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04e5b4b0-f6c8-4067-b3d8-956ae7f2d4a3
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.05314v1
| 2,025
|
[
"states",
"development",
"goals",
"sdgs",
"scores"
] |
arxiv.org
|
For this study, we adopt the following interpretation: "More complex states are capable of achieving more complex goals, and more complex goals are those that can only be achieved by the more complex states." This formalization, as outlined by Tachella et al., can be expressed as a non-linear iterative algorithm. ; Sciarra et. al showed that one could approximate this to an eigen-problem by linearizing the system of equations, enabling us to interpret the two scores as eigenvectors of a similarity matrix among the states as well as among the goals. We can interpret the original data as a weighted bipartite network where the SDGs and states constitute the two sets of nodes. This lets us understand the scores as centrality metrics for ranking the importance of nodes within the network. We start with the matrix I(τ) for a year τ containing ν s (τ) rows corresponding to the states and union territories, and ν g (τ) columns corresponding to the SDGs that are present in that year. Each element I sg (τ) corresponds to the score achieved by state s on goal g. This matrix is visualized by mapping the values to a colourmap for Figure 1A. The states + union territories 3/10
and their respective scores in each sustainable development goal can be considered a bipartite network where the edge weights are given by the scores I sg (τ). It is immediately clear that the NITI Aayog's composite scores for a state s is given by the weighted degree centrality of the nodes ∑ g I sg (τ). A subset of the network with only 6 states sampled across the ranking ladder is shown in Figure 1B. The chosen states are -Kerala(KL), Chandigarh(CH), Haryana(HR), Mizoram(MZ), Jharkhand (JH) and Bihar(BR). The goal of this framework is to obtain two sets of related scores for both the states (D s (τ)) and goals (C g (τ)) corresponding to the centralities of the nodes in the bipartite network given by I sg (τ) we defined above. These scores are motivated by the iterative relationship that the more complex states are the ones achieving more complex goals, and the more complex goals are the ones that are achieved by only the more complex states. To start we can define two vectors k s (τ) and k ′ g (τ) as the column-wise and an adjusted row-wise sum of I sg (τ) respectively. is the total score of the state s and k ′ g (τ) is the g goal's score adjusted for the relative performances of states achieving them. k s (τ) directly corresponds to the NITI Ayog's SDG index since it is the average of the scores, and k s (τ) is the sum. For all purposes, we will use k s to represent the SDG index scores given by NITI Ayog. Using these two vectors along with I(τ) we can compute a matrix N(τ) whose elements are given by
. This matrix formalizes the rationale given in the iterative framework explained before and provides a symmetric representation of the bipartite system. From here we can calculate the vector D s (τ) as the principal eigenvector of the symmetric matrix U(τ) given by. 2 And our score vector C g (τ) can be computed as the principal eigenvector of the conjugate symmetric matrix V given by For comparison, the states are divided into 3 groups based on their NITI-Aayog ranks, and the average of their performances are also plotted as thicker lines along with the national average. The vector D s (τ) is used to rank the states and C g (τ) is used to rank the sustainable development goals. The rankings of states obtained using the SDGs -GENEPY framework and the rankings from just the k s values are shown in Figure 2A and Figure 2B respectively where each of the states is colored according to these ranks. The scores for the SDGs obtained from the vector C g (τ) is normalized W g (τ) = C g (τ)/k ′ g(τ) and plotted in a polar histogram as shown in Figure 3. As opposed to NITI-Aayog's equal weights when calculating the average scores of each state, these weights give the importance of each goal when calculating the SDGs-GENEPY complexities of states and their ranks. Since D s and W g s are calculated from the eigenvectors of a similarity matrix between the states and goals, we can look at it from a spectral clustering perspective [27][28][29] . The ranks for the state/UTs as well as the weights of the SDGs are calculated from the centralities of the weighted bipartite network. Using a geographical plot, the ranks of the states are visualized in Figure 2a. The greener colors represent a higher rank for a state. A visual representation of the bi-partite network with a few selected states are shown in Figure 2b. These states are marked in the geographical plot for reference. The SDGs are indicated by their icons. The links (edges) between SDGs and states show the score NITI-Aayog gave that state on that goal. The colour as well as the thickness of the link indicates the score. The greener and thicker links show higher scores whereas the yellower and thinner links indicate lower scores. The weights calculated for each goal using SDGs-GENEPY formalism are shown as the horizontal bars near the corresponding SDG icons in Figure 3c. The values of these weights are also given as text in each bar. Using the weights obtained from the formalism, we can rescale the scores of each state across goals to get a weighted performance (I sg (2024) * W g ). These weighted performances of all the states and UTs for 2024 are plotted in Figure 3 as line graphs. The x-axis corresponds to each SDG, and the y-axis has the weighted performance of a state in the corresponding SDG.
|
36654a9d-1ebc-45ce-b5f7-ed89e6c6e411
| 3
|
04e63b01-3374-49dd-bcec-144d35b8dffe
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
In certain areas government will need to support and complement market-led decarbonisation with standards and regulation to ensure that, where appropriate, green options are pursued, while high carbon options are phased out. This will help to accelerate low regrets areas like energy efficiency, such as ensuring our homes are built to new standards, and high impact areas like zero emission vehicles. It will also ensure suppliers of higher-carbon technologies and fuels provide low carbon alternatives, • Planning and infrastructure. Low carbon solutions rely on transforming the infrastructure needed to deliver them. Increasing electricity generation needs to be accompanied by building out a flexible grid. Alongside dedicated hydrogen infrastructure, new CO2 transport and storage infrastructure is needed for the use of CCUS which will require investment of around £15 billion from now to the end of the Carbon Budget 6 period. We need to ensure that low carbon energy generation can be connected to sources of demand geographically, which means improving knowledge of local circumstances and opportunities for generation. We also recognise the importance of the planning system to common challenges like combating climate change and supporting • Sustainable use of resources. Net zero will mean maximising the value of resources within a more efficient circular economy. It will need a significant increase in the use of certain types of resources – critical minerals like lithium, graphite, and cobalt, as well an increased demand on resources like copper and steel – from manufacturing green technologies to building large-scale infrastructure. This will require new robust supply chains and provide economic opportunities, but there will be environmental trade-offs, and potential negative impacts on habitats, biodiversity, and water resources to be managed carefully. For example, ammonia emissions from anaerobic digestion, which can use waste as a feedstock, can also affect biodiversity and health. • Understanding land use trade-offs. Like other resources, our land is finite and competition for it will need to be managed as we rely on natural resources and use land for multiple new purposes, such as perennial energy crops and short rotation forestry for energy generation, while allowing for afforestation and peatland restoration to sequester and avoid emissions. We will also need to ensure net zero is compatible with wider uses of land such as agriculture, housing, infrastructure, and environmental goals. These land use challenges are exacerbated by the impact of climate change on the availability of productive land and water in future. 29. These features underpin the critical activity driving decarbonisation across sectors of the economy. A summary is provided below up to 2035, which is not exhaustive but focuses on the new technologies which need to be developed and deployed over the next decade. Policies and proposals to detail how this activity is achieved are set out in Chapter 2 – The Journey to Net Zero
Markers indicate the year milestones will occur rather than the precise point in a given year, while arrows of activity are inclusive of the years in which they start and finish 20252023 2027 20302022 2026 20292024 2028 2035 Market mechanisms continue to evolve to support electricity system decarbonisation, especially from the 2030s Improvements to energy efficiency of buildings to reduce emissions and make them ready for low-carbon heating technologies Building out electricity infrastructure, especially in the 2020s Accelerate heat pump rollout, reducing costs by growing and expanding UK manufacturing Strategic approach to energy networks, smart technologies, and market reform to incorporate low carbon and flexible technologies efficiently Transformation of heat networks – introducing the market framework and zoning Depending on hydrogen decision, prepare for conversion of gas grid Introduction of demand-side measures (e.g.
|
368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37
| 19
|
04ea3705-843f-4a57-b9a5-3f2c4603fc58
|
https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/hazardous-waste-amendment-no-2-regulations-northern-ireland-2015-sr-no-288-of-2015-lex-faoc148712/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=824
| 2,015
|
[
"energy",
"development",
"article",
"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
"resource"
] |
ecolex.org
|
The amendments bring into effect the changes introduced by Commission Decision 2014/955/EU amending Decision 2000/532/EC on the list of waste pursuant to Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Commission Decision 2000/532/EC is directly binding as regards determination of waste that is to be considered as hazardous waste.
|
22d2b1fc-d3f3-420a-8544-559f6e854242
| 1
|
04ecbb72-d8c4-4fff-820d-196d883b6d57
| 2,025
|
[
"co₂/km emissions",
"duty vehicles",
"vehicle technology",
"p.",
"g co₂/km"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
emissions from light-duty vehicles (OJ 2011 L 145, p. 1) sets the average of 175 g CO₂/km and 147 g CO₂/km emissions in 2014 and 2020 respectively to be achieved through the enhancement of vehicle technology.
|
74c89f44-6464-4417-9d94-80ae9fabf890
| 0
|
|
04ed3a12-15ca-4a8a-8829-810c295396c3
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/energy-white-paper_0cd02a608db5fd9fbe071391540a23a7.pdf
| 2,020
|
[
"Energy",
"Fossil Fuels Curbing Measures",
"Fossil Fuel Phase Out",
"energy",
"electricity",
"system",
"support",
"emissions"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
We will identify the international clean growth projects and emerging clean technology sectors in the UK which can benefit from our export finance mechanisms, from innovation to export, with a particular focus on technologies where the UK has first mover advantage. We will also help UK based companies to diversify and take advantage of the opportunities in emerging energy technologies. The downstream oil sector provided 96 per cent of the energy used in the transport sector in 2019.220 It will continue to play a vital role in the transition to a net zero economy, delivering fuels to consumers. The sector is already actively exploring the potential for low-carbon liquid fuels, particularly in aviation, shipping and heavy goods vehicles, which are more challenging to decarbonise. We will work with industry to promote innovation and remove regulatory barriers which hinder the switch from fossil fuels. The Department for Transport will shortly publish a consultation over the use of fuels produced from non-biogenic waste, which is currently incinerated. It offers the potential to convert non-recyclable plastic and industrial waste gases to jet fuel or substitute for diesel and petrol in cars and vans. As we make the transition away from fossil fuels, we must maintain secure supplies of fuel to the people and businesses whose livelihoods depend upon it. `We will take powers to ensure we maintain a secure and resilient supply of fossil fuels during the transition to Our net zero future undoubtedly represents a challenge to the downstream oil sector, which has already been hit hard by falling demand and reduced refining margins resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. We believe that it is necessary for government to have powers to monitor the resilience of the fuel supply market and, should it be necessary, to intervene to ensure there is an orderly transition to clean energy supplies. We will explore options for delivery and look to publish a draft Downstream Oil Resilience bill while we seek an opportunity to introduce these measures to Parliament
Working with the regulators, we will m ake the UK continental shelf a net We will commit the UK to the World Bank’s ‘Zero Routine Flaring by 2030’. We will support the UK oil and gas sector to repurpose its existing infrastructure in support of clean energy technologies. We will undertake a review of the Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning to drive up environmental standards in its regulatory role, and support the sector’s progress towards net zero We aim to lay a new strategy for the Oil & Gas Authority before the end of 2020 to bolster the regulator’s ability to focus the sector on helping deliver net To ensure that licensing continues to be compatible with our climate change ambitions over the coming decades, we are considering formalising aspects of our existing process. We will agree a transformational North Sea Transition Deal with the industry during the first half of 2021. We will use our North Sea Transition Deal to support the UK-based oil and gas supply chain to secure new low-carbon export opportunities in We will take powers to ensure we maintain a secure and resilient supply of fossil fuels during the transition to net zero emissions. Advanced Nuclear Includes Small Modular and Advanced Modular Reactors. Reactors which use novel cooling systems or fuels and may offer new functionalities (such as industrial process heat). Balancing Matching supply with demand, which is important to keep the gas and electricity systems within safe operating limits. For electricity this needs to be done on a second-by-second basis. The tools and markets that are used to make sure it is possible to Refers to bioenergy processes (such as burning it for electricity) during which carbon is captured and stored. If carefully managed, using sustainable biomass, BECCS can generate ‘negative emissions’ because while providing energy it also it also captures and stores the atmospheric CO₂ that is absorbed by plants as they Bioenergy Refers to heat or electricity produced using biomass or gaseous and liquid fuels with a biological origin such as biomethane produced Biomass Refers to any material of biological origin used as a feedstock for products (e.g. wood in construction to make chemicals and materials, like bio-based plastics), or as a fuel for bioenergy (heat, electricity and gaseous fuels such as biomethane and hydrogen) or Biomethane A form of gas that is produced by processing biomass It can be used for the same purposes as natural gas, like producing electricity or heat, and can use the same infrastructure for transmission and Capacity market Is our primary policy mechanism for delivering security of electricity supply. It provides generators and flexibility providers with a payment for firm (reliable) capacity to ensure they deliver electricity generation or demand reduction, when required. Carbon intensity The amount of CO2 emitted when generating a unit of electricity, measured in gram of CO 2 per kWh of electricity produced. Is a requirement imposed on thermal plants (such as coal and gas plants) to enable future capturing and storing of carbon following a plant upgrade. Such plants currently emit CO 2 directly into the The process of capturing carbon dioxide from industrial processes, power generation, certain hydrogen production methods and greenhouse gas removal technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage and direct air capture. The captured carbon dioxide is then either used, for example in chemical processes, or stored permanently in disused oil and gas fields or naturally occurring geological storage sites. Carbon Leakage Refers to the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs related to climate pricing policies, businesses were to transfer production or reallocate future investments to other countries with laxer emission constraints or carbon pricing. This could lead to an increase in total Carbon Price A cost applied to carbon pollution to encourage polluters to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they emit into the atmosphere. Clean Electricity Types of electricity generating technologies that emit little or no fossil fuel derived greenhouse gas from generation.
|
7ddb340e-1bee-46f8-b3fb-be45b01d49ae
| 46
|
04f0df97-a204-40f4-ab17-156c36dc2c23
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.10644v1
| 2,025
|
[
"firms",
"losses",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"banks"
] |
arxiv.org
|
This remarkable jump occurs because a firm that belongs to the systemic risk core of the SCN [42] defaults due to its additional carbon costs. Firms in the systemic risk core are interlinked through essential supply relations that lack alternative suppliers (the corresponding inputs can't be substituted in the pessimistic scenario). Hence, the failure of one core firm cascades to other core firms that will suf- 10 Indirect losses correspond to the difference between dotted and dashed-dot lines. 11 [38] show that for COVID-19 like shocks, propagation effects in a standard Cobb-Douglas general equilibrium model are on average approximately a third smaller than when using linear production functions in our model. Here we expect this relation to be similar. fer large production losses that then propagate to a large fraction of the SCN. For details on high systemic risk firms, see SI Section S4, for details on the core [42]. This implies that if a systemic core firm was to become unprofitable due to carbon costs and firms were not able to substitute essential inputs, even a relatively low carbon price could bear potentially significant transition risks. Consequently, policy makers should monitor the timely transition of firms that are systemically critical in their country's SCN. Indirect losses in the banking system Supply chain contagion causes temporary declines of firms' production levels, reducing their sales and purchases. To assess the SCN-amplification effects on financial stability, we translate production losses to financial losses by updating the firms' income statements and balance sheets accordingly. Then, we assess which firms become insolvent or illiquid and default in this counterfactual scenario. Finally, we calculate additional bank equity losses from writing off loans given to firms that default due to supply chain contagion. For details, see Section Methods, Step 5 and [44]. For the optimistic scenario Fig. 3 shows, that total bank equity losses (blue dash-dotted line), start at 1.1% and gradually increase to 32% at 1,000 EUR/t. At the ETS II cap of 45 EUR/t the supply chain contagion amplifies the losses from 1.2% to 2.7%, for 200 EUR/t losses are amplified substantially from 4.7% to 9.1%. This means that transition risks from prices below the ETS II cap could be approx. doubled by supply chain contagion, but at relatively low levels, hence, are unlikely to affect financial stability. In contrast, the 2030 upper bound of 2-degree compatible CO 2 prices (5-220 USD/t) could involve more substantial risks to the banking system, if firms and banks do not adapt in advance. In the pessimistic scenario, due to the failure of a systemic risk core firm, bank equity losses (blue solid line) jump to 43% (EUR 5.6 bn) at 30 EUR/t. This implies that regulators and central banks should monitor whether high systemic risk firms adapt in time to reduce the potential threats for financial stability. Overall, the contagion results show that banks are not only exposed to transition risks through their own debtors' CO 2 emissions, but also the emissions in their debtors' supply chains; for details, see SI Section S5. SI Section S6 shows that banks are exposed to climate transition risk not only from firms in high emission sectors (C, H, D or G), but also from firms in sectors with relatively small emission shares like (L and F) due to network effects. For details on how individual banks are affected in the 45 EUR/t scenario, see SI Section S5. For robustness checks with respect to supply network topology, see SI Section S4. By estimating CO 2 emissions for all Hungarian firms paying VAT, we show that future carbon pricing policies such as the EU ETS II scheme will affect 45% of all companies (which account for 70% of total sales), across all industrial sectors. Existing emissions data (ETS I) only accounts for 119 Hungarian firms, concentrated in manufacturing, utilities, and transport industries, with combined sales of 7%. The loans granted by banks to firms affected by carbon pricing exceed their CET1 capital in nearly half of the banks. CPRS-based exposure estimates [7] can substantially misestimate the CO 2estimates based exposures of banks to carbon pricing. At a carbon price of 45 EUR/t (EU ETS II 2027-2030 price cap) we find that direct economic losses are relatively small. Those firms that become unprofitable account for about 1.3% of economy-wide gross output and 1.2% of the total bank equity, which are at risk if firms do not adapt in time. A rapid carbon price introduction from 0 to 200 EUR/t (the upper bound of the CO 2 price range in 2030 compatible with 2 degree warming [5]) yields 3.8% of direct gross output and 4.7% of bank equity losses, respectively. Analyzing how firm defaults spread along supply chain networks, we find that supply chain contagion is a substantial amplification factor for transition risks caused by carbon pricing. When assuming that firms can fully substitute their inputs, gross output loss estimates are at a noticeable 5.3% at 45 EUR/t, and reach 12.3% at 200 EUR/t, while bank equity losses amount to 2.7% and 9.1% for 45 EUR/t and 200 EUR/t, respectively. Assuming that firms cannot substitute essential inputs, direct losses are amplified by factors of up to 40, as high systemic risk firms [42] default due to carbon pricing and their output can not be substituted. This pessimistic scenario particularly highlights the importance of systemically relevant firms transitioning early, in line with [46]. Simulating unlikely pessimistic scenarios in stress testing gives a more complete picture of potential risks to decision makers [54]. Importantly, our findings show that banks are not only exposed to transition risks from their debtors CO 2 emissions, but also to emissions in debtors' supply chains. This matters for banks' transition risk management strategies. The estimated economic losses presented here are short-term losses before recovery from the initial carbon pricing shock sets in and are not long-term reductions of output.
|
54018bb6-b4ca-4daf-a2af-62348528342b
| 3
|
04f11ccc-d5a7-4399-bda6-50c093d9f1ff
| 2,025
|
[
"public investment projects",
"economic recovery",
"firms",
"pandemic",
"portugal"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
recommended Portugal to implement measures to secure access to liquidity for firms in the context of the pandemic, to frontload public investment projects and to promote private investment to foster the economic recovery. Lastly, it recommended Portugal to carry out
|
bda2936f-7d6e-4881-8b9c-d4db807a63ea
| 0
|
|
04fba925-f277-4b0b-ac05-e7f2720a66a9
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.03722v2
| 2,021
|
[
"adaptation",
"technologies",
"patents",
"mitigation",
"climate"
] |
arxiv.org
|
In the analysis, we have identified and discussed major drivers of innovation in adaptation such as responses to regulation and shocks in the market, but we also highlighted a prominent role of the government stimulating the development of these technologies. Our analysis has further shown how governments can effectively stimulate the development and adoption of technologies through targeted investments in scientific and technological capacities, and we discussed how this can help enable technology transfer to countries where adaptation needs are high.
|
e7c5ec21-08e6-4ef3-84cf-6a259e7f7c53
| 109
|
05007647-50a9-42e9-8634-474450ba5c13
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
5C Municipal Solid Waste 5.00% 75.00% 1.00% 75.00% (Minor source in UK context) 5C non-fuel combustion 5.00% 50.00% 5.00% 50.00% (Minor source in UK context) 5C Small scale waste burning 300.00% (n) 100.00% (n) 300.00% (n) 100.00% (n) Activity data taken from a relatively new survey with high uncertainty (confidence in this source may improve in future years). The EF uncertainty is the default suggested in the 5C wood 300.00% (r) 50.00% 300.00% (r) 40.00% (r) (Minor source in UK context) 5D1 non-fuel combustion 10.00% 25.00% 10.00% 25.00% UK industry research and model.
|
9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902
| 107
|
05026895-e6c6-40aa-b52c-fdbea1fd3d8b
| 2,025
|
[
"non - eu parties",
"european council",
"emission reductions",
"necessary legal arrangements",
"countries"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
AAUS
Carry-over units
Any
information:
AAUs for the period 2013-2020 have not yet been determined. The EU expects to achieve its 20 % target for the period 2013-2020 with the
implementation of the ETS Directive and the ESD Decision in the non-ETS
sectors, which do not allow the use of AAUs from non-EU Parties. Other
mechanism There are general provisions in place in the EU legislation that allow for the
units under the use of such units provided that the necessary legal arrangements for the
Convention (specify) creation of such units have been put in place in the EU which is not the case at
the point in time of the provision of this report. The time-period of the Convention target is from 1990-2020, no carry-over
units will be used to achieve the 2020 target. other In December 2009, the European Council reiterated the conditional offer of
the EU to move to a 30 % reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels as part
of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012,
provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable
emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately
according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities. other market-based
mechanisms
Possible scale of None
contributions
of
|
390b6d29-c482-4dc4-a6c3-45410fb99f0d
| 0
|
|
0507d831-ce1f-44d1-a794-aa251b677706
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/the-clean-growth-strategy_af15f03cfcd3b9529c696ef513762900.pdf
| 2,018
|
[
"energy",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"government",
"million"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
If battery prices continue to fall there will be less need for Government subsidies for new vehicles in the future. We will provide support for ULEVs to help the development of a mature and self-sufficient 3. We will encourage ULEV uptake through schemes that build on our experience in delivering initiatives - for example the £40 million ‘Go Ultra Low Cities’ scheme. 4. We want to have one of the best electric vehicle (EV) charging networks in the world. We will set out our strategy to achieve this using regulation, funding and private • In addition to workplace and residential charging support, the Government has also allocated an additional £80 million to support charging infrastructure deployment, alongside £15 million from Highways England to ensure rapid charge points every 20 miles across 95 per cent of England’s Strategic Road Network225. • New powers under the Automated and Electric Vehicles Bill 226 will allow the Government to set specific requirements for the provision of EV charge points or hydrogen refuelling infrastructure at motorway service stations and large fuel retailers, as well as ensuring that charge points are convenient to access and work seamlessly right across the UK. 224 DEFRA (2017) UK plan for tackling roadside nitrogen dioxide Detailed plan. attachment_data/file/633270/air-quality-plan-detail.pdf 225 UK Parliament (2017) Electric Written question – 59924 written-question/Commons/2017-01-13/59924/ 226 Cabinet Office (2017) Queen’s Speech Background Briefing Notes 2017 Queens_speech_2017_background_notes.pdf The Government has pledged to be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than it inherited. As well as significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions, wide-scale adoption of ULEVs will improve our health and quality of life by making the air cleaner in our towns and cities. While air quality in the UK has been improving in recent decades and will continue to do so due to Government action and investment of over £3 billion in air quality and cleaner transport, there are some parts of the country where there are unacceptable levels of air pollution. Poor air quality remains the largest environmental risk to public health in the UK. The most immediate challenge is the problem of nitrogen dioxide concentrations around some roads, due mainly to conventional road vehicles, and the Government has published a plan to address this 224. As part of this plan, the Government announced a £255 million Implementation Fund to help local authorities develop and deliver targeted action to improve air quality, and committed to establishing a new Clean Air Fund. In 2018, the Government will also publish a wider Clean Air Strategy, setting out how it will significantly reduce the emissions of five damaging air pollutants by 2020 and 2030. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy • The Bill will also allow the Government to require all new charge points sold or installed in the UK to be ‘smart’ enabled. This will help shift charging away from peak times of the day, reducing demand on the electricity system and keeping • We will consider the role of regulation to accelerate the UK’s transition to widespread provision of 5. The Government has provided £4.8 million through the Hydrogen for Transport Advancement Programme to create a network of 12 hydrogen refuelling stations, and £2 million through the Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Fleet Support Scheme to increase uptake of hydrogen fuel cell cars and vans in the public and private sector. A new £23 million fund was recently announced to boost the creation of hydrogen fuel infrastructure and encourage roll-out of 6. We will announce plans for the public sector to lead the way in transitioning to zero emission vehicles, with an ambitious uptake requirement for central government and new Buying Standards to encourage procurers to choose the cleanest, low 7. We will support the uptake of low emission • The Government will provide £50 million for the Plug-in Taxi programme, which gives taxi drivers up to £7,500 off the purchase price of a new ULEV taxi, alongside £14 million to support ten local areas to deliver dedicated charge points • We will consider whether our revised best practice guidance to local taxi and private hire vehicle (PHV) licensing authorities in England should recommend zero emission capability in urban areas by 2032. In considering the Law Commission’s recommendation for national taxi and PHV standards in England, we will examine the potential for Government to make this target 227 DfT (2017) £23 million boost for hydrogen-powered vehicles and infrastructure news/23-million-boost-for-hydrogen-powered-vehicles-and-infrastructure 228 BEIS, DfT (2017) 1,000 jobs created at new £325 million factory for electric taxis news/1000-jobs-created-at-new-300-million-factory-for-electric-taxis Sue Bentley from Runcorn, “When I purchased an electric car I was the only one in my neighbourhood at that time. I believe electric vehicles are the way forward, they’re easy to run, reliable and good for the planet. Now seven people in my neighbourhood have
8. ‘Go Ultra Low’ 229 brings the Government and leading vehicle manufacturers together to explain the benefits of ULEVs to motorists and businesses, and its success has been internationally recognised. We will continue to work with industry on consumer communications on ULEVs until 9. The Government will set out further detail on a long term strategy for the UK’s transition to zero road vehicle emissions by March 2018. Enabling our Automotive Industry to Become a World Leader in Zero 10. The Automotive Council is now developing an Industrial Strategy Sector Deal, building on the £1 billion Advanced Propulsion Centre, which is seeking to establish the UK as a world leader in zero emission vehicle technologies230. The Sector Deal will aim to accelerate the transition to zero emission vehicles, complemented by Automotive Council research to determine UK priorities Developing a More Efficient and Low 11. Low emission vans and HGVs between 3.5 and 44 tonnes have been eligible since late 2016 for plug-in grants worth up to £20,000 for the first 200 vehicles bought using 12.
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[
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
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In 2019, the Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan of the Slovak Republic (NECP) for 20212030 was adopted*, processed according to Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council No.2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action. The main quantified energy and climate targets for 2030 are a Union-wide reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 40% compared to 1990 (with individual Member States setting shares according to local conditions), a binding Union-wide target of at least 32% for the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption, with a share of RES in transport of at least 14% in each Member State, a national energy efficiency contribution of at least 32.5%, and an interconnectedness of electricity grids of at least 15%. The main quantified targets of the NECP in the framework of the Slovak Republic by 2030 are the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for non-ETS sectors by 20% (the share has been increased from the originally declared level of 12%). The share of RES is set at 19.2 % for 2030 and alternatively at 20% (increased from the initially declared 18%), in both cases meeting the required target of 14% RES in transport. The elaborated measures for achieving the national energy efficiency contribution of the Slovak Republic show values slightly lower (30.3%) than the European target of 32.5%. The industry and buildings sectors will be key to achieving the targets. Electricity grid interconnection is already above 50% and will remain so in 2030, so the target of at least 15% will be met.
|
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05097134-c468-4b73-ad58-0279cf2d68ad
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.13264v1
| 2,025
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[
"Climate change",
"economic modeling",
"uncertainty",
"neural networks",
"optimal control",
"climate mitigation",
"ambiguity aversion",
"endogenous growth",
"computational complexity",
"high-dimensional problems",
"climate policy",
"technology transitions",
"numerical methods",
"model accuracy",
"computational efficiency",
"climate-economic systems",
"mitigation pathways",
"emission-free",
"policy decisions",
"uncertainty representation."
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arxiv.org
|
We compare various neural architectures within a two-network framework against finitedifference ground truth solutions. needed) maximizes welfare given by:
∞
V = � 0
e [−][ρ] log( C ) dt . 0
∞ ∞
e [−][ρ] u ( C ) dt = 0 � 0
motion of the log-value of capital j . Note that as per Îtô’s Lemma, the laws of motion in level would write:
dKL =][ +] 2 [(][σ] [L] [S L] [)][σ] [L] [W] [L] [,]
In the equation, ρ is the discount rate and Cis consumption given by:
C = Y − I,
with Y being the production and I the investment. Y is given by Y = α K . A fraction S L of the capital K is made of low-carbon capital, such that emissions are given by:
E = λα K,
where the parameter λ is the carbon intensity.
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2018/road-to-zero-strategy_0edbd980a9106685e89c39981152a569.pdf
| 2,018
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The MCTC will deliver £100 million of GVA benefit to the local economy and increase the British content of Part 2: Vehicle Supply and Demand
●● we will launch a new supply chain competitiveness and productivity improvement programme targeting areas where key businesses need to improve to programme will provide bespoke training and streamlined business processes to help build the integrated supply chain we need in the UK to manufacture the future generation of vehicles at volume. ●● work with the ONS to extend their data collection to focus on jobs and exports attributable to both low and ultra low emission vehicle technologies. Toyota have built more than four million vehicles and around five million engines and engine sets in the UK since production began in 1992. Altogether, Toyota have invested more than £2.75 billion in their two UK plants and currently employ more Toyota’s UK manufacturing plants were the first in Europe to build their full hybrid electric vehicles and engines, and in total they have produced over 650,000 hybrid electric engines and over 465,000 hybrid electric vehicles in the UK. Toyota is to produce its third generation Auris hybrid electric vehicle in the UK at its Burnaston plant. To support production of the Auris, Toyota have invested £240 million to upgrade the factory with new equipment, technologies and systems. Defra is replacing more than 400 vehicles from its car fleet with these British-built hybrid vehicles. This changeover is already under way and will continue throughout 2018. The new Toyota Auris which will be built in Burnaston The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
The focus on the developments of traction motor and power electronics technologies and capabilities could deliver significant export potential. Through the Advanced Propulsion centre as of February 2018, we are investing £79 million into circa £161 million of consortia projects led by businesses including Jaguar Land Rover, Ford, Mclaren, GKN, hofer powertrain and Ashwoods Electric Motors, to establish supply chains for the manufacture of electric machines and systems, with the aim of establishing both high and niche volume production facilities for electric vehicles in Ensuring we have the right skills Many of the skills utilised in internal combustion engine manufacturing such as stamping, machining and casting are required in the manufacture of electric motors. Investing in these workers represents a good opportunity to quickly deliver some of the skills required for manufacturing ultra low emission vehicles. However, our automotive industry will require new technical skills to meet the specific challenges of new technologies. Our Industrial Strategy sets out plans to tackle our shortage of Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths (STEM) skills, and the growing need for digital skills, through a major programme of reform. This will help ensure that our technical education system can stand alongside our world-class higher education system, and rival the best in the world, with new T levels backed by over £500 million annually by the time the programme is rolled out fully. Ultimately, though, a coordinated, industry- led approach at both national and local levels is required to provide employees with the appropriate skills to develop and manufacture the next generation of vehicles. The industry led Automotive Industrial Partnership (AIP) has identified strategic skills priorities for the automotive sector, informing new Apprenticeship Trailblazer standards and new industry wide qualifications. However, many of these qualifications will not provide the specific skills required for ultra low emission technology. There must be more focus on the skills required to establish the UK as a world-leader in the manufacture and engineering of ultra low emission vehicles. Employers must embrace the opportunity that new technology will bring and play an active role in producing the highly skilled We are reviewing whether current regulations are sufficient to protect mechanics working on electric and hybrid vehicles. We are working with the Institute of the Motor Industry (IMI) to ensure the UK’s workforce of mechanics are well trained and have the skills they need to repair these Part 2: Vehicle Supply and Demand
Our flexible labour market, competitive environment, and growing domestic demand for ULEVs – with stable and supportive policy, fiscal and legal frameworks – make us a great place to do business. However, our Industrial Strategy recognises there are areas where we need to improve to make Britain the best place to start and grow a business, and a global draw for the most innovative ●● Green finance – The Government established a Green Finance Taskforce in September 2017 to help deliver the commitments within the UK’s Industrial Strategy and Clean Growth Strategy. ●● Equity fund for green technology – The Industrial Strategy announced the Government will strengthen support for the commercialisation of new clean technologies through investments in patient capital, starting with a new equity ●● Support UK-based digital design and manufacturing – The Automotive Sector Deal sets out opportunities for the UK in the digital design and testing of new There are a number of new entrants to the automotive market. Dyson, for instance, has recently entered the global market by announcing a new electric vehicle by 151 We want to build on the example of Dyson and other companies in complementary, adjacent sectors, such as the aerospace industry, to adapt their technology and help the UK drive the transition to ultra low emission vehicles globally. The increasing domestic demand for ultra low emission vehicles also provides potential for new industries in charging The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
We remain technology neutral, but recognise that the vast majority of vehicle manufacturer plans include plug-in battery electric powertrains. This section sets out government’s role in the build-up of the supporting these electric vehicles’ (EV) charging infrastructure for passenger cars and small vans and how we will manage the wider impacts to our power system. Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles are at an earlier stage of market development.
|
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Having received two pieces of written evidence from the Minister for the Cabinet Office, then Michael Ellis, we were astounded when he subsequently refused to give evidence to us on a topic of such importance to the UK’s national security and prosperity. We note that the then Defra Minister, Steve Double, stepped in at very short notice, having been in post for only ten days. We are also very grateful to Roger Hargreaves for providing helpful and informative oral evidence on the Cabinet Office’s behalf. Their actions only serve to underscore what a dereliction of duty it was for Mr Ellis to refuse to appear before us—not only in relation to his willingness to be accountable to Parliament, but also in what it suggests about his commitment to deliver for the public that he serves. We can only hope that his successor will take more interest in this vital Lack of ownership and accountability 68. A number of witnesses stressed the importance of a more joined-up Government approach to climate adaptation and CNI resilience; the infrastructure interdependencies outlined in Chapter 2 make this all the more important, given the high risk of unanticipated, ‘cascading’ failures. Unfortunately, the evidence that we considered suggested that such join-up is currently poor. For 119 Correspondence with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Minister for the Cabinet Office relating to oral evidence on the impact of climate change on infrastructure , dated 29 June and 27 June 2022, published
31 Readiness for storms ahead? Critical national infrastructure in an age of climate change • Professor Richard Dawson told us that “there is fragmentation in tackling a lot of these risks across government”, and called for more “joined-up oversight, because a lot of the risks are in danger of falling through some of the gaps”, particularly in relation to interdependencies.120 • The Environment Agency told us that “Infrastructure interdependencies and the potential for cascading climate risks are poorly understood”, and that “There needs to be greater clarity of the roles and responsibilities of state and non state players”.121 It also noted that there is “good work” on climate adaptation in individual departments, but it is “generally ad hoc”. • The Adaptation Committee’s latest Independent Assessment, which was accepted by the Government, found that “Siloed thinking remains a problem for addressing climate change risks or opportunities that interact or are subject to cascading impacts, or where adaptation responsibility falls across more than one • The CCC noted recently that climate adaptation was missing from key policy documents, such as the Levelling Up White Paper, and argued that it needed to be embedded and integrated properly “across the policy landscape”.123 • Sir John Armitt argued that the departmental structure incentivises against coordination, noting that “You get more brownie points for succeeding as a divisional boss than you do for co-operating across your colleagues”, and said that the regular change in Ministers exacerbates this issue.124 69. The evidence that we outline below suggests that these concerns were not misplaced. Perhaps the most damning evidence in support of our assessment, however, is the Government’s abject failure to deliver on the CCC’s adaptation recommendations. In 2021, it set 82 recommendations for actions to progress adaptation prior to the publication of the next National Adaptation Plan; of those, only five crosscutting recommendations had been achieved by July 2022, and none of the recommendations specifically focussed on adaptation had been implemented in full.125 Shockingly, the CCC found that the UK has moved backwards in the last five years, with a widened gap between future levels of risk and planned adaptation.126 Ministerial and departmental ownership 70. At the first oral evidence session for this inquiry, we asked our expert witnesses to identify the Minister responsible for CNI resilience to climate change. None of them were able to give a clear answer. Dr Will Lang from the Met Office “I do not believe there 120 Q8 (Professor Richard Dawson) 121 Environment Agency ( NIC0014) 122 Climate Change Committee, Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk : Advice to Government for the UK’s third Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3), June 2021 123 Climate Change Committee, Progress in reducing emissions, 2022 Report to Parliament, p.28, June 2022 125 Climate Change Committee, Progress in reducing emissions, 2022 Report to Parliament, p.506, June 2022 126 Climate Change Committee, Progress in reducing emissions, 2022 Report to Parliament , June 2022
Readiness for storms ahead? Critical national infrastructure in an age of climate change 32 is a single Minister with the specific responsibility for CNI resilience to climate change”.127 The Government also seemed to struggle to identify the relevant Ministers to give evidence 71. This confusion may stem from the ill-defined allocation of responsibilities for CNI resilience and climate adaptation across Government. Although Defra is the lead Government department for climate adaptation, the Cabinet Office is the overall departmental lead on the resilience of CNI, and it designates a lead Government department (LGD) for each of the 13 CNI sectors. With Cabinet Office support, LGDs are responsible for “resourcing and overseeing levels of preparedness to the potential consequences of each risk” in the National Security Risk Assessment.128 Relevant departments also produce National Policy Statements for England and relevant reserved matters, to guide significant infrastructure project decisions (e.g. on ports and waste water), including adaptation 72. Michael Ellis told us in written evidence that he was the lead Government Minister for resilience and security, and “accordingly for CNI resilience”, but that each sector has a minister who “remains accountable for the security and resilience of their respective sector”.130 At the final evidence session, we pressed Government witnesses on which department and Minister held responsibility for the interdependencies between CNI sectors. Robert Mason from Defra told us that his team was responsible for “picking out the interdependencies” between sectors in relation to climate adaptation, and in “getting individual risk owners for all those risks and for departments to take responsibility”.
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The UK is a strong supporter of the GCF having committed £720 Million for the initial resource mobilisation period, and is committed to ensuring that the GCF delivers maximum impacts in the developing countries it supports. The GCF funds transformational projects with a strong focus on leveraging private finance, with a commitment to provide 50% of its resources for mitigation and 50% for adaptation. At least 50% of its adaptation support will be provided to particularly vulnerable countries including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African States. In the past year, the GCF has made significant progress in terms of programming, tightening its policy framework, and building the Secretariat’s capacity. So far, the GCF has committed $2.65 billion of funding to 54 projects, representing a balanced geographical and thematic split, with over 50% of funds going to private sector projects, and over $400 million to Small Island Developing Progress has also been made on enhancing direct access to finance, with the agreement in 2017 to pilot a Simplified Approvals Process for projects with up to $10 million of GCF financing, and the ongoing work to facilitate increased proposals from direct access entities which saw nine new direct access entities accredited to the GCF in 2017 . The Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme set up by the GCF also aims to facilitate the activity of the Fund, recognising the need to support direct access entities in their applications and to assist countries with related processes under the UNFCCC such as the preparation of National Adaptation Plans. Over $40 million of GEF funds have been approved for readiness activities, with 60 countries benefitting from this support to date. 6.4.1.2 The Global Environment Facility The UK is a long-standing contributor to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to fund projects and activities providing not only climate change benefits, but also tackling broader environmental issues such as biodiversity and land degradation. The GEF is a funding mechanism for five UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants; Minamata Convention on Mercury; UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) as well as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Programmes are implemented through 18 partners including multilateral development banks, UN agencies, and NGOs. The GEF budget is replenished on 4-yearly cycles and a total of 39 countries contribute. The current sixth replenishment period (2014-2018) has a budget of $4.43 billion. The UK is contributing £210 million in total to GEF-6. Since its creation in 1991, GEF has implemented 1,010 climate change mitigation projects contributing to 2.7 billion tonnes of greenhouse gas emission reductions, equivalent of taking 560 million cars off the road each year. It has also led to the creation of 3,300 protected areas, covering more than, 860 million hectares, an area
Chapter 6 – Financial Assistance and Support for Technologies 219 6.4.1.3 Climate Investment Funds The UK is the largest investor in the $8.3 billion Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), having invested £1252.9 million between 2011/12 and 2016/17 , to pilot low-emission and climate resilient development through projects implemented by the multilateral development banks. The CIFs now operate across 72 countries and have a total portfolio of 310 projects. CIFs finance is enabling the building of the equivalent of over a quarter of the current global installed geothermal and concentrated solar power. The projects are unlocking finance flows in the green markets of developing countries and are expected to generate $58 billion of co-financing. The CIFs are comprised of four key programmes, and we detail in the below sections how UK ICF support contributes to each of these programmes individually. 6.4.2 activities undertaken by the public and private sectors to finance The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), setting national targets for reducing emissions towards the common ‘well below 2°C’ increase goal. The UK’s mitigation efforts seek to help meet the financing challenge of realising these emissions reductions by reducing risks to private investment, halting deforestation and accelerating technological change at scale. The UK is using its International Climate Finance to effect “transformational change” through targeted investment in innovative projects with the potential to be scaled up and replicated by others, and by tackling barriers that hold the private sector back from investing. This section describes some of the initiatives and actions that the UK is undertaking to support decarbonisation activities in developing countries. Through and beyond these examples, the UK also aims to raise capacity in countries and build on the UK’s low carbon experience and expertise. Further examples of how the UK is enabling in country capacity are set out in section 5 of this chapter.. 6.4.2.4 Accelerating technological change at scale Raising ambition and accelerating the rate of decarbonisation is critical to achieving global climate goals. There has been a rapid shift towards renewable energy over the last few years. Sectors such as transport, buildings, urban planning, and energy efficiency offer significant potential to reduce emissions while delivering major economic, health and environmental benefits, but are not yet on a pathway consistent with the well below 2°C goal. The UK’s ICF is supporting developing countries to achieve economic growth in a sustainable way. Access to affordable, reliable and sustainable modern energy is central to this. Interventions are being supported at the regional, national, sub-national or sectoral level through UK bilateral and multilateral support.
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L1513
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|
With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified. (37)
Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to ensure a single market for fuel for road transport and non-road mobile machinery and ensure respect for minimum levels of environmental protection in the use of that fuel, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. (38)
Directives 98/70/EC and 2009/28/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
Amendments to Directive 98/70/EC
Directive 98/70/EC is amended as follows:
(1)
In Article 2, the following points are added:
10. renewable liquid and gaseous transport fuels of non-biological origin means liquid or gaseous fuels other than biofuels whose energy content comes from renewable energy sources other than biomass, and which are used in transport;
11. starch-rich crops means crops comprising mainly cereals (regardless of whether only the grains are used or the whole plant, such as in the case of green maize, is used), tubers and root crops (such as potatoes, Jerusalem artichokes, sweet potatoes, cassava and yams), and corm crops (such as taro and cocoyam);
12. low indirect land-use change-risk biofuels means biofuels, the feedstocks of which were produced within schemes which reduce the displacement of production for purposes other than for making biofuels and which were produced in accordance with the sustainability criteria for biofuels set out in Article 7b;
13. processing residue means a substance that is not the end product(s) that a production process directly seeks to produce; it is not a primary aim of the production process and the process has not been deliberately modified to produce it;
14. agricultural, aquaculture, fisheries and forestry residues means residues that are directly generated by agriculture, aquaculture, fisheries and forestry; they do not include residues from related industries or processing.
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These loans are intended to provide the capital cost of energy efficiency retrofit work and other measures to be installed. These loans have a payback period of five years (eight for schools) during which the repayments are met with the energy bill savings from the energy efficiency measures.
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Revenue support for projects such as industrial carbon capture and low carbon hydrogen production is critical for the net zero transition. In the long term, cost reductions in low carbon technologies, coupled with a sustainable increase in the carbon price and a thriving market for low carbon products will make decarbonisation economically viable without subsidy. The government has already supported the early stages of project development in clusters through the Industrial Decarbonisation Challenge. We will continue to support the initial deployment of low-carbon technologies to provide a solid foundation to reduce the Support initial deployment of decarbonisation infrastructure To support the deployment of low carbon infrastructure in clusters we • invest an additional £40 million through the Industrial Decarbonisation Challenge • £172 million to demonstrate and validate at-scale decarbonisation through the UKRI-led Industrial Decarbonisation Challenge
• £8 million for clusters to develop comprehensive blueprints to achieve net zero • £20 million for the development of an Industrial Decarbonisation Research and Innovation Centre, to accelerate challenge-led research and transformative • support the deployment of infrastructure at two carbon capture clusters by the mid- 2020s through the £1 billion CCS Infrastructure Fund. A further two clusters will be supported to deployment by 2030 • deploy a £240 million Net Zero Hydrogen Fund for capital co-investment in new low • the Cluster Sequencing Market Engagement document published in February 2021 sets out a potential approach to determining the deployment sequence of CCUS clusters and for allocating CCUS programme support including the CCS Infrastructure Fund, NZHF and CCUS and hydrogen business model support. We are aiming to seek views on the proposals through the consultation process • where possible, seek to optimise the re-use of existing oil and gas infrastructure to reduce the overall costs of CCUS projects Secure revenue mechanism for companies investing in low carbon infrastructure As set out in the Ten Point Plan and Energy White Paper, we • bring forward details in 2021 of a revenue mechanism to bring through private sector investment into industrial carbon capture and hydrogen projects via our new business models to support these projects Address barriers to deployment of shared infrastructure To help address the barriers to deploying shared infrastructure, in 2021 we • as part of Project Speed, the new infrastructure taskforce, determine how the efficiency of the planning system can be improved to deploy low carbon • engage clusters to determine whether there are non-physical infrastructure requirements to enable the deployment of shared infrastructure and the potential role Support a range of decarbonisation projects In addition to supporting deployment of shared infrastructure, we will also support decarbonisation of specific sites and sectors by deploying other funds that will result in
• deploy £315 million of funding for energy efficiency and decarbonisation projects13 • deploy the £66 million Transforming Foundation Industries Challenge to reduce energy and resource in the UK’s foundation industries • develop a policy framework to facilitate greater resource efficiency in industry • seek to incentivise industry to practice industrial symbiosis Funding innovative projects is an important tool for us to develop, demonstrate and reduce the costs of industrial decarbonisation technologies. We are funding industrial fuel switching solutions, CCUS technologies, and energy efficiency projects. The outcomes from funding these projects will be an increased uptake of industrial decarbonisation technologies by UK industry; improved effectiveness of targeted funding since more viable technologies are available; and the increased likelihood of achieving our To ensure industrial decarbonisation technologies exist that increase the likelihood of achieving this we need to deploy funds to innovative projects now and in the future across a number of different technologies, sectors and locations. 13 £289 million of which will be delivered by BEIS in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through the Industrial Energy Transformation Fund. The remainder will be delivered by the Scottish Government in Scotland through the Scottish IETF. Develop, demonstrate and reduce the costs of industrial decarbonisation technologies through government funded competitions • as part of the £1 billion Net Zero Innovation Portfolio develop and deploy industrial innovation funding competitions in areas like industrial fuel switching, CCUS innovation, and industrial energy efficiency • support research and innovation through the Industrial Decarbonisation Research Supporting industry in deploying the low carbon technologies that will reduce the embedded carbon in industrial products is a key activity to reach net zero. The cost of deploying these technologies needs to be shared between government, industry and consumers of industrial products. In most cases, low carbon industrial products will be more expensive than their higher carbon alternative initially. Although research suggests that the price increase on final products will be relatively low, (Energy Transition Commission, Mission Possible, 2018) there is still a risk that low carbon industry could be undercut by cheaper high carbon imports, especially since many purchasing decisions are driven by price. Currently, there is not sufficient demand for low carbon products, and the public do not have access to information about the environmental impact of the products they buy, even if they were willing to pay more for them. In the long-term, it is our ambition that deployment of low carbon technologies does not require public subsidy. To get to this stage, we must both reduce the costs of decarbonisation technology and create demand for low carbon products. Put in place long-term, sustainable business models to support investment in industrial decarbonisation technologies To support investment in industrial decarbonisation technologies we • publish an update in the second quarter of 2021 and finalise, by 2022, the commercial framework to incentivise deployment of industry carbon capture by the mid-2020s • seek to stimulate private sector investment in low carbon hydrogen deployment by development of a low carbon hydrogen business model.
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
More detail on the The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 as an international agreement in response to the threat of climate change. Countries that have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol are legally bound to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by an agreed amount. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was from 2008 to 2012. A single European Union Kyoto Protocol reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions of -8% compared to base- year levels was negotiated for the first commitment period, and a Burden Sharing Agreement allocated the target between Member States of the European Union. Under this agreement, the UK reduction target was -12.5% on base-year levels. The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol applies from 2013 to 2020 inclusive. For this second commitment period the EU, the Member States and Iceland communicated an independent quantified economy-wide emission reduction target of a 20 percent emission reduction by 2020 compared with 1990 levels (base year) (‘the EU2020 target’). The EU2020 target is based on the understanding that it will be fulfilled jointly by the European Union, the Member States, the UK (including its relevant Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories) and Iceland. Under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK remains committed to its shared target and reporting with the EU under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, including any further requirements for the conclusion of the true-up period. 3.2.1 EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package and the Kyoto Protocol Under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 2013 to 2020, the EU (and participating non-EU Member States) has a collective target to reduce its emissions by 20% relative to 1990 levels by 2020. In 2009 the EU established sub-targets through the 2020 climate and energy package13, which underpins the implementation of the 2020 target under the Convention. A 20% reduction of total GHG emissions from 1990 levels is equivalent to a 14% reduction compared to 2005 levels. This 14% reduction objective is divided between the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sectors. These two 12 The UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution communication to the service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/943618/uk-2030-ndc.pdf 13 EU 2020 Climate and Energy Package
422 8th National Communication • A 21% r eduction in emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS compared to 2005 levels, which includes emissions from the power and industrial sectors, and since 2012 has included international aviation within the European eduction in emissions from ESD sectors compared to 2005 levels, including buildings, agriculture, waste and transport not covered by the EU ETS. The ESD target is distributed between Member States, and participating non-EU Member States, to reflect national circumstances, requirements for economic growth and scope for further emissions reductions. Each Member State has a national emission target for non- ETS sectors for 2020, which have been translated into binding quantified Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs) for the period 2013–2020. Member State (and participating non-EU Member State) emissions from the traded sector are managed centrally by the Union and are not counted towards individual targets, as set out in the EU’s joint fulfilment agreement for the Doha Amendment. Therefore, only the ESD sectors and a subset of LULUCF emissions are counted towards EU Member State targets under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. the distinction between EU and UK international targets for 2020. All 2020 targets have been set using Global Warming Potential values from the IPCC’s fourth Assessment Report (AR4). argets under the Effort Sharing Directive and Kyoto Protocol Under the ESD, the UK has a target of reducing its total emissions to around 16% below the 2005 level by 2020 for non-ETS sectors. The UK’s Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs) 14, and subsequently adjusted in 201315 to ensure consistency with the enlarged EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) scope for 2013-2020. In August 2017, the AEAs for 2017-2020 were updated 16 to ensure consistency with the latest international guidelines and methodologies for reporting emissions. The UK’s AEAs follow a declining path from 358.7 MtCO2e in 2013, to 350.9 MtCO2e in 2020, giving an allocated emission level for the entire commitment period of 2,830.5 MtCO2e17. 14 European Commission Decision 2013/162/EU 15 Initial AEA calculations were revised in Commission Decision 2013/634/EU due to changes in the scope of the EU 16 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1471 of 10 August 2017 amending Decision 2013/162/EU to revise Member States’ annual emission allocations for the period from 2017 to 2020 (notified under document C(2017) 5556): 17 do?languageCode=en&esdRegistry=GB&esdYear=&search=Search¤tSortSettings=
Annex 1: UKs Fifth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC 423 The initial allocated emissions total for the non-ETS sectors in the UK (2,743.4 MtCO2e) was used to calculate the UK’s Assigned Amount for the second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol. The calculation of the UK’s Assigned Amount is set out in UK’s Initial Report for the second commitment period, and results in an Assigned Amount of 2,744,937,332 assigned amount units (AAUs) where one AAU is equivalent to one tCO AAUs for CP2 were issued to the UK Registry in 2021. For the Kyoto Protocol, the UK’s base year for assessing CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions is 1990, and the UK has chosen to use 1995 as the base year for emissions of the F HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3. This is in line with most EU Member States, and in accordance with Article 3.8 of the Kyoto Protocol. geographical, aviation and LULUCF coverage. Target year or period 2020 2020 (Second commitment Emissions reduction target 20% reduction on base year 20% cut in greenhouse gas Base year 1990 1990, but subject to flexibility rules.
|
e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96
| 186
|
053272dd-a311-41c4-ba13-33b210b8f0fa
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf
| 2,021
|
[
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
5 years to deliver a bold future vision for cycling and walking,
Part 2: The plan in commitments, actions, and timings Cycling and walking can help us tackle some of the most challenging issues we face as a society, not just climate change, but improving air quality, health and wellbeing, addressing inequalities, and tackling congestion and noise pollution on our roads. Increased levels of active travel can improve everyday life for us all.
|
b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77
| 108
|
0532d3f0-bb37-41a4-ab9c-18011677d274
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.21147v1
| 2,025
|
[
"Wildfires",
"Ecosystems",
"Biodiversity",
"Climate Change",
"Risk Management",
"Technology",
"Deep Learning",
"Spatio-temporal data",
"Weather data",
"Prediction",
"Contrastive learning",
"Latent representations",
"Morphology",
"Curriculum learning",
"Patch sizes",
"Experimental analysis",
"Mediterranean",
"Hydrological risks",
"Toxic emissions."
] |
arxiv.org
|
The secondary aim is to examine the influence of the geographical area size on the quality of the predictions. In the CL framework, we evaluate four distinct configurations: the triplet-marginal loss approach Eq. using standard label-based sampling, alongside our historical and curriculum sampling methods, and the modern Supervised Contrastive Loss Eq. using labelbased sampling. We then examine two potential classification frameworks. In the first framework, we model the dynamics of the central cell within a specified area using all adjacent cells as sources of contextual information, the FireCube dataset. Conversely, in the second framework, we aim to model the dynamics of all points within the area, thus requiring the model to accommodate a more complex data distribution, the Calabria dataset. To evaluate the influence of contextual information on prediction accuracy, we conducted experiments using various patch sizes. Beginning with the 25 × 25 patch size as utilized in, we progressively decreased the dimensions to define three additional scenarios, maintaining fixed the center cell: 15 × 15, 5 × 5, and 1 × 1. For each specified patch size, all models were retrained from the initial state. In this study, the model LOAN introduced in serves as the reference baseline, modified slightly to fit smaller patch sizes. These architectural modifications are consistently employed across all models implementing CL methodologies. We also select two recent larger models that employ the selfattention mechanism to capture spatiotemporal dependencies. We perform a comparative analysis with recent transformer-based mod
̸
where Bis the batch size, P ( i ) the set of indices of all positive samples for the anchor sample i according to its label and τ the temperature parameter that controls the scaling of the similarities computed by the dot product. In our proposed sampling strategy, we opted for using a tripletloss, as it promises improved optimization of relative distances and higher discriminative capability by employing a margin. In general, contrastive loss functions on pairwise comparisons aiming to reduce the distance between an anchor and a positive example while increasing the distance between the anchor and a negative example. However, it does not rigorously ensure that the negative example is adequately distant from the anchor compared to the positive example. In contrast, triplet-loss engages with a triplet of samples and should guarantee that the distance between the anchor and the positive example is less than the distance between the anchor and the negative example by at least by a specified margin. The objective function used for the training is then defined as:
L CE ( y, ˆ y ) + γ ∗L CL ( z d [a] [, z] d [p] [, z] d [n] [)]
where L CE represents the binary cross-entropy, L CL is one between LT Land L SCL, and γ = |L CE |/|L CL | for |L CL | > 0, and 0 otherwise. This γ adequately scales the contribution of the contrastive term to match the magnitude of the primary target of the learning which is L CE . 4.3 Sampling strategies
The main complexity in implementing the CL approach in this context stems from the significant variation in dynamic features among patches sharing the same labels, attributable to inherent differences in the nature of the areas covered. Consequently, the model must reconcile these disparities within closely related latent representations. Experimental results indicate that this leads to the acquisition of noisier latent representations, thereby reducing the overall model performance. To mitigate this, we propose restricting the sampling following two distinct approaches: historical and curriculum sampling. The historical sampling limits the sampling to patches within the history of the anchor or its closest neighbors . It is worth to notice that, with this strategy, we are focusing solely on patches with positive events to construct historical sets, we thus significantly reduce the volume of data available for training. Without appropriate countermeasures, this reduction could negatively impact the training process and result in suboptimal performance. Thus, we also propose a curriculum-based strategy to sample patches according to their morphological similarity to the anchor. We use the term curriculum for this sampling strategy, since we progressively sample patches that are different from the anchor using a score function f score ( x [i] s [, x] [j] s [)] between the normalized version of x [i] s [and] [ x] [j] s [. The primary advantage] of employing similarity-based sampling lies in its ability to leverage the entire dataset for the construction of positive and negative sample pairs. Additional details in Appendix A of the Supplementary Material. 2 We had to include closest neighbors due to the scarcity of different versions of positive patches in the studied datasets. Table 1. Average Difference over Dynamic Features from the FireCube dataset computed using triplets chosen solely based on label data, triplets selected through our historical methodology, and finally through our curriculum methodology. Avg. Anchor-Positive Diff ( ↓ ) Avg. Anchor-Negative Diff ( ↑ ) ratio ( ↑ ) Feature Resolution Feature Name Label Historical Curriculum Label Historical Curriculum Label Hist.
|
ad90efd0-8172-4fc8-a270-0d29dbf3a921
| 12
|
05355c44-1c30-4150-8eac-b8a8fbc910f8
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0628
| 2,005
|
[
"Transport",
"Electricity and heat",
"Renewables"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Therefore, the emphasis of this action plan is on first-generation biofuels. ANNEX 8 Biofuels: progress at national level
Member State | Market share 2003 | National indicative target for 2005 | Targeted increase, 2003-2005 |
AT | 0.06% | 2.5% | +2.44% |
BE | 0 | 2% | +2% |
CY | 0 | 1% | +1% |
CZ | 1.12% | 3.7% (2006) | + 1.72% (assuming linear path) |
DK | 0 | 0% | +0% |
EE | 0 | 2% | +2% |
FI | 0.1% | 0.1% | +0% |
FR | 0.68% | 2% | +1.32% |
DE | 1.18% | 2% | +0.82% |
GR | 0 | 0.7% | +0.7% |
HU | 0 | 0.4-0.6% | +0.4-0.6% |
IE | 0 | 0.06% | +0.06% |
IT | 0.5% | 1% | +0,5% |
LA | 0.21% | 2% | +1.79% |
LI | 0 (assumed) | 2% | +2% |
LU | 0 (assumed) | not yet reported, assume 0 | not yet reported |
MT | 0.02% | 0.3% | +0.28% |
NL | 0.03% | 2% (2006) | +0% (promotional measures will come into force from January 2006) |
PL | 0.49% | 0.5% | +0.01% |
PT | 0 | 2% | +2% |
SK | 0.14% | 2% | +1.86% |
SI | 0 (assumed) | 0.65% | +0.65% |
ES | 0.76% | 2% | +1.24% |
SV | 1.32% | 3% | +1.68% |
UK | 0.03% | 0.3% | +0.27% |
EU25 | 0.6% | 1.4% | +0.8% |
Sources
2003 : National reports under the biofuels directive except Belgium: Eurostat (figure for 2002) and Italy: EurObserv Er. 2005 : National reports under the biofuels directive. National reports under the biofuels directive are available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/legislation/biofuels_en.htm
ANNEX 9 Implementing the biofuels directive: fuel tax exemptions and biofuel obligations
Member States are using two main tools to implement the Biofuels Directive: tax exemptions and biofuels obligations. Tax exemptions
Member States make a good deal of use of fiscal policy to promote biofuels. The energy taxation directive establishes the framework for the consequent tax exemptions. Under Article 16 of this Directive, Member States can reduce taxes on biofuels or completely exempt them from taxes, without needing the Commission s prior approval (on fiscal grounds), as long as they respect certain strict conditions. The tax reduction or exemption cannot exceed the amount of tax which would otherwise be payable on the volume of biofuel present in the product that is eligible for the reduction. In addition, it should be emphasised that the tax reductions or exemptions introduced by Member States must be modified in line with changes in the price of raw materials, in order to ensure that the reductions do not lead to overcompensation of the additional costs of biofuel production. The fiscal advantage (exemption or reduction) granted to a fuel of renewable origin cannot exceed the difference between this fuel and an equivalent fossil fuel. These fiscal measures no longer need the prior, unanimous approval of other Member States.
|
4d97d3b3-afe5-45f2-8123-6e37d1fdc0fe
| 59
|
053a301a-b6e8-4002-98b2-268a8450b306
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0296
| 2,000
|
[
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
1.(13) Whereas Council Resolution of 19 June 1998 called for a programme of complementary common and co-ordinated measures, such as improved dynamic energy efficiency standards.(14) Whereas an effective enforcement system is necessary to ensure that the Directive is implemented properly, guarantees fair conditions of competition for producers and protects consumer rights;(15) Whereas regard should be had to the Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking (40), which are intended to be used in the technical harmonisation directives;(40) OJ L 220 of 30.8.1993, p. 23.(16) Whereas in the interest of international trade, international standards should be used wherever appropriate; whereas the electricity consumption of a ballast is defined by the European Committee for Standardisation Standard EN 50294 of July 1998, which is based on international standards;(17) Whereas ballasts for fluorescent lighting complying with the energy efficiency requirements of this Directive must bear the \"CE\" marking and associated information, in order to enable them to move freely;(18) Whereas this Directive is confined to ballasts for fluorescent lighting, supplied by mains electricity;(19) Whereas it did not prove possible to achieve the same objectives of the present proposal through a negotiated agreement with the European association of ballast manufacturers: CELMA, due to the high level of imports into the Community marketHAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:Article 1This Directive shall apply to new electric mains-operated ballasts for fluorescent lighting sources as defined in Annex I and referred to hereafter as \"ballasts\".However ballasts to be exported from the Community either as individual parts or as parts of luminaires shall be excluded.Article 21. Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that ballasts covered by this Directive can be placed on the Community market and put into service only if the power consumption of the ballast in question is less than or equal to the maximum allowable power consumption value for its category as calculated according to the procedures defined in Annex I.2. The manufacturer of a ballast covered by this Directive, its authorised representative established in the Community or the person responsible for placing the ballast on the Community market shall be responsible for ensuring that each ballast placed on the market conforms with the requirement referred to in paragraph 1.Article 31. Member States may not prohibit, restrict or impede the placing on the market or the putting into service in their territory of ballasts which bear the \"CE\" marking attesting to their conformity with all the provisions of this Directive.2. Unless they have evidence to the contrary, Member States shall presume that ballasts bearing the \"CE\" marking required under Article 5 comply with all the provisions of this Directive.3. (a) Where ballasts are subject to other directives covering other aspects which also provide for affixing of the \"CE\" marking, the latter shall indicate that the ballasts in question are also presumed, unless evidence to the contrary exists, to conform to the provisions of those other directives. (b) However, where one or more of these directives allows the manufacturer, during a transitional period, to choose which rules to apply, the \"CE\" marking shall indicate conformity solely with the provisions of those directives applied by the manufacturer. In this case, the reference numbers of the directives applied, as published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, must be given in the documents, notices or instructions accompanying the ballasts. (c) When ballasts are exported from the Community either as individual parts or as parts of luminaires this must be clearly indicated by manufacturer, its authorised representative established in the Community or the person responsible for placing the ballasts on the Community market in the documents, notices or instructions accompanying the ballasts.Article 4The conformity assessment procedures and the obligation relating to the \"CE\" marking of ballasts are laid down in Annex II.Article 51. When ballasts are placed on the market, they must bear the \"CE\" marking, which shall consist of the initials \"CE\". The form of the marking to be used is shown in Annex III. The \"CE\" marking shall be affixed visibly, legibly and indelibly to ballasts and, where appropriate, to the packaging.2. The affixing on ballasts of any markings which are likely to mislead third parties as to the meaning and form of the \"CE\" marking shall be prohibited. Any other marking may be affixed to the ballasts, their packaging, the instruction sheet or other documents, provided that the \"CE\" marking remains clearly visible and legible.Article 61. Where a Member State establishes that the \"CE\" marking has been affixed improperly, the manufacturer or his authorised representative established within the Community shall be obliged to bring the product into conformity and to end the infringement in accordance with the conditions imposed by the Member State. Where neither the manufacturer nor his authorised representative is established within the Community, the person who places the ballasts on the Community market shall undertake these obligations.2. Where the product continues not to be in conformity, the Member State shall take all necessary measures pursuant to Article 7 to restrict or prohibit the placing on the market of the product in question or to ensure that it is withdrawn from the market.Article 71. Any decision taken pursuant to this Directive which contains a restriction on the placing on the market of ballasts shall state the precise grounds on which it is based. The party concerned shall be notified without delay of the decision and shall be informed at the same time of the possibilities and time limits regarding the legal remedies available to it under the laws in force in the Member State in question.2.
|
32052901-ad2a-47ed-b5cf-9f7be7d4370f
| 14
|
053bc650-4cfd-4dcd-a53d-15748f12b19d
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
The following paragraph 6 shall be added to Article 10
6. The 5,0 mgkm emission limit for mass of particulate matter referred to in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex I shall be effec-
tive from the applicable dates set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. The 4,5 mgkm emission limit for mass of particulate matter and the particle number limit referred to in Tables 1 and 2
of Annex I shall be effective from 1 September 2011 for the type-approval on new types of vehicles and from 1 January
2013 for all new vehicles sold, registered or put into service in the Community. 2. Tables 1 and 2 of Annex I are replaced by the following tables
Table 1
Euro 5 Emission Limits
Limit values
Reference mass
RM
kg
Mass of carbon mon-
oxide
CO
Mass of total hydrocar-
bons
THC
Mass of non-
methane hydrocar-
bons
NMHC
Mass of oxides of
nitrogen
NOx
Combined mass of
hydrocarbons and
oxides of nitrogen
THC NOx
Mass of particulate
matter 1
PM
Number of particles 2
P
L1
mgkm
L2
mgkm
L3
mgkm
L4
mgkm
L2 L4
mgkm
L5
mgkm
L6
km
Category
Class
PI
CI
PI
CI
M
N1
RM 1 305
1 305 RM 1 760
1 760 RM
All
I
II
III
All
Key PI Positive Ignition, CI Compression Ignition
1 A revised measurement procedure shall be introduced before the application of the 4,5 mgkm limit value. 2 A new measurement procedure shall be introduced before the application of the limit value. 3 Positive ignition particulate mass standards shall apply only to vehicles with direct injection engines. 1 000
1 000
1 810
2 270
2 270
100
100
130
160
160
500
500
630
740
740
N2
PI
68
68
90
108
108
CI
PI
60
60
75
82
82
CI
180
180
235
280
280
PI
CI
230
230
295
350
350
PI 3
CI
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
5,04,5
PI
CI
6,0 x 1011
6,0 1011
6,0 1011
6,0 1011
6,0 1011
Table 2
Euro 6 Emission Limits
Limit values
Reference mass
RM
kg
Mass of carbon mon-
oxide
CO
Mass of total hydrocar-
bons
THC
Mass of non-
methane hydrocar-
bons
NMHC
Mass of oxides of
nitrogen
NOx
Combined mass of
hydrocarbons and
oxides of nitrogen
THC NOx
Mass of particulate
matter 1
PM
Number of particles 2
P
L1
mgkm
L2
mgkm
L3
mgkm
L4
mgkm
L2 L4
mgkm
L5
mgkm
L6
km
L
1
9
9
1
3
0
E
N
O
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
U
n
o
n
i
Category
Class
PI
CI
PI
CI
M
N1
N2
1 000
1 000
1 810
2 270
2 270
RM 1 305
1 305 RM 1 760
1 760 RM
All
I
II
III
All
Key PI Positive Ignition, CI Compression Ignition
1 A revised measurement procedure shall be introduced before the application of the 4,5 mgkm limit value. 2 A number standard is to be defined for this stage for positive ignition vehicles.
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 413
|
054051fc-716a-4d1f-b500-0f193683484a
| 2,025
|
[
"legislative decree",
"tariffs",
"distribution companies",
"natural gas consumption",
"del.aut.en.el"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
9. Coverage of the costs for the realization of the projects. 1. [Pursuant to art. 23, paragraph 4, of the legislative decree 23 May 2000, n. 164, and taking into account the provisions of law no. 481, the costs incurred by the distribution companies for the realization of the projects in the manner set out in art. 8, can be covered, if they involve a reduction in natural gas consumption and limited to the part not covered by other resources, on the components of the tariffs for the transport and distribution of natural gas, according to criteria established by the Electricity Authority and gas. The costs incurred by the distribution companies for the realization of the projects in the manner set out in art. 8 may be covered, if they involve a reduction in electricity consumption and limited to the part not covered by other resources, on the components of tariffs for the transport and distribution of electricity, according to criteria established by the Electricity Authority and gas **] 04. (13) See, also, the Del.Aut.en.el. and gas 16 December 2004, n. 219/04.
|
1e247860-305c-40dc-8c12-fe302e85784b
| 0
|
|
05428994-7c83-4192-bf34-efdda44944f1
|
https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf
| 2,000
|
[
"Industry",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
www.odyssee-mure.eu
|
This includes for example the establishment
of minimum criteria in terms of efficient fleet management so as to grant licences to collective
passenger and goods transport companies, economic incentives for audits and the
conduction of training campaigns aimed at professionals of transport fleets, as well as the
definition and grant of the suitable accreditation to all those firms having an efficient fleet
system management in their organisation. Car Sharing
Energy efficiency of passenger transport can also be improved through soft measures such
as limiting the number of trips made or making car journeys more efficiency by utilising the
maximising the capacity of passengers by car journey, i.e. car sharing. Belgium is trying to incentivise car sharing through measures such as reserving a lane of
traffic to make car sharing more attractive commuters travelling by car represent 20 to 30
of road traffic. The highway code was modified in 2003 to allow the road system manager to
reserve a lane of traffic not only to public transport vehicles, but also to private vehicles
occupied by more than one passenger. France introduced the car club, which is defined as making a fleet of motorised land
transport vehicles available to subscribing users on a shared basis. Each subscriber may
have access to a vehicle, without a driver, for the journey of his or her choice and for a
limited period. A car club label is currently being defined at national level and will be the
subject of a decree stating the terms of its award and use. Town hall authorities may reserve
parking spaces for vehicles with this label. A CERTU study concerns mechanisms for
encouraging the use of alternatives to private cars in European countries, including car clubs. The study has been finalised but has not yet been made public. Similar measures are in
place in the United Kingdom e.g. Streetcar, City Car Club. Horizontal cross cutting measures
Horizontal cross cutting measures are defined as measures that have successfully been
implemented in other sectors than transport and are now introduced to the transport sector to
improve energy efficiency. One example is White Certificates Scheme for Transport in
France The White Certificates Scheme was launched in France in 2005, with the first
obligation period running from 2006 to 2009, and placing obligations for energy suppliers the
tertiary and residential sectors to achieve energy savings by promoting energy efficiency
measures to their customers. In 2010 the scheme was expanded to include transport fuel
suppliers whose annual sales exceed a certain threshold. They will be required to achieve
savings of 30 TWh cumac per year, or a total of 90TWh over the second obligation period
January 2011 to December 2013. The obligation is shared between suppliers according to
their sales.
|
0a44b68e-44b8-4fcc-b398-2ce2c8fbc626
| 66
|
0547b022-1ae7-4598-96e8-c5a193a67074
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2019/2023-green-finance-strategy_f68b791054f1a948a1dd967085b54307.pdf
| 2,019
|
[
"Other",
"Finance",
"investment",
"finance",
"financial",
"green",
"climate"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
All are examples of a creative use of traditional grant funding, that can be customised to the involved parties’ priorities and risk appetites, and can target a particular sector, Box 22: Blended finance case studies focusing on nature markets The U K g overnment is investing £30 million Big Nature Impact Fund (B N I F ), a new blended finance impact fund managed by Federated Hermes and Finance Earth.150 Our catalytic investment will crowd in significant levels of private capital, with the aim of developing a track record for private sector investment in nature recovery at scale, B N I F w ill accelerate the creation across England of high-integrity nature projects that generate revenue from ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity and water quality, by creating biodiverse woodlands and other priority habitats, and restoring peatlands. By taking a blended finance approach and aggregating these projects up to an investible level, B N I F w ill help lower transaction costs and reduce risks, bringing the risk profile of these projects in line with institutional The £50 million Woodland Carbon Guarantee helps accelerate woodland planting rates and develop the domestic market for woodland carbon, by offering a price guarantee for verified carbon credits sold to the U K g overnment.151 Our new Environmental Land Management schemes are being designed to dovetail with private investment.152 In particular, we are supporting the bespoke Landscape Recovery projects to secure private funding alongside public funds in innovative ways. We have carried out numerous tests and trials looking at different mechanisms to crowd in private finance to improve nature’s recovery, and we will continue to learn from these and other projects as private markets for nature develop. 49. Over the past decade the U K h as developed significant international experience developing blended finance instruments, including support for the Global Innovation 153 Many public finance institutions, public funds and Infrastructure Bank has a broad range of options including significant (£10 billion) capacity to provide guarantees, and the British Business Bank oversees products
that use grants and guarantees to crowd in private sector lending. U K Ex port Finance also works closely with a wide range of private credit insurers and lenders to help U K companies access export finance, complementing the provision of support from the 50. To build on a strong track record of existing blended finance structures and interventions, the U K go vernment is committed to exploring additional areas where such structures could have impact. We will work with the Green Finance Institute and industry leaders in the finance sector to develop a forward-looking analysis of blended finance models and where they could be better deployed in the U K. 51. In addition, both our call for evidence and the independent Net Zero Review highlighted concerns that the broad range of government funding schemes that are available for businesses and project developers can at times create undue complexity and do not always suit the specific needs of the relevant sector. The U K go vernment recognises the importance of ensuring the design of funding schemes is as impactful and effective as possible, and delivers value for money. We will explore the design of funding schemes for net zero projects ahead of the next Spending Review. Green infrastructure projects across common barriers and solutions 52. Much of the green investment required at the stage of commercial maturity is investment in infrastructure. Based on industry feedback we understand that there are significant pools of private finance ready to deploy into green infrastructure projects but there can be a mismatch between market appetite and the risk profile of green projects. The U K In frastructure Bank has an important role to play in crowding private
Box 23: U K I nfrastructure Bank U K I B p ublished a Strategic Plan in Summer 2022, which sets out how it will deliver on its mission across its five priority clean energy; digital; transport; water; and, waste.154 Projects which U K I B i nvests in must meet its triple bottom achieving one or both of its strategic objectives (tackling climate change and promoting economic growth across the U K ), generating a positive financial return and demonstrating additionality. It will focus where there’s an undersupply of private finance and reducing barriers to investment – thereby crowding-in private capital. U K I B h as an initial £22 billion of financial capacity which it aims to deploy over the next five to eight years, subject to the pipeline of investable projects. It can provide corporate and project finance and invest across the capital structure, including senior debt, mezzanine, guarantees and equity. Where possible, U K I B w ill invest on terms in line with other sources of finance. However, it can go further, taking on risks that other investors are unwilling – or not yet willing – to take; and offering concessional terms, including on price and tenor, where that is necessary. U K I B w ill finance early-stage technologies commercially deploying for the first time; proven technologies to accelerate their deployment toward government ambitions; and, mature technologies transitioning to subsidy-free models. It will also invest in the natural capital market, creating pathways for future private investment by demonstrating the soundness and replicability of emerging business models, including approaches that aggregate projects. U K I B i s now operational and, as of 27 March 2023, has announced 12 deals, investing approximately £1.2 billion and unlocking over £5 billion of private capital. Projects that contribute towards meeting net zero • Committing £162.5 million as a cornerstone investor in Next Power U K E S G f und, the U K ’s largest subsidy-free solar fund; • Investing £150 million, alongside £1 billion from other investors, in the U K p ortion of finance for the 1.4G W NeuConnect interconnector project; and • Providing £10 million to the West Midlands Combined Authority, supporting the introduction of green buses in Birmingham.
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(See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (8) In this paragraph, “recovery plan” in relation to a CCP, means a plan required under paragraph 29B of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges, Clearing Houses and Central Securities Depositories) Regulations 2001 (S.I. 2001/995). I562 Sch. 11 para. 2 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I563 Sch. 11 para. 2 in force at 31.12.2023 by S.I. 2023/1382, reg. 8(b) Safeguards relating to directions under paragraph 2 3 (1) A direction given to a relevant person under paragraph 2 must be accompanied by (a) states when the direction takes effect (see sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)), (b) gives the Bank’s reasons for giving the direction, and (c) specifies a reasonable period within which the person may make representations to the Bank about the direction. (2) The direction may, if the Bank considers it necessary, take effect— (a) immediately it is given to the relevant person, or (b) on a later date specified in the direction. (3) In any other case the direction takes effect when— (a) it has been confirmed by a notice under sub-paragraph (5), and (b) the period during which the direction may be referred to the Upper Tribunal (under sub-paragraph (6)) has expired and, if the matter was so referred, the reference and any appeal against the Tribunal’s determination, has been (4) Where representations are made by the relevant person within the period specified under sub-paragraph (1)(c), the Bank must, within a reasonable period, consider those representations and decide— (a) whether to confirm or revoke the direction, and (b) if the direction is revoked, whether to give a different direction. (a) if no representations are made within that specified period, give the relevant person written notice that the direction is confirmed, and (b) if representations are made, give the relevant person written notice of its decision under sub-paragraph (4). (6) If the relevant person is aggrieved by the confirmation of the direction, the person may refer the matter to the Upper Tribunal. (7) A notice under sub-paragraph (5)(a) or (b) confirming the direction must— (a) inform the relevant person of the right to refer the matter to the Upper (b) indicate the procedure on such a reference. Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 11 – Central counterparties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (8) A notice given under sub-paragraph (5)(b) of a decision by the Bank to give a different direction must comply with sub-paragraph (1). (9) The Bank must prepare and publish a statement of its policy with respect to the giving of directions under paragraph 2. (10) The Bank may alter or replace a statement of policy published under this paragraph. (11) The Bank must publish a statement as altered or replaced under sub-paragraph (10). (12) No directions may be given under paragraph 2 before the statement of policy under sub-paragraph (9) has been published. (13) In this paragraph “relevant person” means— I564 Sch. 11 para. 3 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I565 Sch. 11 para. 3(1)-(8)(12)(13) in force at 31.12.2023 by S.I. 2023/1382, reg. 8(b) I566 Sch. 11 para. 3(9)-(11) in force at 29.8.2023 by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(ddd)(i) 4 (1) The Treasury may by regulations make provision requiring the Bank to create and maintain a resolution plan for each CCP. (2) The following are examples of provision that regulations under sub-paragraph (1) (a) provision specifying the information that must be contained in a resolution plan (including provision enabling the Bank to specify such information); (b) provision requiring CCPs to give specified information to the Bank for the purpose of the Bank creating and maintaining a resolution plan (including provision enabling the Bank to specify the way in which such information (c) provision specifying the form of resolution plans (including provision enabling the Bank to specify the form); (d) provision requiring the Bank to review resolution plans at specified intervals; (e) provision requiring the Bank to provide specified information relating to a (f) provision requiring the Bank to give specified persons a copy of the resolution plan and any revised plans (including provision about the way in which a copy of a plan is to be given). (3) Regulations under this paragraph may provide for exemptions. (4) Regulations under this paragraph are subject to the negative procedure. 262 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 11 – Central counterparties Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (5) In this paragraph “resolution plan”, in relation to a CCP, means a document setting out the actions that the Bank proposes to take in the event that the CCP meets the conditions under paragraph 17 for the exercise of the stabilisation powers. I567 Sch. 11 para. 4 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I568 Sch. 11 para. 4 in force at 31.12.2023 by S.I. 2023/1382, reg.
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By contrast, the CMIP6 GCM projections forecast significantly higher, and potentially hazardous,
warming levels. Similar conclusions were reached by Connolly et al. using an alternative and more simple empirical model with low climate sensitivity to radiative forcing under business-as-usual
scenarios. Figure 21: [Top] Comparison of the harmonic empirical global climate model under the SSP2-4.5 scenario with the HadCRUT4.6 record alongside the burning ember diagrams representing the five primary global Reasons for Concern (RFCs) under low-to-no adaptation scenarios, as reported by the IPCC AR6. [Bottom] Summary and analysis of the projected impacts and risks of global warming for the 2080–2100 period compared to the climate “thermometer” projections from Climate Action Tracker. Adapted from Scafetta. Figure 21C compares the IPCC predictions with the outputs of alternative empirical climate modeling un der three different assumptions based on the considerations discussed in the above sections:
1. using only the CMIP6 GCMs with ECS < 3°C;
2.
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Emissions from waterborne transport were 11% lower in 2022 than in 2019, having remained at a similar level to their 2020 low. The proliferation of future green technology is advancing, supported by investment in research and development (R&D), alongside incentives and other existing efficiency regulations across all modes of transport.
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The emission reduction obligation of the EU Member State is jointly implemented through the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS). A common 'cap' was established for the EU ETS system, in which 52 facilities from Croatia are also included. The emissions and sectors not covered by the EU ETS, the annual national allocation quotas are determined for the Member States and they must not be exceeded. These quotas are established on the basis of solidarity. A debate on the Proposal for a Regulation on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 for a resilient Energy Union and to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement has finished and the publication in the Official Journal of the EU is expected soon, and for the Republic of Croatia the goal of reducing emissions by 7 % compared to the 2005 level is determined. The EU set a goal of reducing emissions by at least 80 % compared to 1990 in 2050 in the Roadmap for the transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050 (COM (2011) 112).
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. gkm
2.5.3.3. CO2 mass emission weighted, combined 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gkm
2.5.3.4. Fuel consumption Condition A, combined 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l100 km
2.5.3.5. Fuel consumption Condition B, combined 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 131 units; UK ETS (CO 2) operator -reported fuel combustion emission and activity estimates per onshore terminal. Since 1998 there are installation -level data reported to UK Government, including fuel combustion estimates that are based predominantly on installation -specific carbon emission factors for fuel gas; this is therefore a Tier 3 method using the aggregate of reported data across all UK installations, and based on a large dataset of fuel compositional analysis and operator reported emission estimates. Prior to 1998 the source data reported to Government are more aggregated, based on sector surveys and (in some years) the use of proxy data (oil and gas production statistics) to estimate the activity data. An industry submission to Government in 2005 (UKO OA, 2005) provided a comprehensive estimate of sector emissions from 1990 to 2003 based on aggregated UK operator reporting, and hence this is a Tier 2 method. Since 2005, the activity and emissions data for combustion are primarily derived from EU/UK ETS (DESNZ, 2024b) reporting for those installations that report to EU/UK ETS, and from EEMS (DESNZ OPRED, 2024) data for the sites that fall below the reporting th reshold for EU/UK ETS. Analysis has shown that there is a small systematic under-report for fuel gas use by the oil and gas sector for recent years of the time series in the UK energy statistics, DUKES (DESNZ, 2024a). Where the fuel combustion emissions ar e reported for an installation via both EEMS and EU/UK ETS, the EU/UK ETS data are regarded as better quality as they are subject to Third Party verification, as part of the requirements of the trading scheme. However, the scope of reporting under EU/UK ET S is not as complete as EEMS. For example, mobile offshore units (e.g. drilling units) do not fall within EU/UK ETS scope and a number of smaller offshore platforms also report only to EEMS as they do not meet the EU/UK ETS threshold for Onshore oil and gas terminal operators reported fuel combustion estimates via EEMS from 1998 to 2010. Since 2010, terminal operators are not mandated to report to EEMS and most have ceased to do so, as they are already required to report installation-wide annual emission estimates under the IED/PPC reporting systems to onshore regulators. The EU/UK ETS data provide complete estimates for fuel use at all onshore oil and gas terminals from 2005 The EU/UK ETS CO 2 data for high emitting source streams are based on source -stream- specific fuel analysis (i.e. compositional analysis to derive carbon content, NCV) and the assumption that the fuel is 100% oxidised; for example, on most oil and gas platforms the estimates of emissions from fuel gas use within turbines, engines, heaters and other units are based on sampling and analysis of the carbon content of the fuel gas. As such the EU/UK ETS data are considered highly accurate; they provide a rich and detailed dataset that exhibits a range of variability in the fuel gas across installations and across the time series. For 1998 to 2004 inclusive, the combustion activity and emissions were reported by all upstream oil and gas installations, offshore and onshore, via EEMS. The oil and gas operators subsequently conducted more detailed analysis, to review activity data and carbon emission factors, in the course of developing the National Allocation Plans (Phase I NAP, Defra 2005)60, in the years leading up to the EU ETS. The accuracy of the 1998 -2003 data was improved through this process in order to ensure accurate emission allocations per installation in the first phase of EU ETS which ran from 2005 to 2007. To derive the UK GHGI estimates for combustion in 1998 to 2004, the Inventory Agency has reviewed the EEMS and NAPs data 60 EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Approved Phase I National Allocation Plan 2005-2007, Defra (2005) phase_1/phasei_nap/phasei_nap.aspx
UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 132 during the recent oil and gas improvement project and used the best available data per For 1990 to 1997 there are more aggregated data available from industry reporting (UKOOA 2005) that are used to inform the UK GHGI estimates. The 1990 and 1991 CO2 estimates are based on company reported data, with CH 4 and N 2O estimates derived by the Inventory Agency, applying EFs from operator reporting in later years (under EEMS). Data for 1995 to 1997 were compiled from operator reporting under a system with a similar reporting structure to EEMS, but data are only availabl e from across the whole industr y, rather than per installation, and hence are somewhat less transparent. The sector estimates for 1992 to 1994 are based on modelling by the oil and gas trade association, using oil and gas production data as a proxy, scaling emissions between the reported data in 1991 and 1995. The fuel combustion in the sector is a minor source of emissions of methane and nitrous oxide. Operators report estimates to EEMS, predominantly applying defaults from operator guidance for fuel gas combustion or gas oil combustion. The inventory estimates are based on the operator-reported estimates from EEMS for 1998 onwards; the estimates in 1990 -1997 are based on EFs rolled back from EEMS 1998 data. The DUKES commodity balance tables are regarded as high quality and complete for most fuels and sectors, where the fuel allocations are based on fuel sales data (from tax records, from annual and periodic surveys), surveys of fuel suppliers and producers, import and export data. However, for the upstream oil and gas sector a high proportion of fuel use (and hence combustion emissions) arise from operators’ own use of fuels (mainly fuel gas, a mixture of methane and other hydrocarbons) that are generated and used on site and are therefore not ‘bought and sold’ (unlike most fuel use across the UK economy), nor are they metered or delivered through a system (e.g.
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It does mean that the government will have to continue to refine its approach to infrastructure investment in response to the impacts of COVID-19 in the years to come. Chapter 1 of this Strategy focuses on how infrastructure can boost short term economic growth and drive the recovery from COVID-19. It sets out how Spending Review 2020 delivers high levels of investment to support the economic recovery, with long-term settlements for key infrastructure programmes. Chapter 2 focuses on levelling up the economy. The UK’s major cities and regions are not as productive as international comparators. Towns and regions are held back by inadequate and out of date infrastructure, making it hard for people to get to work, run businesses and attract international investment. The UK’s transport networks are ageing and congested and UK gigabit broadband coverage lags behind many competitor countries. There are also problems with poor infrastructure connecting the four nations of the UK. This strategy announces an ambitious package of plans to level up the nations, regions, cities and towns of the UK and strengthen the Union – with vastly improved broadband, road and rail networks connecting up the country, investments to boost cities, towns and communities, and getting the basics right everywhere with better roads, buses and cycling infrastructure. This is underpinned by changes in how and where decisions are made, to better reflect local The UK has made substantial progress in reducing carbon emissions from its power networks and the cost of renewables has fallen sharply – but bold action is now needed to transform the UK’s infrastructure to meet net zero and climate change commitments as one of the world’s leading, modern, sustainable economies. In line with the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, Chapter 3 sets out the government’s plans to decarbonise power, heat, heavy industry and transport networks - which together account for over 80% of UK emissions - and how to adapt to the risks posed by climate change.1 The UK has a proud record of attracting private investment into its infrastructure, and this will be even more vital in delivering on its net zero targets. But the government recognises that investors have faced some uncertainty in the past few years. Chapter 4 of this Strategy sets out the government’s plans to support private investment in infrastructure, including by establishing a new UK infrastructure bank, to harness private capital investment. Finally, infrastructure delivery in the UK has been too slow for too long. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that this doesn’t have to be the case; for instance the Nightingale hospitals were assembled in record timescales. Chapter 5 sets out the steps the government is taking to accelerate and improve infrastructure delivery. This will be achieved through wide-ranging reforms coming out of the Project Speed taskforce, from speeding up the planning system, to improving the way projects are chosen and run, reforming the way the government procures, and using cutting edge construction technology. The whole of the UK will benefit from this Strategy. Where policy is reserved for the UK government, this Strategy includes measures which will benefit every nation of the UK, such as a radical improvement in mobile coverage in rural areas. Where policy sits with the devolved administrations, those governments will receive funding through the Barnett formula for the benefit of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The journey doesn’t stop here. Successful delivery of this plan will require collaboration across all parts of government, industry and civil society. The government will be following up this Strategy with further detail on a number of areas – including the English Devolution and Local Recovery White Paper and the Energy White Paper. The final chapter of this strategy sets out what the government will do next to deliver on its ambitions. High quality infrastructure is crucial for economic growth, boosting productivity and competitiveness. It helps connect people to each other, people to businesses, and businesses to markets, forming a foundation for economic activity. Infrastructure acts as a direct ‘input’ for businesses, which rely on energy, transport and waste collection to operate. Well-developed transport and digital networks allow businesses to grow and expand, enabling them to extend supply chains, deepen labour and product markets, collaborate, innovate and attract inward investment. These ‘agglomeration’ effects are particularly powerful in city regions, where high quality infrastructure can play a substantial role in boosting productivity. But they also apply more broadly. Infrastructure can also support other government policy objectives. For instance, it can improve skills and education through investment in digital technology and buildings. It is a key factor in determining where firms choose to locate and grow, and people’s ability to However, the size of the UK’s capital stock (a measurement of the value of the UK’s current infrastructure networks) is generally considered to be smaller than comparable economies.2 In 2019 the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked UK infrastructure 11th in the world, behind comparable European economies such as France, Germany and the Netherlands.3 The UK also falls well behind other countries on a sector-by-sector basis. For instance, WEF rank the UK 36th for the quality of its road infrastructure, and 79th on fibre internet subscriptions. Businesses and communities also need consistency and certainty about planned infrastructure. For a long time, investment in UK infrastructure has been volatile and stop start. Previous governments have increased investment and then cut back. This has created a fractured supply chain, exposed to significant vulnerability, and is part of the reason why the UK has a lower infrastructure stock than in many other countries. This means that increasing both public and private investment, whether in order to reduce some of the highest levels of road congestion in Europe,4 or increasing gigabit-capable broadband access to continue to catch up to international competitors,5 would have a relatively larger impact on growth and
The government set up the NIC in 2015, with the aim of providing impartial, expert advice on major long-term infrastructure priorities.
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Our priority will be to ensure that we learn from any failures, and can repeat the successes. This will cut more carbon and increase our ability to export the technologies and systems in question to other parts of the world. We are aware that the UK Government will launch a new Industrial Strategy programme – “Prospering From the Energy Revolution”. This programme, alongside other initiatives, such as Ofgem’s Network Innovation Competitions and Low Carbon Networks Fund, will help develop world-leading local, smart energy systems, delivering cheaper and cleaner energy across power, heating and transport – creating high- value jobs and export capabilities. Scotland aims to maintain its leadership in developing local energy systems – building on the global shift away from centralised generation Scotland has a legacy of strong community engagement in local renewable generation, led by rural Scottish communities, including islands. These groups have led the way in developing innovative local energy solutions, overcoming their limited access to national infrastructure. The Scottish Government has supported a number of these early pilot projects through initiatives such as the Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme and the CARES Local Energy Challenge Fund. We recognise the importance of local solutions in National Planning We are determined to build on this, and can learn a great deal from our work to date as we continue this transition towards energy systems which more directly benefit local economies and The main challenges we face are expanding these principles into more densely-populated and urban areas, and identifying sustainable, We need to move from projects with a single beneficiary to ones that are more strategic – covering larger geographical areas, and involving partnership arrangements between communities, local authorities, the public and
Many of Scotland’s island communities are already successfully demonstrating complex energy solutions. Their isolation from mainland energy and supply networks creates a strong incentive for innovation, helped by some of the most powerful renewable energy Orkney, for example, is home to what was the UK’s first smart grid – connecting renewable generation to Orkney’s distribution network at a considerably lower cost than conventional The ‘Surf ‘n’ Turf’ project demonstrates a fully integrated energy model, with hydrogen produced using electricity from tidal and onshore wind turbines. This is stored in a fuel cell, and used to provide low carbon heat, power and transport. A European-funded project called ‘BIG HIT’ will build on the Surf ‘n’ Turf project in Orkney by producing hydrogen from renewable sources for The projects will benefit the community by providing employment and training, as well as reducing harbour electricity costs and There are many other examples of innovation on Scotland’s islands and remote rural communities, supported by Local Energy Scotland ( For example, the Mull Garmony Community Hydro scheme and the Assisting Communities to Connect to Electric Sustainable Sources Project (ACCESS) project – a cost-effective platform for enabling the real time matching of local electricity generation and local electricity demand at a distribution network We intend to develop a local energy systems position paper, containing detailed principles, • Local Heat & Energy Efficiency Strategies in use at a local level, creating a strategy to guide investment in energy efficiency and heat decarbonisation. Led by local authorities, working closely with their communities, this will set out a long-term prospectus for investment in new energy efficiency, district heating, and other heat • Communities empowered wherever possible to develop and commission local energy system plans where they are the full or part owners of the final scheme. • All local projects encouraged to use existing energy infrastructure before developing projects with new transmission These principles will support and promote the • Systems designed and developed in line • Active, energy efficient consumers (both residential and non-residential); • Lower annual energy bills; and • Opportunities for local supply chains and investment in local businesses. Scottish Energy Strategy 56/57 The Scottish Government is committed to developing strategic approaches, based on locally distinctive needs, opportunities and priorities. This includes consulting on a new statutory framework for Local Heat & Energy Efficiency Strategies (LHEES). Led by local authorities working closely with their communities, this will provide opportunities for communities to not only develop their own energy projects, but also to have their voices heard in the planning processes for energy developments. The Scottish Government has already supported local authorities to develop strategies for district heating infrastructure through the Heat Network Partnership Strategy Support Programme, using tools such as Scotland’s Heat Map 22. We are also supporting the voluntary approach to LHEES through the SEEP Phase 2 pilots, with 11 local authorities receiving support in piloting LHEES development from 2017-19, as part of a capacity support programme. Local authorities and city regions will have an enhanced role in this strategic approach – helping to deliver new investment and to manage the local challenges of decarbonisation. We expect Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies to inform, and be informed by, the development plan for the 22 Scotland Heat Solar PV array on the Isle of Eigg, Inner Hebrides; part of a community owned renewable electricity system on the island. (Credit: Highlands and Islands Enterprise)
Scotland enjoys a supply of energy from a range of indigenous sources, and has the potential to generate much more. We expect our energy system to change considerably over the period Our continuing efforts to reduce demand will affect the amount of electricity and gas we consume. But the possible electrification of heat and transport on a large scale could place much greater demand on the renewable electricity sector, on other forms of low carbon or cleaner generation, and on our grid. Renewables will play a huge part in meeting our future energy needs. But there will be roles too for other sources and technologies – for thermal generation with carbon capture, for pumped storage hydro and other forms of storage, and for smarter, more interconnected networks.
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Other 5,284.82 5,284.82 4,292.42 4,086.79 4,140.93 3,959.80 3,886.18 3,804.99 3,630.71 3,194.00 3,149.63 2,916.31 2,921.90 3,056.63 3,162.18 3,052.75 2,838.83 3,458.96 3,746.49 3,249.50 2,977.10 2,890.76 2,748.07 2,519.16 2,285.35 2,019.27 1,984.68 -62.45 7,476.49 7,476.49 7,025.68 7,259.90 7,582.22 7,751.15 9,166.22 9,464.26 7,618.66 7,213.46 6,190.40 5,876.80 6,107.41 5,790.82 5,491.01 5,466.27 6,012.60 5,142.73 5,330.43 4,626.92 4,820.32 4,694.64 4,396.45 3,719.57 4,124.01 4,347.88 4,560.00 -39.01 1. Solid fuels 1,698.56 1,698.56 1,312.14 1,122.56 1,022.21 791.77 737.42 552.48 629.34 294.79 214.74 192.99 198.95 194.12 185.41 228.21 161.26 192.03 246.25 324.95 239.61 296.62 379.66 148.51 278.35 436.08 434.28 -74.43 5,777.92 5,777.92 5,713.55 6,137.34 6,560.01 6,959.38 8,428.80 8,911.79 6,989.33 6,918.67 5,975.66 5,683.82 5,908.47 5,596.70 5,305.60 5,238.06 5,851.34 4,950.70 5,084.18 4,301.97 4,580.71 4,398.02 4,016.79 3,571.06 3,845.66 3,911.80 4,125.72 -28.60 2. Industrial processes 24,525.61 24,525.61 22,213.80 22,195.79 21,990.30 24,146.94 24,721.43 25,700.47 24,029.45 23,400.63 23,363.47 22,190.49 20,579.19 19,963.01 21,260.94 22,552.10 21,331.38 20,323.10 21,930.47 19,958.68 14,271.11 15,853.35 14,769.69 14,984.12 16,810.79 16,405.29 15,918.36 -35.09 A. Mineral industry 9,803.78 9,803.78 8,050.66 7,544.13 7,578.60 8,656.07 8,746.75 9,068.82 9,392.84 9,567.66 8,970.73 8,848.78 8,426.04 8,457.49 8,505.74 8,782.46 8,744.22 8,716.30 9,009.27 7,848.91 5,680.34 5,984.19 6,344.35 6,061.58 6,430.13 6,562.12 6,638.00 -32.29 B. Chemical industry 6,764.97 6,764.97 7,251.99 7,232.26 7,203.67 7,476.83 7,520.65 7,505.75 6,677.34 6,787.95 7,183.80 6,607.79 6,295.44 6,106.83 6,384.21 6,416.65 6,217.58 5,723.63 6,416.93 5,429.05 4,844.13 5,185.43 4,575.82 5,222.72 4,757.87 4,183.51 4,582.71 -32.26 C. Metal industry 7,403.74 7,403.74 6,401.48 5,921.53 5,524.37 6,340.36 6,858.80 7,053.80 6,466.71 6,036.14 6,686.68 6,156.35 5,303.12 4,312.51 5,280.55 5,488.06 5,853.45 5,402.83 6,048.27 5,976.71 3,353.05 3,573.47 3,098.58 3,009.35 4,994.86 4,859.84 4,392.39 -40.67 553.12 553.12 509.67 1,497.86 1,683.65 1,673.67 1,595.24 2,072.10 1,492.56 1,008.87 522.27 577.57 554.59 1,086.18 1,090.44 1,864.92 516.13 480.34 456.01 704.02 393.59 1,110.26 750.94 690.47 627.92 799.82 305.26 -44.81 H. Other IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO IE, NE, NO NE, NO, IE NO, NE, IE 0.00 3. Agriculture 1,831.42 1,831.42 2,164.79 2,144.95 1,475.16 1,567.89 1,875.81 1,831.44 1,698.59 1,290.47 1,156.89 1,040.11 1,001.82 1,076.84 1,215.58 1,169.98 1,050.98 1,101.77 1,249.49 1,039.41 1,275.55 1,247.39 1,385.65 1,160.98 1,286.23 1,139.81 1,192.67 -34.88
Annex 2: Common Tabular Format Tables (CTF) supporting the UK’s third biennial report to the UNFCCC 315 G. Liming 1,576.48 1,576.48 1,922.21 1,929.47 1,270.83 1,397.07 1,693.71 1,651.80 1,502.97 1,152.43 995.17 908.09 830.57 841.35 1,041.26 915.20 820.38 873.99 920.77 834.61 976.51 938.15 1,032.53 832.92 1,037.08 786.46 769.30 -51.20 H. Urea application 252.19 252.19 239.83 212.76 201.63 168.15 179.45 176.98 192.93 135.35 159.04 129.35 168.63 232.87 171.70 252.12 227.94 225.23 326.22 202.14 296.44 306.61 350.51 325.68 246.79 350.96 420.90 66.90 J. Other 2.75 2.75 2.74 2.72 2.70 2.68 2.65 2.66 2.70 2.69 2.68 2.67 2.61 2.61 2.62 2.66 2.66 2.56 2.50 2.66 2.60 2.62 2.60 2.37 2.37 2.39 2.46 -10.46 3,222.58 3,222.58 2,119.50 1,138.23 828.50 548.09 620.00 -319.45 -719.87 -1,557.63 -1,021.12 -1,791.91 -2,697.20 -3,788.19 -3,973.35 -4,682.21 -5,198.77 -6,008.79 -6,522.16 -7,381.33 -7,389.92 -7,529.77 -7,664.38 -6,926.84 -8,159.54 -9,017.77 -8,913.30 -376.59 A. Forest land -10,540.57 -10,540.57 -11,650.64 -12,272.28 -12,466.05 -12,677.10 -12,719.81 -13,340.83 -13,457.94 -14,096.65 -14,261.65 -14,618.53 -15,275.91 -15,707.79 -15,727.20 -15,675.03 -15,889.14 -16,242.15 -16,076.76 -16,850.27 -16,879.71 -16,491.39 -15,872.40 -14,273.43 -16,136.21 -16,554.91 -15,980.26 51.61 B. Cropland 15,122.71 15,122.71 15,091.01 14,980.74 15,159.65 15,188.81 15,471.64 15,373.09 15,395.57 15,451.53 15,524.44 14,981.16 14,686.53 14,375.36 14,066.71 13,849.55 13,529.81 13,362.84 13,005.28 12,896.29 12,903.41 12,692.82 12,549.97 12,418.21 12,186.41 11,926.08 11,782.74 -22.09 C. Grassland -7,750.95 -7,750.95 -7,866.08 -7,982.84 -8,097.24 -8,209.35 -8,319.36 -8,426.42 -8,515.25 -8,635.06 -8,016.59 -7,550.02 -7,565.11 -7,702.23 -7,615.82 -7,867.17 -7,895.23 -8,255.03 -8,204.81 -8,349.29 -8,376.02 -8,449.34 -8,844.38 -8,940.81 -8,911.62 -9,155.59 -9,143.69 17.97 D. Wetlands 486.95 486.95 489.16 477.07 464.25 576.23 656.46 556.33 487.62 361.24 490.74 480.32 519.66 321.31 558.06 387.47 445.08 463.83 299.70 256.59 294.56 320.55 277.03 218.24 378.72 268.69 268.69 -44.82 E. Settlements 6,913.52 6,913.52 6,843.69 6,776.92 6,721.39 6,672.61 6,614.65 6,583.02 6,558.02 6,520.92 6,525.30 6,334.01 6,297.74 6,263.95 6,232.42 6,202.97 6,175.47 6,163.46 6,139.98 6,118.09 6,211.57 6,193.53 6,175.66 6,096.87 6,077.63 6,096.34 6,081.26 -12.04 F. Other land NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 0.00 -1,009.08 -1,009.08 -787.65 -841.38 -953.51 -1,003.11 -1,083.58 -1,064.64 -1,187.90 -1,159.61 -1,283.36 -1,418.86 -1,360.10 -1,338.79 -1,487.53 -1,580.00 -1,564.76 -1,501.74 -1,685.56 -1,452.73 -1,543.74 -1,795.94 -1,950.26 -2,445.91 -1,754.49 -1,598.38 -1,922.04 90.47 5. Waste 1,356.77 1,356.77 1,366.12 1,337.05 1,256.63 1,086.54 943.14 941.65 584.75 588.88 538.07 539.90 546.62 525.47 505.40 465.19 408.99 294.43 354.61 305.74 301.10 299.57 290.14 288.43 294.49 289.51 281.85 -79.23 A.
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This does not require a full switch to [a] vegan diet but a reduction in the most resource intensive animal products such as those factory-farmed.” “When we think about … energy efficiency, the co-benefits are lower bills, improved energy security, reduced import dependence, warmer homes, jobs in Tim Lord, Associate Senior Fellow, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change “The science tells us we are living beyond our means materially.” Professor Ken Peattie, Professor of Marketing and Strategy, Cardiff Business School 153. As Chapter 2 set out, there is a widespread consensus that changes will be needed to how we travel, what we eat and buy, and energy use at home if we are to meet the UK’s climate and environmental goals. This chapter explores challenges and opportunities in these key areas, with a focus on actions that can deliver the largest climate and environmental benefits. It is not exhaustive, given the wide range of behaviours and policies within these 154. Transport makes the largest contribution to emissions. Among areas where behaviour change is relevant, changes to personal travel—including the uptake of EVs, a shift from car use to active travel and public transport, and a reduction in aviation—could deliver meaningful emissions reductions. Chris Boardman, Active Travel Commissioner for England, explained, “Road transport contributes about a quarter of all carbon dioxide emissions at 115 million tonnes a year,” 229 and others made similar points. 230 Witnesses also mentioned emissions from aviation. 231 Green Alliance noted that aviation accounts for 7 per cent of UK emissions, 232 while the Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions told us higher income households “contribute most in absolute terms to increases in frequent flying”.233 155. Health benefits can be delivered by a shift towards active travel, including walking and cycling,234 and Mr Boardman and others suggested these health 230 Written evidence from the Global Sustainability Institute, Anglia Ruskin University ( CCE0056), Sustrans (CCE0070) and Getir (CCE0072) 231 Written evidence from the CAST Consortium ( CCE0048) 232 Written evidence from Green Alliance ( CCE0051) 233 Written evidence from the Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions ( CCE0069)
improvements could reduce the burden on the National Health Service 156. In the CCC’s ranking of actions requiring some consumer engagement up to 2035, adoption of ultra-low emissions vehicles would deliver the largest contribution to emissions reductions. 236 Several witnesses said the shift towards EVs should be a priority due to the scale of emissions reductions this can achieve.237 The second largest contribution in the CCC’s ranking could be delivered by reducing international aviation.238 Many witnesses called for a reduction in flights with an emphasis on trips taken by frequent flyers. 239 157. However, witnesses explained that air pollution and emissions from transport will not be fully addressed through the shift to EVs since the degradation of tyres—which produce particulate matter—will continue and electricity used to power EVs is not yet fully decarbonised. 240 The CAST Consortium told us reduced use of private cars would “improve air quality particularly in deprived communities that are disproportionately affected by air pollution, as well as around schools and other key infrastructure such as hospitals”. 241 While Professor Jillian Anable, Professor of Transport and Energy at the Institute for Transport Studies at the University of Leeds, “The forecasts for the increase in the size of the car fleet, as in the number of vehicles, combined with their size and the weight of those vehicles, puts such an enormous strain on the electricity grid even if they are all electric that it would take us longer to get to a renewable electricity system to fuel those cars.”242 158. Many witnesses emphasised the need for a change in the modes of travel used (‘modal shift’) from private vehicles to active travel and public transport. 243 Midlands Connect noted that alongside the switch to “As much focus needs to be given to shifting away from the car to using active and public 159. Several witnesses argued that an overall reduction in car use should be pursued. Views differed on by how much, with Mr Edwards and Mr Boardman suggesting reductions of private car miles by between 10–30 per cent are required. 245 Prof Anable noted a proposed 20 per cent reduction and went on to 235 Q 88 (Chris Boardman), Q 80 (Angela Terry) and written evidence from Green Alliance ( CCE0051) 236 Written evidence from the Committee on Climate Change ( CCE0112) 237 Written evidence from Climate Outreach ( CCE00111), Midlands Connect ( CCE0075) and Green 238 Written evidence from the Committee on Climate Change ( CCE0112) 239 Q 1 (David Joffe), Q 128 (Steve Smith), Q 128 (Dr Kris De Meyer, Q 83 (Prof Ken Peattie) and written evidence from the CAST Consortium ( CCE0048), the Global Sustainability Institute, Anglia Ruskin University (CCE0056) and the Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions ( CCE0069) 240 Written evidence from Asthma UK and the British Lung Foundation ( CCE0012), the Humanist Climate Action (CCE0071) and Q 87 (Stephen Edwards) 241 Written evidence from the CAST Consortium ( CCE0048) 242 Q 85 (Prof Jillian Anable) 243 Q 1 (David Joffe), Q 85 (Stephen Edwards), Q 85 (Chris Boardman) and written evidence from Climate Outreach ( CCE0111), Sustrans ( CCE0070), Green Alliance ( CCE0051) and Living Streets 244 Written evidence from Midlands Connect ( CCE0075) 245 Q 85 (Stephen Edwards), Q 85 (Chris Boardman)
“It is an absolute reduction from today’s level, so it is not against an increasing baseline. That is the minimum that a whole variety of models, done in a variety of different ways, at different geographical scales across the country, have come up against. As much as a 50 per cent reduction is found in some models at some geographical scales.”246 160. We heard there should also be a focus on the size of cars, with some noting an increase in SUV (sports utility vehicle) sales which has offset climate and environment benefits achieved through other developments.
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309Z6 Procedure for statement of policy about disciplinary action (1) Before the appropriate regulator issues a statement under section 309Z5(1) or (3), it must publish a draft of the proposed statement in the way appearing to it to be best calculated to bring it to the attention of the public. (2) The draft statement must be accompanied by a notice stating that representations about the proposal may be made to the appropriate regulator within a period specified in the notice. (3) Before issuing the proposed statement, the appropriate regulator must have regard to any representations made to it in accordance with subsection (2). (4) If the appropriate regulator issues the proposed statement it must publish the following in the way appearing to the appropriate regulator to be best calculated to bring it to the attention of the public— (b) an account, in general terms, of the representations made to the appropriate regulator in accordance with subsection (2) and the appropriate regulator’s response to them, and (c) if the statement differs from the draft published under subsection (1) in a way which the appropriate regulator considers significant, (5) The appropriate regulator may charge a reasonable fee for providing a person (a) a copy of a draft statement published under subsection (1), or (b) a copy of a statement published under subsection (4)(a). (6) The appropriate regulator must, without delay, give the Treasury a copy of any statement which it publishes under subsection (4)(a). 309Z7 Interpretation of Chapter 2A “director”, in relation to a relevant recognised body, means a member of the board of directors of the body or, if there is no such board, the equivalent body responsible for the management of the “employee”, in relation to a relevant recognised body, includes a (a) personally provides, or is under an obligation personally to provide, services to the body under an arrangement made between the body and the person providing the services or
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 10 – Performance of functions relating to financial market infrastructure Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (b) is subject to, or to the right of, supervision, direction or control by the body as to the manner in which those services are “relevant recognised body” has the meaning given in “senior management function” and “designated senior management function” have the meanings given in section 309G (see subsections (3) and (5) of that section). (2) In this Chapter, references to performing a designated senior management function without approval have the meaning given in section 309U(3). Application of this Chapter to credit rating agencies 309Z8 Power to apply this Chapter to credit rating agencies (1) The Treasury may by regulations provide for this Chapter, or any provision of this Chapter, to apply (with or without modifications) in relation to— (a) registered credit rating agencies, or (b) registered credit rating agencies of descriptions specified in the (2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for the FCA to be the appropriate regulator in relation to a registered credit rating agency to which any provision of this Chapter is applied by the regulations. (3) Regulations under subsection (1) may modify legislation (including any provision of, or made under, this Act). (4) Before making regulations under subsection (1), the Treasury must (b) such other persons who appear to the Treasury to be representative of persons likely to be affected by the application of this Chapter to registered credit rating agencies, or registered credit rating agencies of descriptions specified in the regulations. “legislation” means primary legislation, subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978) and retained direct EU legislation, but does not include rules or other instruments “modify” includes amend, repeal or revoke; “registered credit rating agency” means a credit rating agency registered in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 September 2009 on I539 Sch. 10 para. 1 in force at Royal Assent for specified purposes, see s. 86(1)(e)
250 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) SCHEDULE 10 – Performance of functions relating to financial market infrastructure Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes 2 FSMA 2000 is amended as follows. I540 Sch. 10 para. 2 in force at Royal Assent for specified purposes, see s. 86(1)(e) 3 (1) Section 56 (prohibition orders) is amended as follows— (2) After subsection (7C) insert— (a) the FCA proposes to vary or revoke a prohibition order which makes provision in relation to a recognised body, and (b) the FCA is not the appropriate regulator in relation to recognised the FCA must consult the appropriate regulator. (7E) If the PRA proposes to vary or revoke a prohibition order which makes provision in relation to a recognised body, the PRA must consult the appropriate regulator in relation to recognised bodies of that type.” (3) For subsection (9) substitute— “the appropriate regulator”, in relation to a recognised body, has the meaning given by section 285A; “recognised body” has the meaning given by section 313; “specified” means specified in the prohibition order.” I541 Sch. 10 para.
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2013), particularly when national policies place an emphasis on individual (often threatened) species responses. However, other aggregate measures of biodiversity persistence could include variables such as the geometric mean extinction risk, the expected number of extinctions in the next 50 years (Nicholson & Possingham 2007), or the mean standardised expected minimum abundance (Wintle et al. 2011). Aggregate metrics from stacked species distributions, when individual species responses can be synergistic or antagonistic to drivers of change and declines, however, can cause biases in the biodiversity metric used to summarise overall biodiversity response and trends under the different scenarios. The choice of the metric/indicator and aggregation methods therefore needs further thought. The limited capacity of correlative models to act as a surrogate for extinction or persistence outcomes for species is widely acknowledged (Thuiller et al. 2004;Buckley & Roughgarden 2004;Harte et al. 2004). Mechanistic models of species population dynamics offer a promising alternative to understanding impacts of land-use change that overcome many of the shortcomings of correlative approaches (Akcakaya et al. 2004;Keith et al. 2008;Fordham et al. 2012). Mechanistic species persistence models expand the range of impacts on biodiversity that can be analysed because they address the mechanisms through which impacts occur, such as changes in species survival and fecundity. This provides a natural avenue for analysing impacts of land-use change and invasive species. However, these models require considerable data for parameterising and running models, which has constrained the number of species for which they can practicably be implemented. The emergence of high quality, publicly available geo-spatial and biological databases (GEO BON, GBIF) open up new opportunities to rapidly produce species-level persistence analyses for thousands of species. The demand for such analysis in local, national and global sustainability assessments is now immediate and widespread (CBD3, IPBES4), while the technology and knowledge for delivering these outcomes are developing more slowly. Finally, to address the issue of data deficient species, we will explore opportunities to draw predictive strength through multi-species modelling approaches, such as archetype models that cluster species based on their environmental response (Hui et al. 2013) and joint species distribution models (Wilkinson et al. 2019). The latter can also help account for biotic interactions between species that is currently not considered. Socioeconomic and environmental interactions over distances can have profound implications for biodiversity and sustainability (Liu et al. 2013). Integrating spatial data and models in a clear framework enables reliable and reproducible analyses, while drawing on the best-available data from many real-world case studies, at otherwise infeasible scales. The current framework offers only a lose coupling of models such that outputs from 'upstream' models act as inputs for 'downstream' models. Full integration of the CGE economic model and the land use model in a way that that captures the multiple feedbacks between trade, climate, land constraints and endowments at the appropriate scale is challenging. There are many instances in which constraints on land endowment and elasticity of land use, along with the effects of climate and biosecurity events, limit the ability of the economy to produce commodities at all, much less at nominal production costs. This implies a dynamic equilibrium between production factors and land, a feature that is not currently accommodated in integrated assessment models, including our own. Hence, CGE models have not been able to adequately account for land use change and supply, and certainly not in a forward-looking, large-dimensional setting. As we progress this work, we will attempt to implement a dynamic feedback between our land allocation model and CGE model so that more realistic commodity production predictions can be made. We aim towards building a fully integrated, tightly coupled ecological-economic model that will address the key challenges of dealing with feedback between modules (particularly economy and land endowments), and that will cope with the massive scale of computation and data for global analyses. A key challenge in this work, however, is the storage and access of large datasets (e.g. GBIF species occurrences, high resolution spatial environmental data) and seamless integration of outputs from the economic and land use models required to run species distribution models. Coupling of land-use projections to biodiversity outcomes are currently rare and further innovation will be required to represent non-linear feedbacks between land-use decisions and commodity supply and demand. Addressing spatial autocorrelation for the land-use and biodiversity modelling sub-components at fine resolutions and/or at large extents is conceptually difficult (Guelat & Kery 2018) and demands significantly greater computing resources. However, current computation size limits and long model runtimes make realistically complex analyses difficult to produce, refine, and validate. Finally, increasing the resolution of the analysis to include greater number of species and in land use projections by including land use classes meaningful for assessing biodiversity impacts (e.g. including multiple forest classes rather than just a single land class 'forest' (Hurtt et al. 2011;Rosa et al. 2020) will help align our work with inputs for earth system models and enable comparison of outputs across modelling approaches (Kim et al. 2018). We have ensured that our results are reproducible because the modelling platform are completely transparent, integrated (no manual porting of data between modules) and open access, and all data and modelling script are publicly available. To address these challenges and accommodate the greater thematic, spatial and temporal resolution required to adequately test scenarios and policies of national and global relevance, we need to draw on cutting edge computational strategies and infrastructure. Innovative solutions for a) large data storage and efficient access; b) fast data analysis and modelling; and c) optimised and reusable pipelines are required as we move from local to planetary scales in an attempt to better address the grand challenge of building a sustainable future for nature and people. In keeping with this view, we have ensured that our results are reproducible because the modelling platform are completely transparent, integrated (no manual porting of data between modules) and open access, and all data and modelling script are publicly available.
|
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| 5
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/net-zero-growth-plan_bc80184b303c710cf0e5f7f4fe3afe83.pdf
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Projects that contribute towards meeting net zero − Committing £162.5 million as a cornerstone investor in Next Power UK ESG fund, the UK's largest subsidy-free solar − Investing £150 million, alongside £1 billion from other investors, in the UK portion of finance for the 1.4GW NeuConnect interconnector project. − Providing £10 million to the West Midlands Combined Authority, supporting the introduction of green buses in • Since their launch in 2021, the UK's green gilt programme has raised more than £26 billion from gilts issued by the UK Debt Management Office, and retail Green Savings Bonds sold via • To highlight and communicate more widely the net zero opportunities and incentives for investment in the UK, we published four investor roadmaps - covering the UK's automotive, hydrogen, CCUS, and offshore wind sectors. • Last year we hosted the Green Trade and Investment Expo. This event brought together 200 British business leaders and global investors, showcasing investment and export opportunities presented by the UK's net zero transition. Greening Finance • In 2022 the UK became the first G20 country to require the largest businesses and financial institutions to disclose their climate- related risks and opportunities under the framework set by the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosure. Through our G7 presidency, we facilitated other jurisdictions to take the same steps. Additionally, we have committed to building on this through the delivery of Sustainability Disclosure Requirements. Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan By the end of 2023, government • Consult on transition planning disclosure requirements for the UK's largest • Consult on the UK Green Taxonomy; • Prepare a framework to assess the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) disclosure standards, subject to their finalisation; • Consult on specific steps and interventions needed to support the growth of high integrity voluntary markets and protect against greenwashing; • Receive recommendations from the Transition Finance Market Review; • Furthermore, the UK launched the Transition Plan Taskforce, a group of industry experts tasked with developing guidance for gold
Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan The Government’s net zero and environmental goals depend on the UK having the right workforce with the right skills and capacity in the right locations across the UK. In the next 30 years, the net zero transition will drive opportunities for job creation, with existing occupations set to evolve as the UK’s economy decarbonises. It will be important to manage this shift, with parts of the country requiring the greatest transition often among low-productivity areas of the UK. We agree with the CCC and the Independent Review of Net Zero that government should take a proactive approach to identifying and working with industry to tackle net zero specific workforce challenges and skills gaps. As the UK transitions to net zero, one in five UK workers will experience shifting demand for skills implying a substantial need to upskill and reskill our current workforce. Alongside that, we need to bring new workers and talent along with us on the transition to net zero. Delivering a net zero workforce is a joint government, industry and education sector endeavour which is why the Government set up the Green Jobs Delivery Group. The Delivery Group builds on existing work by the Government to prepare the existing workforce for the green economy and boost the pipeline of skilled workers. Government continues to ensure the skills system is delivering for net zero. This includes the implementation of the Department for Education’s Sustainability and Climate Change Strategy, which will equip children, young people, and adult learners with the knowledge and skills to contribute to the green economy. As just one example in March 2023, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero announced an additional £5 million to support low carbon heating training, expected to support around 10,000 training opportunities, which is starting in April 2023 and continuing until March 2025.This is in addition to the £15 million committed to skills in the energy efficiency and low carbon heating sectors since 2020 through the Home Decarbonisation Skills Training Fund, supporting over 16,000 training opportunities for people working in the energy efficiency, retrofit and low carbon heating sectors in England. A key role for government is to provide industry with certainty and clarity, so that the private sector is better able to address skills challenges through recruitment and training. The Government's commitment to its legally binding carbon budgets and sector specific plans sends an important signal to businesses. We recognise that businesses require greater policy certainty to invest in their workforces and training. Powering Up Britain – The Net Zero Growth Plan While acknowledging the work done so far, the CCC and Independent Review of Net Zero made recommendations on publishing an Action Plan or Roadmap for Net Zero Skills, driving forward delivery of the recommendations of the Green Jobs Delivery Group. We agree on the need to go further and so are committing to publishing a joint government-industry Net Zero and Nature Workforce Action Plan in the first half of 2024, representing the culmination of several sectoral assessments in the coming 12 months. We are beginning with a set of head start actions from the pilot Power and Networks Working Group now, followed by a suite of comprehensive actions for this sector by Summer 2023, which can be used as a template for the other sectoral assessments (more detail set out at the end of this chapter). We will publish an update with this suite of comprehensive actions, alongside biannual progress updates from the Delivery Group’s co-Chairs on its work, later this year. We agree with the Independent Review of Net Zero on the need to develop robust green jobs figures to monitor the transition. We will continue to work closely with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and its Spatial Data Unit to ensure this work supports efforts to reduce geographic disparities and level up the UK (see box below for more information).
|
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf
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A 3.3.7.1 International Conventions The primary purpose of the UK agriculture inventory model is to produce annual inventories of ammonia (NH3) and GHG (nitrous oxide, N2O; methane, CH4; and carbon dioxide, CO2) emissions from all UK agricultural sources in compliance with international inventory methodological and reporting guidelines. The methods deployed in the model are consistent with the IPCC guidelines for national GHG inventories and the EMEP-EEA guidance for air pollutant emission inventories.
|
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0050
| 2,008
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"Energy efficiency",
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"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
5. In drawing up plans as provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 and in informing the public as referred to in paragraph 4, Member States shall, where appropriate, endeavour to pursue cooperation with third countries, and in particular with candidate countries. CHAPTER V
INFORMATION AND REPORTING
Article 26
Public information
1. Member States shall ensure that the public as well as appropriate organisations such as environmental organisations, consumer organisations, organisations representing the interests of sensitive populations, other relevant health-care bodies and the relevant industrial federations are informed, adequately and in good time, of the following:
(a)
ambient air quality in accordance with Annex XVI;
(b)
any postponement decisions pursuant to Article 22(1);
(c)
any exemptions pursuant to Article 22(2);
(d)
air quality plans as provided for in Article 22(1) and Article 23 and programmes referred to in Article 17(2). The information shall be made available free of charge by means of any easily accessible media including the Internet or any other appropriate means of telecommunication, and shall take into account the provisions laid down in Directive 2007/2/EC. 2. Member States shall make available to the public annual reports for all pollutants covered by this Directive. Those reports shall summarise the levels exceeding limit values, target values, long-term objectives, information thresholds and alert thresholds, for the relevant averaging periods. That information shall be combined with a summary assessment of the effects of those exceedances. The reports may include, where appropriate, further information and assessments on forest protection as well as information on other pollutants for which monitoring provisions are specified in this Directive, such as, inter alia, selected non-regulated ozone precursor substances as listed in Section B of Annex X. 3. Member States shall inform the public of the competent authority or body designated in relation to the tasks referred to in Article 3. Article 27
Transmission of information and reporting
1. Member States shall ensure that information on ambient air quality is made available to the Commission within the required timescale as determined by the implementing measures referred to in Article 28(2). 2. In any event, for the specific purpose of assessing compliance with the limit values and critical levels and the attainment of target values, such information shall be made available to the Commission no later than nine months after the end of each year and shall include:
(a)
the changes made in that year to the list and delimitation of zones and agglomerations established under Article 4;
(b)
the list of zones and agglomerations in which the levels of one or more pollutants are higher than the limit values plus the margin of tolerance where applicable or higher than target values or critical levels; and for these zones and agglomerations:
(i)
levels assessed and, if relevant, the dates and periods when such levels were observed;
(ii)
if appropriate, an assessment on contributions from natural sources and from re-suspension of particulates following winter-sanding or -salting of roads to the levels assessed, as declared to the Commission under Articles 20 and 21. 3.
|
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/ENVI/AG/2023/02-09/ETS_MRV_final_text_EN.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
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www.europarl.europa.eu
|
6c
in Article 11, the following paragraph is added
4. By 1 October 2023, the Commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 23 to amend the provisions of this Regulation concerning the rules for
reporting as laid down in Articles 11, 11a and 12 to take account of the inclusion
of methane and nitrous oxide emissions, as well as emissions from offshore ships,
in the scope of this Regulation. 7
the following Article 11a is inserted
Article 11a
Reporting and submission of the aggregated emissions data at company level
1. Companies shall determine the aggregated emissions data at company level during a
reporting period, based on the data of the emissions report and the report referred to
in Article 112 for each ship that was under their responsibility during the reporting
period, in accordance with the rules laid down in the delegated acts adopted pursuant
to paragraph 4. 15
2. From 2025, the company shall submit to the responsible administering authority by
31 March of each year the aggregated emissions data at company level that covers
the emissions in the reporting period to be reported under Directive 200387EC in
relation to maritime transport activities, in accordance with the rules laid down in the
delegated acts adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 and that is verified in accordance
with Chapter III of this Regulation the verified aggregated emissions data at
company level. 3. The administering authority may require companies to submit the verified aggregated
emissions data at company level by a date earlier than 31 March, but not earlier than
by 28 February. 4. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 23
to supplement this Regulation with the rules for the monitoring and reporting of the
aggregated data at company level and the submission of the aggregated emissions
data at company level to the administering authority. 8
Article 12 is amended as follows
a
the title is replaced by the following
Format of the emissions report and reporting of aggregated emissions data at company
level
b
paragraph 1 is replaced by the following
1. The emissions report and the reporting of aggregated emissions data at
company level shall be submitted using automated systems and data exchange
formats, including electronic templates. 16
9
Article 13 is amended as follows
a
paragraph 2 is replaced by the following
2. The verifier shall assess the conformity of the emissions report and the report
referred to in Article 112 with the requirements laid down in Articles 8 to 12
and Annexes I and II. b
the following paragraphs 5 and 6 are added
5. The verifier shall assess the conformity of the aggregated emissions data at
company level with the requirements laid down in the delegated acts adopted
pursuant to paragraph 6. Where the verifier concludes, with reasonable assurance, that the aggregated
emissions data at company level are free from material misstatements, the
verifier shall issue a verification report stating that the aggregated emissions
data at company level have been verified as satisfactory in accordance with the
rules laid down in the delegated acts adopted pursuant to paragraph 6. 6. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 23 to supplement this Regulation with the rules for the verification of
the aggregated emissions data at company level and the issuance of a
verification report. 10
Article 14 is amended as follows
a
in paragraph 2, point d is replaced by the following
d
the calculations leading to the determination of the overall greenhouse gas
emissions and of the total aggregated emissions of greenhouse gases covered
by Directive 200387EC in relation to maritime transport activities in
accordance with Annex I to that Directive to be reported under that Directive
in relation to maritime transport activities
17
b
the following paragraph 4 is added
4. When considering the verification of the aggregated emissions data at company
level, the verifier shall assess the completeness and the consistency of the
reported data with the information provided by the company, including its
verified emissions reports and reports referred to in Article 112. 11
in Article 15, the following paragraph 6 is added
6. In respect of the verification of aggregated emissions data at company level, the
verifier and the company shall comply with the verification rules laid down in the
delegated acts adopted pursuant to the second subparagraph. The verifier shall not
verify the emissions report and the report referred to in Article 112 of each ship
under the responsibility of the company. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 23
to supplement this Regulation with the rules for the verification of aggregated
emissions data at company level, including the verification methods and verification
procedure. 12
in Article 16, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following
1. Verifiers that assess the monitoring plans, the emissions reports and the aggregated
emissions data at company level, and issue verification reports and documents of
compliance referred to in this Regulation shall be accredited for activities under the
scope of this Regulation by a national accreditation body pursuant to Regulation
EC No 7652008.
|
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| 6
|
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|
https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf
| 2,001
|
[
"Buildings",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
www.odyssee-mure.eu
|
Energy efficiency
innovative
flexibility
technologies and solutions than other financing sources. funds offer more
in promoting
How can the state fulfill its exemplary role with respect to energy efficiency
improvement as requested by the Energy Efficiency Directive? The discussion in the report on the exemplary role of the public sector for buildings brings
three major aspects to the focus
The scope for low-cost measures in the public buildings and their large
potential which is well-illustrated in the report with the case of Ireland and the
activities of the Office for Public Works in Ireland. The limits of the approach when it comes to investments, and in particular
investments into the building envelope with comparatively large sums and longer
periods of return, also illustrated with the example of Ireland.
|
122a6704-bce7-4e62-9bc9-5e1516956bc0
| 5
|
05c4baeb-68e6-4abb-b5cb-d1b3f0dcb9e3
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/739460/road-to-zero.pdf
| 2,018
|
[
"vehicles",
"emission",
"emissions",
"vehicle",
"road"
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assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
|
Imports of road transport fuels have also increased over the last decade, in particular to meet the growth in these imports were £1bn and £5bn for petrol Ultra low emission vehicles can help reduce the UK’s reliance on oil, and exposure to the volatility of global markets. The transition to zero emission vehicles could partly replace our reliance on imported oil with largely UK generated energy sources, helping to BEIS (2018). UK energy statistical press release – March 2018 The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
improve the UK’s long-term energy More efficient conventional vehicles on UK roads will mean lower overall fuel consumption for the economy. We have already reduced our reliance on oil imports by producing over £250 million worth of low carbon biodiesel in the UK each year, and the benefit is set to increase with the planned growth in biofuel use. Noise from conventional vehicles affects environment. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that the noise impact of road traffic is second only to pollution as the biggest environmental impact of vehicles. In England alone, the annual social cost of urban road noise is estimated to be vehicles travelling above 12 mph is principally due to tyres and road surface noise, at the lower speeds typically found in town and city centres engine noise is the main contributor. At low speeds, vehicles driven by electric motors are significantly quieter than those powered by conventional The potential reduction in noise should be transformative for those living close to busy roads and city centres. A reduction of urban noise levels by 3dB can reduce annoyance speeds, the reduction in vehicle noise is Noise reducation (dB). compared to conventional vehicles Verheijen, E & Jabben, J (2010). Effect of electric cars on traffic noise and safety
We want our transport systems to be developed in an inclusive way, with the needs of everyone considered. We are due to launch the Inclusive Transport Strategy shortly, which will provide further details on the steps we will take across the entire transport system to ensure this is the case. We will also launch a call for evidence on the Future of Mobility shortly. As part of this, we would welcome views and evidence on the right role for government in helping to ensure that future transport technologies and services are developed in an inclusive manner. We want chargepoints to be easy to locate and access for all users. Existing legislation means that the provision of chargepoints is covered by the Equality Act 2010. This includes a reasonable adjustments duty that applies to, amongst others, a person or organisation providing services, goods or facilities to the public. We also recognise the importance of vehicle noise to alert pedestrians and other road users to a vehicle’s presence. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has adopted a technical standard for electric vehicle noise generators to improve pedestrian safety. Legislation will require fitment to electric vehicles entering the UK market from July 2019 and will improve safety for road users while still reducing The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
Part 2: Vehicle Supply and Demand Part 2a: Reducing emissions from vehicles already In this section we consider the actions being taken to reduce emissions from the 38.9 million vehicles already on UK roads ●● increasing the use of low carbon fuels ●● improving existing vehicles by retrofitting ●● influencing driver behaviour. Low carbon fuels have been one of the most significant contributors to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of UK road transport over the last ten years. In 2008 the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) was introduced, requiring fossil fuel suppliers to ensure a percentage of their fuels are renewable. As a result, sustainable, low carbon fuels are blended with the petrol Over the next few decades demand for liquid fuels will remain high – as the majority of vehicles already on our roads and being sold today still use petrol and diesel. That means low carbon fuels will continue to play a vital role in reducing greenhouse gas Department for Transport (2017). The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations Order - Government response to the consultation 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 Biofuel share of UK transport energy Cumulative carbon savings RTFO share of transport energy The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
emissions from the vehicle fleet as we move to zero emission road transport. In September 2017 we announced a new strategy for low carbon transport fuels for the next 15 years, aligned with our Clean Growth Strategy commitments and designed to provide a firm platform for investment in sustainable advanced fuels for automotive, road freight and aviation use. to increasing the use of low carbon fuels in transport from its current level of around 2.63% in energy terms to around 5.26% by 2020, and 6.7% by 2032. These targets have been enshrined in legislation. RTFO is expected to save nearly 85 million 2 over the 15-year period, and represents around a third of transport’s projected contribution to UK carbon budget This growth is supported by the ‘development fuels’ sub-target within the RTFO, which further incentivises waste- based fuels made using new technologies by setting a target for specific fuels. advanced fuels deliver a range of benefits including very high greenhouse gas savings, reduced waste disposal and improvements in fuel quality, potentially with air quality benefits too. This is also designed to support investment in UK infrastructure for the types of low carbon fuel required to help reduce emissions from the most challenging transport sectors, including the heaviest In addition to the sub-target we are providing funding to support the development of new technologies to produce advanced low carbon fuels that can lead to reduced greenhouse gas emissions in the real world.
|
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| 10
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In August 2022, we also published a consultation on Hydrogen Transport and Storage Business Models, as part of our commitment to design 144 We are aiming to introduce legislative powers, when parliamentary time allows, which will be crucial to designing these new business models by 2025. (See Fuel Supply and Hydrogen chapter of the Net Zero Growth Plan and chapter 4 of Powering Up Britain - Energy Security Plan.) d. A suite of C C U S b usiness models145 are being developed, tailored to different parts of the C C U S s ector. (See Fuel Supply and Hydrogen chapter of the Net Zero Growth Plan and chapter 4 of the Energy Security Plan.) These i. the transport and storage (‘T&S’) business model to establish the commercial arrangements that will fund transport and storage infrastructure and enable ii. the industrial carbon capture (I C C ) and waste I C C b usiness models to provide ongoing revenue support for industrial and waste management iii. the Dispatchable Power Agreement (D P A ) contractual framework for power C C U S , published in November 2022; and iv. the power bioenergy with C C S (power B E C C S) business model, consulted on in August 2022 with our response published imminently. e. We consulted on the design of engineered Greenhouse Gas Removals (G G R ) Business Models in July 2022.146 The consultation also explored options for building a negative greenhouse gas emissions market in the U K a nd key considerations in relation to the monitoring, reporting and verification of engineered G G R s. We intend to respond and set out the next steps this year. (See Greenhouse Gas Removals
43. As part of the British Energy Security Strategy, we announced the Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (R E M A ) programme. It is exploring enduring reforms to our electricity (non-retail) market arrangements to ensure that they remain fit both for today and future generations. We aim to publish a second R E M A consultation in Autumn 2023 and will take decisions on shorter-term reforms more quickly where it is viable to do so throughout the R E M A pr ogramme (see chapter 5 of 44. We also deploy regulation to set standards, create demand and supply signals, and create new market frameworks. These also act as signals for investors to identify investible opportunities across sectors. Key examples a. The Zero Emission Vehicle (Z E V ) mandate147 planned from 2024 will support delivery of the phase out of the sale of new petrol and diesel cars and vans from 2030, and ensure that all new cars and vans are zero emissions at the tailpipe from 2035. This is driving adoption and deployment of zero emission vehicles, as well as investment in their manufacturing, supply chains and enabling infrastructure. b. The Sustainable Aviation Fuel (S A F ) mandate starting in 2025 with a target of at least 10% S A F i n the U K a viation fuel mix by 2030. This aims to reduce G H G emissions from aviation by generating demand for S A F a nd providing an incentive to S A F pr oducers in the form of tradeable certificates. It also sends a long-term signal to investors on the vital role the government believes the technology will play in the U K . In March 2023, we launched a second consultation on the mandate’s design. We commissioned an independent review to help understand the conditions needed to create a sustainable long-term U K S A F i ndustry in October 2022. We will very shortly respond to its findings, and will work with industry on options to increase revenue certainty for U K S A F p lants and options to stabilise the U K m arket for feedstocks. (See Transport chapter of the Net Zero Growth Plan.) c. The Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard sets a maximum G H G e missions threshold for hydrogen production processes to be considered ‘low carbon hydrogen’, and a methodology for calculating G H G e missions.148 Compliance with the standard will help ensure new low carbon hydrogen production supported by government makes a direct contribution to our carbon reduction targets. (See Fuel Supply & Hydrogen d. Mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain, which we legislated to introduce in the Environment Act 2021, will establish a market for biodiversity units from November 149 Land managers who can create or enhance habitat on their land will be able to sell the resulting biodiversity units to developers needing to meet their obligations. (See Goal 1 ‘Thriving plants and wildlife’ and Goal 6 ‘Using resources from nature sustainably’ of the Environmental Improvement Plan.) 45. We have committed to publish a Land Use Framework for England in 2023, which will help to inform how we manage trade-offs between different land uses as we deliver our ambitious climate and environmental goals, and provide greater clarity to the market. (See Goal 6 ‘Using resources from nature sustainably’ and Goal 7 ‘Mitigating and adapting to climate change’ of the Environmental Improvement Plan.) Innovative uses of public financing to make crowding in private investment more effective 46. Innovations in public financing mechanisms have the potential to improve the capacity to crowd in private investment more effectively. A key example of this is the use of blended finance structures which can support projects to secure the investment they need, whilst providing value for money for the taxpayer. 47. ‘Blended finance’ is a catch-all term that covers financial products or structures that combine different funding sources aimed at lowering the risk profile of specific companies or projects and ultimately attracting private capital. 48. Examples include public sector provision of concessional guarantees, first loss tranches of debt structures, performance wraps (insurance), and subordinated debt.
|
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arxiv.org
|
It does not exclude the impact that human action has brought to recent climate change, which might be important and timely, but seems to be insignificant in the face of the millennial variability of the climate, the size and complexity of the universe, and all the natural and astronomical phenomena that interact with the earth in the planetary system. Lastly, it should be argued that the climate scenario predicted here is not enough to determine which are the true causes of recent climate change, whether natural or anthropogenic, since the two may be complementary, not divergent. For this, new studies on paleoclimate and its variability are needed to corroborate the estimates resulting from this research and to bring more evidence in the search for scientific truth. It is unreasonable to subject the world and organizations to be hostages of a dubious thesis with all the consequences that this brings for the strategic planning of political and economic agents. In doing so, we may be condemning humanity to a climate catastrophism without any certainty to justify it. The data for this paper were collected from Kaufmann et al., (2020) unprecedented multimethod reconstruction research of mean land surface temperature (GMST) during the Holocene era (12,000 years) to the present day, "whose database is the most comprehensive global compilation of previously available published Holocene proxy temperature time series" (Kaufman et al., 2020, p. 01). Extraction of the primary data from this study is available as individual CSV files and merged as a netCDF file at figshare 35 and at NOAA Palaeoclimatology 36 (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/study/29712). A CSV file with the multi-method joint median and 5th and 95th percentiles is also available in both data repositories. All were used as input data to compose the 12k time series of paleotemperatures in the two variables and fed into IBM SPSS-Statistics software (v. 22) for the calculation of parameters and estimates. The data generated for the development of this research are available in supplementary file. To introduce the development of the forecast, we justify graphically and mathematically the results that the SPSS software generated with their respective outputs, in the two variables of this study, the median and the uncertainty set. To better understand, we will use the graphs in this section and the mathematical formulation of their results as well as the structuring of the uncertainty set (same pattern) in a supplementary file. First, it is necessary to apply two tests to verify the stationarity of the time series: (1) graphical analysis and (2) the correlogram test, since it is a condition for using the ARIMA (BJ) model. By analyzing Figures 1, 2 and 5, we verify that the series are not stationary, that is, by establishing a mean line for the 12K global temperature median series (Figure 7) we verify that the data do not circulate around it and express a trend. Note: número de sequência means sequence number. Figure 10. Graphical test of partial autocorrelation -PCA. Graphical and correlation analysis indicates that we have to normalize the series making it stationary. The process occurs with the choice of the first lag (lag), which exceeded the confidence interval in both tests and whose degree of graphical significance is higher, i.e., has the highest correlation and the lowest value according to the Ljung-Box statistic. The lag that meets these criteria, therefore, is number 1, highlighted in fig. 9. From these results, we can graphically represent (figure 11) the stationarity adjusted, as a function of the first differentiation (lag 1):
Box-Jenkins's method aims (figure 12) is to estimate a statistical model and interpret it according to the sample data. If this estimated model is used for forecasting, we should assume that its characteristics are constant over the period and particularly in future periods. A simple reason for requiring the stationary data is that any model that is inferred based on that data can be interpreted as stationary or stable and therefore provides a valid basis for prediction (Pokorny, 1987, Gujarati andPorter, 2011). We concluded that the MedTempGlobal (as described in the data/figures) time series model was not stationary and we had to normalize it, making it stationary with constant mean and variance and its covariance invariant over time. Therefore, it is an integrated time series, i.e., it combines the two autoregressive processes (AR and MA) in the same set. An important point to note is that when using the Box-Jenkins methodology, we must have both a stationary time series and a time series that is stationary after one or more differentiations (Gujarati and Porter, 2011). Then, we can state that if a time series is integrated of order 1, therefore, it is I (1), after differentiating it becomes I (0), that is, stationary. In general, if a time series is I (d), after differentiating it d times, we get an I (0) series. If one has to differentiate a time series d times to make it stationary and apply the ARMA (p, q) model to it, one will say that the original time series is ARIMA (p, d, q), that is, it is a moving average integrated autoregressive time series, where p denotes the numbers of the autoregressive terms, d the number of times the series must be differentiated before it becomes stationary, and q the number of moving average terms. We, therefore, have in this time series an ARIMA (1,0,1) model, as it was differentiated once (d = 1) before becoming stationary (of first difference), and can be modeled as an ARMA (1,1) process, as it has an AR term and an MA post stationarity. Finally, it is important to emphasize that to optimize the results, it was necessary to run in the software SPSS -Statistics all the possible combinations of the ARIMA model (p,d,q) in the two parameters, to arrive at the statistically optimal model after the decomposition of the data and meeting the criteria of analysis and execution. Source: Author elaboration (SPSS -Statistics v. 22).
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The transition is being coordinated by the Energy Networks Association through the Open managing networks to enable more competition for network services, including considering smart solutions (potentially using flexibility services provided by EVs) rather As EVs are rolled out, they may be taken up in some areas more quickly than others, an effect known as ‘clustering’. Smart solutions will help and industry is consulting on the best way to manage any effects from 177 The government looks forward to understanding stakeholder views and the best way of managing this issue in the best Electric Nation – smart charging to support mass roll-out of Electric Nation has recruited 700 electric vehicle (EV) drivers, across 40 different EV makes and models, to test the latest smart charging technology and is developing their understanding of customer acceptance of domestic managed charging. Electric Nation is a Western Power Distribution (WPD) and Network Innovation Allowance funded project. WPD’s collaboration partners in the project are EA Technology, DriveElectric, Lucy Electric, GridKey and TRL. Early findings show that charging behaviour does create flexibility for smart charging at the key time of day for distribution networks, which has the potential to delay or reduce the need for costly and disruptive reinforcement work. The trial is due to complete in The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
The development and deployment of hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) is at an earlier stage than for plug-in hybrid or battery electric vehicles. Our approach in considering the appropriate government support to the development of hydrogen as a transport fuel in the UK has been based on moving in step with international progress on standards and technology, ensuring that the UK retains its position in the forefront of the adoption of zero emission vehicle technologies whilst retaining flexibility and managing risk in order to secure the opportunities at this early stage of the market. A lack of refuelling infrastructure remains a key barrier to the future roll out of FCEVs. Since 2014, government has sought to help address this market barrier by providing £4.8m and a co-ordinating function turning the refuelling facilities from various demonstrator projects into an initial network of 15 hydrogen refuelling stations (HRS) – these are operational and publically The early nature of the market means vehicle costs are still high. £2m has been provided to directly support public and private sector fleets to become early adopters of FCEVs. There are limited volumes and models of FCEV’s currently being produced globally. Despite this, the UK has been successful in securing allocations of these first and second generation models, facing strong competition from other lead markets. Major vehicle manufacturers are publicising their plans to increase production and bring new models to market over the next few years. The funding will deliver a fourfold increase in the number of FCEVs on UK roads firmly placing the UK at the forefront of early adoption, alongside California, Japan, and Germany. This is important because fuel cell technology could offer a longer-term solution in the freight and bus sectors. In the long term, hydrogen may be more suited for use in HGVs and by fleets where range and fast The UK is well placed to be a global leader in hydrogen and fuel cell powered transportation. We have high quality and growing engineering and manufacturing capability in relevant supply chains. Hydrogen for Transport Programme In March 2017 , the Government announced £23m of additional funding to increase the uptake of FCEVs and grow the number of HRS. The Hydrogen for Transport Programme (HTP) is providing support out until 2020. The funding competition for the first phase of the programme offered £9m capital budget to provide match funding for eligible projects. The successful bidders were announced on 26 March 2018. The project is being delivered by a consortium which includes Shell, ITM Power, Toyota, Hyundai and Honda as well as fleets users such as the Metropolitan Police and Green Tomato taxis. It will see four new HRS being built, upgrades to five existing stations and the
Our approach has been to align deployment of FCEVs with the appropriate infrastructure investments to ensure significant levels of station utilisation. ‘Healthy’ station utilisation should create levels of revenue for refuelling station operators that will encourage further private sector investment in expanding the network and support the case for investing in regular maintenance. Maintenance is important as it ensures high levels of availability, which in turn creates a positive consumer experience. Our ambition is that with these strategic interventions the market for hydrogen refuelling and vehicles moves to a genuinely sustainable footing as quickly as possible with growing industry An increasing number of studies and reports are presenting a range of visions for both global and UK hydrogen economies. Globally, a number of countries are taking steps to reap the benefits of integrating hydrogen vehicles into the wider energy system. Japan, for example, is seeking to build a ‘hydrogen society’, with hydrogen delivering energy across the economy, as There is more to do to understand how far the UK hydrogen economy could expand, decarbonise and apply to other sectors. Government is supporting a range of innovation activity looking at the potential role of hydrogen in heat and industry as well The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
Part 4: Leadership at all levels The UK’s devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland possess, through their devolved powers, levers not available to central government to encourage motorists to make the switch to ultra low emission vehicles. This includes local incentives and/or regulations, and leading by example by making bold changes to public sector fleets, buses and taxis. We recognise and welcome the progress made in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have already made to reduce emissions from road transport, and promote the uptake of ultra low emission vehicles. Each of the devolved administrations already has its own programme of measures in place.
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Defra will develop research outputs as part of their partnership with the Met Office Hadley Centre to explore the requirements for a climate resilient agri- food system, provide insight into optimising adaptation options and define risk factors associated with climate change across the food system by 2025. 11.
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closures - https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/), the Centre for Responsible and Sustainable Finance in Spain (Finresp) and the Academic Forum on Sustainable Finance in Spain. LINE OF ACTION 14.1. INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION INTO SUSTAINABLE FINANCE INITIATIVES 150 - Some of the many initiatives in this regard are the Principles for Responsible Investment (with the UNEP Finance Initiative and the Global Compact - https:/www.unpri.org/), the Interna- tional Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPFS https:/ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/ banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance), the TCFD (Task force on Climate-Related Financial Dis-
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Figure 7 displays, for three curves of IAM 1, the distribution in (12), i.e. the temporal kriging, represented by bigger dots and the shades (the 95% credible band), and the associated observed data by smaller dots.
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There are also challenges in the planning process for low carbon electricity infrastructure in Scotland, which differs from the systems in England and Wales. These challenges are delaying investment in critical infrastructure and are costly to consumers. Government has run a consultation on proposals for reforming the consenting processes in Scotland under the Electricity Act 1989 and working with the Scottish Government, timely implementation of the results of the consultation process We need to accelerate transformation of the system, building on the work set out in the N S I P Action Plan. In February 2023, the then government published the N S I P Action Plan which outlined five key reform areas to help make the N S I P planning system better, faster, greener, fairer and more resilient. Following on from this, changes to the N S I P system were implemented in Spring 2024 with the introduction of legislative amendments to key infrastructure planning legislation and new infrastructure planning guidance. We recognise previous reforms to the system are yet to be in full effect and will make a positive difference, like the designation of low-carbon nationally significant energy infrastructure projects as ‘Critical National Priorities’ through the energy National Policy Statements. However, existing reforms still do not match our ambition for Clean Power 2030, and so we must go further – using all tools Our planning reform programme for energy infrastructure will need to be tightly coordinated. The delivery of energy infrastructure in Great Britain is split between interacting systems that differ between nations, with varying roles for central, local, and devolved governments. For the planning and environmental reform package to facilitate Clean Power 2030, changes will need to be made that cut across many different areas, involving multiple organisations, including developers, supply chains, and investors. The different systems with different requirements and obligations across the planning landscape are complex and were not designed to deliver at the speed and volumes now required of them. We will equip examining authorities with the tools they need to help deliver Clean Power 2030 and government’s We can unblock bottlenecks by improving resource, particularly shortages of critical specialisms, which are often noted as a main cause of statutory consultees’ reasons for planning application deadline 51 D E S N Z (2023), ‘Hydrogen planning barriers and solutions – research findings’ (viewed in December 2024). delayed responses to planning applications from the Environment Agency were due 52 Environment Agency (2024), ‘Environment Agency’s planning consultation response 2023 to 2024’ (viewed in December 2024). England have said the same for over 80% of the time they need to extend a deadline for 53 Natural England (2023), ‘Natural England’s response times to planning consultations in England’ (viewed in December 2024). consultee, Historic England, have seen a 39% decrease in expenditure on heritage services in Local Planning Authorities in planning 54 Historic England (2024), ‘Proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework and other changes to the planning Consultation Response – September 2024’ (viewed in December 2024). of developments. Reform of the planning system includes a need to better employ key skills and resource across a variety of bodies, which can be managed through targeted interventions and streamlining the system. We are expecting an increase in planning applications with the Clean Power 2030 target, providing further challenges than those the planning system is already experiencing. T o manage this • We will expand cost‑recovery mechanisms across relevant regimes to ensure that all organisations key to consenting have sustainable resourcing models which can match the demand of projects in the system into the future, to help deliver Clean Power Inspectorate and statutory consultees give to developers through the planning process, particularly at the • We will review resourcing in key organisations to determine whether they are suitable for handling an increased number of projects in the coming years. To ensure resource is making the most impact, we will drive operational efficiency in statutory consultees, to speed up consultation and examination timelines. Alongside a review of resourcing, we will establish new performance standards for all public-sector organisations, including central government teams, the Planning Inspectorate, statutory advisors, and local planning authorities; in addition to improving guidance and support for the • We plan to reform planning resourcing for the longer term, including supporting existing strategies such as working with universities and skills providers to strengthen the intake of planners required for all infrastructure building. Additionally, we will look at options for attracting and retaining key specialists, such as through reviewing entry
• We will boost local planning capacity including wider programmes of support, working with partners across the planning sector to ensure that local planning authorities have the skills they need both now and in the future. The government has announced a £46 million package of investment into the planning system to support capacity and capability including the recruitment and training of graduate and apprentice planners to support the • We will consider enhancing the quality standards energy N S I P applications must meet in order for their applications to be accepted into the regime and publish best practice to help prevent resource being used unnecessarily in addressing issues with low quality or incomplete applications. Projects submitted to the Planning Inspectorate should be of a high quality, following best practice and guidance. Through constructive, early engagement with statutory consultees, and timely provision of information and evidence, developers will be able to better meet the • The Clean Power 2030 Unit will convene nature, communities and industry groups on complex projects in order to encourage and facilitate a high standard for projects, and stress-test them prior to application to identify any problems with input from across the planning system.
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It is instructive to examine the sources of historical cumulative CO2 emissions from countries responsible for the largest emissions reported from 1850 to 2021 (Figure 1). Two main contributions can be identified: (1) CO2 emissions related to fossil fuel consumption (grey bars); and (2) CO2 emissions related to land-use change and deforestation (green bars). From 1950, fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions increased about 3.85 times, from 6.5 Gt in 1950 to 25.1 Gt in 2000. In contrast, land-use-change-related CO2 emissions experienced about a 22% decrease from about 5.5 Gt in 1950 to 4.3 Gt in 2000. These statistics underscore the significance of fossil fuels and increased energy demand for economic and population growth in their contributions to CO2 emissions growth. National contributions to CO2 emissions are not as clear-cut as the Figure 1 statistics suggest. A more relevant approach involves analyzing national contributions to emissions in a more holistic manner. One such method is to incorporate a life-cycle analysis related to the production and consumption of key commodities and services. This would involve considering the extraction of raw materials at one end of the life cycle along various supply chains, through processing, manufacturing, and distribution, to post-consumption recycling of waste materials (termination of life cycle). Thus, emissions recorded by resource-rich nations (through extraction and distribution processes) should not be attributed solely to the producing nations but also partially shared with those nations consuming, transporting and trading the commodities and services. Recording net or life-cycle contributions to CO2 emissions would provide a more accurate recognition of the nations most responsible for such emissions. We need to consider a less discussed issue, that is related to the question: What share of carbon emissions is allocated to early-stage technology development? Historically, what we called the "Developed World" and leading companies (through radical innovation processes) spent vast resources and contributed over long periods of time to environmental pollution. However, technology and knowledge development drive national/regional economic and political power, it also increases the level of public access to products and services without reinventing the wheel and emitting carbon. Fairly, such emissions (caused by human activities that are not constrained to confined regions/nations/races etc.) should not be assigned the responsibility of just a few industrial-pioneering countries. On the other hand, it cannot simply be divided based on a simple per capita allocation to calculate nations' shares. Since many nations are still fighting for access to many resources and industrial technologies, it is unfair for them to be financially burdened with the historical pollution associated with resources and technologies they have never had access to. It is important to address potential counterarguments or alternative perspectives regarding the conflicts of interest in international environmental agreements. Critics may argue that focusing solely on economic solutions, such as CO2 emission taxes, may not be sufficient to address the complex and multifaceted nature of climate change. Additionally, some may contend that implementing an international fiscal system may be challenging due to issues of sovereignty and enforcement, and the reality that some nations will game such a system. By acknowledging these perspectives, the analysis becomes more balanced and comprehensive. Another factor concerns how the economically developed world should support developing and underdeveloped nations to help them achieve targeted economic growth and improve their living standards. This includes facilitating access to sufficient, relatively low-cost, clean energy sources. In the current world, many nations, particularly developing ones, opt for the cheapest or most accessible energy solutions. Unfortunately, many of these solutions are the least environmentally friendly (e.g. coal without carbon capture). The position taken, and the modifications demanded to the final COP26 statement by India exemplify how conflicts of interest can lead to lobbying, attenuation, refusal, and even withdrawal from international environmental commitments. Such conflicts of interest primarily arise from the economic drivers influencing national policy decisions. This suggests that economic solutions, such as CO2 emission taxes, are required. The fairest way to implement such a fiscal solution would be to use net (life-cycle) emissions, with the proceeds of the taxes raised used to provide financial and technical assistance to less developed nations, thereby helping them meet environmental commitments while combating poverty by ensuring a certain level of economic growth. To implement such a fiscal system, fair and unbiased international regulators with enforcement powers would be necessary. Moreover, this system would need to be accountable and demonstrate tangible emissions reduction benefits. Such systems are, of course, of no use if they just work on paper and/or are subject to manipulation by vested interests. In an ideal world, governing politicians should represent the collective desires of the population in promoting environmental, cultural, and economic aspirations. However, political oligarchies (represented by political parties in many countries) often attempt to preserve the interests of their supporters and financial backers. Democratically elected politicians tend to prioritize short-term issues, such as job creation or economic growth, as their policies and decisions related to such issues can achieve tangible short-term rewards. For example, the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 prioritized U.S. economic interests over long-term environmental concerns [5]. This example highlights that national environmental policies are often driven and/or constrained by economic influencers and vested interests to secure their political survival. Another factor impacting international environmental accords, such as the Paris Agreement or the Kyoto Protocol, is that not all sectors of the global population have the same level of influence in terms of the scope they cover. The agendas of such accords typically determine the issues that are prioritized, which often do not incorporate all the relevant issues affecting various sectors of society. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions but did not adequately address deforestation or the needs of indigenous communities. To address these gaps in representation, it is essential to involve marginalized groups, or those with limited economic influence, and ensure their voices are heard in the decision-making process.
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This will deliver a major upgrade to the range of UK climate projection tools designed to help decision-makers assess their risk UKCP18 will provide improvements to the existing projections which currently consist of guidance material, graphical displays of potential future climate change and datasets that users can utilise for their own purposes. Importantly, it will continue to enable a range of possible future conditions rather than just a best estimate, allowing users to make decisions according to their preferred level of resilience to future changes and make informed choices about adaptation. There have been many updates to increase the usefulness of the dataset since the original launch and UKCP09 remains a vital source for informing UK adaptation. However, recent 165
Chapter 7 – Research and Systematic Observation 239 advances in climate science and the ability of supercomputers to run more and better climate simulations, combined with an evolving user requirement, mean it is now appropriate to develop 7.3.2.2 UK delivery of climate capability and excellence The UK is extremely well placed to address the research priorities associated with climate change, because of the strength of our climate science research community. There are numerous centres of climate science excellence in NERC centres, UK universities and an increasing focus on applied and policy-relevant research within the private sector. A leading flagship programme is the BEIS and Defra co-funded Met Office Hadley Centre Climate Programme (MOHCP). This delivers world-leading scientific evidence on climate variability and change, and provides the core science evidence on which UK government can make decisions to help the UK become resilient to climate variability and change, benefit from opportunities for growth and engage in international climate negotiations. The MOHCP makes a vital contribution to the UK national climate capability by providing a central role in development of infrastructure and translating, delivering and applying climate science. It focuses on both direct policy-relevant research and improving the underlying The current iteration of the MOHCP , 2015-2018 is addressing four priority theme • Climate sensitivity, thresholds and the water cycle • Dynamics of climate variability and change • Regional climate and extremes In addition to these research themes, enhancements to infrastructure have been across a number of areas, including observational datasets and modelling architecture. Supercomputer facilities were upgraded during the current MOHCP . The 2018-2021 work plan of the MOHCP has recently been agreed and has a central focus of serving the needs of UK Government by providing policy-relevant scientific evidence and advice to support the needs of the Paris Agreement. The programme is designed around the key questions identified above. It will also continue the development of fundamental science and core UK climate science infrastructure. Climate science is a priority area for Government funding of science. More broadly, investment in the UK’s science, research and innovation base is viewed as fundamental by the Government. UK science is the most productive in the G7 and from 3.2% of global research and development (R&D) spend, the UK accounts for 16% of the most highly-cited research articles. Recent examples of the Government’s commitment to science funding • Increasing research and development investment by £4.7 billion over the period 2017- 18 to 2020-21. This equates to an extra £2 billion per year by 2020-21 and is an increase of around 20% to total government R&D spending, more than any increase in • This R&D investment funding is additional to the protection of science resource funding that was announced at the spending review in autumn 2015, where science resource funding was protected in real terms, at £4.7 billion per year, until 2020/21. 240 7th National Communication • £300 million over the next four years to increase the number of PhDs and fellowship programmes, to develop research talent and attract the brightest minds to the UK. • Investing £1.5 billion over the period 2016/17 to 2020/21 in the Global Challenges Research Fund for UK science to support research on global issues affecting developing countries. The Newton Fund will also be doubled to £150 million a year by • £100 million investment to attract highly skilled researchers to the UK through its new Ernest Rutherford Fund. The Rutherford Fund will provide fellowships for early- career and senior researchers, from the developed world and from emerging research powerhouses such as India, China, Brazil and Mexico, helping to maintain the UK’s position as a world-leader in science and research. 7.3.2.4 Government departments and their agencies The following section provides background information on those departments and agencies who are engaged with the climate research agenda. BEIS is the lead government department covering mitigation policy and, as highlighted above, plays a central role in funding research into low-carbon technologies. BEIS also leads the UK Government input into the IPCC and provides funding for research that contributes to the climate science evidence base feeding into the IPCC. Defra is responsible for several policy areas that are associated with GHG emissions agriculture, forestry, land management, waste, and fluorinated gases. Defra works with BEIS to ensure specific government policies on low-carbon energy and decarbonisation measures are sustainable and aligned with Defra’s objectives on the environment, food production and rural economy including ensuring opportunities for maximising co-benefits such as cleaner air. Defra is also responsible for the adaptation agenda described above. DFID has an active interest in the funding of climate science as part of its work leading UK efforts to end extreme poverty and tackle the great global challenges of the 21 details on DFID funding of research, which spans both mitigation and adaptation, can be found in the international cooperation section below. DfT (and the Office for Low Emission Vehicles) is also heavily involved in low-carbon policy in the UK, given the significant contribution that transport emissions make to total UK emissions and the challenges in decarbonising this sector. The UK’s ambition is for a modern, low-carbon, low- pollution transport system with zero emissions in 2050.
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
Many of these are tied to emerging hydrogen and CCUS clusters, providing opportunities for the UK skills base to thrive in industrial regions across the UK and maximising opportunities for jobs in the sector. It is our expectation that the hydrogen sector, as it grows, will invest in growing its skills base and in supporting good-quality jobs, with equality of opportunity as a core focus To support this in the near term, we will seek to introduce measures through the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund, and in due course we would expect to do the same for the proposed Hydrogen Business Model. Our aim is to incentivise project developers to demonstrate how they intend to grow relevant skills and support good quality jobs and equality of opportunity throughout the supply chain. We will continue to monitor this as the hydrogen sector matures and consult if necessary to identify barriers to sufficient private sector investment in growing the UK skills base and supporting good quality jobs and EDI. 3.3 Maximising our research and innovation Supporting research and innovation (R&I) will be key to cost-effective acceleration of the UK hydrogen economy and ensuring it can create and stimulate economic opportunities where the UK has expertise. We will take a whole-system approach to R&I throughout the 2020s to be able to deploy and integrate hydrogen technology and systems holistically in the context of wider social, environmental and economic developments. The UK’s existing hydrogen research base is strong. As the second most active country in hydrogen and fuel cell research in Europe, we are well placed to capture part of the global innovation potential in the hydrogen value chain and position the UK as a leading hydrogen Enhancing the ability of the UK R&I ecosystem to support commercialisation We recognise that the technology journey – from idea to commercialisation – seldom moves from discovery research through to development (learning by research) and demonstration (learning by doing) in a linear way. It is an iterative process which must be further enabled to support the de-risking of current technology while next generation UK government investment in internationally recognised hydrogen R&I projects has already enabled the development of many key hydrogen technologies, including those promoted by a handful of UK firms, such as Bramble Energy, Ceres Power and ITM Power, who have positioned themselves at the forefront of the global shift to hydrogen.88 We want to see others follow in the footsteps of these companies, for example by making the most of opportunities such as our £1 billion Net Zero Innovation Portfolio (NZIP), which has made hydrogen one of ten key priority areas. NZIP itself represents a doubling of the UK’s £505 million Energy Innovation Programme over the past five years. We aim for this new funding to be complemented by up to £3.5 billion of matched and follow- on funding from the private sector. One of the first schemes to be launched under the NZIP is the £60 million Hydrogen Supply 2 Competition, which will support the development of a wide range of innovative low carbon hydrogen supply solutions in the UK, and identify and scale up more efficient solutions for making clean hydrogen from To provide crucial long-term certainty for researchers and innovators, we have also already committed to increasing our investment in research and development (R&D) to 2.4 per cent of GDP by 2027 and to increasing public funding for R&D to £22 billion per year by 2024. This will further boost the UK R&I ecosystem, including hydrogen-related activity. Chapter 3: Realising economic benefits for the UK
Public sector funding is often key to leveraging private sector investment in innovation, and even more so in the context of unlocking commercialisation and creating a market for hydrogen. We will work with the Hydrogen Advisory Council and other partners to better understand the scale, scope and type of private sector investment into hydrogen R&I in the UK, and how it can be further promoted. Our new Innovation Strategy, which will be published later this year, will further outline how we intend to promote private sector investment in R&I more broadly in the UK. With such a critical role to play in enabling the UK hydrogen economy, it is important that a joined up and strategic approach is taken to hydrogen R&I investment and prioritisation. Government has already established governance mechanisms through a Net Zero Innovation Board to ensure a coordinated, strategic approach to R&D and demonstration funding across public funding bodies, and to enhance the alignment of public and private sector innovation in support of net zero. Building on this, we will work with experts, including through the newly established R&I working group under the Hydrogen Advisory Council, to develop a strategic and cross-cutting Hydrogen R&I Roadmap to inform public and private sector R&I investment and prioritisation. UK R&I in the global landscape We recognise that the UK’s world-leading R&I sits at the heart of a global network of UK expertise both benefits from and drives forward advances beyond our own borders. We believe that by engaging actively and openly to share research, progress in R&I can be accelerated and its benefits maximised. We will use our role as one of the co-leads of Mission Innovation’s new Clean Hydrogen Mission – and coordinator of its R&D pillar of activities – to champion this approach from the top down. Our commitment to the Mission affords us a unique opportunity to showcase UK R&I expertise and to leverage its outputs to spur further technological progress, and ensure innovation is commercialised in a way that can push forward hydrogen technology development. In Chapter 4 of this strategy, we set out how we will work to ensure this ‘push’ boost of R&I progress is joined-up with policy, regulatory and demand-focused actions that ‘pull’ its contributions through the value chain.
|
ac51fb39-e78a-494b-9e13-bdfbc5170f0c
| 33
|
05f71314-fab3-4a03-8d35-8888cde36a9d
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.09066v1
| 2,022
|
[
"abatement",
"optimal",
"climate",
"agents",
"change"
] |
arxiv.org
|
Optimal abatement with financial frictions is almost always about 2.5 times higher in an economy with financial frictions than in the Pareto-optimal outcome in the frictionless economy (with the exception of 𝑡 = 2, 𝑧 𝑡 = 6 and 𝑡 = 3, 𝑧 𝑡 = 6). This seems surprising: in an optimal world, emissions, temperature increases, and the resulting damages are significantly higher than in the sub-optimal equilibrium with financial frictions. The economic reasoning is clear; in an economy with financial friction, high carbon taxes substitute for precautionary savings, which are impossible for the hand-to-mouth agents and only possible only in a risky asset for other agents. In the frictionless case, optimal abatement after the fourth period (i.e. 𝑡 = 3) is higher if the economy is in a worse climate state. This makes sense since the marginal benefits of abatement are high precisely in those states. Financial frictions reverse this pattern. Optimal abatement at 𝑡 = 3 is highest in the low ECS states and decreases as the ECS increases. This is caused by the fact that in high ECS states at 𝑡 = 3, there are already substantial damages, and while the marginal benefits of abatement are large, most of the costs have to be borne by the hand-to-mouth agents who are already hard hit. If these agents could insure against this bad outcome they would be able to spend more on abatement. A comparison between the constrained optimal case (BT) and the case without transfers (NT) shows that this is not only caused by the fact that in the optimal case, the hand-to-mouth agents have to pay a large fraction of the abatement costs. Without transfers, all agents pay proportionally to their capital holdings and their labor endowments; in this case, the hand-to-mouth agents actually only bear a small fraction of total costs. Optimal abatement is uniformly larger. In some instances, e.g. in 𝑧 1 = 3 or 𝑧 2 = 6 the difference is quite substantial and larger than 10 percent. The issue becomes clearer if one looks at transfers and total costs of abatement as detailed in Table 2 \ The table shows relative costs (relative to costs at 𝑧 3 = 1 which are normalized to one) as well as the share of these costs each agent bears in the transfer scheme. For good climate shocks with small damages, agent 3 bears almost the entire cost, and the total expenditure for abatement is high. For a bad climate shock, damages to agent 3's labor endowments are already very high (about 30 percent loss in shock six) and the agent simply does not have the resources to finance a large abatement. Of course, the magnitude of the differences between the complete markets abatement and the constrained optimal abatement with financial frictions depends crucially on the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers that are hit hardest by future damages from climate change. While this is arguably a realistic assumption, it is useful to also examine other calibrations. Table 3 compares the optimal abatement in the main calibration (BM) to the optimal abatement in the alternative calibration (AC) and to optimal abatement in the calibration where the only financial friction consists of market incompleteness (IM). In the (AC) calibration, participation in financial markets, even if they are incomplete, leads to much lower optimal abatement levels, certainly in cases where the damages of climate change are not yet too high (in 𝑧 3 = 6 optimal abatement is very similar in the two cases). Note that abatement levels are still significantly higher than in the frictionless case. Interestingly, in the calibration without any hand-to-mouth consumers, optimal abatement levels are again significantly higher than in (AC). This is caused by the fact that the agents that are hardest hit by climate change now constitute a significant fraction of the total population (1/5 instead of only 1/8 in the BM calibration). The constrained optimal abatement is much larger than in the CM markets case (for this case, it is the same as in Table 1, since aggregate damages remain the same). The example illustrates that even when the only friction is the incompleteness of financial markets, optimal abatement levels can differ by a lot. It should be emphasized that in this case of incomplete markets, like in the case of the complete market, abatement in the 4th period is higher in worse climate states. This is in stark contrast to the calibration with hand-to-mouth consumers, where the opposite is true. In fact, at 𝑧 2 = 6 and at 𝑧 3 = 6, constrained optimal abatement in the CM calibration is significantly higher than in the BM calibration. Even with incomplete financial markets, agents that suffer the most from climate change have enough liquidity in bad climate shocks to pay for higher abatement. Finally, I consider the effects of delayed implementation on optimal abatement levels. Table 4 shows optimal abatement for the cases where abatement is delayed for one period and or two periods (i.e., for 10 or 20 years). Delayed implementation slightly increases optimal taxes (also, compared to the results in Table 1). This is also true in the frictionless case (here only reported for a delay by one period) but certainly much less so. In the low ECS states at 𝑡 = 3 optimal taxes in the calibration with frictions are more than three times higher than optimal taxes in the frictionless case. To summarize the findings so far: Financial frictions have very large effects on optimal carbon taxes and optimal abatement. The less sophisticated possible transfer schemes, the higher the optimal taxes (and the lower the resulting climate damages). A natural next step is to investigate the welfare consequences of these findings. We report all welfare losses in lifetime consumption equivalent, i.e., we ask by what percentage consumption at all times and date events has to change to compensate for welfare changes caused by climate change or financial frictions.
|
fb836d8a-bb01-4c22-b865-7f9073467327
| 7
|
05f7a20f-fdbe-49ee-ac33-15a786af1e85
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf
| 2,020
|
[
"Waste",
"Transport",
"Economy-wide",
"Energy",
"Adaptation",
"Carbon Pricing",
"Institutions / Administrative Arrangements",
"Energy Supply",
"Research And Development",
"Energy Demand",
"emissions",
"zero",
"carbon",
"budget",
"costs"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
We also incorporate expected changes to the UK emissions accounts to reflect higher estimates for emissions from peatlands and higher global warming potentials (GWP) proposed by the IPCC (and agreed at the UNFCCC) for non-CO2 greenhouse gases. As a result, our estimate for UK emissions in 2019 is a further 42 MtCO2e higher than in the UK’s official inventory. Box 2.1 in Chapter 2 sets out more details on these issues. Zero, which forms the basis of
25 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero Meeting the Sixth Carbon Budget requires action across four key areas in line with • Reducing demand for carbon-intensive activities. – Reduced demand. Around 10% of the emissions saving in our Balanced Pathway in 2035 comes from changes that reduce demand for carbon-intensive activity. Particularly important in our scenarios are an accelerated shift in diets away from meat and dairy products, reductions in waste, slower growth in flights and reductions in travel demand. While changes are needed, these can happen over time and overall can be positive for health and well-being. – Improved efficiency. A further 5% comes from improving efficiency, in use of energy and resources, especially by better insulation of buildings, improving vehicle efficiency and improving efficiency in • Take-up of low-carbon solutions. Over half the emissions saving is from people and businesses adopting low-carbon solutions as high-carbon and all boiler replacements in homes and other buildings must be low- we expect largely electric. By 2040 all new heavy goods vehicles should be low-carbon. Industry must either adopt technologies that use electricity or hydrogen instead of fossil fuels or install carbon capture and • Expansion of low-carbon energy supplies. – Low-carbon electricity. Low-carbon electricity can now be produced more cheaply than high-carbon electricity in the UK and globally. – In our Balanced Pathway the low-carbon share increases from 50% now to 100% by 2035, cutting UK emissions by 18% compared to our baseline. New demands from transport, buildings and industry (moderated by improving energy efficiency) mean electricity demand rises 50% to 2035, doubling or even trebling by 2050. The largest contribution is from offshore wind, reaching the Government’s goal of 40 GW in 2030, on a path to 65-125 GW by 2050. – Low-carbon hydrogen scales up to 90 TWh by 2035 (i.e. nearly a third of the size of the current power sector), produced using electricity or from natural gas or biomass with carbon capture and storage. It is used in areas less suited to electrification, particularly shipping and parts of industry, and is vital in providing flexibility to deal with intermittency in the power system. It may also have a material longer- term role in buildings and other transport, such as heavy goods • Land (and removals). A transformation is needed in the UK’s land while supporting UK farmers. By 2035 our scenarios involve planting of 440,000 hectares of mixed woodland to remove CO2 from the atmosphere as they grow, with a further 260,000 hectares of agricultural land shifting to bioenergy production (including short rotation forestry). This would see UK woodland cover growing from 13% now to 15% by 2035. Peatlands must be restored widely and managed sustainably. Low-carbon farming practices must be adopted widely, while raising farm productivity. The largest contribution is from
Alongside the nature-based removals, by 2035 the UK should be using bioenergy (largely grown in the UK) with CCS to deliver engineered 2025-2035. Before 2025, newer markets (e.g. for electric vehicles and low-carbon heating) are still scaling up from low levels, so potential for large-scale roll-out and therefore rapid emissions reductions is more limited. Beyond 2035 some opportunities have been exhausted, so progress slows down (e.g. the power sector reaches zero emissions by 2035). BEIS (2020) Provisional UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics 2019; CCC analysis. ‘Other low -carbon technology’ includes use of bioenergy and waste treatment measures. ‘Producing low - carbon electricity’ requires the use of CCS in electricity generation. Emissions fall fastest over 2025- 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Low-carbon electrification Low-carbon hydrogen and other low-carbon technology Low-carbon CO₂ capture from fossil fuels and industry Offset emissions using land and greenhouse gas removals
27 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero
Phase-out dates of high-carbon activities under the Balanced Pathway Technology/behaviour Phase out date (sales) Backstop date (operation) 2032 (including plug-in hybrids) 2050 2030-33 (in commercial properties) Oil boilers 2028 (in residential homes) 2025-26 (in commercial properties) Gas power generation (unabated) 2030 (no new build of unabated gas plants) N/A 2025 ban on all municipal & From today, new plants and extensions should be built with CCS or CCS ready LULUCF = Land use, land-use change and forestry at different rates, reflecting the Surface transport Electricity supply Manufacturing & construction Buildings F-gases LULUCF (sources and sinks)
29 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero Delivering the actions required in the 2020s to meet the Sixth Carbon Budget requires policies to be strengthened now. Matching strong ambition with action is vital for the UK’s credibility, with business and with the international community. Action in early years underpins the transition by developing options and driving learning-by-doing in key technologies. It keeps open the possibility that if faster progress proves possible it can be taken, in further support of the global 1.5°C goal. A vital challenge is to ensure that the transition is fair, and perceived to be fair. That was a key theme from the recent UK Climate Assembly, and it is clear that engaging and involving the public in the transition and in policy design will be vital. The Treasury Net Zero Review must identify fair ways to share the costs and benefits of the transition and the Government must develop effective plans for a just transition while embedding the principle of fairness throughout policy. Plans should recognise interactions with other transformations, such as digitalisation.
|
083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7
| 8
|
05fa3ea6-8c5a-46e9-809d-252a196456bf
|
http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07520v1
| 2,019
|
[
"unlabeled climate model simulation data",
"cam5.1 water vapor data",
"2d turbulence simulation data",
"floods",
"temporal depth"
] |
ArXiv
|
Because they act as transport barriers, they partition the flow on either side and these partitions are given by two distinct local causal states with the boundary between them running along the hyperbolic LCS in the unstable direction. For example, the narrow dark blue-colored state in the upper right of (b) indicates a narrow flow channel squeezed between two hyperbolic LCS. There are other smaller vortices in Jupiter's atmosphere, most notably the "string of pearls" in the Southern Temperate Belt, four of which are highlighted with blue bounding boxes. We can see in (e) that the pearls are nicely captured by the local causal states, similar to the turbulence vortices in (b). Perhaps the most distinctive features of Jupiter's atmosphere are the zonal belts. The east-west zonal jet streams that form the boundaries between bands are of particular relevance to Lagrangian Coherent Structure analysis. Figure 11 in [30] uses the geodesic method to identify these jet streams as shearless parabolic LCS, indicating they act as transport barriers that separate the zonal belts. The particular segmentation shown in (e) captures a fair amount of detail inside the bands, but the edges of the bands have neighboring pairs of local causal states with boundaries that extend contiguously in the east-west direction along the parabolic LCS transport barriers. Two such local causal state boundaries are highlighted in green, for comparison with Figure 11 (a) in [30]. The topmost green line, in the center of (d) and (e), is the southern equatorial jet, shown in more detail in Figure 11 (b) and Figure 12 of [30]. Its north-south meandering is clearly captured by the local causal states. The strong qualitative correspondence between local causal state structural segmentation and LCS gives validation that our method can capture meaningful structure in complex spatiotemporal systems. Our aim now is to use the structural segmentation to build extreme weather segmentation masks for climate data. Each event, e.g. hurricanes or atmospheric rivers (ARs), are identified as a unique set of structured behaviors that are captured by the local causal states in a structural segmentation. For example, a structural segmentation of the water vapor field of the CAM5.1 global atmospheric model is shown on YouTube [32] and in Figure 1 (e), (f). While signatures of hurricanes and ARs are visually apparent, these events are not uniquely identifiable from the local causal states. However, hurricanes and ARs have characteristic structural signatures in other physical fields, including thermodynamic quantities such as temperature and pressure. So it is not surprising that they can not be uniquely identified from a structural segmentation of the water vapor field alone; this would be akin to describing hurricanes as just local concentrations of water vapor. In addition to further optimization and scaling, we are currently working on implementing multi-variate local causal state reconstruction to incorporate additional physical fields. Using, for example, structural segmentation of vorticity, temperature, pressure, and water vapor fields we will be able to identify hurricanes as high rotation objects with a warm, low pressure core that locally concentrate water vapor. Similarly, the inclusion of water vapor transport will help identify ARs, as well as the use of larger lightcone templates that will better capture their large-scale geometry. Though our structural segmentation requires information from multiple physical observables to identify extreme weather events, the generality of the local causal states will allow us to do this. An automated, objective identification of sets of local causal states across the various physical observables that uniquely corresponds to particular extreme weather events will be challenging but, we believe, achievable.
|
a653afd6-f9d2-40eb-a545-bbb59802ed2d
| 2
|
05fb4a65-ec52-43ab-9483-b69128d355d3
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.20105v2
| 2,025
|
[
"temperature",
"growth",
"climate",
"provinces",
"effects"
] |
arxiv.org
|
Specifically, by conditioning on the province fixed effects α p , this ensures that the systematic patterns of weather in each province are isolated from the 7 Specifically, the heating degree days (HDDpy) below 23 • C and the cooling degree days above 28 • C (CDDpy) were calculated as follows:
within-location year-to-year variation in temperature exposure. Because weather fluctuations are unpredictable and potentially difficult for economic agents to anticipate, it seems reasonable to presume that the variation is as good as randomly assigned. The year fixed effects α y account for any time-varying trends or shocks that are common across all provinces in Thailand. Following Deschênes and Greenstone (2011); Schlenker and Roberts (2009), I assumed that the detrended year-to-year variations within each province were uncorrelated with year-to-year variations in potentially important factors that might affect economic growth. This subsection presents the impact of temperature on the growth of provincial aggregate output, as observed in the historical data. First, I discuss a common growth-temperature response function, as estimated using Equations 6, 7, and 8. The next results uncover differences in the growth-temperature response functions across population groups by interacting the temperature with a dummy for a province having low income, defined as a province having below median average inflation-adjusted GPP per capita across the sample period. To better understand the dynamics of the temperature effects in both low-income and no dummy models, I further discuss whether temperature affects growth through level effects or growth effects (Dell et al., 2012), using more flexible models with up to five lags of temperature. The results of various robustness checks on alternative specifications are also reported. I begin by estimating Equations 6, 7, and 8. These simple models examine the null hypothesis that temperature does not affect the growth. The results demonstrate an average growth-temperature response function across 77 provinces in Thailand. Specifically, the estimation uncovers the average growth-temperature response function h(T ) in the general panel specification in Equation 5. Each panel in Figure 2 presents the main estimation results of each alternative functional form assumption. 8 The graphs visualize a common temperature response function across 77 provinces in Thailand, evaluated at each 24-hour average temperature. Interestingly, all three functional forms exhibit analogous patterns in the data, suggesting the inverted-U shape of the response function: the growth rate of output per capita increases as temperature rises from cool to moderate (specifically, the reference temperature), and then declines. The point estimates can be interpreted as the effect of a single day at each 24-hour average temperature on the growth rate of output per capita relative to a day with an average reference temperature. For example, the results indicate that a day at 35 Column 1 in Table 2 additionally details the estimated growth-temperature responses at specific temperatures, relative to a day with the respective reference temperature in each functional form, to facilitate comparison of the estimation results. The point estimates in the polynomial (Panel A) and degree days (Panel C) functional forms are statistically significant, while those in the binned regression (Panel B) are broadly comparable in magnitude but only statistically significant at some temperatures. Regardless of statistical significance, the estimated impacts of temperature in all functional forms decrease as the temperature rises from cool to moderate and then increase. These results make it difficult to reject the hypothesis that the growth-temperature response is nonlinear. For a quick understanding of these temperature effects, here, I adapt the procedure described by Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) to calculate a marginal change in the annual growth rate of the economic output of 1 • C warming. Suppose the GPP growth was uniform across 365 days in a year, then a decrease of 0.014 percentage points of an annual growth from a day at 30 • C9 , relative to the reference day of 26 • C for the polynomial functional form, indicates the growth of that day is roughly 0.014% • 365 = 4.990% less than the growth of an average day of 26 • C. Linearizing the effect of temperature relative to the approximate zero effect at 26 • C, a marginal change in an annual GPP growth rate of 1
Analogously, for the binned regression, a decrease of 0.041 percentage points of an annual GPP growth from a day at 30 • C indicates the growth of that day is roughly 14.801% less than the growth of an average day in the omitted temperature bin. The effects of a 1 • C rise in temperature on an annual GPP growth rate is -3.700%, relative to the approximate zero effect at 26 • C. 10 As for the degree days functional form, the effects of a 1 • C rise in temperature on an annual GPP growth rate is -3.799%, relative to the approximate zero effect at the CDD threshold of 28 • C. Taken together with the estimated growth-temperature responses at various temperatures, these results suggest that estimates using the second-order polynomial functional form are, if anything, more conservative in estimating the impacts of warming temperatures on economic output. In addition to robustness to alternative functional forms, I considered robustness to alternative model specifications and samples. Appendix Table B2 reports the results of estimating a variety of robustness checks for the average growth-temperature response function h(T ) in which the average effect across 77 provinces was recovered. To be comparable with the main estimation results, the regression estimates of the models in Figure 2 are repeated in the first column of Appendix Table B2. Still, three functional form assumptions were estimated for each robustness check. I first dropped precipitation (column 2) to investigate whether changes in precipitation affect temperature estimates. Columns 3-6 demonstrate models that used an alternative set of controls relative to the baseline model. In column 3, I added region-by-year FE; in column 4, I adapted the specification of Burke et al. (2015) by adding quadratic province-specific time trends; in column 5, I adapted the specification of Dell et al.
|
4408d360-ca63-40ba-8dff-2537ab627fe1
| 5
|
05ffd3ca-3651-41f3-897b-7bdb999de9b7
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D1386&from=EN
| 2,013
|
[
"General",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
86. Local and regional authorities, which are generally responsible for decisions on the use of land and marine areas,
have a particularly important role to play in assessing environmental impacts and protecting, conserving and
enhancing natural capital, thus also achieving greater resilience to the impact of climate change and to natural
disasters. 87. The envisaged expansion of energy and transport networks, including offshore infrastructure, will need to be
compatible with protection of nature and climate adaptation needs and obligations. Incorporating green infra
structure into related plans and programmes can help overcome fragmentation of habitats and preserve or restore
ecological connectivity, enhance ecosystem resilience and thereby ensure the continued provision of ecosystem
services, including carbon sequestration, and climate adaptation, while providing healthier environments and
recreational spaces for people to enjoy. 88. The 7th EAP includes a number of priority objectives designed to enhance integration. In its proposals for the
Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, the Trans-European Networks and the Cohesion policy
reforms, the Commission has included measures to further support environmental integration and sustainability. For
the 7th EAP to succeed, those policies should further contribute to meeting environment-related targets and
objectives. Similarly, efforts primarily intended to achieve environmental improvements should be designed to
deliver benefits also for other policies wherever possible. For instance, efforts to restore ecosystems can be
targeted to benefit habitats and species and to sequester carbon dioxide, while improving the delivery of
ecosystem services vital for many economic sectors, such as pollination or water purification for agriculture, and
creating green jobs. 89.
|
2b3f86a5-3e9b-443e-ad77-adb974811b8a
| 47
|
06009cf1-62a7-4502-a893-a4a504c775aa
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L1513
| 2,015
|
[
"Transport",
"Electricity and heat",
"Industry",
"Renewables",
"Renewables"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
The Commission shall, if appropriate in light of the reports by the voluntary schemes in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 7c(6) of Directive 98/70/EC and the second subparagraph of Article 18(6) of Directive 2009/28/EC, submit a proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council for amending the provisions of those Directives relating to voluntary schemes with a view to promoting best practice. Article 4
Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 10 September 2017. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States. 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main measures of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. On that occasion, Member States shall inform the Commission of their national targets set in accordance with point (e) of Article 3(4) of Directive 2009/28/EC and, where appropriate, of a differentiation of their national target as compared to the reference value referred to therein, and the grounds therefor.
|
4fe696dc-952d-4f2f-9b63-404e8a63dbc7
| 29
|
0600cb0d-b8a8-4ec5-af86-c6b44d621734
| 2,025
|
[
"european climate law",
"net greenhouse gas emissions",
"climate change",
"first countries",
"slovakia"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
The European Climate Law legally defines the commitment in the European Green Deal for Europe's economy and society to be climate neutral by 2050. The law also sets an interim target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. Climate neutrality means achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions for EU countries as a whole, mainly by reducing emissions, investing in green technologies and protecting the natural environment. The Law aims to ensure that all EU policies contribute to this goal and that all sectors of the economy and society play their part. The Climate Law includes measures to monitor progress and adapt our actions according to existing systems, such as the process for managing Member States' national energy and climate plans, regular reports from the European Environment Agency, and the latest scientific evidence on climate change and its impacts. Slovakia is part of these actions and was among the first countries in the EU (end of 2019) to agree to climate neutrality by 2050.
|
084fad4b-b814-40ef-be37-9d393815ccda
| 0
|
|
06038367-d7d6-4a39-9e6f-59611d0b8bfc
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf
| 2,022
|
[
"climate",
"energy",
"support",
"emissions",
"carbon"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
At the G7 in 2019 the UK announced it will double its contribution to the GCF to £1.44 billion of new funding between 2020 and 2023, making the UK the largest contributor. £450 million of this commitment was provided in 2020. Other climate specific funding over the period 2018, 2019 and 2020 includes £106 million to the Global Envir The UK also pledged £15 million new funding to the Adaptation Fund at COP26. At least £3 billion of the £11.6 billion ICF commitment will be used to protect and restore nature and biodiversity over the five years to 2025/26 and £1 billion new funding for the Ayrton Fund will support clean energy Research, Development and At COP26 the UK launched the Clean Green Initiative (CGI) to help developing countries bridge the infrastructure gap, while supporting climate change and sustainable development goals, helping to scale up investment by the private sector. Bold commitments have been made at COP26 around key otecting £1.5 billion new UK funding over five years for the Global Forest Finance Pledge (part of the £3 billion nature commitment); • phasing out the UK is the largest contributor to the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) and committed an additional £350 £200 million to the new ransitions programme and £150 million to the Renewable Energy Integration programme (announced at UNGA); • mobilising The CIFs with strong UK leadership announced a new Capital Markets Mechanism expected to issue billions of green bonds in the City of London to support climate action; net zero £27.5 million new funding to support the launch of the Urban Climate Action Programme (UCAP); access to including a £100 million to r espond to recommendations from the UK co-chaired Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance to make it faster and easier for developing countries to access finance for their climate plans. COP26 also saw the launch of the International Just Transition Declaration44 committing to working together to ensure no one is left behind in the transition towards net Since 2011, UK ICF45 investments have helped 88 million people to cope with the effects of climate change. This includes supporting vulnerable individuals and e resilient to increased climate variability such as helping farmers grow crops that can adapt to changing weather conditions. Since 2011, UK ICF has also mobilised £8.0 billion in public and private finance in addition to our ICF spend commitments. Overall ICF provided from April 2011 to March 2021 is expected to avoid or reduce 960 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. 44 UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021: 45 2021 UK ICF
Annex 1: UKs Fifth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC 455 6.3 O verview of UK support, approach and channels The economic recovery after the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic will be critical to secure more ambitious and urgent action to promote a clean, green, inclusive, and resilient future. The UK is committed to supporting the global shift to net zero by providing developing countries access to more, better, and faster finance. Public finance will be used to mobilise the trillions that are urgently needed from the private sector to meet our climate and nature goals. As the new G7 Partnership for Infrastructure and Investment develops; we will collaborate with our G7 counterparts to drive progress towards a global Green The UK is building on the successful delivery of £5.8 billion ICF between 2016/17 – 2020/21 by providing a doubling of finance to £11.6 billion between 2021/22 – 2025/26. This is dedicated ring-fenced funding that is distinguishable from non-climate ODA. The £11.6 billion (2021/22) is a new commitment which is on top of the £5.8 billion commitment (2016/17 – March 2021). Tackling climate change is fundamental to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), therefore UK ICF is integrated into wider development spending. The UK Government has committed to align its ODA spend with the Paris Agreement in 2019 and we have continued to implement this commitment. In 2021 the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) included a new rule in its programme operating framework to ensure that ODA spend aligns with the Paris Agreement and does no harm to nature, with an intention to embed best practice approaches through all ODA spending departments. The UK’s ICF is playing a vital role in helping developing countries to respond and adapt to the challenges of climate change and prevent its worst effects. UK ICF is focusing on driving the rapid transformation and systemic shifts required to achieve the Paris Agreement goals and deliver on the Glasgow Climate Pact. British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance institution, is playing a transformative role in tackling climate change by supporting clean, inclusive, and resilient growth in the countries where it invests. With a climate finance target of at least 30% of new investment, it is supporting investments that facilitate transformation towards net-zero economies by 2050 by either investing in activities that are already low carbon or which indirectly enable emissions reductions in other activities. The UK is ensuring a balanced split between mitigation and adaptation finance, recognising that support for nature can deliver on both as well as addressing biodiversity loss. The UK is investing in mitigation where emissions are growing rapidly and in countries with forests that can play a role as major carbon sinks, whilst supporting those most vulnerable to impacts to adapt and become more resilient. COP26 saw the launch of the International Just Transition Declaration46 committing to working together to ensure no one is left behind in the transition towards net zero economies. The UK will enhance the gender-responsiveness of its programming, including by increasing the proportion of climate finance that has gender equality as a principal or significant objective as defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee Gender Equality policy marker47. The UK provides support through both bilateral and multilateral channels, as well as rules-based international system (RuBIS) to help drive global climate action.
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e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96
| 198
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0603a559-68b6-4da5-ba1d-85c726a964c8
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.12487v1
| 2,024
|
[
"frontiers",
"frontier",
"land",
"actors",
"rent"
] |
arxiv.org
|
With this in mind, intensive research efforts have been focused on describing and explaining the functioning of active frontiers in relation to agricultural expansion (12,14,56). Less focus has been put on explaining the processes that condition and shape emerging frontiers in territories considered as marginal in terms of agricultural productivity and global market connections, but that are in the process of turning into rapidly expanding active frontiers (17). Multiple theoretical perspectives shed light on distinct aspects of frontiers (57). In a historical and etymological analysis of the word "frontier" (in French), Febvre (58) already identified many of the tensions of the concept, i.e. between frontier as a hard boundary that roots a political space into a territory, versus something dynamic and expanding e.g. under military force; frontier as a separation between different populations or, at the contrary, the place where these people meets; or frontiers as contested places versus marginal, neglected places. In this section we unpack the main theories developed to explain frontiers. From the original notion of frontier as a tidal wave of colonists and civilization (18), frontiers have been described as a process of pushing back "wilderness" to create a space for development by taming the natural world (59), as well as spaces facing a rapidly expanding force that brings opportunities for a number of people (60). Frontiers have also been framed as places of resource extraction or exploitation (61). The "resource" in these frontiers can be either newly discovered or "reinvented", for example if it acquires a new value due to technological, institutional, socio-economic, environmental or cultural changes (38). This makes frontiers typical spaces of territorialization, i.e. spaces where institutional actors, including governments and corporations, turn places into "territories" that they can understand, monitor, regulate, and exploit (62). Through these processes, frontiers are also places of interface and friction between different worlds, e.g. subsistence and capitalist economies, different cultures, socio-political systems, and mode of relations to nature (63,64). For Turner (18), in a context of settler colonialism (65), the expansion of the frontier and the rolling back of wilderness was an attempt to make livable space out of an uncooperative nature. This process, which is seen as unfolding as a tidal wave, was more than simply a process of spatial expansion and the progressive taming of the physical world. For Turner, the development of the frontier was thus not only critical for the development of the country in economic and political terms, but also the central experience which defined the uniqueness of the American national identity and values. Each new wave of expansion westward, in its conquest of nature, sent shock waves back east in the democratization of human nature (66). Turner's thesis has now been largely criticized, including for its erroneous and harmful vision of land being "empty" or "unused" (see (67)), justifying colonization and eviction of indigenous people, and its teleological association between the frontier process and the supposed unique character and value of the U.S.A. and its people. Yet, Turner's frontier conceptualization nevertheless included seeds for many of the subsequent theoretical developments presented below, such as the notion of successive waves of frontiers (the pioneer, the settler, the urban, see Section 3.2), how land uses in frontiers are influenced by local contexts (the ranching frontier in the Great Plains versus the mining frontier in the mountains), and how the frontier is not a thin boundary but rather a dynamic space, creating opportunities for some, in which different worlds encounter with frictions (Sections 3.8 and 3.9), and where states and other powerful actors deploy efforts to make the territory legible and assert control of it (territorialization, Section 3.7). Many theorizations emphasize that frontiers do not manifest as a singular process happening once and for all in a certain space or region, but instead as successive waves, which may build on each other, reverse each other, and often overlap. The relations between these waves can be seen as contingent or following a regular, predictable succession pattern. For example, the making of a "second" new resource and commodity frontier in the 20th century in Laos builds on a "first frontier" in French colonial time which profoundly transformed landscapes, property relations, institutions, and the development trajectory, paving the way for this second recent frontier (68). Hirsch (69) describes, in Thailand, the succession of an agricultural frontier, which came to an end after the 1990s, by a peri-urban frontier, both successively transforming landscapes and institutions. The broad theory of land-use transitions corresponds to a typical conceptualization of frontiers occurring in predictable, regular waves. This theory sees land use following regular sequences from natural ecosystems to extensive, smallholder and subsistence land uses, then to intensive agriculture and forestry, then urbanization and the progressive rise of protected areas (20,21) (see section 2.2). Some deterministic versions of forest transition theories -i.e., large-scale shifts from deforestation to reforestation -articulate a similar sequence (55). Other theories such as the capitalist penetration theory (Section 3.2) also posit regular sequences from smallholder frontiers to consolidated, large-scale hollow frontiers. Further, in von Thünen's land rent theory (see section 3.4), concentric circles of distinct land uses progressively expand or contract depending on changes in equilibriums of the costs and benefits of these different land uses. Land rent theory has been widely used to explain successive frontiers waves expanding in a region such as in timber exploitation (41) or across sequences of land uses, such as the sequence from logging to cattle ranching to intensive soy cultivation frequent in South America (70,71). The apparent "closure" of a frontier, i.e. the cessation of the expansion of the land use that was driving the frontier, does not imply that there is no more resource to exploit in this area, or that extraction activities will not resume in the future. Contextual changes can create the potential for renewed rent extraction by new actors arriving with previously absent capacities to create and extract rents (e.g.
|
0753f6bf-892b-421c-8358-c992d89eb107
| 2
|
0604a763-6f8d-4188-949a-d8e8f715781a
|
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.11558v1
| 2,021
|
[
"Wildfires",
"Escape routes",
"Mobile app",
"Fire propagation model"
] |
ArXiv
|
The code of the project is available as opensource; the authors wish to encourage fire authorities around the world to adopt this approach. This project has research and innovation programme under This project has research and innovation programme under
|
bfbdf14d-6515-46bc-b6aa-470ec793342c
| 3
|
06058181-babd-4c96-b880-090e2a59f9fb
|
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/schedule/6/paragraph/9
| 2,008
|
[
"civil sanction",
"e+w+n.i.",
"regulations",
"breaches",
"obstructs"
] |
legislation.gov.uk
|
9 (1) The relevant national authority may make provision by regulations about civil sanctions for breaches of regulations under this Schedule. E+W+N.I. (2) For the purposes of this a person breaches regulations under this if, in such circumstances as may be specified, the person- (a) fails to comply with a requirement made by or under the regulations, or (b) obstructs or fails to assist an administrator. (3) In this " civil sanction " means- (a) a fixed monetary penalty (see paragraph 10), or (b) a discretionary requirement (see paragraph 12).
|
b2e01044-2b25-4a17-9438-cfc82e16fc9d
| 0
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06095a29-3f5f-498b-b961-1579e0a2963e
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19913
1.1.2.2. The parent vehicle shall be tested in the type 1 test on the two extreme gas reference fuels set out in Annex IX. In
the case of NGbiomethane, if the transition from one gas fuel to the other gas fuel is in practice aided through the
use of a switch, this switch shall not be used during type-approval. 1.1.2.3. The vehicle is considered to conform if, with both reference fuels, the vehicle complies with the emission limits. 1.1.2.4.
|
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| 38
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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Done at Brussels, 18 July 2008. For the Commission
Günter VERHEUGEN
Vice-President
1 OJ L 42, 23.2.1970, p. 1 Directive as last amended by Commission
Directive 200737EC
L 19910
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX I
Administrative provisions for EC type-approval
Appendix 1
Verification of conformity of production 1st statistical method
Appendix 2
Verification of conformity of production 2nd statistical method
Appendix 3
Model information document
Appendix 4
Model EC type-approval certificate
Appendix 5
OBD related information
Appendix 6
EC type-approval certificate numbering system
Appendix 7
Manufacturers certificate of compliance with OBD in-use performance requirements
ANNEX II
In-service conformity
Appendix 1
In-service conformity check
Appendix 2
Statistical procedure for in-service conformity testing
Appendix 3
Responsibilities for in-service conformity
ANNEX III
Verifying average exhaust emissions at ambient conditions Type 1 test
ANNEX IV
Emissions data required at type-approval for roadworthiness purposes
Appendix 1
Measuring carbon monoxide emissions at idling speeds Type 2 test
Appendix 2
Measurement of smoke opacity
ANNEX V
Verifying emissions of crankcase gases Type 3 test
ANNEX VI
Determination of evaporative emissions Type 4 test
ANNEX VII
Verifying the durability of pollution control devices Type 5 test
Appendix 1
Standard Bench Cycle SBC
Appendix 2
Standard Diesel Bench Cycle SDBC
Appendix 3
Standard Road Cycle SRC
ANNEX VIII
Verifying the average exhaust emissions at low ambient temperatures Type 6 test
ANNEX IX
Specifications of reference fuels
ANNEX X
Emissions test procedure for hybrid electric vehicles HEV
ANNEX XI
On-board diagnostics OBD for motor vehicles
Appendix 1
Functional aspects of OBD systems
Appendix 2
Essential characteristics of the vehicle family
ANNEX XII
Determination of CO2 emissions and fuel consumption
ANNEX XIII
EC Type-approval of replacement pollution control devices as separate technical unit
Appendix 1
Model information document
Appendix 2
Model EC type-approval certificate
Appendix 3
Model EC type-approval mark
ANNEX XIV
Access to vehicle OBD and vehicle repair and maintenance information
Appendix 1
Certificate of compliance
28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19911
ANNEX XV
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
In-service conformity of vehicles type-approval under Directive 70220EC
In-service conformity check
Statistical procedure for in-service conformity testing
ANNEX XVI
Requirements for vehicles that use a reagent for the exhaust aftertreatment system
ANNEX XVII
Amendments to Regulation EC No 7152007
ANNEX XVIII
Special Provisions Regarding Annex I to Council Directive 70156EEC
ANNEX XIX
Special Provisions Regarding Annex III to Council Directive 70156EEC
L 19912
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
ANNEX I
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS FOR EC TYPE-APPROVAL
1. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTING OF EC TYPE-APPROVAL
1.1. Additional requirements for mono fuel gas vehicles and bi fuel gas vehicles
1.1.1.
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 35
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|
https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2020/12/securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero-update-climate-change-plan-20182032/documents/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero/govscot%3Adocument/update-climate-change-plan-2018-2032-securing-green-recovery-path-net-zero.pdf
| 2,019
|
[
"scotland",
"climate",
"change",
"plan",
"emissions"
] |
www.gov.scot
|
Work with our partners, including the UK Government, local authorities and utility providers to determine the best approach to heat decarbonisation for buildings currently Review the system of building assessments and reports on energy performance and heat to ensure a system that is fit for purpose in meeting net zero emissions objectives for heat in
218 Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes Work with stakeholders to further understand and support the application and use of low and zero emissions heating within designated historic environment assets and hard to treat Develop and introduce future regulation for non-domestic buildings and launch a consultation on these proposals. Undertake work to identify the capacity and output of renewable electricity generation required in Scotland to support the projected roll-out of heat pumps. Consider whether to extend Permitted Development Rights for zero-emission heat networks and micro-renewable Undertake work to better understand the impact on electricity networks of projected heat pump deployment. Work with the Distribution Network Operators through the Heat Electrification Partnership to build an evidence base to Work with industry and networks to understand need for heat pumps systems to be smart enabled, and identify options to integrate smart systems into our delivery programmes; and to explore how innovation can help to improve the consumer Support heat networks Introducing a Non-Domestic Rates Relief for renewable and low carbon heat networks until 2023/24. Working to identify how new buildings in Heat Network Zones could be made ready to connect to heat networks. Including district heating within the Permitted Development Through National Planning Framework 4, ensuring that local development plans take account of where a Heat Network Zone Explore how local tax powers could be used to incentivise or encourage the retrofit of buildings, and commission further analysis to identify potential options. Design future delivery programmes to ensure significantly accelerated retrofit of buildings, with new programmes to be in
Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes 219 Outcome 3: Our gas network supplies an increasing proportion of green gas (hydrogen and biomethane) and is made ready for a fully Hydrogen for heat demonstrator – providing £6.9m support for SGN’s H100 hydrogen for domestic heat demonstrator. Work with UK Government on product standards, with a view to making new gas boilers hydrogen-ready. Outcome 4: The heat transition is fair, leaving no-one behind and stimulates employment opportunities as part of the green recovery Develop a long-term public engagement strategy in 2021 and begin implementation of early actions. New Smart Meter All homes and businesses will be offered a smart meter by 2020 under a UK Government initiative, providing the opportunity for a greater understanding of final energy consumption. Work with the Scottish Cities’ Alliance and the seven cities on the opportunities to accelerate activity on heat and energy Provide capital investment for Scottish colleges for equipment to deliver training for energy efficiency and heat. Respond to the recommendations of the Expert Advisory Group on a heat pump sector deal for Scotland, by Q1 2022. Bring forward and support demonstrator projects, such hybrids and high temperature heat pumps; the use of hydrogen for space and water heating; projects to understand the impact of heat transition on existing energy networks. Publish a ‘Heat Network Investment prospectus’ in 2021/22 - a first-cut of HN Zones across Scotland, combined with information on decarbonisation needs of existing networks. Establish a short life working group on finance for the heat
220 Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes Establish principles to underpin our commitment to ‘no-one being left behind’ in the heat transition, ensuring our approach neither increases the fuel poverty rate nor increases the depth of existing fuel poverty. This will include the effective design and targeting of our fuel poverty and heat in buildings Ensure Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies are developed through extensive engagement with local Continue delivery of energy efficiency investment to support fuel poor households and conduct further modelling and analysis to better understand the potential impact of the heat transition on fuel poor households and the scale of, and options for, mitigation that may be required. Urge the UK Government to rebalance levy costs on energy bills to make gas and electric systems relatively more cost
Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes 221 Outcome 1: To address our overreliance on cars, we will reduce car If the health pandemic has moved to a phase to allow more certainty on future transport trends and people’s behaviours – and work and lifestyle choices future forecasting – we will publish a route-map to meet the 20% reduction by 2030 in Commit to exploring options around remote working, in connection with our work on 20-minute neighbourhoods and COVID-19 has impacted on how we work. We launched a Work Local Challenge to drive innovation in work place choices and remote working to support flexible working and our net zero We will work with the UK Government on options to review fuel duty proposals, in the context of the need to reduce demand for unsustainable travel and the potential for revenue We will work with local authorities to continue to ensure that their parking and local transport strategies have proper appreciation of climate change, as well as the impact on all road users, including public transport operators, disabled motorists, cyclists and pedestrians. To support the monitoring requirement for the National Transport Strategy set out in the Transport (Scotland) Act 2019, and to further our understanding of how and why people travel, we will develop a data strategy and invest in data. Continue to support the Smarter Choices, Smarter Places (SCSP) programme to encourage behaviour change. Continue to support the provision of child and adult cycle training, and safety programmes including driver cycling awareness training
222 Update to the Climate Change Plan | Annexes Support transformational active travel projects with a £500 million investment, over five years, for active travel infrastructure, access to bikes and behaviour change schemes.
|
9e89f3e7-5608-4a69-bc95-89195cd33085
| 60
|
060db658-5699-4aaf-90ed-a357ee45edba
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0394:FIN:EN:PDF
| 2,000
|
[
"Electricity and heat",
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Fisheries
Status
Political commitments
16 March 2001
Commission Communication on the elements for a comprehensive integration strategy
20 March 2001
Commission Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy CFP
28 March 2001
Community Biodiversity Action Plan for Fisheries and Aquaculture
25 April 2001
28 May 2002
By end2005
Council Conclusions on integration of environment and sustainable development into
CFP
Commission Communication on CFP Reform and related proposals Commission Action
Plan to integrate environmental protection requirements into CFP
First report by the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on the
environmental performance of the CFP
Priority objectives of environmental
integration
Milestones to date
Commission
Commission and Council
Parliament
CFP should explicitly include environmental,
economic and social objectives, which should be
considered on a same footing. These objectives
must apply to the Communitys external fisheries
policy and in particular fisheries agreements with
developing countries Source EU SDS
Reduction in fishing pressure on fishing grounds
to sustainable levels source 2001 and 2002
Commission Communications on integration by
2015 source Plan of Implementation for
Johannesburg WSSD
Emergency measures to
protect certain deep sea
habitats such as coral reefs
from effects of bottom
trawling, e.g. for Darwin
Mounds coral reefs,
Commission Regulation
14752003, extended by
further regulations and
Commission proposal COM
2004 58 for longer term
measures
Commission proposals for
recovery plans for sole,
southern hake and Norway
lobster, January 2004 Total
Allowable Catch regulation
for 2004, effort regime in
Western waters. Eco-system-based approach to fisheries policy. Improvement of fishing methods with a view to
reducing discards, incidental by-catch and impact
on habitats source 2001 and 2002 Commission
Communications on integration, Plan of
Implementation for Johannesburg WSSD
.
|
84e2ea09-1d7f-46b5-b066-7956ace9a8aa
| 16
|
060fb145-4bac-41c7-87a6-a487befd0470
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_0fdb5eb8c251d8c2a37a5a1cb4c57f3f.pdf
| 2,023
|
[
"Economy-wide",
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
By 2028, Defra’s current plans are for total spend to be evenly split between farm-level, locally tailored, and landscape-scale investment within ELM 19. Reducing emissions will create growth and employment opportunities across NRWF sectors, and it is important that these opportunities are evenly felt and realised by all. Achieving net zero will require innovation from businesses and landowners, investment from government and the private sector, and changes in our choices as consumers. We want to create domestic and international demand for our low carbon, high welfare and world-renowned produce, whilst supporting international markets for sustainably 20. To achieve the level of emissions reductions in the NRWF sector indicated by our delivery pathway to 2037, we will need additional public and private investment of approximately £30 billion. Given the importance of R&D to deliver our pathway, we are committing to spend £75 million on net zero related R&D across the NRWF sectors 21. Decarbonising the NRWF sectors will regenerate communities and open up new employment opportunities right around the UK. For example, an increase in afforestation across England could support up to 1,900 jobs in 2024 and up to 2,000 jobs in 2030. By investing in rural infrastructure and skills development we will seek to ensure rural communities and rural businesses, including the most disadvantaged, benefit from net zero. There will be significant opportunities for upskilling, reskilling, and starting new career paths, alongside expanding current sectors. For example, nature-based solutions create entry-level opportunities for people just starting out, as well as requiring specialist skills such as hydrology, ecology and forest management. By delivering long-term policy certainty, we will unlock the private investment necessary to deliver these green jobs. Net Zero Build Back Greener
22. Innovation will also be vital to delivering net zero and maximising benefits for the UK. In agriculture, farmers will be able to adopt new emission saving technologies, produce lower carbon foods and steward the land in new ways, such as through vertical farming. This will allow them to diversify income streams and produce high quality, low carbon produce for domestic and international markets, boosting the rural economy. Investment in agricultural innovation, through schemes like the Farming Innovation Programme, will drive development of new precision technologies, explore the potential of robotics and artificial intelligence, and take advantage of developments in breeding technologies, including the potential of gene editing. This can also make our agricultural sector more resilient to the impacts of climate change and safeguard our food security. We also know other technological solutions, such as those to reduce emissions from non-road mobile machinery in the agricultural sector require further development. Cross government work is required to develop non-road mobile machinery policies to support the deployment of technological solutions and required infrastructure in specific sectors, including industry, transport, and buildings. Relevant government departments will work together to ensure a coherent approach (see the Industry chapter). A significant market share for innovations such as alternative proteins will take time to materialise, but will align with consumer dietary trends, and the UK already has a lively and growing domestic market that could grow to become another great British food export that competes internationally. These and other novel methods of food production could create significant opportunities to further promote high quality 23. Innovation is key to other NRWF sectors too. Industry is responding to the HFC phasedown by switching to alternative gases and technologies in areas such as refrigeration, air conditioning, and heat pumps, and will continue to innovate in this area. The UK Research and Innovation’s National Interdisciplinary Circular Economy Research programme is looking at how to transition to a more circular economy. Producers will need to move to more sustainable product design, and consumers, with support from the public and private sectors, will need to shift to more sustainable product choices and towards reusing, repairing, remanufacturing, and Agriculture, forestry, and other land 24. We have begun the Agricultural Transition Period and have moved away from the CAP . We are reducing and then stopping untargeted Direct Payments in England and moving to a system where public money rewards farmers and land managers for environmentally sustainable actions, including reducing emissions and expanding the carbon sequestration potential of our land. We will introduce three environmental land management the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI), Local Nature Recovery (LNR) and Landscape Recovery (LR). The SFI will be open to all farmers and will incentivise low carbon practices, for example, soil and nutrient management. LNR will fund actions that support local nature recovery and deliver local environmental priorities. The LR scheme will fund long-term land use change projects such as large-scale tree planting, and peatland restoration projects. Net zero will be a key priority across the delivery of our environmental land management schemes. Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
25. Take up of these schemes will be voluntary and will require a shift in the practices of landowners and farmers. We are working to ensure the schemes encourage participation, including through appropriate payment rates, in line with the Payment Principles.82 Participants will still be able to benefit from private sector funding, for delivering additional benefits. Advice and guidance will also be provided to support participants to adopt new practices. Tests and trials for the schemes began in 2020. The scheme will be rolled out in full by 2024.83 Government has committed to maintain current levels of spending on the sector in England, based on 2019 levels, until 2024/5, amounting to an average of £2.4 billion a year. 26. We are also supporting the acceleration of private investment in nature through initiatives such as the Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund. These will test new models and build pipelines of investable nature projects by providing technical assistance and capacity building support to create opportunities for private investment. Projects will capture the value of the carbon and other benefits provided by natural assets such as woodlands, peatlands wetlands and river catchments.
|
368033f1-d04a-48ea-83c6-9602b66f0e37
| 53
|
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|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf
| 2,020
|
[
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"Transport",
"Economy-wide",
"Energy",
"Adaptation",
"Carbon Pricing",
"Institutions / Administrative Arrangements",
"Energy Supply",
"Research And Development",
"Energy Demand",
"emissions",
"zero",
"carbon",
"budget",
"costs"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
• These are partly offset by revenues from the sale of harvested products from energy crops, existing broadleaf woodlands and thinnings from the planting of new trees, estimated at £0.1 billion in 2035. • Addressing non-financial barriers for many of these options include widespread information around new practices, re-skilling, and tenancy issues for tenant farmers. More innovative options (e.g. improved crop varieties and use of hydrogen) will require R&D and market commercialisation to bring these to market. 175 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero Wider social and environmental impacts We estimate that the social benefits of land-based measures will contribute around £0.1 billion per year to the UK economy by 2035, rising to £0.6 billion per year by 2050 in the Balanced Pathway. The largest of these is recreation benefits from increased use of woodlands (74%), physical health benefits from exercising in the natural environments (14%), air filtration from increased natural vegetation, primarily trees near urban areas and flood risk alleviation from woodland creation in the upper catchments of rivers. There are also impacts on biodiversity and water quality which have not been possible to quantify. These are detailed in the Energy crops & SRF Broadleaf planting Conifer planting Peatland restoration Agriculture measures Agroforestry & hedges Societal benefits take time to billion by 2050 in benefits to
Chapter 3: Sector pathways to Net Zero 176 Aviation is one of the sectors in which we expect there to be significant remaining positive emissions by 2050, given the limited set of options for decarbonisation. Remaining residual emissions will need to be offset by greenhouse gas removals (see section 11) for the sector to reach Net Zero. The evidence base on how to achieve GHG savings in aviation in the UK relies on internal modelling from DfT, Climate Assembly UK demand scenarios and internal CCC analysis of sustainable aviation fuel costs. Further details are provided in the We present the scenarios for aviation emissions in three a) The Balanced Net Zero Pathway for aviation b) Alternative pathways for aviation emissions c) Investment requirements and costs a) The Balanced Net Zero Pathway for aviation In the Balanced Net Zero Pathway, the aviation sector returns to close to pre- pandemic demand levels by 2024. Thereafter, emissions gradually decline over This gradual reduction in emissions is due to demand management, improvements in efficiency and a modest but increasing share of sustainable aviation • Demand management. The Balanced Net Zero Pathway does allow for some limited growth in aviation demand over the period to 2050, but considerably less than a ‘business as usual’ baseline. We allow for a 25% in growth by 2050 compared to 2018 levels, whereas the baseline reflects unconstrained growth of around 65% over the same period. We assume that, unlike in the baseline, this occurs without any net increase in UK airport capacity, so that any expansion is balanced by reductions in capacity • Efficiency improvements. The fuel efficiency per passenger of aviation is assumed to improve at 1.4% per annum, compared to 0.7% per annum in the baseline. This includes 9% of total aircraft distance in 2050 being flown • Sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) contribute 25% of liquid fuel consumed in 2050, with just over two-thirds of this coming from biofuels* and the remainder from carbon-neutral synthetic jet fuel (produced via direct air capture of CO2 combined with low-carbon hydrogen, with 75% of this synthetic jet fuel assumed to be made in the UK and the rest imported). * Biofuels are assumed to be produced with CCS on the production plant – overall carbon-negative but assumed to have zero direct CO2 emissions in aviation. Removals are accounted for in section 11. A quarter of jet fuel by 2050 is
177 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero Balanced Net Zero Pathway for the aviation BEIS (2020) Provisional UK greenhouse gas emissions national statistics 2019; CCC analysis. a critical role in ensuring GHG
Chapter 3: Sector pathways to Net Zero 178 b) Alternative pathways for aviation emissions Each of our exploratory scenarios for aviation sees emissions fall from 2018 to 2050 • Headwinds assumes the same 25% growth in demand from 2018 to 2050 as in the Balanced Pathway, although with higher demand in the 2030s due to a net increase in airport capacity. Improvements in efficiency are as in the Balanced Pathway, while biofuels comprise 20% of the fuel mix by 2050. Emissions are 25 MtCO2e in 2050, 36% below 2018 levels. • Widespread Engagement has lower demand, with an overall reduction of 15% on 2018 levels and therefore around half the 2050 demand as in the baseline. This is in line with the Climate Assembly UK’s ‘flying less’ scenario. It includes a substantial reduction in business aviation due to widespread near-term adoption of videoconferencing. Efficiency improvements are slightly faster than those in the Balanced Pathway at 1.6% per annum, while the share of biofuels in 2050 is slightly lower at 20%, with a further 5% contribution from the biogenic fraction of waste-based fuels. * Emissions in 2050 are 15 MtCO2e, 62% below 2018 levels. • Widespread Innovation has a greater contribution from technological performance, both in terms of improved efficiency (2.1% per annum) and the contribution of sustainable aviation fuels. By 2050, around a quarter of fuel use is biofuel, with a further quarter carbon-neutral synthetic jet fuel. These technical improvements lead to a lower carbon-intensity and lower cost of aviation, although demand in this scenario is considerably higher, reaching 50% above 2018 levels by 2050 (in line with the Climate Assembly UK’s ‘technological change’ scenario). Emissions in 2050 are 15 MtCO2e, • In Tailwinds, the reductions in demand under Widespread Engagement are combined with the technology improvements in Widespread Innovation. Demand in 2050 is 15% below 2018 levels and efficiency improves at 2.1% per annum.
|
083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7
| 51
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061df585-e4af-4446-ad9e-d1c2a3e39e8f
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http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04119v1
| 2,024
|
[
"SMAP Satellite",
"deep learning",
"Convolutional autoencoders",
"Soil Freeze and Thaw",
"Snow",
"Snow wetness",
"Lband microwaves",
"Soil Remote Sensing"
] |
ArXiv
|
The FTC-Encoder produces a continuous measure p(F ), indicating the probability of frozen (p(F ) = 1) or thawed (p(F ) = 0) states of the landscape. A probability threshold of 0.5 is selected to determine the FT state in a binary setting for comparisons with SPL3FTP E product across the 34 ISMN ground stations -reported through the confusion matrices in Table . I. The ground and air temperature measurements at the sites are used to determine the reference FT status of the landscape. The confusion matrix quantifies the truly identified frozen states (TP: true positives), truly identified thawed states (TN: true negative), number of falsely identified thawed states (FN: false negative), and number of falsely identified frozen states (FP: false positive). Moreover, the classification performance is evaluated based on recall TP/(TP+FN), precision TP/(TP+FP), and accuracy (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) metrics for both frozen and thawed states. The results for FT-cycle retrievals (Table I a) indicate improved performance compared to the SPL3FTP E across almost all classification metrics. When the soil temperature is used for FT labeling, the FTC-Encoder algorithm enhances the frozen state detection (TP) by approximately 12%. The false detection of thawed state (FN) is also reduced by 12%. These improvements manifest themselves in a marked increase of recall and accuracy by 21 and 15%, compared to the SPL3FTP E product. The enhanced statistics can be mostly attributed to the reduction in falsely identified wintertime thawed states (FN), which can impair the results of SPL3FTP E perhaps due to the known effects of snow wetness on the NPR ratio as well as low differences in the NPR reference values [16]. When the FT labels are obtained based on the air temperature (Table I b), the true detection of the frozen state (TP) is improved by 9%, while the incorrect detection of thawed states (FN) is dropped by 9.6% compared to SPL3FTP E. At the same time, the misclassification of thawed states as frozen (FP) is 6.5% for FTC-Encoder, which is larger than that of 3.1% for the SPL3FTP E. This difference can be attributed largely to the instances where the air temperature is above zero, but the FTC-Encoder continues to produce frozen labels (i.e., p(F ) > 0.5). As is well understood, the soil temperature rises above the freezing point and drops below the freezing point later than the air temperature in the spring and fall respectively due to the latent heat release of soil thawing and freezing, known as the zero-curtain effect. Nevertheless, even in this labeling scenario, the TP rate and accuracy are increased by 20 and 5.6%, respectively, compared to the SPL3FTP E. Fig. 3 compares the performance of the FTC-Encoder and SPL3FTP E, by stratifying the accuracy metrics across different land-cover types and sub-grid water fractions for those SMAP pixels containing ISMN stations. When assessing the performance of the FTC-Encoder (SPL3FTP E) using soil temperatures, the mean accuracy across all land-cover types is approximately 90% (70-80%), showing a narrower interquartile range compared to SPL3FTP E. However, over grasslands, open shrublands, and the areas with high water fraction, the accuracy drops to around 83 (78), 85 (68)%, and 87 (77)%, respectively. A few insights can be offered to explain this reduction in accuracy. Firstly, the grasslands' and open shrublands' light vegetation and shallow snow cover provide minimum soil insulation, compared to other landcovers. Thus, the soil temperature can exhibit high temporal variability in response to changes in air temperature and an intermittent FT cycle is expected. This intermittency can decrease the accuracy, especially when a binary comparison is adopted through thresholding the FT probabilities. Secondly, when water fraction is high in satellite FOV, the TB time series cyclic structure primarily responds to ice in/out of the water bodies [59] and wetness of the overlying snow cover, which can exhibit higher correlations with air temperatures rather than soil temperatures. These uncertainties are exacerbated considering that the reference currently rests on comparisons with a limited number of ISMN stations within the FOV. When assessing the performance of the FTC-Encoder (SPL3FTP E) using air temperatures, the mean accuracy across all land-cover types is approximately 80-90 (75-85)%. Thus, consistent with reported metrics in Tab. I, the accuracy does not change markedly for the FTC-Encoder but increases for SPL3FTP E, except in high water fraction areas. For instance, in Woody Savannas, the mean accuracy of FTC-Encoder remains the same around 89%, whereas it rises by 3% for SPL3FTP E. While, in pixels with high water fractions (0.35-0.5), FTC-Encoder's (SPL3FTP E) accuracy increases by 3 (4)%. This observation indicates that perhaps the air temperature is a more realistic reference in explaining the FT cycle for those pixels with high water fractions, due to its higher correlation with the lake ice dynamics. In the case of a zero water fraction , the probability of a frozen state p(F ) is equal to 1 consistently throughout the winter when ISMN ground and air temperatures predominantly stay below the freezing point . In early spring, the probability gradually declines as the air temperatures oscillate around the freezing point, capturing the onset of the thawing season, manifested in the decline of ERA5 snow depth . In the middle of April, for four weeks, the p(F ) declines with some oscillatory behavior around 0.5 when air temperature varies above the freezing point over frozen ground. By early May, as the ground temperature rises above 0 C, the probability of a frozen state is predominantly zero, indicating a fully thawed ground condition until early October. In mid-October, p(F ) sharply rises to 1 when air and ground temperatures drop below freezing over two weeks. It is worth noting that the spring thawing process, when p(F ) goes from 1 to 0, is approximately two weeks longer than the late fall freezing process, which is consistent with the known dynamics of the surface FT-cycle [60].
|
6be4fc81-8e86-4e18-8255-ab211eee1f72
| 3
|
061eaacf-7011-4650-880a-448bd847402d
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.13. Location of the absorption coefficient symbol compression ignition engines only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.14. Details of any devices designed to influence fuel economy if not covered by other items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.15. LPG fuelling system yesno 1
3.2.15.1. EC type-approval number according to Council Directive 70221EEC OJ L 76, 6.4.1970, p. 23 when
the Directive will be amended to cover tanks for gaseous fuels or approval number of UNECE Regula-
tion 67
3.2.15.2. Electronic engine management control unit for LPG fuelling
3.2.15.2.1. Makes .
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 152
|
061ef4da-91a6-4104-bfd4-dff1cc8cccf8
|
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.344.01.0001.01.ENG
| 2,016
|
[
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Non-energy use"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
4. 5. PART 2
National emission projections
1. (a)
clear identification of the adopted and planned policies and measures included in the projections;
(b)
where appropriate, the results of sensitivity analysis performed for the projections;
(c)
a description of methodologies, models, underlying assumptions and key input and output parameters. 2. 3. PART 3
Informative inventory report
The informative inventory reports shall be prepared in accordance with the EMEP Reporting Guidelines and reported using the template for inventory reports as specified therein. The inventory report shall include, as a minimum, the following information:
(a)
descriptions, references and sources of information of the specific methodologies, assumptions, emission factors and activity data, as well as the rationale for their selection;
(b)
a description of the national key categories of emission sources;
(c)
information on uncertainties, quality assurance and verification;
(d)
a description of the institutional arrangements for inventory preparation;
(e)
recalculations and planned improvements;
(f)
if relevant, information on the use of the flexibilities provided for under Article 5(1), (2), (3) and (4);
(g)
if relevant, information on the reasons for deviating from the reduction trajectory determined in accordance with Article 4(2), as well as the measures to converge back on the trajectory;
(h)
an executive summary. PART 4
Adjustment of national emission inventories
1. (a)
evidence that the concerned national emission reduction commitment/s is/are exceeded;
(b)
evidence of the extent to which the adjustment to the emission inventory reduces the exceedance and contributes to compliance with the concerned national emission reduction commitment/s;
(c)
an estimation of whether and when the concerned national emission reduction commitment/s is/are expected to be attained based on national emission projections without the adjustment;
(d)
evidence that the adjustment is consistent with one or several of the following three circumstances. Reference can be made, as appropriate, to relevant previous adjustments:
(i)
in the case of new emission source categories:
evidence that the new emission source category is acknowledged in scientific literature and/or the EMEP/EEA Guidebook;
evidence that this source category was not included in the relevant historic national emission inventory at the time when the emission reduction commitment was set;
evidence that emissions from a new source category contribute to a Member State being unable to meet its emission reduction commitments, supported by a detailed description of the methodology, data and emission factors used to arrive at that conclusion;
(ii)
in the case of significantly different emission factors used for determining emissions from specific source categories:
a description of the original emission factors, including a detailed description of the scientific basis upon which the emission factor was derived;
evidence that the original emission factors were used for determining the emission reductions at the time when they were set;
a description of the updated emission factors, including detailed information on the scientific basis upon which the emission factor was derived;
a comparison of emission estimates made using the original and the updated emission factors, demonstrating that the change in emission factors contributes to a Member State being unable to meet its reduction commitments;
the rationale for deciding whether the changes in emission factors are significant;
(iii)
in the case of significantly different methodologies used for determining emissions from specific source categories:
a description of the original methodology used, including detailed information on the scientific basis upon which the emission factor was derived;
evidence that the original methodology was used for determining the emission reductions at the time when they were set;
a description of the updated methodology used, including a detailed description of the scientific basis or reference upon which it has been derived;
a comparison of emission estimates made using the original and updated methodologies demonstrating that the change in methodology contributes to a Member State being unable to meet its reduction commitment;
the rationale for deciding whether the change in methodology is significant. 2. 3. (1) Member States having the choice to use the national emission total calculated on the basis of fuels used as a basis for compliance under the LRTAP Convention may keep this option in order to ensure coherence between international and Union law.
|
63956a1e-4381-4026-b28c-f728a6bd85e1
| 20
|
0622b425-c4f5-415d-a4b6-85149806bfc6
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.00666v1
| 2,022
|
[
"carbon",
"climate",
"resccu",
"damages",
"future"
] |
arxiv.org
|
Finally, we note that the ReCaP scheme also poses a few practical challenges related to risk management, as well as political buy-in and initial hurdles to implementation. The limits of risk mitigation. We have so far assumed that insurance companies can indeed estimate the total future ReSCCU adjustment, ∆ t0 t , well enough in order to effectively price in risks through one-time premia at the time of CO2 emission. In fact, there are two main challenges in doing so: First, it is inherently unknown to what extent ∆ t0 t can be predicted and whether it is indeed bounded. Second, insurance companies may find it difficult to diversify their climate risks, as climate disasters tend to be correlated across regions and asset classes. Various measures could be taken in order to offset risks to insurance companies. Perhaps most straightforwardly, reinsurers, or, ultimately, governments, could choose to bear excess tail risks. This could be implemented by choosing a finite time horizon for ∆ t0 t , introducing a temporal discounting rate or simply through side contracts. While such measures would be successful in managing risk to insurers, they would at the same time dilute the efficacy of the Pigouvian taxation mechanism. If the total insurance volume for ReCaP transactions becomes sufficiently large, the economic survival of insurance companies may start to be regarded as vital to financial and economic stability ("too big to fail"). This might dilute the perceived risks that insurance companies feel exposed to as they may bet on ultimately being bailed out by the government, potentially leading to artificially low premiums. Political buy-in and hurdles to practical implementation. As a carbon taxation mechanism, ReCaP requires political buy-in from the governments and insurance companies. Currently, operating carbon taxation schemes tend to underprice CO2 emissions from a climate damage perspective, perhaps indicating limited political support for ReSCCU-like adjustments. In Section 6, we introduced ReCaP as an application of ReSCCU to Pigouvian taxation. While, in theory, ReCaP improves over SCC-based taxation, it also poses a few practical challenges grounded in risk diversification, as well as large-scale political buy-in and systemic relevance. In face of these obstacles, and as a complementary measure, it does serve well to consider: What can private investors do in order to help implement ReSCCU? In this section, we introduce Private ReCaP (PReCaP), a novel mechanism that enables ReSCCU to be be implemented with minimal government participation. Importantly, unlike ReCaP, PReCaP could, in principle, see real-world implementation based on the engagement of a few high net-worth individuals or independent institutions as well as a minimal participation from the government. In its basic form, PReCaP implements competitive incentives between a group of insurance companies within the context of a prediction market (also called betting market) that are trying to predict future ReSCCU adjustments estimated by a trusted RetroAgency. This is achieved by creating a market for insurance policies in which demand is stimulated artificially by a sponsoring agency, which we dub the RetroExchange, which can, in turn, derive a decentralized market estimate of SCC t -SCC t based on the spread of insurance premiums offered by the insurance companies (see Figure 3). The RetroExchange bears the insurance default risk. When an insurer goes bankrupt, this means that any associated outstanding retroactive payments will not be covered, but also that any outstanding claims will not be enacted. Hence, insurance default may not necessarily be unprofitable to the RetroExchange. The RetroExchange takes furthermore the risks associated with being on the other side of the swap contracts. This means that large negative retroactive adjustments might cause the RetroExchange to go bankrupt, in which case the insurances would bear the RetroExchange default risk. Such systematic risks can be lowered by traditional ways, e.g., requiring insurers to have reserves posted with the exchange in a default fund, or through reinsurance. Other ways to safeguard against such defaults can include flooring RetroAgency's cumulative pricing adjustments, which may interfere with the quality of the SCC signal, but may be a sensible way to deal with extreme value risks on the tail. Further, RetroExchange might benefit from the revenue stream by selling the SCC signal derived from the observed insurance premium spreads, as these will only be revealed to the RetroExchange (see Appendix C for derivation of the SCC signal). While PReCaP does not implement the polluter-pays principle for greenhouse gas emissions in full, we here discuss a way in which polluters could be charged with the costs of model innovation for SCC estimation, thus internalizing part of the mitigation costs. This may be achieved by implementing PReCaP in the context of voluntary carbon markets, as spearheaded by the Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets (TSVCM). TSVCM has long recognized the centrality of the challenge to divert sufficient cash flows to breakthrough technologies, i.e. early-stage technologies that currently create carbon credits at uncompetitive prices (we dub these breakthrough credits). In fact, TSVCM [2021, Final Report] observes that:
Many of the investments needed to scale emerging breakthrough technologies do not meet the risk and return expectations of today's markets. A range of mechanisms will be needed to ensure capital flows to these technologies. These could include blended financing, access to benefit markets (including voluntary carbon markets), or altering risk, return or time horizon expectations for projects with the highest potential for climate impact. [...] For finance to flow to these GHG emissions avoidance/reduction and removal/ sequestration projects, well-functioning voluntary carbon markets will be a critical enabler. As an alternative approach to these challenges, we propose to introduce regulation that would require polluters to acquire a fixed percentage of their carbon offset credits from breakthrough credit suppliers. To prevent market manipulation, the price of such breakthrough credits would be capped at the social cost of carbon (SCC).
|
b6ea3115-f5df-4e97-8731-232d84c2f7b7
| 6
|
0622ff25-a160-4884-81e5-a473a140043a
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.21201v1
| 2,025
|
[
"Agriculture",
"Crop Recommendation Systems",
"India",
"Random Forest",
"Support Vector Machines",
"SVM",
"Machine Learning",
"Artificial Intelligence",
"Crop Yield",
"Farm Productivity",
"Climate Change",
"Environmental Factors",
"Economic Factors",
"Temporal Dependencies",
"Time-series Analysis",
"Cross Validation",
"Overfitting",
"Lag Variables",
"Green Revolution",
"Irrigation",
"Organic Farming",
"Predictive Modeling."
] |
arxiv.org
|
Chapman and
Hall/CRC. Talagala, T. S., Hyndman, R. J., & Athanasopoulos, G.. Meta-learning how to forecast time
series. Monash Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers, 6, 16. Tanasa, D., & Trousse, B.. Advanced data preprocessing for intersites web usage
mining. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 19, 59-65. Varghese, D.. Comparative study on classic machine learning algorithms. Medium. Available
[at : https://towardsdatascience.com/comparative-study-on-classic-machine-learning-]] Volpi, R., Namkoong, H., Sener, O., Duchi, J. C., Murino, V., & Savarese, S.. Generalizing to unseen domains via adversarial data augmentation. Advances in neural information processing systems, 31 . Wang, J., Lan, C., Liu, C., Ouyang, Y., Qin, T., Lu, W., ... & Yu, P.. Generalizing to unseen
domains: A survey on domain generalization. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering .
|
79c1afa0-fb9f-41a1-96d1-8e5f1f17f52f
| 23
|
06323246-4684-4402-ab6f-41c78a530a2a
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF
| 2,008
|
[
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
soldered or potted computer components or sealed or soldered computer enclosures. 2.3.3. In the case of mechanical fuel-injection pumps fitted to compression-ignition engines, manufacturers shall take
adequate steps to protect the maximum fuel delivery setting from tampering while a vehicle is in service. 28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19915
2.3.4. Manufacturers may apply to the approval authority for an exemption to one of the requirements of Section 2.3 for
those vehicles which are unlikely to require protection. The criteria that the approval authority shall evaluate in
considering an exemption shall include the current availability of performance chips, the high-performance capa-
bility of the vehicle and the projected sales volume of the vehicle.
|
d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481
| 44
|
06347a52-554a-41c6-8c73-4d3d90881eb9
| 2,025
|
[
"ghg emissions reduction",
"energy sector",
"policy measures",
"bulgaria",
"%"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
In conclusion, the implementation of the policy measures set out in Section 3, along with the policies in the Energy sector, in combination with the implementation of additional measures will enable Bulgaria to reduce GHG emissions by 49% by 2030 as compared to 1990. The table below sets out the projections for GHG emissions reduction in Bulgaria as at 2030 with additional measures. Conclusion
|
f7f43577-0103-4cf3-80b6-bc0cd26fd053
| 0
|
|
0634e7af-d13c-42c7-a4af-0bf79a64915f
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/uk-net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_807a7bbb4df0326606e1552618bffc6f.pdf
| 2,021
|
[
"zero",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
Ahead of that, our domestic lead will act as a showcase to the world and bolster our call to action internationally, where cooperation and collaboration through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), will continue to be vital to decarbonise • The Government has set CB6 to formally include the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping emissions, as recommended by the CCC, which allows these emissions to be accounted for • We will address aviation emissions through new technology such as electric and hydrogen aircraft, the commercialisation of sustainable aviation fuels, increasing operational efficiencies, developing and implementing market-based measures and GHG removal methods, while influencing consumers to make more sustainable • The UK will play an important role in developing zero emission maritime technology, such as alternative fuel powered vessels using ammonia or methanol produced from low carbon hydrogen, or highly efficient batteries, particularly where we can build on domestic expertise to capture early • As we have stated in the Ten Point Plan and the Transport Decarbonisation Plan, we need to ensure that the taxation of motoring keeps pace with the change to electric vehicles to ensure that we can continue to fund the first-class public services and infrastructure that people and families across the UK expect. Net Zero Build Back Greener
The transition to zero emission cars and vans is leading the way in our effort to decarbonise transport. The car and van sector is easier to decarbonise compared to other sections of the economy, through the combination of a proven low carbon technology that has significant advantages over the existing high carbon technology it replaces, r and growing consumer demand. Strong progress is already being made towards our 2030/2035 phase out • Demand is Industry figures show over 650,000 new plug-in cars registered in the UK since 2010, and over 1 in 7 cars sold so far in 2021 • Range is increasing as costs are There are 20 EV models that come with a range of over 200 miles compared to the early Nissan Leaf models that delivered 60 miles, and battery prices are little more than a tenth of what they • The charging infrastructure market is There are now over 25,000 public chargepoints in the UK, which includes over 4,700 rapid devices according to industry sources. This is one of the largest networks of rapid 9. Across every form of transport, decarbonisation and growth will go hand in hand. The UK will play a leading role in this modern-day industrial revolution, consolidating our position as a world leader in green technology, science, and research. The imperative to decarbonise brings with it a host of other benefits, including new business models, new modes, increasing levels of autonomy, far better integration, and a blurring of the distinction between traditional forms of transport, as well as public and private travel coming together to offer greater choice and flexibility. We will use research and development to build on the expertise of business and academia, maximising opportunities for growth, exports and hundreds of thousands of new 10. To achieve the level of emissions reductions in the transport sector indicated by our delivery pathway to 2037, we will need additional public and private investment of 11. Decarbonising the transport sector will regenerate communities and open up new employment opportunities right around the UK. Based on current estimates, policies and proposals to reduce emissions in the sector could support up to 22,000 jobs in 2024 and up to 74,000 jobs in 2030. Development of road transport sector technologies as the economy transitions to net zero could support Chapter 3 – Reducing Emissions across the Economy
12. We need a skilled workforce capable of developing, implementing and operating mobility solutions in a way that maximises the huge potential benefits they offer. The government launched the Green Jobs Taskforce, to advise the government, industry and the skills sector on the action required to deliver the jobs and skills required for the net zero transition. Our approach on green jobs and skills is set out in the Green Jobs, Skills and Industries chapter of the Net 13. Decarbonising transport will also help • It will improve health by removing a source of air pollution. There will still be particulate emissions associated with road, rail, tyre, and brake wear, and we are working to tackle those too, but the toxic by-products of burning hydrocarbon fuels will be eliminated from the roadside and rail; • Physical inactivity costs the NHS up to £1 billion per annum, with further indirect costs of £8.2 billion – active travel can • Over half the UK population is exposed to daytime noise levels above recommended limits. Zero emission vehicles – extremely quiet at low, urban speeds – will help address this. This will support levelling-up and help reinvent high streets as enjoyable places to live, work, visit and spend 14. As the Transport Decarbonisation Plan and this Strategy are implemented, we will continue to consider the views of stakeholders from across the UK. We will engage closely with Devolved Administrations, respecting areas of devolved competency, as we work towards our shared goal of achieving net zero. We will also continue to collaborate with local authorities and other regional bodies to identify 15. Depending on progress in the sector, at some points additional targeted action maybe be required, such as steps to reduce use of the most polluting cars and tackle urban congestion, to enable these targets to be met. We will regularly review progress against our targets – publishing the next transport decarbonisation plan within five years – and continue to adapt and take further action if needed to decarbonise transport. 16. Cycling and walking can help us tackle some of the most challenging issues we face as a society, not just climate change, but improving air quality, health and wellbeing, addressing inequalities, and tackling congestion and noise pollution on our roads. Increased levels of active travel can improve 17.
|
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The NHS is now publicly committed to achieving Net Zero for its direct emissions by 2040, and by 2045 for its entire Across the system, Net Zero is pursued through Green Plans at both the individual NHS provider (Trust) and regional (Integrated Care System) level. The 2021/22 NHS Standard Contract set out the requirement for trusts to develop Green Plan to detail their approaches to reducing their emissions in line with the NHS’s national trajectories. Green Plans provide a structured way for each trust and ICS to set out the carbon reduction initiatives over three- year periods. All 212 NHS Trusts in England now have a green plan, setting out actions they will take to reduce their impact on the environment. The Green Plans focus in particular on the need to decarbonise the NHS estate, and this will be a major priority over the next decade. NHS direct emissions account for a third of all public sector direct emissions, and the majority of these are from NHS buildings. The Government has already invested over £550m in NHS estate decarbonisation through the Public Sector Decarbonisation Scheme (PSDS). BEIS has recently confirmed a further £1.425 billion in public sector Net Zero funding for this Spending Review period. The first tranche of this funding is currently being allocated for 22/23. With regard to estates operations, the NHS is committed to ensuring NHS Trusts purchase 100% renewable energy. The NHS also continues to take meaningful steps to decarbonise its significant supply chain emissions. In September 2021, NHS England set out clear expectations of suppliers between now and 2030, supported by a framework for suppliers to self-certify their decarbonisation achievements and benchmark against requirements, initially voluntarily. NHS England is due to launch the NHS sustainable supplier framework in 2022. It will also be used to simplify and provide consistency for the purchasing of low-carbon goods and services. They have also set out an intended timetable for when contractual requirements come into place. With regard monitoring, since 2008, the NHS has tracked and reported its carbon footprint, regularly improving its methods and monitoring across the NHS. Annex 2 of Delivering a Net Zero National Health Service report describes the analytical approach to this in detail. To support the NHS’s net zero and wider environmental ambitions, new data collection methods are being developed to enable the more granular calculation of carbon footprints and environmental impacts at regional, ICS and trust levels. The Greener NHS Data Collection was launched on 30 April 2021 to understand actions that are taking place over 2021/22 and provide a baseline from which progress can be understood. Climate change is embedded across the Scottish Government through a robust ministerial and corporate governance framework as described in Chapter 1. In addition, the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 requires that the Scottish Government set out the greenhouse gas emissions impacts of its spending decisions. A “carbon
258 8th National Communication assessment” of the budget is produced annually alongside any document setting out draft proposals for the use of resources in any financial year143. Since 2016, public bodies in Scotland (including councils and the NHS) have been required to submit annual reports on their organisational emissions, procurement and adaptation. Public consultation in 2019 demonstrated strong support for public sector bodies being required to set targets for when they will achieve zero direct emissions, and for reduced indirect emissions. Subsequently, reporting duties were strengthened to include requirements on targets, where applicable, alongside other measures including a requirement to report Examples of specific commitments and action by the Scottish public sector on climate ease in reported emissions across local authorities between s capital programme of new hospitals and health facilities being governed by their recently strengthened commitment to net zero by 2040; s colleges’ commitment to net zero by 2040, and universities’ ater’s target of net zero by 2040. In addition to the annual reporting of statutory emissions reduction target outcomes. the Scottish Government also reports annually to the Scottish Parliament on progress towards the delivery of Climate Change Plans for meeting emissions reduction targets monitoring framework used for this reporting lies at the heart of Scotland’s ‘learning by doing’ approach to delivering emissions reductions. This approach reflects the inherent uncertainties in areas such as further technological innovation, market development and wider take up and adoption as well as action by others. The independent UK Climate Change Committee (CCC) also publishes independent annual assessments of Scotland’s progress in reducing emissions The public sector has an important role, in not only removing carbon from its own estate but within their span of leadership influence and operations. 143 A carbon assessment of the Scottish Budget 2022-23 is available scottish-budget-2022-23-carbon-assessment/documents/ 144 Public Bodies Climate Change Reporting 2019/20, Sustainable Scotland Network, available sustainablescotlandnetwork.org/uploads/store/mediaupload/1343/file/SSN_AnalysisReport_2021.03.15.pdf 145 The first annual statutory monitoring report required under the Climate Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Act 2019 was published in May 2021 and is available . climate-change-plan-monitoring-reports-2021-compendium/ 146 Available on the UK Climate Change Committee website
Chapter 3 Policies and Measures 259 Our ambition is for the Welsh public sector to be collectively net zero by 2030, radically reducing emissions from over 780 organisations. These organisations deliver vital public services including health and social care, protecting people and the environment, education, culture and the arts – they support and shape communities and have a shared focus on improving the economic, social, environmental and cultural wellbeing of everyone in Wales. Given the diverse nature of the organisations within the public sector the Net Zero Wales plan focuses on the highest emissions areas (sustainable procurement, mobility and transport, net zero buildings and land use) together with the actions of the largest emitting organisations (NHS Wales and local government). Sustainable procurement is also a key area requiring change. Research undertaken within the Welsh public sector has identified that the supply chains supporting the Welsh public sector account for circa 60% of their carbon emissions.
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legislation.gov.uk
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Part 6 U.K. General supplementary provisions Territorial scope of provisions relating to greenhouse gas emissions U.K. 89 Territorial scope of provisions relating to greenhouse gas emissions U.K. (1) The provisions of this Act relating to emissions of greenhouse gases apply to emissions from sources or other matters occurring in, above or below- (a) UK coastal waters, or (b) the UK sector of the continental shelf, as they apply to emissions from sources or matters occurring in the United Kingdom. (2) In subsection (1)- " UK coastal waters " means areas landward of the seaward limit of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom; " the UK sector of the continental shelf " means the areas designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (c. 29). (3) This section is subject to section 30 (emissions from international aviation or international shipping not to count as emissions from UK sources for the purposes of Part 1, except as provided by regulations). Orders and regulations U.K. 90 Orders and regulations U.K. (1) Orders and regulations under this Act must be made by statutory instrument, subject as follows. (2) The power of a Northern Ireland department to make regulations under Part 3 (trading schemes) or (charges for [ F1 single use carrier bags ] [ F1 carrier bags ] )- (a) is exercisable by statutory instrument if the instrument also contains regulations under that Part or made or to be made by another national authority, and (b) otherwise, is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)). (3) An order or regulations under this Act may- (a) make different provision for different cases or circumstances, (b) include supplementary, incidental and consequential provision, and (c) make transitional provision and savings. (4) Any provision that may be made by order under this Act may be made by regulations. (5) Any provision that may be made by regulations under this Act may be made by order. 6 para. 2 substituted (N.I.) (28.4.2014) by (Northern Ireland) 2014 (c. 7) , s. 1(b) 91 Affirmative and negative resolution procedure U.K. (1) Where orders or regulations under this Act are subject to "affirmative resolution procedure" the order or regulations must not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. (2) Where orders or regulations under this Act are subject to "negative resolution procedure" the statutory instrument containing the order or regulations is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. (3) Any provision that may be made by an order or regulations under this Act subject to negative resolution procedure may be made by an order or regulations subject to affirmative resolution procedure. (4) This section does not apply to- (a) regulations under Part 3 (trading schemes) (but see ), or (b) regulations under Schedule 6 (but see Part 3 of that ). Interpretation U.K. 92 Meaning of "greenhouse gas" U.K. (1) In this Act " greenhouse gas " means any of the following- (a) carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), (b) methane (CH 4 ), (c) nitrous oxide (N 2 O), (d) hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), (e) perfluorocarbons (PFCs), (f) sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6 ), [ F2 (g) nitrogen trifluoride (NF 3 ). ] (2) The Secretary of State may by order amend the definition of "greenhouse gas" in subsection (1) to add to the gases listed in that definition. (3) That power may only be exercised if it appears to the Secretary of State that an agreement or arrangement at European or international level recognises that the gas to be added contributes to climate change. (4) An order under this section is subject to negative resolution procedure. 92(1)(g) inserted (3.2.2023) by The Climate Change (Targeted Greenhouse Gases) Order 2023 (S.I. 2023/118) , arts. 1(2) , 3(3) 93 Measurement of emissions etc by reference to carbon dioxide equivalent U.K. (1) For the purposes of this Act greenhouse gas emissions, reductions of such emissions and removals of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere shall be measured or calculated in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. (2) A " tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent " means one metric tonne of carbon dioxide or an amount of any other greenhouse gas with an equivalent global warming potential (calculated consistently with international carbon reporting practice). 94 Meaning of "international carbon reporting practice" U.K. (1) In this Act " international carbon reporting practice " means (c. 30), (b) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament, (c) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, Northern Ireland legislation, and (d) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales; " European law " means- (a) all the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the [ F3 EU ] Treaties, and (b) all the remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the [ F3 EU ] Treaties, and "European policy" has a corresponding meaning; " modifications ", in relation to an enactment, includes additions or amendments to, or omissions from, the enactment; " primary legislation " means- (a) an Act of Parliament, (b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament, (c) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales, or (d) Northern Ireland legislation. 2011 (S.I. 2011/1043), arts. 2, 3, 6 (with art. 3(2)(3)4(2)6(4)6(5)) 98 Index of defined expressions U.K.
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.04040v3
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arxiv.org
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The implied emissions-based first-NIFA probability distributions appear in Table 3. They are nearly identical in shape to the earlier-reported concentration-based first-NIFA distributions, with one difference: the emissions-based distribution is shifted slightly rightward relative to the concentration-based distribution (i.e., shifted toward later first-NIFA years). Using SSP3 7.0 and SIA+SIT , for example, produces an emissions-based median first NIFA of 2033, for example, in contrast to our earlier concentration-based 2031. The right-shifting of the emissions-based distribution makes its left tail thinner, so its 80th and 95th percentiles increase by even more relative to the concentration-based distribution. Moving from concentration to emissions increases the 80th percentile from 2033 to 2036 (again using SSP3 7.0 and SIA+SIT ) and increases the 95th percentile from 2034 to 2038. We have constructed projections of September Arctic sea ice using a variety of specifications. We prefer bivariate rather than univariate projections, because they enlarge the underlying information set in two ways. First, the bivariate projections blend the information in the history of SIA with that in the histories of other sea-ice indicators, such as SIE, SIT , and SIV , which may improve projection accuracy. Second, they provide regularization by enabling us to constrain first IFA to coincide across sea-ice indicators, thereby imposing appropriate geophysical constraints on otherwise flexible statistical models. Importantly, our analysis produces full probability distribution projections of Arctic sea ice and, in particular, distributions of first-NIFA years based on constrained bivariate models. Our empirical results reconcile linear carbon trends with quadratic time trends and provide constrained multivariate support for an early probabilistic September disappearance of sea ice. Notz and Stroeve (2016) and others have also considered carbon regressions of the kind we use, but again, we generalize them to a multivariate setting, impose equal-IFA constraints, and construct density forecasts. Using atmospheric CO 2 concentration data, the median of our preferred first-NIFA distribution is 2031, with 80% probability by 2033 and 95% probability by 2034. Using cumulative CO 2 emissions data, the median is 2033, with 80% probability by 2036 and 95% probability by 2038. Therefore, it is very likely that the September Arctic will be nearly ice-free at some time before the middle of the next decade. Our results are largely robust to the modeling strategy (univariate or multivariate, carbon trend or direct time trend), the sea-ice indicator variable blended with SIA (SIE, SIT , SIV ), concentration path assumptions (high SSP5 8.5, medium SSP3 7.0, low SSP2 4.5), CO 2 measures (atmospheric concentration, cumulative emissions), and statistical confidence levels (80%, 95%). Note in particular that although both this paper and Diebold and Rudebusch (2022) agree that Arctic sea ice will disappear on a seasonal basis within a couple of decades, the two papers use very different information sets and methods, and the fact that they agree is itself an important result. Hence, unless we somehow manage to follow something like the extremely low SSP1 2.6 concentration path, there is no escaping the sharp bottom line: The Arctic will become seasonally ice free very soon -most likely by the midto late 2030's. In closing, we note that although this paper is about refining statistical sea-ice projections, not about comparing statistical and climate-model projections (unlike our earlier paper, Diebold and Rudebusch (2022)), it nevertheless provides indirect evidence supporting the speculations of, for example, Stroeve et al. (2007) and Stroeve et al. (2012) that the slow decline in Arctic sea ice projected by climate models reflects an underestimation of the effects of GHGs. Our forecasts are indeed generally quite different from those of typical climate models; we predict an earlier first NIFA (in the 2030's), whereas the latest CMIP6 coupled-climate models tend to obtain first NIFA around mid-century. Hence, as regards future research, it will be of interest to assess whether the linear relationship between Arctic sea ice and carbon dioxide, which we have documented in the observational record and used to make probabilistic assessments of NIFA arrival, is also present in simulated paths from large-scale dynamical climate models. If so, it will be of great interest to assess whether the "b" parameters (as defined by our equation ( 3)) embedded in various climate models are of sufficient magnitude to achieve consistency with the rapid observed historical Arctic sea-ice decline, and our projected continued rapid decline. Diebold and Rudebusch (2023) take initial steps in that direction. For the sample from 1979 to 2021, we consider four measures of September Arctic sea ice: area, extent, thickness, and volume. Area data are from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (Sea Ice Index monthly dataset, Version 3, Dataset ID G02135, https://nsidc.org/data/G02135/versions/3). Area is from 30.98N, measured in 10 6 km 2 . The satellites miss the "pole hole", and the published SIA data exclude it, implicitly assuming that the pole hole has zero ice (c=0). A better approximation is to assume that the pole hole has full ice (c=1). Hence we first fill the pole hole by adding 1.19 × 10 6 km 2 to SIA from sample start through July 1987, 0.31 × 10 6 km 2 from September 1987 through December 2007, and 0.029 × 10 6 km 2 from January 2008 to present.17
Extent data are from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (Sea Ice Index monthly dataset, Version 3, Dataset ID G02135, https://nsidc.org/data/G02135/versions/3). Extent is from 30.98N, measured in 10 6 km 2 . Thickness and volume date are from PIOMAS at the Polar Science Center, http://psc. apl.uw.edu/research/projects/arctic-sea-ice-volume-anomaly/data/. Thickness is from 49N, measured in m, where greater than 0.15 m. Volume is from 49N, measured in 10 3 km 3 . Volume data are published monthly. Thickness data are published on daily (file PIOMAS.thick.daily.1979.2020.Current.v2.1-2.dat), and we transform the daily data into monthly averages. The CO 2 measures are annual September atmospheric concentration and cumulative emissions. The historical
Cumulative CO 2 emissions data are taken from Rogelj et al. (2021) and the corresponding IPCC report (Allan et al., 2022). The actual dataset (Rogelj et al., 2021) is at https: //data.ceda.ac.uk/badc/ar6_wg1/data/spm/spm_10/v20210809.
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https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.156.01.0075.01.ENG
| 2,018
|
[
"Buildings",
"Construction",
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eur-lex.europa.eu
|
The methodology shall set out the most appropriate format of the smart readiness indicator parameter and shall be simple, transparent, and easily understandable for consumers, owners, investors and demand-response market participants. (3)
Annex II is amended as follows:
(a)
in point 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:
The competent authorities or bodies to which the competent authorities have delegated the responsibility for implementing the independent control system shall make a random selection of all the energy performance certificates issued annually and subject them to verification. The sample shall be of a sufficient size to ensure statistically significant compliance results.
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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf
| 2,021
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[
"hydrogen",
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Maritime Emission Reduction Options. A Summary Report for the Department for Transport’ (viewed June 2021) 65 Department for Transport (2019), ‘Clean Maritime Plan’ (viewed June 2020) 66 H M Government (2021), ‘£20 million fund to propel green shipbuilding launched’ (viewed June 2021) 67 Airbus (2021), ‘ZEROe: towards the world’s first zero-emission commercial aircraft’ (viewed June 2021) 68 ‘SAF’ describes low carbon alternatives to conventional, fossil-derived, aviation fuel which present chemical and physical characteristics similar to those of conventional jet fuel and can therefore be blended into current jet fuel without requiring any aircraft or engine modifications 69 Ricardo (2020), ‘Targeted Aviation Advanced Biofuels Demonstration Competition – Feasibility Study’ 70 Department for Transport (2021) ‘Mandating the use of sustainable aviation fuels in the UK’ (viewed 23 71 The Climate Change Act 2008 set a legally binding target for reducing UK carbon dioxide emission by at least 80 per cent by 2050, compared to 1990 levels, which has since been superseded by our net 72 H M Government (2020), ‘The Ten Point Plan for a green industrial revolution’ (viewed 14 June 2021) 73 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020), ‘Energy White Powering our net zero future’ (viewed 14 June 2021) 74 National Grid (2021), ‘Hydrogen: the future fuel to achieve net zero?’ (viewed 14 June 2021) 75 Legislation.gov.uk (1996), ‘Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996’ (viewed 4 June 2021) 76 HyDeploy (2021), ‘What is HyDeploy?’ (viewed 14 June 2021) 77 National Grid (2021), ‘FutureGrid’ (viewed 14 June 2021) 78 HyLaw sought to identify legal barriers to the commercialisation of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies across 18 countries in Europe; see HyLaw (2021), ‘About HyLAW’ (viewed 14 June 2021)
79 Internal BEIS analysis based on the EINA methodology with updated domestic and global scenarios; figures consider the direct GVA and jobs linked to hydrogen production, stationary CHP fuel cells and domestic distribution only; EINA methodology provided by Vivid Economics (2019), ‘Hydrogen and fuel cells (EINA sub-theme)’ (viewed 1 June 2021) 80 Energy Industries Council (2021), ‘press release’, announcing joint BEIS-DIT-EIC Energy Supply Chain Taskforce (viewed 27 May 2021) 81 Defined as new jobs generated by increased local spending on goods and services 82 As defined in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018), ‘Good Work Plan’ 83 Department for Education (2021), ‘Skills for Jobs White Paper’ (viewed June 2021) 84 Green Jobs Taskforce (2021), ‘Green Jobs Taskforce report’ (viewed on 14 July 2021) 85 For 40% women employed in those sectors by 2030; see Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2019), ‘Offshore Wind Sector Deal’ and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, (2018) ‘Nuclear Sector Deal’ (viewed June 2021) 87 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2021), ‘North Sea Transition Deal’ (viewed 88 Silverman D, Imperial College London (2020), ‘Imperial pioneers innovation in clean energy sector’ (viewed 18 June 2021); Durlacher Ltd (2004), ‘Placing and Admission to the Alternative Investment 89 Hydrogen TCP (2020), ‘International Energy Agency’ (viewed 21 June 2021) 90 Wind Europe (2021) ‘Offshore Wind in Europe, Key Trends and Statistics 2020’ (exchange rate based on monthly average between Jan 2011 and Dec 2020) 91 HM Treasury (2021), ‘UK Infrastructure Bank Press Release’ (viewed 17 June 2021) 92 Sustainable Development scenario from ‘IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2020’ (viewed 17 May 93 GHG abatement estimated relative to IEA Stated Policy scenario, accounting for existing policy 94 Strong policy scenario from ‘Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) Hydrogen Economy Outlook 95 Hydrogen Council (2020), ‘Path to hydrogen competitiveness – A cost perspective’ (viewed 17 May 96 HM Treasury (2020), ‘The Green Book’ (viewed June 2021) 97 To include Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) and BEIS’ Energy and emissions projections (EEP) 98 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020), ‘Monitoring and evaluation framework’ 99 Offshore wind prices in renewable Contracts for Difference auctions have fallen from £120/MWh in 2015 to around £40/MWh in 2019, and operational offshore wind capacity has increased from just over 1GW in 2010 to 10GW by 2019; see Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020), ‘Energy White Powering our net zero future’ (viewed June 2021) 100 To include Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) and BEIS’ Energy and emissions projections (EEP) 101 For further detail on the policy development cycle, HM Treasury (2020), ‘The Green Book’ (viewed
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| 43
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/uk-net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_807a7bbb4df0326606e1552618bffc6f.pdf
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Allowed Revenue estimates are the costs that network operators will be allowed to recover annually – as decided by Ofgem as part of their RIIO price control process. These are therefore the network costs that will be passed through each year. They do not represent the total value of investment in assets. The 2050 illustrative scenarios represent the power sector at a less granular level than DDM. Supplementary adjustments and results were validated by DDM but should not be read as predictive of the optimal technology mix in 2050. For a detailed assessment of potential scenarios for the 2050 electricity system please consult the Modelling 2050: electricity system analysis published alongside the Energy White Paper. high electrification scenario assumes no hydrogen availability for power to illustrate an alternative power sector trajectory. Net Zero Build Back Greener
The hydrogen demand needed to meet the sixth carbon budget in industry, power, buildings and transport was estimated as set out in the evidence base sections for those sectors. The hydrogen production capacity needed to meet this demand has been calculated assuming hydrogen production plants run at a 95% load factor. Evidence on hydrogen supply and demand has also been drawn from the Hydrogen further detail can be found in the Hydrogen Strategy analytical annex. hydrogen production costs are based on the evidence set out in the hydrogen production Upstream Oil and The pathway for upstream oil and gas was developed using the OGA’s projected abatement from offshore electrification and flaring. Estimates of potential abatement from offshore electrification (scope 1 emissions only) were developed using the best available data provided to the OGA by industry as of August 2021, and assumes that there will be a mixture of some installations being partially electrified and some being fully electrified (the list of these installations was provided by industry). Fully electrified installations were estimated, in line with industry representatives’ assessment, to have 70% of power demand provided by electrification, while partially electrified ones have 43%. Additionally, it is assumed that project phasing is one year and that electrification of the installation would not affect previously reported economic cessation of production dates. The estimate of GHG emissions abatement via flaring reduction from offshore oil and gas infrastructure was developed assuming that zero routine flaring will be in place across all UKCS assets in 2030. Routine flaring is assumed to be broadly consistent with category 1 flaring (now defined by the OGA as category A flaring). Future expected flare volumes were calculated by subtracting the routine element of flaring from total anticipated flaring per facility after 2030, with data taken from the UK Stewardship Survey. Flared gas values, in both mass and volume units, have been converted to CO2 emissions using emission factors observed in published datasets (e.g. EEMS). Capex assumptions for Upstream Oil and Gas abatement measures have been sourced from the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget advice. The overall cost profile has been calculated by BEIS and is aligned to the deployment trajectory underpinning the sector’s illustrative emissions pathway. This is an early analysis with significant uncertainties. Through discussion with the OGA BEIS is confident that these estimates are in the right or magnitude, however actual costs might end up being higher. Hydrogen and other fuel supply assumptions for 2050 are aligned with those used in the Sixth Carbon Budget Impact Assessment. The level of curtailment available for electrolysis was taken directly from the power sector modelling. A model of the UK industrial sector called Net Zero Industrial Pathways (NZIP) has been used to generate a technically feasible pathway to achieve a net zero industry sector by 2050. The model was developed by Element Energy for BEIS and the Climate Change 64 and was used to underpin the manufacturing and construction sector analysis in the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget report65 and the Government’s Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy (IDS),66 published in March 2021. The industry pathway required to reach net zero is based on the IDS National Networks scenario but achieves a faster trajectory through earlier decarbonisation of the Iron and Steel sector and increased CCS ambition by 2030. The model calculates the least cost pathway for a range of technologies, assessed on their capital and operating costs, along with cost reductions over time due to technology learning, and a number of key constraints impacting their deployment (e.g. technology readiness level, hydrogen and CO 2 transport and storage availability, supply The 2050 scenario analysis includes supplementary adjustments to align the UKTM emissions, energy demands and CCS requirements with the evidence base in NZIP IDS 2050 scenarios. In the high electrification and high resource scenarios these align with the National Networks scenario, whilst the high innovation scenario is more r epresentative of the Cluster Networks scenario. Both heat and buildings scenarios are developed to be consistent with completely decarbonising buildings by 2050 to meet a net zero target. With the assumption that a typical heating appliance has a lifetime of 15 years, this implies that no new fossil fuel heating systems can be installed after 2035. The high electrification scenario assumes that hydrogen is not available as an option for heating buildings, so the level of heat pump deployment grows from its current level of around 35,000 in 2020 to be able to meet the turnover of fossil fuel systems in 2035. In scenarios involving hydrogen, heat pump deployment meets the common ambition of 600,000 heat pumps by 2028, and further growth is dependent on the level of hydrogen deployment to generate the same level of carbon savings between scenarios. Installation of energy efficiency measures and deployment of low carbon heat networks is assumed to be same in all scenarios. Domestic Energy The domestic energy efficiency modelling was carried out using the National Household Model.
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HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
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GDF, 2013a. Forest Fires in 2012b. GDF Fighting with Forest Fires Department GDF, 2012a.State of Turkey's Forests-2012.GDF Forest Management and Planning Department, 26p. GDF, 2013b. Turkish Forest Existance-2013.GDF Forest Management and Planning Department
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06562e1c-f7cf-4a20-8aec-4e249a099447
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https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2018/road-to-zero-strategy_0edbd980a9106685e89c39981152a569.pdf
| 2,018
|
[
"Transport",
"Mitigation",
"vehicles",
"emission",
"emissions",
"vehicle",
"road"
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
Highways England – progress to date Highways England (HE) have completed a gap analysis to identify locations required to fulfil their target. Under the grants process, HE have already issued grants to two local authorities, Mid Suffolk and Shropshire (A49) with a further four applications South Somerset (A303); Ryedale District Council (A64 York – Scarborough); Herefordshire (A49); Chichester (A27). Chargepoints will be installed this year. The pilot will determine what combination of increased network connection, technologies and storage could be pursued for the increased number of rapid chargepoints, including the higher-powered rapid chargepoints that will be needed to meet Rapid hubs or chargepoint “filling stations” in key strategic, community, or urban locations, also have an important role to play in the future. In particular, for commercial fleets and individuals without off-street parking, they could enable a more “internal combustion engine-like refuelling experience” and greater confidence to users that there is potential for multiple chargepoints to be available for use. The Go Ultra Low Cities scheme will result in the provision of hundreds of additional chargepoints in participating cities including 17 rapid charging hubs sited at high-profile locations in city centres and outer ring roads. Some hubs will host up to 20 rapid chargers coupled with solar canopies and energy storage facilities. We will support sharing the lessons learned from these Investment Public Private Considerable private sector investment will be required over the coming years to achieve the build-out of UK EV charging infrastructure. To catalyse the private investment required, we have announced a new £400 million EV Charging Infrastructure Investment Fund (CIIF). Government will set up the CIIF that will be managed and invested in on a commercial basis by a private sector fund manager, and plans to invest £200 million into the fund, to be matched by private investors. This model – of government setting up a fund for private investment and acting as a cornerstone investor – has also been successfully adopted to support the roll out of full fibre broadband through the Digital Infrastructure This investment in charging infrastructure reflects government’s confidence in the growth potential of the sector. It will accelerate the roll-out of charging infrastructure by providing access to finance to companies that deliver chargepoints and encouraging growth of a more diverse range There have been hundreds of millions of pounds of investment into the UK charging infrastructure sector in the last year alone. Some examples include the recent high profile acquisitions of charging networks by Shell and BP , with commitments made to further deployment of public infrastructure as a result. A partnership agreement between ChargePoint Services and Motor Fuel group (MFG) is seeing an extensive roll-out of forecourt electric vehicle rapid charging across the UK. This partnership will host the 50kW plus rapid chargers at their sites nationwide which operate under the BP , Shell, Texaco, JET and Murco fuel brands. The Road to Next steps towards cleaner road transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy
of actors supporting the private market – growing competition and delivering the best The work to establish the CIIF is being led by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA), part of HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, who have engaged with a wide range of investors, representatives from the chargepoint and related industries, and other stakeholders on how to focus, structure and run the fund. This work will inform a tender process in the form of a Request For Proposal (RFP) to appoint a fund manager, who will make independent, commercial decisions on how to invest, within parameters set by Government. Government will be a Limited Partner in the fund and the fund manager will be tasked with raising at least another £200 million of commitments from the private sector to match the Government’s investment. To date, the IPA have carried out detailed market engagement to work out the best way and timetable for establishing and structuring the fund. This has included over 75 stakeholder meetings with the industry and finance community. The market engagement process is important to ensure the fund is set up correctly. The IPA will launch the RFP to procure the private sector fund manager in the summer. Once a preferred fund manager is nominated and the legal documents agreed, the fund will be formally launched and start investing. At this stage the investment parameters that IPA has in mind are wide, including equity, mezzanine and possibly senior debt investments. Investments may be corporate in nature or directly into project-focused Special Purpose Vehicles. All elements of charging infrastructure are currently considered, including the physical chargepoints, the software required to run communicative and interoperable, connections to the national and local electricity distribution networks and related grid reinforcement, costs associated with site leasing and development, as well as battery storage solutions that may be related to the chargepoints. Equally, existing or novel business models may be considered. Initial market feedback suggests opportunities for commercial investment are likely to require scale/high utilisation or some form of underwritten revenues. Opportunities appear greatest in the rapid charger and destination charging market. Potential solutions could include petrol station or hub-type sites in busy urban and suburban locations, charging “depots” coupled with some form of “minimum usage guarantee” from vehicle fleets, or, in the destination market, contractual arrangements where there are, for example, underwritten Local levers for incentivising EV charging infrastructure provision We recognise that cities, regions and counties have a key role in facilitating the growth of EV charging networks. Legislation in the Automated Electric Vehicles Bill would give them a lever to help them deliver this locally. The Bill will enable elected mayors (the Mayor of London and Mayors of Combined Authorities) to designate locations – at large fuel retailers – to identify and require the installation of charging infrastructure within their areas by the Secretary of State for Transport, taking into
consideration their local knowledge. Mayors will be required to consult on these plans. Local authorities have an intimate knowledge of local needs and responsibility for local planning policies. Planning policy is an important tool in leveraging residential and non-residential chargepoint infrastructure.
|
79c0a495-2ed0-4670-ab49-ef30f5c89e61
| 31
|
066577f4-da01-4e25-83e6-a386a852d96e
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf
| 2,025
|
[
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"emission",
"used"
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cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 81 Explanation for not estimating Estimate N Indirect CO2 emissions from the oxidation of VOCs are not mandatory for reporting under the UNFCCC reporting Estimate of emissions due to abatement of NMVOC by oxidation presented. This estimate is based on the differences in emissions of NMVOC reported for 2017 for each source category within 2D3 compared with emissions reported for 1990 (when solvent emissions will not have been abated).
|
95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c
| 154
|
06689432-1022-4a21-baeb-439db3c9e07e
|
http://arxiv.org/abs/2012.09468v1
| 2,020
|
[
"global inter - annual variability",
"model resolution",
"idealised climate model experiments",
"critical hurricane features",
"equilibrium state v = v"
] |
ArXiv
|
Another example links biases in simulated historical climate and future Indian Summer Monsoon (ISM) rainfall (Li et al., 2017). In this case, the authors find that models overestimating historical precipitation across the tropical western Pacific also exhibit larger increases in Monsoon rains in the future (Li et al., 2017). Using observations of western Pacific rainfall reduces the projected increase in ISM rainfall by nearly 50%. CMIP5 models also differ greatly in their projections of future total (March-April-May mean spanning a region from northwest Tanzania to southwest Ethiopia) -from a 20% decrease to a 120% increase (Rowell and Chadwick, 2018). Rowell (2019) use an EC between present day interannual SST-low level cloud sensitivity and future SST change over the Indian Ocean to assess the credibility of projections of East African precipitation. They find that one outlier model, which projects a doubling of seasonal precipitation is likely unreliable because of unrealistic SST/low cloud processes. This reduction in intermodel spread is another example of the value that an EC approach can provide. Along these lines, Lehner et al. (2019) recently suggested that the sensitivity of historical runoff to temperature and precipitation change across three watersheds in the Western US is closely tied to projections of future runoff across a series of ESMs. It is expected that regional applications of ECs to highly uncertain quantities like precipitation change will be a key area of future research. TABLE I: Collection of existing ECs. Note that some of these ECs involve correlations that are lower than those portrayed in Figure 1, with correspondingly less potential for uncertainty reduction. The ensemble(s) for which the EC appears to have value is also listed (note that many have only been tested on the ensemble that they were developed on). Accurately constraining the unknown future value of Y in the real world requires one to include and quan-tify all the possible sources of uncertainty in each step of the EC procedure. This section will give an overview of four types of uncertainty that have been incorporated into ECs so far: those stemming from uncertainty in the real world observation of X, uncertainty in X from internal variability, uncertainty in the functional form of the emergent relationship and uncertainty from ESMs being imperfect replications of the real world. The section concludes with a discussion on how to combine those four types of uncertainty in the resulting in EC. In addition, we discuss how to combine multiple emergent constraints of the same quantity, derived from alternative features of historical climate. There are multiple sources of observational error in the real world value of X. First, a lack of spatial and/or temporal coverage can be present and this may lead to biases if not taken into account (Cowtan and Way, 2014). There are two ways to handle missing data: it can be interpolated and extrapolated from existing data, or alternatively, model output can be filtered to reflect only locations and times for which observational data is present (e.g. AchutaRao et al. (2006); Cox et al. (2018a); Durack et al. (2014)). Secondly, observational records are of finite length, introducing additional uncertainty from low sample size. Standard errors quantifying finite size effects can be computed, but care should be taken when timeseries are autocorrelated as this increases the standard error by effectively reducing the sample size (Trenberth, 1984). For stationary processes, standard equations for autocorrelation errors can be found in Zhang (2006). Estimates of errors in instrumentation and data gathering are often available from literature e.g. Hennermann (last edited July 2018). If multiple observational data sets are available, these can be used to infer uncertainty (Kwiatkowski et al., 2017;Trenberth and Fasullo, 2010). The errors in these data sets might not be independent; different satellite products might for instance have the same biases. Independent sources of error 1 and 2 can simply be computed by 2 total = 2 1 + 2 2 . If observational uncertainty makes up a large percentage of overall uncertainty, care should be taken to assess whether to use a normal distribution to describe the probability density function (pdf). It may sometimes be possible to estimate a full pdf from measurements. Alternatively, stochastic reduced-form modelling of the system can be used to estimate the shape (Nijsse and Dijkstra, 2018;Williamson et al., 2019). Whatever method is used, it is important that this step of capturing observational error is not neglected (Hall et al., 2019). Like the real world, climate models have internal variability. Because of the finite length of the simulation or observed climate record, internal variability can have a significant impact on the estimation of the predictor. One possibility is to use very long model control simulations to estimate the size of internal variability if it is believed to be independent of forcing (Nijsse et al., 2019). Variability may however be dependent on forcing, and consequently, estimating it from a forced initial value ensemble (see section II.A) may be preferable (Tokarska et al., 2020). For instance, global inter-annual variability is expected to decrease in the future (Huntingford et al., 2013). Jimenez-de-la Cuesta and Mauritsen (2019) used the 100-member historical ensemble of MPI-ESM1.1 to quantify the effect of internal variability, whereas Nijsse et al. (2020) used all available historical initial value members from each CMIP6 model to estimate the mean model variability. Both used model estimates as a proxy for real internal variability. Reducing a high-dimensional climate model to a lower dimension brings some uncertainty. Clearly, not all the variance will be explained with only two variables, and performing a regression is a tool to quantify this. While most emergent constraints so far assume linear relationships between X and Y and use linear regression to infer the emergent relationship, the regression does not necessarily have to be linear (Bracegirdle and Stephenson, 2012;Nijsse and Dijkstra, 2018). If a linear relationship is imposed when, in reality, the relationship is nonlinear, additional errors will occur.
|
e0b7d485-699c-4230-a177-4aae97a1a7fc
| 17
|
066aa9fe-78ec-4a8a-9c89-177babe15fe9
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0094&from=EN
| 2,014
|
[
"Transport",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
50
In the absence of a European standard for a given alternative fuel, Member States should be allowed to use other
standards for user information and labelling. 1 Directive 200868EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the inland transport of dangerous goods
OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13. 2 Directive 200687EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 laying down technical requirements for
inland waterway vessels and repealing Council Directive 82714EEC OJ L 389, 30.12.2006, p.
|
47d41edb-e6e8-4edf-a97f-3da2efd8b5a1
| 11
|
066b0cb0-2b19-49e8-bb9b-187ca673378d
|
https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-updated-2030-ndc_c5fbbb52f2e6781bba1f8f32f5b44d29.pdf
| 2,022
|
[
"climate",
"emissions",
"zero",
"strategy",
"change"
] |
cdn.climatepolicyradar.org
|
Sustainable development and poverty eradication The UK is committed to the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For more information about the UK’s approach to the SDGs, please see the UK’s a(ii)b Best practice and experience related to the preparation of the The UK’s NDC follows the rules for transparency and understanding set out in Decision As described in Section 4a(i), development of the NDC has been closely linked with the UK’s domestic processes for delivery of the net zero commitment under the framework of the Climate Change Act. It also takes into account best available science and evidence, as well A range of HM Government departments were involved in setting the UK’s economy-wide emissions reduction target. This is crucial, given that ownership of the policies required to 64 UK’s Voluntary National Review of the Sustainable Development Goals 65 CCC advice on the UK’s 2030 NDC
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 reduce emissions is spread across government. Going forward, the UK will continue to follow UNFCCC guidelines and use domestic governance and engagement to track For more information on the UK’s domestic institutional structures and GHG inventory governance, see Section 4a(i). For more information on the UK’s process in reviewing its NDC in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact, see Section 6. a(ii)c Other contextual aspirations Beyond the communication of an NDC, the UK continues to make progress on priority policy areas that are crucial to the UK’s overall approach to climate action. The UK’s Agriculture Act66 obligates HM Government to produce a domestic and international food security report every three years. The UK published its first Food Security report under the Agriculture Act in December 202167. The UK is committed to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Goal 2 on ending hunger. Scotland’s National Performance Framework (NPF)68, which integrates the SDGs alongside National Outcomes, is an important part of Scotland’s localisation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ensuring that these objectives are increasingly located at the centre of policymaking and delivery. The NPF has a focus on tackling inequalities so that no one in Scotland is left behind when progressing the SDGs and National Outcomes 66 UK Agriculture Act (2020) 67 United Kingdom Food Security Report (2021) 68 Scotland’s National Performance Framework
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 The UK’s vision for the marine environment is for clean, healthy, safe, and biologically diverse ocean and seas. The sustainable use, protection and restoration of the UK’s marine environment is underpinned by the UK Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009)69, the Environment Act (2021) 70 and Fisheries Act (2020) 71, UK Marine Policy Statement72, Marine Strategy73, commitment to an ecologically coherent well-managed network of Marine Protected Areas, and Joint Fisheries Statement. Through the UK Marine Strategy, HM Government and Devolved Administrations are working closely together to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) in the UK’s seas. The UK’s National Adaptation Programme74 outlines how the UK will address marine climate risks by introducing a Sustainable Fisheries policy, giving consideration to climate change in marine planning, building ecological resilience at sea. The Scottish Government has set out a new Blue Economy vision for the sustainable management of Scotland’s seas, establishing long term outcomes to 2045 and including a dedicated climate outcome to support ecosystem health, improved livelihoods, economic prosperity, social inclusion and wellbeing. New actions to increase protection of the marine environment include; delivery of a network of highly protected marine areas by 2026, fishery management measures across the Marine Protected Areas network by 2024 and introduction of a Scottish Wild Salmon Strategy. New evidence is also being delivered 69 UK Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009) 70 UK Environment Act (2021) 71 UK Fisheries Act (2020) 72 UK Marine Policy Statement 73 UK Marine UK updated assessment and Good Environmental Status 74 UK’s National Adaptation Programme
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 through the Scottish Blue Carbon Forum, building upon actions set out in the second Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Programme75 to address Scotland’s marine climate In November 2019 the Welsh Government published the first Welsh National Marine Plan76. This sets out policy for the next 20 years to achieve healthy and resilient seas and marine ecosystems, in support of a thriving, sustainable economy. The Plan provides the strategic framework to enable renewable energy generation at sea. The draft Marine Plan for Northern Ireland77, published in April 2018, supports the UK Marine Policy Statement, the UK Marine Strategy and the UK’s vision for the marine environment. The sustainable development of Northern Ireland’s marine area is further underpinned by the Marine Act (Northern Ireland) 201378 and the Marine and Coastal Access Act 200979. The Plan represents the first step in sustainably managing Northern Ireland’s marine area in supporting economic, environmental and social objectives. A second iteration of the Plan is currently being drafted which will take account of the advancements in science, technology, policy and legislation, particularly in relation to climate change mitigation and adaption including Blue Carbon, Sustainable Fisheries and Offshore Renewable Energy. The Marine Plan for Northern Ireland is expected to be finalised, adopted and published in 2023. Given the mutually reinforcing effects of climate change and biodiversity loss on people and 75 Climate Ready Climate Change Adaptation Programme 2019-24 (2019) 76 Welsh National Marine Plan (2019) 77 Draft Marine Plan for Northern Ireland 78 Marine Act (Northern Ireland) (2013) 79 UK Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009)
UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution – updated September 2022 the planet, an integrated approach is the only way to address these issues. HM Government is developing a 2030 strategic framework for international climate and nature action that will set out the UK’s integrated approach to tackling both challenges.
|
66804fc0-e8e2-4615-a50d-cd3eaed0144f
| 6
|
067a9a28-4a21-413e-8616-3ed46b539c55
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2504.19145v1
| 2,025
|
[
"Climate change",
"ocean temperature",
"sea level",
"monsoon",
"ocean productivity",
"Global Climate Models",
"SSP",
"CMIP",
"bias correction",
"deep learning",
"UNet",
"LSTM",
"ConvLSTM",
"linear regression",
"EDCDF",
"Bay of Bengal",
"SST",
"CNRM-CM6",
"ORAS5",
"RMSE",
"data-driven",
"climate projections",
"statistical correction",
"model validation",
"hyperparameter tuning",
"2021-2024",
"climatology removal",
"statistical technique"
] |
arxiv.org
|
Quantifying the anthropogenic impact on climate change is a controversial subject that the climate research community must address rightly to adopt the correct climate policies. The World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) runs the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), whose data is used regularly by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its assessment reports. Since the 1990s, the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) has facilitated the simulation of numerous Global Climate Models (GCMs) from a multitude of international institutes to enhance simulation accuracy and acquire precise scientific insights into the Earth’s future climate. The GCMs included in the CMIP Phase 6 have higher resolution compared to the GCMs of previous phases and use shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) to offer projections for future climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The main demerit of GCMs is their potential for error, which can have significant implications for decision-making and policy making, with considerable biases in simulations that require correction methods to reduce model biases for impact studies. Several bias correction methods have been proposed in the literature for correcting GCM projections. The Equi-Distant Cumulative Distribution Function (EDCDF) method, a quantile-based mapping method for bias correction, is one of the most popular statistical bias correction methods used for the CMIP6 climate models.
|
408440dc-8f25-4c57-8224-8ea03f731dce
| 2
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06898f7b-5066-4fb2-b9f8-5a2983bb1de0
| 2,025
|
[
"governance",
"exposure changes",
"certain period",
"sds scenario",
"clarity"
] |
HF-national-climate-targets-dataset
|
f s 5 The EBA amended templates the accordingly. Summary of responses received 9 It would be useful to have more information on the type of information expected with regard to the distance to the IEA scenario. Also, if the IEA scenario seems to be relevant, namely in terms of governance of the scenario and regular updates, it is not clear to stakeholders which 2-degree scenario the template refers to (i.e. whether the SDS scenario or not). It would be necessary to give more clarity on the scenario that should be the basis for the reporting during a certain period (three years for instance). This will avoid volatility in institutions' disclosure not resulting from exposure changes. In addition, this would help reflect changes in historical emissions and changes in technology and policy.
|
4abcd84c-87b2-4039-b5ca-44bc6960785e
| 0
|
|
068a3b1b-82aa-481e-bac9-416f1b2c0775
|
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/schedule/4/paragraph/4
| 2,008
|
[
"26.1.2009",
"u.k.",
"environmental authority",
"notice",
"climate change act"
] |
legislation.gov.uk
|
4 [ F1 (1) A notice under this must comply with the following requirements. U.K. (2) The notice must- (a) be in writing, (b) specify the information to be provided, (c) specify the name and address of the person to whom the information is to be provided, (d) specify the date by which the information is to be provided, and (e) explain the consequences of failure to comply with the notice. (3) An environmental authority must not give a notice requiring information from a person unless- (a) the authority has previously sent the person a request in writing for the information, and (b) the person has failed to provide the information within the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the request was sent. ] 4 paras. 1-5 ceased to have effect (26.1.2009) by virtue of Climate Change Act 2008 (c. 27) , ss. 50(2) , 100(5)
|
3dfbfeb6-6e3e-4165-891d-53200fbc0977
| 0
|
068d06d1-656f-470b-9d90-db89463a5b91
|
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry_en
| 2,005
|
[
"General",
"Industry",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Non-energy use"
] |
ec.europa.eu
|
Explore the basics of the EU ETS
About the Union Registry
The Union Registry is an online database that helps guarantee the precise accounting of all allowances issued under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The Registry keeps track of the ownership of allowances held in electronic accounts, just as a bank has a record of all its customers and their money. Ultimately, it helps assessing if operators and regulated entities comply with their obligation to report emissions and surrender allowances accordingly. The following information is publicly available on the Union Registry website:
A single EU Registry
In 2012, EU ETS operations were centralised into a single registry operated by the European Commission. The Union Registry covers all countries participating in the EU ETS and holds accounts for:
The Registry records:
Opening accounts in the Union Registry
To participate in the EU ETS, be it for compliance or trading of allowances companies must open an account in the Union Registry. To open an account, companies must send a request to their respective national administrator, who collects and verifies all supporting documentation. Once their request is approved, companies receive credentials to access their account on the Union Registry portal. Fees
Click on the + sign for more information.
|
1c8185de-d02c-40fd-a637-11e7e4d30d42
| 0
|
068d9d60-d60f-47ee-9676-4ccf5bd9d969
|
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fbd810dd3bf7f5736c1a18f/NIS_final_web_single_page.pdf
| 2,020
|
[
"infrastructure",
"pages",
"additional",
"file"
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www.gov.uk
|
As well as decarbonising private vehicles, the government wants to increase the share of journeys taken by public transport, cycling and walking, and decarbonise buses and trains. Supporting greener buses is another key part of the government’s agenda for achieving net zero and tackling air pollution. London now has the largest fleet of electric buses in Europe,44 and the UK is one of the world’s leading designers and exporters of buses. The Prime Minister announced in February that the government would deliver a further 4,000 zero emission buses. The Spending Review confirms £120 million to deliver an additional 500 zero emission buses in 2021-22. This builds on up to £50 million investment in the first All Electric Bus Town, which will be announced early next year and is expected to deliver around 300 zero emission buses, supporting greener and cleaner journeys. Where it is less certain what technology will provide the most effective route to decarbonisation or where it is unclear how the technology can be scaled commercially, the government will fund R&D programmes to support innovation. Innovation will play a crucial role in decarbonising domestic shipping, for which emissions are likely to be reduced mainly through the scale adoption of alternative fuel systems like hydrogen and ammonia. The government will provide £20 million in 2021-22 to enable a UK network of technology demonstrations in alternative marine fuels and green shipbuilding, including hydrogen vessels trials in Orkney and groundworks for a hydrogen port in Teesside. In parallel, the government will consider whether and how the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation could be used to encourage the uptake of low carbon fuels in maritime, taking the availability of sustainable resources, competing uses and the international character of the maritime sector into consideration. £21 million will also be provided for the decarbonisation of aviation, through supporting sustainable aviation fuels and zero emission flight infrastructure. This work will be overseen by the recently established Jet Zero Council, a partnership between government and industry to drive the delivery of new technologies and innovative ways to cut aviation emissions. This will fund a one-year competition to support the development of a Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) Demonstration and first-of-a-kind commercial plants. This funding will also kickstart the establishment of a clearing house for SAF, the first of its kind in Europe, to certify new fuels and develop UK expertise. The government will also consult on introducing a SAF mandate. Funding for the Aerospace Technology Institute, which provides match-funding to stimulate the development of innovative and more efficient aircraft technologies, has also been extended. The UK’s airspace is an essential, but invisible, part of its national transport infrastructure. The government is therefore committed to modernising UK airspace, which will deliver quicker, quieter and cleaner journeys and more capacity for the benefit of those who use and are affected by UK airspace. The government will continue to co-sponsor the airspace modernisation programme with the Civil Aviation Authority. This will ensure that carbon savings for aviation can be realised though proven technology this decade. Freight also contributes to pollution and congestion in the UK’s urban areas which, left unchecked, will only get worse. The government supports the NIC’s recommendations in this area, and believes that through the adoption of new technologies and better recognition of freight’s needs in the planning system, it is possible to decarbonise freight by 2050 and manage its contribution to congestion. Unlike lighter goods vehicles, such as passenger cars and vans, there is currently not a commercially viable path to decarbonise heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) which contribute 17% of UK transport emissions.45 To support the sector to make the transition to zero emission vehicles, the government will invest £20 million in 2021-22 to establish zero emission road freight trials. These will assess the most effective and commercial path to decarbonising HGVs. The government will also consult on a phase out date for The government has announced that it will provide a full response to the NIC’s Better The Challenge for Freight report, through the publication of a comprehensive cross-modal freight strategy. This strategy will be published in 2021 and will consider the impacts on the freight system of the end of the transition period as the UK leaves the European Union and the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the publication of Better Delivery in April 2019, progress has been made against the recommendations in the report, including • Better land use through provision of guidance on how local authorities can assess need and allocate space for logistics in the Housing and economic needs asssessment, July 2019; and and • Data and through the ongoing development of a freight mapping tool to enable the UK’s freight networks to meet growing demands for faster deliveries while reducing its impact on congestion and the environment. The discovery phase of this project will conclude in December, with further work planned for 2021. The government has also recently established a Freight Council to provide a forum for discussion with industry stakeholders from all parts of the freight sector. The forum met frequently in the first half of 2020 and will meet quarterly going forward, with a focus on long-term strategic issues for the freight sector.
|
065e5061-603a-4613-810e-5fbe04701545
| 20
|
06921b47-7277-4e16-849d-072ab8707f46
|
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0073
| 2,009
|
[
"Electricity and heat",
"Gas",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] |
eur-lex.europa.eu
|
Done at Brussels, 13Â July 2009. For the European Parliament
The President
H.-G. PÃTTERING
For the Council
The President
E. ERLANDSSON
(1)
OJ C 211, 19.8.2008, p. 23. (2)
OJ C 172, 5.7.2008, p. 55. (3) Opinion of the European Parliament of 9 July 2008 (not yet published in the Official Journal), Council Common Position of 9 January 2009 (OJ C 70 E, 24.3.2009, p. 37) and Position of the European Parliament of 22 April 2009 (not yet published in the Official Journal). Council Decision of 25 June 2009. (4)
OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 57. (5)
OJ C 175 E, 10.7.2008, p. 206. (6)
OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. (7) See page 1 of this Official Journal. (8)
OJ L 25, 29.1.2009, p. 18. (9) See page 36 of this Official Journal. (10)
OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23. (11)
OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, p. 1. (*1) The title of Directive 83/349/EEC has been adjusted to take account of the renumbering of the Articles of the Treaty establishing the European Community in accordance with Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam; the original reference was to Article 54(3)(g). (12)
OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 1. (13)
OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1. (14)
OJ L 127, 29.4.2004, p. 92. (15)
OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37.
|
468e5f96-94f7-4694-bfed-829608c266ef
| 69
|
06982434-171c-4924-a7cd-9bfa0dc54baa
|
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.09959v2
| 2,020
|
[
"patents",
"energy",
"science",
"citations",
"scientific"
] |
arxiv.org
|
If spillovers are sufficiently strong to generate increasing returns, the benefits of technological specialization are higher if R&D resources are focused on one cluster instead of being spread across technologies belonging to different clusters. The following tables give an overview of the subset of LCET patents and papers we analyze here. Table 4 shows the counts of patents, papers and citations for all LCETs and per LCET type and the number of citation links with highest and lowest confidence score (CS). The confidence score indicates the reliability of the citation link inferred by the stochastic paper-patent matching procedure by Marx and Fuegi [32]. The average CS of our data ranges between 7.41 and 9.34 which indicates an expected precision rate of more than 99.7%. Patent citations can be added to the document by the examiner or applicant. In the data, 72-96% of citations to science are added by the applicant and between 1-10% by the examiner. The type of the remaining fraction is unknown. 13-63% of citations are retrieved from the text body only and 30-79% from the front page only. The remaining citations are made in both, the text body and the front page. Table 5 shows the age characteristics of the patents and papers. In Table 6, information on the most cited paper per technology group is shown. The title and the DOI, if available, can be used to search manually for the paper online. As a validation test, the papers without DOI/Journal were checked manually. 11 These are a technical report and a conference contribution which have not been published in an official conference-proceeding or journal and two books. Overview statistics of subset of green patents citing scientific papers. Columns show the number of (1) unique patents, (2) unique papers, (3) citation links, (4) citations with highest confidence score (CS = 10), ( 5) lowest confidence score (CS = 3), ( 6) the average confidence score, (7) the share of applicant and ( 7) examiner added citations (remaining share is of unknown type), ( 8) share of citations made exclusively in the text body or (9) front page of the patent document (remaining shares account for citations made in both). Table 9 Most cited journal (J) or conference proceeding (C) and number of citations received within technology type and from all types. In Table 7, we show the patents per technology group with the highest number of citations to science. Patents and the citation links made by the patent can be manually checked on the website of USPTO using the patent search by number. 12 Table 8 gives an overview of the most cited fields of research and Table 9 summarizes the most cited journals and conference proceedings. Table 10 shows relevant statistics on the most granular classification level possible. Our main result is that there is a rising importance of science in LCET patenting. To be sure that this result is not driven by artefacts in the data, we proceed to a significant manual checking and cleaning of the data. Recent patents are written in digitized form natively. This makes them easy to parse. They also have a list of references on the front page, with references to patents in a subsection and references to other documents in a separate subsection. In contrast, scientific citations in earlier patents are much harder to parse, because the text itself comes from optical character recognition of old documents and is harder to decipher the further in time we go back, and because bibliographic references are within the body of the text. Fortunately, the RoS files include references to science that are found in the body of the text, but of course, these are likely to contain more mistakes. At this point, it is important to note that 1976 marks a important change in the quality of the data. Before this date, most citations to science are found in the body of the text, and the RoS confidence scores are generally low. After this date, most citations to science are found in the reference list, and the RoS confidence scores are high. This implies that data cleaning efforts should concentrate on early years, say up to 1976. For Solar thermal, Geothermal, Ocean and Wind, each patent was checked until (and excluding) 1976. For Hydro, this check was done until 1987, when a reasonable share of non-false positive patents began. In Fusion, the first patent citing papers is from 1959 and is parsed correctly. This is not checked further. In Fission and Solar PV, patents clearly rely on science and tend to make citations in a clear scientific style that presumably makes parsing easier. Fission was checked until 1956 and Solar PV until 1958, because the number of patents is too high to check manually. Cleaning up earlier patents more than later patents creates a potentially important issue, as it automatically decreases the observed reliance of science of earlier periods without affecting recent periods. Thus, the result that LCET technologies rely more and more on science could be the result of the data cleaning procedure. However, our results were similar on the uncleaned data. A more serious issue is if the RoS data set, rather than the additional data cleaning, is biased towards identifying scientific references more easily in recent patents, which is plausible. This is addressed in two ways. First of all, while reading patents manually for our own data cleaning described above, specific attention is paid to "false negatives", that is, references that are in the patents but not in the RoS data. While some instance of this were found, they were rare. Second, a more rigorous approach was used and all early patents of a specific technology in a given year were read. Wind in 1875 chosen. All 52 patents were inspected, and it was confirmed that none of them had a citation to a scientific paper. Incidentally, it is striking to compare the 1875 patents with the 20th century ones.
|
88003841-86dc-4cf8-8f5a-a9e1b41682dc
| 8
|
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