calendar and work alongside longer-term resilience programmes to reduce the long term demand for humanitarian assistance in the Sahel, and will be delivered through NGO and multilateral partners. Africa Division funding to the African Agriculture 16.8 22.7 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation Agriculture To evaluate and improve AgDevCo’s facility to leverage private sector investment in Africa agribusiness and agricultural infrastructure. This includes increasing clean renewable energy capacity enabling climate change resilience and stimulating cross border trade in targeted countries, which will generate jobs and income for smallholder farmers and women. The evaluation is also to ensure accountability, demonstrate how funds are spent, and ensure value for money of DFID investments in AgDevCo by 2020.To support poverty reduction and increased food security through catalysing additional private sector investment in agribusiness and agricultural infrastructure and increasing agricultural cross border trade in targeted countries, generating jobs and income for smallholders. Building Resilience in the Sahel through Adaptive 15.4 20.8 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation Other social Build the evidence and justification for adaptive social protection in the Sahel by establishing national level systems that will build the resilience of vulnerable populations to climate change and can be scaled in a time of crisis. Enhancing resilience in Karamoja Uganda 14.4 19.5 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation Agriculture To increase the resilience of targeted communities to climate extremes and weather events. The programme will support 700,000 people to cope with the effects of climate change, this 200,000 people with improved food security through participation in public works programmes; 6,000 agro- pastoralists and pastoralists with access to improved animal nutrition; and 175,000 children under five and pregnant and lactating women treated for malnutrition and with improved access to water by March 2017. Recipient country/region/project/programme Total amount Status Funding Type of support Sector Additional Information Hunger Safety Net Programme 12.6 17.0 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation General To reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability by providing the poorest households in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands with cash transfers including in response to climate shocks such as droughts. This contributes to our MDGs by preventing 720,000 people from becoming poorer and help them to increase their expenditure on food, health, education and wider livelihood Strategic Partnership Arrangement II between 8.5 11.5 Provided ODA Grant Adaptation Basic To provide support to BRAC’s development programmes to improve access to quality basic services (health, education, water and sanitation), help the poorest, most marginalised people across the whole of Bangladesh graduate from extreme poverty, support inclusive growth and help build effective formal and informal institutions. Climate finance will be integrated across BRAC’s programmes to strengthen the resilience of BRAC’s investments and the communities they serve.
|
c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f
| 155
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02b7d192-3f55-41fa-a84d-6102eb8f127d
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf
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The findings fed into a paper submitted by UBA to the EU Working Group 1 for inventory agencies. Preparatory review to the UNFCCC assessment of UK KP reporting.
|
70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69
| 135
|
02bed3bc-2cf0-40de-b5b8-4791074ea9b5
|
https://civitas.eu/sites/default/files/civitas_guide_for_the_urban_transport_professional.pdf
| 2,001
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civitas.eu
|
Unspoiled by mas-
the interconnection of the main points of inter-
sive urban sprawl, the city has always been noted
est in the city through a series of walkways. for its careful planning, human dimension and the
Identify the infrastructure demands for parking
care that has been taken to balance new devel-
and the space required for the loading and un-
opment with environmental concerns and social
loading of goods. initiatives. Reduce the environmental impact of noise pol-
On the other hand, the unprecedented growth of
lution in the streets. the city and projects such as the urban tramway
Increase the accessibility to public space. and plans to replace the existing underground
railway line make it necessary, more than ever be-
The city strongly promoted public participation in
fore, to initiate a debate on sustainable mobility in
the development of its Sustainable Mobility and
Vitoria-Gasteiz. Public Space Plan. The public participation was
In March 2006, Vitoria-Gasteiz began to prepare
set up in line with its Citizens Pact for Sustainable
its Sustainable Mobility and Public Space Plan, in
Mobility. The information flow was organised not
order to face the following challenges
only vertically from the city council to citizens, but
Reorganise traffic, so that vehicles crossing the
also introduced citizen-to-citizen exchange. city travel via the basic roadway network, free-
A volunteer campaign fostered exchange with more
ing up secondary thoroughfares. than 27,000 people and included over one hundred
Redefine its public transport network in order
volunteers. Unanimous approval of the Plan was
to improve the efficiency of the system in terms
assured through a strong consensus among all po-
of accessibility and coverage. litical groups, and coordination of technical areas
Consolidate its network of bicycle paths by
that were used to operating separately. maintaining most of the existing pathways and
thereby form a series of main routes to ensure
the maximum use of bicycles as a means of
urban transport. 92
CIVITAS GuI de for T he u rbA n TrAnS po rT p ro feSSIonAl
3.8 SUSTAINABLE URBAN MOB IL IT Y PL ANS SUMP
CASE STUDY
dialogue with citizens in odense, denmark
At the level of individual measures, citizen and
on the project, and improve the results. The lo-
stakeholder participation helps to better em-
cal residents know the areas better than the mu-
bed policies into the local context. The City of
nicipality administration because they live there
Odense tested a strategy for environmental zones
and see the everyday problems. The residents
in Odense municipality within the CIVITAS Initia-
could also be local safety ambassadors setting
tive a strategy to implement a 30 kmh speed
the standard.
|
a20264eb-0ca9-4fb5-983a-e64bfbff96ce
| 94
|
02befb5b-4891-4228-a3d3-c911adf5a45a
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/environmental-improvement-plan-2023_b63089e656c9dc7d7685d25d071d24a1.pdf
| 2,023
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[
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"climate"
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
• Re-aligning local air quality zones in line with local government boundaries, to drive effective coordinated • Publishing new statutory Local Transport Plan Guidance that will set the government’s current expectations on improving air quality and other local environmental issues in the local transport context. Enable local authorities to use their powers as Defra has supported local authorities with guidance, funding and tools to improve local air quality, including more than £30 million since 2018 awarded through the Air Quality grant. On top of this, we • Increase transparency by requiring timely and accurate publication of air quality assessments by local • Conduct an audit of all powers relevant to air quality available to local authorities, how they are using them and any barriers to successful delivery. Case study - Defra’s Air Quality Grant Scheme - Clean Air Villages - Cross River Almost £2 million awarded to local authorities for 4 Defra’s Air Quality Grant scheme funds English local authorities for community projects that tackle air pollution. This helps to level up our country by addressing disparities in exposure to air pollution. The Clean Air Villages project was run across London between 2018 and 2022, managed by a group of London Boroughs. Each ‘Village’ was an area with pollution and high population densities. Local solutions were implemented in high-pollution areas, driving down emissions from freight, and encouraging active travel. • Nine cargo bike schemes, and a shared electric • A micro hub consolidation scheme to reduce the number of vehicles and journeys in the area. • A citizen scientist monitoring project for hospital staff to gather evidence to raise awareness of air quality in the hospital and implement ideas to • Seven traffic monitoring devices were installed to improve the evidence based for future air quality The next phase of the scheme will deliver river-based logistics, paired with cargo bikes and electric delivery vans, to reduce pollution from freight deliveries. Industrial processes are a key part of our economy but they also create pollution. To avoid potentially serious impacts on our health and environment, these processes are carefully managed and this has already made a significant contribution to reductions in air pollution. Reducing these emissions further will have a direct impact on the concentration of air pollutants in those places where people Continue to drive progress in large industry Since 2018, we have jointly consulted with the devolved administrations on our approach for setting “Best Available Techniques” (BAT) for tackling industrial emissions. Data suggests that, by applying Best Available Techniques, pollution can be reduced by between 25% and 60%, depending on the sector and pollutant. Following on from this, Defra will, working with industry, regulators and the devolved • Continue to roll out the UK BAT system, through which industry and regulators are able to collaborate to improve standards in industrial processes. • Further develop UK BAT, particularly around new technologies and methods that industry should put in Improve the overall regulatory framework It is vital that UK businesses can innovate within a clear regulatory framework. We will consult on improvements to the mechanisms for developing standards for industrial processes to better reflect our priorities for the environment and to support businesses in innovating and delivering net zero, including by integrating the regulations of GHG emissions alongside other emissions from industry. Regulate to support progress in smaller industry We have extended environmental permitting so that a much wider range of combustion plants are now required to meet emission limits. This has reduced emissions of NOx, SO2 and Whilst we have achieved significant improvements with large industry, smaller industry has been left with lagging emissions standards. Instead of the same system of regularly updated standards, small industry is covered by a complex multitude of documents which has led to out-of- date requirements on a large number of sectors and sites. These smaller sites also tend to be more numerous and are more likely to be located in urban or residential areas. As such, reducing their pollution will help drive progress against our population exposure reduction target. We will consult on a new system for updating standards for small industry like petrol stations, metals processing, and quarrying. As set out above, the BAT approach has been highly successful in reducing emissions from large industry. Applying a similar approach to small industry will reduce pollution from this source, and help drive progress. The agricultural sector is responsible for 87% of UK ammonia emissions, which are a major contributor to biodiversity loss. As well as impacting on biodiversity, ammonia also creates PM2.5 in the air by reacting with other pollutants. This is known as secondary PM2.5, which can negatively affect air quality far from the original source. It is therefore important that the agricultural sector reduces these emissions. Incentivise pollutant reduction through our new Defra has already supported farmers to reduce their ammonia emissions. Since 2018 we have made available grants to support investment in low emissions equipment through the Countryside Stewardship scheme and the Farm Equipment and Technology Fund. We have also made advice available to farmers through extending the scope of A new nutrient management standard in the Sustainable • Incentivise appropriate nutrient management on • Fund advice on improving efficient nutrient use. • Fund farmers to take action including by planting and Consider expanding environmental permitting conditions to dairy and intensive beef farms Pig and poultry farms are already required to adhere to environmental permit conditions. Since we have required this, their emissions are estimated to have decreased by around 30%. Dairy and intensive beef farms together contributed over half of the UK’s ammonia emissions from agriculture in 2020. Cattle farming also accounted for 46%
of all UK agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in 2020, and agricultural diffuse pollution was the primary cause for 40% of water bodies failing to achieve good ecological status. • Consult this year on extending environmental permitting to dairy and intensive beef farms.
|
5fca7948-556a-402c-afe1-93234c8be5cb
| 21
|
02bfbbd4-a050-4285-9235-1fe057d2165e
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https://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/natres/pdf/final_report_wg1.pdf
| 2,000
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ec.europa.eu
|
Fig. 4 lists some of the pressures text in black that can be generated by resources
gaining activities, and the possible resulting environmental impacts. Following these constraints we can already draw a conclusion that we believe will be
shared by many of the stakeholders
Page 46
Life
Life
Natural
Natural
Natural
Natural
capital
capital
capital
capital
supporting
supporting
sytems
sytems
Social
Social
Social
Social
capital
capital
capital
capital
Institutions
Institutions
Institutions
Codes
Codes
Codes
Standards
Standards
Standards
Law
Law
Law
Data
Data
Data
Knowledge
Knowledge
Knowledge
Technologies
Technologies
Technologies
A
A
A
d
d
d
d
d
d
e
e
e
d
d
d
v
v
v
a
a
a
u
u
u
e
e
e
l
l
l
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
capital
capital
capital
capital
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
capital
capital
capital
capital
Fig. 3 Various forms of capital and their linkage
Red connecting lines these forms of capital can be substituted
Black dashed discontinuous lines limited substitutability
Page 47
RESOURCE GAINING USE
RESOURCE GAINING USE
Environmental impacts to be assessed
Environmental impacts to be assessed
on the basis of
on the basis of
local conditions
local conditions
the threat to life supporting systems
the threat to life supporting systems
their spatial distribution
their spatial distribution
their intensity and distribution
their intensity and distribution
the vulnerability importance of the
the vulnerability importance of the
impacted systems
impacted systems
social and economic benefits
social and economic benefits
Fig. 4 The multi-faceted environmental impacts of resources gaining use
Page 48
Finally environmental impacts will result from the complex local interlinkages between a
series of factors, including the above natural components
o climatology,
o topography,
o geology,
o soils
o hydrography
o groundwater
o biodiversity in soils and on the surface
o existence and probability of natural risk factors such as avalanches, landslides,
rock fall, underground cavities, swelling clays, floods, earthquakes, volcanic
activity
o the nature, intensity, geographic extent and duration of man-made pressures
They may also be a consequence of the economic and or cultural value of elements
such as buildings, infrastructure, landscape, monuments, trees or any other elements of
particular cultural value. R 15
These factors need to be well investigated, documented and understood if economically
optimal impact prevention strategies are to be designed and implemented. Ignoring local
conditions may lead to unnecessary expenditure in environmental protection or to high
cost to mitigate or remediate the effects of the impacts. The data describing these
conditions forms an essential component of sensible land-use planning. Although this
investigation work, and the resulting knowledge, is to be performed locally, under the
responsibility of local, regional andor national authorities there is much scope to develop
European Union wide data acquisition, analytical and data processing procedures and
common thesauri of technical terms involved. The European Commission has an
important role to play, well in line with the INSPIRE directive project and the GMES
program to set the overarching guiding norms and to make this harmonisation possible. Therefore generic one size fits all protection strategies based on a blanketing
application of the precautionary principle could be unnecessarily expensive curtail
innovation and growth, and fail to address specific conditions.
|
a5fe6535-9c80-4d16-a22c-92e1e4ed7d30
| 62
|
02c0caa9-fe10-4e03-8049-7e8c67627c0f
|
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/46661/documents/238663/default/
| 2,025
|
[
"methane",
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"report"
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parliament.uk
|
Biogas production has been ‘identified as a environmentally sympathetic and economic method of fuel and ‘nutrient rich fertiliser’ generation and an important means of addressing the interconnected issues of sustainable waste management, renewable energy provision and ‘stabilisation of greenhouse gas It continues to be the case that, under section 45(3) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, waste collection authorities have a duty to collect garden waste where collection has been requested by the householder. Under Simpler Recycling, garden waste collected in the household recycling waste stream must be sent to composting, and never to incineration or landfill. In addition, we are developing policies with a view to working towards the near total elimination of biodegradable waste to landfill, focusing both on municipal and non-municipal waste. We are also undertaking world-leading research to quantify site-specific methane emissions from landfill and update our understanding of residual (non-recyclable) waste composition, which will help us in gathering the evidence to support policy development to address legacy emissions from already deposited waste. 3 L.I. Blake, F.A. Halim, C. Gray, R. Mair, D.A.C. Manning, P. Sallis, H. Hutchinson, N.D. Gray, Evaluating an anaerobic digestion (AD) feedstock derived from a novel non-source segregated municipal solid waste (MSW) product, Waste Management, Volume 59, 2017, Pages 149-159,
Government Response to ECC Methane Report As well as tackling methane emissions from waste, we are determined to minimise waste and the UK Government is committed to transitioning to a Circular Economy. Government Response to ECC Methane Report The 2026 target date to have all local authorities conduct weekly domestic food waste collections will be crucial. The Government should publish a clear delivery plan, including the steps that will be required of local authorities and taking into account logistical and financial obstacles they may face. The implementation dates and materials in scope for Simpler Recycling were confirmed in the government’s consultation response in October 2023. Following this, the relevant legislation that was introduced in the Environment Act 2021 was brought into force in May 2024. This means that the core legislative requirements of Simpler Recycling and implementation dates are now set in legislation. In May 2024, regulations were also made that set the descriptions of the recyclable waste streams for Simpler Recycling. In practice, this sets out what materials are in scope of Simpler Recycling collections, ready for when the policy comes into effect. For the avoidance of doubt, new section 45 of the Environmental Protection Act (as amended by the Environment Act 2021) will require all local authorities in England4 to arrange for the collection of food waste for recycling at least weekly by 31st March 2026. This must always be collected separately from residual waste and dry recyclable materials so that it can be recycled. In England, as of 2022/23 an estimated 180 (56% of all) waste collection authorities collected food waste for recycling (source: Waste and Resources Action Programme internal data). We are aware of concerns about delivery timelines, pressure on supply chains for vehicles and containers, and the need to upgrade waste and recycling infrastructure. We are engaging with key stakeholders across the sector and welcome input to help us understand the challenges and ensure successful delivery. We are working with WRAP (Waste and Resources Action Programme) to scope interventions to address bottlenecks in supply chains. We are also working with WRAP to provide guidance on best practice to help local authorities deliver food waste services to all householders. WRAP recently published procurement guidance for food waste, and communications guidance for local authorities rolling out food Local authorities are best placed to communicate the new collection requirements with their residents when rolling out food waste services. To support local authorities, we will provide transitional resource funding for food waste communications. We will continue to work with local authorities to support readiness for these new 4 Except for 31 waste collection authorities (WCAs) with complex existing residual waste contracts that present a barrier to food waste collections. These WCAs have bespoke transitional arrangements, delaying the implementation date for food waste The Environment Act 2021 (Commencement No. 9 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2024
Government Response to ECC Methane Report The Government should provide its assessment of whether the number of anaerobic digestion facilities is on track to keep pace with the mandatory food waste collection target date and put this information into the public domain. In February 2025 Wrap, having worked with the government, published its ‘Recycling Infrastructure Capacity Analysis’. This set out anticipated waste volumes to 2035, mapping this modelling against known waste management infrastructure for various waste streams, including food waste. The analysis signals where there is likely over or under-provision of end processing capacity for those materials. Furthermore, the Green Gas Support Scheme (GGSS), open to applications from 2021 to 2028, will support the construction of new anaerobic digestion facilities. The GGSS will do this by providing a tariff supporting the price of biomethane injected into the gas grid at anaerobic digestion sites. The scheme follows on from the non- domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) and will pay tariffs to registered producers of biomethane for a period of 15 years. This will produce enough green gas to heat around 250,000 homes annually. Government Response to ECC Methane Report The Government should review regulatory oversight of anaerobic digestors and give serious consideration to the requirement for regular leak assessments for all sites. (Paragraph 201) Government is reviewing the effectiveness of environmental requirements and plan to consult on proposals for regulatory reform of the Environmental Permitting Regulations, including permitting for the Anaerobic Digestion sector, by June 2025. Permitted AD plant are currently required to perform regular LDAR surveys.
|
f5154231-07e2-46ec-9c20-5dd0f6b167c0
| 6
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Article 2 Continued application of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 to programmes supported by the EAFRD 1. Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 shall continue to apply to programmes supported by the EAFRD under the 2014–2020 programming period and extended in accordance with Article 1 of this Regulation. 2. For programmes extended in accordance with Article 1 of this Regulation, the references to periods or deadlines in Article 50(1), Article 51(1), Article 57(2) and Article 65(2) and (4) and the first paragraph of Article 76 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 shall be extended by two years.
|
c7b4c5e3-1388-4880-96c9-626372368b1c
| 0
|
|
02c5cf29-066b-40e7-aa2c-4a4a0ac4d2a6
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.20105v2
| 2,025
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[
"Thailand",
"economic growth",
"temperature fluctuations",
"subnational",
"gross provincial product",
"GPP",
"per capita",
"climate",
"Thailand economy",
"1982-2022",
"annual data",
"regional development",
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"climate change",
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"temperature",
"productivity",
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"Southeast Asia"
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arxiv.org
|
If the same sequence occurs over the course of a year, under the assumption of temporal and spatial separability, i.e. that the economy conditional on temperature is additively separable across locations and moments of time, the annual aggregate output Y py can then be written as the sum of daily outputs observed across all locations l in the province p from each day din the year y
Y py = �
d∈y
9
� Y sd
Although the output data are usually measured at a higher level of aggregation, it is possible to recover nonlinear relationships at the grid cell level at which climatic data are recorded.
|
204f66ab-3478-4548-97ea-18fe74c73224
| 11
|
02c6201f-7cee-43ac-96c8-6da4843ef966
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf
| 2,021
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[
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"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
That is why we will consult on the feasibility of domestic waterways and domestic air travel being net zero emission in advance of the economy wide 2050 target. And the imperative to decarbonise brings with it a host of other benefits, including new business models, new modes, increasing levels of autonomy, far better integration, and a blurring of the distinction between traditional forms of transport, as well as public and private travel coming together to offer greater choice and flexibility about how and when to travel from place to place.
|
b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77
| 64
|
02caa429-c803-4d18-b8bb-a66a6c3810d3
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Most overview of the emissions reduction actions and timing of the Balanced Pathway • Improvements in resource and energy efficiency lead to the largest emissions reductions in the early 2020s, with smaller contributions from electrification, biofuel use and material substitution. Fuel-switching and CCS deployment scale up from 2025. • Infrastructures for CCS and hydrogen are deployed from 2025 in the pathway, starting near industrial clusters. Electricity network connection capacity is also increased around newly electrifying sites. The 2030s sees substantial scale-up across these three major networks. • Policy develops rapidly to ensure that it pays for companies to implement societally cost-effective measures and that non-financial barriers are addressed. See the accompanying Policy Report for policy • Supply chains scale up at pace in the pathway. More workers acquire skills to implement low-carbon measures, the supply of necessary technologies and equipment grows, and the availability of finance increases. Improvements in resource and energy efficiency and material substitution in the Balanced Pathway reduce emissions by 12 MtCO2e per year by 2035, contributing 8 MtCO2e, 3 MtCO2e and 1 MtCO2e • Resource efficiency abatement gradually increases from 2020 to 2035. • Improvements that reduce end-user consumption of new resources measures such as consumers using clothes and electronics products for longer, which may require improved durability. • Measures that improve resource efficiency in production reduce emissions by 5 MtCO2e per year in 2035. This includes measures such as optimising building design to reduce material use. • The resource efficiency measures can alternatively be split into the following design optimisation to reduce material inputs (3 MtCO2e per year in 2035), increased recycling and reuse (3 MtCO2e, of which half is through reuse of construction materials), increasing product longevity (2 MtCO2e, largely from electronics), and increased product utilisation and sharing (1 MtCO2e, including sharing leisure technologies, policy, resource Recycling, reusing and sharing
127 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero • Energy efficiency improvements achieve emissions reductions of 4 MtCO2e per year by 2050. Measures in the most energy-intensive sectors are divided between heat recovery (0.5 MtCO2e), process upgrade (1 MtCO2e), equipment upgrade (1 MtCO2e) and integration/clustering (0.5 MtCO2e), with a further 1 MtCO2e in less energy intense sectors. • Material substitution measures in the pathway include partial substitution of clinker in cement and the use of wood in construction, and increase steadily over the period to 2050. abatement and residual emissions in 2050 in Balanced Net Zero Pathway against Fuel-switching reduces sector emissions in the Balanced Pathway in 2035 by 18 of fuel-switching technologies are deployed to keep options open for subsequent deployment, given uncertainty about which fuel-switching options will prevail in the 2030s. In the 2030s options are deployed where they are cost-effective under our cost assumptions - this results in a mix of electrification, hydrogen and bioenergy deployment, reflecting variation in cost-effectiveness between different • Electrification reduces emissions by 9 MtCO2e per year by 2035, increasing to 14 MtCO2e by 2045. Electrification measures include electric boilers, switching from on-site generation to a grid connection, electric arc furnaces, electric mobile machinery, electric dryers and electric infra-red largest emissions reductions in With falling electricity costs, Switching from fossil fuels to
Chapter 3: Sector pathways to Net Zero 128 Some electrification options are introduced in the early 2020s due to high levels of technology and commercial readiness. Some electrification measures involve scrapping existing assets before the end of their expected lifespan. This reflects preferable economics over the alternatives and the inability to retrofit some electrification options. • Hydrogen use reduces emissions by 7 MtCO2e per year by 2035, increasing to 14 MtCO2e by 2045. Hydrogen measures include hydrogen boilers, CHP, generators, mobile machinery and kilns. Our latest evidence suggests that these measures can typically be retrofitted, limiting the need to wait for a replacement cycle or to scrap assets before fitting. • Bioenergy use reduces fossil emissions by 2 MtCO2e per year by 2035 increasing to 2.5 MtCO2e in 2045. Its use is prioritised for sectors already using bioenergy, such as cement and pulp, or with the potential to fit CCS. CCS is applied to all new bioenergy use in manufacturing and construction*, apart from biofuel use in mobile machinery. In 2035, biofuels contribute 0.5 MtCO2e per year of abatement, falling to zero by 2040. The application of CCS to bioenergy results in further abatement of 3 MtCO2e in 2045 – this fraction of the BECCS is not accounted for in our manufacturing results, but rather in greenhouse gas removals (see section 11). CCS reduces manufacturing emissions in the Balanced Net Zero Pathway by 6 pathway, CCS is applied to fertiliser plants, half of the UK’s integrated steelwork capacity, and processes where it is the only deep decarbonisation option • There is 5 MtCO2e per year of abatement in 2045 from processes where we have not identified alternative options to reduce emissions to near-zero. This includes processes that a) produce CO2 from non-combustion processes, such as cement production and b) combust fuels (sometimes called internal fuels or off-gases) that are produced as part of the industrial • CCS is also applied as a lower-cost measure to existing ammonia/fertiliser plants in the mid-2020s and half of the UK’s integrated steelwork capacity in the early 2030s. This contributes 4 MtCO2e per year of abatement in 2045. • Smaller scale, more expensive CCS is deployed in the late 2030s and 2040s. The geographical distribution of fuel-switching and CCS measures is focussed around industrial clusters. However, there is still substantial abatement outside of • The location of sites may affect the choice of deep decarbonisation option when multiple options are possible – our evidence suggests that electrification has an advantage over hydrogen at dispersed sites, due to differences in electricity and hydrogen distribution options and availability. • Pipeline, train, truck or shipping are considered as options to transport CO2 from dispersed sites where CCS is their only deep decarbonisation option, such as cement, lime and other mineral sites.
|
083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7
| 35
|
02cc2098-3bc3-46de-b1ef-ff79fc5eba1a
|
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19498v3
| 2,024
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[
"global 10.1029/2025av001698 warming",
"arctic sea ice coverage",
"global warming levels",
"grid cell data",
"boreal forest changes"
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ArXiv
|
These shifts are most prevalent in surface upwelling shortwave radiation, a proxy for albedo, indicating a sudden loss of snow cover, with 12 models showing an abrupt shift. Additionally, we found abrupt shifts in snow area percentage (4 models), melt rate (2 models), and snow depth (6 models). Drijfhout et al. (2015) also identified two CMIP5 models with an abrupt decline in snow cover of the Tibetan Plateau. The level of global warming at which all these shifts occur in CMIP6 is between 0.53 and 2.61 K (90% IPR). This range overlaps with the global warming threshold estimated by Armstrong McKay et al. (2022), who place it between 1.4 and 2.2 K of global warming, although we also detect abrupt shifts below their lower bound of 1.4 K. Abrupt shifts in glaciers could not be assessed because they are typically not dynamically represented in CMIP models. Nevertheless, the presence of abrupt shifts in snow cover is clear in both CMIP5 and CMIP6 models. For the land permafrost, we found more abrupt shifts than Drijfhout et al. (2015) who found only one: an abrupt shift in total soil moisture content in HadGEM2-ES. However, the CMIP6 variant of this model was excluded from our assessment due to not having the simulation output available at the time of analysis (see Text S1.C in Supporting Information S1). The abrupt shifts detected in CMIP6, although generally individually small, add up to larger areas. For soil frozen water content, only one model has an individual abrupt shift covering more than 1 AGU Advances 10.1029/2025AV001698 million km 2 . However, 19 models have a total area of abrupt shifts of more than 1 million km 2 . These occur between 0.63 and 4.59 K of global warming. This is a lower range than the global warming threshold estimated by Armstrong McKay et al. (2022) who place it between 3.0 and 6.0 K of global warming. In the monsoon systems, we only found abrupt shifts in one model for the Indian Summer Monsoon and none for the South American and West African Monsoons. For the Indian summer monsoon, previous work (Katzenberger et al., 2021) suggests linearly increasing rainfall with rising global temperatures under the SSP5-8.5 scenario in CMIP6 models (when averaged across the entire monsoon region). Similarly, no abrupt shifts in the monsoons were found in the CMIP5 ensemble (Drijfhout et al., 2015). Since we detected only one model with (local) abrupt shifts in just one of the monsoon systems, we consider abrupt shifts unlikely to occur in the monsoons based on the CMIP6 models. Overall, the results support previous assessments indicating that multiple climate subsystems might undergo abrupt shifts (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022;Bathiany et al., 2020;Drijfhout et al., 2015;Lenton, 2023). However, the level of global warming at which these shifts occur remains highly uncertain. Notably, we find the lower bound of the global warming thresholds for the North Atlantic subpolar gyre, Tibetan Plateau, Antarctic sea ice, and Arctic winter sea ice is lower in our assessment than in that of Armstrong McKay et al. (2022). It is important to note that their assessment was based not only on CMIP models, but consisting of multiple lines of evidence from the literature, and they assessed for tipping and not just abrupt shifts as in this study. Table S4 in Supporting Information S1 provides an overview of the global warming thresholds from our assessment, Drijfhout et al. (2015), andArmstrong McKay et al. (2022). The high uncertainty in global warming levels at which abrupt shifts occur in CMIP6 models has multiple causes. One contributing factor is the grouping of shifts across different months. In some systems, abrupt shifts can occur in different months and at different levels of global warming, often depending on the season during which the shift takes place. This is evident with the Arctic sea ice, where there is a significant difference in the onset of abrupt shifts between summer and winter. However, seasonal variation alone does not fully account for the substantial differences between models. Other contributing factors include the different ways each model resolves the underlying physics and the diversity in climate sensitivity across the models. In addition to the variation in the timing of abrupt shifts across different models and variables, this study's estimates of global warming levels at which these shifts occur might be overestimated. The 1pctCO 2 scenario represents a situation of rapidly increasing CO 2 concentrations, whereas the current CO 2 concentration increases more slowly. Due to this rapid increase of CO 2 in the simulations, the edge detector may identify abrupt shifts at higher warming levels than it would under a more gradual increase, as systems require time to adjust to a rising CO 2 concentration. However, the high rate of warming might also trigger rate-dependent tipping, where the system is forced into a new state due to the rate of forcing. As a result, some estimates of the global warming required to trigger abrupt shifts might be underestimated compared to those from scenarios with slower forcing rates, more closely aligned with the current rate of global warming. To detect the abrupt shifts, we made several methodological choices, though alternative approaches are possible. Most importantly, the definition of the threshold for the spatial extent of large-scale abrupt shifts remains somewhat subjective, even though we based it on the specific characteristics of each subsystem. The field lacks an objective definition of how large an abrupt shift must be to be considered relevant since its impact can be measured from multiple perspectives-for example, its effect on other climate subsystems, dependent ecosystems, or socio-economic systems. Detecting abrupt shifts in a systematic way remains challenging given the extensive and diverse model outputs from CMIP6. Here, we use edge detection, a general tool that can be applied to all systems without requiring system-specific knowledge. However, designing a measure to quantify abruptness while avoiding detecting abrupt shifts of small magnitude remains challenging, as different variables exhibit different noise characteristics and shifts occur on different scales.
|
928e79fd-8a94-4df7-9f28-21d5064c744d
| 9
|
02ce5470-68c5-461d-8bf0-948144ce3200
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/987432/england-trees-action-plan.pdf
| 2,021
|
[
"trees",
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assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
|
Woodland carbon offers exciting opportunities for the private sector and other investors and we will work to develop these markets further. Levelling up through a thriving forest Forestry is an economically important sector, particularly in often neglected parts of England. We will encourage demand for UK- grown timber which can reduce our carbon footprint from imports and reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive materials and encourage innovative green finance for trees and woodlands. In addition, we will work with the sector to develop the skills and resources to deliver our ambitions. We will see that trees and woodlands contribute to the bottom line of
Trees and woodlands for water and Establishing trees and woodlands can impact on water resources, and this may be amplified as the climate changes. The right trees and woodland in the right places along and near rivers and within water catchments present opportunities for improving water quality, for flood alleviation and nature recovery. Soil is critical to supporting trees and woodland and we will improve our understanding of appropriate soil management to sequester carbon and protect this precious resource from degradation and inappropriate tree establishment. Trees and woodlands for people in town and The COVID-19 pandemic has brought home the important role nature plays in improving wellbeing and mental health and is often most valuable when close to and part of the places we live, work and play. Trees and woodlands can cool our settlements, improve air quality and contribute to community cohesion and sense of place. We will take steps to improve public access to trees and woodlands in a responsible way, encourage community-led tree planting and invest in partnerships with communities and local government. Heritage and Trees and woodlands are important features in our landscapes. We will encourage greater landscape scale planning which will enhance and transform landscape character, while protecting and conserving heritage assets from inappropriate tree planting and during woodland management. Trees outside Trees throughout the environment such as wood pastures, ancient and veteran trees, scrub, scattered and hedgerow trees contribute to England’s natural beauty and are important spaces for nature. We must continue to protect and enhance these features. Agroforestry will also play an important role in delivering more trees on farms and in our landscape, improving climate resilience and encouraging more wildlife and biodiversity in our farming systems. Healthy, resilient trees and Climate change threatens our trees and woodlands, increasing the risks from pests, diseases, wildfire and long-term changes to growing conditions. We will act now to help our trees and woodlands adapt, to enhance their resilience to stresses by reducing risks and encouraging greater diversity. We will respond swiftly to outbreaks of pests and diseases and improve the management of deer Government and its arms-length bodies including the Forestry Commission, Natural England and the Environment Agency will play a role in delivering these ambitions, but we cannot do it alone. We need the forestry sector, land-owners and managers, investors, the third sector, and communities to help us meet the challenge. We will provide funding and guidance, improve regulations, and encourage private finance to enable foresters, land- owners, managers, investors and communities to plant and protect our trees. We will act as a catalyst for the sector, making sure that our grants and the nation’s forests deliver high environmental, social, and economic benefits to secure the greatest value for public
There are actions that everyone can take to help deliver our long-term vision for trees and woodlands in England. In particular, we hope stakeholders • Apply for grants for establishing and managing trees and woodlands; • Access more and better advice and guidance on establishing and managing trees • W ork with us to unlock more private finance to invest in trees and woodlands; • Plant trees particularly where they make the most difference - for water, biodiversity, climate resilience and close to where people live, work and play; • Responsibly enjoy our wonderful wooded landscapes. Implementation, monitoring and evaluation Work on this action plan will not stop once it has been published - this is just the beginning. To deliver these ambitions over the coming years, we will work closely with stakeholders to implement our actions. We will create a monitoring and evaluation plan for the action plan and develop a detailed evaluation framework. This framework will form part of a wider programme of work to improve performance measurement across the delivery of the action plan. We will track progress towards key objectives and adapt our interventions as we learn from the successes and failures during implementation. Expanding and connecting our trees and We intend to spend over £500 million of the £640 million Nature for Climate Fund on trees and woodlands between 2020 and 2025. With this funding, we aim to at least treble woodland creation rates by the end of this Parliament, reflecting England’s contribution to meeting the UK’s overall target of planting 30,000 hectares per year by the end of this Parliament. Increasing planting now is just the start of a journey towards creating a more wooded country, and we plan to consult on a long-term tree target within a public consultation on Environment Bill targets, expected in early 2022 to help meet our commitments on climate change and biodiversity. The Government’s new Sustainable Farming Incentive, Local Nature Recovery and Landscape Recovery Schemes will provide the main mechanism for publicly funded woodland creation after 2024 and will be informed by any new target. To reach these targets, England will need a step change in public and private financial support for tree establishment. While increasing planting and establishment rates, we will maintain high environmental and biosecurity standards. All woodland creation and woodland management operations in
England are expected to comply with UK Forestry Standard requirements and Government grants and regulatory approval for forestry are conditional on this.
|
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| 2
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https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7206/documents/75818/default/
| 2,021
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[
"energy",
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"industrial"
] |
parliament.uk
|
Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP Minister of State for Business, Energy and Department for Business, Energy & I am writing regarding today’s publication of th is year’s Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES). The publication shows that energy consumption in 2020 was remarkably low as COVID-19 restrictions affected industrial output, leisure, and travel. Energy requirements for industrial use and services (e.g. shops, restaurants, offices) were both down 6 per cent on 2019. However, domestic demand was up 6 per cent as more people stayed at home. Total final consumption was down 13 per cent on last year, 1 1 per cent on a temperature and Renewables contributed a record 43.1 per cent of electricity generation in 2020, outpacing for the first-time annual fossil fuel generation (37.7 per cent). Put in a historical perspective, the changes are significant. In 2010, fossil fuel generation was 75.4 per cent, and this shows that the UK has been performing extremely well on the deployment of re newable electricity The publication also reports on the progress against the targets established by the European Union’s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (RED). Through the RED, the EU set the UK a binding renewabl e energy targets for our energy consumption derived from renewable sources, covering electricity, heat and transport sectors. The UK’s target was the most ambitious in relative terms out of all Member States, requiring a more than ten-time increase in the sh are of renewables . Whilst we have not met the overall target yet , the UK has exceeded expectations on electricity, met the sub target for transport and made progress towards the heat component. In addition to this, as you know, the UK has met or exceeded all of its Carbon Budgets for the period covered by the RED and has seen a 44 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions since 1990, compared to 28 per cent for the EU -27 We have set out concrete steps we will take to build back greener from the pande mic and reach net zero emissions by 2050. We have already published the Energy White Paper, Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy and our Transport Decarbonisation Plan, and a head of COP26, we will bring forward further bold proposals, including a Net Zero Strategy, to cut emissions and create new jobs and industries across the whole country. We are also publishing a number of sector strategies this year, including the Heat and Buildings Strategy and a Hydrogen Strategy. Minister of State for Business, Energy and Clean Growth Chair of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy
|
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| 0
|
02d50fe5-9018-4ab6-bb51-02a72193a35d
| 2,025
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[
"annual energy efficiency plan",
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"executive body"
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
Annual energy efficiency plan (1) The annual energy efficiency plan (hereinafter: Annual Plan) must be adopted by the executive body of the regional (regional) self-government, i.e. the executive body of a large city, with the prior consent of the National Coordination Body. (2) The annual plan is a planning document that is adopted by the end of the current year for the following year, and which determines the implementation of the policy for improving energy efficiency in the territory of a regional (regional) self-government unit, i.e. a large city in accordance with the National Action Plan and the Action Plan.
|
c08c0aee-a85c-4ef7-b166-dc757b141775
| 0
|
|
02d9116e-30f5-49e8-ae42-06d4f2197f5b
| 2,025
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[
"long- term commitments",
"carbon emissions commitments",
"disclosure frameworks",
"organisational change",
"capital markets"
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
To date, these initiatives have been progressing in parallel. We aim to play our part, including through IOSCO, to bring these initiatives together and drive them forward in a way that will best meet the needs of capital markets, and serve the public interest. Net zero commitments by companies Looking beyond disclosure frameworks and standards, companies are increasingly making commitments towards net zero in their long-term business plans to ensure that real action is taken. We have seen an increasing number of companies, across different sectors, make net zero carbon emissions commitments. These are long- term commitments that require significant strategic and organisational change.
|
09b69502-b9f5-4921-9b2b-a5046aa2832e
| 0
|
|
02e215d7-d095-45f3-b687-7bb70fb18f03
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6424b2d760a35e000c0cb135/carbon-budget-delivery-plan.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"carbon",
"delivery",
"additional",
"plan"
] |
www.gov.uk
|
We have also confirmed we will launch a process to Track 2 of the Cluster Sequencing Programme - The cluster sequencing process was established to identify and sequence carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) clusters, with Track-2 seeking clusters suitable for deployment by 2030. We have launched further details alongside the Net Zero Growth Plan and Energy Security Plan. late CB4 We will be launching Track-2 of the CCUS Programme to select two new transport and storage systems, and associated capture projects to deliver government's ambition of deploying CCUS in four clusters by 2030, with Track-2 clusters to be operational by 2030. Any projects delivered throughTrack-2 will enable emissions savings by capturing CO2 emissions and transporting that CO2 to permanent response to the Independent Review of Net Zero, we have confirmed we will set out a vision on how the CCUS sector will support our net zero ambitions. late CB4 Policies to support the delivery of CO2 capture projects and the delivery of further CO2 transport and storage infrastructure are essential for enabling the sectoral capture policies, across power, industry, low-C hydrogen production,
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ Business Model for Transport and Storage (T&S) of CO2, including associated economic regulatory framework and legislation to support the development of T&S networks for the deployment of CCUS clusters using a regulated asset base model. The economic licence and supporting network code will be overseen by an economic late CB4 The delivery of the CO2 transport and storage infrastructure is essential for enabling the sectoral capture policies, across power, industry, low-C hydrogen production, waste, and Delivery of £100 million innovation funding (a subset of the £1bn innovation funding set out in the innovation policy CB4 The Innovation funding supports the development of GGR technologies to help them achieve commercialisation. This includes the Direct Air Capture and GGR Innovation Competition. Phase 2 of the competition was announced in July 2022, with over £54m of government funding awarded across 15 of the most promising demonstration projects. This will support our ambition of at least 5MtCO2/yr of engineered removals by 2030 (see quantified list). Respond to, and take action following, the call for evidence exploring the role of the UK ETS as a potential long-term CB5 The call for evidence explored whether GGRs could be incentivised further if they were integrated into the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. Inclusion of engineered GGRs in the ETS could further support the growth and deployment of GGRs, which will be important in achieving our ambition to deploy at least 5MtCO2/yr of engineered removals by 2030. No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ Explore options for regulatory monitoring, reporting and verification recommendations of the BEIS-led MRV Task & Finish Group involving experts CB4 This policy supports carbon budget delivery by designing policy to address critical barriers to the deployment of engineered GGRs through the establishment of reliable MRV standards to underpin business model support and a future negative emissions markets. It plays a critical role in balancing residual emissions from the hardest to decarbonise sectors by setting out accounting and sustainability frameworks to ensure that GGR projects deliver verifiable, permanent and sustainable removals of 59 Buildings Phasing out of new and replacement gas boilers. The government stated an ambition in the Heat & Buildings Strategy to phase out new and replacement gas boilers by 2035 at the latest. CB6 The emission savings for the 2035 ambition are embedded within the quantified pathways. 60 Buildings Additional measures to support the Network enabling measures aim to ensure that future heat network policies are delivered at the pace and scale needed to meet our net zero targets. The programme ensures that policies are delivered in a programmatic and systematic way and encompasses a range of supporting activity which de- CB4 Supports savings associated with the Heat Networks
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ risks delivery. This includes the development of procurement models to leverage private sector investment, technical standards, developing skills and 61 Buildings Boiler Upgrade Scheme - The current Boiler Upgrade Scheme can be extended. This would be a part of a number of measures to reach the ambition for 600,000 heat pump CB4 Heat Pump uptake could be accelerated to deliver up to ~15Mt/year of emission savings2 (on average over CB6 period). This depends on wider commercial factors such as the cost of heat pumps (both their upfront costs and running costs). Any future government support would be dependent on future Spending Review outcomes. 62 Buildings Green Gas The Green Gas Levy will raise the capital required to fund the Green Gas Support Scheme by placing a levy on all licensed fossil fuel gas CB4 The Green Gas Levy (GGL) applies to licensed fossil fuel gas suppliers in Great Britain from 30 November 2021, and funds the Green Gas Support Scheme (GGSS) (supporting 63 Buildings Energy Technology List - Annual A government list of energy efficient products that meet the robust energy saving criteria. HMG annually reviews the technologies and products that qualify for inclusion. This can be CB4 The list functions as an easy-to-use procurement tool for energy managers, procurement professionals, facilities managers and a wide variety of other professions and organisations. The ETL gives the added reassurance to purchasers of measured and verified energy performance
No. Sector Policy name and description How the policy supports delivery/ 64 Buildings EPC Action The EPC Action Plan, published in Summer 2020, is intended to improve the accuracy and reliability of EPCs, their usefulness to users, and to The EPC Register was launched in redesigned to provide a more user- friendly experience to help people improve the energy performance of their CB4 Better reflecting the benefits of heat pump installation in buildings assessments could incentivise greater deployment of low carbon technologies.
|
15a3290f-77f0-4f00-b9be-47c5b73d4f14
| 33
|
02e4c36b-2740-4c2c-86ab-2429964a9838
|
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.13694v2
| 2,022
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[
"current global warming",
"s=5.1x10",
"total thermal energy",
"planet`s surface",
"hydroelectric dams"
] |
ArXiv
|
There are three implications from this study that require attention: (1) There is an important practical difference between theories regarding the mitigation of climate change: the new approach recommends a reduction in global energy production, while the traditional approach focuses on reducing emission of carbon dioxide. (2) Due to the generality of thermodynamics, it is impossible to neglect or circumvent its basic concepts. Albert Einstein wrote [21] about the classical thermodynamics: "It is the only physical theory of universal content that, I am convinced, will never be overthrown, within the framework of applicability of its basic concepts." Indeed, it is impossible to preserve the environment (nature and climate) as they were 200-500 years ago, and at the same time preserve the system (civilization) in its current state. If both approaches are correct, then it would be advisable, along with the measures already taken, to focus on reducing the energy consumption. This conclusion can have a strong impact on environmental decision-making. (3) The intermediate result of the study concerning the use of the Stefan-Boltzmann law is also noteworthy because it eliminates confusion that apparently went unnoticed during more than a century of application of the law. (3) The intermediate result of the study concerning the use of the Stefan-Boltzmann law is also noteworthy because it eliminates confusion that apparently went unnoticed during more than a century of application of the law.
|
6d8115a2-e3c5-4275-80d1-0211837834e7
| 3
|
02f4ded7-7430-4176-a815-1a9535487006
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.03187v2
| 2,022
|
[
"economic",
"climate",
"energy",
"growth",
"change"
] |
arxiv.org
|
All in all, the main conclusion about the impact of natural disasters on income or GDP seems to be negative for all extreme input variables but heavy rain. However, this effect depends on the country being poor or rich. For the latter, the effects seem to be small and transitory, probably, However, the first issue faced to begin with is defining climate change. Climate is usually defined as the long-run average of weather in a given location (or globally) and climate change as the long-run variation in the joint probability distributions describing the state of the atmosphere, oceans, and fresh water including ice. In many studies analysing the relationship between climate change and economic activity, the measures used for the former are observations of weather variables, often temperatures and precipitations, obtained from weather stations. A majority of studies of climate change measure it by looking at temperatures and mainly to average temperatures. With respect to the first channel, the nexus between energy consumption and economic growth has been analysed since long based mainly on panel data. Evidence on causality between energy consumption and economic growth still remains ambiguous. There is also a huge and still growing literature on the nexus between economic activity and pollution. Most works focus on estimation of EKC based on either panel data or time series models. However, the time span considered in empirical studies is often relatively short while the variables considered are non-stationary. Consequently, the results are mixed and inconclusive. With respect to the works looking at the relationship between economic activity and climate change, many papers focus on the effects of the latter on particular sectors while other, looking at a more aggregate level, find a negative correlation between temperature and income per capita (mainly in poorer countries). However, once more, evidence is mixed. Finally, we survey the literature on the economic effects of catastrophic weather phenomena, which mainly focus on short-term effects. As before, the results are mixed, however, the empirical evidence seems to point to a negative relation between weather extreme events (but heavy pricipitation) and economic growth in poorer countries. Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014) andConvery and Wagner (2015) discuss that, by necessity, standard climate-economy models focus on what is known and can be quantified and, consequently, they convey a false sense of precision.Tol (2009Tol ( , 2014) ) also argues that the level of uncertainty about the economic effects of climate change is large and understated, especially in terms of capturing downside risk. Petris et al. Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014) andConvery and Wagner (2015) discuss that, by necessity, standard climate-economy models focus on what is known and can be quantified and, consequently, they convey a false sense of precision.Tol (2009Tol ( , 2014) )
Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014) andConvery and Wagner (2015) discuss that, by necessity, standard climate-economy models focus on what is known and can be quantified and, consequently, they convey a false sense of precision. Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014) andConvery and Wagner (2015)
Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014) and
Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),Pindyck (2014)
Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016)),
Stern (2008Stern ( , 2016))
1. Naturally, climate change could excessively increase the electricity demand for cooling during heat waves. New literature is emerging
seeWagner (2008), who shows that most studies estimating EKC gave spurious results. For example, Paruolo, Murphy and Janssens-Maenhout (2005) analyze the relation between income and emissions in all countries in the world over the period 1970-2008 based on a VEC model. seeWagner (2008)
see
A number of elements related to growth as, for example, changes in the economic structure, technological progress, changes in preferences and increased environmental awareness, would be at the basis of such a relationship; see the survey byDinda (2004), who summarizes the factors responsible for the shape of the EKC. Note thatKuznets (1955) postulates the inverted U-shape for the relationship between income and income inequality. Alternatively, many important studies of climate change consider paleo-climate observations. For example, Schmidt et al. (2014) model paleo-climate changes for the Last Glacial Maximum, the mid-Holocene and the Last Millennium, while Castle and Hendry (2020) model climate variability over the Ice Ages. While the Kyoto protocol adopted in 1997 set top-down legally binding emission reduction targets and sanctions only for developed nations, the Paris Agreement of 2015 requires that all developed and developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Gaast (2017) describes the three main climate negotiation phases between 2005 and 2015. Other proposals based on panel data take into account non-linearities as, for example, the panel quantile regression proposed by Zhu et al. (2016)) or the nonlinear panel model proposed by Wang and Wang (2020). Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) propose non-linear ARDL tests. More recently, McNown, Sam and Goh (2018) propose a bootstrap correction of the ARDL tests with better properties. Note that short-run relations between emissions and the economy are also of interest because some policy instruments, such as emissions trading schemes, use economic incentives to control emissions over a short time spam, with the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in US being an example. Fosten (2019) also considers emissions by source and non-linear specifications including polynomials of the factors. Note that all variables in the SADFM are previously transformed to stationarity and, consequently, the diffusion index and SADFM models capture short-run relationships. This plot was obtained from https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/monitoring/billions/time-series on 17th April 2022. Although the three studies look for spatial spillover effects, only Felbermayr et al. (2022) include them directly in the model and find strong evidence of them with one lag.
|
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| 6
|
02fec4e9-1f6b-45c4-9408-caa3ce434fa8
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https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ditching-costly-gas-and-oil-is-cheaper-thanks-to-heat-pump-scheme
| 2,022
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[
"heat",
"scheme",
"pumps",
"boiler",
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] |
www.gov.uk
|
Ditching costly gas and oil is cheaper thanks to heat pump scheme - GOV.UK
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Press release
The cost of installing heat pumps has been slashed by thousands of pounds as consumers can now receive grants through the £450 million Boiler Upgrade Scheme. From:
,
and
Published
23 May 2022
This was published under the
2019 to 2022 Johnson Conservative government
Government grants of £5,000 are now available for homeowners choosing to replace fossil fuel boilers with efficient low-carbon heat pumps
£450 million 3-year Boiler Upgrade Scheme helps make electric heat pumps much cheaper and a viable alternative when families come to replace gas and oil heating
government’s commitment to low-carbon heating technology to help protect households from record high oil and gas prices
Costs to install cleaner, more efficient heating solutions have been slashed by thousands of pounds as consumers can now receive grants through the government’s new £450 million
. Homeowners across England and Wales can now benefit from £5,000 grants to fit clean heating systems when they come to replace their oil and gas boilers. This includes clean heating systems installed from 1 April this year. Heat pumps are now much cheaper and more competitively priced against gas and oil boilers than ever before and thanks to these grants, it will be significantly cheaper for consumers to install a heat pump and closer to the cost of installing a traditional gas boiler, whilst improving the energy efficiency of their homes, reducing their energy bills and cutting emissions in the long-term. The scheme will also help kick-start the British heat pump manufacturing industry, helping government and industry to achieve the aim of bringing down the cost of the technology to ensure they are no more expensive to buy and run for consumers than fossil fuel boilers by 2030 when more households will be looking to make the switch. With the market for electric heat pumps set to rapidly expand in Europe over the coming years, there is also a huge export opportunity for British firms in research and development, production, supply chain and installation over the next decade, creating well-paid jobs across the country. It will contribute to the 175,000 green skilled jobs we expect to be delivered by 2030 through the
BUS
and other government commitments made in the Heat and Buildings Strategy. Energy Minister Greg Hands said:
The Energy Security Strategy showed our strong commitment to powering Britain with homegrown renewable and nuclear energy. Thanks to the government’s Boiler Upgrade Scheme, heat pumps using this clean, cheaper electricity will be the cheaper, obvious choice for households choosing to replace their fossil fuel boiler. It will also kick-start a British manufacturing industry that will help bring down prices even further whilst creating huge investment and job opportunities. The grants are in addition to the 5-year long 0% rate of VAT on the installation of heat pumps and biomass boilers, announced as part of a package of measures to help ease the cost of living. With a global spike in oil and gas after unprecedented pressures on global markets, the government is committed to ensuring households are better protected from unforeseen rises in fossil fuel prices by encouraging them to gradually move away from using gas and oil to heat their homes. The scheme has a committed budget of £450 million over 3 years from 2022-2025, with an annual budget allocation of £150 million and property owners will be able to get:
£5,000 off the cost and installation of an air source heat pump
£5,000 off the cost and installation of a biomass boiler
£6,000 off the cost and installation of a ground source heat pump
In its landmark
, the government committed to working with industry to help meet the aim of heat pumps costing the same to buy and run as fossil fuel boilers by 2030, with big cost reductions of between a quarter and a half by 2025 expected as the market expands and technology develops. The Boiler Upgrade Scheme is designed to kickstart the mass rollout of heat pumps across the country in a similar way that government grants have accelerated the uptake of electric vehicles. Business and Energy Minister Lord Callanan said:
We want to make it easier and more cost-effective for homeowners to move away from using expensive fossil fuels for heating. The Boiler Upgrade Scheme means they can make the switch to more efficient, greener alternatives today in an affordable and practical way. In the Heat and Buildings Strategy, the government also confirmed its intention that by 2035, all new heating systems installed in UK homes will either be low-carbon technologies, such as electric heat pumps, or will support new technologies like hydrogen-ready boilers, where we are confident we can supply clean, green fuel. No-one will be forced to remove their existing boiler, with this transition of the next 13 years seeing the UK’s households gradually move away from fossil fuel boilers in an affordable, practical and fair way. The new Boiler Upgrade Scheme grants are helping to make heat pumps an affordable option for homes and small businesses across England and Wales. Government-funded studies by the
have recently shown that there is no property type or age that is unsuitable for a heat pump. As well as not having to use expensive fossil fuels, heat pumps are also more efficient to run, able to deliver more than 3 units of heat for every unit of energy input, while traditional gas and oil boilers deliver less that one unit of heat per unit of energy.
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Gas 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Carbon dioxide 599 563 562 562 502 412 377 322 301 300 294 Methane 133 126 109 87 64 53 52 47 44 42 41 Nitrous oxide 48 39 29 25 21 20 21 21 21 20 20 Hydrofluorocarbons 14 19 10 13 16 16 14 11 7 4 3 Perfluorocarbons 2 1 1 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 Sulphur Hexafluoride 1 1 2 1 1 <0.5 1 <0.5 <0.5 1 1 Total 798 750 712 688 605 502 464 402 374 368 359 Change from 1990 (%) -6 -11 -14 -24 -37 -42 -50 -53 -54 -55 Aviation bunkers 16 20 30 35 32 33 35 34 34 34 34 Marine bunkers 9 9 8 9 12 11 11 12 12 12 12 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage
Gas 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Carbon dioxide 599 563 562 562 502 412 377 321 301 296 288 Methane 133 126 109 87 64 53 52 47 44 42 41 Nitrous oxide 48 39 29 25 21 20 21 21 21 20 20 Hydrofluorocarbons 14 19 10 13 16 16 14 11 7 4 3 Perfluorocarbons 2 1 1 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 Sulphur Hexafluoride 1 1 2 1 1 <0.5 1 <0.5 <0.5 1 1 Total 798 750 712 688 605 502 464 401 374 364 353 Change from 1990 (%) -6 -11 -14 -24 -37 -42 -50 -53 -54 -56 Aviation bunkers 16 20 30 35 32 33 35 34 34 34 34 Marine bunkers 9 9 8 9 12 11 11 12 12 12 12 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage 5.2.1 Projected progress across the traded and non-traded sectors The traded sector largely consists of emissions from power generation and heavy industry, which are discussed in the energy supply and business sectors in section 5.3.2. EEP 2018 projects that these sectors will make up around 27% of UK emissions in 2020. With existing measures, traded emissions will decrease by around 17% between 2020 and 2030 and emissions from the remaining sectors covered by the effort sharing regulation (excluding projected traded emissions decrease by around 20% over the same period. This is before taking planned and Clean Growth Strategy policies into account. By 2035, the UK projects that the additional impact of these measures could leave emissions
54 UK’s Fourth Biennial Report regulation) sectors (UNFCCC coverage) Sector 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Non-traded excluding LULUCF 381 335 336 311 297 290 290 Traded 234 177 139 107 91 88 77 Total 605 502 464 402 374 368 359 Sector 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Non-traded excluding LULUCF 381 335 336 311 296 290 290 Traded 234 177 139 106 92 85 71 Total 605 502 464 401 374 364 353 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
Sector 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Transport 130 131 135 138 126 125 127 117 110 105 103 Energy supply 279 239 223 233 209 147 114 71 60 58 46 Business 114 112 116 109 94 85 80 83 73 69 69 Residential 80 82 89 86 88 68 67 68 71 74 78 Agriculture 54 53 51 48 45 45 46 45 42 42 41 Waste management 67 69 63 49 30 21 21 17 15 14 13 Industrial processes 60 51 27 21 13 13 11 11 10 9 9 Public 13 13 12 11 9 8 8 7 7 7 8 Total 798 750 712 688 605 502 464 402 374 368 359 Change from 1990 (%) -6 -11 -14 -24 -37 -42 -50 -53 -54 -55 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage 10% lower than 1990 levels by 2020 and 19% lower by 2030. The UK expects that measures will improve vehicle efficiency, such as the EU tailpipe emissions targets for new cars and vans; or will directly reduce emissions, such as mandating greater use of biofuels and providing incentives to encourage the adoption of electric vehicles. Gas 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Carbon dioxide 127 128 133 136 125 124 126 115 108 104 101 Methane 1 1 1 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 <0.5 Nitrous oxide 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Total 130 131 135 138 126 125 127 117 110 105 103 Change from 1990 (%) 1 4 6 -3 -3 -2 -10 -15 -19 -21 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage The UK projects that energy supply emissions will be 75% lower than 1990 levels by 2020 and projects a further gradual decline in fossil fuel-based generation out to 2035: it is displaced by more renewables and eventually nuclear generation in the 2030s. Projections show that
56 UK’s Fourth Biennial Report Gas 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 Carbon dioxide 243 212 205 220 199 139 107 64 54 52 41 Methane 34 26 16 11 9 7 6 6 6 5 4 Nitrous oxide 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Total 279 239 223 233 209 147 114 71 60 58 46 Change from 1990 (%) -14 -20 -17 -25 -47 -59 -75 -78 -79 -83 Primary Inventory 2019. EEP, 2018, uplifted to UNFCCC coverage lower by 2030. The UK attributes improvements over time to the impact of policies that encourage energy efficiency, such as building regulations and minimum energy efficiency standards for new products, together with economic measures such as the Carbon Reduction Commitment and the Renewable Heat Incentive.
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29 (1) The regulations may provide that a person is liable to a financial or other penalty if the person fails to comply with the requirements of a trading scheme. U.K. (2) The regulations may- (a) specify the amount of any financial penalty, or (b) provide for the amount of any financial penalty to be determined in accordance with the regulations. (3) If the regulations provide for financial penalties to be payable to a person other than a national authority, they must provide for that person to pay the sums received to the national authority or authorities specified in or determined in accordance with the regulations.
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December 2015 saw a historical moment for climate policy in which, for the first time, almost all countries of the world adopted a formal agreement to reduce emissions in order to limit global warming to temperatures below 2°C [1]. 1 This event marked a change in efforts to develop climate policy: the agenda, whether or not to adopt measures to avoid climate change, was mostly set. What remained to be done was to find out how to achieve this objective with public policies, in every country that is party to the agreement. Developing climate policy is a complex process that could involve planning for dramatic societal changes and socio-economic impacts [2]. Policies can have unintended effects. The far-reaching consequences of adopting particular emissions reduction policies can be challenging to fully foresee, as they involve changes in many sectors and for many actors. For example, could adopting a high price of carbon to incentivise electrification increase electricity prices for consumers, thereby reducing access to modern energy for those who cannot afford it? Can biofuels policy lead to unintended land-use change, or lead to water or food scarcity? Could reducing the consumption of fossil fuels globally lead to high rates of unemployment in producer countries? Could a highly capital-intensive, low-carbon transition lead to excessive debt leveraging of government and/or firms, and result in a carbon bubble? In order to determine the impacts of specific policies, research must move from the agenda-setting stage to the actual impact assessment of policies. This corresponds to a different stage of the policy cycle, and requires analysing the impacts of detailed baskets of policies, as they are envisaged by policy-makers, with all the attendant political and legal complexities, rather than merely recommending -often unrealistic -policies that appear optimal. In the perspective of impact assessment (e.g. see [3]) the policy parameter space is too large to optimise, and individual policies can synergise or interfere [4]. The complexity of the impact assessment problem must account for the uncertainty over the knowledge of the modeller about the way in which decisionmaking actually takes place with agents [5], and how the heterogeneity of agents might influence policy outcomes [6,7]. Models based on representative agents have therefore insufficient resolution for carrying out realistic impact assessment [8]. It is more and more recognised that increasing the level of behavioural information in models enables them to represent more policy instruments and thus cover a wider policy space [9][10][11][12]. Climate policy analysis, in the agenda setting perspective (e.g. [13][14][15]), has focused primarily on total energy system cost, consumption loss and GDP loss as indicators to characterise the socioeconomic impacts. This is now insufficient, as policy-makers are increasingly requiring information on many other types of impact [16]. For example, questions arise over large-scale finance of technological change, and its impact on the macroeconomic system [17]. The choice of model type for this purpose pre-determines the results that can be reached [18]. Most equilibrium models of the economy used to analyse climate policy have restrictive assumptions over the functioning of the financial sector such that their outcomes are almost entirely determined by a debatable assumption, that re-allocating finance for technological change to reduce emissions takes away investment from other productive sectors of the economy, which automatically leads to loss of GDP ( [19], see also [13] and references therein). In fact, research on innovation tends to suggest the reverse [20][21][22]. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the key question on the mind of many policy-makers is not how many percentage points of GDP loss climate policy might entail, but rather, whether securing large-scale investment is possible without leading countries to financial instability [23][24][25][26][27]. In this paper, we introduce the new integrated assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE1, which is designed to tackle the question of environmental impact assessment with the most realistic policy definition currently available, while enabling policy-makers to explore macro-financial issues that may arise from the introduction of such policy. We first describe the policy context that the model attempts to address, as well as the origin and history of economic thought behind its assumptions. We then describe its components: climatology, non-equilibrium macroeconomics and evolutionary technology modelling. We subsequently provide an example of environmental policy analysis under several socio-economic indicators. We conclude with an outlook for future research in the field of integrated assessment modelling. The modelling approach described in this paper is one of simulation. Each part of the E3ME-FTT-GENIE1 modelling framework attempts to represent real world relationships, in terms of accounting balances, physical interactions and human behaviour. This consistency in approach throughout the suite of linked models is crucial to providing insights that are useful to policy-makers. The results from the model are predictions of outcomes based on empirical behavioural and physical relationships observed in the past and the present. The starting point of this methodology regarding human behaviour is one of fundamental uncertainty [28,29]. This premise expresses limitations to knowledge and to the knowable for agents that take part in the economic process. This position runs contrary to the assumptions of perfect knowledge and/or perfect foresight that underlie many other modelling tools, which are used in order to simplify theories and models to a tractable state. Fundamental uncertainty recognises that it is not possible for individuals, firms or other agents to know all the possible outcomes from a decision-making process, and thus that 'unknown unknowns' exist. Under these conditions, it is not possible to estimate probabilities of different outcomes of particular agent decisions, as, with unknown outcomes, the probabilities would never sum to one. From this standpoint, some aspects of decision-making by agents lacking knowledge cannot be reduced to pure risk (as it is in standard Expected Utility Theory). Hence, it is therefore not possible to optimise the decision-making process, and agents either make decision errors, or plan ahead for uncertain outcomes (e.g. with spare production capacity). As noted by Keen [30], it only requires one agent to make sub-optimal decisions for the system of optimisation to break down as a whole.
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These are not to be confused with Approaches 1 and 2 for Key Category Analysis (KCA), of which Approach 2 KCA uses Approach 1 uncertainties to account for uncertainty in determining Key Categories. Uncertainties have been estimated by IPCC sector and direct greenhouse gas.
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34 Information to be included in the subsidy database (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the information that must be included in a public authority’s entry in the subsidy database in relation to a (2) The regulations may, in particular, require a public authority’s entry to include— (a) the power under which the subsidy is given; (b) the policy objective of the subsidy or scheme; (c) the name of the beneficiary to which the subsidy is given; (d) the date the public authority confirms the decision to give the subsidy or make (e) the duration of the subsidy or scheme; (f) any time limits or other conditions attached to the use of the subsidy or (g) the amount of the subsidy or scheme or the amount budgeted for the subsidy (h) the location of any of the information mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (g) and (i) the location of any other publicly available information relating to the subsidy (3) In relation to subsidy schemes, the regulations may require a public authority’s entry (a) the categories of beneficiary eligible to receive subsidies under the scheme; (b) the terms and conditions for subsidy eligibility; (c) the basis for the calculation of the subsidy including any relevant conditions (4) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure. 20 Subsidy Control Act 2022 (c. 23) Document 2023-04-24 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (1) This Part provides for cases in which the subsidy control requirements do not apply (2) Where the subsidy control requirements do not apply to the giving of a subsidy, those requirements are to be taken as not applying to the making of a subsidy scheme so far as it provides for the giving of such a subsidy. (3) Subsection (2) is subject to express provision in this Part about the application of the subsidy control requirements to subsidy schemes. 36 Minimal financial assistance (1) The subsidy control requirements do not apply to minimal financial assistance given to an enterprise if the total amount of minimal or SPEI financial assistance given to the enterprise within the applicable period does not exceed £315,000. (2) The applicable period is the period comprising— (a) the elapsed part of the current financial year, and (b) the two financial years immediately preceding the current financial year. (3) “Minimal financial assistance” means a subsidy given under this section, and for this purpose a subsidy is given under this section if the authority that is giving the subsidy provides to the enterprise that receives it a minimal financial assistance confirmation (4) In subsection (1), the reference to the subsidy control requirements does not include the requirements as to transparency in Chapter 3 of Part 2 except in relation to the giving of a subsidy as minimal financial assistance if the amount of the subsidy is no (5) For the purposes of this section— (a) if minimal financial assistance is provided in cash, the gross cash amount given is to be used in determining the amount of assistance;
Subsidy Control Act 2022 (c. 23) CHAPTER 2 – Minimal or SPEI financial assistance Document 2023-04-24 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (b) if minimal financial assistance is provided otherwise than in cash, the amount of assistance given is to be determined by reference to the gross cash (6) This section does not authorise the giving of a subsidy relating to goods that is in contravention of section 16 (export performance) or 17 (use of domestic goods or (a) the “current financial year” is the financial year in which the minimal financial (b) the “elapsed part” of that year is so much of it as has passed at the time when 37 Section 36: procedural requirements (1) Before giving minimal financial assistance, a public authority must give to the enterprise a minimal financial assistance notification. (2) A “minimal financial assistance notification” means a written statement— (a) explaining that the authority is proposing to give to the enterprise a subsidy by way of minimal financial assistance, (b) specifying the gross value amount of the assistance, and (c) requesting written confirmation from the enterprise that the total amount specified in section 36(1) will not be exceeded by the enterprise receiving the (3) The public authority may proceed to give the assistance only after it has received the confirmation referred to in subsection (2)(c). (4) On giving the assistance, the public authority must provide to the enterprise a minimal financial assistance confirmation. (5) A “minimal financial assistance confirmation” means a written statement (a) that the subsidy is given as minimal financial assistance, (b) the date on which it is given, and (c) the gross value amount of the assistance. (6) The enterprise must keep a written record detailing— (a) that it has received a subsidy by way of minimal financial assistance, (b) the date on which it was given, and (c) the gross value amount of the assistance. (7) The record required by subsection (6) must be kept for at least three years beginning with the date mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection. “the enterprise” means the enterprise that receives, or would receive, “gross value amount” of minimal financial assistance means the gross cash amount (see subsection (5)(a) of section 36) or the gross cash equivalent (see subsection (5)(b) of that section). 22 Subsidy Control Act 2022 (c. 23) CHAPTER 2 – Minimal or SPEI financial assistance Document 2023-04-24 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). Services of public economic interest assistance 38 Services of public economic interest assistance (1) The subsidy control requirements do not apply to SPEI assistance given to an enterprise if the total amount of minimal or SPEI financial assistance given to the enterprise within the applicable period does not exceed £725,000. (2) The applicable period is the period comprising— (a) the elapsed part of the current financial year, and (b) the two financial years immediately preceding the current financial year. (3) “SPEI assistance” means a subsidy given under this section, and for this purpose a subsidy is given under this section if— (a) it is given to a SPEI enterprise for the purposes of the provision of SPEI (b) the authority giving the subsidy provides to the enterprise a SPEI assistance confirmation (see section 39(5)).
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The transition to a low-carbon circular economy in Slovenia is not a task that Slovenia can carry out independently, but rather a joint engagement of the international community, especially the EC's preparation and guidance of legislative policies, and various international programs, such as Horizon Europe, bilateral programs and future comparable programs of various institutions. 7.1.3 Target by 2050 The transition to a low-carbon circular economy will only be possible with radical changes in society and the economy, as well as innovations in existing approaches - only with a simultaneous approach at different levels of society.
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Industry has already made significant progress in this area, with the implementation of efficiency measures contributing to falling emissions in recent years. Government has played a key role in this process with a portfolio of programmes. These programmes include the UK ETS, CCL, CCA scheme and Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme audits, which encourage energy efficiency improvements, and the Resources and Waste Strategy which sets the foundations for minimising material use across the economy. Additionally, businesses who need support to invest to cut their emissions and energy use have access to funds such as the IETF. Although current policies have made great strides, there is a need to stimulate further efficiency savings to align with net zero. There is still untapped potential in industry due to • awareness and efficiency is not always prioritised within industry and sites find it difficult to implement efficiency measures, due to the risk of disrupting operations and a lack of staff capacity. Consumer awareness regarding resource efficient decisions, such as prolonging the life of products through reuse and repair, • access to expertise and industry needs access to quality expertise and advice about available technical solutions and support • access to some efficiency measures have higher payback times than businesses are willing to invest in and businesses face internal investment competition between efficiency measures and other investments • measurement and equipment (meters, sensors), information (e.g. from suppliers), access to audits and management of energy efficiency can be improved
• incentives to adopt circular business and consumer habits are not presently set up to encourage product sharing, reuse and other circular We need to overcome these barriers and maximise the potential of energy and resource efficiency measures as they are a win-win for reducing costs and emissions and will be key to help industry reach net zero. Increasing industrial energy efficiency Improving energy efficiency in industry means maintaining at least the same quality and level of output, while using less energy in the process. By doing this, emissions can be significantly reduced, and the final products of these processes will represent a lower level of emissions per unit of output. Energy efficiency measures have the potential to contribute 4 MtCO2e abatement in industry by 2050 (see Annex 4) with heat recovery, process and equipment upgrades being most relevant for energy-intensive sectors, and further savings possible in less energy intense sectors To realise this potential, in addition to the specific actions listed in this chapter, we will also review regulatory options relating to energy efficiency, working with industry to determine which regulations are optimal in improving industry efficiency levels. This review process will focus on raising baseline energy efficiency levels and all suitable options will be assessed on several factors, including emission reduction potential and synergies with existing programmes and mechanisms. To help improve efficiency within industry, we Action 5.1: Support sites to install energy management Energy management systems can help businesses improve their energy performance and potentially reduce their energy costs, but their uptake so far has been limited. To drive widespread adoption and improvement of these systems, we will encourage sites to adhere to the requirements set by international energy management standards such as ISO 50001, which enables companies to follow a systematic approach to improve their energy performance. By encouraging companies to meet the requirements of these standards, overall energy use in industry can be reduced. We recognise that the early implementation of energy management systems may be challenging for some companies, particularly SMEs. Because of this, we are supportive of the work that is currently being undertaken to develop a new voluntary ISO standard, ISO 50005, that allows companies with limited resources to take a phased approach in implementing these systems. This can help companies decide in which areas efficiency improvements are required and the pace at which they should be pursued, based on their specific needs and resource availability. The introduction of this new standard will
help our aim of encouraging all sites and companies to install these systems as soon as possible. We will also review how government can encourage more widespread collection and utilisation of data to drive improvements in energy efficiency. We recognise that these improved systems will have associated capital and operational costs, and therefore we will consider how government can help support and incentivise these improvements. Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) and Energy Service Contracts (ESCs) The private sector has also developed mechanisms to improve energy efficiency in industry such as EPCs and ESCs. These contracts often involve private energy suppliers entering into an agreement with companies to identify and implement measures which could increase the company’s energy efficiency, with the energy supplier receiving payment for the contract from the resultant energy savings gained. Action 5.2: Improve heat recovery and reuse across industry, particularly in sites which use high In the UK, the majority (70%) of the UK industrial energy demand is for heat (HM Government, Energy Consumption in the UK, 2020), with around 35% of this demand from steam systems alone. For example, superheated high pressure steam is often produced in boilers and then reduced in pressure within distribution networks for use in different processes. Unfortunately, when this pressure reduction occurs energy is lost (Chowdhury, et al., 2018). More widely, some heating processes such as those in the steel and glass making sectors, can waste up to 50% of the heat used, so there is significant scope to improve the efficiency of these heating processes. The use of heat recovery technologies can significantly reduce energy consumption, improve the efficiency of manufacturing processes, and reduce waste. Both the Industrial Heat Recovery Support programme (IHRS) and the IETF provide support for industry to invest in new technology to recover and reuse heat (IHRS has closed to new applications but will continue to provide funding until 2022, phase 2 of the IETF will launch this year).
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(5) An instrument containing regulations made by the Welsh Ministers that are subject to negative resolution procedure is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of the National Assembly for Wales. (6) An instrument containing regulations made by the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland that are subject to negative resolution procedure is subject to negative resolution within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954 (c. 33 (N.I.)) as if it were a statutory instrument within the meaning of that Act. (7) Any provision that may be made by regulations subject to negative resolution procedure may be made by regulations subject to affirmative resolution procedure. Regulations made by two or more national authorities E+W+N.I. 28 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to an instrument containing regulations under this made or to be made by any two or more of- E+W+N.I. (a) the Secretary of State, (b) the Welsh Ministers, and (c) the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland. (2) If any of the regulations are subject to affirmative resolution procedure, all of them are subject to that procedure. (3) Sub-paragraphs (2) to (6) of paragraph 27 apply to the instrument as they apply to an instrument containing regulations made by a single national authority. (4) If in accordance with that paragraph- (a) either House of Parliament resolves that an address be presented to Her Majesty praying that an instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State be annulled, or (b) a devolved legislature resolves that an instrument containing regulations made by a national authority be annulled, nothing further is to be done under the instrument after the date of the resolution and Her Majesty may by Order in Council revoke the instrument. (5) This is without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the instrument or to the making of a new instrument. (6) This paragraph applies in place of provision made by any other enactment about the effect of such a resolution. Hybrid instruments E+W+N.I. 29 E+W+N.I. If a draft of an instrument containing regulations under this would, apart from this paragraph, be treated for the purposes of the standing orders of either House of Parliament as a hybrid instrument, it is to proceed in that House as if it were not such an instrument.
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The model calculates the least cost technically feasible pathway for a range of technologies, assessed on their capital and operating costs, along with cost reductions over time due to technology learning, and a number of key constraints impacting their deployment (e.g. technology readiness level, hydrogen and CO2 transport and storage availability, supply chain capacity). The model has been updated to reflect latest Energy Emission Projections, fossil fuel prices, hydrogen production costs and For developed policies, quantified savings not already included in the baseline used for the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan are informed by business cases based on bespoke modelling which are designed to quantify the impact of government interventions on the deployment of CCS, fuel switching and efficiency measures displacing carbon-intensive activity. The quantified savings of designed and early-stage policies and proposals are estimated in line with the socially cost-effective technically feasible pathway modelled in NZIP, delivered by the identified policy instruments set out in the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan. For instance, estimated savings from industrial carbon capture reflect the socially optimal abatement from industrial carbon capture by the end of Carbon Budget 6. Policies and proposals, such as the industrial carbon capture business model, will therefore be developed to deliver the cost-effective abatement identified by the modelling. The carbon savings from decarbonisation of the steel sector are estimated by assuming policy incentivises the electrification of production processes. Assumptions about the impact of policies and proposals in the Carbon Budget Delivery Plan on industrial non-road mobile machinery (NRMM) decarbonisation are aligned with CCC’s CB6 advice and will be refined further ahead of the publication of the NRMM strategy. This modelling relies on many exogenous assumptions and inputs that are uncertain and will evolve over time. This includes industrial output according to emission projections which could increase or decrease delivery requirements, and the technical potential for emissions savings from resource and energy efficiency (REEE). Investment requirements as set out in the Net Zero Growth Plan associated with the deep decarbonisation of industry (e.g. fuel switching and CCS) are based on NZIP technological cost assumptions and exclude networks related operating expenditure. Investment requirements for industrial energy efficiency are based on the Industrial Decarbonisation and Energy Efficiency Roadmaps (BEIS, 2015) and include additional estimates for non- roadmaps sectors. Investment requirements associated with resource efficiency measures An adjustment to the CBDP baseline has been made to account for minor discrepancies between the DESNZ Net Zero Industrial Pathways model, used to model emission savings in the industry sector, and the EEP 2021-2040. This alignment is needed to calibrate sub- sector breakdowns in both EEP21-40 and NZIP models. This is a minor calibration that amounts to 0.5MtCO2e/year on average over each of the carbon budget periods. Calculated emission savings for heat and buildings policies and proposals under all scenarios (high electrification and hydrogen scenarios) are developed to be consistent with completely decarbonising buildings by 2050. Calculations assume that a typical heating appliance has a lifetime of 15 years. This implies that no new fossil fuel heating systems can be installed after 2035, and as such our policies and proposals are designed to achieve this ambition. For most policies and proposals, we quantify savings under the central scenario. However, we have modelled different decarbonisation pathways options for some policies and proposals in the buildings sector. The emissions savings attached to these measures vary depending on the level of deployment of hydrogen across the economy. This applies to policies and proposals covering heat pump deployment, buildings “on the gas grid”, and the emissions associated with hydrogen production. These measures would be subject to future consultation. The modelled scenarios show how differing uptake rates of hydrogen may displace some technologies that rely on electrification (and the policies that support them) across the economy. For domestic buildings, we will seek to grow the market and help consumers transition to different supplies of heat – all while continuing to follow natural replacement cycles and working with the grain of consumer behaviour. For non-domestic buildings, we will focus policy interventions on key segments of the building stock, for example based on tenure or The high electrification scenario assumes that hydrogen is not available as an option for heating buildings. It therefore assumes the level of heat pump deployment grows from its current level of around 55,000 in 2021 to be able to meet the turnover of fossil fuel systems in 2035. In scenarios involving hydrogen, heat pump deployment meets the common ambition of 600,000 heat pumps by 2028. In both hydrogen scenarios, the impact of policies and proposals are modelled such that hydrogen deployment is optimised to displace the same volume of emissions as the heat pumps would in the electrification scenario. Installation of energy efficiency measures and deployment of low carbon heat networks is assumed to be same in all scenarios. A summary of the hydrogen and electrification scenarios is in Appendix B of the Carbon Domestic Energy modelling of domestic energy efficiency policies was carried out using the National Household Model (NHM)xiv. This model is applied to policies that directly support the installation of energy efficiency measures (such as the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund, future phases of Home Upgrade Grant and Local Authority Delivery Scheme) or indirectly encourage homeowners to install measures (such as early- stage, minimum energy efficiency regulations). From this, emission savings for each proposal or policy are then derived. The NHM estimates the impact of installing different energy efficiency measures in different properties by applying the Standard Assessment Procedurexv to a representative sample of the housing stock based on the English Housing Surveyxvi.
|
bff69e7d-0a39-4bcc-b446-41882979776a
| 8
|
0329e199-ff37-487e-b5ab-7e152d05fa1d
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
6.5.8. A copy of all instructions to be sent to those persons who are to perform the repair. 6.5.9. A description of the impact of the proposed remedial measures on the emissions, fuel consumption, driveability,
and safety of each vehicle type, covered by the plan of remedial measures with data and technical studies which
support these conclusions. 6.5.10. Any other information, reports or data the type-approval authority may reasonably determine is necessary to evalu-
ate the plan of remedial measures.
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 254
|
032aa618-db18-46e6-a8e2-2cfa886fbde6
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
. 3.4.4.3. Identification number
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4.4. Kind of electrochemical couple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3.4.4.5. Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 160
|
032ad741-02a8-4c4f-a623-622456fc366d
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.00902v1
| 2,024
|
[
"transition",
"climate",
"risk",
"production",
"policy"
] |
arxiv.org
|
In equilibrium, firms are 100% equity financed and households will hold all the equity, and so the evolution of household wealth can be written as
where µ ϖ , C t /ϖ t , and σ ϖ are determined by optimal choices and endogenous firm price and state variable dynamics. The consumption sector firm's profit maximization problem is given by
The capital sector firm's profit maximization problem is given by
The oil fossil fuel sector firm's profit maximization problem is given by
The coal fossil fuel sector firm's profit maximization problem is given by
The green energy sector firm's profit maximization problem is given by
The firms' profit maximization problems are subject to the evolution of the state variables, as well as the relevant market conditions (competitiveness and externality internalization) and market clearing conditions and constraints. From the household's FOC, we derive the stochastic discount factor (SDF) as
and from the FOC for the consumption firm, we derive the input prices P K,t , P L,t = w t , P 1,t , P 2,t , and P 3,t as given in the main text. By combining the input prices, the SDF, and the FOC from the firms, we can derive expressions for the optimal input choices:
Note that the optimal fossil fuel choices from the SP's problem are given by
Equating the SP and decentralized FOCs for the oil production choice gives us
Equating the SP and decentralized FOCs for the coal production choice gives us
Now, to derive firm prices, I apply the envelope theorem to the social planner's Lagrangian. This follows the approach used by Papanikolaou (2011), among others. Note for the final output firm, the constant returns to scale and perfect competition assumptions mean that when we plug in the input prices, we see that the firm price is given by
Likewise, the consumption capital, green energy, and brown energy firm prices are
Note the Lagrangian for the social planner's problem is given by
By application of the envelope theorem we know that
Calculating derivatives of the Lagrangian and comparing I find that
While there is no direct counterpart for S
(2) t , I directly solve the firm price PDE derived and characterized in Section 4.2 of the main text. Finally, returning to the SDF π t the expression for risk free rate is given by
which comes from the no arbitrage condition and application of Ito's Lemma to derive
The compensations for the diffusive risks of consumption capital (σ π,log K C ), green capital (σ π,log K G ), fossil fuel reserves (σ π,log R ), temperature (σ π,T ), and transition and stranded assets (σ π,λ ), as well as the compensation for the jump risk related to transition and stranded assets risk (Θ π ) are as given in the main text. B.1 Alternative Preferences
While the model with recursive preferences and non-unitary EIS becomes quite unwieldy, I highlight the potential impact of relaxing the unitary EIS assumption by characterizing the transition jump risk premium. When θ = 1, we saw that this risk price was given by
Without the EIS restriction, and denoting the EIS as ψ -1 , preferences are given by
The stochastic discount factor given by π t = exp( t 0 h V )h C , but these derivatives are now
Therefore, the climate policy jump risk price would therefore be given by
Note that for the model simulations results the climate-linked transition shock leads to reduced consumption and a more negative continuation value and so Cpost Cpre < 1 and Vpost Vpre > 1. As a result, holding all else constant, when ψ -1 > 1, we see that
On the other hand, holding all else constant, when ψ -1 < 1, we see that
Therefore, the result of relaxing the EIS from being unitary is that when ψ -1 > 1, holding all else constant, the transition jump risk premium is diminished, i.e., |Θ ′ π | < |Θ π |, whereas when ψ -1 < 1, all else constant, the green transition jump risk premium is amplified, i.e.,
This comparative static or partial equilibrium analysis highlights the role of the EIS. Consistent with the asset pricing literate, an EIS greater than one leads to increased concern about the resolution of uncertainty and amplifies the magnitude of the risk price of the climate-linked transition jump. However, an EIS less than one leads to decreased concern about the resolution of uncertainty and diminishes the magnitude of the risk price of the green transition jump. Such an analysis highlights the value of using asset prices in analyzing the impact of climate change and transition risk, and provides insight for the expected macroeconomic outcomes, where a larger EIS should amplify the run on oil we would expect and a smaller EIS should diminish this effect. I conjecture and verify that the value functions for the technology and taxation shock cases, pre-and post-transition shock are of the form
where the value function coefficients c pre and c post,i , i ∈ {tech, tax} are given by
Plugging in terms, I arrive at a simplified pre-transition HJB equation of the form
There key difference is that the value function is now additively separable rather than multiplicatively separable. Importantly, the main drivers previously highlighted, the marginal value of reserves, the marginal cost of forgoing labor for final output production, and the marginal cost of climate change, are still central components for the optimal choice of extraction. These results highlight that the recursive utility specification introduces an additional amplification effect related to the continuation value and forward-looking concerns about the resolution of uncertainty that the log utility setting does not have. The same dynamic run impacts of the risk of the climate-linked transition shock that strands fossil fuel production are still in effect, though they are likely more muted quantitatively. With a constant policy arrival rate, the post-transition results match the baseline setting.
|
60c4cd0c-9dfd-42ae-9a4c-9143de4135bc
| 12
|
032cd18b-7469-4d6e-9556-6e7d867bc006
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf
| 2,021
|
[
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] |
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
|
Where feasible, uncertainty in projections reflects uncertainty on policy design, GDP, fuel prices, trip rates, and historic volatility in emissions. Transport emission projections exclude military aircraft and shipping.
|
8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66
| 107
|
03396b72-4965-47ec-99e3-2e3f3537bd25
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2116
| 2,013
|
[
"Agriculture and forestry",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
3. The body or bodies responsible for the application of this Chapter shall be organised in such a way as to be independent of the departments or branches of departments responsible for the payments and the checks carried out prior to payment. 4. Undertakings for which the sum of the receipts or payments amounted to less than EUR 40 000 shall be scrutinised in accordance with this Chapter only for specific reasons to be indicated by the Member States in their annual control plan referred to in Article 80(1). 5.
|
8f9bf1c1-a150-4ba5-bf0e-b248d1eace93
| 72
|
033b81b9-b058-46c8-8064-01893ba5e383
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.01398v1
| 2,019
|
[
"economy",
"business",
"world",
"people",
"social"
] |
arxiv.org
|
76 Heilbroner, R. L., (1999), The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, Simon and Schuster, New York. increasingly favor access to products over ownership. 79 And technology has made connecting, sharing, swapping, and trading unbelievably easy. All of these transformations in society mean that NFP businesses might soon be outcompeting their for-profit peers due to the serious advantages they hold in the changing marketplace. In a world with rising demand for ethical products and services, organizations that focus on fulfilling human and ecological needs are ahead of the game. Not-for-profit businesses don't have dividends to worry about and can often offer lower prices, primarily because they are NFP. They often receive tax exemptions and the ability to receive tax deductible donations. They more easily draw on the support of passionate volunteers and attract the growing segment of the population that wants their paid work to contribute positively to society. Notfor-profit enterprises' propensity for flatter organizational structures enables exciting prospects for productivity and innovation, as well. Moreover, NFP businesses are freer to truly innovate, due to the absence of owners and shareholders who so often restrict creative energy to only the areas they deem will reap a good financial return. We are collectively stepping out of the profit motive and into the purpose motive and are likely witnessing the beginning of a whole new economic paradigm: the Not-for-Profit Era. It's rooted in a very simple notion: there is enough for us all if we keep the surplus circulating in an economy that promotes value creation, rather than value appropriation, and shared interest, rather than self-interest. And this new economic era has the potential to offer a truly sustainable economy that works for both people and planet. We are not at the end of history. We are somewhere in the larger evolution of human civilization, and the Not-for-Profit Era could very well be the next phase in the evolution of our economy. Our hope is that this book is only the beginning; that it will spark a much larger field of interest, debate, and research into NFP business and galvanize a social movement to realize the potential of a NFP World economy. Imagine waking up and feeling good about going to work, no matter what the nature of your job is. You feel positive and motivated, knowing that your work provides you with a livelihood that also contributes to the wellbeing of the wider community. How might a world look in which every person woke up feeling this way? What would it be like if every business were an NFP? A Not-for-Profit World would still involve a thriving market. Government, banks, money, loans and interest would remain. It is just that within a NFP framework, these things would have vastly different purposes and consequences. For instance, when banks can't privately distribute profits and they have no shareholders or owners that they need to keep happy with dividends, they have no reason to exist other than to provide high-quality financial services to their customers, and they have very little to distract them from this mission. They are built to be more transparent and more efficient. Rather than siphoning wealth away from people and communities who take out loans, all profits are allocated according to the NFP bank's social mission, enabling the generation of real community wealth. Now imagine the entire banking sector being NFP. Imagine the entire retail sector being NFP. Imagine all manufacturing being NFP. Envision a world in which all energy, food, transportation, housing and all other goods and services are provided by NFP companies. In a world with NFP business at its heart, profit is a means by which social and environmental wellbeing is achieved; it is not a goal in itself. With changes in the nature of incentive and ownership in business, the NFP model enables companies to make truly sustainable decisions, in turn promoting a less consumerist society and doing less harm to the natural environment. In fact, many NFP enterprises have a mission to help regenerate ecosystems. The NFP World fosters a more equitable economy because it naturally leads to a more balanced distribution of wealth. The requirement that NFP businesses reinvest all their profit into their mission translates into the constant circulation of wealth throughout the whole economy. Money and other resources go to where they're needed most, as the market is made up of mission-driven businesses. Thus, wealth, power and other benefits are distributed more widely and this is particularly important in light of our current inequality crisis. Not-for-profit business restores the functionality of the wealth circulation pump of the market. In transitioning to an NFP World economy, most people will experience relative increases in wages and salaries, as huge dividend payouts to the world's richest people disappear and companies are able to better value the work their employees do. This would contribute to a lot more equality, on the local, regional and global levels, therein increasing the quality of life for everyone. 80 The NFP World would also be better for the environment due to what we call the Paradox of Enough. In an economy in which wealth concentrates, we consume more but have less, whereas in an economy in which wealth circulates, we consume less but have more. In the for-profit world, we have less social connection, less free time, and less relative wealth. We consume more goods and services in order to compensate for not having enough of the stuff that makes life truly worthwhile. We have too much material wealth and not enough immaterial wealth. But in the NFP World, we have more free time, more cooperation, more dignity, tighter social connections and more equality. Rather than having too much of one kind of wealth and not enough of the other, we have enough of both. And when we have enough, we are better able to meet our needs without the pressure to over-consume.
|
7aa7f968-38f8-4177-8669-ac6d65db7e5a
| 10
|
033eaba8-e2a1-42e9-a9ec-b6f94f39d7be
|
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/schedule/4/crossheading/disclosure-of-information
| 2,008
|
[
"environmental authority",
"electricity supplier",
"from- u.k.",
"potential participant",
"trading scheme-"
] |
legislation.gov.uk
|
Disclosure of information U.K. 6 (1) This paragraph applies to information obtained by an environmental authority (whether or not pursuant to a notice under this ) from- U.K. (a) an electricity supplier or electricity distributor, or (b) a potential participant, for the purposes of enabling a trading scheme to be established. (2) The information may be disclosed for the purposes of or in connection with the establishment, operation or enforcement of a trading scheme- (a) by an environmental authority to another environmental authority or the administrator of the scheme, or (b) by the administrator of the scheme to any other administrator of the scheme or an environmental authority. (3) This does not affect any other right to disclose information within sub-paragraph (1) apart from this paragraph.
|
1e31a00f-ebbb-4578-889a-64712156a2f7
| 0
|
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